2 * Copyright 2006 Juan Lang
4 * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
5 * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
6 * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
7 * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
9 * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
10 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
11 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
12 * Lesser General Public License for more details.
14 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
15 * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
16 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
20 #define NONAMELESSUNION
23 #define CERT_CHAIN_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
24 #define CERT_REVOCATION_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
26 #include "wine/debug.h"
27 #include "wine/unicode.h"
28 #include "crypt32_private.h"
30 WINE_DEFAULT_DEBUG_CHANNEL(crypt
);
31 WINE_DECLARE_DEBUG_CHANNEL(chain
);
33 #define DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS 7
35 static HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
;
37 /* This represents a subset of a certificate chain engine: it doesn't include
38 * the "hOther" store described by MSDN, because I'm not sure how that's used.
39 * It also doesn't include the "hTrust" store, because I don't yet implement
40 * CTLs or complex certificate chains.
42 typedef struct _CertificateChainEngine
48 DWORD dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
;
49 DWORD MaximumCachedCertificates
;
50 DWORD CycleDetectionModulus
;
51 } CertificateChainEngine
, *PCertificateChainEngine
;
53 static inline void CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(HCERTSTORE collection
,
54 DWORD cStores
, HCERTSTORE
*stores
)
58 for (i
= 0; i
< cStores
; i
++)
59 CertAddStoreToCollection(collection
, stores
[i
], 0, 0);
62 static inline void CRYPT_CloseStores(DWORD cStores
, HCERTSTORE
*stores
)
66 for (i
= 0; i
< cStores
; i
++)
67 CertCloseStore(stores
[i
], 0);
70 static const WCHAR rootW
[] = { 'R','o','o','t',0 };
72 /* Finds cert in store by comparing the cert's hashes. */
73 static PCCERT_CONTEXT
CRYPT_FindCertInStore(HCERTSTORE store
,
76 PCCERT_CONTEXT matching
= NULL
;
78 DWORD size
= sizeof(hash
);
80 if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert
, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID
, hash
, &size
))
82 CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob
= { sizeof(hash
), hash
};
84 matching
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
, cert
->dwCertEncodingType
,
85 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH
, &blob
, NULL
);
90 static BOOL
CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(HCERTSTORE store
)
96 HCERTSTORE rootStore
= CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW
);
97 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
= NULL
, check
;
100 cert
= CertEnumCertificatesInStore(store
, cert
);
103 if (!(check
= CRYPT_FindCertInStore(rootStore
, cert
)))
106 CertFreeCertificateContext(check
);
108 } while (ret
&& cert
);
110 CertFreeCertificateContext(cert
);
111 CertCloseStore(rootStore
, 0);
116 HCERTCHAINENGINE
CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(HCERTSTORE root
,
117 PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig
)
119 static const WCHAR caW
[] = { 'C','A',0 };
120 static const WCHAR myW
[] = { 'M','y',0 };
121 static const WCHAR trustW
[] = { 'T','r','u','s','t',0 };
122 PCertificateChainEngine engine
=
123 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChainEngine
));
127 HCERTSTORE worldStores
[4];
130 engine
->hRoot
= root
;
131 engine
->hWorld
= CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION
, 0, 0,
132 CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG
, NULL
);
133 worldStores
[0] = CertDuplicateStore(engine
->hRoot
);
134 worldStores
[1] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, caW
);
135 worldStores
[2] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, myW
);
136 worldStores
[3] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, trustW
);
137 CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine
->hWorld
,
138 sizeof(worldStores
) / sizeof(worldStores
[0]), worldStores
);
139 CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine
->hWorld
,
140 pConfig
->cAdditionalStore
, pConfig
->rghAdditionalStore
);
141 CRYPT_CloseStores(sizeof(worldStores
) / sizeof(worldStores
[0]),
143 engine
->dwFlags
= pConfig
->dwFlags
;
144 engine
->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
= pConfig
->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
;
145 engine
->MaximumCachedCertificates
=
146 pConfig
->MaximumCachedCertificates
;
147 if (pConfig
->CycleDetectionModulus
)
148 engine
->CycleDetectionModulus
= pConfig
->CycleDetectionModulus
;
150 engine
->CycleDetectionModulus
= DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS
;
155 BOOL WINAPI
CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig
,
156 HCERTCHAINENGINE
*phChainEngine
)
160 TRACE("(%p, %p)\n", pConfig
, phChainEngine
);
162 if (pConfig
->cbSize
!= sizeof(*pConfig
))
164 SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG
);
167 *phChainEngine
= NULL
;
168 ret
= CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(pConfig
->hRestrictedRoot
);
172 HCERTCHAINENGINE engine
;
174 if (pConfig
->hRestrictedRoot
)
175 root
= CertDuplicateStore(pConfig
->hRestrictedRoot
);
177 root
= CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW
);
178 engine
= CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(root
, pConfig
);
181 *phChainEngine
= engine
;
190 VOID WINAPI
CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine
)
192 PCertificateChainEngine engine
= (PCertificateChainEngine
)hChainEngine
;
194 TRACE("(%p)\n", hChainEngine
);
196 if (engine
&& InterlockedDecrement(&engine
->ref
) == 0)
198 CertCloseStore(engine
->hWorld
, 0);
199 CertCloseStore(engine
->hRoot
, 0);
200 CryptMemFree(engine
);
204 static HCERTCHAINENGINE
CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine(void)
206 if (!CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
)
208 CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG config
= { 0 };
209 HCERTCHAINENGINE engine
;
211 config
.cbSize
= sizeof(config
);
212 CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(&config
, &engine
);
213 InterlockedCompareExchangePointer(&CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
, engine
,
215 if (CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
!= engine
)
216 CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(engine
);
218 return CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
;
221 void default_chain_engine_free(void)
223 CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
);
226 typedef struct _CertificateChain
228 CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT context
;
231 } CertificateChain
, *PCertificateChain
;
233 static inline BOOL
CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
)
235 return CertCompareCertificateName(cert
->dwCertEncodingType
,
236 &cert
->pCertInfo
->Subject
, &cert
->pCertInfo
->Issuer
);
239 static void CRYPT_FreeChainElement(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
)
241 CertFreeCertificateContext(element
->pCertContext
);
242 CryptMemFree(element
);
245 static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
)
247 DWORD i
, j
, cyclicCertIndex
= 0;
249 /* O(n^2) - I don't think there's a faster way */
250 for (i
= 0; !cyclicCertIndex
&& i
< chain
->cElement
; i
++)
251 for (j
= i
+ 1; !cyclicCertIndex
&& j
< chain
->cElement
; j
++)
252 if (CertCompareCertificate(X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
253 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
,
254 chain
->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
))
258 chain
->rgpElement
[cyclicCertIndex
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
259 |= CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
| CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
260 /* Release remaining certs */
261 for (i
= cyclicCertIndex
+ 1; i
< chain
->cElement
; i
++)
262 CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain
->rgpElement
[i
]);
264 chain
->cElement
= cyclicCertIndex
+ 1;
268 /* Checks whether the chain is cyclic by examining the last element's status */
269 static inline BOOL
CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
*chain
)
272 return chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
273 & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
;
278 static inline void CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(CERT_TRUST_STATUS
*chainStatus
,
279 const CERT_TRUST_STATUS
*elementStatus
)
281 /* Any error that applies to an element also applies to a chain.. */
282 chainStatus
->dwErrorStatus
|= elementStatus
->dwErrorStatus
;
283 /* but the bottom nibble of an element's info status doesn't apply to the
286 chainStatus
->dwInfoStatus
|= (elementStatus
->dwInfoStatus
& 0xfffffff0);
289 static BOOL
CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine
*engine
,
290 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, DWORD subjectInfoStatus
)
293 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
297 if (!chain
->cElement
)
298 chain
->rgpElement
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
300 chain
->rgpElement
= CryptMemRealloc(chain
->rgpElement
,
301 (chain
->cElement
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
302 if (chain
->rgpElement
)
304 chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
++] = element
;
305 memset(element
, 0, sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
306 element
->cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
);
307 element
->pCertContext
= CertDuplicateCertificateContext(cert
);
308 if (chain
->cElement
> 1)
309 chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 2]->TrustStatus
.dwInfoStatus
311 /* FIXME: initialize the rest of element */
312 if (!(chain
->cElement
% engine
->CycleDetectionModulus
))
314 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(chain
);
315 /* Reinitialize the element pointer in case the chain is
316 * cyclic, in which case the chain is truncated.
318 element
= chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1];
320 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain
->TrustStatus
,
321 &element
->TrustStatus
);
325 CryptMemFree(element
);
330 static void CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
)
334 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->cElement
; i
++)
335 CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain
->rgpElement
[i
]);
336 CryptMemFree(chain
->rgpElement
);
340 static void CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(HCERTSTORE hRoot
,
341 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement
)
343 PCCERT_CONTEXT trustedRoot
= CRYPT_FindCertInStore(hRoot
,
344 rootElement
->pCertContext
);
347 rootElement
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
348 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
;
350 CertFreeCertificateContext(trustedRoot
);
353 static void CRYPT_CheckRootCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hRoot
,
354 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement
)
356 PCCERT_CONTEXT root
= rootElement
->pCertContext
;
358 if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, root
->dwCertEncodingType
,
359 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT
, (void *)root
,
360 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT
, (void *)root
, 0, NULL
))
362 TRACE_(chain
)("Last certificate's signature is invalid\n");
363 rootElement
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
364 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
;
366 CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(hRoot
, rootElement
);
369 /* Decodes a cert's basic constraints extension (either szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
370 * or szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, whichever is present) into a
371 * CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO. If it neither extension is present, sets
372 * constraints->fCA to defaultIfNotSpecified.
373 * Returns FALSE if the extension is present but couldn't be decoded.
375 static BOOL
CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
,
376 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO
*constraints
, BOOL defaultIfNotSpecified
)
379 PCERT_EXTENSION ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
,
380 cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
);
382 constraints
->fPathLenConstraint
= FALSE
;
385 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*info
;
388 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
,
389 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
,
393 if (info
->SubjectType
.cbData
== 1)
395 info
->SubjectType
.pbData
[0] & CERT_CA_SUBJECT_FLAG
;
401 ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
,
402 cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
);
405 DWORD size
= sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO
);
407 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
408 szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
409 0, NULL
, constraints
, &size
);
412 constraints
->fCA
= defaultIfNotSpecified
;
417 /* Checks element's basic constraints to see if it can act as a CA, with
418 * remainingCAs CAs left in this chain. In general, a cert must include the
419 * basic constraints extension, with the CA flag asserted, in order to be
420 * allowed to be a CA. A V1 or V2 cert, which has no extensions, is also
421 * allowed to be a CA if it's installed locally (in the engine's world store.)
422 * This matches the expected usage in RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.9: a conforming
423 * CA MUST include the basic constraints extension in all certificates that are
424 * used to validate digital signatures on certificates. It also matches
425 * section 6.1.4(k): "If a certificate is a v1 or v2 certificate, then the
426 * application MUST either verify that the certificate is a CA certificate
427 * through out-of-band means or reject the certificate." Rejecting the
428 * certificate prohibits a large number of commonly used certificates, so
429 * accepting locally installed ones is a compromise.
430 * Root certificates are also allowed to be CAs even without a basic
431 * constraints extension. This is implied by RFC 5280, section 6.1: the
432 * root of a certificate chain's only requirement is that it was used to issue
433 * the next certificate in the chain.
434 * Updates chainConstraints with the element's constraints, if:
435 * 1. chainConstraints doesn't have a path length constraint, or
436 * 2. element's path length constraint is smaller than chainConstraints's
437 * Sets *pathLengthConstraintViolated to TRUE if a path length violation
439 * Returns TRUE if the element can be a CA, and the length of the remaining
442 static BOOL
CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(PCertificateChainEngine engine
,
443 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO
*chainConstraints
,
444 DWORD remainingCAs
, BOOL isRoot
, BOOL
*pathLengthConstraintViolated
)
446 BOOL validBasicConstraints
, implicitCA
= FALSE
;
447 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints
;
451 else if (cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
== CERT_V1
||
452 cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
== CERT_V2
)
455 DWORD size
= sizeof(hash
);
457 if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert
, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID
,
460 CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob
= { sizeof(hash
), hash
};
461 PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert
= CertFindCertificateInStore(
462 engine
->hWorld
, cert
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH
,
467 CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert
);
472 if ((validBasicConstraints
= CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(cert
,
473 &constraints
, implicitCA
)))
475 chainConstraints
->fCA
= constraints
.fCA
;
476 if (!constraints
.fCA
)
478 TRACE_(chain
)("chain element %d can't be a CA\n", remainingCAs
+ 1);
479 validBasicConstraints
= FALSE
;
481 else if (constraints
.fPathLenConstraint
)
483 /* If the element has path length constraints, they apply to the
484 * entire remaining chain.
486 if (!chainConstraints
->fPathLenConstraint
||
487 constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
<
488 chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
)
490 TRACE_(chain
)("setting path length constraint to %d\n",
491 chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
);
492 chainConstraints
->fPathLenConstraint
= TRUE
;
493 chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
=
494 constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
;
498 if (chainConstraints
->fPathLenConstraint
&&
499 remainingCAs
> chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
)
501 TRACE_(chain
)("remaining CAs %d exceed max path length %d\n",
502 remainingCAs
, chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
);
503 validBasicConstraints
= FALSE
;
504 *pathLengthConstraintViolated
= TRUE
;
506 return validBasicConstraints
;
509 static BOOL
url_matches(LPCWSTR constraint
, LPCWSTR name
,
510 DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
514 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint
), debugstr_w(name
));
517 *trustErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
520 else if (constraint
[0] == '.')
522 if (lstrlenW(name
) > lstrlenW(constraint
))
523 match
= !lstrcmpiW(name
+ lstrlenW(name
) - lstrlenW(constraint
),
527 match
= !lstrcmpiW(constraint
, name
);
531 static BOOL
rfc822_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint
, LPCWSTR name
,
532 DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
537 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint
), debugstr_w(name
));
540 *trustErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
543 else if ((at
= strchrW(constraint
, '@')))
544 match
= !lstrcmpiW(constraint
, name
);
547 if ((at
= strchrW(name
, '@')))
548 match
= url_matches(constraint
, at
+ 1, trustErrorStatus
);
550 match
= !lstrcmpiW(constraint
, name
);
555 static BOOL
dns_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint
, LPCWSTR name
,
556 DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
560 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint
), debugstr_w(name
));
563 *trustErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
566 else if (lstrlenW(name
) >= lstrlenW(constraint
))
567 match
= !lstrcmpiW(name
+ lstrlenW(name
) - lstrlenW(constraint
),
569 /* else: name is too short, no match */
574 static BOOL
ip_address_matches(const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB
*constraint
,
575 const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB
*name
, DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
579 TRACE("(%d, %p), (%d, %p)\n", constraint
->cbData
, constraint
->pbData
,
580 name
->cbData
, name
->pbData
);
582 /* RFC5280, section 4.2.1.10, iPAddress syntax: either 8 or 32 bytes, for
583 * IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, respectively.
585 if (constraint
->cbData
!= sizeof(DWORD
) * 2 && constraint
->cbData
!= 32)
586 *trustErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
587 else if (name
->cbData
== sizeof(DWORD
) &&
588 constraint
->cbData
== sizeof(DWORD
) * 2)
590 DWORD subnet
, mask
, addr
;
592 memcpy(&subnet
, constraint
->pbData
, sizeof(subnet
));
593 memcpy(&mask
, constraint
->pbData
+ sizeof(subnet
), sizeof(mask
));
594 memcpy(&addr
, name
->pbData
, sizeof(addr
));
595 /* These are really in big-endian order, but for equality matching we
596 * don't need to swap to host order
598 match
= (subnet
& mask
) == (addr
& mask
);
600 else if (name
->cbData
== 16 && constraint
->cbData
== 32)
602 const BYTE
*subnet
, *mask
, *addr
;
605 subnet
= constraint
->pbData
;
606 mask
= constraint
->pbData
+ 16;
609 for (i
= 0; match
&& i
< 16; i
++)
610 if ((subnet
[i
] & mask
[i
]) != (addr
[i
] & mask
[i
]))
613 /* else: name is wrong size, no match */
618 static void CRYPT_FindMatchingNameEntry(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY
*constraint
,
619 const CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO
*subjectName
, DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
,
620 DWORD errorIfFound
, DWORD errorIfNotFound
)
625 for (i
= 0; i
< subjectName
->cAltEntry
; i
++)
627 if (subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].dwAltNameChoice
==
628 constraint
->dwAltNameChoice
)
630 switch (constraint
->dwAltNameChoice
)
632 case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME
:
633 match
= rfc822_name_matches(constraint
->u
.pwszURL
,
634 subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.pwszURL
, trustErrorStatus
);
636 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME
:
637 match
= dns_name_matches(constraint
->u
.pwszURL
,
638 subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.pwszURL
, trustErrorStatus
);
640 case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL
:
641 match
= url_matches(constraint
->u
.pwszURL
,
642 subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.pwszURL
, trustErrorStatus
);
644 case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS
:
645 match
= ip_address_matches(&constraint
->u
.IPAddress
,
646 &subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.IPAddress
, trustErrorStatus
);
648 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME
:
650 ERR("name choice %d unsupported in this context\n",
651 constraint
->dwAltNameChoice
);
653 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
657 *trustErrorStatus
|= match
? errorIfFound
: errorIfNotFound
;
660 static inline PCERT_EXTENSION
get_subject_alt_name_ext(const CERT_INFO
*cert
)
664 ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2
,
665 cert
->cExtension
, cert
->rgExtension
);
667 ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
,
668 cert
->cExtension
, cert
->rgExtension
);
672 static void CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(
673 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*nameConstraints
, const CERT_INFO
*cert
,
674 DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
676 /* If there aren't any existing constraints, don't bother checking */
677 if (nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
|| nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
)
679 CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
= get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert
);
683 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO
*subjectName
;
686 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME
,
687 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
688 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
689 &subjectName
, &size
))
693 for (i
= 0; i
< nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
; i
++)
694 CRYPT_FindMatchingNameEntry(
695 &nameConstraints
->rgExcludedSubtree
[i
].Base
, subjectName
,
697 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
, 0);
698 for (i
= 0; i
< nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
; i
++)
699 CRYPT_FindMatchingNameEntry(
700 &nameConstraints
->rgPermittedSubtree
[i
].Base
, subjectName
,
702 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
);
703 LocalFree(subjectName
);
707 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION
|
708 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
712 if (nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
)
714 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_DEFINED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
|
715 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
716 if (nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
)
718 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
723 /* Gets cert's name constraints, if any. Free with LocalFree. */
724 static CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(CERT_INFO
*cert
)
726 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*info
= NULL
;
730 if ((ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
, cert
->cExtension
,
735 CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
,
736 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
737 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &info
,
743 static BOOL
CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*info
)
748 /* Check that none of the constraints specifies a minimum or a maximum.
749 * See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
750 * "Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with
751 * any name forms, thus, the minimum MUST be zero, and maximum MUST be
752 * absent. However, if an application encounters a critical name
753 * constraints extension that specifies other values for minimum or
754 * maximum for a name form that appears in a subsequent certificate, the
755 * application MUST either process these fields or reject the
757 * Since it gives no guidance as to how to process these fields, we
758 * reject any name constraint that contains them.
760 for (i
= 0; ret
&& i
< info
->cPermittedSubtree
; i
++)
761 if (info
->rgPermittedSubtree
[i
].dwMinimum
||
762 info
->rgPermittedSubtree
[i
].fMaximum
)
764 TRACE_(chain
)("found a minimum or maximum in permitted subtrees\n");
767 for (i
= 0; ret
&& i
< info
->cExcludedSubtree
; i
++)
768 if (info
->rgExcludedSubtree
[i
].dwMinimum
||
769 info
->rgExcludedSubtree
[i
].fMaximum
)
771 TRACE_(chain
)("found a minimum or maximum in excluded subtrees\n");
777 static void CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
)
781 /* Microsoft's implementation appears to violate RFC 3280: according to
782 * MSDN, the various CERT_TRUST_*_NAME_CONSTRAINT errors are set if a CA's
783 * name constraint is violated in the end cert. According to RFC 3280,
784 * the constraints should be checked against every subsequent certificate
785 * in the chain, not just the end cert.
786 * Microsoft's implementation also sets the name constraint errors on the
787 * certs whose constraints were violated, not on the certs that violated
789 * In order to be error-compatible with Microsoft's implementation, while
790 * still adhering to RFC 3280, I use a O(n ^ 2) algorithm to check name
793 for (i
= chain
->cElement
- 1; i
> 0; i
--)
795 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*nameConstraints
;
797 if ((nameConstraints
= CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(
798 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
)))
800 if (!CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(nameConstraints
))
801 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
802 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
805 for (j
= i
- 1; j
>= 0; j
--)
807 DWORD errorStatus
= 0;
809 /* According to RFC 3280, self-signed certs don't have name
810 * constraints checked unless they're the end cert.
812 if (j
== 0 || !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
813 chain
->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
))
815 CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(nameConstraints
,
816 chain
->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
,
819 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
822 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwInfoStatus
|=
823 CERT_TRUST_HAS_VALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
827 LocalFree(nameConstraints
);
832 static LPWSTR
name_value_to_str(const CERT_NAME_BLOB
*name
)
834 DWORD len
= cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, 0, name
,
835 CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR
, NULL
, 0);
840 str
= CryptMemAlloc(len
* sizeof(WCHAR
));
842 cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, 0, name
,
843 CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR
, str
, len
);
848 static void dump_alt_name_entry(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY
*entry
)
852 switch (entry
->dwAltNameChoice
)
854 case CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME
:
855 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME, oid = %s\n",
856 debugstr_a(entry
->u
.pOtherName
->pszObjId
));
858 case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME
:
859 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME: %s\n",
860 debugstr_w(entry
->u
.pwszRfc822Name
));
862 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME
:
863 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME: %s\n",
864 debugstr_w(entry
->u
.pwszDNSName
));
866 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME
:
867 str
= name_value_to_str(&entry
->u
.DirectoryName
);
868 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME: %s\n", debugstr_w(str
));
871 case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL
:
872 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_URL: %s\n", debugstr_w(entry
->u
.pwszURL
));
874 case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS
:
875 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS: %d bytes\n",
876 entry
->u
.IPAddress
.cbData
);
878 case CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID
:
879 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID: %s\n",
880 debugstr_a(entry
->u
.pszRegisteredID
));
883 TRACE_(chain
)("dwAltNameChoice = %d\n", entry
->dwAltNameChoice
);
887 static void dump_alt_name(LPCSTR type
, const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
889 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO
*name
;
892 TRACE_(chain
)("%s:\n", type
);
893 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME
,
894 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
895 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &name
, &size
))
899 TRACE_(chain
)("%d alt name entries:\n", name
->cAltEntry
);
900 for (i
= 0; i
< name
->cAltEntry
; i
++)
901 dump_alt_name_entry(&name
->rgAltEntry
[i
]);
906 static void dump_basic_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
908 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*info
;
911 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
,
912 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
,
915 TRACE_(chain
)("SubjectType: %02x\n", info
->SubjectType
.pbData
[0]);
916 TRACE_(chain
)("%s path length constraint\n",
917 info
->fPathLenConstraint
? "has" : "doesn't have");
918 TRACE_(chain
)("path length=%d\n", info
->dwPathLenConstraint
);
923 static void dump_basic_constraints2(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
925 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints
;
926 DWORD size
= sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO
);
928 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
929 szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
930 0, NULL
, &constraints
, &size
))
932 TRACE_(chain
)("basic constraints:\n");
933 TRACE_(chain
)("can%s be a CA\n", constraints
.fCA
? "" : "not");
934 TRACE_(chain
)("%s path length constraint\n",
935 constraints
.fPathLenConstraint
? "has" : "doesn't have");
936 TRACE_(chain
)("path length=%d\n", constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
);
940 static void dump_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
942 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage
;
943 DWORD size
= sizeof(usage
);
945 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_BITS
, ext
->Value
.pbData
,
946 ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &usage
, &size
))
948 #define trace_usage_bit(bits, bit) \
949 if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
952 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE_KEY_USAGE
);
953 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_NON_REPUDIATION_KEY_USAGE
);
954 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE
);
955 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE
);
956 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_KEY_AGREEMENT_KEY_USAGE
);
957 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE
);
958 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_CRL_SIGN_KEY_USAGE
);
959 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_ENCIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE
);
961 #undef trace_usage_bit
962 if (usage
.cbData
> 1 && usage
.pbData
[1] & CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE
)
963 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE\n");
967 static void dump_general_subtree(const CERT_GENERAL_SUBTREE
*subtree
)
969 dump_alt_name_entry(&subtree
->Base
);
970 TRACE_(chain
)("dwMinimum = %d, fMaximum = %d, dwMaximum = %d\n",
971 subtree
->dwMinimum
, subtree
->fMaximum
, subtree
->dwMaximum
);
974 static void dump_name_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
976 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*nameConstraints
;
979 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
,
980 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
981 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &nameConstraints
,
986 TRACE_(chain
)("%d permitted subtrees:\n",
987 nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
);
988 for (i
= 0; i
< nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
; i
++)
989 dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints
->rgPermittedSubtree
[i
]);
990 TRACE_(chain
)("%d excluded subtrees:\n",
991 nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
);
992 for (i
= 0; i
< nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
; i
++)
993 dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints
->rgExcludedSubtree
[i
]);
994 LocalFree(nameConstraints
);
998 static void dump_cert_policies(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1000 CERT_POLICIES_INFO
*policies
;
1003 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_CERT_POLICIES
,
1004 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
, NULL
,
1009 TRACE_(chain
)("%d policies:\n", policies
->cPolicyInfo
);
1010 for (i
= 0; i
< policies
->cPolicyInfo
; i
++)
1012 TRACE_(chain
)("policy identifier: %s\n",
1013 debugstr_a(policies
->rgPolicyInfo
[i
].pszPolicyIdentifier
));
1014 TRACE_(chain
)("%d policy qualifiers:\n",
1015 policies
->rgPolicyInfo
[i
].cPolicyQualifier
);
1016 for (j
= 0; j
< policies
->rgPolicyInfo
[i
].cPolicyQualifier
; j
++)
1017 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", debugstr_a(
1018 policies
->rgPolicyInfo
[i
].rgPolicyQualifier
[j
].
1019 pszPolicyQualifierId
));
1021 LocalFree(policies
);
1025 static void dump_enhanced_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1027 CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE
*usage
;
1030 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
,
1031 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
, NULL
,
1036 TRACE_(chain
)("%d usages:\n", usage
->cUsageIdentifier
);
1037 for (i
= 0; i
< usage
->cUsageIdentifier
; i
++)
1038 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", usage
->rgpszUsageIdentifier
[i
]);
1043 static void dump_netscape_cert_type(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1045 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage
;
1046 DWORD size
= sizeof(usage
);
1048 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_BITS
, ext
->Value
.pbData
,
1049 ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &usage
, &size
))
1051 #define trace_cert_type_bit(bits, bit) \
1052 if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
1055 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0],
1056 NETSCAPE_SSL_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT_TYPE
);
1057 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0],
1058 NETSCAPE_SSL_SERVER_AUTH_CERT_TYPE
);
1059 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CERT_TYPE
);
1060 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CERT_TYPE
);
1061 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SSL_CA_CERT_TYPE
);
1062 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CA_CERT_TYPE
);
1063 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CA_CERT_TYPE
);
1065 #undef trace_cert_type_bit
1069 static void dump_extension(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1071 TRACE_(chain
)("%s (%scritical)\n", debugstr_a(ext
->pszObjId
),
1072 ext
->fCritical
? "" : "not ");
1073 if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
))
1074 dump_alt_name("subject alt name", ext
);
1075 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME
))
1076 dump_alt_name("issuer alt name", ext
);
1077 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
))
1078 dump_basic_constraints(ext
);
1079 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_KEY_USAGE
))
1080 dump_key_usage(ext
);
1081 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2
))
1082 dump_alt_name("subject alt name 2", ext
);
1083 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME2
))
1084 dump_alt_name("issuer alt name 2", ext
);
1085 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
))
1086 dump_basic_constraints2(ext
);
1087 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
))
1088 dump_name_constraints(ext
);
1089 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_CERT_POLICIES
))
1090 dump_cert_policies(ext
);
1091 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
))
1092 dump_enhanced_key_usage(ext
);
1093 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_NETSCAPE_CERT_TYPE
))
1094 dump_netscape_cert_type(ext
);
1097 static LPCWSTR
filetime_to_str(const FILETIME
*time
)
1099 static WCHAR date
[80];
1100 WCHAR dateFmt
[80]; /* sufficient for all versions of LOCALE_SSHORTDATE */
1103 if (!time
) return NULL
;
1105 GetLocaleInfoW(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT
, LOCALE_SSHORTDATE
, dateFmt
,
1106 sizeof(dateFmt
) / sizeof(dateFmt
[0]));
1107 FileTimeToSystemTime(time
, &sysTime
);
1108 GetDateFormatW(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT
, 0, &sysTime
, dateFmt
, date
,
1109 sizeof(date
) / sizeof(date
[0]));
1113 static void dump_element(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
)
1118 TRACE_(chain
)("%p: version %d\n", cert
, cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
);
1119 len
= CertGetNameStringW(cert
, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE
,
1120 CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG
, NULL
, NULL
, 0);
1121 name
= CryptMemAlloc(len
* sizeof(WCHAR
));
1124 CertGetNameStringW(cert
, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE
,
1125 CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG
, NULL
, name
, len
);
1126 TRACE_(chain
)("issued by %s\n", debugstr_w(name
));
1129 len
= CertGetNameStringW(cert
, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE
, 0, NULL
,
1131 name
= CryptMemAlloc(len
* sizeof(WCHAR
));
1134 CertGetNameStringW(cert
, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE
, 0, NULL
,
1136 TRACE_(chain
)("issued to %s\n", debugstr_w(name
));
1139 TRACE_(chain
)("valid from %s to %s\n",
1140 debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(&cert
->pCertInfo
->NotBefore
)),
1141 debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(&cert
->pCertInfo
->NotAfter
)));
1142 TRACE_(chain
)("%d extensions\n", cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
);
1143 for (i
= 0; i
< cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
; i
++)
1144 dump_extension(&cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
[i
]);
1147 static BOOL
CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(PCertificateChainEngine engine
,
1148 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, BOOL isRoot
, BOOL isCA
, DWORD index
)
1150 PCERT_EXTENSION ext
;
1154 ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_KEY_USAGE
, cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
,
1155 cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
);
1158 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage
;
1159 DWORD size
= sizeof(usage
);
1161 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert
->dwCertEncodingType
, X509_BITS
,
1162 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
1166 else if (usage
.cbData
> 2)
1168 /* The key usage extension only defines 9 bits => no more than 2
1169 * bytes are needed to encode all known usages.
1175 /* The only bit relevant to chain validation is the keyCertSign
1176 * bit, which is always in the least significant byte of the
1179 usageBits
= usage
.pbData
[usage
.cbData
- 1];
1186 /* MS appears to violate RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.3 (Key Usage)
1187 * here. Quoting the RFC:
1188 * "This [key usage] extension MUST appear in certificates that
1189 * contain public keys that are used to validate digital signatures
1190 * on other public key certificates or CRLs."
1191 * MS appears to accept certs that do not contain key usage
1192 * extensions as CA certs. V1 and V2 certificates did not have
1193 * extensions, and many root certificates are V1 certificates, so
1194 * perhaps this is prudent. On the other hand, MS also accepts V3
1195 * certs without key usage extensions. We are more restrictive:
1196 * we accept locally installed V1 or V2 certs as CA certs.
1197 * We also accept a lack of key usage extension on root certs,
1198 * which is implied in RFC 5280, section 6.1: the trust anchor's
1199 * only requirement is that it was used to issue the next
1200 * certificate in the chain.
1204 else if (cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
== CERT_V1
||
1205 cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
== CERT_V2
)
1207 PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert
= CRYPT_FindCertInStore(
1208 engine
->hWorld
, cert
);
1210 ret
= localCert
!= NULL
;
1211 CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert
);
1216 WARN_(chain
)("no key usage extension on a CA cert\n");
1220 if (!(usageBits
& CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE
))
1222 WARN_(chain
)("keyCertSign not asserted on a CA cert\n");
1231 if (ext
&& (usageBits
& CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE
))
1233 WARN_(chain
)("keyCertSign asserted on a non-CA cert\n");
1242 static BOOL
CRYPT_ExtendedKeyUsageValidForCA(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
)
1244 PCERT_EXTENSION ext
;
1247 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.12: "In general, this extension will only
1248 * appear in end entity certificates." And, "If a certificate contains
1249 * both a key usage extension and an extended key usage extension, then
1250 * both extensions MUST be processed independently and the certificate MUST
1251 * only be used for a purpose consistent with both extensions." This seems
1252 * to imply that it should be checked if present, and ignored if not.
1253 * Unfortunately some CAs, e.g. the Thawte SGC CA, don't include the code
1254 * signing extended key usage, whereas they do include the keyCertSign
1255 * key usage. Thus, when checking for a CA, we only require the
1256 * code signing extended key usage if the extended key usage is critical.
1258 ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
,
1259 cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
);
1260 if (ext
&& ext
->fCritical
)
1262 CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE
*usage
;
1265 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert
->dwCertEncodingType
,
1266 X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
1267 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
, NULL
, &usage
, &size
);
1272 /* Explicitly require the code signing extended key usage for a CA
1273 * with an extended key usage extension. That is, don't assume
1274 * a cert is allowed to be a CA if it specifies the
1275 * anyExtendedKeyUsage usage oid. See again RFC 5280, section
1276 * 4.2.1.12: "Applications that require the presence of a
1277 * particular purpose MAY reject certificates that include the
1278 * anyExtendedKeyUsage OID but not the particular OID expected for
1282 for (i
= 0; !ret
&& i
< usage
->cUsageIdentifier
; i
++)
1283 if (!strcmp(usage
->rgpszUsageIdentifier
[i
],
1284 szOID_PKIX_KP_CODE_SIGNING
))
1294 static BOOL
CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
)
1299 for (i
= 0; ret
&& i
< cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
; i
++)
1301 if (cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
[i
].fCritical
)
1303 LPCSTR oid
= cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
[i
].pszObjId
;
1305 if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
))
1307 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
))
1309 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
))
1311 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_KEY_USAGE
))
1313 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
))
1315 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2
))
1317 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
))
1321 FIXME("unsupported critical extension %s\n",
1330 static BOOL
CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
)
1334 /* Checks whether the contents of the cert match the cert's version. */
1335 switch (cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
)
1338 /* A V1 cert may not contain unique identifiers. See RFC 5280,
1340 * "These fields MUST only appear if the version is 2 or 3 (Section
1341 * 4.1.2.1). These fields MUST NOT appear if the version is 1."
1343 if (cert
->pCertInfo
->IssuerUniqueId
.cbData
||
1344 cert
->pCertInfo
->SubjectUniqueId
.cbData
)
1346 /* A V1 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
1347 * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
1349 if (cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
)
1353 /* A V2 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
1354 * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
1356 if (cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
)
1360 /* Do nothing, all fields are allowed for V3 certs */
1363 WARN_(chain
)("invalid cert version %d\n", cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
);
1369 static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(PCertificateChainEngine engine
,
1370 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
, LPFILETIME time
)
1372 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement
= chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1];
1374 BOOL pathLengthConstraintViolated
= FALSE
;
1375 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints
= { FALSE
, FALSE
, 0 };
1377 TRACE_(chain
)("checking chain with %d elements for time %s\n",
1378 chain
->cElement
, debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(time
)));
1379 for (i
= chain
->cElement
- 1; i
>= 0; i
--)
1383 if (TRACE_ON(chain
))
1384 dump_element(chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
);
1385 if (i
== chain
->cElement
- 1)
1386 isRoot
= CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
1387 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
);
1390 if (!CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
))
1392 /* MS appears to accept certs whose versions don't match their
1393 * contents, so there isn't an appropriate error code.
1395 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1396 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION
;
1398 if (CertVerifyTimeValidity(time
,
1399 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
) != 0)
1400 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1401 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID
;
1404 /* Check the signature of the cert this issued */
1405 if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
1406 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT
,
1407 (void *)chain
->rgpElement
[i
- 1]->pCertContext
,
1408 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT
,
1409 (void *)chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
, 0, NULL
))
1410 chain
->rgpElement
[i
- 1]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1411 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
;
1412 /* Once a path length constraint has been violated, every remaining
1413 * CA cert's basic constraints is considered invalid.
1415 if (pathLengthConstraintViolated
)
1416 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1417 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
1418 else if (!CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(engine
,
1419 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
, &constraints
, i
- 1, isRoot
,
1420 &pathLengthConstraintViolated
))
1421 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1422 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
1423 else if (constraints
.fPathLenConstraint
&&
1424 constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
)
1426 /* This one's valid - decrement max length */
1427 constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
--;
1432 /* Check whether end cert has a basic constraints extension */
1433 if (!CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(
1434 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
, &constraints
, FALSE
))
1435 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1436 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
1438 if (!CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(engine
, chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
,
1439 isRoot
, constraints
.fCA
, i
))
1440 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1441 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE
;
1443 if (!CRYPT_ExtendedKeyUsageValidForCA(
1444 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
))
1445 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1446 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE
;
1447 if (CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain
))
1449 /* If the chain is cyclic, then the path length constraints
1450 * are violated, because the chain is infinitely long.
1452 pathLengthConstraintViolated
= TRUE
;
1453 chain
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1454 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN
|
1455 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
1457 /* Check whether every critical extension is supported */
1458 if (!CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(
1459 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
))
1460 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1461 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION
;
1462 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain
->TrustStatus
,
1463 &chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
);
1465 CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(chain
);
1466 if (CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(rootElement
->pCertContext
))
1468 rootElement
->TrustStatus
.dwInfoStatus
|=
1469 CERT_TRUST_IS_SELF_SIGNED
| CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1470 CRYPT_CheckRootCert(engine
->hRoot
, rootElement
);
1472 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain
->TrustStatus
, &rootElement
->TrustStatus
);
1475 static PCCERT_CONTEXT
CRYPT_GetIssuer(HCERTSTORE store
, PCCERT_CONTEXT subject
,
1476 PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer
, DWORD
*infoStatus
)
1478 PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer
= NULL
;
1479 PCERT_EXTENSION ext
;
1483 if ((ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER
,
1484 subject
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, subject
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
)))
1486 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID_INFO
*info
;
1489 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject
->dwCertEncodingType
,
1490 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
1491 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
1497 if (info
->CertIssuer
.cbData
&& info
->CertSerialNumber
.cbData
)
1499 id
.dwIdChoice
= CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER
;
1500 memcpy(&id
.u
.IssuerSerialNumber
.Issuer
, &info
->CertIssuer
,
1501 sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB
));
1502 memcpy(&id
.u
.IssuerSerialNumber
.SerialNumber
,
1503 &info
->CertSerialNumber
, sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB
));
1504 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1505 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID
, &id
,
1509 TRACE_(chain
)("issuer found by issuer/serial number\n");
1510 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1513 else if (info
->KeyId
.cbData
)
1515 id
.dwIdChoice
= CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER
;
1516 memcpy(&id
.u
.KeyId
, &info
->KeyId
, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB
));
1517 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1518 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID
, &id
,
1522 TRACE_(chain
)("issuer found by key id\n");
1523 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1529 else if ((ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER2
,
1530 subject
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, subject
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
)))
1532 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2_INFO
*info
;
1535 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject
->dwCertEncodingType
,
1536 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
1537 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
1543 if (info
->AuthorityCertIssuer
.cAltEntry
&&
1544 info
->AuthorityCertSerialNumber
.cbData
)
1546 PCERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY directoryName
= NULL
;
1549 for (i
= 0; !directoryName
&&
1550 i
< info
->AuthorityCertIssuer
.cAltEntry
; i
++)
1551 if (info
->AuthorityCertIssuer
.rgAltEntry
[i
].dwAltNameChoice
1552 == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME
)
1554 &info
->AuthorityCertIssuer
.rgAltEntry
[i
];
1557 id
.dwIdChoice
= CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER
;
1558 memcpy(&id
.u
.IssuerSerialNumber
.Issuer
,
1559 &directoryName
->u
.DirectoryName
, sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB
));
1560 memcpy(&id
.u
.IssuerSerialNumber
.SerialNumber
,
1561 &info
->AuthorityCertSerialNumber
,
1562 sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB
));
1563 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1564 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID
, &id
,
1568 TRACE_(chain
)("issuer found by directory name\n");
1569 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1573 FIXME("no supported name type in authority key id2\n");
1575 else if (info
->KeyId
.cbData
)
1577 id
.dwIdChoice
= CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER
;
1578 memcpy(&id
.u
.KeyId
, &info
->KeyId
, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB
));
1579 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1580 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID
, &id
,
1584 TRACE_(chain
)("issuer found by key id\n");
1585 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1593 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1594 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_SUBJECT_NAME
,
1595 &subject
->pCertInfo
->Issuer
, prevIssuer
);
1596 TRACE_(chain
)("issuer found by name\n");
1597 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1602 /* Builds a simple chain by finding an issuer for the last cert in the chain,
1603 * until reaching a self-signed cert, or until no issuer can be found.
1605 static BOOL
CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine
*engine
,
1606 HCERTSTORE world
, PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
)
1609 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
= chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1]->pCertContext
;
1611 while (ret
&& !CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain
) &&
1612 !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(cert
))
1614 PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer
= CRYPT_GetIssuer(world
, cert
, NULL
,
1615 &chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1]->TrustStatus
.dwInfoStatus
);
1619 ret
= CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine
, chain
, issuer
,
1620 chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1]->TrustStatus
.dwInfoStatus
);
1621 /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it to
1622 * close the enumeration that found it
1624 CertFreeCertificateContext(issuer
);
1629 TRACE_(chain
)("Couldn't find issuer, halting chain creation\n");
1630 chain
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN
;
1637 static BOOL
CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(PCertificateChainEngine engine
,
1638 HCERTSTORE world
, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, LPFILETIME pTime
,
1639 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
*ppChain
)
1642 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
;
1644 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p)\n", engine
, world
, cert
, pTime
);
1646 chain
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1649 memset(chain
, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1650 chain
->cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
);
1651 ret
= CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine
, chain
, cert
, 0);
1654 ret
= CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine
, world
, chain
);
1656 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine
, chain
, pTime
);
1660 CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain
);
1668 static BOOL
CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine
,
1669 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, LPFILETIME pTime
, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore
,
1670 PCertificateChain
*ppChain
)
1672 PCertificateChainEngine engine
= (PCertificateChainEngine
)hChainEngine
;
1673 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN simpleChain
= NULL
;
1677 world
= CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION
, 0, 0,
1678 CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG
, NULL
);
1679 CertAddStoreToCollection(world
, engine
->hWorld
, 0, 0);
1680 if (hAdditionalStore
)
1681 CertAddStoreToCollection(world
, hAdditionalStore
, 0, 0);
1682 /* FIXME: only simple chains are supported for now, as CTLs aren't
1685 if ((ret
= CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(engine
, world
, cert
, pTime
,
1688 PCertificateChain chain
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain
));
1693 chain
->world
= world
;
1694 chain
->context
.cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
);
1695 chain
->context
.TrustStatus
= simpleChain
->TrustStatus
;
1696 chain
->context
.cChain
= 1;
1697 chain
->context
.rgpChain
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1698 chain
->context
.rgpChain
[0] = simpleChain
;
1699 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
= 0;
1700 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
= NULL
;
1701 chain
->context
.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime
= FALSE
;
1702 chain
->context
.dwRevocationFreshnessTime
= 0;
1711 /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement. */
1712 static PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(
1713 const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
*chain
, DWORD iElement
)
1715 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN copy
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1719 memset(copy
, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1720 copy
->cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
);
1722 CryptMemAlloc((iElement
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
1723 if (copy
->rgpElement
)
1728 memset(copy
->rgpElement
, 0,
1729 (iElement
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
1730 for (i
= 0; ret
&& i
<= iElement
; i
++)
1732 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
=
1733 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
1737 *element
= *chain
->rgpElement
[i
];
1738 element
->pCertContext
= CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
1739 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
);
1740 /* Reset the trust status of the copied element, it'll get
1741 * rechecked after the new chain is done.
1743 memset(&element
->TrustStatus
, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS
));
1744 copy
->rgpElement
[copy
->cElement
++] = element
;
1751 for (i
= 0; i
<= iElement
; i
++)
1752 CryptMemFree(copy
->rgpElement
[i
]);
1753 CryptMemFree(copy
->rgpElement
);
1767 static void CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(PCertificateChain chain
)
1771 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
; i
++)
1772 CertFreeCertificateChain(chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[i
]);
1773 CryptMemFree(chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
);
1774 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
= 0;
1775 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
= NULL
;
1778 static void CRYPT_FreeChainContext(PCertificateChain chain
)
1782 CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain
);
1783 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->context
.cChain
; i
++)
1784 CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]);
1785 CryptMemFree(chain
->context
.rgpChain
);
1786 CertCloseStore(chain
->world
, 0);
1787 CryptMemFree(chain
);
1790 /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement of
1791 * simple chain iChain.
1793 static PCertificateChain
CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(PCertificateChain chain
,
1794 DWORD iChain
, DWORD iElement
)
1796 PCertificateChain copy
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain
));
1801 copy
->world
= CertDuplicateStore(chain
->world
);
1802 copy
->context
.cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
);
1803 /* Leave the trust status of the copied chain unset, it'll get
1804 * rechecked after the new chain is done.
1806 memset(©
->context
.TrustStatus
, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS
));
1807 copy
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
= 0;
1808 copy
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
= NULL
;
1809 copy
->context
.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime
= FALSE
;
1810 copy
->context
.dwRevocationFreshnessTime
= 0;
1811 copy
->context
.rgpChain
= CryptMemAlloc(
1812 (iChain
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1813 if (copy
->context
.rgpChain
)
1818 memset(copy
->context
.rgpChain
, 0,
1819 (iChain
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1822 for (i
= 0; ret
&& iChain
&& i
< iChain
- 1; i
++)
1824 copy
->context
.rgpChain
[i
] =
1825 CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
],
1826 chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
- 1);
1827 if (!copy
->context
.rgpChain
[i
])
1835 copy
->context
.rgpChain
[i
] =
1836 CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
],
1838 if (!copy
->context
.rgpChain
[i
])
1843 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(copy
);
1847 copy
->context
.cChain
= iChain
+ 1;
1858 static PCertificateChain
CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(
1859 HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine
, LPFILETIME pTime
, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore
,
1860 PCertificateChain chain
)
1862 PCertificateChainEngine engine
= (PCertificateChainEngine
)hChainEngine
;
1863 PCertificateChain alternate
;
1865 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine
, pTime
, hAdditionalStore
, chain
);
1867 /* Always start with the last "lower quality" chain to ensure a consistent
1868 * order of alternate creation:
1870 if (chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
)
1871 chain
= (PCertificateChain
)chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[
1872 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
- 1];
1873 /* A chain with only one element can't have any alternates */
1874 if (chain
->context
.cChain
<= 1 && chain
->context
.rgpChain
[0]->cElement
<= 1)
1878 DWORD i
, j
, infoStatus
;
1879 PCCERT_CONTEXT alternateIssuer
= NULL
;
1882 for (i
= 0; !alternateIssuer
&& i
< chain
->context
.cChain
; i
++)
1883 for (j
= 0; !alternateIssuer
&&
1884 j
< chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
- 1; j
++)
1886 PCCERT_CONTEXT subject
=
1887 chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
;
1888 PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer
= CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
1889 chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->rgpElement
[j
+ 1]->pCertContext
);
1891 alternateIssuer
= CRYPT_GetIssuer(prevIssuer
->hCertStore
,
1892 subject
, prevIssuer
, &infoStatus
);
1894 if (alternateIssuer
)
1898 alternate
= CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(chain
, i
, j
);
1901 BOOL ret
= CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine
,
1902 alternate
->context
.rgpChain
[i
], alternateIssuer
, infoStatus
);
1904 /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it
1905 * to close the enumeration that found it
1907 CertFreeCertificateContext(alternateIssuer
);
1910 ret
= CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine
, alternate
->world
,
1911 alternate
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]);
1913 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine
,
1914 alternate
->context
.rgpChain
[i
], pTime
);
1915 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&alternate
->context
.TrustStatus
,
1916 &alternate
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->TrustStatus
);
1920 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(alternate
);
1926 TRACE("%p\n", alternate
);
1930 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID 0x16
1931 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID 8
1932 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN 4
1933 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS 2
1934 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT 1
1936 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST \
1937 CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID | CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID | \
1938 CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN | CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS | \
1939 CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT
1941 #define IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(TrustStatus, bits) \
1942 (TrustStatus)->dwErrorStatus & (bits)
1944 static DWORD
CRYPT_ChainQuality(const CertificateChain
*chain
)
1946 DWORD quality
= CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST
;
1948 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
1949 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
))
1950 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT
;
1951 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
1952 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
))
1953 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
1954 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
1955 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN
))
1956 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN
;
1957 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
1958 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID
| CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED
))
1959 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID
;
1960 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
1961 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
))
1962 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID
;
1966 /* Chooses the highest quality chain among chain and its "lower quality"
1967 * alternate chains. Returns the highest quality chain, with all other
1968 * chains as lower quality chains of it.
1970 static PCertificateChain
CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(
1971 PCertificateChain chain
)
1975 /* There are always only two chains being considered: chain, and an
1976 * alternate at chain->rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]. If the alternate
1977 * has a higher quality than chain, the alternate gets assigned the lower
1978 * quality contexts, with chain taking the alternate's place among the
1979 * lower quality contexts.
1981 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
; i
++)
1983 PCertificateChain alternate
=
1984 (PCertificateChain
)chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[i
];
1986 if (CRYPT_ChainQuality(alternate
) > CRYPT_ChainQuality(chain
))
1988 alternate
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
=
1989 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
;
1990 alternate
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
=
1991 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
;
1992 alternate
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[i
] =
1993 (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
)chain
;
1994 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
= 0;
1995 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
= NULL
;
2002 static BOOL
CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(PCertificateChain chain
,
2003 const CertificateChain
*alternate
)
2007 if (chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
)
2008 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
=
2009 CryptMemRealloc(chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
,
2010 (chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
+ 1) *
2011 sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
));
2013 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
=
2014 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
));
2015 if (chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
)
2017 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[
2018 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
++] =
2019 (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
)alternate
;
2027 static PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(
2028 const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
*chain
, DWORD i
)
2031 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
= NULL
;
2033 for (j
= 0, iElement
= 0; !element
&& j
< chain
->cChain
; j
++)
2035 if (iElement
+ chain
->rgpChain
[j
]->cElement
< i
)
2036 iElement
+= chain
->rgpChain
[j
]->cElement
;
2038 element
= chain
->rgpChain
[j
]->rgpElement
[i
- iElement
];
2043 typedef struct _CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS
{
2045 CERT_USAGE_MATCH RequestedUsage
;
2046 } CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS
, *PCERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS
;
2048 static void CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain
,
2049 LPFILETIME pTime
, const CERT_CHAIN_PARA
*pChainPara
, DWORD chainFlags
)
2053 if (chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_END_CERT
)
2055 else if ((chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN
) ||
2056 (chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT
))
2060 for (i
= 0, cContext
= 0; i
< chain
->cChain
; i
++)
2062 if (i
< chain
->cChain
- 1 ||
2063 chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN
)
2064 cContext
+= chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
;
2066 cContext
+= chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
- 1;
2073 PCCERT_CONTEXT
*contexts
=
2074 CryptMemAlloc(cContext
* sizeof(PCCERT_CONTEXT
*));
2078 DWORD i
, j
, iContext
, revocationFlags
;
2079 CERT_REVOCATION_PARA revocationPara
= { sizeof(revocationPara
), 0 };
2080 CERT_REVOCATION_STATUS revocationStatus
=
2081 { sizeof(revocationStatus
), 0 };
2084 for (i
= 0, iContext
= 0; iContext
< cContext
&& i
< chain
->cChain
;
2087 for (j
= 0; iContext
< cContext
&&
2088 j
< chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
; j
++)
2089 contexts
[iContext
++] =
2090 chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
;
2092 revocationFlags
= CERT_VERIFY_REV_CHAIN_FLAG
;
2093 if (chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY
)
2094 revocationFlags
|= CERT_VERIFY_CACHE_ONLY_BASED_REVOCATION
;
2095 if (chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT
)
2096 revocationFlags
|= CERT_VERIFY_REV_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT_FLAG
;
2097 revocationPara
.pftTimeToUse
= pTime
;
2098 if (pChainPara
->cbSize
== sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA
))
2100 revocationPara
.dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
=
2101 pChainPara
->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
;
2102 revocationPara
.fCheckFreshnessTime
=
2103 pChainPara
->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime
;
2104 revocationPara
.dwFreshnessTime
=
2105 pChainPara
->dwRevocationFreshnessTime
;
2107 ret
= CertVerifyRevocation(X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
2108 CERT_CONTEXT_REVOCATION_TYPE
, cContext
, (void **)contexts
,
2109 revocationFlags
, &revocationPara
, &revocationStatus
);
2112 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
=
2113 CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(chain
, revocationStatus
.dwIndex
);
2116 switch (revocationStatus
.dwError
)
2118 case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK
:
2119 case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_DLL
:
2120 case CRYPT_E_NOT_IN_REVOCATION_DATABASE
:
2121 error
= CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN
;
2123 case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE
:
2124 error
= CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION
;
2126 case CRYPT_E_REVOKED
:
2127 error
= CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED
;
2130 WARN("unmapped error %08x\n", revocationStatus
.dwError
);
2135 /* FIXME: set element's pRevocationInfo member */
2136 element
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|= error
;
2138 chain
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|= error
;
2140 CryptMemFree(contexts
);
2145 static void dump_usage_match(LPCSTR name
, const CERT_USAGE_MATCH
*usageMatch
)
2149 TRACE_(chain
)("%s: %s\n", name
,
2150 usageMatch
->dwType
== USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND
? "AND" : "OR");
2151 for (i
= 0; i
< usageMatch
->Usage
.cUsageIdentifier
; i
++)
2152 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", usageMatch
->Usage
.rgpszUsageIdentifier
[i
]);
2155 static void dump_chain_para(const CERT_CHAIN_PARA
*pChainPara
)
2157 TRACE_(chain
)("%d\n", pChainPara
->cbSize
);
2158 if (pChainPara
->cbSize
>= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS
))
2159 dump_usage_match("RequestedUsage", &pChainPara
->RequestedUsage
);
2160 if (pChainPara
->cbSize
>= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA
))
2162 dump_usage_match("RequestedIssuancePolicy",
2163 &pChainPara
->RequestedIssuancePolicy
);
2164 TRACE_(chain
)("%d\n", pChainPara
->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
);
2165 TRACE_(chain
)("%d\n", pChainPara
->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime
);
2166 TRACE_(chain
)("%d\n", pChainPara
->dwRevocationFreshnessTime
);
2170 BOOL WINAPI
CertGetCertificateChain(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine
,
2171 PCCERT_CONTEXT pCertContext
, LPFILETIME pTime
, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore
,
2172 PCERT_CHAIN_PARA pChainPara
, DWORD dwFlags
, LPVOID pvReserved
,
2173 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
* ppChainContext
)
2176 PCertificateChain chain
= NULL
;
2178 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p, %p, %08x, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine
, pCertContext
,
2179 pTime
, hAdditionalStore
, pChainPara
, dwFlags
, pvReserved
, ppChainContext
);
2182 *ppChainContext
= NULL
;
2185 SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG
);
2188 if (!pCertContext
->pCertInfo
->SignatureAlgorithm
.pszObjId
)
2190 SetLastError(ERROR_INVALID_DATA
);
2195 hChainEngine
= CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine();
2196 if (TRACE_ON(chain
))
2197 dump_chain_para(pChainPara
);
2198 /* FIXME: what about HCCE_LOCAL_MACHINE? */
2199 ret
= CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(hChainEngine
, pCertContext
, pTime
,
2200 hAdditionalStore
, &chain
);
2203 PCertificateChain alternate
= NULL
;
2204 PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChain
;
2207 alternate
= CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(hChainEngine
,
2208 pTime
, hAdditionalStore
, chain
);
2210 /* Alternate contexts are added as "lower quality" contexts of
2211 * chain, to avoid loops in alternate chain creation.
2212 * The highest-quality chain is chosen at the end.
2215 ret
= CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(chain
, alternate
);
2216 } while (ret
&& alternate
);
2217 chain
= CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(chain
);
2218 if (!(dwFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_RETURN_LOWER_QUALITY_CONTEXTS
))
2219 CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain
);
2220 pChain
= (PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
)chain
;
2221 CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(pChain
, pTime
, pChainPara
, dwFlags
);
2223 *ppChainContext
= pChain
;
2225 CertFreeCertificateChain(pChain
);
2227 TRACE("returning %d\n", ret
);
2231 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT WINAPI
CertDuplicateCertificateChain(
2232 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
)
2234 PCertificateChain chain
= (PCertificateChain
)pChainContext
;
2236 TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext
);
2239 InterlockedIncrement(&chain
->ref
);
2240 return pChainContext
;
2243 VOID WINAPI
CertFreeCertificateChain(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
)
2245 PCertificateChain chain
= (PCertificateChain
)pChainContext
;
2247 TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext
);
2251 if (InterlockedDecrement(&chain
->ref
) == 0)
2252 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(chain
);
2256 static void find_element_with_error(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain
, DWORD error
,
2257 LONG
*iChain
, LONG
*iElement
)
2261 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->cChain
; i
++)
2262 for (j
= 0; j
< chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
; j
++)
2263 if (chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->rgpElement
[j
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2272 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_base_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2273 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2274 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2276 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
2277 if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2278 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
)
2280 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE
;
2281 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2282 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2283 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2285 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2286 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
)
2288 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT
;
2289 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2290 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2291 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2293 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
& CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
)
2295 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_CHAINING
;
2296 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
, CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
,
2297 &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
, &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2298 /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
2299 pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
2302 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= NO_ERROR
;
2306 static BYTE msTestPubKey1
[] = {
2307 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x81,0x55,0x22,0xb9,0x8a,0xa4,0x6f,0xed,0xd6,0xe7,0xd9,
2308 0x66,0x0f,0x55,0xbc,0xd7,0xcd,0xd5,0xbc,0x4e,0x40,0x02,0x21,0xa2,0xb1,0xf7,
2309 0x87,0x30,0x85,0x5e,0xd2,0xf2,0x44,0xb9,0xdc,0x9b,0x75,0xb6,0xfb,0x46,0x5f,
2310 0x42,0xb6,0x9d,0x23,0x36,0x0b,0xde,0x54,0x0f,0xcd,0xbd,0x1f,0x99,0x2a,0x10,
2311 0x58,0x11,0xcb,0x40,0xcb,0xb5,0xa7,0x41,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2312 static BYTE msTestPubKey2
[] = {
2313 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x9c,0x50,0x05,0x1d,0xe2,0x0e,0x4c,0x53,0xd8,0xd9,0xb5,
2314 0xe5,0xfd,0xe9,0xe3,0xad,0x83,0x4b,0x80,0x08,0xd9,0xdc,0xe8,0xe8,0x35,0xf8,
2315 0x11,0xf1,0xe9,0x9b,0x03,0x7a,0x65,0x64,0x76,0x35,0xce,0x38,0x2c,0xf2,0xb6,
2316 0x71,0x9e,0x06,0xd9,0xbf,0xbb,0x31,0x69,0xa3,0xf6,0x30,0xa0,0x78,0x7b,0x18,
2317 0xdd,0x50,0x4d,0x79,0x1e,0xeb,0x61,0xc1,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2319 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_authenticode_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2320 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2321 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2323 BOOL ret
= verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID
, pChainContext
, pPolicyPara
,
2326 if (ret
&& pPolicyStatus
->dwError
== CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT
)
2328 CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey
= { { 0 } };
2329 BOOL isMSTestRoot
= FALSE
;
2330 PCCERT_CONTEXT failingCert
=
2331 pChainContext
->rgpChain
[pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
]->
2332 rgpElement
[pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
]->pCertContext
;
2334 CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs
[] = {
2335 { sizeof(msTestPubKey1
), msTestPubKey1
},
2336 { sizeof(msTestPubKey2
), msTestPubKey2
},
2339 /* Check whether the root is an MS test root */
2340 for (i
= 0; !isMSTestRoot
&& i
< sizeof(keyBlobs
) / sizeof(keyBlobs
[0]);
2343 msPubKey
.PublicKey
.cbData
= keyBlobs
[i
].cbData
;
2344 msPubKey
.PublicKey
.pbData
= keyBlobs
[i
].pbData
;
2345 if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
2346 X509_ASN_ENCODING
| PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING
,
2347 &failingCert
->pCertInfo
->SubjectPublicKeyInfo
, &msPubKey
))
2348 isMSTestRoot
= TRUE
;
2351 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDTESTROOT
;
2356 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_basic_constraints_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2357 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2358 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2360 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
2361 if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2362 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
)
2364 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
2365 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2366 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2367 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2370 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= NO_ERROR
;
2374 static BOOL
match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(PCERT_EXTENSION ext
,
2375 LPCWSTR server_name
)
2377 BOOL matches
= FALSE
;
2378 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO
*subjectName
;
2381 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name
));
2382 /* This could be spoofed by the embedded NULL vulnerability, since the
2383 * returned CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO doesn't have a way to indicate the
2384 * encoded length of a name. Fortunately CryptDecodeObjectEx fails if
2385 * the encoded form of the name contains a NULL.
2387 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME
,
2388 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
2389 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
2390 &subjectName
, &size
))
2394 /* RFC 5280 states that multiple instances of each name type may exist,
2395 * in section 4.2.1.6:
2396 * "Multiple name forms, and multiple instances of each name form,
2398 * It doesn't specify the behavior in such cases, but both RFC 2818
2399 * and RFC 2595 explicitly accept a certificate if any name matches.
2401 for (i
= 0; !matches
&& i
< subjectName
->cAltEntry
; i
++)
2403 if (subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].dwAltNameChoice
==
2404 CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME
)
2406 TRACE_(chain
)("dNSName: %s\n", debugstr_w(
2407 subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.pwszDNSName
));
2408 if (!strcmpiW(server_name
,
2409 subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.pwszDNSName
))
2413 LocalFree(subjectName
);
2418 static BOOL
find_matching_domain_component(CERT_NAME_INFO
*name
,
2421 BOOL matches
= FALSE
;
2424 for (i
= 0; !matches
&& i
< name
->cRDN
; i
++)
2425 for (j
= 0; j
< name
->rgRDN
[i
].cRDNAttr
; j
++)
2426 if (!strcmp(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT
,
2427 name
->rgRDN
[i
].rgRDNAttr
[j
].pszObjId
))
2429 PCERT_RDN_ATTR attr
;
2431 attr
= &name
->rgRDN
[i
].rgRDNAttr
[j
];
2432 /* Compare with memicmpW rather than strcmpiW in order to avoid
2433 * a match with a string with an embedded NULL. The component
2434 * must match one domain component attribute's entire string
2435 * value with a case-insensitive match.
2437 matches
= !memicmpW(component
, (LPWSTR
)attr
->Value
.pbData
,
2438 attr
->Value
.cbData
/ sizeof(WCHAR
));
2443 static BOOL
match_domain_component(LPCWSTR allowed_component
, DWORD allowed_len
,
2444 LPCWSTR server_component
, DWORD server_len
, BOOL allow_wildcards
,
2447 LPCWSTR allowed_ptr
, server_ptr
;
2448 BOOL matches
= TRUE
;
2450 *see_wildcard
= FALSE
;
2451 if (server_len
< allowed_len
)
2453 WARN_(chain
)("domain component %s too short for %s\n",
2454 debugstr_wn(server_component
, server_len
),
2455 debugstr_wn(allowed_component
, allowed_len
));
2456 /* A domain component can't contain a wildcard character, so a domain
2457 * component shorter than the allowed string can't produce a match.
2461 for (allowed_ptr
= allowed_component
, server_ptr
= server_component
;
2462 matches
&& allowed_ptr
- allowed_component
< allowed_len
;
2463 allowed_ptr
++, server_ptr
++)
2465 if (*allowed_ptr
== '*')
2467 if (allowed_ptr
- allowed_component
< allowed_len
- 1)
2469 WARN_(chain
)("non-wildcard characters after wildcard not supported\n");
2472 else if (!allow_wildcards
)
2474 WARN_(chain
)("wildcard after non-wildcard component\n");
2479 /* the preceding characters must have matched, so the rest of
2480 * the component also matches.
2482 *see_wildcard
= TRUE
;
2486 matches
= tolowerW(*allowed_ptr
) == tolowerW(*server_ptr
);
2488 if (matches
&& server_ptr
- server_component
< server_len
)
2490 /* If there are unmatched characters in the server domain component,
2491 * the server domain only matches if the allowed string ended in a '*'.
2493 matches
= *allowed_ptr
== '*';
2498 static BOOL
match_common_name(LPCWSTR server_name
, PCERT_RDN_ATTR nameAttr
)
2500 LPCWSTR allowed
= (LPCWSTR
)nameAttr
->Value
.pbData
;
2501 LPCWSTR allowed_component
= allowed
;
2502 DWORD allowed_len
= nameAttr
->Value
.cbData
/ sizeof(WCHAR
);
2503 LPCWSTR server_component
= server_name
;
2504 DWORD server_len
= strlenW(server_name
);
2505 BOOL matches
= TRUE
, allow_wildcards
= TRUE
;
2507 TRACE_(chain
)("CN = %s\n", debugstr_wn(allowed_component
, allowed_len
));
2509 /* From RFC 2818 (HTTP over TLS), section 3.1:
2510 * "Names may contain the wildcard character * which is considered to match
2511 * any single domain name component or component fragment. E.g.,
2512 * *.a.com matches foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com
2515 * And from RFC 2595 (Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP), section 2.4:
2516 * "A "*" wildcard character MAY be used as the left-most name component in
2517 * the certificate. For example, *.example.com would match a.example.com,
2518 * foo.example.com, etc. but would not match example.com."
2520 * There are other protocols which use TLS, and none of them is
2521 * authoritative. This accepts certificates in common usage, e.g.
2522 * *.domain.com matches www.domain.com but not domain.com, and
2523 * www*.domain.com matches www1.domain.com but not mail.domain.com.
2526 LPCWSTR allowed_dot
, server_dot
;
2528 allowed_dot
= memchrW(allowed_component
, '.',
2529 allowed_len
- (allowed_component
- allowed
));
2530 server_dot
= memchrW(server_component
, '.',
2531 server_len
- (server_component
- server_name
));
2532 /* The number of components must match */
2533 if ((!allowed_dot
&& server_dot
) || (allowed_dot
&& !server_dot
))
2536 WARN_(chain
)("%s: too many components for CN=%s\n",
2537 debugstr_w(server_name
), debugstr_wn(allowed
, allowed_len
));
2539 WARN_(chain
)("%s: not enough components for CN=%s\n",
2540 debugstr_w(server_name
), debugstr_wn(allowed
, allowed_len
));
2545 LPCWSTR allowed_end
, server_end
;
2548 allowed_end
= allowed_dot
? allowed_dot
: allowed
+ allowed_len
;
2549 server_end
= server_dot
? server_dot
: server_name
+ server_len
;
2550 matches
= match_domain_component(allowed_component
,
2551 allowed_end
- allowed_component
, server_component
,
2552 server_end
- server_component
, allow_wildcards
, &has_wildcard
);
2553 /* Once a non-wildcard component is seen, no wildcard components
2557 allow_wildcards
= FALSE
;
2560 allowed_component
= allowed_dot
? allowed_dot
+ 1 : allowed_end
;
2561 server_component
= server_dot
? server_dot
+ 1 : server_end
;
2564 } while (matches
&& allowed_component
&&
2565 allowed_component
- allowed
< allowed_len
&&
2566 server_component
&& server_component
- server_name
< server_len
);
2567 TRACE_(chain
)("returning %d\n", matches
);
2571 static BOOL
match_dns_to_subject_dn(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, LPCWSTR server_name
)
2573 BOOL matches
= FALSE
;
2574 CERT_NAME_INFO
*name
;
2577 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name
));
2578 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_UNICODE_NAME
,
2579 cert
->pCertInfo
->Subject
.pbData
, cert
->pCertInfo
->Subject
.cbData
,
2580 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
2583 /* If the subject distinguished name contains any name components,
2584 * make sure all of them are present.
2586 if (CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT
, name
))
2588 LPCWSTR ptr
= server_name
;
2592 LPCWSTR dot
= strchrW(ptr
, '.'), end
;
2593 /* 254 is the maximum DNS label length, see RFC 1035 */
2594 WCHAR component
[255];
2597 end
= dot
? dot
: ptr
+ strlenW(ptr
);
2599 if (len
>= sizeof(component
) / sizeof(component
[0]))
2601 WARN_(chain
)("domain component %s too long\n",
2602 debugstr_wn(ptr
, len
));
2607 memcpy(component
, ptr
, len
* sizeof(WCHAR
));
2609 matches
= find_matching_domain_component(name
, component
);
2611 ptr
= dot
? dot
+ 1 : end
;
2612 } while (matches
&& ptr
&& *ptr
);
2616 PCERT_RDN_ATTR attr
;
2618 /* If the certificate isn't using a DN attribute in the name, make
2619 * make sure the common name matches.
2621 if ((attr
= CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_COMMON_NAME
, name
)))
2622 matches
= match_common_name(server_name
, attr
);
2629 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_ssl_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2630 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2631 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2633 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
2634 if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2635 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
)
2637 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE
;
2638 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2639 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2640 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2642 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2643 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
)
2645 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT
;
2646 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2647 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2648 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2650 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
& CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
)
2652 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT
;
2653 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2654 CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2655 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2656 /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
2657 pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
2659 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2660 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID
)
2662 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_EXPIRED
;
2663 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2664 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2665 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2668 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= NO_ERROR
;
2669 /* We only need bother checking whether the name in the end certificate
2670 * matches if the chain is otherwise okay.
2672 if (!pPolicyStatus
->dwError
&& pPolicyPara
&&
2673 pPolicyPara
->cbSize
>= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA
))
2675 HTTPSPolicyCallbackData
*sslPara
= pPolicyPara
->pvExtraPolicyPara
;
2677 if (sslPara
&& sslPara
->u
.cbSize
>= sizeof(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData
))
2679 if (sslPara
->dwAuthType
== AUTHTYPE_SERVER
&&
2680 sslPara
->pwszServerName
)
2682 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
;
2683 PCERT_EXTENSION altNameExt
;
2686 cert
= pChainContext
->rgpChain
[0]->rgpElement
[0]->pCertContext
;
2687 altNameExt
= get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert
->pCertInfo
);
2688 /* If the alternate name extension exists, the name it contains
2689 * is bound to the certificate, so make sure the name matches
2690 * it. Otherwise, look for the server name in the subject
2691 * distinguished name. RFC5280, section 4.2.1.6:
2692 * "Whenever such identities are to be bound into a
2693 * certificate, the subject alternative name (or issuer
2694 * alternative name) extension MUST be used; however, a DNS
2695 * name MAY also be represented in the subject field using the
2696 * domainComponent attribute."
2699 matches
= match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(altNameExt
,
2700 sslPara
->pwszServerName
);
2702 matches
= match_dns_to_subject_dn(cert
,
2703 sslPara
->pwszServerName
);
2706 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH
;
2707 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= 0;
2708 pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= 0;
2716 static BYTE msPubKey1
[] = {
2717 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xdf,0x08,0xba,0xe3,0x3f,0x6e,
2718 0x64,0x9b,0xf5,0x89,0xaf,0x28,0x96,0x4a,0x07,0x8f,0x1b,0x2e,0x8b,0x3e,0x1d,
2719 0xfc,0xb8,0x80,0x69,0xa3,0xa1,0xce,0xdb,0xdf,0xb0,0x8e,0x6c,0x89,0x76,0x29,
2720 0x4f,0xca,0x60,0x35,0x39,0xad,0x72,0x32,0xe0,0x0b,0xae,0x29,0x3d,0x4c,0x16,
2721 0xd9,0x4b,0x3c,0x9d,0xda,0xc5,0xd3,0xd1,0x09,0xc9,0x2c,0x6f,0xa6,0xc2,0x60,
2722 0x53,0x45,0xdd,0x4b,0xd1,0x55,0xcd,0x03,0x1c,0xd2,0x59,0x56,0x24,0xf3,0xe5,
2723 0x78,0xd8,0x07,0xcc,0xd8,0xb3,0x1f,0x90,0x3f,0xc0,0x1a,0x71,0x50,0x1d,0x2d,
2724 0xa7,0x12,0x08,0x6d,0x7c,0xb0,0x86,0x6c,0xc7,0xba,0x85,0x32,0x07,0xe1,0x61,
2725 0x6f,0xaf,0x03,0xc5,0x6d,0xe5,0xd6,0xa1,0x8f,0x36,0xf6,0xc1,0x0b,0xd1,0x3e,
2726 0x69,0x97,0x48,0x72,0xc9,0x7f,0xa4,0xc8,0xc2,0x4a,0x4c,0x7e,0xa1,0xd1,0x94,
2727 0xa6,0xd7,0xdc,0xeb,0x05,0x46,0x2e,0xb8,0x18,0xb4,0x57,0x1d,0x86,0x49,0xdb,
2728 0x69,0x4a,0x2c,0x21,0xf5,0x5e,0x0f,0x54,0x2d,0x5a,0x43,0xa9,0x7a,0x7e,0x6a,
2729 0x8e,0x50,0x4d,0x25,0x57,0xa1,0xbf,0x1b,0x15,0x05,0x43,0x7b,0x2c,0x05,0x8d,
2730 0xbd,0x3d,0x03,0x8c,0x93,0x22,0x7d,0x63,0xea,0x0a,0x57,0x05,0x06,0x0a,0xdb,
2731 0x61,0x98,0x65,0x2d,0x47,0x49,0xa8,0xe7,0xe6,0x56,0x75,0x5c,0xb8,0x64,0x08,
2732 0x63,0xa9,0x30,0x40,0x66,0xb2,0xf9,0xb6,0xe3,0x34,0xe8,0x67,0x30,0xe1,0x43,
2733 0x0b,0x87,0xff,0xc9,0xbe,0x72,0x10,0x5e,0x23,0xf0,0x9b,0xa7,0x48,0x65,0xbf,
2734 0x09,0x88,0x7b,0xcd,0x72,0xbc,0x2e,0x79,0x9b,0x7b,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2735 static BYTE msPubKey2
[] = {
2736 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xa9,0x02,0xbd,0xc1,0x70,0xe6,
2737 0x3b,0xf2,0x4e,0x1b,0x28,0x9f,0x97,0x78,0x5e,0x30,0xea,0xa2,0xa9,0x8d,0x25,
2738 0x5f,0xf8,0xfe,0x95,0x4c,0xa3,0xb7,0xfe,0x9d,0xa2,0x20,0x3e,0x7c,0x51,0xa2,
2739 0x9b,0xa2,0x8f,0x60,0x32,0x6b,0xd1,0x42,0x64,0x79,0xee,0xac,0x76,0xc9,0x54,
2740 0xda,0xf2,0xeb,0x9c,0x86,0x1c,0x8f,0x9f,0x84,0x66,0xb3,0xc5,0x6b,0x7a,0x62,
2741 0x23,0xd6,0x1d,0x3c,0xde,0x0f,0x01,0x92,0xe8,0x96,0xc4,0xbf,0x2d,0x66,0x9a,
2742 0x9a,0x68,0x26,0x99,0xd0,0x3a,0x2c,0xbf,0x0c,0xb5,0x58,0x26,0xc1,0x46,0xe7,
2743 0x0a,0x3e,0x38,0x96,0x2c,0xa9,0x28,0x39,0xa8,0xec,0x49,0x83,0x42,0xe3,0x84,
2744 0x0f,0xbb,0x9a,0x6c,0x55,0x61,0xac,0x82,0x7c,0xa1,0x60,0x2d,0x77,0x4c,0xe9,
2745 0x99,0xb4,0x64,0x3b,0x9a,0x50,0x1c,0x31,0x08,0x24,0x14,0x9f,0xa9,0xe7,0x91,
2746 0x2b,0x18,0xe6,0x3d,0x98,0x63,0x14,0x60,0x58,0x05,0x65,0x9f,0x1d,0x37,0x52,
2747 0x87,0xf7,0xa7,0xef,0x94,0x02,0xc6,0x1b,0xd3,0xbf,0x55,0x45,0xb3,0x89,0x80,
2748 0xbf,0x3a,0xec,0x54,0x94,0x4e,0xae,0xfd,0xa7,0x7a,0x6d,0x74,0x4e,0xaf,0x18,
2749 0xcc,0x96,0x09,0x28,0x21,0x00,0x57,0x90,0x60,0x69,0x37,0xbb,0x4b,0x12,0x07,
2750 0x3c,0x56,0xff,0x5b,0xfb,0xa4,0x66,0x0a,0x08,0xa6,0xd2,0x81,0x56,0x57,0xef,
2751 0xb6,0x3b,0x5e,0x16,0x81,0x77,0x04,0xda,0xf6,0xbe,0xae,0x80,0x95,0xfe,0xb0,
2752 0xcd,0x7f,0xd6,0xa7,0x1a,0x72,0x5c,0x3c,0xca,0xbc,0xf0,0x08,0xa3,0x22,0x30,
2753 0xb3,0x06,0x85,0xc9,0xb3,0x20,0x77,0x13,0x85,0xdf,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2754 static BYTE msPubKey3
[] = {
2755 0x30,0x82,0x02,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x02,0x01,0x00,0xf3,0x5d,0xfa,0x80,0x67,0xd4,
2756 0x5a,0xa7,0xa9,0x0c,0x2c,0x90,0x20,0xd0,0x35,0x08,0x3c,0x75,0x84,0xcd,0xb7,
2757 0x07,0x89,0x9c,0x89,0xda,0xde,0xce,0xc3,0x60,0xfa,0x91,0x68,0x5a,0x9e,0x94,
2758 0x71,0x29,0x18,0x76,0x7c,0xc2,0xe0,0xc8,0x25,0x76,0x94,0x0e,0x58,0xfa,0x04,
2759 0x34,0x36,0xe6,0xdf,0xaf,0xf7,0x80,0xba,0xe9,0x58,0x0b,0x2b,0x93,0xe5,0x9d,
2760 0x05,0xe3,0x77,0x22,0x91,0xf7,0x34,0x64,0x3c,0x22,0x91,0x1d,0x5e,0xe1,0x09,
2761 0x90,0xbc,0x14,0xfe,0xfc,0x75,0x58,0x19,0xe1,0x79,0xb7,0x07,0x92,0xa3,0xae,
2762 0x88,0x59,0x08,0xd8,0x9f,0x07,0xca,0x03,0x58,0xfc,0x68,0x29,0x6d,0x32,0xd7,
2763 0xd2,0xa8,0xcb,0x4b,0xfc,0xe1,0x0b,0x48,0x32,0x4f,0xe6,0xeb,0xb8,0xad,0x4f,
2764 0xe4,0x5c,0x6f,0x13,0x94,0x99,0xdb,0x95,0xd5,0x75,0xdb,0xa8,0x1a,0xb7,0x94,
2765 0x91,0xb4,0x77,0x5b,0xf5,0x48,0x0c,0x8f,0x6a,0x79,0x7d,0x14,0x70,0x04,0x7d,
2766 0x6d,0xaf,0x90,0xf5,0xda,0x70,0xd8,0x47,0xb7,0xbf,0x9b,0x2f,0x6c,0xe7,0x05,
2767 0xb7,0xe1,0x11,0x60,0xac,0x79,0x91,0x14,0x7c,0xc5,0xd6,0xa6,0xe4,0xe1,0x7e,
2768 0xd5,0xc3,0x7e,0xe5,0x92,0xd2,0x3c,0x00,0xb5,0x36,0x82,0xde,0x79,0xe1,0x6d,
2769 0xf3,0xb5,0x6e,0xf8,0x9f,0x33,0xc9,0xcb,0x52,0x7d,0x73,0x98,0x36,0xdb,0x8b,
2770 0xa1,0x6b,0xa2,0x95,0x97,0x9b,0xa3,0xde,0xc2,0x4d,0x26,0xff,0x06,0x96,0x67,
2771 0x25,0x06,0xc8,0xe7,0xac,0xe4,0xee,0x12,0x33,0x95,0x31,0x99,0xc8,0x35,0x08,
2772 0x4e,0x34,0xca,0x79,0x53,0xd5,0xb5,0xbe,0x63,0x32,0x59,0x40,0x36,0xc0,0xa5,
2773 0x4e,0x04,0x4d,0x3d,0xdb,0x5b,0x07,0x33,0xe4,0x58,0xbf,0xef,0x3f,0x53,0x64,
2774 0xd8,0x42,0x59,0x35,0x57,0xfd,0x0f,0x45,0x7c,0x24,0x04,0x4d,0x9e,0xd6,0x38,
2775 0x74,0x11,0x97,0x22,0x90,0xce,0x68,0x44,0x74,0x92,0x6f,0xd5,0x4b,0x6f,0xb0,
2776 0x86,0xe3,0xc7,0x36,0x42,0xa0,0xd0,0xfc,0xc1,0xc0,0x5a,0xf9,0xa3,0x61,0xb9,
2777 0x30,0x47,0x71,0x96,0x0a,0x16,0xb0,0x91,0xc0,0x42,0x95,0xef,0x10,0x7f,0x28,
2778 0x6a,0xe3,0x2a,0x1f,0xb1,0xe4,0xcd,0x03,0x3f,0x77,0x71,0x04,0xc7,0x20,0xfc,
2779 0x49,0x0f,0x1d,0x45,0x88,0xa4,0xd7,0xcb,0x7e,0x88,0xad,0x8e,0x2d,0xec,0x45,
2780 0xdb,0xc4,0x51,0x04,0xc9,0x2a,0xfc,0xec,0x86,0x9e,0x9a,0x11,0x97,0x5b,0xde,
2781 0xce,0x53,0x88,0xe6,0xe2,0xb7,0xfd,0xac,0x95,0xc2,0x28,0x40,0xdb,0xef,0x04,
2782 0x90,0xdf,0x81,0x33,0x39,0xd9,0xb2,0x45,0xa5,0x23,0x87,0x06,0xa5,0x55,0x89,
2783 0x31,0xbb,0x06,0x2d,0x60,0x0e,0x41,0x18,0x7d,0x1f,0x2e,0xb5,0x97,0xcb,0x11,
2784 0xeb,0x15,0xd5,0x24,0xa5,0x94,0xef,0x15,0x14,0x89,0xfd,0x4b,0x73,0xfa,0x32,
2785 0x5b,0xfc,0xd1,0x33,0x00,0xf9,0x59,0x62,0x70,0x07,0x32,0xea,0x2e,0xab,0x40,
2786 0x2d,0x7b,0xca,0xdd,0x21,0x67,0x1b,0x30,0x99,0x8f,0x16,0xaa,0x23,0xa8,0x41,
2787 0xd1,0xb0,0x6e,0x11,0x9b,0x36,0xc4,0xde,0x40,0x74,0x9c,0xe1,0x58,0x65,0xc1,
2788 0x60,0x1e,0x7a,0x5b,0x38,0xc8,0x8f,0xbb,0x04,0x26,0x7c,0xd4,0x16,0x40,0xe5,
2789 0xb6,0x6b,0x6c,0xaa,0x86,0xfd,0x00,0xbf,0xce,0xc1,0x35,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,
2792 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_ms_root_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2793 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2794 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2796 BOOL ret
= verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID
, pChainContext
, pPolicyPara
,
2799 if (ret
&& !pPolicyStatus
->dwError
)
2801 CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey
= { { 0 } };
2802 BOOL isMSRoot
= FALSE
;
2804 CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs
[] = {
2805 { sizeof(msPubKey1
), msPubKey1
},
2806 { sizeof(msPubKey2
), msPubKey2
},
2807 { sizeof(msPubKey3
), msPubKey3
},
2809 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN rootChain
=
2810 pChainContext
->rgpChain
[pChainContext
->cChain
-1 ];
2811 PCCERT_CONTEXT root
=
2812 rootChain
->rgpElement
[rootChain
->cElement
- 1]->pCertContext
;
2814 for (i
= 0; !isMSRoot
&& i
< sizeof(keyBlobs
) / sizeof(keyBlobs
[0]);
2817 msPubKey
.PublicKey
.cbData
= keyBlobs
[i
].cbData
;
2818 msPubKey
.PublicKey
.pbData
= keyBlobs
[i
].pbData
;
2819 if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
2820 X509_ASN_ENCODING
| PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING
,
2821 &root
->pCertInfo
->SubjectPublicKeyInfo
, &msPubKey
))
2825 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= 0;
2830 typedef BOOL (WINAPI
*CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc
)(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2831 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2832 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
);
2834 BOOL WINAPI
CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2835 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2836 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2838 static HCRYPTOIDFUNCSET set
= NULL
;
2840 CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc verifyPolicy
= NULL
;
2841 HCRYPTOIDFUNCADDR hFunc
= NULL
;
2843 TRACE("(%s, %p, %p, %p)\n", debugstr_a(szPolicyOID
), pChainContext
,
2844 pPolicyPara
, pPolicyStatus
);
2846 if (!HIWORD(szPolicyOID
))
2848 switch (LOWORD(szPolicyOID
))
2850 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASE
):
2851 verifyPolicy
= verify_base_policy
;
2853 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_AUTHENTICODE
):
2854 verifyPolicy
= verify_authenticode_policy
;
2856 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL
):
2857 verifyPolicy
= verify_ssl_policy
;
2859 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
):
2860 verifyPolicy
= verify_basic_constraints_policy
;
2862 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_MICROSOFT_ROOT
):
2863 verifyPolicy
= verify_ms_root_policy
;
2866 FIXME("unimplemented for %d\n", LOWORD(szPolicyOID
));
2872 set
= CryptInitOIDFunctionSet(
2873 CRYPT_OID_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_POLICY_FUNC
, 0);
2874 CryptGetOIDFunctionAddress(set
, X509_ASN_ENCODING
, szPolicyOID
, 0,
2875 (void **)&verifyPolicy
, &hFunc
);
2878 ret
= verifyPolicy(szPolicyOID
, pChainContext
, pPolicyPara
,
2881 CryptFreeOIDFunctionAddress(hFunc
, 0);
2882 TRACE("returning %d (%08x)\n", ret
, pPolicyStatus
->dwError
);