2 * Copyright 2006 Juan Lang
4 * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
5 * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
6 * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
7 * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
9 * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
10 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
11 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
12 * Lesser General Public License for more details.
14 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
15 * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
16 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
20 #define NONAMELESSUNION
23 #define CERT_CHAIN_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
24 #define CERT_REVOCATION_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
26 #include "wine/debug.h"
27 #include "wine/unicode.h"
28 #include "crypt32_private.h"
30 WINE_DEFAULT_DEBUG_CHANNEL(crypt
);
31 WINE_DECLARE_DEBUG_CHANNEL(chain
);
33 #define DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS 7
35 static HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
;
37 /* This represents a subset of a certificate chain engine: it doesn't include
38 * the "hOther" store described by MSDN, because I'm not sure how that's used.
39 * It also doesn't include the "hTrust" store, because I don't yet implement
40 * CTLs or complex certificate chains.
42 typedef struct _CertificateChainEngine
48 DWORD dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
;
49 DWORD MaximumCachedCertificates
;
50 DWORD CycleDetectionModulus
;
51 } CertificateChainEngine
, *PCertificateChainEngine
;
53 static inline void CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(HCERTSTORE collection
,
54 DWORD cStores
, HCERTSTORE
*stores
)
58 for (i
= 0; i
< cStores
; i
++)
59 CertAddStoreToCollection(collection
, stores
[i
], 0, 0);
62 static inline void CRYPT_CloseStores(DWORD cStores
, HCERTSTORE
*stores
)
66 for (i
= 0; i
< cStores
; i
++)
67 CertCloseStore(stores
[i
], 0);
70 static const WCHAR rootW
[] = { 'R','o','o','t',0 };
72 /* Finds cert in store by comparing the cert's hashes. */
73 static PCCERT_CONTEXT
CRYPT_FindCertInStore(HCERTSTORE store
,
76 PCCERT_CONTEXT matching
= NULL
;
78 DWORD size
= sizeof(hash
);
80 if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert
, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID
, hash
, &size
))
82 CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob
= { sizeof(hash
), hash
};
84 matching
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
, cert
->dwCertEncodingType
,
85 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH
, &blob
, NULL
);
90 static BOOL
CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(HCERTSTORE store
)
96 HCERTSTORE rootStore
= CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW
);
97 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
= NULL
, check
;
100 cert
= CertEnumCertificatesInStore(store
, cert
);
103 if (!(check
= CRYPT_FindCertInStore(rootStore
, cert
)))
106 CertFreeCertificateContext(check
);
108 } while (ret
&& cert
);
110 CertFreeCertificateContext(cert
);
111 CertCloseStore(rootStore
, 0);
116 HCERTCHAINENGINE
CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(HCERTSTORE root
,
117 PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig
)
119 static const WCHAR caW
[] = { 'C','A',0 };
120 static const WCHAR myW
[] = { 'M','y',0 };
121 static const WCHAR trustW
[] = { 'T','r','u','s','t',0 };
122 PCertificateChainEngine engine
=
123 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChainEngine
));
127 HCERTSTORE worldStores
[4];
130 engine
->hRoot
= root
;
131 engine
->hWorld
= CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION
, 0, 0,
132 CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG
, NULL
);
133 worldStores
[0] = CertDuplicateStore(engine
->hRoot
);
134 worldStores
[1] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, caW
);
135 worldStores
[2] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, myW
);
136 worldStores
[3] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, trustW
);
137 CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine
->hWorld
,
138 sizeof(worldStores
) / sizeof(worldStores
[0]), worldStores
);
139 CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine
->hWorld
,
140 pConfig
->cAdditionalStore
, pConfig
->rghAdditionalStore
);
141 CRYPT_CloseStores(sizeof(worldStores
) / sizeof(worldStores
[0]),
143 engine
->dwFlags
= pConfig
->dwFlags
;
144 engine
->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
= pConfig
->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
;
145 engine
->MaximumCachedCertificates
=
146 pConfig
->MaximumCachedCertificates
;
147 if (pConfig
->CycleDetectionModulus
)
148 engine
->CycleDetectionModulus
= pConfig
->CycleDetectionModulus
;
150 engine
->CycleDetectionModulus
= DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS
;
155 BOOL WINAPI
CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig
,
156 HCERTCHAINENGINE
*phChainEngine
)
160 TRACE("(%p, %p)\n", pConfig
, phChainEngine
);
162 if (pConfig
->cbSize
!= sizeof(*pConfig
))
164 SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG
);
167 *phChainEngine
= NULL
;
168 ret
= CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(pConfig
->hRestrictedRoot
);
172 HCERTCHAINENGINE engine
;
174 if (pConfig
->hRestrictedRoot
)
175 root
= CertDuplicateStore(pConfig
->hRestrictedRoot
);
177 root
= CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW
);
178 engine
= CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(root
, pConfig
);
181 *phChainEngine
= engine
;
190 VOID WINAPI
CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine
)
192 PCertificateChainEngine engine
= (PCertificateChainEngine
)hChainEngine
;
194 TRACE("(%p)\n", hChainEngine
);
196 if (engine
&& InterlockedDecrement(&engine
->ref
) == 0)
198 CertCloseStore(engine
->hWorld
, 0);
199 CertCloseStore(engine
->hRoot
, 0);
200 CryptMemFree(engine
);
204 static HCERTCHAINENGINE
CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine(void)
206 if (!CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
)
208 CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG config
= { 0 };
209 HCERTCHAINENGINE engine
;
211 config
.cbSize
= sizeof(config
);
212 CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(&config
, &engine
);
213 InterlockedCompareExchangePointer(&CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
, engine
,
215 if (CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
!= engine
)
216 CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(engine
);
218 return CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
;
221 void default_chain_engine_free(void)
223 CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
);
226 typedef struct _CertificateChain
228 CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT context
;
231 } CertificateChain
, *PCertificateChain
;
233 static inline BOOL
CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
)
235 return CertCompareCertificateName(cert
->dwCertEncodingType
,
236 &cert
->pCertInfo
->Subject
, &cert
->pCertInfo
->Issuer
);
239 static void CRYPT_FreeChainElement(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
)
241 CertFreeCertificateContext(element
->pCertContext
);
242 CryptMemFree(element
);
245 static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
)
247 DWORD i
, j
, cyclicCertIndex
= 0;
249 /* O(n^2) - I don't think there's a faster way */
250 for (i
= 0; !cyclicCertIndex
&& i
< chain
->cElement
; i
++)
251 for (j
= i
+ 1; !cyclicCertIndex
&& j
< chain
->cElement
; j
++)
252 if (CertCompareCertificate(X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
253 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
,
254 chain
->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
))
258 chain
->rgpElement
[cyclicCertIndex
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
259 |= CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
| CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
260 /* Release remaining certs */
261 for (i
= cyclicCertIndex
+ 1; i
< chain
->cElement
; i
++)
262 CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain
->rgpElement
[i
]);
264 chain
->cElement
= cyclicCertIndex
+ 1;
268 /* Checks whether the chain is cyclic by examining the last element's status */
269 static inline BOOL
CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
*chain
)
272 return chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
273 & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
;
278 static inline void CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(CERT_TRUST_STATUS
*chainStatus
,
279 const CERT_TRUST_STATUS
*elementStatus
)
281 /* Any error that applies to an element also applies to a chain.. */
282 chainStatus
->dwErrorStatus
|= elementStatus
->dwErrorStatus
;
283 /* but the bottom nibble of an element's info status doesn't apply to the
286 chainStatus
->dwInfoStatus
|= (elementStatus
->dwInfoStatus
& 0xfffffff0);
289 static BOOL
CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine
*engine
,
290 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, DWORD subjectInfoStatus
)
293 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
297 if (!chain
->cElement
)
298 chain
->rgpElement
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
300 chain
->rgpElement
= CryptMemRealloc(chain
->rgpElement
,
301 (chain
->cElement
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
302 if (chain
->rgpElement
)
304 chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
++] = element
;
305 memset(element
, 0, sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
306 element
->cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
);
307 element
->pCertContext
= CertDuplicateCertificateContext(cert
);
308 if (chain
->cElement
> 1)
309 chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 2]->TrustStatus
.dwInfoStatus
311 /* FIXME: initialize the rest of element */
312 if (!(chain
->cElement
% engine
->CycleDetectionModulus
))
314 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(chain
);
315 /* Reinitialize the element pointer in case the chain is
316 * cyclic, in which case the chain is truncated.
318 element
= chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1];
320 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain
->TrustStatus
,
321 &element
->TrustStatus
);
325 CryptMemFree(element
);
330 static void CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
)
334 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->cElement
; i
++)
335 CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain
->rgpElement
[i
]);
336 CryptMemFree(chain
->rgpElement
);
340 static void CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(HCERTSTORE hRoot
,
341 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement
)
343 PCCERT_CONTEXT trustedRoot
= CRYPT_FindCertInStore(hRoot
,
344 rootElement
->pCertContext
);
347 rootElement
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
348 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
;
350 CertFreeCertificateContext(trustedRoot
);
353 static void CRYPT_CheckRootCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hRoot
,
354 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement
)
356 PCCERT_CONTEXT root
= rootElement
->pCertContext
;
358 if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, root
->dwCertEncodingType
,
359 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT
, (void *)root
,
360 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT
, (void *)root
, 0, NULL
))
362 TRACE_(chain
)("Last certificate's signature is invalid\n");
363 rootElement
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
364 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
;
366 CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(hRoot
, rootElement
);
369 /* Decodes a cert's basic constraints extension (either szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
370 * or szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, whichever is present) into a
371 * CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO. If it neither extension is present, sets
372 * constraints->fCA to defaultIfNotSpecified.
373 * Returns FALSE if the extension is present but couldn't be decoded.
375 static BOOL
CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
,
376 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO
*constraints
, BOOL defaultIfNotSpecified
)
379 PCERT_EXTENSION ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
,
380 cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
);
382 constraints
->fPathLenConstraint
= FALSE
;
385 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*info
;
388 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
,
389 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
,
393 if (info
->SubjectType
.cbData
== 1)
395 info
->SubjectType
.pbData
[0] & CERT_CA_SUBJECT_FLAG
;
401 ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
,
402 cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
);
405 DWORD size
= sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO
);
407 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
408 szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
409 0, NULL
, constraints
, &size
);
412 constraints
->fCA
= defaultIfNotSpecified
;
417 /* Checks element's basic constraints to see if it can act as a CA, with
418 * remainingCAs CAs left in this chain. In general, a cert must include the
419 * basic constraints extension, with the CA flag asserted, in order to be
420 * allowed to be a CA. A V1 or V2 cert, which has no extensions, is also
421 * allowed to be a CA if it's installed locally (in the engine's world store.)
422 * This matches the expected usage in RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.9: a conforming
423 * CA MUST include the basic constraints extension in all certificates that are
424 * used to validate digital signatures on certificates. It also matches
425 * section 6.1.4(k): "If a certificate is a v1 or v2 certificate, then the
426 * application MUST either verify that the certificate is a CA certificate
427 * through out-of-band means or reject the certificate." Rejecting the
428 * certificate prohibits a large number of commonly used certificates, so
429 * accepting locally installed ones is a compromise.
430 * Root certificates are also allowed to be CAs even without a basic
431 * constraints extension. This is implied by RFC 5280, section 6.1: the
432 * root of a certificate chain's only requirement is that it was used to issue
433 * the next certificate in the chain.
434 * Updates chainConstraints with the element's constraints, if:
435 * 1. chainConstraints doesn't have a path length constraint, or
436 * 2. element's path length constraint is smaller than chainConstraints's
437 * Sets *pathLengthConstraintViolated to TRUE if a path length violation
439 * Returns TRUE if the element can be a CA, and the length of the remaining
442 static BOOL
CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(PCertificateChainEngine engine
,
443 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO
*chainConstraints
,
444 DWORD remainingCAs
, BOOL isRoot
, BOOL
*pathLengthConstraintViolated
)
446 BOOL validBasicConstraints
, implicitCA
= FALSE
;
447 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints
;
451 else if (cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
== CERT_V1
||
452 cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
== CERT_V2
)
455 DWORD size
= sizeof(hash
);
457 if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert
, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID
,
460 CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob
= { sizeof(hash
), hash
};
461 PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert
= CertFindCertificateInStore(
462 engine
->hWorld
, cert
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH
,
467 CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert
);
472 if ((validBasicConstraints
= CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(cert
,
473 &constraints
, implicitCA
)))
475 chainConstraints
->fCA
= constraints
.fCA
;
476 if (!constraints
.fCA
)
478 TRACE_(chain
)("chain element %d can't be a CA\n", remainingCAs
+ 1);
479 validBasicConstraints
= FALSE
;
481 else if (constraints
.fPathLenConstraint
)
483 /* If the element has path length constraints, they apply to the
484 * entire remaining chain.
486 if (!chainConstraints
->fPathLenConstraint
||
487 constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
<
488 chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
)
490 TRACE_(chain
)("setting path length constraint to %d\n",
491 chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
);
492 chainConstraints
->fPathLenConstraint
= TRUE
;
493 chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
=
494 constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
;
498 if (chainConstraints
->fPathLenConstraint
&&
499 remainingCAs
> chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
)
501 TRACE_(chain
)("remaining CAs %d exceed max path length %d\n",
502 remainingCAs
, chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
);
503 validBasicConstraints
= FALSE
;
504 *pathLengthConstraintViolated
= TRUE
;
506 return validBasicConstraints
;
509 static BOOL
domain_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint
, LPCWSTR name
)
513 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
514 * "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name...
515 * When the constraint begins with a period, it MAY be expanded with one
516 * or more labels. That is, the constraint ".example.com" is satisfied by
517 * both host.example.com and my.host.example.com. However, the constraint
518 * ".example.com" is not satisfied by "example.com". When the constraint
519 * does not begin with a period, it specifies a host."
520 * and for email addresses,
521 * "To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a particular host, the
522 * constraint is specified as the host name. For example, the constraint
523 * "example.com" is satisfied by any mail address at the host
524 * "example.com". To specify any address within a domain, the constraint
525 * is specified with a leading period (as with URIs)."
527 if (constraint
[0] == '.')
529 /* Must be strictly greater than, a name can't begin with '.' */
530 if (lstrlenW(name
) > lstrlenW(constraint
))
531 match
= !lstrcmpiW(name
+ lstrlenW(name
) - lstrlenW(constraint
),
535 /* name is too short, no match */
540 match
= !lstrcmpiW(name
, constraint
);
544 static BOOL
url_matches(LPCWSTR constraint
, LPCWSTR name
,
545 DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
549 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint
), debugstr_w(name
));
552 *trustErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
557 LPCWSTR colon
, authority_end
, at
, hostname
= NULL
;
558 /* The maximum length for a hostname is 254 in the DNS, see RFC 1034 */
559 WCHAR hostname_buf
[255];
561 /* RFC 5280: only the hostname portion of the URL is compared. From
563 * "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name.
564 * The constraint MUST be specified as a fully qualified domain name
565 * and MAY specify a host or a domain."
566 * The format for URIs is in RFC 2396.
568 * First, remove any scheme that's present. */
569 colon
= strchrW(name
, ':');
570 if (colon
&& *(colon
+ 1) == '/' && *(colon
+ 2) == '/')
572 /* Next, find the end of the authority component. (The authority is
573 * generally just the hostname, but it may contain a username or a port.
574 * Those are removed next.)
576 authority_end
= strchrW(name
, '/');
578 authority_end
= strchrW(name
, '?');
580 authority_end
= name
+ strlenW(name
);
581 /* Remove any port number from the authority */
582 for (colon
= authority_end
; colon
>= name
&& *colon
!= ':'; colon
--)
585 authority_end
= colon
;
586 /* Remove any username from the authority */
587 if ((at
= strchrW(name
, '@')))
589 /* Ignore any path or query portion of the URL. */
592 if (authority_end
- name
< sizeof(hostname_buf
) /
593 sizeof(hostname_buf
[0]))
595 memcpy(hostname_buf
, name
,
596 (authority_end
- name
) * sizeof(WCHAR
));
597 hostname_buf
[authority_end
- name
] = 0;
598 hostname
= hostname_buf
;
600 /* else: Hostname is too long, not a match */
605 match
= domain_name_matches(constraint
, hostname
);
610 static BOOL
rfc822_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint
, LPCWSTR name
,
611 DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
616 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint
), debugstr_w(name
));
619 *trustErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
622 else if ((at
= strchrW(constraint
, '@')))
623 match
= !lstrcmpiW(constraint
, name
);
626 if ((at
= strchrW(name
, '@')))
627 match
= domain_name_matches(constraint
, at
+ 1);
629 match
= !lstrcmpiW(constraint
, name
);
634 static BOOL
dns_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint
, LPCWSTR name
,
635 DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
639 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint
), debugstr_w(name
));
642 *trustErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
645 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
646 * "DNS name restrictions are expressed as host.example.com. Any DNS name
647 * that can be constructed by simply adding zero or more labels to the
648 * left-hand side of the name satisfies the name constraint. For example,
649 * www.host.example.com would satisfy the constraint but host1.example.com
652 else if (lstrlenW(name
) == lstrlenW(constraint
))
653 match
= !lstrcmpiW(name
, constraint
);
654 else if (lstrlenW(name
) > lstrlenW(constraint
))
656 match
= !lstrcmpiW(name
+ lstrlenW(name
) - lstrlenW(constraint
),
663 /* This only matches if name is a subdomain of constraint, i.e.
664 * there's a '.' between the beginning of the name and the
665 * matching portion of the name.
667 for (ptr
= name
+ lstrlenW(name
) - lstrlenW(constraint
);
668 !dot
&& ptr
>= name
; ptr
--)
674 /* else: name is too short, no match */
679 static BOOL
ip_address_matches(const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB
*constraint
,
680 const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB
*name
, DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
684 TRACE("(%d, %p), (%d, %p)\n", constraint
->cbData
, constraint
->pbData
,
685 name
->cbData
, name
->pbData
);
687 /* RFC5280, section 4.2.1.10, iPAddress syntax: either 8 or 32 bytes, for
688 * IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, respectively.
690 if (constraint
->cbData
!= sizeof(DWORD
) * 2 && constraint
->cbData
!= 32)
691 *trustErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
692 else if (name
->cbData
== sizeof(DWORD
) &&
693 constraint
->cbData
== sizeof(DWORD
) * 2)
695 DWORD subnet
, mask
, addr
;
697 memcpy(&subnet
, constraint
->pbData
, sizeof(subnet
));
698 memcpy(&mask
, constraint
->pbData
+ sizeof(subnet
), sizeof(mask
));
699 memcpy(&addr
, name
->pbData
, sizeof(addr
));
700 /* These are really in big-endian order, but for equality matching we
701 * don't need to swap to host order
703 match
= (subnet
& mask
) == (addr
& mask
);
705 else if (name
->cbData
== 16 && constraint
->cbData
== 32)
707 const BYTE
*subnet
, *mask
, *addr
;
710 subnet
= constraint
->pbData
;
711 mask
= constraint
->pbData
+ 16;
714 for (i
= 0; match
&& i
< 16; i
++)
715 if ((subnet
[i
] & mask
[i
]) != (addr
[i
] & mask
[i
]))
718 /* else: name is wrong size, no match */
723 static void CRYPT_FindMatchingNameEntry(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY
*constraint
,
724 const CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO
*subjectName
, DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
,
725 DWORD errorIfFound
, DWORD errorIfNotFound
)
730 for (i
= 0; i
< subjectName
->cAltEntry
; i
++)
732 if (subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].dwAltNameChoice
==
733 constraint
->dwAltNameChoice
)
735 switch (constraint
->dwAltNameChoice
)
737 case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME
:
738 match
= rfc822_name_matches(constraint
->u
.pwszURL
,
739 subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.pwszURL
, trustErrorStatus
);
741 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME
:
742 match
= dns_name_matches(constraint
->u
.pwszURL
,
743 subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.pwszURL
, trustErrorStatus
);
745 case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL
:
746 match
= url_matches(constraint
->u
.pwszURL
,
747 subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.pwszURL
, trustErrorStatus
);
749 case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS
:
750 match
= ip_address_matches(&constraint
->u
.IPAddress
,
751 &subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.IPAddress
, trustErrorStatus
);
753 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME
:
755 ERR("name choice %d unsupported in this context\n",
756 constraint
->dwAltNameChoice
);
758 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
762 *trustErrorStatus
|= match
? errorIfFound
: errorIfNotFound
;
765 static inline PCERT_EXTENSION
get_subject_alt_name_ext(const CERT_INFO
*cert
)
769 ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2
,
770 cert
->cExtension
, cert
->rgExtension
);
772 ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
,
773 cert
->cExtension
, cert
->rgExtension
);
777 static void CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(
778 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*nameConstraints
, const CERT_INFO
*cert
,
779 DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
781 CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
= get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert
);
785 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO
*subjectName
;
788 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME
,
789 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
790 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
791 &subjectName
, &size
))
795 for (i
= 0; i
< nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
; i
++)
796 CRYPT_FindMatchingNameEntry(
797 &nameConstraints
->rgExcludedSubtree
[i
].Base
, subjectName
,
798 trustErrorStatus
, CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
, 0);
799 for (i
= 0; i
< nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
; i
++)
800 CRYPT_FindMatchingNameEntry(
801 &nameConstraints
->rgPermittedSubtree
[i
].Base
, subjectName
,
803 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
);
804 LocalFree(subjectName
);
808 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION
| CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
812 if (nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
)
814 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_DEFINED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
|
815 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
816 if (nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
)
817 *trustErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
821 /* Gets cert's name constraints, if any. Free with LocalFree. */
822 static CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(CERT_INFO
*cert
)
824 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*info
= NULL
;
828 if ((ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
, cert
->cExtension
,
833 CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
,
834 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
835 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &info
,
841 static BOOL
CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*info
)
846 /* Make sure at least one permitted or excluded subtree is present. From
847 * RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
848 * "Conforming CAs MUST NOT issue certificates where name constraints is an
849 * empty sequence. That is, either the permittedSubtrees field or the
850 * excludedSubtrees MUST be present."
852 if (!info
->cPermittedSubtree
&& !info
->cExcludedSubtree
)
854 WARN_(chain
)("constraints contain no permitted nor excluded subtree\n");
857 /* Check that none of the constraints specifies a minimum or a maximum.
858 * See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
859 * "Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with
860 * any name forms, thus, the minimum MUST be zero, and maximum MUST be
861 * absent. However, if an application encounters a critical name
862 * constraints extension that specifies other values for minimum or
863 * maximum for a name form that appears in a subsequent certificate, the
864 * application MUST either process these fields or reject the
866 * Since it gives no guidance as to how to process these fields, we
867 * reject any name constraint that contains them.
869 for (i
= 0; ret
&& i
< info
->cPermittedSubtree
; i
++)
870 if (info
->rgPermittedSubtree
[i
].dwMinimum
||
871 info
->rgPermittedSubtree
[i
].fMaximum
)
873 TRACE_(chain
)("found a minimum or maximum in permitted subtrees\n");
876 for (i
= 0; ret
&& i
< info
->cExcludedSubtree
; i
++)
877 if (info
->rgExcludedSubtree
[i
].dwMinimum
||
878 info
->rgExcludedSubtree
[i
].fMaximum
)
880 TRACE_(chain
)("found a minimum or maximum in excluded subtrees\n");
886 static void CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
)
890 /* Microsoft's implementation appears to violate RFC 3280: according to
891 * MSDN, the various CERT_TRUST_*_NAME_CONSTRAINT errors are set if a CA's
892 * name constraint is violated in the end cert. According to RFC 3280,
893 * the constraints should be checked against every subsequent certificate
894 * in the chain, not just the end cert.
895 * Microsoft's implementation also sets the name constraint errors on the
896 * certs whose constraints were violated, not on the certs that violated
898 * In order to be error-compatible with Microsoft's implementation, while
899 * still adhering to RFC 3280, I use a O(n ^ 2) algorithm to check name
902 for (i
= chain
->cElement
- 1; i
> 0; i
--)
904 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*nameConstraints
;
906 if ((nameConstraints
= CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(
907 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
)))
909 if (!CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(nameConstraints
))
910 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
911 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
914 for (j
= i
- 1; j
>= 0; j
--)
916 DWORD errorStatus
= 0;
918 /* According to RFC 3280, self-signed certs don't have name
919 * constraints checked unless they're the end cert.
921 if (j
== 0 || !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
922 chain
->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
))
924 CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(nameConstraints
,
925 chain
->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
,
929 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
931 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain
->TrustStatus
,
932 &chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
);
935 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwInfoStatus
|=
936 CERT_TRUST_HAS_VALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
940 LocalFree(nameConstraints
);
945 static LPWSTR
name_value_to_str(const CERT_NAME_BLOB
*name
)
947 DWORD len
= cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, 0, name
,
948 CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR
, NULL
, 0);
953 str
= CryptMemAlloc(len
* sizeof(WCHAR
));
955 cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, 0, name
,
956 CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR
, str
, len
);
961 static void dump_alt_name_entry(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY
*entry
)
965 switch (entry
->dwAltNameChoice
)
967 case CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME
:
968 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME, oid = %s\n",
969 debugstr_a(entry
->u
.pOtherName
->pszObjId
));
971 case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME
:
972 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME: %s\n",
973 debugstr_w(entry
->u
.pwszRfc822Name
));
975 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME
:
976 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME: %s\n",
977 debugstr_w(entry
->u
.pwszDNSName
));
979 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME
:
980 str
= name_value_to_str(&entry
->u
.DirectoryName
);
981 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME: %s\n", debugstr_w(str
));
984 case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL
:
985 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_URL: %s\n", debugstr_w(entry
->u
.pwszURL
));
987 case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS
:
988 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS: %d bytes\n",
989 entry
->u
.IPAddress
.cbData
);
991 case CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID
:
992 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID: %s\n",
993 debugstr_a(entry
->u
.pszRegisteredID
));
996 TRACE_(chain
)("dwAltNameChoice = %d\n", entry
->dwAltNameChoice
);
1000 static void dump_alt_name(LPCSTR type
, const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1002 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO
*name
;
1005 TRACE_(chain
)("%s:\n", type
);
1006 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME
,
1007 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
1008 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &name
, &size
))
1012 TRACE_(chain
)("%d alt name entries:\n", name
->cAltEntry
);
1013 for (i
= 0; i
< name
->cAltEntry
; i
++)
1014 dump_alt_name_entry(&name
->rgAltEntry
[i
]);
1019 static void dump_basic_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1021 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*info
;
1024 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
,
1025 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
,
1026 NULL
, &info
, &size
))
1028 TRACE_(chain
)("SubjectType: %02x\n", info
->SubjectType
.pbData
[0]);
1029 TRACE_(chain
)("%s path length constraint\n",
1030 info
->fPathLenConstraint
? "has" : "doesn't have");
1031 TRACE_(chain
)("path length=%d\n", info
->dwPathLenConstraint
);
1036 static void dump_basic_constraints2(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1038 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints
;
1039 DWORD size
= sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO
);
1041 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
1042 szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
1043 0, NULL
, &constraints
, &size
))
1045 TRACE_(chain
)("basic constraints:\n");
1046 TRACE_(chain
)("can%s be a CA\n", constraints
.fCA
? "" : "not");
1047 TRACE_(chain
)("%s path length constraint\n",
1048 constraints
.fPathLenConstraint
? "has" : "doesn't have");
1049 TRACE_(chain
)("path length=%d\n", constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
);
1053 static void dump_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1055 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage
;
1056 DWORD size
= sizeof(usage
);
1058 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_BITS
, ext
->Value
.pbData
,
1059 ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &usage
, &size
))
1061 #define trace_usage_bit(bits, bit) \
1062 if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
1065 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE_KEY_USAGE
);
1066 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_NON_REPUDIATION_KEY_USAGE
);
1067 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE
);
1068 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE
);
1069 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_KEY_AGREEMENT_KEY_USAGE
);
1070 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE
);
1071 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_CRL_SIGN_KEY_USAGE
);
1072 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_ENCIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE
);
1074 #undef trace_usage_bit
1075 if (usage
.cbData
> 1 && usage
.pbData
[1] & CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE
)
1076 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE\n");
1080 static void dump_general_subtree(const CERT_GENERAL_SUBTREE
*subtree
)
1082 dump_alt_name_entry(&subtree
->Base
);
1083 TRACE_(chain
)("dwMinimum = %d, fMaximum = %d, dwMaximum = %d\n",
1084 subtree
->dwMinimum
, subtree
->fMaximum
, subtree
->dwMaximum
);
1087 static void dump_name_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1089 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*nameConstraints
;
1092 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
,
1093 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
1094 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &nameConstraints
,
1099 TRACE_(chain
)("%d permitted subtrees:\n",
1100 nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
);
1101 for (i
= 0; i
< nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
; i
++)
1102 dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints
->rgPermittedSubtree
[i
]);
1103 TRACE_(chain
)("%d excluded subtrees:\n",
1104 nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
);
1105 for (i
= 0; i
< nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
; i
++)
1106 dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints
->rgExcludedSubtree
[i
]);
1107 LocalFree(nameConstraints
);
1111 static void dump_cert_policies(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1113 CERT_POLICIES_INFO
*policies
;
1116 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_CERT_POLICIES
,
1117 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
, NULL
,
1122 TRACE_(chain
)("%d policies:\n", policies
->cPolicyInfo
);
1123 for (i
= 0; i
< policies
->cPolicyInfo
; i
++)
1125 TRACE_(chain
)("policy identifier: %s\n",
1126 debugstr_a(policies
->rgPolicyInfo
[i
].pszPolicyIdentifier
));
1127 TRACE_(chain
)("%d policy qualifiers:\n",
1128 policies
->rgPolicyInfo
[i
].cPolicyQualifier
);
1129 for (j
= 0; j
< policies
->rgPolicyInfo
[i
].cPolicyQualifier
; j
++)
1130 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", debugstr_a(
1131 policies
->rgPolicyInfo
[i
].rgPolicyQualifier
[j
].
1132 pszPolicyQualifierId
));
1134 LocalFree(policies
);
1138 static void dump_enhanced_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1140 CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE
*usage
;
1143 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
,
1144 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
, NULL
,
1149 TRACE_(chain
)("%d usages:\n", usage
->cUsageIdentifier
);
1150 for (i
= 0; i
< usage
->cUsageIdentifier
; i
++)
1151 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", usage
->rgpszUsageIdentifier
[i
]);
1156 static void dump_netscape_cert_type(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1158 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage
;
1159 DWORD size
= sizeof(usage
);
1161 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_BITS
, ext
->Value
.pbData
,
1162 ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &usage
, &size
))
1164 #define trace_cert_type_bit(bits, bit) \
1165 if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
1168 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0],
1169 NETSCAPE_SSL_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT_TYPE
);
1170 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0],
1171 NETSCAPE_SSL_SERVER_AUTH_CERT_TYPE
);
1172 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CERT_TYPE
);
1173 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CERT_TYPE
);
1174 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SSL_CA_CERT_TYPE
);
1175 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CA_CERT_TYPE
);
1176 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CA_CERT_TYPE
);
1178 #undef trace_cert_type_bit
1182 static void dump_extension(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1184 TRACE_(chain
)("%s (%scritical)\n", debugstr_a(ext
->pszObjId
),
1185 ext
->fCritical
? "" : "not ");
1186 if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
))
1187 dump_alt_name("subject alt name", ext
);
1188 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME
))
1189 dump_alt_name("issuer alt name", ext
);
1190 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
))
1191 dump_basic_constraints(ext
);
1192 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_KEY_USAGE
))
1193 dump_key_usage(ext
);
1194 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2
))
1195 dump_alt_name("subject alt name 2", ext
);
1196 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME2
))
1197 dump_alt_name("issuer alt name 2", ext
);
1198 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
))
1199 dump_basic_constraints2(ext
);
1200 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
))
1201 dump_name_constraints(ext
);
1202 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_CERT_POLICIES
))
1203 dump_cert_policies(ext
);
1204 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
))
1205 dump_enhanced_key_usage(ext
);
1206 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_NETSCAPE_CERT_TYPE
))
1207 dump_netscape_cert_type(ext
);
1210 static LPCWSTR
filetime_to_str(const FILETIME
*time
)
1212 static WCHAR date
[80];
1213 WCHAR dateFmt
[80]; /* sufficient for all versions of LOCALE_SSHORTDATE */
1216 if (!time
) return NULL
;
1218 GetLocaleInfoW(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT
, LOCALE_SSHORTDATE
, dateFmt
,
1219 sizeof(dateFmt
) / sizeof(dateFmt
[0]));
1220 FileTimeToSystemTime(time
, &sysTime
);
1221 GetDateFormatW(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT
, 0, &sysTime
, dateFmt
, date
,
1222 sizeof(date
) / sizeof(date
[0]));
1226 static void dump_element(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
)
1231 TRACE_(chain
)("%p: version %d\n", cert
, cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
);
1232 len
= CertGetNameStringW(cert
, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE
,
1233 CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG
, NULL
, NULL
, 0);
1234 name
= CryptMemAlloc(len
* sizeof(WCHAR
));
1237 CertGetNameStringW(cert
, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE
,
1238 CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG
, NULL
, name
, len
);
1239 TRACE_(chain
)("issued by %s\n", debugstr_w(name
));
1242 len
= CertGetNameStringW(cert
, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE
, 0, NULL
,
1244 name
= CryptMemAlloc(len
* sizeof(WCHAR
));
1247 CertGetNameStringW(cert
, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE
, 0, NULL
,
1249 TRACE_(chain
)("issued to %s\n", debugstr_w(name
));
1252 TRACE_(chain
)("valid from %s to %s\n",
1253 debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(&cert
->pCertInfo
->NotBefore
)),
1254 debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(&cert
->pCertInfo
->NotAfter
)));
1255 TRACE_(chain
)("%d extensions\n", cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
);
1256 for (i
= 0; i
< cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
; i
++)
1257 dump_extension(&cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
[i
]);
1260 static BOOL
CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(PCertificateChainEngine engine
,
1261 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, BOOL isRoot
, BOOL isCA
, DWORD index
)
1263 PCERT_EXTENSION ext
;
1267 ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_KEY_USAGE
, cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
,
1268 cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
);
1271 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage
;
1272 DWORD size
= sizeof(usage
);
1274 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert
->dwCertEncodingType
, X509_BITS
,
1275 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
1279 else if (usage
.cbData
> 2)
1281 /* The key usage extension only defines 9 bits => no more than 2
1282 * bytes are needed to encode all known usages.
1288 /* The only bit relevant to chain validation is the keyCertSign
1289 * bit, which is always in the least significant byte of the
1292 usageBits
= usage
.pbData
[usage
.cbData
- 1];
1299 /* MS appears to violate RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.3 (Key Usage)
1300 * here. Quoting the RFC:
1301 * "This [key usage] extension MUST appear in certificates that
1302 * contain public keys that are used to validate digital signatures
1303 * on other public key certificates or CRLs."
1304 * MS appears to accept certs that do not contain key usage
1305 * extensions as CA certs. V1 and V2 certificates did not have
1306 * extensions, and many root certificates are V1 certificates, so
1307 * perhaps this is prudent. On the other hand, MS also accepts V3
1308 * certs without key usage extensions. We are more restrictive:
1309 * we accept locally installed V1 or V2 certs as CA certs.
1310 * We also accept a lack of key usage extension on root certs,
1311 * which is implied in RFC 5280, section 6.1: the trust anchor's
1312 * only requirement is that it was used to issue the next
1313 * certificate in the chain.
1317 else if (cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
== CERT_V1
||
1318 cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
== CERT_V2
)
1320 PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert
= CRYPT_FindCertInStore(
1321 engine
->hWorld
, cert
);
1323 ret
= localCert
!= NULL
;
1324 CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert
);
1329 WARN_(chain
)("no key usage extension on a CA cert\n");
1333 if (!(usageBits
& CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE
))
1335 WARN_(chain
)("keyCertSign not asserted on a CA cert\n");
1344 if (ext
&& (usageBits
& CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE
))
1346 WARN_(chain
)("keyCertSign asserted on a non-CA cert\n");
1355 static BOOL
CRYPT_ExtendedKeyUsageValidForCA(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
)
1357 PCERT_EXTENSION ext
;
1360 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.12: "In general, this extension will only
1361 * appear in end entity certificates." And, "If a certificate contains
1362 * both a key usage extension and an extended key usage extension, then
1363 * both extensions MUST be processed independently and the certificate MUST
1364 * only be used for a purpose consistent with both extensions." This seems
1365 * to imply that it should be checked if present, and ignored if not.
1366 * Unfortunately some CAs, e.g. the Thawte SGC CA, don't include the code
1367 * signing extended key usage, whereas they do include the keyCertSign
1368 * key usage. Thus, when checking for a CA, we only require the
1369 * code signing extended key usage if the extended key usage is critical.
1371 ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
,
1372 cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
);
1373 if (ext
&& ext
->fCritical
)
1375 CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE
*usage
;
1378 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert
->dwCertEncodingType
,
1379 X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
1380 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
, NULL
, &usage
, &size
);
1385 /* Explicitly require the code signing extended key usage for a CA
1386 * with an extended key usage extension. That is, don't assume
1387 * a cert is allowed to be a CA if it specifies the
1388 * anyExtendedKeyUsage usage oid. See again RFC 5280, section
1389 * 4.2.1.12: "Applications that require the presence of a
1390 * particular purpose MAY reject certificates that include the
1391 * anyExtendedKeyUsage OID but not the particular OID expected for
1395 for (i
= 0; !ret
&& i
< usage
->cUsageIdentifier
; i
++)
1396 if (!strcmp(usage
->rgpszUsageIdentifier
[i
],
1397 szOID_PKIX_KP_CODE_SIGNING
))
1407 static BOOL
CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
)
1412 for (i
= 0; ret
&& i
< cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
; i
++)
1414 if (cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
[i
].fCritical
)
1416 LPCSTR oid
= cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
[i
].pszObjId
;
1418 if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
))
1420 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
))
1422 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
))
1424 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_KEY_USAGE
))
1426 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
))
1428 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2
))
1430 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
))
1434 FIXME("unsupported critical extension %s\n",
1443 static BOOL
CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
)
1447 /* Checks whether the contents of the cert match the cert's version. */
1448 switch (cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
)
1451 /* A V1 cert may not contain unique identifiers. See RFC 5280,
1453 * "These fields MUST only appear if the version is 2 or 3 (Section
1454 * 4.1.2.1). These fields MUST NOT appear if the version is 1."
1456 if (cert
->pCertInfo
->IssuerUniqueId
.cbData
||
1457 cert
->pCertInfo
->SubjectUniqueId
.cbData
)
1459 /* A V1 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
1460 * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
1462 if (cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
)
1466 /* A V2 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
1467 * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
1469 if (cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
)
1473 /* Do nothing, all fields are allowed for V3 certs */
1476 WARN_(chain
)("invalid cert version %d\n", cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
);
1482 static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(PCertificateChainEngine engine
,
1483 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
, LPFILETIME time
)
1485 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement
= chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1];
1487 BOOL pathLengthConstraintViolated
= FALSE
;
1488 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints
= { FALSE
, FALSE
, 0 };
1490 TRACE_(chain
)("checking chain with %d elements for time %s\n",
1491 chain
->cElement
, debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(time
)));
1492 for (i
= chain
->cElement
- 1; i
>= 0; i
--)
1496 if (TRACE_ON(chain
))
1497 dump_element(chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
);
1498 if (i
== chain
->cElement
- 1)
1499 isRoot
= CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
1500 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
);
1503 if (!CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
))
1505 /* MS appears to accept certs whose versions don't match their
1506 * contents, so there isn't an appropriate error code.
1508 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1509 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION
;
1511 if (CertVerifyTimeValidity(time
,
1512 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
) != 0)
1513 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1514 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID
;
1517 /* Check the signature of the cert this issued */
1518 if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
1519 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT
,
1520 (void *)chain
->rgpElement
[i
- 1]->pCertContext
,
1521 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT
,
1522 (void *)chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
, 0, NULL
))
1523 chain
->rgpElement
[i
- 1]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1524 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
;
1525 /* Once a path length constraint has been violated, every remaining
1526 * CA cert's basic constraints is considered invalid.
1528 if (pathLengthConstraintViolated
)
1529 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1530 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
1531 else if (!CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(engine
,
1532 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
, &constraints
, i
- 1, isRoot
,
1533 &pathLengthConstraintViolated
))
1534 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1535 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
1536 else if (constraints
.fPathLenConstraint
&&
1537 constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
)
1539 /* This one's valid - decrement max length */
1540 constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
--;
1545 /* Check whether end cert has a basic constraints extension */
1546 if (!CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(
1547 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
, &constraints
, FALSE
))
1548 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1549 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
1551 if (!CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(engine
, chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
,
1552 isRoot
, constraints
.fCA
, i
))
1553 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1554 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE
;
1556 if (!CRYPT_ExtendedKeyUsageValidForCA(
1557 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
))
1558 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1559 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE
;
1560 if (CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain
))
1562 /* If the chain is cyclic, then the path length constraints
1563 * are violated, because the chain is infinitely long.
1565 pathLengthConstraintViolated
= TRUE
;
1566 chain
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1567 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN
|
1568 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
1570 /* Check whether every critical extension is supported */
1571 if (!CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(
1572 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
))
1573 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1574 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION
;
1575 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain
->TrustStatus
,
1576 &chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
);
1578 CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(chain
);
1579 if (CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(rootElement
->pCertContext
))
1581 rootElement
->TrustStatus
.dwInfoStatus
|=
1582 CERT_TRUST_IS_SELF_SIGNED
| CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1583 CRYPT_CheckRootCert(engine
->hRoot
, rootElement
);
1585 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain
->TrustStatus
, &rootElement
->TrustStatus
);
1588 static PCCERT_CONTEXT
CRYPT_GetIssuer(HCERTSTORE store
, PCCERT_CONTEXT subject
,
1589 PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer
, DWORD
*infoStatus
)
1591 PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer
= NULL
;
1592 PCERT_EXTENSION ext
;
1596 if ((ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER
,
1597 subject
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, subject
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
)))
1599 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID_INFO
*info
;
1602 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject
->dwCertEncodingType
,
1603 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
1604 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
1610 if (info
->CertIssuer
.cbData
&& info
->CertSerialNumber
.cbData
)
1612 id
.dwIdChoice
= CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER
;
1613 memcpy(&id
.u
.IssuerSerialNumber
.Issuer
, &info
->CertIssuer
,
1614 sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB
));
1615 memcpy(&id
.u
.IssuerSerialNumber
.SerialNumber
,
1616 &info
->CertSerialNumber
, sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB
));
1617 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1618 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID
, &id
,
1622 TRACE_(chain
)("issuer found by issuer/serial number\n");
1623 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1626 else if (info
->KeyId
.cbData
)
1628 id
.dwIdChoice
= CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER
;
1629 memcpy(&id
.u
.KeyId
, &info
->KeyId
, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB
));
1630 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1631 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID
, &id
,
1635 TRACE_(chain
)("issuer found by key id\n");
1636 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1642 else if ((ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER2
,
1643 subject
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, subject
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
)))
1645 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2_INFO
*info
;
1648 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject
->dwCertEncodingType
,
1649 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
1650 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
1656 if (info
->AuthorityCertIssuer
.cAltEntry
&&
1657 info
->AuthorityCertSerialNumber
.cbData
)
1659 PCERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY directoryName
= NULL
;
1662 for (i
= 0; !directoryName
&&
1663 i
< info
->AuthorityCertIssuer
.cAltEntry
; i
++)
1664 if (info
->AuthorityCertIssuer
.rgAltEntry
[i
].dwAltNameChoice
1665 == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME
)
1667 &info
->AuthorityCertIssuer
.rgAltEntry
[i
];
1670 id
.dwIdChoice
= CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER
;
1671 memcpy(&id
.u
.IssuerSerialNumber
.Issuer
,
1672 &directoryName
->u
.DirectoryName
, sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB
));
1673 memcpy(&id
.u
.IssuerSerialNumber
.SerialNumber
,
1674 &info
->AuthorityCertSerialNumber
,
1675 sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB
));
1676 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1677 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID
, &id
,
1681 TRACE_(chain
)("issuer found by directory name\n");
1682 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1686 FIXME("no supported name type in authority key id2\n");
1688 else if (info
->KeyId
.cbData
)
1690 id
.dwIdChoice
= CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER
;
1691 memcpy(&id
.u
.KeyId
, &info
->KeyId
, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB
));
1692 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1693 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID
, &id
,
1697 TRACE_(chain
)("issuer found by key id\n");
1698 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1706 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1707 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_SUBJECT_NAME
,
1708 &subject
->pCertInfo
->Issuer
, prevIssuer
);
1709 TRACE_(chain
)("issuer found by name\n");
1710 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1715 /* Builds a simple chain by finding an issuer for the last cert in the chain,
1716 * until reaching a self-signed cert, or until no issuer can be found.
1718 static BOOL
CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine
*engine
,
1719 HCERTSTORE world
, PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
)
1722 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
= chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1]->pCertContext
;
1724 while (ret
&& !CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain
) &&
1725 !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(cert
))
1727 PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer
= CRYPT_GetIssuer(world
, cert
, NULL
,
1728 &chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1]->TrustStatus
.dwInfoStatus
);
1732 ret
= CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine
, chain
, issuer
,
1733 chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1]->TrustStatus
.dwInfoStatus
);
1734 /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it to
1735 * close the enumeration that found it
1737 CertFreeCertificateContext(issuer
);
1742 TRACE_(chain
)("Couldn't find issuer, halting chain creation\n");
1743 chain
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN
;
1750 static BOOL
CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(PCertificateChainEngine engine
,
1751 HCERTSTORE world
, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, LPFILETIME pTime
,
1752 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
*ppChain
)
1755 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
;
1757 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p)\n", engine
, world
, cert
, pTime
);
1759 chain
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1762 memset(chain
, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1763 chain
->cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
);
1764 ret
= CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine
, chain
, cert
, 0);
1767 ret
= CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine
, world
, chain
);
1769 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine
, chain
, pTime
);
1773 CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain
);
1781 static BOOL
CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine
,
1782 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, LPFILETIME pTime
, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore
,
1783 PCertificateChain
*ppChain
)
1785 PCertificateChainEngine engine
= (PCertificateChainEngine
)hChainEngine
;
1786 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN simpleChain
= NULL
;
1790 world
= CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION
, 0, 0,
1791 CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG
, NULL
);
1792 CertAddStoreToCollection(world
, engine
->hWorld
, 0, 0);
1793 if (hAdditionalStore
)
1794 CertAddStoreToCollection(world
, hAdditionalStore
, 0, 0);
1795 /* FIXME: only simple chains are supported for now, as CTLs aren't
1798 if ((ret
= CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(engine
, world
, cert
, pTime
,
1801 PCertificateChain chain
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain
));
1806 chain
->world
= world
;
1807 chain
->context
.cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
);
1808 chain
->context
.TrustStatus
= simpleChain
->TrustStatus
;
1809 chain
->context
.cChain
= 1;
1810 chain
->context
.rgpChain
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1811 chain
->context
.rgpChain
[0] = simpleChain
;
1812 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
= 0;
1813 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
= NULL
;
1814 chain
->context
.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime
= FALSE
;
1815 chain
->context
.dwRevocationFreshnessTime
= 0;
1824 /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement. */
1825 static PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(
1826 const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
*chain
, DWORD iElement
)
1828 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN copy
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1832 memset(copy
, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1833 copy
->cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
);
1835 CryptMemAlloc((iElement
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
1836 if (copy
->rgpElement
)
1841 memset(copy
->rgpElement
, 0,
1842 (iElement
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
1843 for (i
= 0; ret
&& i
<= iElement
; i
++)
1845 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
=
1846 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
1850 *element
= *chain
->rgpElement
[i
];
1851 element
->pCertContext
= CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
1852 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
);
1853 /* Reset the trust status of the copied element, it'll get
1854 * rechecked after the new chain is done.
1856 memset(&element
->TrustStatus
, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS
));
1857 copy
->rgpElement
[copy
->cElement
++] = element
;
1864 for (i
= 0; i
<= iElement
; i
++)
1865 CryptMemFree(copy
->rgpElement
[i
]);
1866 CryptMemFree(copy
->rgpElement
);
1880 static void CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(PCertificateChain chain
)
1884 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
; i
++)
1885 CertFreeCertificateChain(chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[i
]);
1886 CryptMemFree(chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
);
1887 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
= 0;
1888 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
= NULL
;
1891 static void CRYPT_FreeChainContext(PCertificateChain chain
)
1895 CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain
);
1896 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->context
.cChain
; i
++)
1897 CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]);
1898 CryptMemFree(chain
->context
.rgpChain
);
1899 CertCloseStore(chain
->world
, 0);
1900 CryptMemFree(chain
);
1903 /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement of
1904 * simple chain iChain.
1906 static PCertificateChain
CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(PCertificateChain chain
,
1907 DWORD iChain
, DWORD iElement
)
1909 PCertificateChain copy
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain
));
1914 copy
->world
= CertDuplicateStore(chain
->world
);
1915 copy
->context
.cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
);
1916 /* Leave the trust status of the copied chain unset, it'll get
1917 * rechecked after the new chain is done.
1919 memset(©
->context
.TrustStatus
, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS
));
1920 copy
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
= 0;
1921 copy
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
= NULL
;
1922 copy
->context
.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime
= FALSE
;
1923 copy
->context
.dwRevocationFreshnessTime
= 0;
1924 copy
->context
.rgpChain
= CryptMemAlloc(
1925 (iChain
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1926 if (copy
->context
.rgpChain
)
1931 memset(copy
->context
.rgpChain
, 0,
1932 (iChain
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1935 for (i
= 0; ret
&& iChain
&& i
< iChain
- 1; i
++)
1937 copy
->context
.rgpChain
[i
] =
1938 CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
],
1939 chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
- 1);
1940 if (!copy
->context
.rgpChain
[i
])
1948 copy
->context
.rgpChain
[i
] =
1949 CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
],
1951 if (!copy
->context
.rgpChain
[i
])
1956 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(copy
);
1960 copy
->context
.cChain
= iChain
+ 1;
1971 static PCertificateChain
CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(
1972 HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine
, LPFILETIME pTime
, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore
,
1973 PCertificateChain chain
)
1975 PCertificateChainEngine engine
= (PCertificateChainEngine
)hChainEngine
;
1976 PCertificateChain alternate
;
1978 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine
, pTime
, hAdditionalStore
, chain
);
1980 /* Always start with the last "lower quality" chain to ensure a consistent
1981 * order of alternate creation:
1983 if (chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
)
1984 chain
= (PCertificateChain
)chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[
1985 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
- 1];
1986 /* A chain with only one element can't have any alternates */
1987 if (chain
->context
.cChain
<= 1 && chain
->context
.rgpChain
[0]->cElement
<= 1)
1991 DWORD i
, j
, infoStatus
;
1992 PCCERT_CONTEXT alternateIssuer
= NULL
;
1995 for (i
= 0; !alternateIssuer
&& i
< chain
->context
.cChain
; i
++)
1996 for (j
= 0; !alternateIssuer
&&
1997 j
< chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
- 1; j
++)
1999 PCCERT_CONTEXT subject
=
2000 chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
;
2001 PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer
= CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
2002 chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->rgpElement
[j
+ 1]->pCertContext
);
2004 alternateIssuer
= CRYPT_GetIssuer(prevIssuer
->hCertStore
,
2005 subject
, prevIssuer
, &infoStatus
);
2007 if (alternateIssuer
)
2011 alternate
= CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(chain
, i
, j
);
2014 BOOL ret
= CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine
,
2015 alternate
->context
.rgpChain
[i
], alternateIssuer
, infoStatus
);
2017 /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it
2018 * to close the enumeration that found it
2020 CertFreeCertificateContext(alternateIssuer
);
2023 ret
= CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine
, alternate
->world
,
2024 alternate
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]);
2026 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine
,
2027 alternate
->context
.rgpChain
[i
], pTime
);
2028 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&alternate
->context
.TrustStatus
,
2029 &alternate
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->TrustStatus
);
2033 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(alternate
);
2039 TRACE("%p\n", alternate
);
2043 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID 0x16
2044 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID 8
2045 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN 4
2046 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS 2
2047 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT 1
2049 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST \
2050 CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID | CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID | \
2051 CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN | CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS | \
2052 CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT
2054 #define IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(TrustStatus, bits) \
2055 (TrustStatus)->dwErrorStatus & (bits)
2057 static DWORD
CRYPT_ChainQuality(const CertificateChain
*chain
)
2059 DWORD quality
= CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST
;
2061 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
2062 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
))
2063 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT
;
2064 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
2065 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
))
2066 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
2067 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
2068 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN
))
2069 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN
;
2070 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
2071 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID
| CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED
))
2072 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID
;
2073 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
2074 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
))
2075 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID
;
2079 /* Chooses the highest quality chain among chain and its "lower quality"
2080 * alternate chains. Returns the highest quality chain, with all other
2081 * chains as lower quality chains of it.
2083 static PCertificateChain
CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(
2084 PCertificateChain chain
)
2088 /* There are always only two chains being considered: chain, and an
2089 * alternate at chain->rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]. If the alternate
2090 * has a higher quality than chain, the alternate gets assigned the lower
2091 * quality contexts, with chain taking the alternate's place among the
2092 * lower quality contexts.
2094 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
; i
++)
2096 PCertificateChain alternate
=
2097 (PCertificateChain
)chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[i
];
2099 if (CRYPT_ChainQuality(alternate
) > CRYPT_ChainQuality(chain
))
2101 alternate
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
=
2102 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
;
2103 alternate
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
=
2104 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
;
2105 alternate
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[i
] =
2106 (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
)chain
;
2107 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
= 0;
2108 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
= NULL
;
2115 static BOOL
CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(PCertificateChain chain
,
2116 const CertificateChain
*alternate
)
2120 if (chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
)
2121 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
=
2122 CryptMemRealloc(chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
,
2123 (chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
+ 1) *
2124 sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
));
2126 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
=
2127 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
));
2128 if (chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
)
2130 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[
2131 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
++] =
2132 (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
)alternate
;
2140 static PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(
2141 const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
*chain
, DWORD i
)
2144 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
= NULL
;
2146 for (j
= 0, iElement
= 0; !element
&& j
< chain
->cChain
; j
++)
2148 if (iElement
+ chain
->rgpChain
[j
]->cElement
< i
)
2149 iElement
+= chain
->rgpChain
[j
]->cElement
;
2151 element
= chain
->rgpChain
[j
]->rgpElement
[i
- iElement
];
2156 typedef struct _CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS
{
2158 CERT_USAGE_MATCH RequestedUsage
;
2159 } CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS
, *PCERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS
;
2161 static void CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain
,
2162 LPFILETIME pTime
, const CERT_CHAIN_PARA
*pChainPara
, DWORD chainFlags
)
2166 if (chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_END_CERT
)
2168 else if ((chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN
) ||
2169 (chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT
))
2173 for (i
= 0, cContext
= 0; i
< chain
->cChain
; i
++)
2175 if (i
< chain
->cChain
- 1 ||
2176 chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN
)
2177 cContext
+= chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
;
2179 cContext
+= chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
- 1;
2186 PCCERT_CONTEXT
*contexts
=
2187 CryptMemAlloc(cContext
* sizeof(PCCERT_CONTEXT
*));
2191 DWORD i
, j
, iContext
, revocationFlags
;
2192 CERT_REVOCATION_PARA revocationPara
= { sizeof(revocationPara
), 0 };
2193 CERT_REVOCATION_STATUS revocationStatus
=
2194 { sizeof(revocationStatus
), 0 };
2197 for (i
= 0, iContext
= 0; iContext
< cContext
&& i
< chain
->cChain
;
2200 for (j
= 0; iContext
< cContext
&&
2201 j
< chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
; j
++)
2202 contexts
[iContext
++] =
2203 chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
;
2205 revocationFlags
= CERT_VERIFY_REV_CHAIN_FLAG
;
2206 if (chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY
)
2207 revocationFlags
|= CERT_VERIFY_CACHE_ONLY_BASED_REVOCATION
;
2208 if (chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT
)
2209 revocationFlags
|= CERT_VERIFY_REV_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT_FLAG
;
2210 revocationPara
.pftTimeToUse
= pTime
;
2211 if (pChainPara
->cbSize
== sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA
))
2213 revocationPara
.dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
=
2214 pChainPara
->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
;
2215 revocationPara
.fCheckFreshnessTime
=
2216 pChainPara
->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime
;
2217 revocationPara
.dwFreshnessTime
=
2218 pChainPara
->dwRevocationFreshnessTime
;
2220 ret
= CertVerifyRevocation(X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
2221 CERT_CONTEXT_REVOCATION_TYPE
, cContext
, (void **)contexts
,
2222 revocationFlags
, &revocationPara
, &revocationStatus
);
2225 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
=
2226 CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(chain
, revocationStatus
.dwIndex
);
2229 switch (revocationStatus
.dwError
)
2231 case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK
:
2232 case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_DLL
:
2233 case CRYPT_E_NOT_IN_REVOCATION_DATABASE
:
2234 error
= CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN
;
2236 case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE
:
2237 error
= CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION
;
2239 case CRYPT_E_REVOKED
:
2240 error
= CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED
;
2243 WARN("unmapped error %08x\n", revocationStatus
.dwError
);
2248 /* FIXME: set element's pRevocationInfo member */
2249 element
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|= error
;
2251 chain
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|= error
;
2253 CryptMemFree(contexts
);
2258 static void dump_usage_match(LPCSTR name
, const CERT_USAGE_MATCH
*usageMatch
)
2262 TRACE_(chain
)("%s: %s\n", name
,
2263 usageMatch
->dwType
== USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND
? "AND" : "OR");
2264 for (i
= 0; i
< usageMatch
->Usage
.cUsageIdentifier
; i
++)
2265 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", usageMatch
->Usage
.rgpszUsageIdentifier
[i
]);
2268 static void dump_chain_para(const CERT_CHAIN_PARA
*pChainPara
)
2270 TRACE_(chain
)("%d\n", pChainPara
->cbSize
);
2271 if (pChainPara
->cbSize
>= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS
))
2272 dump_usage_match("RequestedUsage", &pChainPara
->RequestedUsage
);
2273 if (pChainPara
->cbSize
>= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA
))
2275 dump_usage_match("RequestedIssuancePolicy",
2276 &pChainPara
->RequestedIssuancePolicy
);
2277 TRACE_(chain
)("%d\n", pChainPara
->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
);
2278 TRACE_(chain
)("%d\n", pChainPara
->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime
);
2279 TRACE_(chain
)("%d\n", pChainPara
->dwRevocationFreshnessTime
);
2283 BOOL WINAPI
CertGetCertificateChain(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine
,
2284 PCCERT_CONTEXT pCertContext
, LPFILETIME pTime
, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore
,
2285 PCERT_CHAIN_PARA pChainPara
, DWORD dwFlags
, LPVOID pvReserved
,
2286 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
* ppChainContext
)
2289 PCertificateChain chain
= NULL
;
2291 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p, %p, %08x, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine
, pCertContext
,
2292 pTime
, hAdditionalStore
, pChainPara
, dwFlags
, pvReserved
, ppChainContext
);
2295 *ppChainContext
= NULL
;
2298 SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG
);
2301 if (!pCertContext
->pCertInfo
->SignatureAlgorithm
.pszObjId
)
2303 SetLastError(ERROR_INVALID_DATA
);
2308 hChainEngine
= CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine();
2309 if (TRACE_ON(chain
))
2310 dump_chain_para(pChainPara
);
2311 /* FIXME: what about HCCE_LOCAL_MACHINE? */
2312 ret
= CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(hChainEngine
, pCertContext
, pTime
,
2313 hAdditionalStore
, &chain
);
2316 PCertificateChain alternate
= NULL
;
2317 PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChain
;
2320 alternate
= CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(hChainEngine
,
2321 pTime
, hAdditionalStore
, chain
);
2323 /* Alternate contexts are added as "lower quality" contexts of
2324 * chain, to avoid loops in alternate chain creation.
2325 * The highest-quality chain is chosen at the end.
2328 ret
= CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(chain
, alternate
);
2329 } while (ret
&& alternate
);
2330 chain
= CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(chain
);
2331 if (!(dwFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_RETURN_LOWER_QUALITY_CONTEXTS
))
2332 CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain
);
2333 pChain
= (PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
)chain
;
2334 CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(pChain
, pTime
, pChainPara
, dwFlags
);
2336 *ppChainContext
= pChain
;
2338 CertFreeCertificateChain(pChain
);
2340 TRACE("returning %d\n", ret
);
2344 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT WINAPI
CertDuplicateCertificateChain(
2345 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
)
2347 PCertificateChain chain
= (PCertificateChain
)pChainContext
;
2349 TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext
);
2352 InterlockedIncrement(&chain
->ref
);
2353 return pChainContext
;
2356 VOID WINAPI
CertFreeCertificateChain(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
)
2358 PCertificateChain chain
= (PCertificateChain
)pChainContext
;
2360 TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext
);
2364 if (InterlockedDecrement(&chain
->ref
) == 0)
2365 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(chain
);
2369 static void find_element_with_error(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain
, DWORD error
,
2370 LONG
*iChain
, LONG
*iElement
)
2374 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->cChain
; i
++)
2375 for (j
= 0; j
< chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
; j
++)
2376 if (chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->rgpElement
[j
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2385 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_base_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2386 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2387 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2389 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
2390 if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2391 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
)
2393 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE
;
2394 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2395 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2396 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2398 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2399 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
)
2401 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT
;
2402 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2403 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2404 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2406 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
& CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
)
2408 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_CHAINING
;
2409 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
, CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
,
2410 &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
, &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2411 /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
2412 pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
2415 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= NO_ERROR
;
2419 static BYTE msTestPubKey1
[] = {
2420 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x81,0x55,0x22,0xb9,0x8a,0xa4,0x6f,0xed,0xd6,0xe7,0xd9,
2421 0x66,0x0f,0x55,0xbc,0xd7,0xcd,0xd5,0xbc,0x4e,0x40,0x02,0x21,0xa2,0xb1,0xf7,
2422 0x87,0x30,0x85,0x5e,0xd2,0xf2,0x44,0xb9,0xdc,0x9b,0x75,0xb6,0xfb,0x46,0x5f,
2423 0x42,0xb6,0x9d,0x23,0x36,0x0b,0xde,0x54,0x0f,0xcd,0xbd,0x1f,0x99,0x2a,0x10,
2424 0x58,0x11,0xcb,0x40,0xcb,0xb5,0xa7,0x41,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2425 static BYTE msTestPubKey2
[] = {
2426 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x9c,0x50,0x05,0x1d,0xe2,0x0e,0x4c,0x53,0xd8,0xd9,0xb5,
2427 0xe5,0xfd,0xe9,0xe3,0xad,0x83,0x4b,0x80,0x08,0xd9,0xdc,0xe8,0xe8,0x35,0xf8,
2428 0x11,0xf1,0xe9,0x9b,0x03,0x7a,0x65,0x64,0x76,0x35,0xce,0x38,0x2c,0xf2,0xb6,
2429 0x71,0x9e,0x06,0xd9,0xbf,0xbb,0x31,0x69,0xa3,0xf6,0x30,0xa0,0x78,0x7b,0x18,
2430 0xdd,0x50,0x4d,0x79,0x1e,0xeb,0x61,0xc1,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2432 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_authenticode_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2433 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2434 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2436 BOOL ret
= verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID
, pChainContext
, pPolicyPara
,
2439 if (ret
&& pPolicyStatus
->dwError
== CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT
)
2441 CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey
= { { 0 } };
2442 BOOL isMSTestRoot
= FALSE
;
2443 PCCERT_CONTEXT failingCert
=
2444 pChainContext
->rgpChain
[pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
]->
2445 rgpElement
[pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
]->pCertContext
;
2447 CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs
[] = {
2448 { sizeof(msTestPubKey1
), msTestPubKey1
},
2449 { sizeof(msTestPubKey2
), msTestPubKey2
},
2452 /* Check whether the root is an MS test root */
2453 for (i
= 0; !isMSTestRoot
&& i
< sizeof(keyBlobs
) / sizeof(keyBlobs
[0]);
2456 msPubKey
.PublicKey
.cbData
= keyBlobs
[i
].cbData
;
2457 msPubKey
.PublicKey
.pbData
= keyBlobs
[i
].pbData
;
2458 if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
2459 X509_ASN_ENCODING
| PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING
,
2460 &failingCert
->pCertInfo
->SubjectPublicKeyInfo
, &msPubKey
))
2461 isMSTestRoot
= TRUE
;
2464 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDTESTROOT
;
2469 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_basic_constraints_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2470 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2471 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2473 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
2474 if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2475 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
)
2477 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
2478 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2479 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2480 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2483 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= NO_ERROR
;
2487 static BOOL
match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(PCERT_EXTENSION ext
,
2488 LPCWSTR server_name
)
2490 BOOL matches
= FALSE
;
2491 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO
*subjectName
;
2494 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name
));
2495 /* This could be spoofed by the embedded NULL vulnerability, since the
2496 * returned CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO doesn't have a way to indicate the
2497 * encoded length of a name. Fortunately CryptDecodeObjectEx fails if
2498 * the encoded form of the name contains a NULL.
2500 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME
,
2501 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
2502 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
2503 &subjectName
, &size
))
2507 /* RFC 5280 states that multiple instances of each name type may exist,
2508 * in section 4.2.1.6:
2509 * "Multiple name forms, and multiple instances of each name form,
2511 * It doesn't specify the behavior in such cases, but both RFC 2818
2512 * and RFC 2595 explicitly accept a certificate if any name matches.
2514 for (i
= 0; !matches
&& i
< subjectName
->cAltEntry
; i
++)
2516 if (subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].dwAltNameChoice
==
2517 CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME
)
2519 TRACE_(chain
)("dNSName: %s\n", debugstr_w(
2520 subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.pwszDNSName
));
2521 if (!strcmpiW(server_name
,
2522 subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.pwszDNSName
))
2526 LocalFree(subjectName
);
2531 static BOOL
find_matching_domain_component(CERT_NAME_INFO
*name
,
2534 BOOL matches
= FALSE
;
2537 for (i
= 0; !matches
&& i
< name
->cRDN
; i
++)
2538 for (j
= 0; j
< name
->rgRDN
[i
].cRDNAttr
; j
++)
2539 if (!strcmp(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT
,
2540 name
->rgRDN
[i
].rgRDNAttr
[j
].pszObjId
))
2542 PCERT_RDN_ATTR attr
;
2544 attr
= &name
->rgRDN
[i
].rgRDNAttr
[j
];
2545 /* Compare with memicmpW rather than strcmpiW in order to avoid
2546 * a match with a string with an embedded NULL. The component
2547 * must match one domain component attribute's entire string
2548 * value with a case-insensitive match.
2550 matches
= !memicmpW(component
, (LPWSTR
)attr
->Value
.pbData
,
2551 attr
->Value
.cbData
/ sizeof(WCHAR
));
2556 static BOOL
match_domain_component(LPCWSTR allowed_component
, DWORD allowed_len
,
2557 LPCWSTR server_component
, DWORD server_len
, BOOL allow_wildcards
,
2560 LPCWSTR allowed_ptr
, server_ptr
;
2561 BOOL matches
= TRUE
;
2563 *see_wildcard
= FALSE
;
2564 if (server_len
< allowed_len
)
2566 WARN_(chain
)("domain component %s too short for %s\n",
2567 debugstr_wn(server_component
, server_len
),
2568 debugstr_wn(allowed_component
, allowed_len
));
2569 /* A domain component can't contain a wildcard character, so a domain
2570 * component shorter than the allowed string can't produce a match.
2574 for (allowed_ptr
= allowed_component
, server_ptr
= server_component
;
2575 matches
&& allowed_ptr
- allowed_component
< allowed_len
;
2576 allowed_ptr
++, server_ptr
++)
2578 if (*allowed_ptr
== '*')
2580 if (allowed_ptr
- allowed_component
< allowed_len
- 1)
2582 WARN_(chain
)("non-wildcard characters after wildcard not supported\n");
2585 else if (!allow_wildcards
)
2587 WARN_(chain
)("wildcard after non-wildcard component\n");
2592 /* the preceding characters must have matched, so the rest of
2593 * the component also matches.
2595 *see_wildcard
= TRUE
;
2599 matches
= tolowerW(*allowed_ptr
) == tolowerW(*server_ptr
);
2601 if (matches
&& server_ptr
- server_component
< server_len
)
2603 /* If there are unmatched characters in the server domain component,
2604 * the server domain only matches if the allowed string ended in a '*'.
2606 matches
= *allowed_ptr
== '*';
2611 static BOOL
match_common_name(LPCWSTR server_name
, PCERT_RDN_ATTR nameAttr
)
2613 LPCWSTR allowed
= (LPCWSTR
)nameAttr
->Value
.pbData
;
2614 LPCWSTR allowed_component
= allowed
;
2615 DWORD allowed_len
= nameAttr
->Value
.cbData
/ sizeof(WCHAR
);
2616 LPCWSTR server_component
= server_name
;
2617 DWORD server_len
= strlenW(server_name
);
2618 BOOL matches
= TRUE
, allow_wildcards
= TRUE
;
2620 TRACE_(chain
)("CN = %s\n", debugstr_wn(allowed_component
, allowed_len
));
2622 /* From RFC 2818 (HTTP over TLS), section 3.1:
2623 * "Names may contain the wildcard character * which is considered to match
2624 * any single domain name component or component fragment. E.g.,
2625 * *.a.com matches foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com
2628 * And from RFC 2595 (Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP), section 2.4:
2629 * "A "*" wildcard character MAY be used as the left-most name component in
2630 * the certificate. For example, *.example.com would match a.example.com,
2631 * foo.example.com, etc. but would not match example.com."
2633 * There are other protocols which use TLS, and none of them is
2634 * authoritative. This accepts certificates in common usage, e.g.
2635 * *.domain.com matches www.domain.com but not domain.com, and
2636 * www*.domain.com matches www1.domain.com but not mail.domain.com.
2639 LPCWSTR allowed_dot
, server_dot
;
2641 allowed_dot
= memchrW(allowed_component
, '.',
2642 allowed_len
- (allowed_component
- allowed
));
2643 server_dot
= memchrW(server_component
, '.',
2644 server_len
- (server_component
- server_name
));
2645 /* The number of components must match */
2646 if ((!allowed_dot
&& server_dot
) || (allowed_dot
&& !server_dot
))
2649 WARN_(chain
)("%s: too many components for CN=%s\n",
2650 debugstr_w(server_name
), debugstr_wn(allowed
, allowed_len
));
2652 WARN_(chain
)("%s: not enough components for CN=%s\n",
2653 debugstr_w(server_name
), debugstr_wn(allowed
, allowed_len
));
2658 LPCWSTR allowed_end
, server_end
;
2661 allowed_end
= allowed_dot
? allowed_dot
: allowed
+ allowed_len
;
2662 server_end
= server_dot
? server_dot
: server_name
+ server_len
;
2663 matches
= match_domain_component(allowed_component
,
2664 allowed_end
- allowed_component
, server_component
,
2665 server_end
- server_component
, allow_wildcards
, &has_wildcard
);
2666 /* Once a non-wildcard component is seen, no wildcard components
2670 allow_wildcards
= FALSE
;
2673 allowed_component
= allowed_dot
? allowed_dot
+ 1 : allowed_end
;
2674 server_component
= server_dot
? server_dot
+ 1 : server_end
;
2677 } while (matches
&& allowed_component
&&
2678 allowed_component
- allowed
< allowed_len
&&
2679 server_component
&& server_component
- server_name
< server_len
);
2680 TRACE_(chain
)("returning %d\n", matches
);
2684 static BOOL
match_dns_to_subject_dn(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, LPCWSTR server_name
)
2686 BOOL matches
= FALSE
;
2687 CERT_NAME_INFO
*name
;
2690 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name
));
2691 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_UNICODE_NAME
,
2692 cert
->pCertInfo
->Subject
.pbData
, cert
->pCertInfo
->Subject
.cbData
,
2693 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
2696 /* If the subject distinguished name contains any name components,
2697 * make sure all of them are present.
2699 if (CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT
, name
))
2701 LPCWSTR ptr
= server_name
;
2705 LPCWSTR dot
= strchrW(ptr
, '.'), end
;
2706 /* 254 is the maximum DNS label length, see RFC 1035 */
2707 WCHAR component
[255];
2710 end
= dot
? dot
: ptr
+ strlenW(ptr
);
2712 if (len
>= sizeof(component
) / sizeof(component
[0]))
2714 WARN_(chain
)("domain component %s too long\n",
2715 debugstr_wn(ptr
, len
));
2720 memcpy(component
, ptr
, len
* sizeof(WCHAR
));
2722 matches
= find_matching_domain_component(name
, component
);
2724 ptr
= dot
? dot
+ 1 : end
;
2725 } while (matches
&& ptr
&& *ptr
);
2729 PCERT_RDN_ATTR attr
;
2731 /* If the certificate isn't using a DN attribute in the name, make
2732 * make sure the common name matches.
2734 if ((attr
= CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_COMMON_NAME
, name
)))
2735 matches
= match_common_name(server_name
, attr
);
2742 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_ssl_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2743 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2744 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2746 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
2747 if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2748 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
)
2750 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE
;
2751 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2752 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2753 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2755 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2756 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
)
2758 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT
;
2759 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2760 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2761 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2763 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
& CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
)
2765 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT
;
2766 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2767 CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2768 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2769 /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
2770 pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
2772 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2773 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID
)
2775 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_EXPIRED
;
2776 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2777 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2778 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2781 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= NO_ERROR
;
2782 /* We only need bother checking whether the name in the end certificate
2783 * matches if the chain is otherwise okay.
2785 if (!pPolicyStatus
->dwError
&& pPolicyPara
&&
2786 pPolicyPara
->cbSize
>= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA
))
2788 HTTPSPolicyCallbackData
*sslPara
= pPolicyPara
->pvExtraPolicyPara
;
2790 if (sslPara
&& sslPara
->u
.cbSize
>= sizeof(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData
))
2792 if (sslPara
->dwAuthType
== AUTHTYPE_SERVER
&&
2793 sslPara
->pwszServerName
)
2795 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
;
2796 PCERT_EXTENSION altNameExt
;
2799 cert
= pChainContext
->rgpChain
[0]->rgpElement
[0]->pCertContext
;
2800 altNameExt
= get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert
->pCertInfo
);
2801 /* If the alternate name extension exists, the name it contains
2802 * is bound to the certificate, so make sure the name matches
2803 * it. Otherwise, look for the server name in the subject
2804 * distinguished name. RFC5280, section 4.2.1.6:
2805 * "Whenever such identities are to be bound into a
2806 * certificate, the subject alternative name (or issuer
2807 * alternative name) extension MUST be used; however, a DNS
2808 * name MAY also be represented in the subject field using the
2809 * domainComponent attribute."
2812 matches
= match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(altNameExt
,
2813 sslPara
->pwszServerName
);
2815 matches
= match_dns_to_subject_dn(cert
,
2816 sslPara
->pwszServerName
);
2819 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH
;
2820 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= 0;
2821 pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= 0;
2829 static BYTE msPubKey1
[] = {
2830 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xdf,0x08,0xba,0xe3,0x3f,0x6e,
2831 0x64,0x9b,0xf5,0x89,0xaf,0x28,0x96,0x4a,0x07,0x8f,0x1b,0x2e,0x8b,0x3e,0x1d,
2832 0xfc,0xb8,0x80,0x69,0xa3,0xa1,0xce,0xdb,0xdf,0xb0,0x8e,0x6c,0x89,0x76,0x29,
2833 0x4f,0xca,0x60,0x35,0x39,0xad,0x72,0x32,0xe0,0x0b,0xae,0x29,0x3d,0x4c,0x16,
2834 0xd9,0x4b,0x3c,0x9d,0xda,0xc5,0xd3,0xd1,0x09,0xc9,0x2c,0x6f,0xa6,0xc2,0x60,
2835 0x53,0x45,0xdd,0x4b,0xd1,0x55,0xcd,0x03,0x1c,0xd2,0x59,0x56,0x24,0xf3,0xe5,
2836 0x78,0xd8,0x07,0xcc,0xd8,0xb3,0x1f,0x90,0x3f,0xc0,0x1a,0x71,0x50,0x1d,0x2d,
2837 0xa7,0x12,0x08,0x6d,0x7c,0xb0,0x86,0x6c,0xc7,0xba,0x85,0x32,0x07,0xe1,0x61,
2838 0x6f,0xaf,0x03,0xc5,0x6d,0xe5,0xd6,0xa1,0x8f,0x36,0xf6,0xc1,0x0b,0xd1,0x3e,
2839 0x69,0x97,0x48,0x72,0xc9,0x7f,0xa4,0xc8,0xc2,0x4a,0x4c,0x7e,0xa1,0xd1,0x94,
2840 0xa6,0xd7,0xdc,0xeb,0x05,0x46,0x2e,0xb8,0x18,0xb4,0x57,0x1d,0x86,0x49,0xdb,
2841 0x69,0x4a,0x2c,0x21,0xf5,0x5e,0x0f,0x54,0x2d,0x5a,0x43,0xa9,0x7a,0x7e,0x6a,
2842 0x8e,0x50,0x4d,0x25,0x57,0xa1,0xbf,0x1b,0x15,0x05,0x43,0x7b,0x2c,0x05,0x8d,
2843 0xbd,0x3d,0x03,0x8c,0x93,0x22,0x7d,0x63,0xea,0x0a,0x57,0x05,0x06,0x0a,0xdb,
2844 0x61,0x98,0x65,0x2d,0x47,0x49,0xa8,0xe7,0xe6,0x56,0x75,0x5c,0xb8,0x64,0x08,
2845 0x63,0xa9,0x30,0x40,0x66,0xb2,0xf9,0xb6,0xe3,0x34,0xe8,0x67,0x30,0xe1,0x43,
2846 0x0b,0x87,0xff,0xc9,0xbe,0x72,0x10,0x5e,0x23,0xf0,0x9b,0xa7,0x48,0x65,0xbf,
2847 0x09,0x88,0x7b,0xcd,0x72,0xbc,0x2e,0x79,0x9b,0x7b,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2848 static BYTE msPubKey2
[] = {
2849 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xa9,0x02,0xbd,0xc1,0x70,0xe6,
2850 0x3b,0xf2,0x4e,0x1b,0x28,0x9f,0x97,0x78,0x5e,0x30,0xea,0xa2,0xa9,0x8d,0x25,
2851 0x5f,0xf8,0xfe,0x95,0x4c,0xa3,0xb7,0xfe,0x9d,0xa2,0x20,0x3e,0x7c,0x51,0xa2,
2852 0x9b,0xa2,0x8f,0x60,0x32,0x6b,0xd1,0x42,0x64,0x79,0xee,0xac,0x76,0xc9,0x54,
2853 0xda,0xf2,0xeb,0x9c,0x86,0x1c,0x8f,0x9f,0x84,0x66,0xb3,0xc5,0x6b,0x7a,0x62,
2854 0x23,0xd6,0x1d,0x3c,0xde,0x0f,0x01,0x92,0xe8,0x96,0xc4,0xbf,0x2d,0x66,0x9a,
2855 0x9a,0x68,0x26,0x99,0xd0,0x3a,0x2c,0xbf,0x0c,0xb5,0x58,0x26,0xc1,0x46,0xe7,
2856 0x0a,0x3e,0x38,0x96,0x2c,0xa9,0x28,0x39,0xa8,0xec,0x49,0x83,0x42,0xe3,0x84,
2857 0x0f,0xbb,0x9a,0x6c,0x55,0x61,0xac,0x82,0x7c,0xa1,0x60,0x2d,0x77,0x4c,0xe9,
2858 0x99,0xb4,0x64,0x3b,0x9a,0x50,0x1c,0x31,0x08,0x24,0x14,0x9f,0xa9,0xe7,0x91,
2859 0x2b,0x18,0xe6,0x3d,0x98,0x63,0x14,0x60,0x58,0x05,0x65,0x9f,0x1d,0x37,0x52,
2860 0x87,0xf7,0xa7,0xef,0x94,0x02,0xc6,0x1b,0xd3,0xbf,0x55,0x45,0xb3,0x89,0x80,
2861 0xbf,0x3a,0xec,0x54,0x94,0x4e,0xae,0xfd,0xa7,0x7a,0x6d,0x74,0x4e,0xaf,0x18,
2862 0xcc,0x96,0x09,0x28,0x21,0x00,0x57,0x90,0x60,0x69,0x37,0xbb,0x4b,0x12,0x07,
2863 0x3c,0x56,0xff,0x5b,0xfb,0xa4,0x66,0x0a,0x08,0xa6,0xd2,0x81,0x56,0x57,0xef,
2864 0xb6,0x3b,0x5e,0x16,0x81,0x77,0x04,0xda,0xf6,0xbe,0xae,0x80,0x95,0xfe,0xb0,
2865 0xcd,0x7f,0xd6,0xa7,0x1a,0x72,0x5c,0x3c,0xca,0xbc,0xf0,0x08,0xa3,0x22,0x30,
2866 0xb3,0x06,0x85,0xc9,0xb3,0x20,0x77,0x13,0x85,0xdf,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2867 static BYTE msPubKey3
[] = {
2868 0x30,0x82,0x02,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x02,0x01,0x00,0xf3,0x5d,0xfa,0x80,0x67,0xd4,
2869 0x5a,0xa7,0xa9,0x0c,0x2c,0x90,0x20,0xd0,0x35,0x08,0x3c,0x75,0x84,0xcd,0xb7,
2870 0x07,0x89,0x9c,0x89,0xda,0xde,0xce,0xc3,0x60,0xfa,0x91,0x68,0x5a,0x9e,0x94,
2871 0x71,0x29,0x18,0x76,0x7c,0xc2,0xe0,0xc8,0x25,0x76,0x94,0x0e,0x58,0xfa,0x04,
2872 0x34,0x36,0xe6,0xdf,0xaf,0xf7,0x80,0xba,0xe9,0x58,0x0b,0x2b,0x93,0xe5,0x9d,
2873 0x05,0xe3,0x77,0x22,0x91,0xf7,0x34,0x64,0x3c,0x22,0x91,0x1d,0x5e,0xe1,0x09,
2874 0x90,0xbc,0x14,0xfe,0xfc,0x75,0x58,0x19,0xe1,0x79,0xb7,0x07,0x92,0xa3,0xae,
2875 0x88,0x59,0x08,0xd8,0x9f,0x07,0xca,0x03,0x58,0xfc,0x68,0x29,0x6d,0x32,0xd7,
2876 0xd2,0xa8,0xcb,0x4b,0xfc,0xe1,0x0b,0x48,0x32,0x4f,0xe6,0xeb,0xb8,0xad,0x4f,
2877 0xe4,0x5c,0x6f,0x13,0x94,0x99,0xdb,0x95,0xd5,0x75,0xdb,0xa8,0x1a,0xb7,0x94,
2878 0x91,0xb4,0x77,0x5b,0xf5,0x48,0x0c,0x8f,0x6a,0x79,0x7d,0x14,0x70,0x04,0x7d,
2879 0x6d,0xaf,0x90,0xf5,0xda,0x70,0xd8,0x47,0xb7,0xbf,0x9b,0x2f,0x6c,0xe7,0x05,
2880 0xb7,0xe1,0x11,0x60,0xac,0x79,0x91,0x14,0x7c,0xc5,0xd6,0xa6,0xe4,0xe1,0x7e,
2881 0xd5,0xc3,0x7e,0xe5,0x92,0xd2,0x3c,0x00,0xb5,0x36,0x82,0xde,0x79,0xe1,0x6d,
2882 0xf3,0xb5,0x6e,0xf8,0x9f,0x33,0xc9,0xcb,0x52,0x7d,0x73,0x98,0x36,0xdb,0x8b,
2883 0xa1,0x6b,0xa2,0x95,0x97,0x9b,0xa3,0xde,0xc2,0x4d,0x26,0xff,0x06,0x96,0x67,
2884 0x25,0x06,0xc8,0xe7,0xac,0xe4,0xee,0x12,0x33,0x95,0x31,0x99,0xc8,0x35,0x08,
2885 0x4e,0x34,0xca,0x79,0x53,0xd5,0xb5,0xbe,0x63,0x32,0x59,0x40,0x36,0xc0,0xa5,
2886 0x4e,0x04,0x4d,0x3d,0xdb,0x5b,0x07,0x33,0xe4,0x58,0xbf,0xef,0x3f,0x53,0x64,
2887 0xd8,0x42,0x59,0x35,0x57,0xfd,0x0f,0x45,0x7c,0x24,0x04,0x4d,0x9e,0xd6,0x38,
2888 0x74,0x11,0x97,0x22,0x90,0xce,0x68,0x44,0x74,0x92,0x6f,0xd5,0x4b,0x6f,0xb0,
2889 0x86,0xe3,0xc7,0x36,0x42,0xa0,0xd0,0xfc,0xc1,0xc0,0x5a,0xf9,0xa3,0x61,0xb9,
2890 0x30,0x47,0x71,0x96,0x0a,0x16,0xb0,0x91,0xc0,0x42,0x95,0xef,0x10,0x7f,0x28,
2891 0x6a,0xe3,0x2a,0x1f,0xb1,0xe4,0xcd,0x03,0x3f,0x77,0x71,0x04,0xc7,0x20,0xfc,
2892 0x49,0x0f,0x1d,0x45,0x88,0xa4,0xd7,0xcb,0x7e,0x88,0xad,0x8e,0x2d,0xec,0x45,
2893 0xdb,0xc4,0x51,0x04,0xc9,0x2a,0xfc,0xec,0x86,0x9e,0x9a,0x11,0x97,0x5b,0xde,
2894 0xce,0x53,0x88,0xe6,0xe2,0xb7,0xfd,0xac,0x95,0xc2,0x28,0x40,0xdb,0xef,0x04,
2895 0x90,0xdf,0x81,0x33,0x39,0xd9,0xb2,0x45,0xa5,0x23,0x87,0x06,0xa5,0x55,0x89,
2896 0x31,0xbb,0x06,0x2d,0x60,0x0e,0x41,0x18,0x7d,0x1f,0x2e,0xb5,0x97,0xcb,0x11,
2897 0xeb,0x15,0xd5,0x24,0xa5,0x94,0xef,0x15,0x14,0x89,0xfd,0x4b,0x73,0xfa,0x32,
2898 0x5b,0xfc,0xd1,0x33,0x00,0xf9,0x59,0x62,0x70,0x07,0x32,0xea,0x2e,0xab,0x40,
2899 0x2d,0x7b,0xca,0xdd,0x21,0x67,0x1b,0x30,0x99,0x8f,0x16,0xaa,0x23,0xa8,0x41,
2900 0xd1,0xb0,0x6e,0x11,0x9b,0x36,0xc4,0xde,0x40,0x74,0x9c,0xe1,0x58,0x65,0xc1,
2901 0x60,0x1e,0x7a,0x5b,0x38,0xc8,0x8f,0xbb,0x04,0x26,0x7c,0xd4,0x16,0x40,0xe5,
2902 0xb6,0x6b,0x6c,0xaa,0x86,0xfd,0x00,0xbf,0xce,0xc1,0x35,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,
2905 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_ms_root_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2906 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2907 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2909 BOOL ret
= verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID
, pChainContext
, pPolicyPara
,
2912 if (ret
&& !pPolicyStatus
->dwError
)
2914 CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey
= { { 0 } };
2915 BOOL isMSRoot
= FALSE
;
2917 CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs
[] = {
2918 { sizeof(msPubKey1
), msPubKey1
},
2919 { sizeof(msPubKey2
), msPubKey2
},
2920 { sizeof(msPubKey3
), msPubKey3
},
2922 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN rootChain
=
2923 pChainContext
->rgpChain
[pChainContext
->cChain
-1 ];
2924 PCCERT_CONTEXT root
=
2925 rootChain
->rgpElement
[rootChain
->cElement
- 1]->pCertContext
;
2927 for (i
= 0; !isMSRoot
&& i
< sizeof(keyBlobs
) / sizeof(keyBlobs
[0]);
2930 msPubKey
.PublicKey
.cbData
= keyBlobs
[i
].cbData
;
2931 msPubKey
.PublicKey
.pbData
= keyBlobs
[i
].pbData
;
2932 if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
2933 X509_ASN_ENCODING
| PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING
,
2934 &root
->pCertInfo
->SubjectPublicKeyInfo
, &msPubKey
))
2938 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= 0;
2943 typedef BOOL (WINAPI
*CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc
)(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2944 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2945 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
);
2947 BOOL WINAPI
CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2948 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2949 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2951 static HCRYPTOIDFUNCSET set
= NULL
;
2953 CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc verifyPolicy
= NULL
;
2954 HCRYPTOIDFUNCADDR hFunc
= NULL
;
2956 TRACE("(%s, %p, %p, %p)\n", debugstr_a(szPolicyOID
), pChainContext
,
2957 pPolicyPara
, pPolicyStatus
);
2959 if (!HIWORD(szPolicyOID
))
2961 switch (LOWORD(szPolicyOID
))
2963 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASE
):
2964 verifyPolicy
= verify_base_policy
;
2966 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_AUTHENTICODE
):
2967 verifyPolicy
= verify_authenticode_policy
;
2969 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL
):
2970 verifyPolicy
= verify_ssl_policy
;
2972 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
):
2973 verifyPolicy
= verify_basic_constraints_policy
;
2975 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_MICROSOFT_ROOT
):
2976 verifyPolicy
= verify_ms_root_policy
;
2979 FIXME("unimplemented for %d\n", LOWORD(szPolicyOID
));
2985 set
= CryptInitOIDFunctionSet(
2986 CRYPT_OID_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_POLICY_FUNC
, 0);
2987 CryptGetOIDFunctionAddress(set
, X509_ASN_ENCODING
, szPolicyOID
, 0,
2988 (void **)&verifyPolicy
, &hFunc
);
2991 ret
= verifyPolicy(szPolicyOID
, pChainContext
, pPolicyPara
,
2994 CryptFreeOIDFunctionAddress(hFunc
, 0);
2995 TRACE("returning %d (%08x)\n", ret
, pPolicyStatus
->dwError
);