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crypt32: Only trace a usage match if it's not empty.
[wine/hacks.git] / dlls / crypt32 / chain.c
bloba53b030a5044876c452ff280e777b1b2ea99b37e
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2006 Juan Lang
3 *
4 * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
5 * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
6 * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
7 * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
8 *
9 * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
10 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
11 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
12 * Lesser General Public License for more details.
13 *
14 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
15 * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
16 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
17 *
18 */
19 #include <stdarg.h>
20 #define NONAMELESSUNION
21 #include "windef.h"
22 #include "winbase.h"
23 #define CERT_CHAIN_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
24 #define CERT_REVOCATION_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
25 #include "wincrypt.h"
26 #include "wine/debug.h"
27 #include "wine/unicode.h"
28 #include "crypt32_private.h"
29
30 WINE_DEFAULT_DEBUG_CHANNEL(crypt);
31 WINE_DECLARE_DEBUG_CHANNEL(chain);
32
33 #define DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS 7
34
35 static HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_defaultChainEngine;
36
37 /* This represents a subset of a certificate chain engine: it doesn't include
38 * the "hOther" store described by MSDN, because I'm not sure how that's used.
39 * It also doesn't include the "hTrust" store, because I don't yet implement
40 * CTLs or complex certificate chains.
41 */
42 typedef struct _CertificateChainEngine
43 {
44 LONG ref;
45 HCERTSTORE hRoot;
46 HCERTSTORE hWorld;
47 DWORD dwFlags;
48 DWORD dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
49 DWORD MaximumCachedCertificates;
50 DWORD CycleDetectionModulus;
51 } CertificateChainEngine, *PCertificateChainEngine;
52
53 static inline void CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(HCERTSTORE collection,
54 DWORD cStores, HCERTSTORE *stores)
55 {
56 DWORD i;
57
58 for (i = 0; i < cStores; i++)
59 CertAddStoreToCollection(collection, stores[i], 0, 0);
60 }
61
62 static inline void CRYPT_CloseStores(DWORD cStores, HCERTSTORE *stores)
63 {
64 DWORD i;
65
66 for (i = 0; i < cStores; i++)
67 CertCloseStore(stores[i], 0);
68 }
69
70 static const WCHAR rootW[] = { 'R','o','o','t',0 };
71
72 /* Finds cert in store by comparing the cert's hashes. */
73 static PCCERT_CONTEXT CRYPT_FindCertInStore(HCERTSTORE store,
74 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
75 {
76 PCCERT_CONTEXT matching = NULL;
77 BYTE hash[20];
78 DWORD size = sizeof(hash);
79
80 if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID, hash, &size))
81 {
82 CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob = { sizeof(hash), hash };
83
84 matching = CertFindCertificateInStore(store, cert->dwCertEncodingType,
85 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH, &blob, NULL);
86 }
87 return matching;
88 }
89
90 static BOOL CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(HCERTSTORE store)
91 {
92 BOOL ret = TRUE;
93
94 if (store)
95 {
96 HCERTSTORE rootStore = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW);
97 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = NULL, check;
98
99 do {
100 cert = CertEnumCertificatesInStore(store, cert);
101 if (cert)
102 {
103 if (!(check = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(rootStore, cert)))
104 ret = FALSE;
105 else
106 CertFreeCertificateContext(check);
107 }
108 } while (ret && cert);
109 if (cert)
110 CertFreeCertificateContext(cert);
111 CertCloseStore(rootStore, 0);
112 }
113 return ret;
114 }
115
116 HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(HCERTSTORE root,
117 PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig)
118 {
119 static const WCHAR caW[] = { 'C','A',0 };
120 static const WCHAR myW[] = { 'M','y',0 };
121 static const WCHAR trustW[] = { 'T','r','u','s','t',0 };
122 PCertificateChainEngine engine =
123 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChainEngine));
124
125 if (engine)
126 {
127 HCERTSTORE worldStores[4];
128
129 engine->ref = 1;
130 engine->hRoot = root;
131 engine->hWorld = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION, 0, 0,
132 CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG, NULL);
133 worldStores[0] = CertDuplicateStore(engine->hRoot);
134 worldStores[1] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, caW);
135 worldStores[2] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, myW);
136 worldStores[3] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, trustW);
137 CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine->hWorld,
138 sizeof(worldStores) / sizeof(worldStores[0]), worldStores);
139 CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine->hWorld,
140 pConfig->cAdditionalStore, pConfig->rghAdditionalStore);
141 CRYPT_CloseStores(sizeof(worldStores) / sizeof(worldStores[0]),
142 worldStores);
143 engine->dwFlags = pConfig->dwFlags;
144 engine->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout = pConfig->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
145 engine->MaximumCachedCertificates =
146 pConfig->MaximumCachedCertificates;
147 if (pConfig->CycleDetectionModulus)
148 engine->CycleDetectionModulus = pConfig->CycleDetectionModulus;
149 else
150 engine->CycleDetectionModulus = DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS;
151 }
152 return engine;
153 }
154
155 BOOL WINAPI CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig,
156 HCERTCHAINENGINE *phChainEngine)
157 {
158 BOOL ret;
159
160 TRACE("(%p, %p)\n", pConfig, phChainEngine);
161
162 if (pConfig->cbSize != sizeof(*pConfig))
163 {
164 SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG);
165 return FALSE;
166 }
167 *phChainEngine = NULL;
168 ret = CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(pConfig->hRestrictedRoot);
169 if (ret)
170 {
171 HCERTSTORE root;
172 HCERTCHAINENGINE engine;
173
174 if (pConfig->hRestrictedRoot)
175 root = CertDuplicateStore(pConfig->hRestrictedRoot);
176 else
177 root = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW);
178 engine = CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(root, pConfig);
179 if (engine)
180 {
181 *phChainEngine = engine;
182 ret = TRUE;
183 }
184 else
185 ret = FALSE;
186 }
187 return ret;
188 }
189
190 VOID WINAPI CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine)
191 {
192 PCertificateChainEngine engine = (PCertificateChainEngine)hChainEngine;
193
194 TRACE("(%p)\n", hChainEngine);
195
196 if (engine && InterlockedDecrement(&engine->ref) == 0)
197 {
198 CertCloseStore(engine->hWorld, 0);
199 CertCloseStore(engine->hRoot, 0);
200 CryptMemFree(engine);
201 }
202 }
203
204 static HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine(void)
205 {
206 if (!CRYPT_defaultChainEngine)
207 {
208 CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG config = { 0 };
209 HCERTCHAINENGINE engine;
210
211 config.cbSize = sizeof(config);
212 CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(&config, &engine);
213 InterlockedCompareExchangePointer(&CRYPT_defaultChainEngine, engine,
214 NULL);
215 if (CRYPT_defaultChainEngine != engine)
216 CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(engine);
217 }
218 return CRYPT_defaultChainEngine;
219 }
220
221 void default_chain_engine_free(void)
222 {
223 CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(CRYPT_defaultChainEngine);
224 }
225
226 typedef struct _CertificateChain
227 {
228 CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT context;
229 HCERTSTORE world;
230 LONG ref;
231 } CertificateChain, *PCertificateChain;
232
233 static inline BOOL CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
234 {
235 return CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
236 &cert->pCertInfo->Subject, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer);
237 }
238
239 static void CRYPT_FreeChainElement(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element)
240 {
241 CertFreeCertificateContext(element->pCertContext);
242 CryptMemFree(element);
243 }
244
245 static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
246 {
247 DWORD i, j, cyclicCertIndex = 0;
248
249 /* O(n^2) - I don't think there's a faster way */
250 for (i = 0; !cyclicCertIndex && i < chain->cElement; i++)
251 for (j = i + 1; !cyclicCertIndex && j < chain->cElement; j++)
252 if (CertCompareCertificate(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
253 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo,
254 chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo))
255 cyclicCertIndex = j;
256 if (cyclicCertIndex)
257 {
258 chain->rgpElement[cyclicCertIndex]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus
259 |= CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
260 /* Release remaining certs */
261 for (i = cyclicCertIndex + 1; i < chain->cElement; i++)
262 CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain->rgpElement[i]);
263 /* Truncate chain */
264 chain->cElement = cyclicCertIndex + 1;
265 }
266 }
267
268 /* Checks whether the chain is cyclic by examining the last element's status */
269 static inline BOOL CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *chain)
270 {
271 if (chain->cElement)
272 return chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus
273 & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC;
274 else
275 return FALSE;
276 }
277
278 static inline void CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(CERT_TRUST_STATUS *chainStatus,
279 const CERT_TRUST_STATUS *elementStatus)
280 {
281 /* Any error that applies to an element also applies to a chain.. */
282 chainStatus->dwErrorStatus |= elementStatus->dwErrorStatus;
283 /* but the bottom nibble of an element's info status doesn't apply to the
284 * chain.
285 */
286 chainStatus->dwInfoStatus |= (elementStatus->dwInfoStatus & 0xfffffff0);
287 }
288
289 static BOOL CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine *engine,
290 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, DWORD subjectInfoStatus)
291 {
292 BOOL ret = FALSE;
293 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
294
295 if (element)
296 {
297 if (!chain->cElement)
298 chain->rgpElement = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
299 else
300 chain->rgpElement = CryptMemRealloc(chain->rgpElement,
301 (chain->cElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
302 if (chain->rgpElement)
303 {
304 chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement++] = element;
305 memset(element, 0, sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
306 element->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT);
307 element->pCertContext = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(cert);
308 if (chain->cElement > 1)
309 chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 2]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus
310 = subjectInfoStatus;
311 /* FIXME: initialize the rest of element */
312 if (!(chain->cElement % engine->CycleDetectionModulus))
313 {
314 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(chain);
315 /* Reinitialize the element pointer in case the chain is
316 * cyclic, in which case the chain is truncated.
317 */
318 element = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1];
319 }
320 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
321 &element->TrustStatus);
322 ret = TRUE;
323 }
324 else
325 CryptMemFree(element);
326 }
327 return ret;
328 }
329
330 static void CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
331 {
332 DWORD i;
333
334 for (i = 0; i < chain->cElement; i++)
335 CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain->rgpElement[i]);
336 CryptMemFree(chain->rgpElement);
337 CryptMemFree(chain);
338 }
339
340 static void CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(HCERTSTORE hRoot,
341 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement)
342 {
343 PCCERT_CONTEXT trustedRoot = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(hRoot,
344 rootElement->pCertContext);
345
346 if (!trustedRoot)
347 rootElement->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
348 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT;
349 else
350 CertFreeCertificateContext(trustedRoot);
351 }
352
353 static void CRYPT_CheckRootCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hRoot,
354 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement)
355 {
356 PCCERT_CONTEXT root = rootElement->pCertContext;
357
358 if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, root->dwCertEncodingType,
359 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT, (void *)root,
360 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT, (void *)root, 0, NULL))
361 {
362 TRACE_(chain)("Last certificate's signature is invalid\n");
363 rootElement->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
364 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID;
365 }
366 CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(hRoot, rootElement);
367 }
368
369 /* Decodes a cert's basic constraints extension (either szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
370 * or szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, whichever is present) into a
371 * CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO. If it neither extension is present, sets
372 * constraints->fCA to defaultIfNotSpecified.
373 * Returns FALSE if the extension is present but couldn't be decoded.
374 */
375 static BOOL CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert,
376 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO *constraints, BOOL defaultIfNotSpecified)
377 {
378 BOOL ret = TRUE;
379 PCERT_EXTENSION ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
380 cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
381
382 constraints->fPathLenConstraint = FALSE;
383 if (ext)
384 {
385 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info;
386 DWORD size = 0;
387
388 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
389 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG,
390 NULL, &info, &size);
391 if (ret)
392 {
393 if (info->SubjectType.cbData == 1)
394 constraints->fCA =
395 info->SubjectType.pbData[0] & CERT_CA_SUBJECT_FLAG;
396 LocalFree(info);
397 }
398 }
399 else
400 {
401 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2,
402 cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
403 if (ext)
404 {
405 DWORD size = sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO);
406
407 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
408 szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
409 0, NULL, constraints, &size);
410 }
411 else
412 constraints->fCA = defaultIfNotSpecified;
413 }
414 return ret;
415 }
416
417 /* Checks element's basic constraints to see if it can act as a CA, with
418 * remainingCAs CAs left in this chain. In general, a cert must include the
419 * basic constraints extension, with the CA flag asserted, in order to be
420 * allowed to be a CA. A V1 or V2 cert, which has no extensions, is also
421 * allowed to be a CA if it's installed locally (in the engine's world store.)
422 * This matches the expected usage in RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.9: a conforming
423 * CA MUST include the basic constraints extension in all certificates that are
424 * used to validate digital signatures on certificates. It also matches
425 * section 6.1.4(k): "If a certificate is a v1 or v2 certificate, then the
426 * application MUST either verify that the certificate is a CA certificate
427 * through out-of-band means or reject the certificate." Rejecting the
428 * certificate prohibits a large number of commonly used certificates, so
429 * accepting locally installed ones is a compromise.
430 * Root certificates are also allowed to be CAs even without a basic
431 * constraints extension. This is implied by RFC 5280, section 6.1: the
432 * root of a certificate chain's only requirement is that it was used to issue
433 * the next certificate in the chain.
434 * Updates chainConstraints with the element's constraints, if:
435 * 1. chainConstraints doesn't have a path length constraint, or
436 * 2. element's path length constraint is smaller than chainConstraints's
437 * Sets *pathLengthConstraintViolated to TRUE if a path length violation
438 * occurs.
439 * Returns TRUE if the element can be a CA, and the length of the remaining
440 * chain is valid.
441 */
442 static BOOL CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
443 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO *chainConstraints,
444 DWORD remainingCAs, BOOL isRoot, BOOL *pathLengthConstraintViolated)
445 {
446 BOOL validBasicConstraints, implicitCA = FALSE;
447 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints;
448
449 if (isRoot)
450 implicitCA = TRUE;
451 else if (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V1 ||
452 cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V2)
453 {
454 BYTE hash[20];
455 DWORD size = sizeof(hash);
456
457 if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID,
458 hash, &size))
459 {
460 CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob = { sizeof(hash), hash };
461 PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert = CertFindCertificateInStore(
462 engine->hWorld, cert->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH,
463 &blob, NULL);
464
465 if (localCert)
466 {
467 CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert);
468 implicitCA = TRUE;
469 }
470 }
471 }
472 if ((validBasicConstraints = CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(cert,
473 &constraints, implicitCA)))
474 {
475 chainConstraints->fCA = constraints.fCA;
476 if (!constraints.fCA)
477 {
478 TRACE_(chain)("chain element %d can't be a CA\n", remainingCAs + 1);
479 validBasicConstraints = FALSE;
480 }
481 else if (constraints.fPathLenConstraint)
482 {
483 /* If the element has path length constraints, they apply to the
484 * entire remaining chain.
485 */
486 if (!chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint ||
487 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint <
488 chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint)
489 {
490 TRACE_(chain)("setting path length constraint to %d\n",
491 chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint);
492 chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint = TRUE;
493 chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint =
494 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint;
495 }
496 }
497 }
498 if (chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint &&
499 remainingCAs > chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint)
500 {
501 TRACE_(chain)("remaining CAs %d exceed max path length %d\n",
502 remainingCAs, chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint);
503 validBasicConstraints = FALSE;
504 *pathLengthConstraintViolated = TRUE;
505 }
506 return validBasicConstraints;
507 }
508
509 static BOOL domain_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name)
510 {
511 BOOL match;
512
513 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
514 * "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name...
515 * When the constraint begins with a period, it MAY be expanded with one
516 * or more labels. That is, the constraint ".example.com" is satisfied by
517 * both host.example.com and my.host.example.com. However, the constraint
518 * ".example.com" is not satisfied by "example.com". When the constraint
519 * does not begin with a period, it specifies a host."
520 * and for email addresses,
521 * "To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a particular host, the
522 * constraint is specified as the host name. For example, the constraint
523 * "example.com" is satisfied by any mail address at the host
524 * "example.com". To specify any address within a domain, the constraint
525 * is specified with a leading period (as with URIs)."
526 */
527 if (constraint[0] == '.')
528 {
529 /* Must be strictly greater than, a name can't begin with '.' */
530 if (lstrlenW(name) > lstrlenW(constraint))
531 match = !lstrcmpiW(name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint),
532 constraint);
533 else
534 {
535 /* name is too short, no match */
536 match = FALSE;
537 }
538 }
539 else
540 match = !lstrcmpiW(name, constraint);
541 return match;
542 }
543
544 static BOOL url_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
545 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
546 {
547 BOOL match = FALSE;
548
549 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
550
551 if (!constraint)
552 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
553 else if (!name)
554 ; /* no match */
555 else
556 {
557 LPCWSTR colon, authority_end, at, hostname = NULL;
558 /* The maximum length for a hostname is 254 in the DNS, see RFC 1034 */
559 WCHAR hostname_buf[255];
560
561 /* RFC 5280: only the hostname portion of the URL is compared. From
562 * section 4.2.1.10:
563 * "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name.
564 * The constraint MUST be specified as a fully qualified domain name
565 * and MAY specify a host or a domain."
566 * The format for URIs is in RFC 2396.
567 *
568 * First, remove any scheme that's present. */
569 colon = strchrW(name, ':');
570 if (colon && *(colon + 1) == '/' && *(colon + 2) == '/')
571 name = colon + 3;
572 /* Next, find the end of the authority component. (The authority is
573 * generally just the hostname, but it may contain a username or a port.
574 * Those are removed next.)
575 */
576 authority_end = strchrW(name, '/');
577 if (!authority_end)
578 authority_end = strchrW(name, '?');
579 if (!authority_end)
580 authority_end = name + strlenW(name);
581 /* Remove any port number from the authority */
582 for (colon = authority_end; colon >= name && *colon != ':'; colon--)
583 ;
584 if (*colon == ':')
585 authority_end = colon;
586 /* Remove any username from the authority */
587 if ((at = strchrW(name, '@')))
588 name = at;
589 /* Ignore any path or query portion of the URL. */
590 if (*authority_end)
591 {
592 if (authority_end - name < sizeof(hostname_buf) /
593 sizeof(hostname_buf[0]))
594 {
595 memcpy(hostname_buf, name,
596 (authority_end - name) * sizeof(WCHAR));
597 hostname_buf[authority_end - name] = 0;
598 hostname = hostname_buf;
599 }
600 /* else: Hostname is too long, not a match */
601 }
602 else
603 hostname = name;
604 if (hostname)
605 match = domain_name_matches(constraint, hostname);
606 }
607 return match;
608 }
609
610 static BOOL rfc822_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
611 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
612 {
613 BOOL match = FALSE;
614 LPCWSTR at;
615
616 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
617
618 if (!constraint)
619 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
620 else if (!name)
621 ; /* no match */
622 else if ((at = strchrW(constraint, '@')))
623 match = !lstrcmpiW(constraint, name);
624 else
625 {
626 if ((at = strchrW(name, '@')))
627 match = domain_name_matches(constraint, at + 1);
628 else
629 match = !lstrcmpiW(constraint, name);
630 }
631 return match;
632 }
633
634 static BOOL dns_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
635 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
636 {
637 BOOL match = FALSE;
638
639 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
640
641 if (!constraint)
642 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
643 else if (!name)
644 ; /* no match */
645 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
646 * "DNS name restrictions are expressed as host.example.com. Any DNS name
647 * that can be constructed by simply adding zero or more labels to the
648 * left-hand side of the name satisfies the name constraint. For example,
649 * www.host.example.com would satisfy the constraint but host1.example.com
650 * would not."
651 */
652 else if (lstrlenW(name) == lstrlenW(constraint))
653 match = !lstrcmpiW(name, constraint);
654 else if (lstrlenW(name) > lstrlenW(constraint))
655 {
656 match = !lstrcmpiW(name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint),
657 constraint);
658 if (match)
659 {
660 BOOL dot = FALSE;
661 LPCWSTR ptr;
662
663 /* This only matches if name is a subdomain of constraint, i.e.
664 * there's a '.' between the beginning of the name and the
665 * matching portion of the name.
666 */
667 for (ptr = name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint);
668 !dot && ptr >= name; ptr--)
669 if (*ptr == '.')
670 dot = TRUE;
671 match = dot;
672 }
673 }
674 /* else: name is too short, no match */
675
676 return match;
677 }
678
679 static BOOL ip_address_matches(const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB *constraint,
680 const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB *name, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
681 {
682 BOOL match = FALSE;
683
684 TRACE("(%d, %p), (%d, %p)\n", constraint->cbData, constraint->pbData,
685 name->cbData, name->pbData);
686
687 /* RFC5280, section 4.2.1.10, iPAddress syntax: either 8 or 32 bytes, for
688 * IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, respectively.
689 */
690 if (constraint->cbData != sizeof(DWORD) * 2 && constraint->cbData != 32)
691 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
692 else if (name->cbData == sizeof(DWORD) &&
693 constraint->cbData == sizeof(DWORD) * 2)
694 {
695 DWORD subnet, mask, addr;
696
697 memcpy(&subnet, constraint->pbData, sizeof(subnet));
698 memcpy(&mask, constraint->pbData + sizeof(subnet), sizeof(mask));
699 memcpy(&addr, name->pbData, sizeof(addr));
700 /* These are really in big-endian order, but for equality matching we
701 * don't need to swap to host order
702 */
703 match = (subnet & mask) == (addr & mask);
704 }
705 else if (name->cbData == 16 && constraint->cbData == 32)
706 {
707 const BYTE *subnet, *mask, *addr;
708 DWORD i;
709
710 subnet = constraint->pbData;
711 mask = constraint->pbData + 16;
712 addr = name->pbData;
713 match = TRUE;
714 for (i = 0; match && i < 16; i++)
715 if ((subnet[i] & mask[i]) != (addr[i] & mask[i]))
716 match = FALSE;
717 }
718 /* else: name is wrong size, no match */
719
720 return match;
721 }
722
723 static BOOL directory_name_matches(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *constraint,
724 const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
725 {
726 CERT_NAME_INFO *constraintName;
727 DWORD size;
728 BOOL match = FALSE;
729
730 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME, constraint->pbData,
731 constraint->cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &constraintName, &size))
732 {
733 DWORD i;
734
735 match = TRUE;
736 for (i = 0; match && i < constraintName->cRDN; i++)
737 match = CertIsRDNAttrsInCertificateName(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
738 CERT_CASE_INSENSITIVE_IS_RDN_ATTRS_FLAG,
739 (CERT_NAME_BLOB *)name, &constraintName->rgRDN[i]);
740 LocalFree(constraintName);
741 }
742 return match;
743 }
744
745 static BOOL alt_name_matches(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
746 const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint, DWORD *trustErrorStatus, BOOL *present)
747 {
748 BOOL match = FALSE;
749
750 if (name->dwAltNameChoice == constraint->dwAltNameChoice)
751 {
752 if (present)
753 *present = TRUE;
754 switch (constraint->dwAltNameChoice)
755 {
756 case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME:
757 match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
758 name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
759 break;
760 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME:
761 match = dns_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
762 name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
763 break;
764 case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL:
765 match = url_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
766 name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
767 break;
768 case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS:
769 match = ip_address_matches(&constraint->u.IPAddress,
770 &name->u.IPAddress, trustErrorStatus);
771 break;
772 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME:
773 match = directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName,
774 &name->u.DirectoryName);
775 break;
776 default:
777 ERR("name choice %d unsupported in this context\n",
778 constraint->dwAltNameChoice);
779 *trustErrorStatus |=
780 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
781 }
782 }
783 else if (present)
784 *present = FALSE;
785 return match;
786 }
787
788 static BOOL alt_name_matches_excluded_name(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
789 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
790 {
791 DWORD i;
792 BOOL match = FALSE;
793
794 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
795 match = alt_name_matches(name,
796 &nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base, trustErrorStatus, NULL);
797 return match;
798 }
799
800 static BOOL alt_name_matches_permitted_name(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
801 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus,
802 BOOL *present)
803 {
804 DWORD i;
805 BOOL match = FALSE;
806
807 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
808 match = alt_name_matches(name,
809 &nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base, trustErrorStatus,
810 present);
811 return match;
812 }
813
814 static inline PCERT_EXTENSION get_subject_alt_name_ext(const CERT_INFO *cert)
815 {
816 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
817
818 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2,
819 cert->cExtension, cert->rgExtension);
820 if (!ext)
821 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
822 cert->cExtension, cert->rgExtension);
823 return ext;
824 }
825
826 static void compare_alt_name_with_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *altNameExt,
827 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
828 {
829 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *subjectAltName;
830 DWORD size;
831
832 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
833 altNameExt->Value.pbData, altNameExt->Value.cbData,
834 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
835 &subjectAltName, &size))
836 {
837 DWORD i;
838
839 for (i = 0; i < subjectAltName->cAltEntry; i++)
840 {
841 BOOL nameFormPresent;
842
843 /* A name constraint only applies if the name form is present.
844 * From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
845 * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is
846 * present. If no name of the type is in the certificate,
847 * the certificate is acceptable."
848 */
849 if (alt_name_matches_excluded_name(
850 &subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i], nameConstraints,
851 trustErrorStatus))
852 {
853 TRACE_(chain)("subject alternate name form %d excluded\n",
854 subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice);
855 *trustErrorStatus |=
856 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
857 }
858 nameFormPresent = FALSE;
859 if (!alt_name_matches_permitted_name(
860 &subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i], nameConstraints,
861 trustErrorStatus, &nameFormPresent) && nameFormPresent)
862 {
863 TRACE_(chain)("subject alternate name form %d not permitted\n",
864 subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice);
865 *trustErrorStatus |=
866 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
867 }
868 }
869 LocalFree(subjectAltName);
870 }
871 else
872 *trustErrorStatus |=
873 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
874 }
875
876 static BOOL rfc822_attr_matches_excluded_name(const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr,
877 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
878 {
879 DWORD i;
880 BOOL match = FALSE;
881
882 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
883 {
884 const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
885 &nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base;
886
887 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
888 match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszRfc822Name,
889 (LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData, trustErrorStatus);
890 }
891 return match;
892 }
893
894 static BOOL rfc822_attr_matches_permitted_name(const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr,
895 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus,
896 BOOL *present)
897 {
898 DWORD i;
899 BOOL match = FALSE;
900
901 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
902 {
903 const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
904 &nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base;
905
906 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
907 {
908 *present = TRUE;
909 match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszRfc822Name,
910 (LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData, trustErrorStatus);
911 }
912 }
913 return match;
914 }
915
916 static void compare_subject_with_email_constraints(
917 const CERT_NAME_BLOB *subjectName,
918 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
919 {
920 CERT_NAME_INFO *name;
921 DWORD size;
922
923 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_UNICODE_NAME,
924 subjectName->pbData, subjectName->cbData,
925 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &name, &size))
926 {
927 DWORD i, j;
928
929 for (i = 0; i < name->cRDN; i++)
930 for (j = 0; j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++)
931 if (!strcmp(name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j].pszObjId,
932 szOID_RSA_emailAddr))
933 {
934 BOOL nameFormPresent;
935
936 /* A name constraint only applies if the name form is
937 * present. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
938 * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is
939 * present. If no name of the type is in the certificate,
940 * the certificate is acceptable."
941 */
942 if (rfc822_attr_matches_excluded_name(
943 &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j], nameConstraints,
944 trustErrorStatus))
945 {
946 TRACE_(chain)(
947 "email address in subject name is excluded\n");
948 *trustErrorStatus |=
949 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
950 }
951 nameFormPresent = FALSE;
952 if (!rfc822_attr_matches_permitted_name(
953 &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j], nameConstraints,
954 trustErrorStatus, &nameFormPresent) && nameFormPresent)
955 {
956 TRACE_(chain)(
957 "email address in subject name is not permitted\n");
958 *trustErrorStatus |=
959 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
960 }
961 }
962 LocalFree(name);
963 }
964 else
965 *trustErrorStatus |=
966 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
967 }
968
969 static BOOL CRYPT_IsEmptyName(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
970 {
971 BOOL empty;
972
973 if (!name->cbData)
974 empty = TRUE;
975 else if (name->cbData == 2 && name->pbData[1] == 0)
976 {
977 /* An empty sequence is also empty */
978 empty = TRUE;
979 }
980 else
981 empty = FALSE;
982 return empty;
983 }
984
985 static void compare_subject_with_constraints(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *subjectName,
986 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
987 {
988 BOOL hasEmailConstraint = FALSE;
989 DWORD i;
990
991 /* In general, a subject distinguished name only matches a directory name
992 * constraint. However, an exception exists for email addresses.
993 * From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.6:
994 * "Legacy implementations exist where an electronic mail address is
995 * embedded in the subject distinguished name as an emailAddress
996 * attribute [RFC2985]."
997 * If an email address constraint exists, check that constraint separately.
998 */
999 for (i = 0; !hasEmailConstraint && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree;
1000 i++)
1001 if (nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base.dwAltNameChoice ==
1002 CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
1003 hasEmailConstraint = TRUE;
1004 for (i = 0; !hasEmailConstraint && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree;
1005 i++)
1006 if (nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base.dwAltNameChoice ==
1007 CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
1008 hasEmailConstraint = TRUE;
1009 if (hasEmailConstraint)
1010 compare_subject_with_email_constraints(subjectName, nameConstraints,
1011 trustErrorStatus);
1012 for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
1013 {
1014 CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
1015 &nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base;
1016
1017 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME &&
1018 directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName, subjectName))
1019 {
1020 TRACE_(chain)("subject name is excluded\n");
1021 *trustErrorStatus |=
1022 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1023 }
1024 }
1025 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1026 * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is present.
1027 * If no name of the type is in the certificate, the certificate is
1028 * acceptable."
1029 * An empty name can't have the name form present, so don't check it.
1030 */
1031 if (nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree && !CRYPT_IsEmptyName(subjectName))
1032 {
1033 BOOL match = FALSE, hasDirectoryConstraint = FALSE;
1034
1035 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
1036 {
1037 CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
1038 &nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base;
1039
1040 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
1041 {
1042 hasDirectoryConstraint = TRUE;
1043 match = directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName,
1044 subjectName);
1045 }
1046 }
1047 if (hasDirectoryConstraint && !match)
1048 {
1049 TRACE_(chain)("subject name is not permitted\n");
1050 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1051 }
1052 }
1053 }
1054
1055 static void CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(
1056 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, const CERT_INFO *cert,
1057 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
1058 {
1059 CERT_EXTENSION *ext = get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert);
1060
1061 if (ext)
1062 compare_alt_name_with_constraints(ext, nameConstraints,
1063 trustErrorStatus);
1064 /* Name constraints apply to the subject alternative name as well as the
1065 * subject name. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1066 * "Restrictions apply to the subject distinguished name and apply to
1067 * subject alternative names."
1068 */
1069 compare_subject_with_constraints(&cert->Subject, nameConstraints,
1070 trustErrorStatus);
1071 }
1072
1073 /* Gets cert's name constraints, if any. Free with LocalFree. */
1074 static CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(CERT_INFO *cert)
1075 {
1076 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info = NULL;
1077
1078 CERT_EXTENSION *ext;
1079
1080 if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, cert->cExtension,
1081 cert->rgExtension)))
1082 {
1083 DWORD size;
1084
1085 CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS,
1086 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1087 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &info,
1088 &size);
1089 }
1090 return info;
1091 }
1092
1093 static BOOL CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info)
1094 {
1095 DWORD i;
1096 BOOL ret = TRUE;
1097
1098 /* Make sure at least one permitted or excluded subtree is present. From
1099 * RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1100 * "Conforming CAs MUST NOT issue certificates where name constraints is an
1101 * empty sequence. That is, either the permittedSubtrees field or the
1102 * excludedSubtrees MUST be present."
1103 */
1104 if (!info->cPermittedSubtree && !info->cExcludedSubtree)
1105 {
1106 WARN_(chain)("constraints contain no permitted nor excluded subtree\n");
1107 ret = FALSE;
1108 }
1109 /* Check that none of the constraints specifies a minimum or a maximum.
1110 * See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1111 * "Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with
1112 * any name forms, thus, the minimum MUST be zero, and maximum MUST be
1113 * absent. However, if an application encounters a critical name
1114 * constraints extension that specifies other values for minimum or
1115 * maximum for a name form that appears in a subsequent certificate, the
1116 * application MUST either process these fields or reject the
1117 * certificate."
1118 * Since it gives no guidance as to how to process these fields, we
1119 * reject any name constraint that contains them.
1120 */
1121 for (i = 0; ret && i < info->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
1122 if (info->rgPermittedSubtree[i].dwMinimum ||
1123 info->rgPermittedSubtree[i].fMaximum)
1124 {
1125 TRACE_(chain)("found a minimum or maximum in permitted subtrees\n");
1126 ret = FALSE;
1127 }
1128 for (i = 0; ret && i < info->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
1129 if (info->rgExcludedSubtree[i].dwMinimum ||
1130 info->rgExcludedSubtree[i].fMaximum)
1131 {
1132 TRACE_(chain)("found a minimum or maximum in excluded subtrees\n");
1133 ret = FALSE;
1134 }
1135 return ret;
1136 }
1137
1138 static void CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
1139 {
1140 int i, j;
1141
1142 /* Microsoft's implementation appears to violate RFC 3280: according to
1143 * MSDN, the various CERT_TRUST_*_NAME_CONSTRAINT errors are set if a CA's
1144 * name constraint is violated in the end cert. According to RFC 3280,
1145 * the constraints should be checked against every subsequent certificate
1146 * in the chain, not just the end cert.
1147 * Microsoft's implementation also sets the name constraint errors on the
1148 * certs whose constraints were violated, not on the certs that violated
1149 * them.
1150 * In order to be error-compatible with Microsoft's implementation, while
1151 * still adhering to RFC 3280, I use a O(n ^ 2) algorithm to check name
1152 * constraints.
1153 */
1154 for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i > 0; i--)
1155 {
1156 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints;
1157
1158 if ((nameConstraints = CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(
1159 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo)))
1160 {
1161 if (!CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(nameConstraints))
1162 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1163 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1164 else
1165 {
1166 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--)
1167 {
1168 DWORD errorStatus = 0;
1169
1170 /* According to RFC 3280, self-signed certs don't have name
1171 * constraints checked unless they're the end cert.
1172 */
1173 if (j == 0 || !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
1174 chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext))
1175 {
1176 CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(nameConstraints,
1177 chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo,
1178 &errorStatus);
1179 if (errorStatus)
1180 {
1181 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1182 errorStatus;
1183 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
1184 &chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus);
1185 }
1186 else
1187 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus |=
1188 CERT_TRUST_HAS_VALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
1189 }
1190 }
1191 }
1192 LocalFree(nameConstraints);
1193 }
1194 }
1195 }
1196
1197 static LPWSTR name_value_to_str(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
1198 {
1199 DWORD len = cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING, 0, name,
1200 CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR, NULL, 0);
1201 LPWSTR str = NULL;
1202
1203 if (len)
1204 {
1205 str = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
1206 if (str)
1207 cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING, 0, name,
1208 CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR, str, len);
1209 }
1210 return str;
1211 }
1212
1213 static void dump_alt_name_entry(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *entry)
1214 {
1215 LPWSTR str;
1216
1217 switch (entry->dwAltNameChoice)
1218 {
1219 case CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME:
1220 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME, oid = %s\n",
1221 debugstr_a(entry->u.pOtherName->pszObjId));
1222 break;
1223 case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME:
1224 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME: %s\n",
1225 debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszRfc822Name));
1226 break;
1227 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME:
1228 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME: %s\n",
1229 debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszDNSName));
1230 break;
1231 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME:
1232 str = name_value_to_str(&entry->u.DirectoryName);
1233 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME: %s\n", debugstr_w(str));
1234 CryptMemFree(str);
1235 break;
1236 case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL:
1237 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_URL: %s\n", debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszURL));
1238 break;
1239 case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS:
1240 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS: %d bytes\n",
1241 entry->u.IPAddress.cbData);
1242 break;
1243 case CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID:
1244 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID: %s\n",
1245 debugstr_a(entry->u.pszRegisteredID));
1246 break;
1247 default:
1248 TRACE_(chain)("dwAltNameChoice = %d\n", entry->dwAltNameChoice);
1249 }
1250 }
1251
1252 static void dump_alt_name(LPCSTR type, const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1253 {
1254 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *name;
1255 DWORD size;
1256
1257 TRACE_(chain)("%s:\n", type);
1258 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
1259 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1260 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &name, &size))
1261 {
1262 DWORD i;
1263
1264 TRACE_(chain)("%d alt name entries:\n", name->cAltEntry);
1265 for (i = 0; i < name->cAltEntry; i++)
1266 dump_alt_name_entry(&name->rgAltEntry[i]);
1267 LocalFree(name);
1268 }
1269 }
1270
1271 static void dump_basic_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1272 {
1273 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info;
1274 DWORD size = 0;
1275
1276 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
1277 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG,
1278 NULL, &info, &size))
1279 {
1280 TRACE_(chain)("SubjectType: %02x\n", info->SubjectType.pbData[0]);
1281 TRACE_(chain)("%s path length constraint\n",
1282 info->fPathLenConstraint ? "has" : "doesn't have");
1283 TRACE_(chain)("path length=%d\n", info->dwPathLenConstraint);
1284 LocalFree(info);
1285 }
1286 }
1287
1288 static void dump_basic_constraints2(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1289 {
1290 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints;
1291 DWORD size = sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO);
1292
1293 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
1294 szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1295 0, NULL, &constraints, &size))
1296 {
1297 TRACE_(chain)("basic constraints:\n");
1298 TRACE_(chain)("can%s be a CA\n", constraints.fCA ? "" : "not");
1299 TRACE_(chain)("%s path length constraint\n",
1300 constraints.fPathLenConstraint ? "has" : "doesn't have");
1301 TRACE_(chain)("path length=%d\n", constraints.dwPathLenConstraint);
1302 }
1303 }
1304
1305 static void dump_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1306 {
1307 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
1308 DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
1309
1310 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_BITS, ext->Value.pbData,
1311 ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
1312 {
1313 #define trace_usage_bit(bits, bit) \
1314 if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
1315 if (usage.cbData)
1316 {
1317 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE_KEY_USAGE);
1318 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_NON_REPUDIATION_KEY_USAGE);
1319 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE);
1320 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE);
1321 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_AGREEMENT_KEY_USAGE);
1322 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE);
1323 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_CRL_SIGN_KEY_USAGE);
1324 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_ENCIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE);
1325 }
1326 #undef trace_usage_bit
1327 if (usage.cbData > 1 && usage.pbData[1] & CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE)
1328 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE\n");
1329 }
1330 }
1331
1332 static void dump_general_subtree(const CERT_GENERAL_SUBTREE *subtree)
1333 {
1334 dump_alt_name_entry(&subtree->Base);
1335 TRACE_(chain)("dwMinimum = %d, fMaximum = %d, dwMaximum = %d\n",
1336 subtree->dwMinimum, subtree->fMaximum, subtree->dwMaximum);
1337 }
1338
1339 static void dump_name_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1340 {
1341 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints;
1342 DWORD size;
1343
1344 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS,
1345 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1346 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &nameConstraints,
1347 &size))
1348 {
1349 DWORD i;
1350
1351 TRACE_(chain)("%d permitted subtrees:\n",
1352 nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree);
1353 for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
1354 dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i]);
1355 TRACE_(chain)("%d excluded subtrees:\n",
1356 nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree);
1357 for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
1358 dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i]);
1359 LocalFree(nameConstraints);
1360 }
1361 }
1362
1363 static void dump_cert_policies(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1364 {
1365 CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies;
1366 DWORD size;
1367
1368 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_CERT_POLICIES,
1369 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
1370 &policies, &size))
1371 {
1372 DWORD i, j;
1373
1374 TRACE_(chain)("%d policies:\n", policies->cPolicyInfo);
1375 for (i = 0; i < policies->cPolicyInfo; i++)
1376 {
1377 TRACE_(chain)("policy identifier: %s\n",
1378 debugstr_a(policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier));
1379 TRACE_(chain)("%d policy qualifiers:\n",
1380 policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].cPolicyQualifier);
1381 for (j = 0; j < policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].cPolicyQualifier; j++)
1382 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_a(
1383 policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].rgPolicyQualifier[j].
1384 pszPolicyQualifierId));
1385 }
1386 LocalFree(policies);
1387 }
1388 }
1389
1390 static void dump_enhanced_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1391 {
1392 CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *usage;
1393 DWORD size;
1394
1395 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE,
1396 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
1397 &usage, &size))
1398 {
1399 DWORD i;
1400
1401 TRACE_(chain)("%d usages:\n", usage->cUsageIdentifier);
1402 for (i = 0; i < usage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
1403 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
1404 LocalFree(usage);
1405 }
1406 }
1407
1408 static void dump_netscape_cert_type(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1409 {
1410 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
1411 DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
1412
1413 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_BITS, ext->Value.pbData,
1414 ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
1415 {
1416 #define trace_cert_type_bit(bits, bit) \
1417 if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
1418 if (usage.cbData)
1419 {
1420 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0],
1421 NETSCAPE_SSL_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT_TYPE);
1422 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0],
1423 NETSCAPE_SSL_SERVER_AUTH_CERT_TYPE);
1424 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CERT_TYPE);
1425 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CERT_TYPE);
1426 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SSL_CA_CERT_TYPE);
1427 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CA_CERT_TYPE);
1428 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CA_CERT_TYPE);
1429 }
1430 #undef trace_cert_type_bit
1431 }
1432 }
1433
1434 static void dump_extension(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1435 {
1436 TRACE_(chain)("%s (%scritical)\n", debugstr_a(ext->pszObjId),
1437 ext->fCritical ? "" : "not ");
1438 if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME))
1439 dump_alt_name("subject alt name", ext);
1440 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME))
1441 dump_alt_name("issuer alt name", ext);
1442 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
1443 dump_basic_constraints(ext);
1444 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_KEY_USAGE))
1445 dump_key_usage(ext);
1446 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2))
1447 dump_alt_name("subject alt name 2", ext);
1448 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME2))
1449 dump_alt_name("issuer alt name 2", ext);
1450 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2))
1451 dump_basic_constraints2(ext);
1452 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS))
1453 dump_name_constraints(ext);
1454 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_CERT_POLICIES))
1455 dump_cert_policies(ext);
1456 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE))
1457 dump_enhanced_key_usage(ext);
1458 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_NETSCAPE_CERT_TYPE))
1459 dump_netscape_cert_type(ext);
1460 }
1461
1462 static LPCWSTR filetime_to_str(const FILETIME *time)
1463 {
1464 static WCHAR date[80];
1465 WCHAR dateFmt[80]; /* sufficient for all versions of LOCALE_SSHORTDATE */
1466 SYSTEMTIME sysTime;
1467
1468 if (!time) return NULL;
1469
1470 GetLocaleInfoW(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT, LOCALE_SSHORTDATE, dateFmt,
1471 sizeof(dateFmt) / sizeof(dateFmt[0]));
1472 FileTimeToSystemTime(time, &sysTime);
1473 GetDateFormatW(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT, 0, &sysTime, dateFmt, date,
1474 sizeof(date) / sizeof(date[0]));
1475 return date;
1476 }
1477
1478 static void dump_element(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
1479 {
1480 LPWSTR name = NULL;
1481 DWORD len, i;
1482
1483 TRACE_(chain)("%p: version %d\n", cert, cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion);
1484 len = CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE,
1485 CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG, NULL, NULL, 0);
1486 name = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
1487 if (name)
1488 {
1489 CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE,
1490 CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG, NULL, name, len);
1491 TRACE_(chain)("issued by %s\n", debugstr_w(name));
1492 CryptMemFree(name);
1493 }
1494 len = CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0, NULL,
1495 NULL, 0);
1496 name = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
1497 if (name)
1498 {
1499 CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0, NULL,
1500 name, len);
1501 TRACE_(chain)("issued to %s\n", debugstr_w(name));
1502 CryptMemFree(name);
1503 }
1504 TRACE_(chain)("valid from %s to %s\n",
1505 debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(&cert->pCertInfo->NotBefore)),
1506 debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(&cert->pCertInfo->NotAfter)));
1507 TRACE_(chain)("%d extensions\n", cert->pCertInfo->cExtension);
1508 for (i = 0; i < cert->pCertInfo->cExtension; i++)
1509 dump_extension(&cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i]);
1510 }
1511
1512 static BOOL CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
1513 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, BOOL isRoot, BOOL isCA, DWORD index)
1514 {
1515 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
1516 BOOL ret;
1517 BYTE usageBits = 0;
1518
1519 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_KEY_USAGE, cert->pCertInfo->cExtension,
1520 cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
1521 if (ext)
1522 {
1523 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
1524 DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
1525
1526 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType, X509_BITS,
1527 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
1528 &usage, &size);
1529 if (!ret)
1530 return FALSE;
1531 else if (usage.cbData > 2)
1532 {
1533 /* The key usage extension only defines 9 bits => no more than 2
1534 * bytes are needed to encode all known usages.
1535 */
1536 return FALSE;
1537 }
1538 else
1539 {
1540 /* The only bit relevant to chain validation is the keyCertSign
1541 * bit, which is always in the least significant byte of the
1542 * key usage bits.
1543 */
1544 usageBits = usage.pbData[usage.cbData - 1];
1545 }
1546 }
1547 if (isCA)
1548 {
1549 if (!ext)
1550 {
1551 /* MS appears to violate RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.3 (Key Usage)
1552 * here. Quoting the RFC:
1553 * "This [key usage] extension MUST appear in certificates that
1554 * contain public keys that are used to validate digital signatures
1555 * on other public key certificates or CRLs."
1556 * MS appears to accept certs that do not contain key usage
1557 * extensions as CA certs. V1 and V2 certificates did not have
1558 * extensions, and many root certificates are V1 certificates, so
1559 * perhaps this is prudent. On the other hand, MS also accepts V3
1560 * certs without key usage extensions. We are more restrictive:
1561 * we accept locally installed V1 or V2 certs as CA certs.
1562 * We also accept a lack of key usage extension on root certs,
1563 * which is implied in RFC 5280, section 6.1: the trust anchor's
1564 * only requirement is that it was used to issue the next
1565 * certificate in the chain.
1566 */
1567 if (isRoot)
1568 ret = TRUE;
1569 else if (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V1 ||
1570 cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V2)
1571 {
1572 PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(
1573 engine->hWorld, cert);
1574
1575 ret = localCert != NULL;
1576 CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert);
1577 }
1578 else
1579 ret = FALSE;
1580 if (!ret)
1581 WARN_(chain)("no key usage extension on a CA cert\n");
1582 }
1583 else
1584 {
1585 if (!(usageBits & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE))
1586 {
1587 WARN_(chain)("keyCertSign not asserted on a CA cert\n");
1588 ret = FALSE;
1589 }
1590 else
1591 ret = TRUE;
1592 }
1593 }
1594 else
1595 {
1596 if (ext && (usageBits & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE))
1597 {
1598 WARN_(chain)("keyCertSign asserted on a non-CA cert\n");
1599 ret = FALSE;
1600 }
1601 else
1602 ret = TRUE;
1603 }
1604 return ret;
1605 }
1606
1607 static BOOL CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
1608 {
1609 BOOL ret = TRUE;
1610 DWORD i;
1611
1612 for (i = 0; ret && i < cert->pCertInfo->cExtension; i++)
1613 {
1614 if (cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i].fCritical)
1615 {
1616 LPCSTR oid = cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i].pszObjId;
1617
1618 if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
1619 ret = TRUE;
1620 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2))
1621 ret = TRUE;
1622 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS))
1623 ret = TRUE;
1624 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_KEY_USAGE))
1625 ret = TRUE;
1626 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME))
1627 ret = TRUE;
1628 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2))
1629 ret = TRUE;
1630 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE))
1631 ret = TRUE;
1632 else
1633 {
1634 FIXME("unsupported critical extension %s\n",
1635 debugstr_a(oid));
1636 ret = FALSE;
1637 }
1638 }
1639 }
1640 return ret;
1641 }
1642
1643 static BOOL CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
1644 {
1645 BOOL ret = TRUE;
1646
1647 /* Checks whether the contents of the cert match the cert's version. */
1648 switch (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion)
1649 {
1650 case CERT_V1:
1651 /* A V1 cert may not contain unique identifiers. See RFC 5280,
1652 * section 4.1.2.8:
1653 * "These fields MUST only appear if the version is 2 or 3 (Section
1654 * 4.1.2.1). These fields MUST NOT appear if the version is 1."
1655 */
1656 if (cert->pCertInfo->IssuerUniqueId.cbData ||
1657 cert->pCertInfo->SubjectUniqueId.cbData)
1658 ret = FALSE;
1659 /* A V1 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
1660 * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
1661 */
1662 if (cert->pCertInfo->cExtension)
1663 ret = FALSE;
1664 break;
1665 case CERT_V2:
1666 /* A V2 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
1667 * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
1668 */
1669 if (cert->pCertInfo->cExtension)
1670 ret = FALSE;
1671 break;
1672 case CERT_V3:
1673 /* Do nothing, all fields are allowed for V3 certs */
1674 break;
1675 default:
1676 WARN_(chain)("invalid cert version %d\n", cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion);
1677 ret = FALSE;
1678 }
1679 return ret;
1680 }
1681
1682 static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
1683 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain, LPFILETIME time)
1684 {
1685 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1];
1686 int i;
1687 BOOL pathLengthConstraintViolated = FALSE;
1688 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints = { FALSE, FALSE, 0 };
1689
1690 TRACE_(chain)("checking chain with %d elements for time %s\n",
1691 chain->cElement, debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(time)));
1692 for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i >= 0; i--)
1693 {
1694 BOOL isRoot;
1695
1696 if (TRACE_ON(chain))
1697 dump_element(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
1698 if (i == chain->cElement - 1)
1699 isRoot = CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
1700 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
1701 else
1702 isRoot = FALSE;
1703 if (!CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext))
1704 {
1705 /* MS appears to accept certs whose versions don't match their
1706 * contents, so there isn't an appropriate error code.
1707 */
1708 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1709 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1710 }
1711 if (CertVerifyTimeValidity(time,
1712 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo) != 0)
1713 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1714 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID;
1715 if (i != 0)
1716 {
1717 /* Check the signature of the cert this issued */
1718 if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, X509_ASN_ENCODING,
1719 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT,
1720 (void *)chain->rgpElement[i - 1]->pCertContext,
1721 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT,
1722 (void *)chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, 0, NULL))
1723 chain->rgpElement[i - 1]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1724 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID;
1725 /* Once a path length constraint has been violated, every remaining
1726 * CA cert's basic constraints is considered invalid.
1727 */
1728 if (pathLengthConstraintViolated)
1729 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1730 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1731 else if (!CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(engine,
1732 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, &constraints, i - 1, isRoot,
1733 &pathLengthConstraintViolated))
1734 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1735 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1736 else if (constraints.fPathLenConstraint &&
1737 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint)
1738 {
1739 /* This one's valid - decrement max length */
1740 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint--;
1741 }
1742 }
1743 else
1744 {
1745 /* Check whether end cert has a basic constraints extension */
1746 if (!CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(
1747 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, &constraints, FALSE))
1748 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1749 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1750 }
1751 if (!CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(engine, chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext,
1752 isRoot, constraints.fCA, i))
1753 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1754 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
1755 if (CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain))
1756 {
1757 /* If the chain is cyclic, then the path length constraints
1758 * are violated, because the chain is infinitely long.
1759 */
1760 pathLengthConstraintViolated = TRUE;
1761 chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1762 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN |
1763 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1764 }
1765 /* Check whether every critical extension is supported */
1766 if (!CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(
1767 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext))
1768 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1769 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1770 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
1771 &chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus);
1772 }
1773 CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(chain);
1774 if (CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(rootElement->pCertContext))
1775 {
1776 rootElement->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus |=
1777 CERT_TRUST_IS_SELF_SIGNED | CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER;
1778 CRYPT_CheckRootCert(engine->hRoot, rootElement);
1779 }
1780 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus, &rootElement->TrustStatus);
1781 }
1782
1783 static PCCERT_CONTEXT CRYPT_GetIssuer(HCERTSTORE store, PCCERT_CONTEXT subject,
1784 PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer, DWORD *infoStatus)
1785 {
1786 PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer = NULL;
1787 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
1788 DWORD size;
1789
1790 *infoStatus = 0;
1791 if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
1792 subject->pCertInfo->cExtension, subject->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
1793 {
1794 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID_INFO *info;
1795 BOOL ret;
1796
1797 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject->dwCertEncodingType,
1798 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1799 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
1800 &info, &size);
1801 if (ret)
1802 {
1803 CERT_ID id;
1804
1805 if (info->CertIssuer.cbData && info->CertSerialNumber.cbData)
1806 {
1807 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER;
1808 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.Issuer, &info->CertIssuer,
1809 sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB));
1810 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.SerialNumber,
1811 &info->CertSerialNumber, sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB));
1812 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
1813 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
1814 prevIssuer);
1815 if (issuer)
1816 {
1817 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by issuer/serial number\n");
1818 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER;
1819 }
1820 }
1821 else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
1822 {
1823 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER;
1824 memcpy(&id.u.KeyId, &info->KeyId, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB));
1825 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
1826 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
1827 prevIssuer);
1828 if (issuer)
1829 {
1830 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by key id\n");
1831 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER;
1832 }
1833 }
1834 LocalFree(info);
1835 }
1836 }
1837 else if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER2,
1838 subject->pCertInfo->cExtension, subject->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
1839 {
1840 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2_INFO *info;
1841 BOOL ret;
1842
1843 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject->dwCertEncodingType,
1844 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1845 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
1846 &info, &size);
1847 if (ret)
1848 {
1849 CERT_ID id;
1850
1851 if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry &&
1852 info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber.cbData)
1853 {
1854 PCERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY directoryName = NULL;
1855 DWORD i;
1856
1857 for (i = 0; !directoryName &&
1858 i < info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry; i++)
1859 if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice
1860 == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
1861 directoryName =
1862 &info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i];
1863 if (directoryName)
1864 {
1865 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER;
1866 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.Issuer,
1867 &directoryName->u.DirectoryName, sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB));
1868 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.SerialNumber,
1869 &info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber,
1870 sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB));
1871 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
1872 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
1873 prevIssuer);
1874 if (issuer)
1875 {
1876 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by directory name\n");
1877 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER;
1878 }
1879 }
1880 else
1881 FIXME("no supported name type in authority key id2\n");
1882 }
1883 else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
1884 {
1885 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER;
1886 memcpy(&id.u.KeyId, &info->KeyId, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB));
1887 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
1888 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
1889 prevIssuer);
1890 if (issuer)
1891 {
1892 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by key id\n");
1893 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER;
1894 }
1895 }
1896 LocalFree(info);
1897 }
1898 }
1899 else
1900 {
1901 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
1902 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_SUBJECT_NAME,
1903 &subject->pCertInfo->Issuer, prevIssuer);
1904 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by name\n");
1905 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER;
1906 }
1907 return issuer;
1908 }
1909
1910 /* Builds a simple chain by finding an issuer for the last cert in the chain,
1911 * until reaching a self-signed cert, or until no issuer can be found.
1912 */
1913 static BOOL CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine *engine,
1914 HCERTSTORE world, PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
1915 {
1916 BOOL ret = TRUE;
1917 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->pCertContext;
1918
1919 while (ret && !CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain) &&
1920 !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(cert))
1921 {
1922 PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer = CRYPT_GetIssuer(world, cert, NULL,
1923 &chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus);
1924
1925 if (issuer)
1926 {
1927 ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine, chain, issuer,
1928 chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus);
1929 /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it to
1930 * close the enumeration that found it
1931 */
1932 CertFreeCertificateContext(issuer);
1933 cert = issuer;
1934 }
1935 else
1936 {
1937 TRACE_(chain)("Couldn't find issuer, halting chain creation\n");
1938 chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN;
1939 break;
1940 }
1941 }
1942 return ret;
1943 }
1944
1945 static BOOL CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
1946 HCERTSTORE world, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPFILETIME pTime,
1947 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *ppChain)
1948 {
1949 BOOL ret = FALSE;
1950 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain;
1951
1952 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p)\n", engine, world, cert, pTime);
1953
1954 chain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
1955 if (chain)
1956 {
1957 memset(chain, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
1958 chain->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN);
1959 ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine, chain, cert, 0);
1960 if (ret)
1961 {
1962 ret = CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine, world, chain);
1963 if (ret)
1964 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine, chain, pTime);
1965 }
1966 if (!ret)
1967 {
1968 CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain);
1969 chain = NULL;
1970 }
1971 *ppChain = chain;
1972 }
1973 return ret;
1974 }
1975
1976 static BOOL CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine,
1977 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
1978 PCertificateChain *ppChain)
1979 {
1980 PCertificateChainEngine engine = (PCertificateChainEngine)hChainEngine;
1981 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN simpleChain = NULL;
1982 HCERTSTORE world;
1983 BOOL ret;
1984
1985 world = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION, 0, 0,
1986 CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG, NULL);
1987 CertAddStoreToCollection(world, engine->hWorld, 0, 0);
1988 if (hAdditionalStore)
1989 CertAddStoreToCollection(world, hAdditionalStore, 0, 0);
1990 /* FIXME: only simple chains are supported for now, as CTLs aren't
1991 * supported yet.
1992 */
1993 if ((ret = CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(engine, world, cert, pTime,
1994 &simpleChain)))
1995 {
1996 PCertificateChain chain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain));
1997
1998 if (chain)
1999 {
2000 chain->ref = 1;
2001 chain->world = world;
2002 chain->context.cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT);
2003 chain->context.TrustStatus = simpleChain->TrustStatus;
2004 chain->context.cChain = 1;
2005 chain->context.rgpChain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2006 chain->context.rgpChain[0] = simpleChain;
2007 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2008 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2009 chain->context.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime = FALSE;
2010 chain->context.dwRevocationFreshnessTime = 0;
2011 }
2012 else
2013 ret = FALSE;
2014 *ppChain = chain;
2015 }
2016 return ret;
2017 }
2018
2019 /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement. */
2020 static PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(
2021 const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *chain, DWORD iElement)
2022 {
2023 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN copy = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2024
2025 if (copy)
2026 {
2027 memset(copy, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2028 copy->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN);
2029 copy->rgpElement =
2030 CryptMemAlloc((iElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
2031 if (copy->rgpElement)
2032 {
2033 DWORD i;
2034 BOOL ret = TRUE;
2035
2036 memset(copy->rgpElement, 0,
2037 (iElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
2038 for (i = 0; ret && i <= iElement; i++)
2039 {
2040 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element =
2041 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
2042
2043 if (element)
2044 {
2045 *element = *chain->rgpElement[i];
2046 element->pCertContext = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
2047 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
2048 /* Reset the trust status of the copied element, it'll get
2049 * rechecked after the new chain is done.
2050 */
2051 memset(&element->TrustStatus, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS));
2052 copy->rgpElement[copy->cElement++] = element;
2053 }
2054 else
2055 ret = FALSE;
2056 }
2057 if (!ret)
2058 {
2059 for (i = 0; i <= iElement; i++)
2060 CryptMemFree(copy->rgpElement[i]);
2061 CryptMemFree(copy->rgpElement);
2062 CryptMemFree(copy);
2063 copy = NULL;
2064 }
2065 }
2066 else
2067 {
2068 CryptMemFree(copy);
2069 copy = NULL;
2070 }
2071 }
2072 return copy;
2073 }
2074
2075 static void CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(PCertificateChain chain)
2076 {
2077 DWORD i;
2078
2079 for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext; i++)
2080 CertFreeCertificateChain(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]);
2081 CryptMemFree(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext);
2082 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2083 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2084 }
2085
2086 static void CRYPT_FreeChainContext(PCertificateChain chain)
2087 {
2088 DWORD i;
2089
2090 CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain);
2091 for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cChain; i++)
2092 CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain->context.rgpChain[i]);
2093 CryptMemFree(chain->context.rgpChain);
2094 CertCloseStore(chain->world, 0);
2095 CryptMemFree(chain);
2096 }
2097
2098 /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement of
2099 * simple chain iChain.
2100 */
2101 static PCertificateChain CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(PCertificateChain chain,
2102 DWORD iChain, DWORD iElement)
2103 {
2104 PCertificateChain copy = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain));
2105
2106 if (copy)
2107 {
2108 copy->ref = 1;
2109 copy->world = CertDuplicateStore(chain->world);
2110 copy->context.cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT);
2111 /* Leave the trust status of the copied chain unset, it'll get
2112 * rechecked after the new chain is done.
2113 */
2114 memset(&copy->context.TrustStatus, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS));
2115 copy->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2116 copy->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2117 copy->context.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime = FALSE;
2118 copy->context.dwRevocationFreshnessTime = 0;
2119 copy->context.rgpChain = CryptMemAlloc(
2120 (iChain + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2121 if (copy->context.rgpChain)
2122 {
2123 BOOL ret = TRUE;
2124 DWORD i;
2125
2126 memset(copy->context.rgpChain, 0,
2127 (iChain + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2128 if (iChain)
2129 {
2130 for (i = 0; ret && iChain && i < iChain - 1; i++)
2131 {
2132 copy->context.rgpChain[i] =
2133 CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain->context.rgpChain[i],
2134 chain->context.rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1);
2135 if (!copy->context.rgpChain[i])
2136 ret = FALSE;
2137 }
2138 }
2139 else
2140 i = 0;
2141 if (ret)
2142 {
2143 copy->context.rgpChain[i] =
2144 CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain->context.rgpChain[i],
2145 iElement);
2146 if (!copy->context.rgpChain[i])
2147 ret = FALSE;
2148 }
2149 if (!ret)
2150 {
2151 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(copy);
2152 copy = NULL;
2153 }
2154 else
2155 copy->context.cChain = iChain + 1;
2156 }
2157 else
2158 {
2159 CryptMemFree(copy);
2160 copy = NULL;
2161 }
2162 }
2163 return copy;
2164 }
2165
2166 static PCertificateChain CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(
2167 HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
2168 PCertificateChain chain)
2169 {
2170 PCertificateChainEngine engine = (PCertificateChainEngine)hChainEngine;
2171 PCertificateChain alternate;
2172
2173 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine, pTime, hAdditionalStore, chain);
2174
2175 /* Always start with the last "lower quality" chain to ensure a consistent
2176 * order of alternate creation:
2177 */
2178 if (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext)
2179 chain = (PCertificateChain)chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[
2180 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext - 1];
2181 /* A chain with only one element can't have any alternates */
2182 if (chain->context.cChain <= 1 && chain->context.rgpChain[0]->cElement <= 1)
2183 alternate = NULL;
2184 else
2185 {
2186 DWORD i, j, infoStatus;
2187 PCCERT_CONTEXT alternateIssuer = NULL;
2188
2189 alternate = NULL;
2190 for (i = 0; !alternateIssuer && i < chain->context.cChain; i++)
2191 for (j = 0; !alternateIssuer &&
2192 j < chain->context.rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1; j++)
2193 {
2194 PCCERT_CONTEXT subject =
2195 chain->context.rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext;
2196 PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
2197 chain->context.rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j + 1]->pCertContext);
2198
2199 alternateIssuer = CRYPT_GetIssuer(prevIssuer->hCertStore,
2200 subject, prevIssuer, &infoStatus);
2201 }
2202 if (alternateIssuer)
2203 {
2204 i--;
2205 j--;
2206 alternate = CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(chain, i, j);
2207 if (alternate)
2208 {
2209 BOOL ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine,
2210 alternate->context.rgpChain[i], alternateIssuer, infoStatus);
2211
2212 /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it
2213 * to close the enumeration that found it
2214 */
2215 CertFreeCertificateContext(alternateIssuer);
2216 if (ret)
2217 {
2218 ret = CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine, alternate->world,
2219 alternate->context.rgpChain[i]);
2220 if (ret)
2221 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine,
2222 alternate->context.rgpChain[i], pTime);
2223 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&alternate->context.TrustStatus,
2224 &alternate->context.rgpChain[i]->TrustStatus);
2225 }
2226 if (!ret)
2227 {
2228 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(alternate);
2229 alternate = NULL;
2230 }
2231 }
2232 }
2233 }
2234 TRACE("%p\n", alternate);
2235 return alternate;
2236 }
2237
2238 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID 0x16
2239 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID 8
2240 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN 4
2241 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS 2
2242 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT 1
2243
2244 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST \
2245 CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID | CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID | \
2246 CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN | CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS | \
2247 CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT
2248
2249 #define IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(TrustStatus, bits) \
2250 (TrustStatus)->dwErrorStatus & (bits)
2251
2252 static DWORD CRYPT_ChainQuality(const CertificateChain *chain)
2253 {
2254 DWORD quality = CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST;
2255
2256 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2257 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT))
2258 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT;
2259 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2260 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
2261 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
2262 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2263 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN))
2264 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN;
2265 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2266 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID | CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED))
2267 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID;
2268 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2269 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID))
2270 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID;
2271 return quality;
2272 }
2273
2274 /* Chooses the highest quality chain among chain and its "lower quality"
2275 * alternate chains. Returns the highest quality chain, with all other
2276 * chains as lower quality chains of it.
2277 */
2278 static PCertificateChain CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(
2279 PCertificateChain chain)
2280 {
2281 DWORD i;
2282
2283 /* There are always only two chains being considered: chain, and an
2284 * alternate at chain->rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]. If the alternate
2285 * has a higher quality than chain, the alternate gets assigned the lower
2286 * quality contexts, with chain taking the alternate's place among the
2287 * lower quality contexts.
2288 */
2289 for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext; i++)
2290 {
2291 PCertificateChain alternate =
2292 (PCertificateChain)chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i];
2293
2294 if (CRYPT_ChainQuality(alternate) > CRYPT_ChainQuality(chain))
2295 {
2296 alternate->context.cLowerQualityChainContext =
2297 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext;
2298 alternate->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
2299 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext;
2300 alternate->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i] =
2301 (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)chain;
2302 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2303 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2304 chain = alternate;
2305 }
2306 }
2307 return chain;
2308 }
2309
2310 static BOOL CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(PCertificateChain chain,
2311 const CertificateChain *alternate)
2312 {
2313 BOOL ret;
2314
2315 if (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext)
2316 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
2317 CryptMemRealloc(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext,
2318 (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext + 1) *
2319 sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT));
2320 else
2321 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
2322 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT));
2323 if (chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext)
2324 {
2325 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[
2326 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext++] =
2327 (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)alternate;
2328 ret = TRUE;
2329 }
2330 else
2331 ret = FALSE;
2332 return ret;
2333 }
2334
2335 static PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(
2336 const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT *chain, DWORD i)
2337 {
2338 DWORD j, iElement;
2339 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = NULL;
2340
2341 for (j = 0, iElement = 0; !element && j < chain->cChain; j++)
2342 {
2343 if (iElement + chain->rgpChain[j]->cElement < i)
2344 iElement += chain->rgpChain[j]->cElement;
2345 else
2346 element = chain->rgpChain[j]->rgpElement[i - iElement];
2347 }
2348 return element;
2349 }
2350
2351 typedef struct _CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS {
2352 DWORD cbSize;
2353 CERT_USAGE_MATCH RequestedUsage;
2354 } CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS, *PCERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS;
2355
2356 static void CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain,
2357 LPFILETIME pTime, const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara, DWORD chainFlags)
2358 {
2359 DWORD cContext;
2360
2361 if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_END_CERT)
2362 cContext = 1;
2363 else if ((chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN) ||
2364 (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT))
2365 {
2366 DWORD i;
2367
2368 for (i = 0, cContext = 0; i < chain->cChain; i++)
2369 {
2370 if (i < chain->cChain - 1 ||
2371 chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN)
2372 cContext += chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement;
2373 else
2374 cContext += chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1;
2375 }
2376 }
2377 else
2378 cContext = 0;
2379 if (cContext)
2380 {
2381 PCCERT_CONTEXT *contexts =
2382 CryptMemAlloc(cContext * sizeof(PCCERT_CONTEXT));
2383
2384 if (contexts)
2385 {
2386 DWORD i, j, iContext, revocationFlags;
2387 CERT_REVOCATION_PARA revocationPara = { sizeof(revocationPara), 0 };
2388 CERT_REVOCATION_STATUS revocationStatus =
2389 { sizeof(revocationStatus), 0 };
2390 BOOL ret;
2391
2392 for (i = 0, iContext = 0; iContext < cContext && i < chain->cChain;
2393 i++)
2394 {
2395 for (j = 0; iContext < cContext &&
2396 j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement; j++)
2397 contexts[iContext++] =
2398 chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext;
2399 }
2400 revocationFlags = CERT_VERIFY_REV_CHAIN_FLAG;
2401 if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY)
2402 revocationFlags |= CERT_VERIFY_CACHE_ONLY_BASED_REVOCATION;
2403 if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT)
2404 revocationFlags |= CERT_VERIFY_REV_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT_FLAG;
2405 revocationPara.pftTimeToUse = pTime;
2406 if (pChainPara->cbSize == sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA))
2407 {
2408 revocationPara.dwUrlRetrievalTimeout =
2409 pChainPara->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
2410 revocationPara.fCheckFreshnessTime =
2411 pChainPara->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime;
2412 revocationPara.dwFreshnessTime =
2413 pChainPara->dwRevocationFreshnessTime;
2414 }
2415 ret = CertVerifyRevocation(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
2416 CERT_CONTEXT_REVOCATION_TYPE, cContext, (void **)contexts,
2417 revocationFlags, &revocationPara, &revocationStatus);
2418 if (!ret)
2419 {
2420 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element =
2421 CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(chain, revocationStatus.dwIndex);
2422 DWORD error;
2423
2424 switch (revocationStatus.dwError)
2425 {
2426 case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK:
2427 case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_DLL:
2428 case CRYPT_E_NOT_IN_REVOCATION_DATABASE:
2429 /* If the revocation status is unknown, it's assumed to be
2430 * offline too.
2431 */
2432 error = CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN |
2433 CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION;
2434 break;
2435 case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE:
2436 error = CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION;
2437 break;
2438 case CRYPT_E_REVOKED:
2439 error = CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED;
2440 break;
2441 default:
2442 WARN("unmapped error %08x\n", revocationStatus.dwError);
2443 error = 0;
2444 }
2445 if (element)
2446 {
2447 /* FIXME: set element's pRevocationInfo member */
2448 element->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= error;
2449 }
2450 chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= error;
2451 }
2452 CryptMemFree(contexts);
2453 }
2454 }
2455 }
2456
2457 static void dump_usage_match(LPCSTR name, const CERT_USAGE_MATCH *usageMatch)
2458 {
2459 if (usageMatch->Usage.cUsageIdentifier)
2460 {
2461 DWORD i;
2462
2463 TRACE_(chain)("%s: %s\n", name,
2464 usageMatch->dwType == USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND ? "AND" : "OR");
2465 for (i = 0; i < usageMatch->Usage.cUsageIdentifier; i++)
2466 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", usageMatch->Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
2467 }
2468 }
2469
2470 static void dump_chain_para(const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara)
2471 {
2472 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->cbSize);
2473 if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS))
2474 dump_usage_match("RequestedUsage", &pChainPara->RequestedUsage);
2475 if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA))
2476 {
2477 dump_usage_match("RequestedIssuancePolicy",
2478 &pChainPara->RequestedIssuancePolicy);
2479 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout);
2480 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime);
2481 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->dwRevocationFreshnessTime);
2482 }
2483 }
2484
2485 BOOL WINAPI CertGetCertificateChain(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine,
2486 PCCERT_CONTEXT pCertContext, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
2487 PCERT_CHAIN_PARA pChainPara, DWORD dwFlags, LPVOID pvReserved,
2488 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT* ppChainContext)
2489 {
2490 BOOL ret;
2491 PCertificateChain chain = NULL;
2492
2493 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p, %p, %08x, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine, pCertContext,
2494 pTime, hAdditionalStore, pChainPara, dwFlags, pvReserved, ppChainContext);
2495
2496 if (ppChainContext)
2497 *ppChainContext = NULL;
2498 if (!pChainPara)
2499 {
2500 SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG);
2501 return FALSE;
2502 }
2503 if (!pCertContext->pCertInfo->SignatureAlgorithm.pszObjId)
2504 {
2505 SetLastError(ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
2506 return FALSE;
2507 }
2508
2509 if (!hChainEngine)
2510 hChainEngine = CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine();
2511 if (TRACE_ON(chain))
2512 dump_chain_para(pChainPara);
2513 /* FIXME: what about HCCE_LOCAL_MACHINE? */
2514 ret = CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(hChainEngine, pCertContext, pTime,
2515 hAdditionalStore, &chain);
2516 if (ret)
2517 {
2518 PCertificateChain alternate = NULL;
2519 PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChain;
2520
2521 do {
2522 alternate = CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(hChainEngine,
2523 pTime, hAdditionalStore, chain);
2524
2525 /* Alternate contexts are added as "lower quality" contexts of
2526 * chain, to avoid loops in alternate chain creation.
2527 * The highest-quality chain is chosen at the end.
2528 */
2529 if (alternate)
2530 ret = CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(chain, alternate);
2531 } while (ret && alternate);
2532 chain = CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(chain);
2533 if (!(dwFlags & CERT_CHAIN_RETURN_LOWER_QUALITY_CONTEXTS))
2534 CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain);
2535 pChain = (PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)chain;
2536 CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(pChain, pTime, pChainPara, dwFlags);
2537 if (ppChainContext)
2538 *ppChainContext = pChain;
2539 else
2540 CertFreeCertificateChain(pChain);
2541 }
2542 TRACE("returning %d\n", ret);
2543 return ret;
2544 }
2545
2546 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT WINAPI CertDuplicateCertificateChain(
2547 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext)
2548 {
2549 PCertificateChain chain = (PCertificateChain)pChainContext;
2550
2551 TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext);
2552
2553 if (chain)
2554 InterlockedIncrement(&chain->ref);
2555 return pChainContext;
2556 }
2557
2558 VOID WINAPI CertFreeCertificateChain(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext)
2559 {
2560 PCertificateChain chain = (PCertificateChain)pChainContext;
2561
2562 TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext);
2563
2564 if (chain)
2565 {
2566 if (InterlockedDecrement(&chain->ref) == 0)
2567 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(chain);
2568 }
2569 }
2570
2571 static void find_element_with_error(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain, DWORD error,
2572 LONG *iChain, LONG *iElement)
2573 {
2574 DWORD i, j;
2575
2576 for (i = 0; i < chain->cChain; i++)
2577 for (j = 0; j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement; j++)
2578 if (chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
2579 error)
2580 {
2581 *iChain = i;
2582 *iElement = j;
2583 return;
2584 }
2585 }
2586
2587 static BOOL WINAPI verify_base_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
2588 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
2589 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
2590 {
2591 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
2592 if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
2593 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID)
2594 {
2595 pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE;
2596 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
2597 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
2598 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2599 }
2600 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
2601 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT)
2602 {
2603 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
2604 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
2605 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
2606 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2607 }
2608 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC)
2609 {
2610 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CHAINING;
2611 find_element_with_error(pChainContext, CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC,
2612 &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex, &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2613 /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
2614 pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
2615 }
2616 else
2617 pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
2618 return TRUE;
2619 }
2620
2621 static BYTE msTestPubKey1[] = {
2622 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x81,0x55,0x22,0xb9,0x8a,0xa4,0x6f,0xed,0xd6,0xe7,0xd9,
2623 0x66,0x0f,0x55,0xbc,0xd7,0xcd,0xd5,0xbc,0x4e,0x40,0x02,0x21,0xa2,0xb1,0xf7,
2624 0x87,0x30,0x85,0x5e,0xd2,0xf2,0x44,0xb9,0xdc,0x9b,0x75,0xb6,0xfb,0x46,0x5f,
2625 0x42,0xb6,0x9d,0x23,0x36,0x0b,0xde,0x54,0x0f,0xcd,0xbd,0x1f,0x99,0x2a,0x10,
2626 0x58,0x11,0xcb,0x40,0xcb,0xb5,0xa7,0x41,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2627 static BYTE msTestPubKey2[] = {
2628 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x9c,0x50,0x05,0x1d,0xe2,0x0e,0x4c,0x53,0xd8,0xd9,0xb5,
2629 0xe5,0xfd,0xe9,0xe3,0xad,0x83,0x4b,0x80,0x08,0xd9,0xdc,0xe8,0xe8,0x35,0xf8,
2630 0x11,0xf1,0xe9,0x9b,0x03,0x7a,0x65,0x64,0x76,0x35,0xce,0x38,0x2c,0xf2,0xb6,
2631 0x71,0x9e,0x06,0xd9,0xbf,0xbb,0x31,0x69,0xa3,0xf6,0x30,0xa0,0x78,0x7b,0x18,
2632 0xdd,0x50,0x4d,0x79,0x1e,0xeb,0x61,0xc1,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2633
2634 static BOOL WINAPI verify_authenticode_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
2635 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
2636 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
2637 {
2638 BOOL ret = verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
2639 pPolicyStatus);
2640
2641 if (ret && pPolicyStatus->dwError == CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT)
2642 {
2643 CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey = { { 0 } };
2644 BOOL isMSTestRoot = FALSE;
2645 PCCERT_CONTEXT failingCert =
2646 pChainContext->rgpChain[pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex]->
2647 rgpElement[pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex]->pCertContext;
2648 DWORD i;
2649 CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs[] = {
2650 { sizeof(msTestPubKey1), msTestPubKey1 },
2651 { sizeof(msTestPubKey2), msTestPubKey2 },
2652 };
2653
2654 /* Check whether the root is an MS test root */
2655 for (i = 0; !isMSTestRoot && i < sizeof(keyBlobs) / sizeof(keyBlobs[0]);
2656 i++)
2657 {
2658 msPubKey.PublicKey.cbData = keyBlobs[i].cbData;
2659 msPubKey.PublicKey.pbData = keyBlobs[i].pbData;
2660 if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
2661 X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
2662 &failingCert->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo, &msPubKey))
2663 isMSTestRoot = TRUE;
2664 }
2665 if (isMSTestRoot)
2666 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDTESTROOT;
2667 }
2668 return ret;
2669 }
2670
2671 static BOOL WINAPI verify_basic_constraints_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
2672 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
2673 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
2674 {
2675 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
2676 if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
2677 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS)
2678 {
2679 pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
2680 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
2681 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
2682 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2683 }
2684 else
2685 pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
2686 return TRUE;
2687 }
2688
2689 static BOOL match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(PCERT_EXTENSION ext,
2690 LPCWSTR server_name)
2691 {
2692 BOOL matches = FALSE;
2693 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *subjectName;
2694 DWORD size;
2695
2696 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name));
2697 /* This could be spoofed by the embedded NULL vulnerability, since the
2698 * returned CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO doesn't have a way to indicate the
2699 * encoded length of a name. Fortunately CryptDecodeObjectEx fails if
2700 * the encoded form of the name contains a NULL.
2701 */
2702 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
2703 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
2704 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
2705 &subjectName, &size))
2706 {
2707 DWORD i;
2708
2709 /* RFC 5280 states that multiple instances of each name type may exist,
2710 * in section 4.2.1.6:
2711 * "Multiple name forms, and multiple instances of each name form,
2712 * MAY be included."
2713 * It doesn't specify the behavior in such cases, but both RFC 2818
2714 * and RFC 2595 explicitly accept a certificate if any name matches.
2715 */
2716 for (i = 0; !matches && i < subjectName->cAltEntry; i++)
2717 {
2718 if (subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice ==
2719 CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME)
2720 {
2721 TRACE_(chain)("dNSName: %s\n", debugstr_w(
2722 subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName));
2723 if (!strcmpiW(server_name,
2724 subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName))
2725 matches = TRUE;
2726 }
2727 }
2728 LocalFree(subjectName);
2729 }
2730 return matches;
2731 }
2732
2733 static BOOL find_matching_domain_component(CERT_NAME_INFO *name,
2734 LPCWSTR component)
2735 {
2736 BOOL matches = FALSE;
2737 DWORD i, j;
2738
2739 for (i = 0; !matches && i < name->cRDN; i++)
2740 for (j = 0; j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++)
2741 if (!strcmp(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT,
2742 name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j].pszObjId))
2743 {
2744 PCERT_RDN_ATTR attr;
2745
2746 attr = &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j];
2747 /* Compare with memicmpW rather than strcmpiW in order to avoid
2748 * a match with a string with an embedded NULL. The component
2749 * must match one domain component attribute's entire string
2750 * value with a case-insensitive match.
2751 */
2752 matches = !memicmpW(component, (LPWSTR)attr->Value.pbData,
2753 attr->Value.cbData / sizeof(WCHAR));
2754 }
2755 return matches;
2756 }
2757
2758 static BOOL match_domain_component(LPCWSTR allowed_component, DWORD allowed_len,
2759 LPCWSTR server_component, DWORD server_len, BOOL allow_wildcards,
2760 BOOL *see_wildcard)
2761 {
2762 LPCWSTR allowed_ptr, server_ptr;
2763 BOOL matches = TRUE;
2764
2765 *see_wildcard = FALSE;
2766 if (server_len < allowed_len)
2767 {
2768 WARN_(chain)("domain component %s too short for %s\n",
2769 debugstr_wn(server_component, server_len),
2770 debugstr_wn(allowed_component, allowed_len));
2771 /* A domain component can't contain a wildcard character, so a domain
2772 * component shorter than the allowed string can't produce a match.
2773 */
2774 return FALSE;
2775 }
2776 for (allowed_ptr = allowed_component, server_ptr = server_component;
2777 matches && allowed_ptr - allowed_component < allowed_len;
2778 allowed_ptr++, server_ptr++)
2779 {
2780 if (*allowed_ptr == '*')
2781 {
2782 if (allowed_ptr - allowed_component < allowed_len - 1)
2783 {
2784 WARN_(chain)("non-wildcard characters after wildcard not supported\n");
2785 matches = FALSE;
2786 }
2787 else if (!allow_wildcards)
2788 {
2789 WARN_(chain)("wildcard after non-wildcard component\n");
2790 matches = FALSE;
2791 }
2792 else
2793 {
2794 /* the preceding characters must have matched, so the rest of
2795 * the component also matches.
2796 */
2797 *see_wildcard = TRUE;
2798 break;
2799 }
2800 }
2801 matches = tolowerW(*allowed_ptr) == tolowerW(*server_ptr);
2802 }
2803 if (matches && server_ptr - server_component < server_len)
2804 {
2805 /* If there are unmatched characters in the server domain component,
2806 * the server domain only matches if the allowed string ended in a '*'.
2807 */
2808 matches = *allowed_ptr == '*';
2809 }
2810 return matches;
2811 }
2812
2813 static BOOL match_common_name(LPCWSTR server_name, PCERT_RDN_ATTR nameAttr)
2814 {
2815 LPCWSTR allowed = (LPCWSTR)nameAttr->Value.pbData;
2816 LPCWSTR allowed_component = allowed;
2817 DWORD allowed_len = nameAttr->Value.cbData / sizeof(WCHAR);
2818 LPCWSTR server_component = server_name;
2819 DWORD server_len = strlenW(server_name);
2820 BOOL matches = TRUE, allow_wildcards = TRUE;
2821
2822 TRACE_(chain)("CN = %s\n", debugstr_wn(allowed_component, allowed_len));
2823
2824 /* From RFC 2818 (HTTP over TLS), section 3.1:
2825 * "Names may contain the wildcard character * which is considered to match
2826 * any single domain name component or component fragment. E.g.,
2827 * *.a.com matches foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com
2828 * but not bar.com."
2829 *
2830 * And from RFC 2595 (Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP), section 2.4:
2831 * "A "*" wildcard character MAY be used as the left-most name component in
2832 * the certificate. For example, *.example.com would match a.example.com,
2833 * foo.example.com, etc. but would not match example.com."
2834 *
2835 * There are other protocols which use TLS, and none of them is
2836 * authoritative. This accepts certificates in common usage, e.g.
2837 * *.domain.com matches www.domain.com but not domain.com, and
2838 * www*.domain.com matches www1.domain.com but not mail.domain.com.
2839 */
2840 do {
2841 LPCWSTR allowed_dot, server_dot;
2842
2843 allowed_dot = memchrW(allowed_component, '.',
2844 allowed_len - (allowed_component - allowed));
2845 server_dot = memchrW(server_component, '.',
2846 server_len - (server_component - server_name));
2847 /* The number of components must match */
2848 if ((!allowed_dot && server_dot) || (allowed_dot && !server_dot))
2849 {
2850 if (!allowed_dot)
2851 WARN_(chain)("%s: too many components for CN=%s\n",
2852 debugstr_w(server_name), debugstr_wn(allowed, allowed_len));
2853 else
2854 WARN_(chain)("%s: not enough components for CN=%s\n",
2855 debugstr_w(server_name), debugstr_wn(allowed, allowed_len));
2856 matches = FALSE;
2857 }
2858 else
2859 {
2860 LPCWSTR allowed_end, server_end;
2861 BOOL has_wildcard;
2862
2863 allowed_end = allowed_dot ? allowed_dot : allowed + allowed_len;
2864 server_end = server_dot ? server_dot : server_name + server_len;
2865 matches = match_domain_component(allowed_component,
2866 allowed_end - allowed_component, server_component,
2867 server_end - server_component, allow_wildcards, &has_wildcard);
2868 /* Once a non-wildcard component is seen, no wildcard components
2869 * may follow
2870 */
2871 if (!has_wildcard)
2872 allow_wildcards = FALSE;
2873 if (matches)
2874 {
2875 allowed_component = allowed_dot ? allowed_dot + 1 : allowed_end;
2876 server_component = server_dot ? server_dot + 1 : server_end;
2877 }
2878 }
2879 } while (matches && allowed_component &&
2880 allowed_component - allowed < allowed_len &&
2881 server_component && server_component - server_name < server_len);
2882 TRACE_(chain)("returning %d\n", matches);
2883 return matches;
2884 }
2885
2886 static BOOL match_dns_to_subject_dn(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPCWSTR server_name)
2887 {
2888 BOOL matches = FALSE;
2889 CERT_NAME_INFO *name;
2890 DWORD size;
2891
2892 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name));
2893 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_UNICODE_NAME,
2894 cert->pCertInfo->Subject.pbData, cert->pCertInfo->Subject.cbData,
2895 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
2896 &name, &size))
2897 {
2898 /* If the subject distinguished name contains any name components,
2899 * make sure all of them are present.
2900 */
2901 if (CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, name))
2902 {
2903 LPCWSTR ptr = server_name;
2904
2905 matches = TRUE;
2906 do {
2907 LPCWSTR dot = strchrW(ptr, '.'), end;
2908 /* 254 is the maximum DNS label length, see RFC 1035 */
2909 WCHAR component[255];
2910 DWORD len;
2911
2912 end = dot ? dot : ptr + strlenW(ptr);
2913 len = end - ptr;
2914 if (len >= sizeof(component) / sizeof(component[0]))
2915 {
2916 WARN_(chain)("domain component %s too long\n",
2917 debugstr_wn(ptr, len));
2918 matches = FALSE;
2919 }
2920 else
2921 {
2922 memcpy(component, ptr, len * sizeof(WCHAR));
2923 component[len] = 0;
2924 matches = find_matching_domain_component(name, component);
2925 }
2926 ptr = dot ? dot + 1 : end;
2927 } while (matches && ptr && *ptr);
2928 }
2929 else
2930 {
2931 PCERT_RDN_ATTR attr;
2932
2933 /* If the certificate isn't using a DN attribute in the name, make
2934 * make sure the common name matches.
2935 */
2936 if ((attr = CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_COMMON_NAME, name)))
2937 matches = match_common_name(server_name, attr);
2938 }
2939 LocalFree(name);
2940 }
2941 return matches;
2942 }
2943
2944 static BOOL WINAPI verify_ssl_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
2945 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
2946 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
2947 {
2948 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
2949 if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
2950 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID)
2951 {
2952 pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE;
2953 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
2954 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
2955 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2956 }
2957 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
2958 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT)
2959 {
2960 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
2961 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
2962 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
2963 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2964 }
2965 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC)
2966 {
2967 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
2968 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
2969 CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
2970 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2971 /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
2972 pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
2973 }
2974 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
2975 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID)
2976 {
2977 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_EXPIRED;
2978 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
2979 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
2980 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2981 }
2982 else
2983 pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
2984 /* We only need bother checking whether the name in the end certificate
2985 * matches if the chain is otherwise okay.
2986 */
2987 if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError && pPolicyPara &&
2988 pPolicyPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA))
2989 {
2990 HTTPSPolicyCallbackData *sslPara = pPolicyPara->pvExtraPolicyPara;
2991
2992 if (sslPara && sslPara->u.cbSize >= sizeof(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData))
2993 {
2994 if (sslPara->dwAuthType == AUTHTYPE_SERVER &&
2995 sslPara->pwszServerName)
2996 {
2997 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert;
2998 PCERT_EXTENSION altNameExt;
2999 BOOL matches;
3000
3001 cert = pChainContext->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->pCertContext;
3002 altNameExt = get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert->pCertInfo);
3003 /* If the alternate name extension exists, the name it contains
3004 * is bound to the certificate, so make sure the name matches
3005 * it. Otherwise, look for the server name in the subject
3006 * distinguished name. RFC5280, section 4.2.1.6:
3007 * "Whenever such identities are to be bound into a
3008 * certificate, the subject alternative name (or issuer
3009 * alternative name) extension MUST be used; however, a DNS
3010 * name MAY also be represented in the subject field using the
3011 * domainComponent attribute."
3012 */
3013 if (altNameExt)
3014 matches = match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(altNameExt,
3015 sslPara->pwszServerName);
3016 else
3017 matches = match_dns_to_subject_dn(cert,
3018 sslPara->pwszServerName);
3019 if (!matches)
3020 {
3021 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH;
3022 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = 0;
3023 pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = 0;
3024 }
3025 }
3026 }
3027 }
3028 return TRUE;
3029 }
3030
3031 static BYTE msPubKey1[] = {
3032 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xdf,0x08,0xba,0xe3,0x3f,0x6e,
3033 0x64,0x9b,0xf5,0x89,0xaf,0x28,0x96,0x4a,0x07,0x8f,0x1b,0x2e,0x8b,0x3e,0x1d,
3034 0xfc,0xb8,0x80,0x69,0xa3,0xa1,0xce,0xdb,0xdf,0xb0,0x8e,0x6c,0x89,0x76,0x29,
3035 0x4f,0xca,0x60,0x35,0x39,0xad,0x72,0x32,0xe0,0x0b,0xae,0x29,0x3d,0x4c,0x16,
3036 0xd9,0x4b,0x3c,0x9d,0xda,0xc5,0xd3,0xd1,0x09,0xc9,0x2c,0x6f,0xa6,0xc2,0x60,
3037 0x53,0x45,0xdd,0x4b,0xd1,0x55,0xcd,0x03,0x1c,0xd2,0x59,0x56,0x24,0xf3,0xe5,
3038 0x78,0xd8,0x07,0xcc,0xd8,0xb3,0x1f,0x90,0x3f,0xc0,0x1a,0x71,0x50,0x1d,0x2d,
3039 0xa7,0x12,0x08,0x6d,0x7c,0xb0,0x86,0x6c,0xc7,0xba,0x85,0x32,0x07,0xe1,0x61,
3040 0x6f,0xaf,0x03,0xc5,0x6d,0xe5,0xd6,0xa1,0x8f,0x36,0xf6,0xc1,0x0b,0xd1,0x3e,
3041 0x69,0x97,0x48,0x72,0xc9,0x7f,0xa4,0xc8,0xc2,0x4a,0x4c,0x7e,0xa1,0xd1,0x94,
3042 0xa6,0xd7,0xdc,0xeb,0x05,0x46,0x2e,0xb8,0x18,0xb4,0x57,0x1d,0x86,0x49,0xdb,
3043 0x69,0x4a,0x2c,0x21,0xf5,0x5e,0x0f,0x54,0x2d,0x5a,0x43,0xa9,0x7a,0x7e,0x6a,
3044 0x8e,0x50,0x4d,0x25,0x57,0xa1,0xbf,0x1b,0x15,0x05,0x43,0x7b,0x2c,0x05,0x8d,
3045 0xbd,0x3d,0x03,0x8c,0x93,0x22,0x7d,0x63,0xea,0x0a,0x57,0x05,0x06,0x0a,0xdb,
3046 0x61,0x98,0x65,0x2d,0x47,0x49,0xa8,0xe7,0xe6,0x56,0x75,0x5c,0xb8,0x64,0x08,
3047 0x63,0xa9,0x30,0x40,0x66,0xb2,0xf9,0xb6,0xe3,0x34,0xe8,0x67,0x30,0xe1,0x43,
3048 0x0b,0x87,0xff,0xc9,0xbe,0x72,0x10,0x5e,0x23,0xf0,0x9b,0xa7,0x48,0x65,0xbf,
3049 0x09,0x88,0x7b,0xcd,0x72,0xbc,0x2e,0x79,0x9b,0x7b,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
3050 static BYTE msPubKey2[] = {
3051 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xa9,0x02,0xbd,0xc1,0x70,0xe6,
3052 0x3b,0xf2,0x4e,0x1b,0x28,0x9f,0x97,0x78,0x5e,0x30,0xea,0xa2,0xa9,0x8d,0x25,
3053 0x5f,0xf8,0xfe,0x95,0x4c,0xa3,0xb7,0xfe,0x9d,0xa2,0x20,0x3e,0x7c,0x51,0xa2,
3054 0x9b,0xa2,0x8f,0x60,0x32,0x6b,0xd1,0x42,0x64,0x79,0xee,0xac,0x76,0xc9,0x54,
3055 0xda,0xf2,0xeb,0x9c,0x86,0x1c,0x8f,0x9f,0x84,0x66,0xb3,0xc5,0x6b,0x7a,0x62,
3056 0x23,0xd6,0x1d,0x3c,0xde,0x0f,0x01,0x92,0xe8,0x96,0xc4,0xbf,0x2d,0x66,0x9a,
3057 0x9a,0x68,0x26,0x99,0xd0,0x3a,0x2c,0xbf,0x0c,0xb5,0x58,0x26,0xc1,0x46,0xe7,
3058 0x0a,0x3e,0x38,0x96,0x2c,0xa9,0x28,0x39,0xa8,0xec,0x49,0x83,0x42,0xe3,0x84,
3059 0x0f,0xbb,0x9a,0x6c,0x55,0x61,0xac,0x82,0x7c,0xa1,0x60,0x2d,0x77,0x4c,0xe9,
3060 0x99,0xb4,0x64,0x3b,0x9a,0x50,0x1c,0x31,0x08,0x24,0x14,0x9f,0xa9,0xe7,0x91,
3061 0x2b,0x18,0xe6,0x3d,0x98,0x63,0x14,0x60,0x58,0x05,0x65,0x9f,0x1d,0x37,0x52,
3062 0x87,0xf7,0xa7,0xef,0x94,0x02,0xc6,0x1b,0xd3,0xbf,0x55,0x45,0xb3,0x89,0x80,
3063 0xbf,0x3a,0xec,0x54,0x94,0x4e,0xae,0xfd,0xa7,0x7a,0x6d,0x74,0x4e,0xaf,0x18,
3064 0xcc,0x96,0x09,0x28,0x21,0x00,0x57,0x90,0x60,0x69,0x37,0xbb,0x4b,0x12,0x07,
3065 0x3c,0x56,0xff,0x5b,0xfb,0xa4,0x66,0x0a,0x08,0xa6,0xd2,0x81,0x56,0x57,0xef,
3066 0xb6,0x3b,0x5e,0x16,0x81,0x77,0x04,0xda,0xf6,0xbe,0xae,0x80,0x95,0xfe,0xb0,
3067 0xcd,0x7f,0xd6,0xa7,0x1a,0x72,0x5c,0x3c,0xca,0xbc,0xf0,0x08,0xa3,0x22,0x30,
3068 0xb3,0x06,0x85,0xc9,0xb3,0x20,0x77,0x13,0x85,0xdf,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
3069 static BYTE msPubKey3[] = {
3070 0x30,0x82,0x02,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x02,0x01,0x00,0xf3,0x5d,0xfa,0x80,0x67,0xd4,
3071 0x5a,0xa7,0xa9,0x0c,0x2c,0x90,0x20,0xd0,0x35,0x08,0x3c,0x75,0x84,0xcd,0xb7,
3072 0x07,0x89,0x9c,0x89,0xda,0xde,0xce,0xc3,0x60,0xfa,0x91,0x68,0x5a,0x9e,0x94,
3073 0x71,0x29,0x18,0x76,0x7c,0xc2,0xe0,0xc8,0x25,0x76,0x94,0x0e,0x58,0xfa,0x04,
3074 0x34,0x36,0xe6,0xdf,0xaf,0xf7,0x80,0xba,0xe9,0x58,0x0b,0x2b,0x93,0xe5,0x9d,
3075 0x05,0xe3,0x77,0x22,0x91,0xf7,0x34,0x64,0x3c,0x22,0x91,0x1d,0x5e,0xe1,0x09,
3076 0x90,0xbc,0x14,0xfe,0xfc,0x75,0x58,0x19,0xe1,0x79,0xb7,0x07,0x92,0xa3,0xae,
3077 0x88,0x59,0x08,0xd8,0x9f,0x07,0xca,0x03,0x58,0xfc,0x68,0x29,0x6d,0x32,0xd7,
3078 0xd2,0xa8,0xcb,0x4b,0xfc,0xe1,0x0b,0x48,0x32,0x4f,0xe6,0xeb,0xb8,0xad,0x4f,
3079 0xe4,0x5c,0x6f,0x13,0x94,0x99,0xdb,0x95,0xd5,0x75,0xdb,0xa8,0x1a,0xb7,0x94,
3080 0x91,0xb4,0x77,0x5b,0xf5,0x48,0x0c,0x8f,0x6a,0x79,0x7d,0x14,0x70,0x04,0x7d,
3081 0x6d,0xaf,0x90,0xf5,0xda,0x70,0xd8,0x47,0xb7,0xbf,0x9b,0x2f,0x6c,0xe7,0x05,
3082 0xb7,0xe1,0x11,0x60,0xac,0x79,0x91,0x14,0x7c,0xc5,0xd6,0xa6,0xe4,0xe1,0x7e,
3083 0xd5,0xc3,0x7e,0xe5,0x92,0xd2,0x3c,0x00,0xb5,0x36,0x82,0xde,0x79,0xe1,0x6d,
3084 0xf3,0xb5,0x6e,0xf8,0x9f,0x33,0xc9,0xcb,0x52,0x7d,0x73,0x98,0x36,0xdb,0x8b,
3085 0xa1,0x6b,0xa2,0x95,0x97,0x9b,0xa3,0xde,0xc2,0x4d,0x26,0xff,0x06,0x96,0x67,
3086 0x25,0x06,0xc8,0xe7,0xac,0xe4,0xee,0x12,0x33,0x95,0x31,0x99,0xc8,0x35,0x08,
3087 0x4e,0x34,0xca,0x79,0x53,0xd5,0xb5,0xbe,0x63,0x32,0x59,0x40,0x36,0xc0,0xa5,
3088 0x4e,0x04,0x4d,0x3d,0xdb,0x5b,0x07,0x33,0xe4,0x58,0xbf,0xef,0x3f,0x53,0x64,
3089 0xd8,0x42,0x59,0x35,0x57,0xfd,0x0f,0x45,0x7c,0x24,0x04,0x4d,0x9e,0xd6,0x38,
3090 0x74,0x11,0x97,0x22,0x90,0xce,0x68,0x44,0x74,0x92,0x6f,0xd5,0x4b,0x6f,0xb0,
3091 0x86,0xe3,0xc7,0x36,0x42,0xa0,0xd0,0xfc,0xc1,0xc0,0x5a,0xf9,0xa3,0x61,0xb9,
3092 0x30,0x47,0x71,0x96,0x0a,0x16,0xb0,0x91,0xc0,0x42,0x95,0xef,0x10,0x7f,0x28,
3093 0x6a,0xe3,0x2a,0x1f,0xb1,0xe4,0xcd,0x03,0x3f,0x77,0x71,0x04,0xc7,0x20,0xfc,
3094 0x49,0x0f,0x1d,0x45,0x88,0xa4,0xd7,0xcb,0x7e,0x88,0xad,0x8e,0x2d,0xec,0x45,
3095 0xdb,0xc4,0x51,0x04,0xc9,0x2a,0xfc,0xec,0x86,0x9e,0x9a,0x11,0x97,0x5b,0xde,
3096 0xce,0x53,0x88,0xe6,0xe2,0xb7,0xfd,0xac,0x95,0xc2,0x28,0x40,0xdb,0xef,0x04,
3097 0x90,0xdf,0x81,0x33,0x39,0xd9,0xb2,0x45,0xa5,0x23,0x87,0x06,0xa5,0x55,0x89,
3098 0x31,0xbb,0x06,0x2d,0x60,0x0e,0x41,0x18,0x7d,0x1f,0x2e,0xb5,0x97,0xcb,0x11,
3099 0xeb,0x15,0xd5,0x24,0xa5,0x94,0xef,0x15,0x14,0x89,0xfd,0x4b,0x73,0xfa,0x32,
3100 0x5b,0xfc,0xd1,0x33,0x00,0xf9,0x59,0x62,0x70,0x07,0x32,0xea,0x2e,0xab,0x40,
3101 0x2d,0x7b,0xca,0xdd,0x21,0x67,0x1b,0x30,0x99,0x8f,0x16,0xaa,0x23,0xa8,0x41,
3102 0xd1,0xb0,0x6e,0x11,0x9b,0x36,0xc4,0xde,0x40,0x74,0x9c,0xe1,0x58,0x65,0xc1,
3103 0x60,0x1e,0x7a,0x5b,0x38,0xc8,0x8f,0xbb,0x04,0x26,0x7c,0xd4,0x16,0x40,0xe5,
3104 0xb6,0x6b,0x6c,0xaa,0x86,0xfd,0x00,0xbf,0xce,0xc1,0x35,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,
3105 0x01 };
3106
3107 static BOOL WINAPI verify_ms_root_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3108 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3109 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
3110 {
3111 BOOL ret = verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
3112 pPolicyStatus);
3113
3114 if (ret && !pPolicyStatus->dwError)
3115 {
3116 CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey = { { 0 } };
3117 BOOL isMSRoot = FALSE;
3118 DWORD i;
3119 CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs[] = {
3120 { sizeof(msPubKey1), msPubKey1 },
3121 { sizeof(msPubKey2), msPubKey2 },
3122 { sizeof(msPubKey3), msPubKey3 },
3123 };
3124 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN rootChain =
3125 pChainContext->rgpChain[pChainContext->cChain -1 ];
3126 PCCERT_CONTEXT root =
3127 rootChain->rgpElement[rootChain->cElement - 1]->pCertContext;
3128
3129 for (i = 0; !isMSRoot && i < sizeof(keyBlobs) / sizeof(keyBlobs[0]);
3130 i++)
3131 {
3132 msPubKey.PublicKey.cbData = keyBlobs[i].cbData;
3133 msPubKey.PublicKey.pbData = keyBlobs[i].pbData;
3134 if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
3135 X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
3136 &root->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo, &msPubKey))
3137 isMSRoot = TRUE;
3138 }
3139 if (isMSRoot)
3140 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = 0;
3141 }
3142 return ret;
3143 }
3144
3145 typedef BOOL (WINAPI *CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc)(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3146 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3147 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus);
3148
3149 BOOL WINAPI CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3150 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3151 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
3152 {
3153 static HCRYPTOIDFUNCSET set = NULL;
3154 BOOL ret = FALSE;
3155 CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc verifyPolicy = NULL;
3156 HCRYPTOIDFUNCADDR hFunc = NULL;
3157
3158 TRACE("(%s, %p, %p, %p)\n", debugstr_a(szPolicyOID), pChainContext,
3159 pPolicyPara, pPolicyStatus);
3160
3161 if (!HIWORD(szPolicyOID))
3162 {
3163 switch (LOWORD(szPolicyOID))
3164 {
3165 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASE):
3166 verifyPolicy = verify_base_policy;
3167 break;
3168 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_AUTHENTICODE):
3169 verifyPolicy = verify_authenticode_policy;
3170 break;
3171 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL):
3172 verifyPolicy = verify_ssl_policy;
3173 break;
3174 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS):
3175 verifyPolicy = verify_basic_constraints_policy;
3176 break;
3177 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_MICROSOFT_ROOT):
3178 verifyPolicy = verify_ms_root_policy;
3179 break;
3180 default:
3181 FIXME("unimplemented for %d\n", LOWORD(szPolicyOID));
3182 }
3183 }
3184 if (!verifyPolicy)
3185 {
3186 if (!set)
3187 set = CryptInitOIDFunctionSet(
3188 CRYPT_OID_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_POLICY_FUNC, 0);
3189 CryptGetOIDFunctionAddress(set, X509_ASN_ENCODING, szPolicyOID, 0,
3190 (void **)&verifyPolicy, &hFunc);
3191 }
3192 if (verifyPolicy)
3193 ret = verifyPolicy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
3194 pPolicyStatus);
3195 if (hFunc)
3196 CryptFreeOIDFunctionAddress(hFunc, 0);
3197 TRACE("returning %d (%08x)\n", ret, pPolicyStatus->dwError);
3198 return ret;
3199 }
useful hacks and other patches not (yet) suitable for mainline