?  search:
summary | log | graphiclog1 | graphiclog2 | commit | commitdiff | tree | refs | edit | fork
blame | history | raw | HEAD
Merge commit '37e84ab74e939caf52150fc3352081786ecc0c29' into merges
[unleashed.git] / usr / src / uts / common / io / cryptmod.c
blobd61f123f7261db8736118bd7a6013a514a8ef5f7
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2010 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
3 * Use is subject to license terms.
4 *
5 * STREAMS Crypto Module
6 *
7 * This module is used to facilitate Kerberos encryption
8 * operations for the telnet daemon and rlogin daemon.
9 * Because the Solaris telnet and rlogin daemons run mostly
10 * in-kernel via 'telmod' and 'rlmod', this module must be
11 * pushed on the STREAM *below* telmod or rlmod.
12 *
13 * Parts of the 3DES key derivation code are covered by the
14 * following copyright.
15 *
16 * Copyright (C) 1998 by the FundsXpress, INC.
17 *
18 * All rights reserved.
19 *
20 * Export of this software from the United States of America may require
21 * a specific license from the United States Government. It is the
22 * responsibility of any person or organization contemplating export to
23 * obtain such a license before exporting.
24 *
25 * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
26 * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
27 * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
28 * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
29 * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
30 * the name of FundsXpress. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
31 * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
32 * permission. FundsXpress makes no representations about the suitability of
33 * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express
34 * or implied warranty.
35 *
36 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
37 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
38 * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
39 */
40
41 #include <sys/types.h>
42 #include <sys/sysmacros.h>
43 #include <sys/errno.h>
44 #include <sys/debug.h>
45 #include <sys/time.h>
46 #include <sys/stropts.h>
47 #include <sys/stream.h>
48 #include <sys/strsubr.h>
49 #include <sys/strlog.h>
50 #include <sys/cmn_err.h>
51 #include <sys/conf.h>
52 #include <sys/sunddi.h>
53 #include <sys/kmem.h>
54 #include <sys/strsun.h>
55 #include <sys/random.h>
56 #include <sys/types.h>
57 #include <sys/byteorder.h>
58 #include <sys/cryptmod.h>
59 #include <sys/crc32.h>
60 #include <sys/policy.h>
61
62 #include <sys/crypto/api.h>
63
64 /*
65 * Function prototypes.
66 */
67 static int cryptmodopen(queue_t *, dev_t *, int, int, cred_t *);
68 static void cryptmodrput(queue_t *, mblk_t *);
69 static void cryptmodwput(queue_t *, mblk_t *);
70 static int cryptmodclose(queue_t *);
71 static int cryptmodwsrv(queue_t *);
72 static int cryptmodrsrv(queue_t *);
73
74 static mblk_t *do_encrypt(queue_t *q, mblk_t *mp);
75 static mblk_t *do_decrypt(queue_t *q, mblk_t *mp);
76
77 #define CRYPTMOD_ID 5150
78
79 #define CFB_BLKSZ 8
80
81 #define K5CLENGTH 5
82
83 static struct module_info cryptmod_minfo = {
84 CRYPTMOD_ID, /* mi_idnum */
85 "cryptmod", /* mi_idname */
86 0, /* mi_minpsz */
87 INFPSZ, /* mi_maxpsz */
88 65536, /* mi_hiwat */
89 1024 /* mi_lowat */
90 };
91
92 static struct qinit cryptmod_rinit = {
93 (int (*)())cryptmodrput, /* qi_putp */
94 cryptmodrsrv, /* qi_svc */
95 cryptmodopen, /* qi_qopen */
96 cryptmodclose, /* qi_qclose */
97 NULL, /* qi_qadmin */
98 &cryptmod_minfo, /* qi_minfo */
99 NULL /* qi_mstat */
100 };
101
102 static struct qinit cryptmod_winit = {
103 (int (*)())cryptmodwput, /* qi_putp */
104 cryptmodwsrv, /* qi_srvp */
105 NULL, /* qi_qopen */
106 NULL, /* qi_qclose */
107 NULL, /* qi_qadmin */
108 &cryptmod_minfo, /* qi_minfo */
109 NULL /* qi_mstat */
110 };
111
112 static struct streamtab cryptmod_info = {
113 &cryptmod_rinit, /* st_rdinit */
114 &cryptmod_winit, /* st_wrinit */
115 NULL, /* st_muxrinit */
116 NULL /* st_muxwinit */
117 };
118
119 typedef struct {
120 uint_t hash_len;
121 uint_t confound_len;
122 int (*hashfunc)();
123 } hash_info_t;
124
125 #define MAX_CKSUM_LEN 20
126 #define CONFOUNDER_LEN 8
127
128 #define SHA1_HASHSIZE 20
129 #define MD5_HASHSIZE 16
130 #define CRC32_HASHSIZE 4
131 #define MSGBUF_SIZE 4096
132 #define CONFOUNDER_BYTES 128
133
134
135 static int crc32_calc(uchar_t *, uchar_t *, uint_t);
136 static int md5_calc(uchar_t *, uchar_t *, uint_t);
137 static int sha1_calc(uchar_t *, uchar_t *, uint_t);
138
139 static hash_info_t null_hash = {0, 0, NULL};
140 static hash_info_t crc32_hash = {CRC32_HASHSIZE, CONFOUNDER_LEN, crc32_calc};
141 static hash_info_t md5_hash = {MD5_HASHSIZE, CONFOUNDER_LEN, md5_calc};
142 static hash_info_t sha1_hash = {SHA1_HASHSIZE, CONFOUNDER_LEN, sha1_calc};
143
144 static crypto_mech_type_t sha1_hmac_mech = CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID;
145 static crypto_mech_type_t md5_hmac_mech = CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID;
146 static crypto_mech_type_t sha1_hash_mech = CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID;
147 static crypto_mech_type_t md5_hash_mech = CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID;
148
149 static int kef_crypt(struct cipher_data_t *, void *,
150 crypto_data_format_t, size_t, int);
151 static mblk_t *
152 arcfour_hmac_md5_encrypt(queue_t *, struct tmodinfo *,
153 mblk_t *, hash_info_t *);
154 static mblk_t *
155 arcfour_hmac_md5_decrypt(queue_t *, struct tmodinfo *,
156 mblk_t *, hash_info_t *);
157
158 static int
159 do_hmac(crypto_mech_type_t, crypto_key_t *, char *, int, char *, int);
160
161 /*
162 * This is the loadable module wrapper.
163 */
164 #include <sys/modctl.h>
165
166 static struct fmodsw fsw = {
167 "cryptmod",
168 &cryptmod_info,
169 D_MP | D_MTQPAIR
170 };
171
172 /*
173 * Module linkage information for the kernel.
174 */
175 static struct modlstrmod modlstrmod = {
176 &mod_strmodops,
177 "STREAMS encryption module",
178 &fsw
179 };
180
181 static struct modlinkage modlinkage = {
182 MODREV_1,
183 &modlstrmod,
184 NULL
185 };
186
187 int
188 _init(void)
189 {
190 return (mod_install(&modlinkage));
191 }
192
193 int
194 _fini(void)
195 {
196 return (mod_remove(&modlinkage));
197 }
198
199 int
200 _info(struct modinfo *modinfop)
201 {
202 return (mod_info(&modlinkage, modinfop));
203 }
204
205 static void
206 cleanup(struct cipher_data_t *cd)
207 {
208 if (cd->key != NULL) {
209 bzero(cd->key, cd->keylen);
210 kmem_free(cd->key, cd->keylen);
211 cd->key = NULL;
212 }
213
214 if (cd->ckey != NULL) {
215 /*
216 * ckey is a crypto_key_t structure which references
217 * "cd->key" for its raw key data. Since that was already
218 * cleared out, we don't need another "bzero" here.
219 */
220 kmem_free(cd->ckey, sizeof (crypto_key_t));
221 cd->ckey = NULL;
222 }
223
224 if (cd->block != NULL) {
225 kmem_free(cd->block, cd->blocklen);
226 cd->block = NULL;
227 }
228
229 if (cd->saveblock != NULL) {
230 kmem_free(cd->saveblock, cd->blocklen);
231 cd->saveblock = NULL;
232 }
233
234 if (cd->ivec != NULL) {
235 kmem_free(cd->ivec, cd->ivlen);
236 cd->ivec = NULL;
237 }
238
239 if (cd->d_encr_key.ck_data != NULL) {
240 bzero(cd->d_encr_key.ck_data, cd->keylen);
241 kmem_free(cd->d_encr_key.ck_data, cd->keylen);
242 }
243
244 if (cd->d_hmac_key.ck_data != NULL) {
245 bzero(cd->d_hmac_key.ck_data, cd->keylen);
246 kmem_free(cd->d_hmac_key.ck_data, cd->keylen);
247 }
248
249 if (cd->enc_tmpl != NULL)
250 (void) crypto_destroy_ctx_template(cd->enc_tmpl);
251
252 if (cd->hmac_tmpl != NULL)
253 (void) crypto_destroy_ctx_template(cd->hmac_tmpl);
254
255 if (cd->ctx != NULL) {
256 crypto_cancel_ctx(cd->ctx);
257 cd->ctx = NULL;
258 }
259 }
260
261 /* ARGSUSED */
262 static int
263 cryptmodopen(queue_t *rq, dev_t *dev, int oflag, int sflag, cred_t *crp)
264 {
265 struct tmodinfo *tmi;
266 ASSERT(rq);
267
268 if (sflag != MODOPEN)
269 return (EINVAL);
270
271 (void) (STRLOG(CRYPTMOD_ID, 0, 5, SL_TRACE|SL_NOTE,
272 "cryptmodopen: opening module(PID %d)",
273 ddi_get_pid()));
274
275 if (rq->q_ptr != NULL) {
276 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "cryptmodopen: already opened");
277 return (0);
278 }
279
280 /*
281 * Allocate and initialize per-Stream structure.
282 */
283 tmi = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (struct tmodinfo), KM_SLEEP);
284
285 tmi->enc_data.method = CRYPT_METHOD_NONE;
286 tmi->dec_data.method = CRYPT_METHOD_NONE;
287
288 tmi->ready = (CRYPT_READ_READY | CRYPT_WRITE_READY);
289
290 rq->q_ptr = WR(rq)->q_ptr = tmi;
291
292 sha1_hmac_mech = crypto_mech2id(SUN_CKM_SHA1_HMAC);
293 md5_hmac_mech = crypto_mech2id(SUN_CKM_MD5_HMAC);
294 sha1_hash_mech = crypto_mech2id(SUN_CKM_SHA1);
295 md5_hash_mech = crypto_mech2id(SUN_CKM_MD5);
296
297 qprocson(rq);
298
299 return (0);
300 }
301
302 static int
303 cryptmodclose(queue_t *rq)
304 {
305 struct tmodinfo *tmi = (struct tmodinfo *)rq->q_ptr;
306 ASSERT(tmi);
307
308 qprocsoff(rq);
309
310 cleanup(&tmi->enc_data);
311 cleanup(&tmi->dec_data);
312
313 kmem_free(tmi, sizeof (struct tmodinfo));
314 rq->q_ptr = WR(rq)->q_ptr = NULL;
315
316 return (0);
317 }
318
319 /*
320 * plaintext_offset
321 *
322 * Calculate exactly how much space is needed in front
323 * of the "plaintext" in an mbuf so it can be positioned
324 * 1 time instead of potentially moving the data multiple
325 * times.
326 */
327 static int
328 plaintext_offset(struct cipher_data_t *cd)
329 {
330 int headspace = 0;
331
332 /* 4 byte length prepended to all RCMD msgs */
333 if (ANY_RCMD_MODE(cd->option_mask))
334 headspace += RCMD_LEN_SZ;
335
336 /* RCMD V2 mode adds an additional 4 byte plaintext length */
337 if (cd->option_mask & CRYPTOPT_RCMD_MODE_V2)
338 headspace += RCMD_LEN_SZ;
339
340 /* Need extra space for hash and counfounder */
341 switch (cd->method) {
342 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CBC_NULL:
343 headspace += null_hash.hash_len + null_hash.confound_len;
344 break;
345 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CBC_CRC:
346 headspace += crc32_hash.hash_len + crc32_hash.confound_len;
347 break;
348 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CBC_MD5:
349 headspace += md5_hash.hash_len + md5_hash.confound_len;
350 break;
351 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
352 headspace += sha1_hash.confound_len;
353 break;
354 case CRYPT_METHOD_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
355 headspace += md5_hash.hash_len + md5_hash.confound_len;
356 break;
357 case CRYPT_METHOD_AES128:
358 case CRYPT_METHOD_AES256:
359 headspace += DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
360 break;
361 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CFB:
362 case CRYPT_METHOD_NONE:
363 break;
364 }
365
366 return (headspace);
367 }
368 /*
369 * encrypt_size
370 *
371 * Calculate the resulting size when encrypting 'plainlen' bytes
372 * of data.
373 */
374 static size_t
375 encrypt_size(struct cipher_data_t *cd, size_t plainlen)
376 {
377 size_t cipherlen;
378
379 switch (cd->method) {
380 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CBC_NULL:
381 cipherlen = (size_t)P2ROUNDUP(null_hash.hash_len +
382 plainlen, 8);
383 break;
384 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CBC_MD5:
385 cipherlen = (size_t)P2ROUNDUP(md5_hash.hash_len +
386 md5_hash.confound_len +
387 plainlen, 8);
388 break;
389 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CBC_CRC:
390 cipherlen = (size_t)P2ROUNDUP(crc32_hash.hash_len +
391 crc32_hash.confound_len +
392 plainlen, 8);
393 break;
394 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
395 cipherlen = (size_t)P2ROUNDUP(sha1_hash.confound_len +
396 plainlen, 8) +
397 sha1_hash.hash_len;
398 break;
399 case CRYPT_METHOD_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
400 cipherlen = (size_t)P2ROUNDUP(md5_hash.confound_len +
401 plainlen, 1) + md5_hash.hash_len;
402 break;
403 case CRYPT_METHOD_AES128:
404 case CRYPT_METHOD_AES256:
405 /* No roundup for AES-CBC-CTS */
406 cipherlen = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN + plainlen +
407 AES_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN;
408 break;
409 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CFB:
410 case CRYPT_METHOD_NONE:
411 cipherlen = plainlen;
412 break;
413 }
414
415 return (cipherlen);
416 }
417
418 /*
419 * des_cfb_encrypt
420 *
421 * Encrypt the mblk data using DES with cipher feedback.
422 *
423 * Given that V[i] is the initial 64 bit vector, V[n] is the nth 64 bit
424 * vector, D[n] is the nth chunk of 64 bits of data to encrypt
425 * (decrypt), and O[n] is the nth chunk of 64 bits of encrypted
426 * (decrypted) data, then:
427 *
428 * V[0] = DES(V[i], key)
429 * O[n] = D[n] <exclusive or > V[n]
430 * V[n+1] = DES(O[n], key)
431 *
432 * The size of the message being encrypted does not change in this
433 * algorithm, num_bytes in == num_bytes out.
434 */
435 static mblk_t *
436 des_cfb_encrypt(queue_t *q, struct tmodinfo *tmi, mblk_t *mp)
437 {
438 int savedbytes;
439 char *iptr, *optr, *lastoutput;
440
441 lastoutput = optr = (char *)mp->b_rptr;
442 iptr = (char *)mp->b_rptr;
443 savedbytes = tmi->enc_data.bytes % CFB_BLKSZ;
444
445 while (iptr < (char *)mp->b_wptr) {
446 /*
447 * Do DES-ECB.
448 * The first time this runs, the 'tmi->enc_data.block' will
449 * contain the initialization vector that should have been
450 * passed in with the SETUP ioctl.
451 *
452 * V[n] = DES(V[n-1], key)
453 */
454 if (!(tmi->enc_data.bytes % CFB_BLKSZ)) {
455 int retval = 0;
456 retval = kef_crypt(&tmi->enc_data,
457 tmi->enc_data.block,
458 CRYPTO_DATA_RAW,
459 tmi->enc_data.blocklen,
460 CRYPT_ENCRYPT);
461
462 if (retval != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
463 #ifdef DEBUG
464 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "des_cfb_encrypt: kef_crypt "
465 "failed - error 0x%0x", retval);
466 #endif
467 mp->b_datap->db_type = M_ERROR;
468 mp->b_rptr = mp->b_datap->db_base;
469 *mp->b_rptr = EIO;
470 mp->b_wptr = mp->b_rptr + sizeof (char);
471 freemsg(mp->b_cont);
472 mp->b_cont = NULL;
473 qreply(WR(q), mp);
474 return (NULL);
475 }
476 }
477
478 /* O[n] = I[n] ^ V[n] */
479 *(optr++) = *(iptr++) ^
480 tmi->enc_data.block[tmi->enc_data.bytes % CFB_BLKSZ];
481
482 tmi->enc_data.bytes++;
483 /*
484 * Feedback the encrypted output as the input to next DES call.
485 */
486 if (!(tmi->enc_data.bytes % CFB_BLKSZ)) {
487 char *dbptr = tmi->enc_data.block;
488 /*
489 * Get the last bits of input from the previous
490 * msg block that we haven't yet used as feedback input.
491 */
492 if (savedbytes > 0) {
493 bcopy(tmi->enc_data.saveblock,
494 dbptr, (size_t)savedbytes);
495 dbptr += savedbytes;
496 }
497
498 /*
499 * Now copy the correct bytes from the current input
500 * stream and update the 'lastoutput' ptr
501 */
502 bcopy(lastoutput, dbptr,
503 (size_t)(CFB_BLKSZ - savedbytes));
504
505 lastoutput += (CFB_BLKSZ - savedbytes);
506 savedbytes = 0;
507 }
508 }
509 /*
510 * If there are bytes of input here that we need in the next
511 * block to build an ivec, save them off here.
512 */
513 if (lastoutput < optr) {
514 bcopy(lastoutput,
515 tmi->enc_data.saveblock + savedbytes,
516 (uint_t)(optr - lastoutput));
517 }
518 return (mp);
519 }
520
521 /*
522 * des_cfb_decrypt
523 *
524 * Decrypt the data in the mblk using DES in Cipher Feedback mode
525 *
526 * # bytes in == # bytes out, no padding, confounding, or hashing
527 * is added.
528 *
529 */
530 static mblk_t *
531 des_cfb_decrypt(queue_t *q, struct tmodinfo *tmi, mblk_t *mp)
532 {
533 uint_t len;
534 uint_t savedbytes;
535 char *iptr;
536 char *lastinput;
537 uint_t cp;
538
539 len = MBLKL(mp);
540
541 /* decrypted output goes into the new data buffer */
542 lastinput = iptr = (char *)mp->b_rptr;
543
544 savedbytes = tmi->dec_data.bytes % tmi->dec_data.blocklen;
545
546 /*
547 * Save the input CFB_BLKSZ bytes at a time.
548 * We are trying to decrypt in-place, but need to keep
549 * a small sliding window of encrypted text to be
550 * used to construct the feedback buffer.
551 */
552 cp = ((tmi->dec_data.blocklen - savedbytes) > len ? len :
553 tmi->dec_data.blocklen - savedbytes);
554
555 bcopy(lastinput, tmi->dec_data.saveblock + savedbytes, cp);
556 savedbytes += cp;
557
558 lastinput += cp;
559
560 while (iptr < (char *)mp->b_wptr) {
561 /*
562 * Do DES-ECB.
563 * The first time this runs, the 'tmi->dec_data.block' will
564 * contain the initialization vector that should have been
565 * passed in with the SETUP ioctl.
566 */
567 if (!(tmi->dec_data.bytes % CFB_BLKSZ)) {
568 int retval;
569 retval = kef_crypt(&tmi->dec_data,
570 tmi->dec_data.block,
571 CRYPTO_DATA_RAW,
572 tmi->dec_data.blocklen,
573 CRYPT_ENCRYPT);
574
575 if (retval != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
576 #ifdef DEBUG
577 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "des_cfb_decrypt: kef_crypt "
578 "failed - status 0x%0x", retval);
579 #endif
580 mp->b_datap->db_type = M_ERROR;
581 mp->b_rptr = mp->b_datap->db_base;
582 *mp->b_rptr = EIO;
583 mp->b_wptr = mp->b_rptr + sizeof (char);
584 freemsg(mp->b_cont);
585 mp->b_cont = NULL;
586 qreply(WR(q), mp);
587 return (NULL);
588 }
589 }
590
591 /*
592 * To decrypt, XOR the input with the output from the DES call
593 */
594 *(iptr++) ^= tmi->dec_data.block[tmi->dec_data.bytes %
595 CFB_BLKSZ];
596
597 tmi->dec_data.bytes++;
598
599 /*
600 * Feedback the encrypted input for next DES call.
601 */
602 if (!(tmi->dec_data.bytes % tmi->dec_data.blocklen)) {
603 char *dbptr = tmi->dec_data.block;
604 /*
605 * Get the last bits of input from the previous block
606 * that we haven't yet processed.
607 */
608 if (savedbytes > 0) {
609 bcopy(tmi->dec_data.saveblock,
610 dbptr, savedbytes);
611 dbptr += savedbytes;
612 }
613
614 savedbytes = 0;
615
616 /*
617 * This block makes sure that our local
618 * buffer of input data is full and can
619 * be accessed from the beginning.
620 */
621 if (lastinput < (char *)mp->b_wptr) {
622
623 /* How many bytes are left in the mblk? */
624 cp = (((char *)mp->b_wptr - lastinput) >
625 tmi->dec_data.blocklen ?
626 tmi->dec_data.blocklen :
627 (char *)mp->b_wptr - lastinput);
628
629 /* copy what we need */
630 bcopy(lastinput, tmi->dec_data.saveblock,
631 cp);
632
633 lastinput += cp;
634 savedbytes = cp;
635 }
636 }
637 }
638
639 return (mp);
640 }
641
642 /*
643 * crc32_calc
644 *
645 * Compute a CRC32 checksum on the input
646 */
647 static int
648 crc32_calc(uchar_t *buf, uchar_t *input, uint_t len)
649 {
650 uint32_t crc;
651
652 CRC32(crc, input, len, 0, crc32_table);
653
654 buf[0] = (uchar_t)(crc & 0xff);
655 buf[1] = (uchar_t)((crc >> 8) & 0xff);
656 buf[2] = (uchar_t)((crc >> 16) & 0xff);
657 buf[3] = (uchar_t)((crc >> 24) & 0xff);
658
659 return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
660 }
661
662 static int
663 kef_digest(crypto_mech_type_t digest_type,
664 uchar_t *input, uint_t inlen,
665 uchar_t *output, uint_t hashlen)
666 {
667 iovec_t v1, v2;
668 crypto_data_t d1, d2;
669 crypto_mechanism_t mech;
670 int rv;
671
672 mech.cm_type = digest_type;
673 mech.cm_param = 0;
674 mech.cm_param_len = 0;
675
676 v1.iov_base = (void *)input;
677 v1.iov_len = inlen;
678
679 d1.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW;
680 d1.cd_offset = 0;
681 d1.cd_length = v1.iov_len;
682 d1.cd_raw = v1;
683
684 v2.iov_base = (void *)output;
685 v2.iov_len = hashlen;
686
687 d2.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW;
688 d2.cd_offset = 0;
689 d2.cd_length = v2.iov_len;
690 d2.cd_raw = v2;
691
692 rv = crypto_digest(&mech, &d1, &d2, NULL);
693
694 return (rv);
695 }
696
697 /*
698 * sha1_calc
699 *
700 * Get a SHA1 hash on the input data.
701 */
702 static int
703 sha1_calc(uchar_t *output, uchar_t *input, uint_t inlen)
704 {
705 int rv;
706
707 rv = kef_digest(sha1_hash_mech, input, inlen, output, SHA1_HASHSIZE);
708
709 return (rv);
710 }
711
712 /*
713 * Get an MD5 hash on the input data.
714 * md5_calc
715 *
716 */
717 static int
718 md5_calc(uchar_t *output, uchar_t *input, uint_t inlen)
719 {
720 int rv;
721
722 rv = kef_digest(md5_hash_mech, input, inlen, output, MD5_HASHSIZE);
723
724 return (rv);
725 }
726
727 /*
728 * nfold
729 * duplicate the functionality of the krb5_nfold function from
730 * the userland kerberos mech.
731 * This is needed to derive keys for use with 3DES/SHA1-HMAC
732 * ciphers.
733 */
734 static void
735 nfold(int inbits, uchar_t *in, int outbits, uchar_t *out)
736 {
737 int a, b, c, lcm;
738 int byte, i, msbit;
739
740 inbits >>= 3;
741 outbits >>= 3;
742
743 /* first compute lcm(n,k) */
744 a = outbits;
745 b = inbits;
746
747 while (b != 0) {
748 c = b;
749 b = a%b;
750 a = c;
751 }
752
753 lcm = outbits*inbits/a;
754
755 /* now do the real work */
756
757 bzero(out, outbits);
758 byte = 0;
759
760 /*
761 * Compute the msbit in k which gets added into this byte
762 * first, start with the msbit in the first, unrotated byte
763 * then, for each byte, shift to the right for each repetition
764 * last, pick out the correct byte within that shifted repetition
765 */
766 for (i = lcm-1; i >= 0; i--) {
767 msbit = (((inbits<<3)-1)
768 +(((inbits<<3)+13)*(i/inbits))
769 +((inbits-(i%inbits))<<3)) %(inbits<<3);
770
771 /* pull out the byte value itself */
772 byte += (((in[((inbits-1)-(msbit>>3))%inbits]<<8)|
773 (in[((inbits)-(msbit>>3))%inbits]))
774 >>((msbit&7)+1))&0xff;
775
776 /* do the addition */
777 byte += out[i%outbits];
778 out[i%outbits] = byte&0xff;
779
780 byte >>= 8;
781 }
782
783 /* if there's a carry bit left over, add it back in */
784 if (byte) {
785 for (i = outbits-1; i >= 0; i--) {
786 /* do the addition */
787 byte += out[i];
788 out[i] = byte&0xff;
789
790 /* keep around the carry bit, if any */
791 byte >>= 8;
792 }
793 }
794 }
795
796 #define smask(step) ((1<<step)-1)
797 #define pstep(x, step) (((x)&smask(step))^(((x)>>step)&smask(step)))
798 #define parity_char(x) pstep(pstep(pstep((x), 4), 2), 1)
799
800 /*
801 * Duplicate the functionality of the "dk_derive_key" function
802 * in the Kerberos mechanism.
803 */
804 static int
805 derive_key(struct cipher_data_t *cdata, uchar_t *constdata,
806 int constlen, char *dkey, int keybytes,
807 int blocklen)
808 {
809 int rv = 0;
810 int n = 0, i;
811 char *inblock;
812 char *rawkey;
813 char *zeroblock;
814 char *saveblock;
815
816 inblock = kmem_zalloc(blocklen, KM_SLEEP);
817 rawkey = kmem_zalloc(keybytes, KM_SLEEP);
818 zeroblock = kmem_zalloc(blocklen, KM_SLEEP);
819
820 if (constlen == blocklen)
821 bcopy(constdata, inblock, blocklen);
822 else
823 nfold(constlen * 8, constdata,
824 blocklen * 8, (uchar_t *)inblock);
825
826 /*
827 * zeroblock is an IV of all 0's.
828 *
829 * The "block" section of the cdata record is used as the
830 * IV for crypto operations in the kef_crypt function.
831 *
832 * We use 'block' as a generic IV data buffer because it
833 * is attached to the stream state data and thus can
834 * be used to hold information that must carry over
835 * from processing of one mblk to another.
836 *
837 * Here, we save the current IV and replace it with
838 * and empty IV (all 0's) for use when deriving the
839 * keys. Once the key derivation is done, we swap the
840 * old IV back into place.
841 */
842 saveblock = cdata->block;
843 cdata->block = zeroblock;
844
845 while (n < keybytes) {
846 rv = kef_crypt(cdata, inblock, CRYPTO_DATA_RAW,
847 blocklen, CRYPT_ENCRYPT);
848 if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
849 /* put the original IV block back in place */
850 cdata->block = saveblock;
851 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "failed to derive a key: %0x", rv);
852 goto cleanup;
853 }
854
855 if (keybytes - n < blocklen) {
856 bcopy(inblock, rawkey+n, (keybytes-n));
857 break;
858 }
859 bcopy(inblock, rawkey+n, blocklen);
860 n += blocklen;
861 }
862 /* put the original IV block back in place */
863 cdata->block = saveblock;
864
865 /* finally, make the key */
866 if (cdata->method == CRYPT_METHOD_DES3_CBC_SHA1) {
867 /*
868 * 3DES key derivation requires that we make sure the
869 * key has the proper parity.
870 */
871 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
872 bcopy(rawkey+(i*7), dkey+(i*8), 7);
873
874 /* 'dkey' is our derived key output buffer */
875 dkey[i*8+7] = (((dkey[i*8]&1)<<1) |
876 ((dkey[i*8+1]&1)<<2) |
877 ((dkey[i*8+2]&1)<<3) |
878 ((dkey[i*8+3]&1)<<4) |
879 ((dkey[i*8+4]&1)<<5) |
880 ((dkey[i*8+5]&1)<<6) |
881 ((dkey[i*8+6]&1)<<7));
882
883 for (n = 0; n < 8; n++) {
884 dkey[i*8 + n] &= 0xfe;
885 dkey[i*8 + n] |= 1^parity_char(dkey[i*8 + n]);
886 }
887 }
888 } else if (IS_AES_METHOD(cdata->method)) {
889 bcopy(rawkey, dkey, keybytes);
890 }
891 cleanup:
892 kmem_free(inblock, blocklen);
893 kmem_free(zeroblock, blocklen);
894 kmem_free(rawkey, keybytes);
895 return (rv);
896 }
897
898 /*
899 * create_derived_keys
900 *
901 * Algorithm for deriving a new key and an HMAC key
902 * before computing the 3DES-SHA1-HMAC operation on the plaintext
903 * This algorithm matches the work done by Kerberos mechanism
904 * in userland.
905 */
906 static int
907 create_derived_keys(struct cipher_data_t *cdata, uint32_t usage,
908 crypto_key_t *enckey, crypto_key_t *hmackey)
909 {
910 uchar_t constdata[K5CLENGTH];
911 int keybytes;
912 int rv;
913
914 constdata[0] = (usage>>24)&0xff;
915 constdata[1] = (usage>>16)&0xff;
916 constdata[2] = (usage>>8)&0xff;
917 constdata[3] = usage & 0xff;
918 /* Use "0xAA" for deriving encryption key */
919 constdata[4] = 0xAA; /* from MIT Kerberos code */
920
921 enckey->ck_length = cdata->keylen * 8;
922 enckey->ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW;
923 enckey->ck_data = kmem_zalloc(cdata->keylen, KM_SLEEP);
924
925 switch (cdata->method) {
926 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CFB:
927 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CBC_NULL:
928 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CBC_MD5:
929 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CBC_CRC:
930 keybytes = 8;
931 break;
932 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
933 keybytes = CRYPT_DES3_KEYBYTES;
934 break;
935 case CRYPT_METHOD_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
936 case CRYPT_METHOD_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_EXP:
937 keybytes = CRYPT_ARCFOUR_KEYBYTES;
938 break;
939 case CRYPT_METHOD_AES128:
940 keybytes = CRYPT_AES128_KEYBYTES;
941 break;
942 case CRYPT_METHOD_AES256:
943 keybytes = CRYPT_AES256_KEYBYTES;
944 break;
945 }
946
947 /* derive main crypto key */
948 rv = derive_key(cdata, constdata, sizeof (constdata),
949 enckey->ck_data, keybytes, cdata->blocklen);
950
951 if (rv == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
952
953 /* Use "0x55" for deriving mac key */
954 constdata[4] = 0x55;
955
956 hmackey->ck_length = cdata->keylen * 8;
957 hmackey->ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW;
958 hmackey->ck_data = kmem_zalloc(cdata->keylen, KM_SLEEP);
959
960 rv = derive_key(cdata, constdata, sizeof (constdata),
961 hmackey->ck_data, keybytes,
962 cdata->blocklen);
963 } else {
964 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "failed to derive crypto key: %02x", rv);
965 }
966
967 return (rv);
968 }
969
970 /*
971 * Compute 3-DES crypto and HMAC.
972 */
973 static int
974 kef_decr_hmac(struct cipher_data_t *cdata,
975 mblk_t *mp, int length,
976 char *hmac, int hmaclen)
977 {
978 int rv = CRYPTO_FAILED;
979
980 crypto_mechanism_t encr_mech;
981 crypto_mechanism_t mac_mech;
982 crypto_data_t dd;
983 crypto_data_t mac;
984 iovec_t v1;
985
986 ASSERT(cdata != NULL);
987 ASSERT(mp != NULL);
988 ASSERT(hmac != NULL);
989
990 bzero(&dd, sizeof (dd));
991 dd.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_MBLK;
992 dd.cd_offset = 0;
993 dd.cd_length = length;
994 dd.cd_mp = mp;
995
996 v1.iov_base = hmac;
997 v1.iov_len = hmaclen;
998
999 mac.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW;
1000 mac.cd_offset = 0;
1001 mac.cd_length = hmaclen;
1002 mac.cd_raw = v1;
1003
1004 /*
1005 * cdata->block holds the IVEC
1006 */
1007 encr_mech.cm_type = cdata->mech_type;
1008 encr_mech.cm_param = cdata->block;
1009
1010 if (cdata->block != NULL)
1011 encr_mech.cm_param_len = cdata->blocklen;
1012 else
1013 encr_mech.cm_param_len = 0;
1014
1015 rv = crypto_decrypt(&encr_mech, &dd, &cdata->d_encr_key,
1016 cdata->enc_tmpl, NULL, NULL);
1017 if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1018 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "crypto_decrypt failed: %0x", rv);
1019 return (rv);
1020 }
1021
1022 mac_mech.cm_type = sha1_hmac_mech;
1023 mac_mech.cm_param = NULL;
1024 mac_mech.cm_param_len = 0;
1025
1026 /*
1027 * Compute MAC of the plaintext decrypted above.
1028 */
1029 rv = crypto_mac(&mac_mech, &dd, &cdata->d_hmac_key,
1030 cdata->hmac_tmpl, &mac, NULL);
1031
1032 if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1033 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "crypto_mac failed: %0x", rv);
1034 }
1035
1036 return (rv);
1037 }
1038
1039 /*
1040 * Compute 3-DES crypto and HMAC.
1041 */
1042 static int
1043 kef_encr_hmac(struct cipher_data_t *cdata,
1044 mblk_t *mp, int length,
1045 char *hmac, int hmaclen)
1046 {
1047 int rv = CRYPTO_FAILED;
1048
1049 crypto_mechanism_t encr_mech;
1050 crypto_mechanism_t mac_mech;
1051 crypto_data_t dd;
1052 crypto_data_t mac;
1053 iovec_t v1;
1054
1055 ASSERT(cdata != NULL);
1056 ASSERT(mp != NULL);
1057 ASSERT(hmac != NULL);
1058
1059 bzero(&dd, sizeof (dd));
1060 dd.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_MBLK;
1061 dd.cd_offset = 0;
1062 dd.cd_length = length;
1063 dd.cd_mp = mp;
1064
1065 v1.iov_base = hmac;
1066 v1.iov_len = hmaclen;
1067
1068 mac.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW;
1069 mac.cd_offset = 0;
1070 mac.cd_length = hmaclen;
1071 mac.cd_raw = v1;
1072
1073 /*
1074 * cdata->block holds the IVEC
1075 */
1076 encr_mech.cm_type = cdata->mech_type;
1077 encr_mech.cm_param = cdata->block;
1078
1079 if (cdata->block != NULL)
1080 encr_mech.cm_param_len = cdata->blocklen;
1081 else
1082 encr_mech.cm_param_len = 0;
1083
1084 mac_mech.cm_type = sha1_hmac_mech;
1085 mac_mech.cm_param = NULL;
1086 mac_mech.cm_param_len = 0;
1087
1088 rv = crypto_mac(&mac_mech, &dd, &cdata->d_hmac_key,
1089 cdata->hmac_tmpl, &mac, NULL);
1090
1091 if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1092 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "crypto_mac failed: %0x", rv);
1093 return (rv);
1094 }
1095
1096 rv = crypto_encrypt(&encr_mech, &dd, &cdata->d_encr_key,
1097 cdata->enc_tmpl, NULL, NULL);
1098 if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1099 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "crypto_encrypt failed: %0x", rv);
1100 }
1101
1102 return (rv);
1103 }
1104
1105 /*
1106 * kef_crypt
1107 *
1108 * Use the Kernel encryption framework to provide the
1109 * crypto operations for the indicated data.
1110 */
1111 static int
1112 kef_crypt(struct cipher_data_t *cdata,
1113 void *indata, crypto_data_format_t fmt,
1114 size_t length, int mode)
1115 {
1116 int rv = CRYPTO_FAILED;
1117
1118 crypto_mechanism_t mech;
1119 crypto_key_t crkey;
1120 iovec_t v1;
1121 crypto_data_t d1;
1122
1123 ASSERT(cdata != NULL);
1124 ASSERT(indata != NULL);
1125 ASSERT(fmt == CRYPTO_DATA_RAW || fmt == CRYPTO_DATA_MBLK);
1126
1127 bzero(&crkey, sizeof (crkey));
1128 bzero(&d1, sizeof (d1));
1129
1130 crkey.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW;
1131 crkey.ck_data = cdata->key;
1132
1133 /* keys are measured in bits, not bytes, so multiply by 8 */
1134 crkey.ck_length = cdata->keylen * 8;
1135
1136 if (fmt == CRYPTO_DATA_RAW) {
1137 v1.iov_base = (char *)indata;
1138 v1.iov_len = length;
1139 }
1140
1141 d1.cd_format = fmt;
1142 d1.cd_offset = 0;
1143 d1.cd_length = length;
1144 if (fmt == CRYPTO_DATA_RAW)
1145 d1.cd_raw = v1;
1146 else if (fmt == CRYPTO_DATA_MBLK)
1147 d1.cd_mp = (mblk_t *)indata;
1148
1149 mech.cm_type = cdata->mech_type;
1150 mech.cm_param = cdata->block;
1151 /*
1152 * cdata->block holds the IVEC
1153 */
1154 if (cdata->block != NULL)
1155 mech.cm_param_len = cdata->blocklen;
1156 else
1157 mech.cm_param_len = 0;
1158
1159 /*
1160 * encrypt and decrypt in-place
1161 */
1162 if (mode == CRYPT_ENCRYPT)
1163 rv = crypto_encrypt(&mech, &d1, &crkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
1164 else
1165 rv = crypto_decrypt(&mech, &d1, &crkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
1166
1167 if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1168 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "%s returned error %08x",
1169 (mode == CRYPT_ENCRYPT ? "crypto_encrypt" :
1170 "crypto_decrypt"), rv);
1171 return (CRYPTO_FAILED);
1172 }
1173
1174 return (rv);
1175 }
1176
1177 static int
1178 do_hmac(crypto_mech_type_t mech,
1179 crypto_key_t *key,
1180 char *data, int datalen,
1181 char *hmac, int hmaclen)
1182 {
1183 int rv = 0;
1184 crypto_mechanism_t mac_mech;
1185 crypto_data_t dd;
1186 crypto_data_t mac;
1187 iovec_t vdata, vmac;
1188
1189 mac_mech.cm_type = mech;
1190 mac_mech.cm_param = NULL;
1191 mac_mech.cm_param_len = 0;
1192
1193 vdata.iov_base = data;
1194 vdata.iov_len = datalen;
1195
1196 bzero(&dd, sizeof (dd));
1197 dd.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW;
1198 dd.cd_offset = 0;
1199 dd.cd_length = datalen;
1200 dd.cd_raw = vdata;
1201
1202 vmac.iov_base = hmac;
1203 vmac.iov_len = hmaclen;
1204
1205 mac.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW;
1206 mac.cd_offset = 0;
1207 mac.cd_length = hmaclen;
1208 mac.cd_raw = vmac;
1209
1210 /*
1211 * Compute MAC of the plaintext decrypted above.
1212 */
1213 rv = crypto_mac(&mac_mech, &dd, key, NULL, &mac, NULL);
1214
1215 if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1216 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "crypto_mac failed: %0x", rv);
1217 }
1218
1219 return (rv);
1220 }
1221
1222 #define XOR_BLOCK(src, dst) \
1223 (dst)[0] ^= (src)[0]; \
1224 (dst)[1] ^= (src)[1]; \
1225 (dst)[2] ^= (src)[2]; \
1226 (dst)[3] ^= (src)[3]; \
1227 (dst)[4] ^= (src)[4]; \
1228 (dst)[5] ^= (src)[5]; \
1229 (dst)[6] ^= (src)[6]; \
1230 (dst)[7] ^= (src)[7]; \
1231 (dst)[8] ^= (src)[8]; \
1232 (dst)[9] ^= (src)[9]; \
1233 (dst)[10] ^= (src)[10]; \
1234 (dst)[11] ^= (src)[11]; \
1235 (dst)[12] ^= (src)[12]; \
1236 (dst)[13] ^= (src)[13]; \
1237 (dst)[14] ^= (src)[14]; \
1238 (dst)[15] ^= (src)[15]
1239
1240 #define xorblock(x, y) XOR_BLOCK(y, x)
1241
1242 static int
1243 aes_cbc_cts_encrypt(struct tmodinfo *tmi, uchar_t *plain, size_t length)
1244 {
1245 int result = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
1246 unsigned char tmp[DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN];
1247 unsigned char tmp2[DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN];
1248 unsigned char tmp3[DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN];
1249 int nblocks = 0, blockno;
1250 crypto_data_t ct, pt;
1251 crypto_mechanism_t mech;
1252
1253 mech.cm_type = tmi->enc_data.mech_type;
1254 if (tmi->enc_data.ivlen > 0 && tmi->enc_data.ivec != NULL) {
1255 bcopy(tmi->enc_data.ivec, tmp, DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN);
1256 } else {
1257 bzero(tmp, sizeof (tmp));
1258 }
1259 mech.cm_param = NULL;
1260 mech.cm_param_len = 0;
1261
1262 nblocks = (length + DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN - 1) / DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1263
1264 bzero(&ct, sizeof (crypto_data_t));
1265 bzero(&pt, sizeof (crypto_data_t));
1266
1267 if (nblocks == 1) {
1268 pt.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW;
1269 pt.cd_length = length;
1270 pt.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)plain;
1271 pt.cd_raw.iov_len = length;
1272
1273 result = crypto_encrypt(&mech, &pt,
1274 &tmi->enc_data.d_encr_key, NULL, NULL, NULL);
1275
1276 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1277 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "aes_cbc_cts_encrypt: "
1278 "crypto_encrypt failed: %0x", result);
1279 }
1280 } else {
1281 size_t nleft;
1282
1283 ct.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW;
1284 ct.cd_offset = 0;
1285 ct.cd_length = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1286
1287 pt.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW;
1288 pt.cd_offset = 0;
1289 pt.cd_length = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1290
1291 result = crypto_encrypt_init(&mech,
1292 &tmi->enc_data.d_encr_key,
1293 tmi->enc_data.enc_tmpl,
1294 &tmi->enc_data.ctx, NULL);
1295
1296 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1297 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "aes_cbc_cts_encrypt: "
1298 "crypto_encrypt_init failed: %0x", result);
1299 goto cleanup;
1300 }
1301
1302 for (blockno = 0; blockno < nblocks - 2; blockno++) {
1303 xorblock(tmp, plain + blockno * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN);
1304
1305 pt.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)tmp;
1306 pt.cd_raw.iov_len = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1307
1308 ct.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)plain +
1309 blockno * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1310 ct.cd_raw.iov_len = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1311
1312 result = crypto_encrypt_update(tmi->enc_data.ctx,
1313 &pt, &ct, NULL);
1314
1315 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1316 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "aes_cbc_cts_encrypt: "
1317 "crypto_encrypt_update failed: %0x",
1318 result);
1319 goto cleanup;
1320 }
1321 /* copy result over original bytes */
1322 /* make another copy for the next XOR step */
1323 bcopy(plain + blockno * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN,
1324 tmp, DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN);
1325 }
1326 /* XOR cipher text from n-3 with plain text from n-2 */
1327 xorblock(tmp, plain + (nblocks - 2) * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN);
1328
1329 pt.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)tmp;
1330 pt.cd_raw.iov_len = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1331
1332 ct.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)tmp2;
1333 ct.cd_raw.iov_len = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1334
1335 /* encrypt XOR-ed block N-2 */
1336 result = crypto_encrypt_update(tmi->enc_data.ctx,
1337 &pt, &ct, NULL);
1338 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1339 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "aes_cbc_cts_encrypt: "
1340 "crypto_encrypt_update(2) failed: %0x",
1341 result);
1342 goto cleanup;
1343 }
1344 nleft = length - (nblocks - 1) * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1345
1346 bzero(tmp3, sizeof (tmp3));
1347 /* Save final plaintext bytes from n-1 */
1348 bcopy(plain + (nblocks - 1) * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN, tmp3,
1349 nleft);
1350
1351 /* Overwrite n-1 with cipher text from n-2 */
1352 bcopy(tmp2, plain + (nblocks - 1) * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN,
1353 nleft);
1354
1355 bcopy(tmp2, tmp, DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN);
1356 /* XOR cipher text from n-1 with plain text from n-1 */
1357 xorblock(tmp, tmp3);
1358
1359 pt.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)tmp;
1360 pt.cd_raw.iov_len = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1361
1362 ct.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)tmp2;
1363 ct.cd_raw.iov_len = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1364
1365 /* encrypt block N-2 */
1366 result = crypto_encrypt_update(tmi->enc_data.ctx,
1367 &pt, &ct, NULL);
1368
1369 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1370 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "aes_cbc_cts_encrypt: "
1371 "crypto_encrypt_update(3) failed: %0x",
1372 result);
1373 goto cleanup;
1374 }
1375
1376 bcopy(tmp2, plain + (nblocks - 2) * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN,
1377 DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN);
1378
1379
1380 ct.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)tmp2;
1381 ct.cd_raw.iov_len = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1382
1383 /*
1384 * Ignore the output on the final step.
1385 */
1386 result = crypto_encrypt_final(tmi->enc_data.ctx, &ct, NULL);
1387 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1388 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "aes_cbc_cts_encrypt: "
1389 "crypto_encrypt_final(3) failed: %0x",
1390 result);
1391 }
1392 tmi->enc_data.ctx = NULL;
1393 }
1394 cleanup:
1395 bzero(tmp, sizeof (tmp));
1396 bzero(tmp2, sizeof (tmp));
1397 bzero(tmp3, sizeof (tmp));
1398 bzero(tmi->enc_data.block, tmi->enc_data.blocklen);
1399 return (result);
1400 }
1401
1402 static int
1403 aes_cbc_cts_decrypt(struct tmodinfo *tmi, uchar_t *buff, size_t length)
1404 {
1405 int result = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
1406 unsigned char tmp[DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN];
1407 unsigned char tmp2[DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN];
1408 unsigned char tmp3[DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN];
1409 int nblocks = 0, blockno;
1410 crypto_data_t ct, pt;
1411 crypto_mechanism_t mech;
1412
1413 mech.cm_type = tmi->enc_data.mech_type;
1414
1415 if (tmi->dec_data.ivec_usage != IVEC_NEVER &&
1416 tmi->dec_data.ivlen > 0 && tmi->dec_data.ivec != NULL) {
1417 bcopy(tmi->dec_data.ivec, tmp, DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN);
1418 } else {
1419 bzero(tmp, sizeof (tmp));
1420 }
1421 mech.cm_param_len = 0;
1422 mech.cm_param = NULL;
1423
1424 nblocks = (length + DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN - 1) / DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1425
1426 bzero(&pt, sizeof (pt));
1427 bzero(&ct, sizeof (ct));
1428
1429 if (nblocks == 1) {
1430 ct.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW;
1431 ct.cd_length = length;
1432 ct.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)buff;
1433 ct.cd_raw.iov_len = length;
1434
1435 result = crypto_decrypt(&mech, &ct,
1436 &tmi->dec_data.d_encr_key, NULL, NULL, NULL);
1437
1438 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1439 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "aes_cbc_cts_decrypt: "
1440 "crypto_decrypt failed: %0x", result);
1441 goto cleanup;
1442 }
1443 } else {
1444 ct.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW;
1445 ct.cd_offset = 0;
1446 ct.cd_length = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1447
1448 pt.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW;
1449 pt.cd_offset = 0;
1450 pt.cd_length = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1451
1452 result = crypto_decrypt_init(&mech,
1453 &tmi->dec_data.d_encr_key,
1454 tmi->dec_data.enc_tmpl,
1455 &tmi->dec_data.ctx, NULL);
1456
1457 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1458 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "aes_cbc_cts_decrypt: "
1459 "crypto_decrypt_init failed: %0x", result);
1460 goto cleanup;
1461 }
1462 for (blockno = 0; blockno < nblocks - 2; blockno++) {
1463 ct.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)buff +
1464 (blockno * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN);
1465 ct.cd_raw.iov_len = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1466
1467 pt.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)tmp2;
1468 pt.cd_raw.iov_len = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1469
1470 /*
1471 * Save the input to the decrypt so it can
1472 * be used later for an XOR operation
1473 */
1474 bcopy(buff + (blockno * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN),
1475 tmi->dec_data.block, DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN);
1476
1477 result = crypto_decrypt_update(tmi->dec_data.ctx,
1478 &ct, &pt, NULL);
1479 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1480 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "aes_cbc_cts_decrypt: "
1481 "crypto_decrypt_update(1) error - "
1482 "result = 0x%08x", result);
1483 goto cleanup;
1484 }
1485 xorblock(tmp2, tmp);
1486 bcopy(tmp2, buff + blockno * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN,
1487 DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN);
1488 /*
1489 * The original cipher text is used as the xor
1490 * for the next block, save it here.
1491 */
1492 bcopy(tmi->dec_data.block, tmp, DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN);
1493 }
1494 ct.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)buff +
1495 ((nblocks - 2) * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN);
1496 ct.cd_raw.iov_len = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1497 pt.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)tmp2;
1498 pt.cd_raw.iov_len = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1499
1500 result = crypto_decrypt_update(tmi->dec_data.ctx,
1501 &ct, &pt, NULL);
1502 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1503 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
1504 "aes_cbc_cts_decrypt: "
1505 "crypto_decrypt_update(2) error -"
1506 " result = 0x%08x", result);
1507 goto cleanup;
1508 }
1509 bzero(tmp3, sizeof (tmp3));
1510 bcopy(buff + (nblocks - 1) * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN, tmp3,
1511 length - ((nblocks - 1) * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN));
1512
1513 xorblock(tmp2, tmp3);
1514 bcopy(tmp2, buff + (nblocks - 1) * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN,
1515 length - ((nblocks - 1) * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN));
1516
1517 /* 2nd to last block ... */
1518 bcopy(tmp3, tmp2,
1519 length - ((nblocks - 1) * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN));
1520
1521 ct.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)tmp2;
1522 ct.cd_raw.iov_len = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1523 pt.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)tmp3;
1524 pt.cd_raw.iov_len = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1525
1526 result = crypto_decrypt_update(tmi->dec_data.ctx,
1527 &ct, &pt, NULL);
1528 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1529 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
1530 "aes_cbc_cts_decrypt: "
1531 "crypto_decrypt_update(3) error - "
1532 "result = 0x%08x", result);
1533 goto cleanup;
1534 }
1535 xorblock(tmp3, tmp);
1536
1537
1538 /* Finally, update the 2nd to last block and we are done. */
1539 bcopy(tmp3, buff + (nblocks - 2) * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN,
1540 DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN);
1541
1542 /* Do Final step, but ignore output */
1543 pt.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)tmp2;
1544 pt.cd_raw.iov_len = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1545 result = crypto_decrypt_final(tmi->dec_data.ctx, &pt, NULL);
1546 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1547 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "aes_cbc_cts_decrypt: "
1548 "crypto_decrypt_final error - "
1549 "result = 0x%0x", result);
1550 }
1551 tmi->dec_data.ctx = NULL;
1552 }
1553
1554 cleanup:
1555 bzero(tmp, sizeof (tmp));
1556 bzero(tmp2, sizeof (tmp));
1557 bzero(tmp3, sizeof (tmp));
1558 bzero(tmi->dec_data.block, tmi->dec_data.blocklen);
1559 return (result);
1560 }
1561
1562 /*
1563 * AES decrypt
1564 *
1565 * format of ciphertext when using AES
1566 * +-------------+------------+------------+
1567 * | confounder | msg-data | hmac |
1568 * +-------------+------------+------------+
1569 */
1570 static mblk_t *
1571 aes_decrypt(queue_t *q, struct tmodinfo *tmi, mblk_t *mp,
1572 hash_info_t *hash)
1573 {
1574 int result;
1575 size_t enclen;
1576 size_t inlen;
1577 uchar_t hmacbuff[64];
1578 uchar_t tmpiv[DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN];
1579
1580 inlen = (size_t)MBLKL(mp);
1581
1582 enclen = inlen - AES_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN;
1583 if (tmi->dec_data.ivec_usage != IVEC_NEVER &&
1584 tmi->dec_data.ivec != NULL && tmi->dec_data.ivlen > 0) {
1585 int nblocks = (enclen + DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN - 1) /
1586 DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1587 bcopy(mp->b_rptr + DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN * (nblocks - 2),
1588 tmpiv, DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN);
1589 }
1590
1591 /* AES Decrypt */
1592 result = aes_cbc_cts_decrypt(tmi, mp->b_rptr, enclen);
1593
1594 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1595 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
1596 "aes_decrypt: aes_cbc_cts_decrypt "
1597 "failed - error %0x", result);
1598 goto cleanup;
1599 }
1600
1601 /* Verify the HMAC */
1602 result = do_hmac(sha1_hmac_mech,
1603 &tmi->dec_data.d_hmac_key,
1604 (char *)mp->b_rptr, enclen,
1605 (char *)hmacbuff, hash->hash_len);
1606
1607 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1608 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
1609 "aes_decrypt: do_hmac failed - error %0x", result);
1610 goto cleanup;
1611 }
1612
1613 if (bcmp(hmacbuff, mp->b_rptr + enclen,
1614 AES_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN) != 0) {
1615 result = -1;
1616 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "aes_decrypt: checksum verification failed");
1617 goto cleanup;
1618 }
1619
1620 /* truncate the mblk at the end of the decrypted text */
1621 mp->b_wptr = mp->b_rptr + enclen;
1622
1623 /* Adjust the beginning of the buffer to skip the confounder */
1624 mp->b_rptr += DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1625
1626 if (tmi->dec_data.ivec_usage != IVEC_NEVER &&
1627 tmi->dec_data.ivec != NULL && tmi->dec_data.ivlen > 0)
1628 bcopy(tmpiv, tmi->dec_data.ivec, DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN);
1629
1630 cleanup:
1631 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1632 mp->b_datap->db_type = M_ERROR;
1633 mp->b_rptr = mp->b_datap->db_base;
1634 *mp->b_rptr = EIO;
1635 mp->b_wptr = mp->b_rptr + sizeof (char);
1636 freemsg(mp->b_cont);
1637 mp->b_cont = NULL;
1638 qreply(WR(q), mp);
1639 return (NULL);
1640 }
1641 return (mp);
1642 }
1643
1644 /*
1645 * AES encrypt
1646 *
1647 * format of ciphertext when using AES
1648 * +-------------+------------+------------+
1649 * | confounder | msg-data | hmac |
1650 * +-------------+------------+------------+
1651 */
1652 static mblk_t *
1653 aes_encrypt(queue_t *q, struct tmodinfo *tmi, mblk_t *mp,
1654 hash_info_t *hash)
1655 {
1656 int result;
1657 size_t cipherlen;
1658 size_t inlen;
1659 uchar_t hmacbuff[64];
1660
1661 inlen = (size_t)MBLKL(mp);
1662
1663 cipherlen = encrypt_size(&tmi->enc_data, inlen);
1664
1665 ASSERT(MBLKSIZE(mp) >= cipherlen);
1666
1667 /*
1668 * Shift the rptr back enough to insert the confounder.
1669 */
1670 mp->b_rptr -= DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1671
1672 /* Get random data for confounder */
1673 (void) random_get_pseudo_bytes((uint8_t *)mp->b_rptr,
1674 DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN);
1675
1676 /*
1677 * Because we encrypt in-place, we need to calculate
1678 * the HMAC of the plaintext now, then stick it on
1679 * the end of the ciphertext down below.
1680 */
1681 result = do_hmac(sha1_hmac_mech,
1682 &tmi->enc_data.d_hmac_key,
1683 (char *)mp->b_rptr, DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN + inlen,
1684 (char *)hmacbuff, hash->hash_len);
1685
1686 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1687 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "aes_encrypt: do_hmac failed - error %0x",
1688 result);
1689 goto cleanup;
1690 }
1691 /* Encrypt using AES-CBC-CTS */
1692 result = aes_cbc_cts_encrypt(tmi, mp->b_rptr,
1693 inlen + DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN);
1694
1695 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1696 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "aes_encrypt: aes_cbc_cts_encrypt "
1697 "failed - error %0x", result);
1698 goto cleanup;
1699 }
1700
1701 /* copy the truncated HMAC to the end of the mblk */
1702 bcopy(hmacbuff, mp->b_rptr + DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN + inlen,
1703 AES_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN);
1704
1705 mp->b_wptr = mp->b_rptr + cipherlen;
1706
1707 /*
1708 * The final block of cipher text (not the HMAC) is used
1709 * as the next IV.
1710 */
1711 if (tmi->enc_data.ivec_usage != IVEC_NEVER &&
1712 tmi->enc_data.ivec != NULL) {
1713 int nblocks = (inlen + 2 * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN - 1) /
1714 DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
1715
1716 bcopy(mp->b_rptr + (nblocks - 2) * DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN,
1717 tmi->enc_data.ivec, DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN);
1718 }
1719
1720 cleanup:
1721 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1722 mp->b_datap->db_type = M_ERROR;
1723 mp->b_rptr = mp->b_datap->db_base;
1724 *mp->b_rptr = EIO;
1725 mp->b_wptr = mp->b_rptr + sizeof (char);
1726 freemsg(mp->b_cont);
1727 mp->b_cont = NULL;
1728 qreply(WR(q), mp);
1729 return (NULL);
1730 }
1731 return (mp);
1732 }
1733
1734 /*
1735 * ARCFOUR-HMAC-MD5 decrypt
1736 *
1737 * format of ciphertext when using ARCFOUR-HMAC-MD5
1738 * +-----------+------------+------------+
1739 * | hmac | confounder | msg-data |
1740 * +-----------+------------+------------+
1741 *
1742 */
1743 static mblk_t *
1744 arcfour_hmac_md5_decrypt(queue_t *q, struct tmodinfo *tmi, mblk_t *mp,
1745 hash_info_t *hash)
1746 {
1747 int result;
1748 size_t cipherlen;
1749 size_t inlen;
1750 size_t saltlen;
1751 crypto_key_t k1, k2;
1752 crypto_data_t indata;
1753 iovec_t v1;
1754 uchar_t ms_exp[9] = {0xab, 0xab, 0xab, 0xab, 0xab,
1755 0xab, 0xab, 0xab, 0xab };
1756 uchar_t k1data[CRYPT_ARCFOUR_KEYBYTES];
1757 uchar_t k2data[CRYPT_ARCFOUR_KEYBYTES];
1758 uchar_t cksum[MD5_HASHSIZE];
1759 uchar_t saltdata[CRYPT_ARCFOUR_KEYBYTES];
1760 crypto_mechanism_t mech;
1761 int usage;
1762
1763 bzero(&indata, sizeof (indata));
1764
1765 /* The usage constant is 1026 for all "old" rcmd mode operations */
1766 if (tmi->dec_data.option_mask & CRYPTOPT_RCMD_MODE_V1)
1767 usage = RCMDV1_USAGE;
1768 else
1769 usage = ARCFOUR_DECRYPT_USAGE;
1770
1771 /*
1772 * The size at this point should be the size of
1773 * all the plaintext plus the optional plaintext length
1774 * needed for RCMD V2 mode. There should also be room
1775 * at the head of the mblk for the confounder and hash info.
1776 */
1777 inlen = (size_t)MBLKL(mp);
1778
1779 /*
1780 * The cipherlen does not include the HMAC at the
1781 * head of the buffer.
1782 */
1783 cipherlen = inlen - hash->hash_len;
1784
1785 ASSERT(MBLKSIZE(mp) >= cipherlen);
1786 if (tmi->dec_data.method == CRYPT_METHOD_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_EXP) {
1787 bcopy(ARCFOUR_EXP_SALT, saltdata, strlen(ARCFOUR_EXP_SALT));
1788 saltdata[9] = 0;
1789 saltdata[10] = usage & 0xff;
1790 saltdata[11] = (usage >> 8) & 0xff;
1791 saltdata[12] = (usage >> 16) & 0xff;
1792 saltdata[13] = (usage >> 24) & 0xff;
1793 saltlen = 14;
1794 } else {
1795 saltdata[0] = usage & 0xff;
1796 saltdata[1] = (usage >> 8) & 0xff;
1797 saltdata[2] = (usage >> 16) & 0xff;
1798 saltdata[3] = (usage >> 24) & 0xff;
1799 saltlen = 4;
1800 }
1801 /*
1802 * Use the salt value to create a key to be used
1803 * for subsequent HMAC operations.
1804 */
1805 result = do_hmac(md5_hmac_mech,
1806 tmi->dec_data.ckey,
1807 (char *)saltdata, saltlen,
1808 (char *)k1data, sizeof (k1data));
1809 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1810 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
1811 "arcfour_hmac_md5_decrypt: do_hmac(k1)"
1812 "failed - error %0x", result);
1813 goto cleanup;
1814 }
1815 bcopy(k1data, k2data, sizeof (k1data));
1816
1817 /*
1818 * For the neutered MS RC4 encryption type,
1819 * set the trailing 9 bytes to 0xab per the
1820 * RC4-HMAC spec.
1821 */
1822 if (tmi->dec_data.method == CRYPT_METHOD_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_EXP) {
1823 bcopy((void *)&k1data[7], ms_exp, sizeof (ms_exp));
1824 }
1825
1826 mech.cm_type = tmi->dec_data.mech_type;
1827 mech.cm_param = NULL;
1828 mech.cm_param_len = 0;
1829
1830 /*
1831 * If we have not yet initialized the decryption key,
1832 * context, and template, do it now.
1833 */
1834 if (tmi->dec_data.ctx == NULL ||
1835 (tmi->dec_data.option_mask & CRYPTOPT_RCMD_MODE_V1)) {
1836 k1.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW;
1837 k1.ck_length = CRYPT_ARCFOUR_KEYBYTES * 8;
1838 k1.ck_data = k1data;
1839
1840 tmi->dec_data.d_encr_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW;
1841 tmi->dec_data.d_encr_key.ck_length = k1.ck_length;
1842 if (tmi->dec_data.d_encr_key.ck_data == NULL)
1843 tmi->dec_data.d_encr_key.ck_data = kmem_zalloc(
1844 CRYPT_ARCFOUR_KEYBYTES, KM_SLEEP);
1845
1846 /*
1847 * HMAC operation creates the encryption
1848 * key to be used for the decrypt operations.
1849 */
1850 result = do_hmac(md5_hmac_mech, &k1,
1851 (char *)mp->b_rptr, hash->hash_len,
1852 (char *)tmi->dec_data.d_encr_key.ck_data,
1853 CRYPT_ARCFOUR_KEYBYTES);
1854
1855
1856 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1857 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
1858 "arcfour_hmac_md5_decrypt: do_hmac(k3)"
1859 "failed - error %0x", result);
1860 goto cleanup;
1861 }
1862 }
1863
1864 tmi->dec_data.enc_tmpl = NULL;
1865
1866 if (tmi->dec_data.ctx == NULL &&
1867 (tmi->dec_data.option_mask & CRYPTOPT_RCMD_MODE_V2)) {
1868 /*
1869 * Only create a template if we are doing
1870 * chaining from block to block.
1871 */
1872 result = crypto_create_ctx_template(&mech,
1873 &tmi->dec_data.d_encr_key,
1874 &tmi->dec_data.enc_tmpl,
1875 KM_SLEEP);
1876 if (result == CRYPTO_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
1877 tmi->dec_data.enc_tmpl = NULL;
1878 } else if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1879 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
1880 "arcfour_hmac_md5_decrypt: "
1881 "failed to create dec template "
1882 "for RC4 encrypt: %0x", result);
1883 goto cleanup;
1884 }
1885
1886 result = crypto_decrypt_init(&mech,
1887 &tmi->dec_data.d_encr_key,
1888 tmi->dec_data.enc_tmpl,
1889 &tmi->dec_data.ctx, NULL);
1890
1891 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1892 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "crypto_decrypt_init failed:"
1893 " %0x", result);
1894 goto cleanup;
1895 }
1896 }
1897
1898 /* adjust the rptr so we don't decrypt the original hmac field */
1899
1900 v1.iov_base = (char *)mp->b_rptr + hash->hash_len;
1901 v1.iov_len = cipherlen;
1902
1903 indata.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW;
1904 indata.cd_offset = 0;
1905 indata.cd_length = cipherlen;
1906 indata.cd_raw = v1;
1907
1908 if (tmi->dec_data.option_mask & CRYPTOPT_RCMD_MODE_V2)
1909 result = crypto_decrypt_update(tmi->dec_data.ctx,
1910 &indata, NULL, NULL);
1911 else
1912 result = crypto_decrypt(&mech, &indata,
1913 &tmi->dec_data.d_encr_key, NULL, NULL, NULL);
1914
1915 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1916 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "crypto_decrypt_update failed:"
1917 " %0x", result);
1918 goto cleanup;
1919 }
1920
1921 k2.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW;
1922 k2.ck_length = sizeof (k2data) * 8;
1923 k2.ck_data = k2data;
1924
1925 result = do_hmac(md5_hmac_mech,
1926 &k2,
1927 (char *)mp->b_rptr + hash->hash_len, cipherlen,
1928 (char *)cksum, hash->hash_len);
1929
1930 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1931 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
1932 "arcfour_hmac_md5_decrypt: do_hmac(k2)"
1933 "failed - error %0x", result);
1934 goto cleanup;
1935 }
1936
1937 if (bcmp(cksum, mp->b_rptr, hash->hash_len) != 0) {
1938 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "arcfour_decrypt HMAC comparison failed");
1939 result = -1;
1940 goto cleanup;
1941 }
1942
1943 /*
1944 * adjust the start of the mblk to skip over the
1945 * hash and confounder.
1946 */
1947 mp->b_rptr += hash->hash_len + hash->confound_len;
1948
1949 cleanup:
1950 bzero(k1data, sizeof (k1data));
1951 bzero(k2data, sizeof (k2data));
1952 bzero(cksum, sizeof (cksum));
1953 bzero(saltdata, sizeof (saltdata));
1954 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1955 mp->b_datap->db_type = M_ERROR;
1956 mp->b_rptr = mp->b_datap->db_base;
1957 *mp->b_rptr = EIO;
1958 mp->b_wptr = mp->b_rptr + sizeof (char);
1959 freemsg(mp->b_cont);
1960 mp->b_cont = NULL;
1961 qreply(WR(q), mp);
1962 return (NULL);
1963 }
1964 return (mp);
1965 }
1966
1967 /*
1968 * ARCFOUR-HMAC-MD5 encrypt
1969 *
1970 * format of ciphertext when using ARCFOUR-HMAC-MD5
1971 * +-----------+------------+------------+
1972 * | hmac | confounder | msg-data |
1973 * +-----------+------------+------------+
1974 *
1975 */
1976 static mblk_t *
1977 arcfour_hmac_md5_encrypt(queue_t *q, struct tmodinfo *tmi, mblk_t *mp,
1978 hash_info_t *hash)
1979 {
1980 int result;
1981 size_t cipherlen;
1982 size_t inlen;
1983 size_t saltlen;
1984 crypto_key_t k1, k2;
1985 crypto_data_t indata;
1986 iovec_t v1;
1987 uchar_t ms_exp[9] = {0xab, 0xab, 0xab, 0xab, 0xab,
1988 0xab, 0xab, 0xab, 0xab };
1989 uchar_t k1data[CRYPT_ARCFOUR_KEYBYTES];
1990 uchar_t k2data[CRYPT_ARCFOUR_KEYBYTES];
1991 uchar_t saltdata[CRYPT_ARCFOUR_KEYBYTES];
1992 crypto_mechanism_t mech;
1993 int usage;
1994
1995 bzero(&indata, sizeof (indata));
1996
1997 /* The usage constant is 1026 for all "old" rcmd mode operations */
1998 if (tmi->enc_data.option_mask & CRYPTOPT_RCMD_MODE_V1)
1999 usage = RCMDV1_USAGE;
2000 else
2001 usage = ARCFOUR_ENCRYPT_USAGE;
2002
2003 mech.cm_type = tmi->enc_data.mech_type;
2004 mech.cm_param = NULL;
2005 mech.cm_param_len = 0;
2006
2007 /*
2008 * The size at this point should be the size of
2009 * all the plaintext plus the optional plaintext length
2010 * needed for RCMD V2 mode. There should also be room
2011 * at the head of the mblk for the confounder and hash info.
2012 */
2013 inlen = (size_t)MBLKL(mp);
2014
2015 cipherlen = encrypt_size(&tmi->enc_data, inlen);
2016
2017 ASSERT(MBLKSIZE(mp) >= cipherlen);
2018
2019 /*
2020 * Shift the rptr back enough to insert
2021 * the confounder and hash.
2022 */
2023 mp->b_rptr -= (hash->confound_len + hash->hash_len);
2024
2025 /* zero out the hash area */
2026 bzero(mp->b_rptr, (size_t)hash->hash_len);
2027
2028 if (cipherlen > inlen) {
2029 bzero(mp->b_wptr, MBLKTAIL(mp));
2030 }
2031
2032 if (tmi->enc_data.method == CRYPT_METHOD_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_EXP) {
2033 bcopy(ARCFOUR_EXP_SALT, saltdata, strlen(ARCFOUR_EXP_SALT));
2034 saltdata[9] = 0;
2035 saltdata[10] = usage & 0xff;
2036 saltdata[11] = (usage >> 8) & 0xff;
2037 saltdata[12] = (usage >> 16) & 0xff;
2038 saltdata[13] = (usage >> 24) & 0xff;
2039 saltlen = 14;
2040 } else {
2041 saltdata[0] = usage & 0xff;
2042 saltdata[1] = (usage >> 8) & 0xff;
2043 saltdata[2] = (usage >> 16) & 0xff;
2044 saltdata[3] = (usage >> 24) & 0xff;
2045 saltlen = 4;
2046 }
2047 /*
2048 * Use the salt value to create a key to be used
2049 * for subsequent HMAC operations.
2050 */
2051 result = do_hmac(md5_hmac_mech,
2052 tmi->enc_data.ckey,
2053 (char *)saltdata, saltlen,
2054 (char *)k1data, sizeof (k1data));
2055 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
2056 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
2057 "arcfour_hmac_md5_encrypt: do_hmac(k1)"
2058 "failed - error %0x", result);
2059 goto cleanup;
2060 }
2061
2062 bcopy(k1data, k2data, sizeof (k2data));
2063
2064 /*
2065 * For the neutered MS RC4 encryption type,
2066 * set the trailing 9 bytes to 0xab per the
2067 * RC4-HMAC spec.
2068 */
2069 if (tmi->enc_data.method == CRYPT_METHOD_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_EXP) {
2070 bcopy((void *)&k1data[7], ms_exp, sizeof (ms_exp));
2071 }
2072
2073 /*
2074 * Get the confounder bytes.
2075 */
2076 (void) random_get_pseudo_bytes(
2077 (uint8_t *)(mp->b_rptr + hash->hash_len),
2078 (size_t)hash->confound_len);
2079
2080 k2.ck_data = k2data;
2081 k2.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW;
2082 k2.ck_length = sizeof (k2data) * 8;
2083
2084 /*
2085 * This writes the HMAC to the hash area in the
2086 * mblk. The key used is the one just created by
2087 * the previous HMAC operation.
2088 * The data being processed is the confounder bytes
2089 * PLUS the input plaintext.
2090 */
2091 result = do_hmac(md5_hmac_mech, &k2,
2092 (char *)mp->b_rptr + hash->hash_len,
2093 hash->confound_len + inlen,
2094 (char *)mp->b_rptr, hash->hash_len);
2095 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
2096 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
2097 "arcfour_hmac_md5_encrypt: do_hmac(k2)"
2098 "failed - error %0x", result);
2099 goto cleanup;
2100 }
2101 /*
2102 * Because of the odd way that MIT uses RC4 keys
2103 * on the rlogin stream, we only need to create
2104 * this key once.
2105 * However, if using "old" rcmd mode, we need to do
2106 * it every time.
2107 */
2108 if (tmi->enc_data.ctx == NULL ||
2109 (tmi->enc_data.option_mask & CRYPTOPT_RCMD_MODE_V1)) {
2110 crypto_key_t *key = &tmi->enc_data.d_encr_key;
2111
2112 k1.ck_data = k1data;
2113 k1.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW;
2114 k1.ck_length = sizeof (k1data) * 8;
2115
2116 key->ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW;
2117 key->ck_length = k1.ck_length;
2118 if (key->ck_data == NULL)
2119 key->ck_data = kmem_zalloc(
2120 CRYPT_ARCFOUR_KEYBYTES, KM_SLEEP);
2121
2122 /*
2123 * The final HMAC operation creates the encryption
2124 * key to be used for the encrypt operation.
2125 */
2126 result = do_hmac(md5_hmac_mech, &k1,
2127 (char *)mp->b_rptr, hash->hash_len,
2128 (char *)key->ck_data, CRYPT_ARCFOUR_KEYBYTES);
2129
2130 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
2131 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
2132 "arcfour_hmac_md5_encrypt: do_hmac(k3)"
2133 "failed - error %0x", result);
2134 goto cleanup;
2135 }
2136 }
2137
2138 /*
2139 * If the context has not been initialized, do it now.
2140 */
2141 if (tmi->enc_data.ctx == NULL &&
2142 (tmi->enc_data.option_mask & CRYPTOPT_RCMD_MODE_V2)) {
2143 /*
2144 * Only create a template if we are doing
2145 * chaining from block to block.
2146 */
2147 result = crypto_create_ctx_template(&mech,
2148 &tmi->enc_data.d_encr_key,
2149 &tmi->enc_data.enc_tmpl,
2150 KM_SLEEP);
2151 if (result == CRYPTO_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
2152 tmi->enc_data.enc_tmpl = NULL;
2153 } else if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
2154 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "failed to create enc template "
2155 "for RC4 encrypt: %0x", result);
2156 goto cleanup;
2157 }
2158
2159 result = crypto_encrypt_init(&mech,
2160 &tmi->enc_data.d_encr_key,
2161 tmi->enc_data.enc_tmpl,
2162 &tmi->enc_data.ctx, NULL);
2163 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
2164 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "crypto_encrypt_init failed:"
2165 " %0x", result);
2166 goto cleanup;
2167 }
2168 }
2169 v1.iov_base = (char *)mp->b_rptr + hash->hash_len;
2170 v1.iov_len = hash->confound_len + inlen;
2171
2172 indata.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW;
2173 indata.cd_offset = 0;
2174 indata.cd_length = hash->confound_len + inlen;
2175 indata.cd_raw = v1;
2176
2177 if (tmi->enc_data.option_mask & CRYPTOPT_RCMD_MODE_V2)
2178 result = crypto_encrypt_update(tmi->enc_data.ctx,
2179 &indata, NULL, NULL);
2180 else
2181 result = crypto_encrypt(&mech, &indata,
2182 &tmi->enc_data.d_encr_key, NULL,
2183 NULL, NULL);
2184
2185 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
2186 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "crypto_encrypt_update failed: 0x%0x",
2187 result);
2188 }
2189
2190 cleanup:
2191 bzero(k1data, sizeof (k1data));
2192 bzero(k2data, sizeof (k2data));
2193 bzero(saltdata, sizeof (saltdata));
2194 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
2195 mp->b_datap->db_type = M_ERROR;
2196 mp->b_rptr = mp->b_datap->db_base;
2197 *mp->b_rptr = EIO;
2198 mp->b_wptr = mp->b_rptr + sizeof (char);
2199 freemsg(mp->b_cont);
2200 mp->b_cont = NULL;
2201 qreply(WR(q), mp);
2202 return (NULL);
2203 }
2204 return (mp);
2205 }
2206
2207 /*
2208 * DES-CBC-[HASH] encrypt
2209 *
2210 * Needed to support userland apps that must support Kerberos V5
2211 * encryption DES-CBC encryption modes.
2212 *
2213 * The HASH values supported are RAW(NULL), MD5, CRC32, and SHA1
2214 *
2215 * format of ciphertext for DES-CBC functions, per RFC1510 is:
2216 * +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+
2217 * |confounder | cksum | msg-data | pad |
2218 * +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+
2219 *
2220 * format of ciphertext when using DES3-SHA1-HMAC
2221 * +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+
2222 * |confounder | msg-data | hmac | pad |
2223 * +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+
2224 *
2225 * The confounder is 8 bytes of random data.
2226 * The cksum depends on the hash being used.
2227 * 4 bytes for CRC32
2228 * 16 bytes for MD5
2229 * 20 bytes for SHA1
2230 * 0 bytes for RAW
2231 *
2232 */
2233 static mblk_t *
2234 des_cbc_encrypt(queue_t *q, struct tmodinfo *tmi, mblk_t *mp, hash_info_t *hash)
2235 {
2236 int result;
2237 size_t cipherlen;
2238 size_t inlen;
2239 size_t plainlen;
2240
2241 /*
2242 * The size at this point should be the size of
2243 * all the plaintext plus the optional plaintext length
2244 * needed for RCMD V2 mode. There should also be room
2245 * at the head of the mblk for the confounder and hash info.
2246 */
2247 inlen = (size_t)MBLKL(mp);
2248
2249 /*
2250 * The output size will be a multiple of 8 because this algorithm
2251 * only works on 8 byte chunks.
2252 */
2253 cipherlen = encrypt_size(&tmi->enc_data, inlen);
2254
2255 ASSERT(MBLKSIZE(mp) >= cipherlen);
2256
2257 if (cipherlen > inlen) {
2258 bzero(mp->b_wptr, MBLKTAIL(mp));
2259 }
2260
2261 /*
2262 * Shift the rptr back enough to insert
2263 * the confounder and hash.
2264 */
2265 if (tmi->enc_data.method == CRYPT_METHOD_DES3_CBC_SHA1) {
2266 mp->b_rptr -= hash->confound_len;
2267 } else {
2268 mp->b_rptr -= (hash->confound_len + hash->hash_len);
2269
2270 /* zero out the hash area */
2271 bzero(mp->b_rptr + hash->confound_len, (size_t)hash->hash_len);
2272 }
2273
2274 /* get random confounder from our friend, the 'random' module */
2275 if (hash->confound_len > 0) {
2276 (void) random_get_pseudo_bytes((uint8_t *)mp->b_rptr,
2277 (size_t)hash->confound_len);
2278 }
2279
2280 /*
2281 * For 3DES we calculate an HMAC later.
2282 */
2283 if (tmi->enc_data.method != CRYPT_METHOD_DES3_CBC_SHA1) {
2284 /* calculate chksum of confounder + input */
2285 if (hash->hash_len > 0 && hash->hashfunc != NULL) {
2286 uchar_t cksum[MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
2287
2288 result = hash->hashfunc(cksum, mp->b_rptr,
2289 cipherlen);
2290 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
2291 goto failure;
2292 }
2293
2294 /* put hash in place right after the confounder */
2295 bcopy(cksum, (mp->b_rptr + hash->confound_len),
2296 (size_t)hash->hash_len);
2297 }
2298 }
2299 /*
2300 * In order to support the "old" Kerberos RCMD protocol,
2301 * we must use the IVEC 3 different ways:
2302 * IVEC_REUSE = keep using the same IV each time, this is
2303 * ugly and insecure, but necessary for
2304 * backwards compatibility with existing MIT code.
2305 * IVEC_ONETIME = Use the ivec as initialized when the crypto
2306 * was setup (see setup_crypto routine).
2307 * IVEC_NEVER = never use an IVEC, use a bunch of 0's as the IV (yuk).
2308 */
2309 if (tmi->enc_data.ivec_usage == IVEC_NEVER) {
2310 bzero(tmi->enc_data.block, tmi->enc_data.blocklen);
2311 } else if (tmi->enc_data.ivec_usage == IVEC_REUSE) {
2312 bcopy(tmi->enc_data.ivec, tmi->enc_data.block,
2313 tmi->enc_data.blocklen);
2314 }
2315
2316 if (tmi->enc_data.method == CRYPT_METHOD_DES3_CBC_SHA1) {
2317 /*
2318 * The input length already included the hash size,
2319 * don't include this in the plaintext length
2320 * calculations.
2321 */
2322 plainlen = cipherlen - hash->hash_len;
2323
2324 mp->b_wptr = mp->b_rptr + plainlen;
2325
2326 result = kef_encr_hmac(&tmi->enc_data,
2327 (void *)mp, (size_t)plainlen,
2328 (char *)(mp->b_rptr + plainlen),
2329 hash->hash_len);
2330 } else {
2331 ASSERT(mp->b_rptr + cipherlen <= DB_LIM(mp));
2332 mp->b_wptr = mp->b_rptr + cipherlen;
2333 result = kef_crypt(&tmi->enc_data, (void *)mp,
2334 CRYPTO_DATA_MBLK, (size_t)cipherlen,
2335 CRYPT_ENCRYPT);
2336 }
2337 failure:
2338 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
2339 #ifdef DEBUG
2340 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
2341 "des_cbc_encrypt: kef_crypt encrypt "
2342 "failed (len: %ld) - error %0x",
2343 cipherlen, result);
2344 #endif
2345 mp->b_datap->db_type = M_ERROR;
2346 mp->b_rptr = mp->b_datap->db_base;
2347 *mp->b_rptr = EIO;
2348 mp->b_wptr = mp->b_rptr + sizeof (char);
2349 freemsg(mp->b_cont);
2350 mp->b_cont = NULL;
2351 qreply(WR(q), mp);
2352 return (NULL);
2353 } else if (tmi->enc_data.ivec_usage == IVEC_ONETIME) {
2354 /*
2355 * Because we are using KEF, we must manually
2356 * update our IV.
2357 */
2358 bcopy(mp->b_wptr - tmi->enc_data.ivlen,
2359 tmi->enc_data.block, tmi->enc_data.ivlen);
2360 }
2361 if (tmi->enc_data.method == CRYPT_METHOD_DES3_CBC_SHA1) {
2362 mp->b_wptr = mp->b_rptr + cipherlen;
2363 }
2364
2365 return (mp);
2366 }
2367
2368 /*
2369 * des_cbc_decrypt
2370 *
2371 *
2372 * Needed to support userland apps that must support Kerberos V5
2373 * encryption DES-CBC decryption modes.
2374 *
2375 * The HASH values supported are RAW(NULL), MD5, CRC32, and SHA1
2376 *
2377 * format of ciphertext for DES-CBC functions, per RFC1510 is:
2378 * +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+
2379 * |confounder | cksum | msg-data | pad |
2380 * +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+
2381 *
2382 * format of ciphertext when using DES3-SHA1-HMAC
2383 * +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+
2384 * |confounder | msg-data | hmac | pad |
2385 * +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+
2386 *
2387 * The confounder is 8 bytes of random data.
2388 * The cksum depends on the hash being used.
2389 * 4 bytes for CRC32
2390 * 16 bytes for MD5
2391 * 20 bytes for SHA1
2392 * 0 bytes for RAW
2393 *
2394 */
2395 static mblk_t *
2396 des_cbc_decrypt(queue_t *q, struct tmodinfo *tmi, mblk_t *mp, hash_info_t *hash)
2397 {
2398 uint_t inlen, datalen;
2399 int result = 0;
2400 uchar_t *optr = NULL;
2401 uchar_t cksum[MAX_CKSUM_LEN], newcksum[MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
2402 uchar_t nextiv[DEFAULT_DES_BLOCKLEN];
2403
2404 /* Compute adjusted size */
2405 inlen = MBLKL(mp);
2406
2407 optr = mp->b_rptr;
2408
2409 /*
2410 * In order to support the "old" Kerberos RCMD protocol,
2411 * we must use the IVEC 3 different ways:
2412 * IVEC_REUSE = keep using the same IV each time, this is
2413 * ugly and insecure, but necessary for
2414 * backwards compatibility with existing MIT code.
2415 * IVEC_ONETIME = Use the ivec as initialized when the crypto
2416 * was setup (see setup_crypto routine).
2417 * IVEC_NEVER = never use an IVEC, use a bunch of 0's as the IV (yuk).
2418 */
2419 if (tmi->dec_data.ivec_usage == IVEC_NEVER)
2420 bzero(tmi->dec_data.block, tmi->dec_data.blocklen);
2421 else if (tmi->dec_data.ivec_usage == IVEC_REUSE)
2422 bcopy(tmi->dec_data.ivec, tmi->dec_data.block,
2423 tmi->dec_data.blocklen);
2424
2425 if (tmi->dec_data.method == CRYPT_METHOD_DES3_CBC_SHA1) {
2426 /*
2427 * Do not decrypt the HMAC at the end
2428 */
2429 int decrypt_len = inlen - hash->hash_len;
2430
2431 /*
2432 * Move the wptr so the mblk appears to end
2433 * BEFORE the HMAC section.
2434 */
2435 mp->b_wptr = mp->b_rptr + decrypt_len;
2436
2437 /*
2438 * Because we are using KEF, we must manually update our
2439 * IV.
2440 */
2441 if (tmi->dec_data.ivec_usage == IVEC_ONETIME) {
2442 bcopy(mp->b_rptr + decrypt_len - tmi->dec_data.ivlen,
2443 nextiv, tmi->dec_data.ivlen);
2444 }
2445
2446 result = kef_decr_hmac(&tmi->dec_data, mp, decrypt_len,
2447 (char *)newcksum, hash->hash_len);
2448 } else {
2449 /*
2450 * Because we are using KEF, we must manually update our
2451 * IV.
2452 */
2453 if (tmi->dec_data.ivec_usage == IVEC_ONETIME) {
2454 bcopy(mp->b_wptr - tmi->enc_data.ivlen, nextiv,
2455 tmi->dec_data.ivlen);
2456 }
2457 result = kef_crypt(&tmi->dec_data, (void *)mp,
2458 CRYPTO_DATA_MBLK, (size_t)inlen, CRYPT_DECRYPT);
2459 }
2460 if (result != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
2461 #ifdef DEBUG
2462 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
2463 "des_cbc_decrypt: kef_crypt decrypt "
2464 "failed - error %0x", result);
2465 #endif
2466 mp->b_datap->db_type = M_ERROR;
2467 mp->b_rptr = mp->b_datap->db_base;
2468 *mp->b_rptr = EIO;
2469 mp->b_wptr = mp->b_rptr + sizeof (char);
2470 freemsg(mp->b_cont);
2471 mp->b_cont = NULL;
2472 qreply(WR(q), mp);
2473 return (NULL);
2474 }
2475
2476 /*
2477 * Manually update the IV, KEF does not track this for us.
2478 */
2479 if (tmi->dec_data.ivec_usage == IVEC_ONETIME) {
2480 bcopy(nextiv, tmi->dec_data.block, tmi->dec_data.ivlen);
2481 }
2482
2483 /* Verify the checksum(if necessary) */
2484 if (hash->hash_len > 0) {
2485 if (tmi->dec_data.method == CRYPT_METHOD_DES3_CBC_SHA1) {
2486 bcopy(mp->b_rptr + inlen - hash->hash_len, cksum,
2487 hash->hash_len);
2488 } else {
2489 bcopy(optr + hash->confound_len, cksum, hash->hash_len);
2490
2491 /* zero the cksum in the buffer */
2492 ASSERT(optr + hash->confound_len + hash->hash_len <=
2493 DB_LIM(mp));
2494 bzero(optr + hash->confound_len, hash->hash_len);
2495
2496 /* calculate MD5 chksum of confounder + input */
2497 if (hash->hashfunc) {
2498 (void) hash->hashfunc(newcksum, optr, inlen);
2499 }
2500 }
2501
2502 if (bcmp(cksum, newcksum, hash->hash_len)) {
2503 #ifdef DEBUG
2504 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "des_cbc_decrypt: checksum "
2505 "verification failed");
2506 #endif
2507 mp->b_datap->db_type = M_ERROR;
2508 mp->b_rptr = mp->b_datap->db_base;
2509 *mp->b_rptr = EIO;
2510 mp->b_wptr = mp->b_rptr + sizeof (char);
2511 freemsg(mp->b_cont);
2512 mp->b_cont = NULL;
2513 qreply(WR(q), mp);
2514 return (NULL);
2515 }
2516 }
2517
2518 datalen = inlen - hash->confound_len - hash->hash_len;
2519
2520 /* Move just the decrypted input into place if necessary */
2521 if (hash->confound_len > 0 || hash->hash_len > 0) {
2522 if (tmi->dec_data.method == CRYPT_METHOD_DES3_CBC_SHA1)
2523 mp->b_rptr += hash->confound_len;
2524 else
2525 mp->b_rptr += hash->confound_len + hash->hash_len;
2526 }
2527
2528 ASSERT(mp->b_rptr + datalen <= DB_LIM(mp));
2529 mp->b_wptr = mp->b_rptr + datalen;
2530
2531 return (mp);
2532 }
2533
2534 static mblk_t *
2535 do_decrypt(queue_t *q, mblk_t *mp)
2536 {
2537 struct tmodinfo *tmi = (struct tmodinfo *)q->q_ptr;
2538 mblk_t *outmp;
2539
2540 switch (tmi->dec_data.method) {
2541 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CFB:
2542 outmp = des_cfb_decrypt(q, tmi, mp);
2543 break;
2544 case CRYPT_METHOD_NONE:
2545 outmp = mp;
2546 break;
2547 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CBC_NULL:
2548 outmp = des_cbc_decrypt(q, tmi, mp, &null_hash);
2549 break;
2550 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CBC_MD5:
2551 outmp = des_cbc_decrypt(q, tmi, mp, &md5_hash);
2552 break;
2553 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CBC_CRC:
2554 outmp = des_cbc_decrypt(q, tmi, mp, &crc32_hash);
2555 break;
2556 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
2557 outmp = des_cbc_decrypt(q, tmi, mp, &sha1_hash);
2558 break;
2559 case CRYPT_METHOD_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
2560 case CRYPT_METHOD_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_EXP:
2561 outmp = arcfour_hmac_md5_decrypt(q, tmi, mp, &md5_hash);
2562 break;
2563 case CRYPT_METHOD_AES128:
2564 case CRYPT_METHOD_AES256:
2565 outmp = aes_decrypt(q, tmi, mp, &sha1_hash);
2566 break;
2567 }
2568 return (outmp);
2569 }
2570
2571 /*
2572 * do_encrypt
2573 *
2574 * Generic encryption routine for a single message block.
2575 * The input mblk may be replaced by some encrypt routines
2576 * because they add extra data in some cases that may exceed
2577 * the input mblk_t size limit.
2578 */
2579 static mblk_t *
2580 do_encrypt(queue_t *q, mblk_t *mp)
2581 {
2582 struct tmodinfo *tmi = (struct tmodinfo *)q->q_ptr;
2583 mblk_t *outmp;
2584
2585 switch (tmi->enc_data.method) {
2586 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CFB:
2587 outmp = des_cfb_encrypt(q, tmi, mp);
2588 break;
2589 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CBC_NULL:
2590 outmp = des_cbc_encrypt(q, tmi, mp, &null_hash);
2591 break;
2592 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CBC_MD5:
2593 outmp = des_cbc_encrypt(q, tmi, mp, &md5_hash);
2594 break;
2595 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CBC_CRC:
2596 outmp = des_cbc_encrypt(q, tmi, mp, &crc32_hash);
2597 break;
2598 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
2599 outmp = des_cbc_encrypt(q, tmi, mp, &sha1_hash);
2600 break;
2601 case CRYPT_METHOD_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
2602 case CRYPT_METHOD_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_EXP:
2603 outmp = arcfour_hmac_md5_encrypt(q, tmi, mp, &md5_hash);
2604 break;
2605 case CRYPT_METHOD_AES128:
2606 case CRYPT_METHOD_AES256:
2607 outmp = aes_encrypt(q, tmi, mp, &sha1_hash);
2608 break;
2609 case CRYPT_METHOD_NONE:
2610 outmp = mp;
2611 break;
2612 }
2613 return (outmp);
2614 }
2615
2616 /*
2617 * setup_crypto
2618 *
2619 * This takes the data from the CRYPTIOCSETUP ioctl
2620 * and sets up a cipher_data_t structure for either
2621 * encryption or decryption. This is where the
2622 * key and initialization vector data get stored
2623 * prior to beginning any crypto functions.
2624 *
2625 * Special note:
2626 * Some applications(e.g. telnetd) have ability to switch
2627 * crypto on/off periodically. Thus, the application may call
2628 * the CRYPTIOCSETUP ioctl many times for the same stream.
2629 * If the CRYPTIOCSETUP is called with 0 length key or ivec fields
2630 * assume that the key, block, and saveblock fields that are already
2631 * set from a previous CRIOCSETUP call are still valid. This helps avoid
2632 * a rekeying error that could occur if we overwrite these fields
2633 * with each CRYPTIOCSETUP call.
2634 * In short, sometimes, CRYPTIOCSETUP is used to simply toggle on/off
2635 * without resetting the original crypto parameters.
2636 *
2637 */
2638 static int
2639 setup_crypto(struct cr_info_t *ci, struct cipher_data_t *cd, int encrypt)
2640 {
2641 uint_t newblocklen;
2642 uint32_t enc_usage = 0, dec_usage = 0;
2643 int rv;
2644
2645 /*
2646 * Initial sanity checks
2647 */
2648 if (!CR_METHOD_OK(ci->crypto_method)) {
2649 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "Illegal crypto method (%d)",
2650 ci->crypto_method);
2651 return (EINVAL);
2652 }
2653 if (!CR_OPTIONS_OK(ci->option_mask)) {
2654 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "Illegal crypto options (%d)",
2655 ci->option_mask);
2656 return (EINVAL);
2657 }
2658 if (!CR_IVUSAGE_OK(ci->ivec_usage)) {
2659 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "Illegal ivec usage value (%d)",
2660 ci->ivec_usage);
2661 return (EINVAL);
2662 }
2663
2664 cd->method = ci->crypto_method;
2665 cd->bytes = 0;
2666
2667 if (ci->keylen > 0) {
2668 if (cd->key != NULL) {
2669 kmem_free(cd->key, cd->keylen);
2670 cd->key = NULL;
2671 cd->keylen = 0;
2672 }
2673 /*
2674 * cd->key holds the copy of the raw key bytes passed in
2675 * from the userland app.
2676 */
2677 cd->key = kmem_alloc((size_t)ci->keylen, KM_SLEEP);
2678
2679 cd->keylen = ci->keylen;
2680 bcopy(ci->key, cd->key, (size_t)ci->keylen);
2681 }
2682
2683 /*
2684 * Configure the block size based on the type of cipher.
2685 */
2686 switch (cd->method) {
2687 case CRYPT_METHOD_NONE:
2688 newblocklen = 0;
2689 break;
2690 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CFB:
2691 newblocklen = DEFAULT_DES_BLOCKLEN;
2692 cd->mech_type = crypto_mech2id(SUN_CKM_DES_ECB);
2693 break;
2694 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CBC_NULL:
2695 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CBC_MD5:
2696 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CBC_CRC:
2697 newblocklen = DEFAULT_DES_BLOCKLEN;
2698 cd->mech_type = crypto_mech2id(SUN_CKM_DES_CBC);
2699 break;
2700 case CRYPT_METHOD_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
2701 newblocklen = DEFAULT_DES_BLOCKLEN;
2702 cd->mech_type = crypto_mech2id(SUN_CKM_DES3_CBC);
2703 /* 3DES always uses the old usage constant */
2704 enc_usage = RCMDV1_USAGE;
2705 dec_usage = RCMDV1_USAGE;
2706 break;
2707 case CRYPT_METHOD_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
2708 case CRYPT_METHOD_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_EXP:
2709 newblocklen = 0;
2710 cd->mech_type = crypto_mech2id(SUN_CKM_RC4);
2711 break;
2712 case CRYPT_METHOD_AES128:
2713 case CRYPT_METHOD_AES256:
2714 newblocklen = DEFAULT_AES_BLOCKLEN;
2715 cd->mech_type = crypto_mech2id(SUN_CKM_AES_ECB);
2716 enc_usage = AES_ENCRYPT_USAGE;
2717 dec_usage = AES_DECRYPT_USAGE;
2718 break;
2719 }
2720 if (cd->mech_type == CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID) {
2721 return (CRYPTO_FAILED);
2722 }
2723
2724 /*
2725 * If RC4, initialize the master crypto key used by
2726 * the RC4 algorithm to derive the final encrypt and decrypt keys.
2727 */
2728 if (cd->keylen > 0 && IS_RC4_METHOD(cd->method)) {
2729 /*
2730 * cd->ckey is a kernel crypto key structure used as the
2731 * master key in the RC4-HMAC crypto operations.
2732 */
2733 if (cd->ckey == NULL) {
2734 cd->ckey = (crypto_key_t *)kmem_zalloc(
2735 sizeof (crypto_key_t), KM_SLEEP);
2736 }
2737
2738 cd->ckey->ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW;
2739 cd->ckey->ck_data = cd->key;
2740
2741 /* key length for EF is measured in bits */
2742 cd->ckey->ck_length = cd->keylen * 8;
2743 }
2744
2745 /*
2746 * cd->block and cd->saveblock are used as temporary storage for
2747 * data that must be carried over between encrypt/decrypt operations
2748 * in some of the "feedback" modes.
2749 */
2750 if (newblocklen != cd->blocklen) {
2751 if (cd->block != NULL) {
2752 kmem_free(cd->block, cd->blocklen);
2753 cd->block = NULL;
2754 }
2755
2756 if (cd->saveblock != NULL) {
2757 kmem_free(cd->saveblock, cd->blocklen);
2758 cd->saveblock = NULL;
2759 }
2760
2761 cd->blocklen = newblocklen;
2762 if (cd->blocklen) {
2763 cd->block = kmem_zalloc((size_t)cd->blocklen,
2764 KM_SLEEP);
2765 }
2766
2767 if (cd->method == CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CFB)
2768 cd->saveblock = kmem_zalloc(cd->blocklen,
2769 KM_SLEEP);
2770 else
2771 cd->saveblock = NULL;
2772 }
2773
2774 if (ci->iveclen != cd->ivlen) {
2775 if (cd->ivec != NULL) {
2776 kmem_free(cd->ivec, cd->ivlen);
2777 cd->ivec = NULL;
2778 }
2779 if (ci->ivec_usage != IVEC_NEVER && ci->iveclen > 0) {
2780 cd->ivec = kmem_zalloc((size_t)ci->iveclen,
2781 KM_SLEEP);
2782 cd->ivlen = ci->iveclen;
2783 } else {
2784 cd->ivlen = 0;
2785 cd->ivec = NULL;
2786 }
2787 }
2788 cd->option_mask = ci->option_mask;
2789
2790 /*
2791 * Old protocol requires a static 'usage' value for
2792 * deriving keys. Yuk.
2793 */
2794 if (cd->option_mask & CRYPTOPT_RCMD_MODE_V1) {
2795 enc_usage = dec_usage = RCMDV1_USAGE;
2796 }
2797
2798 if (cd->ivlen > cd->blocklen) {
2799 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "setup_crypto: IV longer than block size");
2800 return (EINVAL);
2801 }
2802
2803 /*
2804 * If we are using an IVEC "correctly" (i.e. set it once)
2805 * copy it here.
2806 */
2807 if (ci->ivec_usage == IVEC_ONETIME && cd->block != NULL)
2808 bcopy(ci->ivec, cd->block, (size_t)cd->ivlen);
2809
2810 cd->ivec_usage = ci->ivec_usage;
2811 if (cd->ivec != NULL) {
2812 /* Save the original IVEC in case we need it later */
2813 bcopy(ci->ivec, cd->ivec, (size_t)cd->ivlen);
2814 }
2815 /*
2816 * Special handling for 3DES-SHA1-HMAC and AES crypto:
2817 * generate derived keys and context templates
2818 * for better performance.
2819 */
2820 if (cd->method == CRYPT_METHOD_DES3_CBC_SHA1 ||
2821 IS_AES_METHOD(cd->method)) {
2822 crypto_mechanism_t enc_mech;
2823 crypto_mechanism_t hmac_mech;
2824
2825 if (cd->d_encr_key.ck_data != NULL) {
2826 bzero(cd->d_encr_key.ck_data, cd->keylen);
2827 kmem_free(cd->d_encr_key.ck_data, cd->keylen);
2828 }
2829
2830 if (cd->d_hmac_key.ck_data != NULL) {
2831 bzero(cd->d_hmac_key.ck_data, cd->keylen);
2832 kmem_free(cd->d_hmac_key.ck_data, cd->keylen);
2833 }
2834
2835 if (cd->enc_tmpl != NULL)
2836 (void) crypto_destroy_ctx_template(cd->enc_tmpl);
2837
2838 if (cd->hmac_tmpl != NULL)
2839 (void) crypto_destroy_ctx_template(cd->hmac_tmpl);
2840
2841 enc_mech.cm_type = cd->mech_type;
2842 enc_mech.cm_param = cd->ivec;
2843 enc_mech.cm_param_len = cd->ivlen;
2844
2845 hmac_mech.cm_type = sha1_hmac_mech;
2846 hmac_mech.cm_param = NULL;
2847 hmac_mech.cm_param_len = 0;
2848
2849 /*
2850 * Create the derived keys.
2851 */
2852 rv = create_derived_keys(cd,
2853 (encrypt ? enc_usage : dec_usage),
2854 &cd->d_encr_key, &cd->d_hmac_key);
2855
2856 if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
2857 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "failed to create derived "
2858 "keys: %0x", rv);
2859 return (CRYPTO_FAILED);
2860 }
2861
2862 rv = crypto_create_ctx_template(&enc_mech,
2863 &cd->d_encr_key,
2864 &cd->enc_tmpl, KM_SLEEP);
2865 if (rv == CRYPTO_MECH_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
2866 cd->enc_tmpl = NULL;
2867 } else if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
2868 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "failed to create enc template "
2869 "for d_encr_key: %0x", rv);
2870 return (CRYPTO_FAILED);
2871 }
2872
2873 rv = crypto_create_ctx_template(&hmac_mech,
2874 &cd->d_hmac_key,
2875 &cd->hmac_tmpl, KM_SLEEP);
2876 if (rv == CRYPTO_MECH_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
2877 cd->hmac_tmpl = NULL;
2878 } else if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
2879 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "failed to create hmac template:"
2880 " %0x", rv);
2881 return (CRYPTO_FAILED);
2882 }
2883 } else if (IS_RC4_METHOD(cd->method)) {
2884 bzero(&cd->d_encr_key, sizeof (crypto_key_t));
2885 bzero(&cd->d_hmac_key, sizeof (crypto_key_t));
2886 cd->ctx = NULL;
2887 cd->enc_tmpl = NULL;
2888 cd->hmac_tmpl = NULL;
2889 }
2890
2891 /* Final sanity checks, make sure no fields are NULL */
2892 if (cd->method != CRYPT_METHOD_NONE) {
2893 if (cd->block == NULL && cd->blocklen > 0) {
2894 #ifdef DEBUG
2895 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
2896 "setup_crypto: IV block not allocated");
2897 #endif
2898 return (ENOMEM);
2899 }
2900 if (cd->key == NULL && cd->keylen > 0) {
2901 #ifdef DEBUG
2902 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
2903 "setup_crypto: key block not allocated");
2904 #endif
2905 return (ENOMEM);
2906 }
2907 if (cd->method == CRYPT_METHOD_DES_CFB &&
2908 cd->saveblock == NULL && cd->blocklen > 0) {
2909 #ifdef DEBUG
2910 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
2911 "setup_crypto: save block not allocated");
2912 #endif
2913 return (ENOMEM);
2914 }
2915 if (cd->ivec == NULL && cd->ivlen > 0) {
2916 #ifdef DEBUG
2917 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
2918 "setup_crypto: IV not allocated");
2919 #endif
2920 return (ENOMEM);
2921 }
2922 }
2923 return (0);
2924 }
2925
2926 /*
2927 * RCMDS require a 4 byte, clear text
2928 * length field before each message.
2929 * Add it now.
2930 */
2931 static mblk_t *
2932 mklenmp(mblk_t *bp, uint32_t len)
2933 {
2934 mblk_t *lenmp;
2935 uchar_t *ucp;
2936
2937 if (bp->b_rptr - 4 < DB_BASE(bp) || DB_REF(bp) > 1) {
2938 lenmp = allocb(4, BPRI_MED);
2939 if (lenmp != NULL) {
2940 lenmp->b_rptr = lenmp->b_wptr = DB_LIM(lenmp);
2941 linkb(lenmp, bp);
2942 bp = lenmp;
2943 }
2944 }
2945 ucp = bp->b_rptr;
2946 *--ucp = len;
2947 *--ucp = len >> 8;
2948 *--ucp = len >> 16;
2949 *--ucp = len >> 24;
2950
2951 bp->b_rptr = ucp;
2952
2953 return (bp);
2954 }
2955
2956 static mblk_t *
2957 encrypt_block(queue_t *q, struct tmodinfo *tmi, mblk_t *mp, size_t plainlen)
2958 {
2959 mblk_t *newmp;
2960 size_t headspace;
2961
2962 mblk_t *cbp;
2963 size_t cipherlen;
2964 size_t extra = 0;
2965 uint32_t ptlen = (uint32_t)plainlen;
2966 /*
2967 * If we are using the "NEW" RCMD mode,
2968 * add 4 bytes to the plaintext for the
2969 * plaintext length that gets prepended
2970 * before encrypting.
2971 */
2972 if (tmi->enc_data.option_mask & CRYPTOPT_RCMD_MODE_V2)
2973 ptlen += 4;
2974
2975 cipherlen = encrypt_size(&tmi->enc_data, (size_t)ptlen);
2976
2977 /*
2978 * if we must allocb, then make sure its enough
2979 * to hold the length field so we dont have to allocb
2980 * again down below in 'mklenmp'
2981 */
2982 if (ANY_RCMD_MODE(tmi->enc_data.option_mask)) {
2983 extra = sizeof (uint32_t);
2984 }
2985
2986 /*
2987 * Calculate how much space is needed in front of
2988 * the data.
2989 */
2990 headspace = plaintext_offset(&tmi->enc_data);
2991
2992 /*
2993 * If the current block is too small, reallocate
2994 * one large enough to hold the hdr, tail, and
2995 * ciphertext.
2996 */
2997 if ((cipherlen + extra >= MBLKSIZE(mp)) || DB_REF(mp) > 1) {
2998 int sz = P2ROUNDUP(cipherlen+extra, 8);
2999
3000 cbp = allocb_tmpl(sz, mp);
3001 if (cbp == NULL) {
3002 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
3003 "allocb (%d bytes) failed", sz);
3004 return (NULL);
3005 }
3006
3007 cbp->b_cont = mp->b_cont;
3008
3009 /*
3010 * headspace includes the length fields needed
3011 * for the RCMD modes (v1 == 4 bytes, V2 = 8)
3012 */
3013 ASSERT(cbp->b_rptr + P2ROUNDUP(plainlen+headspace, 8)
3014 <= DB_LIM(cbp));
3015
3016 cbp->b_rptr = DB_BASE(cbp) + headspace;
3017 bcopy(mp->b_rptr, cbp->b_rptr, plainlen);
3018 cbp->b_wptr = cbp->b_rptr + plainlen;
3019
3020 freeb(mp);
3021 } else {
3022 size_t extra = 0;
3023 cbp = mp;
3024
3025 /*
3026 * Some ciphers add HMAC after the final block
3027 * of the ciphertext, not at the beginning like the
3028 * 1-DES ciphers.
3029 */
3030 if (tmi->enc_data.method ==
3031 CRYPT_METHOD_DES3_CBC_SHA1 ||
3032 IS_AES_METHOD(tmi->enc_data.method)) {
3033 extra = sha1_hash.hash_len;
3034 }
3035
3036 /*
3037 * Make sure the rptr is positioned correctly so that
3038 * routines later do not have to shift this data around
3039 */
3040 if ((cbp->b_rptr + P2ROUNDUP(cipherlen + extra, 8) >
3041 DB_LIM(cbp)) ||
3042 (cbp->b_rptr - headspace < DB_BASE(cbp))) {
3043 ovbcopy(cbp->b_rptr, DB_BASE(cbp) + headspace,
3044 plainlen);
3045 cbp->b_rptr = DB_BASE(cbp) + headspace;
3046 cbp->b_wptr = cbp->b_rptr + plainlen;
3047 }
3048 }
3049
3050 ASSERT(cbp->b_rptr - headspace >= DB_BASE(cbp));
3051 ASSERT(cbp->b_wptr <= DB_LIM(cbp));
3052
3053 /*
3054 * If using RCMD_MODE_V2 (new rcmd mode), prepend
3055 * the plaintext length before the actual plaintext.
3056 */
3057 if (tmi->enc_data.option_mask & CRYPTOPT_RCMD_MODE_V2) {
3058 cbp->b_rptr -= RCMD_LEN_SZ;
3059
3060 /* put plaintext length at head of buffer */
3061 *(cbp->b_rptr + 3) = (uchar_t)(plainlen & 0xff);
3062 *(cbp->b_rptr + 2) = (uchar_t)((plainlen >> 8) & 0xff);
3063 *(cbp->b_rptr + 1) = (uchar_t)((plainlen >> 16) & 0xff);
3064 *(cbp->b_rptr) = (uchar_t)((plainlen >> 24) & 0xff);
3065 }
3066
3067 newmp = do_encrypt(q, cbp);
3068
3069 if (newmp != NULL &&
3070 (tmi->enc_data.option_mask &
3071 (CRYPTOPT_RCMD_MODE_V1 | CRYPTOPT_RCMD_MODE_V2))) {
3072 mblk_t *lp;
3073 /*
3074 * Add length field, required when this is
3075 * used to encrypt "r*" commands(rlogin, rsh)
3076 * with Kerberos.
3077 */
3078 lp = mklenmp(newmp, plainlen);
3079
3080 if (lp == NULL) {
3081 freeb(newmp);
3082 return (NULL);
3083 } else {
3084 newmp = lp;
3085 }
3086 }
3087 return (newmp);
3088 }
3089
3090 /*
3091 * encrypt_msgb
3092 *
3093 * encrypt a single message. This routine adds the
3094 * RCMD overhead bytes when necessary.
3095 */
3096 static mblk_t *
3097 encrypt_msgb(queue_t *q, struct tmodinfo *tmi, mblk_t *mp)
3098 {
3099 size_t plainlen, outlen;
3100 mblk_t *newmp = NULL;
3101
3102 /* If not encrypting, do nothing */
3103 if (tmi->enc_data.method == CRYPT_METHOD_NONE) {
3104 return (mp);
3105 }
3106
3107 plainlen = MBLKL(mp);
3108 if (plainlen == 0)
3109 return (NULL);
3110
3111 /*
3112 * If the block is too big, we encrypt in 4K chunks so that
3113 * older rlogin clients do not choke on the larger buffers.
3114 */
3115 while ((plainlen = MBLKL(mp)) > MSGBUF_SIZE) {
3116 mblk_t *mp1 = NULL;
3117 outlen = MSGBUF_SIZE;
3118 /*
3119 * Allocate a new buffer that is only 4K bytes, the
3120 * extra bytes are for crypto overhead.
3121 */
3122 mp1 = allocb(outlen + CONFOUNDER_BYTES, BPRI_MED);
3123 if (mp1 == NULL) {
3124 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
3125 "allocb (%d bytes) failed",
3126 (int)(outlen + CONFOUNDER_BYTES));
3127 return (NULL);
3128 }
3129 /* Copy the next 4K bytes from the old block. */
3130 bcopy(mp->b_rptr, mp1->b_rptr, outlen);
3131 mp1->b_wptr = mp1->b_rptr + outlen;
3132 /* Advance the old block. */
3133 mp->b_rptr += outlen;
3134
3135 /* encrypt the new block */
3136 newmp = encrypt_block(q, tmi, mp1, outlen);
3137 if (newmp == NULL)
3138 return (NULL);
3139
3140 putnext(q, newmp);
3141 }
3142 newmp = NULL;
3143 /* If there is data left (< MSGBUF_SIZE), encrypt it. */
3144 if ((plainlen = MBLKL(mp)) > 0)
3145 newmp = encrypt_block(q, tmi, mp, plainlen);
3146
3147 return (newmp);
3148 }
3149
3150 /*
3151 * cryptmodwsrv
3152 *
3153 * Service routine for the write queue.
3154 *
3155 * Because data may be placed in the queue to hold between
3156 * the CRYPTIOCSTOP and CRYPTIOCSTART ioctls, the service routine is needed.
3157 */
3158 static int
3159 cryptmodwsrv(queue_t *q)
3160 {
3161 mblk_t *mp;
3162 struct tmodinfo *tmi = (struct tmodinfo *)q->q_ptr;
3163
3164 while ((mp = getq(q)) != NULL) {
3165 switch (mp->b_datap->db_type) {
3166 default:
3167 /*
3168 * wput does not queue anything > QPCTL
3169 */
3170 if (!canputnext(q) ||
3171 !(tmi->ready & CRYPT_WRITE_READY)) {
3172 if (!putbq(q, mp)) {
3173 freemsg(mp);
3174 }
3175 return (0);
3176 }
3177 putnext(q, mp);
3178 break;
3179 case M_DATA:
3180 if (canputnext(q) && (tmi->ready & CRYPT_WRITE_READY)) {
3181 mblk_t *bp;
3182 mblk_t *newmsg = NULL;
3183
3184 /*
3185 * If multiple msgs, concat into 1
3186 * to minimize crypto operations later.
3187 */
3188 if (mp->b_cont != NULL) {
3189 bp = msgpullup(mp, -1);
3190 if (bp != NULL) {
3191 freemsg(mp);
3192 mp = bp;
3193 }
3194 }
3195 newmsg = encrypt_msgb(q, tmi, mp);
3196 if (newmsg != NULL)
3197 putnext(q, newmsg);
3198 } else {
3199 if (!putbq(q, mp)) {
3200 freemsg(mp);
3201 }
3202 return (0);
3203 }
3204 break;
3205 }
3206 }
3207 return (0);
3208 }
3209
3210 static void
3211 start_stream(queue_t *wq, mblk_t *mp, uchar_t dir)
3212 {
3213 mblk_t *newmp = NULL;
3214 struct tmodinfo *tmi = (struct tmodinfo *)wq->q_ptr;
3215
3216 if (dir == CRYPT_ENCRYPT) {
3217 tmi->ready |= CRYPT_WRITE_READY;
3218 (void) (STRLOG(CRYPTMOD_ID, 0, 5, SL_TRACE|SL_NOTE,
3219 "start_stream: restart ENCRYPT/WRITE q"));
3220
3221 enableok(wq);
3222 qenable(wq);
3223 } else if (dir == CRYPT_DECRYPT) {
3224 /*
3225 * put any extra data in the RD
3226 * queue to be processed and
3227 * sent back up.
3228 */
3229 newmp = mp->b_cont;
3230 mp->b_cont = NULL;
3231
3232 tmi->ready |= CRYPT_READ_READY;
3233 (void) (STRLOG(CRYPTMOD_ID, 0, 5,
3234 SL_TRACE|SL_NOTE,
3235 "start_stream: restart "
3236 "DECRYPT/READ q"));
3237
3238 if (newmp != NULL)
3239 if (!putbq(RD(wq), newmp))
3240 freemsg(newmp);
3241
3242 enableok(RD(wq));
3243 qenable(RD(wq));
3244 }
3245
3246 miocack(wq, mp, 0, 0);
3247 }
3248
3249 /*
3250 * Write-side put procedure. Its main task is to detect ioctls and
3251 * FLUSH operations. Other message types are passed on through.
3252 */
3253 static void
3254 cryptmodwput(queue_t *wq, mblk_t *mp)
3255 {
3256 struct iocblk *iocp;
3257 struct tmodinfo *tmi = (struct tmodinfo *)wq->q_ptr;
3258 int ret, err;
3259
3260 switch (mp->b_datap->db_type) {
3261 case M_DATA:
3262 if (wq->q_first == NULL && canputnext(wq) &&
3263 (tmi->ready & CRYPT_WRITE_READY) &&
3264 tmi->enc_data.method == CRYPT_METHOD_NONE) {
3265 putnext(wq, mp);
3266 return;
3267 }
3268 /* else, put it in the service queue */
3269 if (!putq(wq, mp)) {
3270 freemsg(mp);
3271 }
3272 break;
3273 case M_FLUSH:
3274 if (*mp->b_rptr & FLUSHW) {
3275 flushq(wq, FLUSHDATA);
3276 }
3277 putnext(wq, mp);
3278 break;
3279 case M_IOCTL:
3280 iocp = (struct iocblk *)mp->b_rptr;
3281 switch (iocp->ioc_cmd) {
3282 case CRYPTIOCSETUP:
3283 ret = 0;
3284 (void) (STRLOG(CRYPTMOD_ID, 0, 5,
3285 SL_TRACE | SL_NOTE,
3286 "wput: got CRYPTIOCSETUP "
3287 "ioctl(%d)", iocp->ioc_cmd));
3288
3289 if ((err = miocpullup(mp,
3290 sizeof (struct cr_info_t))) != 0) {
3291 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
3292 "wput: miocpullup failed for cr_info_t");
3293 miocnak(wq, mp, 0, err);
3294 } else {
3295 struct cr_info_t *ci;
3296 ci = (struct cr_info_t *)mp->b_cont->b_rptr;
3297
3298 if (ci->direction_mask & CRYPT_ENCRYPT) {
3299 ret = setup_crypto(ci, &tmi->enc_data, 1);
3300 }
3301
3302 if (ret == 0 &&
3303 (ci->direction_mask & CRYPT_DECRYPT)) {
3304 ret = setup_crypto(ci, &tmi->dec_data, 0);
3305 }
3306 if (ret == 0 &&
3307 (ci->direction_mask & CRYPT_DECRYPT) &&
3308 ANY_RCMD_MODE(tmi->dec_data.option_mask)) {
3309 bzero(&tmi->rcmd_state,
3310 sizeof (tmi->rcmd_state));
3311 }
3312 if (ret == 0) {
3313 miocack(wq, mp, 0, 0);
3314 } else {
3315 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
3316 "wput: setup_crypto failed");
3317 miocnak(wq, mp, 0, ret);
3318 }
3319 (void) (STRLOG(CRYPTMOD_ID, 0, 5,
3320 SL_TRACE|SL_NOTE,
3321 "wput: done with SETUP "
3322 "ioctl"));
3323 }
3324 break;
3325 case CRYPTIOCSTOP:
3326 (void) (STRLOG(CRYPTMOD_ID, 0, 5,
3327 SL_TRACE|SL_NOTE,
3328 "wput: got CRYPTIOCSTOP "
3329 "ioctl(%d)", iocp->ioc_cmd));
3330
3331 if ((err = miocpullup(mp, sizeof (uint32_t))) != 0) {
3332 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
3333 "wput: CRYPTIOCSTOP ioctl wrong "
3334 "size (%d should be %d)",
3335 (int)iocp->ioc_count,
3336 (int)sizeof (uint32_t));
3337 miocnak(wq, mp, 0, err);
3338 } else {
3339 uint32_t *stopdir;
3340
3341 stopdir = (uint32_t *)mp->b_cont->b_rptr;
3342 if (!CR_DIRECTION_OK(*stopdir)) {
3343 miocnak(wq, mp, 0, EINVAL);
3344 return;
3345 }
3346
3347 /* disable the queues until further notice */
3348 if (*stopdir & CRYPT_ENCRYPT) {
3349 noenable(wq);
3350 tmi->ready &= ~CRYPT_WRITE_READY;
3351 }
3352 if (*stopdir & CRYPT_DECRYPT) {
3353 noenable(RD(wq));
3354 tmi->ready &= ~CRYPT_READ_READY;
3355 }
3356
3357 miocack(wq, mp, 0, 0);
3358 }
3359 break;
3360 case CRYPTIOCSTARTDEC:
3361 (void) (STRLOG(CRYPTMOD_ID, 0, 5,
3362 SL_TRACE|SL_NOTE,
3363 "wput: got CRYPTIOCSTARTDEC "
3364 "ioctl(%d)", iocp->ioc_cmd));
3365
3366 start_stream(wq, mp, CRYPT_DECRYPT);
3367 break;
3368 case CRYPTIOCSTARTENC:
3369 (void) (STRLOG(CRYPTMOD_ID, 0, 5,
3370 SL_TRACE|SL_NOTE,
3371 "wput: got CRYPTIOCSTARTENC "
3372 "ioctl(%d)", iocp->ioc_cmd));
3373
3374 start_stream(wq, mp, CRYPT_ENCRYPT);
3375 break;
3376 default:
3377 putnext(wq, mp);
3378 break;
3379 }
3380 break;
3381 default:
3382 if (queclass(mp) < QPCTL) {
3383 if (wq->q_first != NULL || !canputnext(wq)) {
3384 if (!putq(wq, mp))
3385 freemsg(mp);
3386 return;
3387 }
3388 }
3389 putnext(wq, mp);
3390 break;
3391 }
3392 }
3393
3394 /*
3395 * decrypt_rcmd_mblks
3396 *
3397 * Because kerberized r* commands(rsh, rlogin, etc)
3398 * use a 4 byte length field to indicate the # of
3399 * PLAINTEXT bytes that are encrypted in the field
3400 * that follows, we must parse out each message and
3401 * break out the length fields prior to sending them
3402 * upstream to our Solaris r* clients/servers which do
3403 * NOT understand this format.
3404 *
3405 * Kerberized/encrypted message format:
3406 * -------------------------------
3407 * | XXXX | N bytes of ciphertext|
3408 * -------------------------------
3409 *
3410 * Where: XXXX = number of plaintext bytes that were encrypted in
3411 * to make the ciphertext field. This is done
3412 * because we are using a cipher that pads out to
3413 * an 8 byte boundary. We only want the application
3414 * layer to see the correct number of plain text bytes,
3415 * not plaintext + pad. So, after we decrypt, we
3416 * must trim the output block down to the intended
3417 * plaintext length and eliminate the pad bytes.
3418 *
3419 * This routine takes the entire input message, breaks it into
3420 * a new message that does not contain these length fields and
3421 * returns a message consisting of mblks filled with just ciphertext.
3422 *
3423 */
3424 static mblk_t *
3425 decrypt_rcmd_mblks(queue_t *q, mblk_t *mp)
3426 {
3427 mblk_t *newmp = NULL;
3428 size_t msglen;
3429 struct tmodinfo *tmi = (struct tmodinfo *)q->q_ptr;
3430
3431 msglen = msgsize(mp);
3432
3433 /*
3434 * If we need the length field, get it here.
3435 * Test the "plaintext length" indicator.
3436 */
3437 if (tmi->rcmd_state.pt_len == 0) {
3438 uint32_t elen;
3439 int tocopy;
3440 mblk_t *nextp;
3441
3442 /*
3443 * Make sure we have recieved all 4 bytes of the
3444 * length field.
3445 */
3446 while (mp != NULL) {
3447 ASSERT(tmi->rcmd_state.cd_len < sizeof (uint32_t));
3448
3449 tocopy = sizeof (uint32_t) -
3450 tmi->rcmd_state.cd_len;
3451 if (tocopy > msglen)
3452 tocopy = msglen;
3453
3454 ASSERT(mp->b_rptr + tocopy <= DB_LIM(mp));
3455 bcopy(mp->b_rptr,
3456 (char *)(&tmi->rcmd_state.next_len +
3457 tmi->rcmd_state.cd_len), tocopy);
3458
3459 tmi->rcmd_state.cd_len += tocopy;
3460
3461 if (tmi->rcmd_state.cd_len >= sizeof (uint32_t)) {
3462 tmi->rcmd_state.next_len =
3463 ntohl(tmi->rcmd_state.next_len);
3464 break;
3465 }
3466
3467 nextp = mp->b_cont;
3468 mp->b_cont = NULL;
3469 freeb(mp);
3470 mp = nextp;
3471 }
3472
3473 if (mp == NULL) {
3474 return (NULL);
3475 }
3476 /*
3477 * recalculate the msglen now that we've read the
3478 * length and adjusted the bufptr (b_rptr).
3479 */
3480 msglen -= tocopy;
3481 mp->b_rptr += tocopy;
3482
3483 tmi->rcmd_state.pt_len = tmi->rcmd_state.next_len;
3484
3485 if (tmi->rcmd_state.pt_len <= 0) {
3486 /*
3487 * Return an IO error to break the connection. there
3488 * is no way to recover from this. Usually it means
3489 * the app has incorrectly requested decryption on
3490 * a non-encrypted stream, thus the "pt_len" field
3491 * is negative.
3492 */
3493 mp->b_datap->db_type = M_ERROR;
3494 mp->b_rptr = mp->b_datap->db_base;
3495 *mp->b_rptr = EIO;
3496 mp->b_wptr = mp->b_rptr + sizeof (char);
3497
3498 freemsg(mp->b_cont);
3499 mp->b_cont = NULL;
3500 qreply(WR(q), mp);
3501 tmi->rcmd_state.cd_len = tmi->rcmd_state.pt_len = 0;
3502 return (NULL);
3503 }
3504
3505 /*
3506 * If this is V2 mode, then the encrypted data is actually
3507 * 4 bytes bigger than the indicated len because the plaintext
3508 * length is encrypted for an additional security check, but
3509 * its not counted as part of the overall length we just read.
3510 * Strange and confusing, but true.
3511 */
3512
3513 if (tmi->dec_data.option_mask & CRYPTOPT_RCMD_MODE_V2)
3514 elen = tmi->rcmd_state.pt_len + 4;
3515 else
3516 elen = tmi->rcmd_state.pt_len;
3517
3518 tmi->rcmd_state.cd_len = encrypt_size(&tmi->dec_data, elen);
3519
3520 /*
3521 * Allocate an mblk to hold the cipher text until it is
3522 * all ready to be processed.
3523 */
3524 tmi->rcmd_state.c_msg = allocb(tmi->rcmd_state.cd_len,
3525 BPRI_HI);
3526 if (tmi->rcmd_state.c_msg == NULL) {
3527 #ifdef DEBUG
3528 cmn_err(CE_WARN, "decrypt_rcmd_msgb: allocb failed "
3529 "for %d bytes",
3530 (int)tmi->rcmd_state.cd_len);
3531 #endif
3532 /*
3533 * Return an IO error to break the connection.
3534 */
3535 mp->b_datap->db_type = M_ERROR;
3536 mp->b_rptr = mp->b_datap->db_base;
3537 *mp->b_rptr = EIO;
3538 mp->b_wptr = mp->b_rptr + sizeof (char);
3539 freemsg(mp->b_cont);
3540 mp->b_cont = NULL;
3541 tmi->rcmd_state.cd_len = tmi->rcmd_state.pt_len = 0;
3542 qreply(WR(q), mp);
3543 return (NULL);
3544 }
3545 }
3546
3547 /*
3548 * If this entire message was just the length field,
3549 * free and return. The actual data will probably be next.
3550 */
3551 if (msglen == 0) {
3552 freemsg(mp);
3553 return (NULL);
3554 }
3555
3556 /*
3557 * Copy as much of the cipher text as possible into
3558 * the new msgb (c_msg).
3559 *
3560 * Logic: if we got some bytes (msglen) and we still
3561 * "need" some bytes (len-rcvd), get them here.
3562 */
3563 ASSERT(tmi->rcmd_state.c_msg != NULL);
3564 if (msglen > 0 &&
3565 (tmi->rcmd_state.cd_len > MBLKL(tmi->rcmd_state.c_msg))) {
3566 mblk_t *bp, *nextp;
3567 size_t n;
3568
3569 /*
3570 * Walk the mblks and copy just as many bytes as we need
3571 * for this particular block of cipher text.
3572 */
3573 bp = mp;
3574 while (bp != NULL) {
3575 size_t needed;
3576 size_t tocopy;
3577 n = MBLKL(bp);
3578
3579 needed = tmi->rcmd_state.cd_len -
3580 MBLKL(tmi->rcmd_state.c_msg);
3581
3582 tocopy = (needed >= n ? n : needed);
3583
3584 ASSERT(bp->b_rptr + tocopy <= DB_LIM(bp));
3585 ASSERT(tmi->rcmd_state.c_msg->b_wptr + tocopy <=
3586 DB_LIM(tmi->rcmd_state.c_msg));
3587
3588 /* Copy to end of new mblk */
3589 bcopy(bp->b_rptr, tmi->rcmd_state.c_msg->b_wptr,
3590 tocopy);
3591
3592 tmi->rcmd_state.c_msg->b_wptr += tocopy;
3593
3594 bp->b_rptr += tocopy;
3595
3596 nextp = bp->b_cont;
3597
3598 /*
3599 * If we used this whole block, free it and
3600 * move on.
3601 */
3602 if (!MBLKL(bp)) {
3603 freeb(bp);
3604 bp = NULL;
3605 }
3606
3607 /* If we got what we needed, stop the loop */
3608 if (MBLKL(tmi->rcmd_state.c_msg) ==
3609 tmi->rcmd_state.cd_len) {
3610 /*
3611 * If there is more data in the message,
3612 * its for another block of cipher text,
3613 * put it back in the queue for next time.
3614 */
3615 if (bp) {
3616 if (!putbq(q, bp))
3617 freemsg(bp);
3618 } else if (nextp != NULL) {
3619 /*
3620 * If there is more, put it back in the
3621 * queue for another pass thru.
3622 */
3623 if (!putbq(q, nextp))
3624 freemsg(nextp);
3625 }
3626 break;
3627 }
3628 bp = nextp;
3629 }
3630 }
3631 /*
3632 * Finally, if we received all the cipher text data for
3633 * this message, decrypt it into a new msg and send it up
3634 * to the app.
3635 */
3636 if (tmi->rcmd_state.pt_len > 0 &&
3637 MBLKL(tmi->rcmd_state.c_msg) == tmi->rcmd_state.cd_len) {
3638 mblk_t *bp;
3639 mblk_t *newbp;
3640
3641 /*
3642 * Now we can use our msg that we created when the
3643 * initial message boundary was detected.
3644 */
3645 bp = tmi->rcmd_state.c_msg;
3646 tmi->rcmd_state.c_msg = NULL;
3647
3648 newbp = do_decrypt(q, bp);
3649 if (newbp != NULL) {
3650 bp = newbp;
3651 /*
3652 * If using RCMD_MODE_V2 ("new" mode),
3653 * look at the 4 byte plaintext length that
3654 * was just decrypted and compare with the
3655 * original pt_len value that was received.
3656 */
3657 if (tmi->dec_data.option_mask &
3658 CRYPTOPT_RCMD_MODE_V2) {
3659 uint32_t pt_len2;
3660
3661 pt_len2 = *(uint32_t *)bp->b_rptr;
3662 pt_len2 = ntohl(pt_len2);
3663 /*
3664 * Make sure the 2 pt len fields agree.
3665 */
3666 if (pt_len2 != tmi->rcmd_state.pt_len) {
3667 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
3668 "Inconsistent length fields"
3669 " received %d != %d",
3670 (int)tmi->rcmd_state.pt_len,
3671 (int)pt_len2);
3672 bp->b_datap->db_type = M_ERROR;
3673 bp->b_rptr = bp->b_datap->db_base;
3674 *bp->b_rptr = EIO;
3675 bp->b_wptr = bp->b_rptr + sizeof (char);
3676 freemsg(bp->b_cont);
3677 bp->b_cont = NULL;
3678 tmi->rcmd_state.cd_len = 0;
3679 qreply(WR(q), bp);
3680 return (NULL);
3681 }
3682 bp->b_rptr += sizeof (uint32_t);
3683 }
3684
3685 /*
3686 * Trim the decrypted block the length originally
3687 * indicated by the sender. This is to remove any
3688 * padding bytes that the sender added to satisfy
3689 * requirements of the crypto algorithm.
3690 */
3691 bp->b_wptr = bp->b_rptr + tmi->rcmd_state.pt_len;
3692
3693 newmp = bp;
3694
3695 /*
3696 * Reset our state to indicate we are ready
3697 * for a new message.
3698 */
3699 tmi->rcmd_state.pt_len = 0;
3700 tmi->rcmd_state.cd_len = 0;
3701 } else {
3702 #ifdef DEBUG
3703 cmn_err(CE_WARN,
3704 "decrypt_rcmd: do_decrypt on %d bytes failed",
3705 (int)tmi->rcmd_state.cd_len);
3706 #endif
3707 /*
3708 * do_decrypt already handled failures, just
3709 * return NULL.
3710 */
3711 tmi->rcmd_state.pt_len = 0;
3712 tmi->rcmd_state.cd_len = 0;
3713 return (NULL);
3714 }
3715 }
3716
3717 /*
3718 * return the new message with the 'length' fields removed
3719 */
3720 return (newmp);
3721 }
3722
3723 /*
3724 * cryptmodrsrv
3725 *
3726 * Read queue service routine
3727 * Necessary because if the ready flag is not set
3728 * (via CRYPTIOCSTOP/CRYPTIOCSTART ioctls) then the data
3729 * must remain on queue and not be passed along.
3730 */
3731 static int
3732 cryptmodrsrv(queue_t *q)
3733 {
3734 mblk_t *mp, *bp;
3735 struct tmodinfo *tmi = (struct tmodinfo *)q->q_ptr;
3736
3737 while ((mp = getq(q)) != NULL) {
3738 switch (mp->b_datap->db_type) {
3739 case M_DATA:
3740 if (canputnext(q) && tmi->ready & CRYPT_READ_READY) {
3741 /*
3742 * Process "rcmd" messages differently because
3743 * they contain a 4 byte plaintext length
3744 * id that needs to be removed.
3745 */
3746 if (tmi->dec_data.method != CRYPT_METHOD_NONE &&
3747 (tmi->dec_data.option_mask &
3748 (CRYPTOPT_RCMD_MODE_V1 |
3749 CRYPTOPT_RCMD_MODE_V2))) {
3750 mp = decrypt_rcmd_mblks(q, mp);
3751 if (mp)
3752 putnext(q, mp);
3753 continue;
3754 }
3755 if ((bp = msgpullup(mp, -1)) != NULL) {
3756 freemsg(mp);
3757 if (MBLKL(bp) > 0) {
3758 mp = do_decrypt(q, bp);
3759 if (mp != NULL)
3760 putnext(q, mp);
3761 }
3762 }
3763 } else {
3764 if (!putbq(q, mp)) {
3765 freemsg(mp);
3766 }
3767 return (0);
3768 }
3769 break;
3770 default:
3771 /*
3772 * rput does not queue anything > QPCTL, so we don't
3773 * need to check for it here.
3774 */
3775 if (!canputnext(q)) {
3776 if (!putbq(q, mp))
3777 freemsg(mp);
3778 return (0);
3779 }
3780 putnext(q, mp);
3781 break;
3782 }
3783 }
3784 return (0);
3785 }
3786
3787
3788 /*
3789 * Read-side put procedure.
3790 */
3791 static void
3792 cryptmodrput(queue_t *rq, mblk_t *mp)
3793 {
3794 switch (mp->b_datap->db_type) {
3795 case M_DATA:
3796 if (!putq(rq, mp)) {
3797 freemsg(mp);
3798 }
3799 break;
3800 case M_FLUSH:
3801 if (*mp->b_rptr & FLUSHR) {
3802 flushq(rq, FLUSHALL);
3803 }
3804 putnext(rq, mp);
3805 break;
3806 default:
3807 if (queclass(mp) < QPCTL) {
3808 if (rq->q_first != NULL || !canputnext(rq)) {
3809 if (!putq(rq, mp))
3810 freemsg(mp);
3811 return;
3812 }
3813 }
3814 putnext(rq, mp);
3815 break;
3816 }
3817 }
Unleashed OS