Add changes file for bug40642.
[tor.git] / src / lib / crypt_ops / crypto_curve25519.c
bloba20eaf4bf7424d3eb6b5e92d5d03e8751d5ca15e
1 /* Copyright (c) 2012-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
2 /* See LICENSE for licensing information */
4 /**
5 * \file crypto_curve25519.c
7 * \brief Wrapper code for a curve25519 implementation.
9 * Curve25519 is an Elliptic-Curve Diffie Hellman handshake, designed by
10 * Dan Bernstein. For more information, see https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html
12 * Tor uses Curve25519 as the basis of its "ntor" circuit extension
13 * handshake, and in related code. The functions in this module are
14 * used to find the most suitable available Curve25519 implementation,
15 * to provide wrappers around it, and so on.
18 #define CRYPTO_CURVE25519_PRIVATE
19 #include "orconfig.h"
20 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
21 #include <sys/stat.h>
22 #endif
23 #include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h"
24 #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_curve25519.h"
25 #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_digest.h"
26 #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
27 #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
28 #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
29 #include "lib/log/log.h"
30 #include "lib/log/util_bug.h"
32 #include "ed25519/donna/ed25519_donna_tor.h"
34 #include <string.h>
36 /* ==============================
37 Part 1: wrap a suitable curve25519 implementation as curve25519_impl
38 ============================== */
40 #ifdef USE_CURVE25519_DONNA
41 int curve25519_donna(uint8_t *mypublic,
42 const uint8_t *secret, const uint8_t *basepoint);
43 #endif
44 #ifdef USE_CURVE25519_NACL
45 #ifdef HAVE_CRYPTO_SCALARMULT_CURVE25519_H
46 #include <crypto_scalarmult_curve25519.h>
47 #elif defined(HAVE_NACL_CRYPTO_SCALARMULT_CURVE25519_H)
48 #include <nacl/crypto_scalarmult_curve25519.h>
49 #endif
50 #endif /* defined(USE_CURVE25519_NACL) */
52 static void pick_curve25519_basepoint_impl(void);
54 /** This is set to 1 if we have an optimized Ed25519-based
55 * implementation for multiplying a value by the basepoint; to 0 if we
56 * don't, and to -1 if we haven't checked. */
57 static int curve25519_use_ed = -1;
59 /**
60 * Helper function: call the most appropriate backend to compute the
61 * scalar "secret" times the point "point". Store the result in
62 * "output". Return 0 on success, negative on failure.
63 **/
64 STATIC int
65 curve25519_impl(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *secret,
66 const uint8_t *point)
68 uint8_t bp[CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN];
69 int r;
70 memcpy(bp, point, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
71 /* Clear the high bit, in case our backend foolishly looks at it. */
72 bp[31] &= 0x7f;
73 #ifdef USE_CURVE25519_DONNA
74 r = curve25519_donna(output, secret, bp);
75 #elif defined(USE_CURVE25519_NACL)
76 r = crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(output, secret, bp);
77 #else
78 #error "No implementation of curve25519 is available."
79 #endif /* defined(USE_CURVE25519_DONNA) || ... */
80 memwipe(bp, 0, sizeof(bp));
81 return r;
84 /**
85 * Helper function: Multiply the scalar "secret" by the Curve25519
86 * basepoint (X=9), and store the result in "output". Return 0 on
87 * success, -1 on failure.
89 STATIC int
90 curve25519_basepoint_impl(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *secret)
92 int r = 0;
93 if (BUG(curve25519_use_ed == -1)) {
94 /* LCOV_EXCL_START - Only reached if we forgot to call curve25519_init() */
95 pick_curve25519_basepoint_impl();
96 /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
99 /* TODO: Someone should benchmark curved25519_scalarmult_basepoint versus
100 * an optimized NaCl build to see which should be used when compiled with
101 * NaCl available. I suspected that the ed25519 optimization always wins.
103 if (PREDICT_LIKELY(curve25519_use_ed == 1)) {
104 curved25519_scalarmult_basepoint_donna(output, secret);
105 r = 0;
106 } else {
107 static const uint8_t basepoint[32] = {9};
108 r = curve25519_impl(output, secret, basepoint);
110 return r;
114 * Override the decision of whether to use the Ed25519-based basepoint
115 * multiply function. Used for testing.
117 void
118 curve25519_set_impl_params(int use_ed)
120 curve25519_use_ed = use_ed;
123 /* ==============================
124 Part 2: Wrap curve25519_impl with some convenience types and functions.
125 ============================== */
128 * Return true iff a curve25519_public_key_t seems valid. (It's not necessary
129 * to see if the point is on the curve, since the twist is also secure, but we
130 * do need to make sure that it isn't the point at infinity.) */
132 curve25519_public_key_is_ok(const curve25519_public_key_t *key)
134 return !safe_mem_is_zero(key->public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
138 * Generate CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN random bytes in <b>out</b>. If
139 * <b>extra_strong</b> is true, this key is possibly going to get used more
140 * than once, so use a better-than-usual RNG. Return 0 on success, -1 on
141 * failure.
143 * This function does not adjust the output of the RNG at all; the will caller
144 * will need to clear or set the appropriate bits to make curve25519 work.
147 curve25519_rand_seckey_bytes(uint8_t *out, int extra_strong)
149 if (extra_strong)
150 crypto_strongest_rand(out, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
151 else
152 crypto_rand((char*)out, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
154 return 0;
157 /** Generate a new keypair and return the secret key. If <b>extra_strong</b>
158 * is true, this key is possibly going to get used more than once, so
159 * use a better-than-usual RNG. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
161 curve25519_secret_key_generate(curve25519_secret_key_t *key_out,
162 int extra_strong)
164 if (curve25519_rand_seckey_bytes(key_out->secret_key, extra_strong) < 0)
165 return -1;
167 key_out->secret_key[0] &= 248;
168 key_out->secret_key[31] &= 127;
169 key_out->secret_key[31] |= 64;
171 return 0;
175 * Given a secret key in <b>seckey</b>, create the corresponding public
176 * key in <b>key_out</b>.
178 void
179 curve25519_public_key_generate(curve25519_public_key_t *key_out,
180 const curve25519_secret_key_t *seckey)
182 curve25519_basepoint_impl(key_out->public_key, seckey->secret_key);
186 * Construct a new keypair in *<b>keypair_out</b>. If <b>extra_strong</b>
187 * is true, this key is possibly going to get used more than once, so
188 * use a better-than-usual RNG. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
190 curve25519_keypair_generate(curve25519_keypair_t *keypair_out,
191 int extra_strong)
193 if (curve25519_secret_key_generate(&keypair_out->seckey, extra_strong) < 0)
194 return -1;
195 curve25519_public_key_generate(&keypair_out->pubkey, &keypair_out->seckey);
196 return 0;
199 /** Store the keypair <b>keypair</b>, including its secret and public
200 * parts, to the file <b>fname</b>. Use the string tag <b>tag</b> to
201 * distinguish this from other Curve25519 keypairs. Return 0 on success,
202 * -1 on failure.
204 * See crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file() for more information on
205 * the metaformat used for these keys.*/
207 curve25519_keypair_write_to_file(const curve25519_keypair_t *keypair,
208 const char *fname,
209 const char *tag)
211 uint8_t contents[CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN];
212 int r;
214 memcpy(contents, keypair->seckey.secret_key, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
215 memcpy(contents+CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN,
216 keypair->pubkey.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
218 r = crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(fname,
219 "c25519v1",
220 tag,
221 contents,
222 sizeof(contents));
224 memwipe(contents, 0, sizeof(contents));
225 return r;
228 /** Read a curve25519 keypair from a file named <b>fname</b> created by
229 * curve25519_keypair_write_to_file(). Store the keypair in
230 * <b>keypair_out</b>, and the associated tag string in <b>tag_out</b>.
231 * Return 0 on success, and -1 on failure. */
233 curve25519_keypair_read_from_file(curve25519_keypair_t *keypair_out,
234 char **tag_out,
235 const char *fname)
237 uint8_t content[CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN];
238 ssize_t len;
239 int r = -1;
241 len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(fname, "c25519v1", tag_out,
242 content, sizeof(content));
243 if (len != sizeof(content))
244 goto end;
246 /* Make sure that the public key matches the secret key */
247 memcpy(keypair_out->seckey.secret_key, content, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
248 curve25519_public_key_generate(&keypair_out->pubkey, &keypair_out->seckey);
249 if (tor_memneq(keypair_out->pubkey.public_key,
250 content + CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN,
251 CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN))
252 goto end;
254 r = 0;
256 end:
257 memwipe(content, 0, sizeof(content));
258 if (r != 0) {
259 memset(keypair_out, 0, sizeof(*keypair_out));
260 tor_free(*tag_out);
262 return r;
265 /** Perform the curve25519 ECDH handshake with <b>skey</b> and <b>pkey</b>,
266 * writing CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN bytes of output into <b>output</b>. */
267 void
268 curve25519_handshake(uint8_t *output,
269 const curve25519_secret_key_t *skey,
270 const curve25519_public_key_t *pkey)
272 curve25519_impl(output, skey->secret_key, pkey->public_key);
275 /** Check whether the ed25519-based curve25519 basepoint optimization seems to
276 * be working. If so, return 0; otherwise return -1. */
277 static int
278 curve25519_basepoint_spot_check(void)
280 static const uint8_t alicesk[32] = {
281 0x77,0x07,0x6d,0x0a,0x73,0x18,0xa5,0x7d,
282 0x3c,0x16,0xc1,0x72,0x51,0xb2,0x66,0x45,
283 0xdf,0x4c,0x2f,0x87,0xeb,0xc0,0x99,0x2a,
284 0xb1,0x77,0xfb,0xa5,0x1d,0xb9,0x2c,0x2a
286 static const uint8_t alicepk[32] = {
287 0x85,0x20,0xf0,0x09,0x89,0x30,0xa7,0x54,
288 0x74,0x8b,0x7d,0xdc,0xb4,0x3e,0xf7,0x5a,
289 0x0d,0xbf,0x3a,0x0d,0x26,0x38,0x1a,0xf4,
290 0xeb,0xa4,0xa9,0x8e,0xaa,0x9b,0x4e,0x6a
292 const int loop_max=8;
293 int save_use_ed = curve25519_use_ed;
294 unsigned char e1[32], e2[32];
295 unsigned char x[32],y[32];
296 int i;
297 int r=0;
299 memset(x, 0, sizeof(x));
300 memset(y, 0, sizeof(y));
301 memset(e1, 0, sizeof(e1));
302 memset(e2, 0, sizeof(e2));
303 e1[0]=5;
304 e2[0]=5;
306 /* Check the most basic possible sanity via the test secret/public key pair
307 * used in "Cryptography in NaCl - 2. Secret keys and public keys". This
308 * may catch catastrophic failures on systems where Curve25519 is expensive,
309 * without requiring a ton of key generation.
311 curve25519_use_ed = 1;
312 r |= curve25519_basepoint_impl(x, alicesk);
313 if (fast_memneq(x, alicepk, 32))
314 goto fail;
316 /* Ok, the optimization appears to produce passable results, try a few more
317 * values, maybe there's something subtle wrong.
319 for (i = 0; i < loop_max; ++i) {
320 curve25519_use_ed = 0;
321 r |= curve25519_basepoint_impl(x, e1);
322 curve25519_use_ed = 1;
323 r |= curve25519_basepoint_impl(y, e2);
324 if (fast_memneq(x,y,32))
325 goto fail;
326 memcpy(e1, x, 32);
327 memcpy(e2, x, 32);
330 goto end;
331 // LCOV_EXCL_START -- we can only hit this code if there is a bug in our
332 // curve25519-basepoint implementation.
333 fail:
334 r = -1;
335 // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
336 end:
337 curve25519_use_ed = save_use_ed;
338 return r;
341 /** Choose whether to use the ed25519-based curve25519-basepoint
342 * implementation. */
343 static void
344 pick_curve25519_basepoint_impl(void)
346 curve25519_use_ed = 1;
348 if (curve25519_basepoint_spot_check() == 0)
349 return;
351 /* LCOV_EXCL_START
352 * only reachable if our basepoint implementation broken */
353 log_warn(LD_BUG|LD_CRYPTO, "The ed25519-based curve25519 basepoint "
354 "multiplication seems broken; using the curve25519 "
355 "implementation.");
356 curve25519_use_ed = 0;
357 /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
360 /** Initialize the curve25519 implementations. This is necessary if you're
361 * going to use them in a multithreaded setting, and not otherwise. */
362 void
363 curve25519_init(void)
365 pick_curve25519_basepoint_impl();