1 // Copyright (c) The Tor Project, Inc.
2 // See LICENSE for licensing information
3 // This is an asciidoc file used to generate the manpage/html reference.
4 // Learn asciidoc on http://www.methods.co.nz/asciidoc/userguide.html
6 :man manual: Tor Manual
12 tor - The second-generation onion router
17 **tor** [__OPTION__ __value__]...
21 Tor is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication
22 service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and
23 negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node
24 knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down
25 the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals
26 the downstream node. +
28 Basically, Tor provides a distributed network of servers or relays ("onion routers").
29 Users bounce their TCP streams -- web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc. -- around the
30 network, and recipients, observers, and even the relays themselves have
31 difficulty tracking the source of the stream.
33 By default, **tor** will act as a client only. To help the network
34 by providing bandwidth as a relay, change the **ORPort** configuration
35 option -- see below. Please also consult the documentation on the Tor
40 [[opt-h]] **-h**, **-help**::
41 Display a short help message and exit.
43 [[opt-f]] **-f** __FILE__::
44 Specify a new configuration file to contain further Tor configuration
45 options OR pass *-* to make Tor read its configuration from standard
46 input. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc, or $HOME/.torrc if that file is not
49 [[opt-allow-missing-torrc]] **--allow-missing-torrc**::
50 Do not require that configuration file specified by **-f** exist if
51 default torrc can be accessed.
53 [[opt-defaults-torrc]] **--defaults-torrc** __FILE__::
54 Specify a file in which to find default values for Tor options. The
55 contents of this file are overridden by those in the regular
56 configuration file, and by those on the command line. (Default:
57 @CONFDIR@/torrc-defaults.)
59 [[opt-ignore-missing-torrc]] **--ignore-missing-torrc**::
60 Specifies that Tor should treat a missing torrc file as though it
61 were empty. Ordinarily, Tor does this for missing default torrc files,
62 but not for those specified on the command line.
64 [[opt-hash-password]] **--hash-password** __PASSWORD__::
65 Generates a hashed password for control port access.
67 [[opt-list-fingerprint]] **--list-fingerprint**::
68 Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint.
70 [[opt-verify-config]] **--verify-config**::
71 Verify the configuration file is valid.
73 [[opt-serviceinstall]] **--service install** [**--options** __command-line options__]::
74 Install an instance of Tor as a Windows service, with the provided
75 command-line options. Current instructions can be found at
76 https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#NTService
78 [[opt-service]] **--service** **remove**|**start**|**stop**::
79 Remove, start, or stop a configured Tor Windows service.
81 [[opt-nt-service]] **--nt-service**::
82 Used internally to implement a Windows service.
84 [[opt-list-torrc-options]] **--list-torrc-options**::
85 List all valid options.
87 [[opt-list-deprecated-options]] **--list-deprecated-options**::
88 List all valid options that are scheduled to become obsolete in a
89 future version. (This is a warning, not a promise.)
91 [[opt-version]] **--version**::
92 Display Tor version and exit.
94 [[opt-quiet]] **--quiet**|**--hush**::
95 Override the default console log. By default, Tor starts out logging
96 messages at level "notice" and higher to the console. It stops doing so
97 after it parses its configuration, if the configuration tells it to log
98 anywhere else. You can override this behavior with the **--hush** option,
99 which tells Tor to only send warnings and errors to the console, or with
100 the **--quiet** option, which tells Tor not to log to the console at all.
102 [[opt-keygen]] **--keygen** [**--newpass**]::
103 Running "tor --keygen" creates a new ed25519 master identity key for a
104 relay, or only a fresh temporary signing key and certificate, if you
105 already have a master key. Optionally you can encrypt the master identity
106 key with a passphrase: Tor will ask you for one. If you don't want to
107 encrypt the master key, just don't enter any passphrase when asked. +
109 The **--newpass** option should be used with --keygen only when you need
110 to add, change, or remove a passphrase on an existing ed25519 master
111 identity key. You will be prompted for the old passphase (if any),
112 and the new passphrase (if any). +
114 When generating a master key, you will probably want to use
115 **--DataDirectory** to control where the keys
116 and certificates will be stored, and **--SigningKeyLifetime** to
117 control their lifetimes. Their behavior is as documented in the
118 server options section below. (You must have write access to the specified
121 To use the generated files, you must copy them to the DataDirectory/keys
122 directory of your Tor daemon, and make sure that they are owned by the
123 user actually running the Tor daemon on your system.
125 **--passphrase-fd** __FILEDES__::
126 Filedescriptor to read the passphrase from. Note that unlike with the
127 tor-gencert program, the entire file contents are read and used as
128 the passphrase, including any trailing newlines.
129 Default: read from the terminal.
131 [[opt-key-expiration]] **--key-expiration** [**purpose**]::
132 The **purpose** specifies which type of key certificate to determine
133 the expiration of. The only currently recognised **purpose** is
136 Running "tor --key-expiration sign" will attempt to find your signing
137 key certificate and will output, both in the logs as well as to stdout,
138 the signing key certificate's expiration time in ISO-8601 format.
139 For example, the output sent to stdout will be of the form:
140 "signing-cert-expiry: 2017-07-25 08:30:15 UTC"
142 Other options can be specified on the command-line in the format "--option
143 value", in the format "option value", or in a configuration file. For
144 instance, you can tell Tor to start listening for SOCKS connections on port
145 9999 by passing --SocksPort 9999 or SocksPort 9999 to it on the command line,
146 or by putting "SocksPort 9999" in the configuration file. You will need to
147 quote options with spaces in them: if you want Tor to log all debugging
148 messages to debug.log, you will probably need to say --Log 'debug file
151 Options on the command line override those in configuration files. See the
152 next section for more information.
154 THE CONFIGURATION FILE FORMAT
155 -----------------------------
157 All configuration options in a configuration are written on a single line by
158 default. They take the form of an option name and a value, or an option name
159 and a quoted value (option value or option "value"). Anything after a #
160 character is treated as a comment. Options are
161 case-insensitive. C-style escaped characters are allowed inside quoted
162 values. To split one configuration entry into multiple lines, use a single
163 backslash character (\) before the end of the line. Comments can be used in
164 such multiline entries, but they must start at the beginning of a line.
166 Configuration options can be imported from files or folders using the %include
167 option with the value being a path. If the path is a file, the options from the
168 file will be parsed as if they were written where the %include option is. If
169 the path is a folder, all files on that folder will be parsed following lexical
170 order. Files starting with a dot are ignored. Files on subfolders are ignored.
171 The %include option can be used recursively.
173 By default, an option on the command line overrides an option found in the
174 configuration file, and an option in a configuration file overrides one in
177 This rule is simple for options that take a single value, but it can become
178 complicated for options that are allowed to occur more than once: if you
179 specify four SocksPorts in your configuration file, and one more SocksPort on
180 the command line, the option on the command line will replace __all__ of the
181 SocksPorts in the configuration file. If this isn't what you want, prefix
182 the option name with a plus sign (+), and it will be appended to the previous
183 set of options instead. For example, setting SocksPort 9100 will use only
184 port 9100, but setting +SocksPort 9100 will use ports 9100 and 9050 (because
185 this is the default).
187 Alternatively, you might want to remove every instance of an option in the
188 configuration file, and not replace it at all: you might want to say on the
189 command line that you want no SocksPorts at all. To do that, prefix the
190 option name with a forward slash (/). You can use the plus sign (+) and the
191 forward slash (/) in the configuration file and on the command line.
196 [[BandwidthRate]] **BandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
197 A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node
198 to the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing
199 bandwidth usage to that same value. If you want to run a relay in the
200 public network, this needs to be _at the very least_ 75 KBytes for a
201 relay (that is, 600 kbits) or 50 KBytes for a bridge (400 kbits) -- but of
202 course, more is better; we recommend at least 250 KBytes (2 mbits) if
203 possible. (Default: 1 GByte) +
205 Note that this option, and other bandwidth-limiting options, apply to TCP
206 data only: They do not count TCP headers or DNS traffic. +
208 With this option, and in other options that take arguments in bytes,
209 KBytes, and so on, other formats are also supported. Notably, "KBytes" can
210 also be written as "kilobytes" or "kb"; "MBytes" can be written as
211 "megabytes" or "MB"; "kbits" can be written as "kilobits"; and so forth.
212 Tor also accepts "byte" and "bit" in the singular.
213 The prefixes "tera" and "T" are also recognized.
214 If no units are given, we default to bytes.
215 To avoid confusion, we recommend writing "bytes" or "bits" explicitly,
216 since it's easy to forget that "B" means bytes, not bits.
218 [[BandwidthBurst]] **BandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
219 Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given
220 number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 1 GByte)
222 [[MaxAdvertisedBandwidth]] **MaxAdvertisedBandwidth** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
223 If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our
224 BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients
225 who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to
226 advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server
227 without impacting network performance.
229 [[RelayBandwidthRate]] **RelayBandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
230 If not 0, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth
231 usage for \_relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes
232 per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value.
233 Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory
234 requests, but that may change in future versions. They do not include directory
235 fetches by the relay (from authority or other relays), because that is considered
236 "client" activity. (Default: 0)
238 [[RelayBandwidthBurst]] **RelayBandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
239 If not 0, limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for
240 \_relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction.
241 They do not include directory fetches by the relay (from authority
242 or other relays), because that is considered "client" activity. (Default: 0)
244 [[PerConnBWRate]] **PerConnBWRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
245 If this option is set manually, or via the "perconnbwrate" consensus
246 field, Tor will use it for separate rate limiting for each connection
247 from a non-relay. (Default: 0)
249 [[PerConnBWBurst]] **PerConnBWBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
250 If this option is set manually, or via the "perconnbwburst" consensus
251 field, Tor will use it for separate rate limiting for each connection
252 from a non-relay. (Default: 0)
254 [[ClientTransportPlugin]] **ClientTransportPlugin** __transport__ socks4|socks5 __IP__:__PORT__::
255 **ClientTransportPlugin** __transport__ exec __path-to-binary__ [options]::
256 In its first form, when set along with a corresponding Bridge line, the Tor
257 client forwards its traffic to a SOCKS-speaking proxy on "IP:PORT".
258 (IPv4 addresses should written as-is; IPv6 addresses should be wrapped in
259 square brackets.) It's the
260 duty of that proxy to properly forward the traffic to the bridge. +
262 In its second form, when set along with a corresponding Bridge line, the Tor
263 client launches the pluggable transport proxy executable in
264 __path-to-binary__ using __options__ as its command-line options, and
265 forwards its traffic to it. It's the duty of that proxy to properly forward
266 the traffic to the bridge.
268 [[ServerTransportPlugin]] **ServerTransportPlugin** __transport__ exec __path-to-binary__ [options]::
269 The Tor relay launches the pluggable transport proxy in __path-to-binary__
270 using __options__ as its command-line options, and expects to receive
271 proxied client traffic from it.
273 [[ServerTransportListenAddr]] **ServerTransportListenAddr** __transport__ __IP__:__PORT__::
274 When this option is set, Tor will suggest __IP__:__PORT__ as the
275 listening address of any pluggable transport proxy that tries to
276 launch __transport__. (IPv4 addresses should written as-is; IPv6
277 addresses should be wrapped in square brackets.)
279 [[ServerTransportOptions]] **ServerTransportOptions** __transport__ __k=v__ __k=v__ ...::
280 When this option is set, Tor will pass the __k=v__ parameters to
281 any pluggable transport proxy that tries to launch __transport__. +
282 (Example: ServerTransportOptions obfs45 shared-secret=bridgepasswd cache=/var/lib/tor/cache)
284 [[ExtORPort]] **ExtORPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto**::
285 Open this port to listen for Extended ORPort connections from your
286 pluggable transports.
288 [[ExtORPortCookieAuthFile]] **ExtORPortCookieAuthFile** __Path__::
289 If set, this option overrides the default location and file name
290 for the Extended ORPort's cookie file -- the cookie file is needed
291 for pluggable transports to communicate through the Extended ORPort.
293 [[ExtORPortCookieAuthFileGroupReadable]] **ExtORPortCookieAuthFileGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
294 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
295 Extended OR Port cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie
296 file readable by the default GID. [Making the file readable by other
297 groups is not yet implemented; let us know if you need this for some
298 reason.] (Default: 0)
300 [[ConnLimit]] **ConnLimit** __NUM__::
301 The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to the Tor
302 process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as many file
303 descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by "ulimit -H -n").
304 If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor will refuse to start. +
306 Tor relays need thousands of sockets, to connect to every other relay.
307 If you are running a private bridge, you can reduce the number of sockets
308 that Tor uses. For example, to limit Tor to 500 sockets, run
309 "ulimit -n 500" in a shell. Then start tor in the same shell, with
310 **ConnLimit 500**. You may also need to set **DisableOOSCheck 0**. +
312 Unless you have severely limited sockets, you probably don't need to
313 adjust **ConnLimit** itself. It has no effect on Windows, since that
314 platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)
316 [[DisableNetwork]] **DisableNetwork** **0**|**1**::
317 When this option is set, we don't listen for or accept any connections
318 other than controller connections, and we close (and don't reattempt)
320 connections. Controllers sometimes use this option to avoid using
321 the network until Tor is fully configured. Tor will make still certain
322 network-related calls (like DNS lookups) as a part of its configuration
323 process, even if DisableNetwork is set. (Default: 0)
325 [[ConstrainedSockets]] **ConstrainedSockets** **0**|**1**::
326 If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all
327 sockets to the size specified in **ConstrainedSockSize**. This is useful for
328 virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP buffers may
329 be limited. If you're on a virtual server, and you encounter the "Error
330 creating network socket: No buffer space available" message, you are
331 likely experiencing this problem. +
333 The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for
334 the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility;
335 this configuration option is a second-resort. +
337 The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The
338 cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates
341 You should **not** enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer
342 space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for
343 the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip
344 time on long paths. (Default: 0)
346 [[ConstrainedSockSize]] **ConstrainedSockSize** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**::
347 When **ConstrainedSockets** is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for
348 all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048 and
349 262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended.
351 [[ControlPort]] **ControlPort** __PORT__|**unix:**__path__|**auto** [__flags__]::
352 If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those
353 connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol
354 (described in control-spec.txt in
355 https://spec.torproject.org[torspec]). Note: unless you also
356 specify one or more of **HashedControlPassword** or
357 **CookieAuthentication**, setting this option will cause Tor to allow
358 any process on the local host to control it. (Setting both authentication
359 methods means either method is sufficient to authenticate to Tor.) This
360 option is required for many Tor controllers; most use the value of 9051.
361 If a unix domain socket is used, you may quote the path using standard
363 Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. (Default: 0) +
365 Recognized flags are...
367 Unix domain sockets only: makes the socket get created as
370 Unix domain sockets only: makes the socket get created as
372 **RelaxDirModeCheck**;;
373 Unix domain sockets only: Do not insist that the directory
374 that holds the socket be read-restricted.
376 [[ControlSocket]] **ControlSocket** __Path__::
377 Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP
378 socket. '0' disables ControlSocket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.)
381 [[ControlSocketsGroupWritable]] **ControlSocketsGroupWritable** **0**|**1**::
382 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read and
383 write unix sockets (e.g. ControlSocket). If the option is set to 1, make
384 the control socket readable and writable by the default GID. (Default: 0)
386 [[HashedControlPassword]] **HashedControlPassword** __hashed_password__::
387 Allow connections on the control port if they present
388 the password whose one-way hash is __hashed_password__. You
389 can compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password
390 __password__". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using more
391 than one HashedControlPassword line.
393 [[CookieAuthentication]] **CookieAuthentication** **0**|**1**::
394 If this option is set to 1, allow connections on the control port
395 when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named
396 "control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This
397 authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem
398 security. (Default: 0)
400 [[CookieAuthFile]] **CookieAuthFile** __Path__::
401 If set, this option overrides the default location and file name
402 for Tor's cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.)
404 [[CookieAuthFileGroupReadable]] **CookieAuthFileGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
405 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
406 cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file readable by
407 the default GID. [Making the file readable by other groups is not yet
408 implemented; let us know if you need this for some reason.] (Default: 0)
410 [[ControlPortWriteToFile]] **ControlPortWriteToFile** __Path__::
411 If set, Tor writes the address and port of any control port it opens to
412 this address. Usable by controllers to learn the actual control port
413 when ControlPort is set to "auto".
415 [[ControlPortFileGroupReadable]] **ControlPortFileGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
416 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
417 control port file. If the option is set to 1, make the control port
418 file readable by the default GID. (Default: 0)
420 [[DataDirectory]] **DataDirectory** __DIR__::
421 Store working data in DIR. Can not be changed while tor is running.
422 (Default: ~/.tor if your home directory is not /; otherwise,
423 @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor. On Windows, the default is
424 your ApplicationData folder.)
426 [[DataDirectoryGroupReadable]] **DataDirectoryGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
427 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
428 DataDirectory. If the option is set to 1, make the DataDirectory readable
429 by the default GID. (Default: 0)
431 [[CacheDirectory]] **CacheDirectory** __DIR__::
432 Store cached directory data in DIR. Can not be changed while tor is
434 (Default: uses the value of DataDirectory.)
436 [[CacheDirectoryGroupReadable]] **CacheDirectoryGroupReadable** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
437 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
438 CacheDirectory. If the option is set to 1, make the CacheDirectory readable
439 by the default GID. If the option is "auto", then we use the
440 setting for DataDirectoryGroupReadable when the CacheDirectory is the
441 same as the DataDirectory, and 0 otherwise. (Default: auto)
443 [[FallbackDir]] **FallbackDir** __ipv4address__:__port__ orport=__port__ id=__fingerprint__ [weight=__num__] [ipv6=**[**__ipv6address__**]**:__orport__]::
444 When we're unable to connect to any directory cache for directory info
445 (usually because we don't know about any yet) we try a directory authority.
446 Clients also simultaneously try a FallbackDir, to avoid hangs on client
447 startup if a directory authority is down. Clients retry FallbackDirs more
448 often than directory authorities, to reduce the load on the directory
450 By default, the directory authorities are also FallbackDirs. Specifying a
451 FallbackDir replaces Tor's default hard-coded FallbackDirs (if any).
452 (See the **DirAuthority** entry for an explanation of each flag.)
454 [[UseDefaultFallbackDirs]] **UseDefaultFallbackDirs** **0**|**1**::
455 Use Tor's default hard-coded FallbackDirs (if any). (When a
456 FallbackDir line is present, it replaces the hard-coded FallbackDirs,
457 regardless of the value of UseDefaultFallbackDirs.) (Default: 1)
459 [[DirAuthority]] **DirAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __ipv4address__:__port__ __fingerprint__::
460 Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address
461 and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated
462 many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are
463 separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an authority this directory
464 is. By default, an authority is not authoritative for any directory style
465 or version unless an appropriate flag is given.
466 Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the
467 "bridge" flag is set. If a flag "orport=**port**" is given, Tor will use the
468 given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. If a flag
469 "weight=**num**" is given, then the directory server is chosen randomly
470 with probability proportional to that weight (default 1.0). If a
471 flag "v3ident=**fp**" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority
472 whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint **fp**. Lastly,
473 if an "ipv6=**[**__ipv6address__**]**:__orport__" flag is present, then
475 authority is listening for IPv6 connections on the indicated IPv6 address
478 Tor will contact the authority at __ipv4address__ to
479 download directory documents. The provided __port__ value is a dirport;
480 clients ignore this in favor of the specified "orport=" value. If an
481 IPv6 ORPort is supplied, Tor will
482 also download directory documents at the IPv6 ORPort. +
484 If no **DirAuthority** line is given, Tor will use the default directory
485 authorities. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor
486 network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be
487 distinguishable from other users, because you won't believe the same
490 [[DirAuthorityFallbackRate]] **DirAuthorityFallbackRate** __NUM__::
491 When configured to use both directory authorities and fallback
492 directories, the directory authorities also work as fallbacks. They are
493 chosen with their regular weights, multiplied by this number, which
494 should be 1.0 or less. The default is less than 1, to reduce load on
495 authorities. (Default: 0.1)
497 [[AlternateDirAuthority]] **AlternateDirAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __ipv4address__:__port__ __fingerprint__ +
499 [[AlternateBridgeAuthority]] **AlternateBridgeAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __ipv4address__:__port__ __ fingerprint__::
500 These options behave as DirAuthority, but they replace fewer of the
501 default directory authorities. Using
502 AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but
503 leaves the default bridge authorities in
505 AlternateBridgeAuthority replaces the default bridge authority,
506 but leaves the directory authorities alone.
508 [[DisableAllSwap]] **DisableAllSwap** **0**|**1**::
509 If set to 1, Tor will attempt to lock all current and future memory pages,
510 so that memory cannot be paged out. Windows, OS X and Solaris are currently
511 not supported. We believe that this feature works on modern Gnu/Linux
512 distributions, and that it should work on *BSD systems (untested). This
513 option requires that you start your Tor as root, and you should use the
514 **User** option to properly reduce Tor's privileges.
515 Can not be changed while tor is running. (Default: 0)
517 [[DisableDebuggerAttachment]] **DisableDebuggerAttachment** **0**|**1**::
518 If set to 1, Tor will attempt to prevent basic debugging attachment attempts
519 by other processes. This may also keep Tor from generating core files if
520 it crashes. It has no impact for users who wish to attach if they
521 have CAP_SYS_PTRACE or if they are root. We believe that this feature
522 works on modern Gnu/Linux distributions, and that it may also work on *BSD
523 systems (untested). Some modern Gnu/Linux systems such as Ubuntu have the
524 kernel.yama.ptrace_scope sysctl and by default enable it as an attempt to
525 limit the PTRACE scope for all user processes by default. This feature will
526 attempt to limit the PTRACE scope for Tor specifically - it will not attempt
527 to alter the system wide ptrace scope as it may not even exist. If you wish
528 to attach to Tor with a debugger such as gdb or strace you will want to set
529 this to 0 for the duration of your debugging. Normal users should leave it
530 on. Disabling this option while Tor is running is prohibited. (Default: 1)
532 [[FetchDirInfoEarly]] **FetchDirInfoEarly** **0**|**1**::
533 If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other
534 directory caches, even if you don't meet the normal criteria for fetching
535 early. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0)
537 [[FetchDirInfoExtraEarly]] **FetchDirInfoExtraEarly** **0**|**1**::
538 If set to 1, Tor will fetch directory information before other directory
539 caches. It will attempt to download directory information closer to the
540 start of the consensus period. Normal users should leave it off.
543 [[FetchHidServDescriptors]] **FetchHidServDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
544 If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from the
545 rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you're using a Tor
546 controller that handles hidden service fetches for you. (Default: 1)
548 [[FetchServerDescriptors]] **FetchServerDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
549 If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server
550 descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if
551 you're using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you.
554 [[FetchUselessDescriptors]] **FetchUselessDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
555 If set to 1, Tor will fetch every consensus flavor, and all server
556 descriptors and authority certificates referenced by those consensuses,
557 except for extra info descriptors. When this option is 1, Tor will also
558 keep fetching descriptors, even when idle.
559 If set to 0, Tor will avoid fetching useless descriptors: flavors that it
560 is not using to build circuits, and authority certificates it does not
561 trust. When Tor hasn't built any application circuits, it will go idle,
562 and stop fetching descriptors. This option is useful if you're using a
563 tor client with an external parser that uses a full consensus.
564 This option fetches all documents except extrainfo descriptors,
565 **DirCache** fetches and serves all documents except extrainfo
566 descriptors, **DownloadExtraInfo*** fetches extrainfo documents, and serves
567 them if **DirCache** is on, and **UseMicrodescriptors** changes the
568 flavour of consensues and descriptors that is fetched and used for
569 building circuits. (Default: 0)
571 [[HTTPProxy]] **HTTPProxy** __host__[:__port__]::
572 Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port (or host:80
573 if port is not specified), rather than connecting directly to any directory
574 servers. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.3.1.0-alpha you should use HTTPSProxy.)
576 [[HTTPProxyAuthenticator]] **HTTPProxyAuthenticator** __username:password__::
577 If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy
578 authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTP
579 proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you
580 want it to support others. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.3.1.0-alpha you should use
581 HTTPSProxyAuthenticator.)
583 [[HTTPSProxy]] **HTTPSProxy** __host__[:__port__]::
584 Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port (or
585 host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than connecting
586 directly to servers. You may want to set **FascistFirewall** to restrict
587 the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy only
588 allows connecting to certain ports.
590 [[HTTPSProxyAuthenticator]] **HTTPSProxyAuthenticator** __username:password__::
591 If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS proxy
592 authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTPS
593 proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you
594 want it to support others.
596 [[Sandbox]] **Sandbox** **0**|**1**::
597 If set to 1, Tor will run securely through the use of a syscall sandbox.
598 Otherwise the sandbox will be disabled. The option is currently an
599 experimental feature. It only works on Linux-based operating systems,
600 and only when Tor has been built with the libseccomp library. This option
601 can not be changed while tor is running.
603 When the Sandbox is 1, the following options can not be changed when tor
609 ExtORPortCookieAuthFile
611 ServerDNSResolvConfFile
612 Tor must remain in client or server mode (some changes to ClientOnly and
613 ORPort are not allowed).
616 [[Socks4Proxy]] **Socks4Proxy** __host__[:__port__]::
617 Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 4 proxy at host:port
618 (or host:1080 if port is not specified).
620 [[Socks5Proxy]] **Socks5Proxy** __host__[:__port__]::
621 Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 5 proxy at host:port
622 (or host:1080 if port is not specified).
624 [[Socks5ProxyUsername]] **Socks5ProxyUsername** __username__ +
626 [[Socks5ProxyPassword]] **Socks5ProxyPassword** __password__::
627 If defined, authenticate to the SOCKS 5 server using username and password
628 in accordance to RFC 1929. Both username and password must be between 1 and
631 [[UnixSocksGroupWritable]] **UnixSocksGroupWritable** **0**|**1**::
632 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read and
633 write unix sockets (e.g. SocksPort unix:). If the option is set to 1, make
634 the Unix socket readable and writable by the default GID. (Default: 0)
636 [[KeepalivePeriod]] **KeepalivePeriod** __NUM__::
637 To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell
638 every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the connection
639 has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM seconds of
640 idleness. (Default: 5 minutes)
642 [[Log]] **Log** __minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] **stderr**|**stdout**|**syslog**::
643 Send all messages between __minSeverity__ and __maxSeverity__ to the standard
644 output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system log. (The
645 "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized severity levels are
646 debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using "notice" in most cases,
647 since anything more verbose may provide sensitive information to an
648 attacker who obtains the logs. If only one severity level is given, all
649 messages of that level or higher will be sent to the listed destination.
651 [[Log2]] **Log** __minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] **file** __FILENAME__::
652 As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The
653 "Log" option may appear more than once in a configuration file.
654 Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity
657 [[Log3]] **Log** **[**__domain__,...**]**__minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] ... **file** __FILENAME__ +
659 [[Log4]] **Log** **[**__domain__,...**]**__minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] ... **stderr**|**stdout**|**syslog**::
660 As above, but select messages by range of log severity __and__ by a
661 set of "logging domains". Each logging domain corresponds to an area of
662 functionality inside Tor. You can specify any number of severity ranges
663 for a single log statement, each of them prefixed by a comma-separated
664 list of logging domains. You can prefix a domain with $$~$$ to indicate
665 negation, and use * to indicate "all domains". If you specify a severity
666 range without a list of domains, it matches all domains. +
668 This is an advanced feature which is most useful for debugging one or two
669 of Tor's subsystems at a time. +
671 The currently recognized domains are: general, crypto, net, config, fs,
672 protocol, mm, http, app, control, circ, rend, bug, dir, dirserv, or, edge,
673 acct, hist, handshake, heartbeat, channel, sched, guard, consdiff, and dos.
674 Domain names are case-insensitive. +
676 For example, "`Log [handshake]debug [~net,~mm]info notice stdout`" sends
677 to stdout: all handshake messages of any severity, all info-and-higher
678 messages from domains other than networking and memory management, and all
679 messages of severity notice or higher.
681 [[LogMessageDomains]] **LogMessageDomains** **0**|**1**::
682 If 1, Tor includes message domains with each log message. Every log
683 message currently has at least one domain; most currently have exactly
684 one. This doesn't affect controller log messages. (Default: 0)
686 [[MaxUnparseableDescSizeToLog]] **MaxUnparseableDescSizeToLog** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**::
687 Unparseable descriptors (e.g. for votes, consensuses, routers) are logged
688 in separate files by hash, up to the specified size in total. Note that
689 only files logged during the lifetime of this Tor process count toward the
690 total; this is intended to be used to debug problems without opening live
691 servers to resource exhaustion attacks. (Default: 10 MB)
693 [[OutboundBindAddress]] **OutboundBindAddress** __IP__::
694 Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This
695 is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all
696 of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one. This option may
697 be used twice, once with an IPv4 address and once with an IPv6 address.
698 IPv6 addresses should be wrapped in square brackets.
699 This setting will be ignored for connections to the loopback addresses
700 (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1), and is not used for DNS requests as well.
702 [[OutboundBindAddressOR]] **OutboundBindAddressOR** __IP__::
703 Make all outbound non-exit (relay and other) connections
704 originate from the IP address specified. This option overrides
705 **OutboundBindAddress** for the same IP version. This option may
706 be used twice, once with an IPv4 address and once with an IPv6
707 address. IPv6 addresses should be wrapped in square brackets.
708 This setting will be ignored for connections to the loopback
709 addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).
711 [[OutboundBindAddressExit]] **OutboundBindAddressExit** __IP__::
712 Make all outbound exit connections originate from the IP address
713 specified. This option overrides **OutboundBindAddress** for the
714 same IP version. This option may be used twice, once with an IPv4
715 address and once with an IPv6 address.
716 IPv6 addresses should be wrapped in square brackets.
717 This setting will be ignored
718 for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).
720 [[PidFile]] **PidFile** __FILE__::
721 On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove
722 FILE. Can not be changed while tor is running.
724 [[ProtocolWarnings]] **ProtocolWarnings** **0**|**1**::
725 If 1, Tor will log with severity \'warn' various cases of other parties not
726 following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with severity
727 \'info'. (Default: 0)
729 [[RunAsDaemon]] **RunAsDaemon** **0**|**1**::
730 If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect
731 on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option.
732 Can not be changed while tor is running.
735 [[LogTimeGranularity]] **LogTimeGranularity** __NUM__::
736 Set the resolution of timestamps in Tor's logs to NUM milliseconds.
737 NUM must be positive and either a divisor or a multiple of 1 second.
738 Note that this option only controls the granularity written by Tor to
739 a file or console log. Tor does not (for example) "batch up" log
740 messages to affect times logged by a controller, times attached to
741 syslog messages, or the mtime fields on log files. (Default: 1 second)
743 [[TruncateLogFile]] **TruncateLogFile** **0**|**1**::
744 If 1, Tor will overwrite logs at startup and in response to a HUP signal,
745 instead of appending to them. (Default: 0)
747 [[SyslogIdentityTag]] **SyslogIdentityTag** __tag__::
748 When logging to syslog, adds a tag to the syslog identity such that
749 log entries are marked with "Tor-__tag__". Can not be changed while tor is
750 running. (Default: none)
752 [[AndroidIdentityTag]] **AndroidIdentityTag** __tag__::
753 When logging to Android's logging subsystem, adds a tag to the log identity
754 such that log entries are marked with "Tor-__tag__". Can not be changed while
755 tor is running. (Default: none)
757 [[SafeLogging]] **SafeLogging** **0**|**1**|**relay**::
758 Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages (e.g.
759 addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can
760 still be useful, but they don't leave behind personally identifying
761 information about what sites a user might have visited. +
763 If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is
764 set to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. If it is set to
765 relay, all log messages generated when acting as a relay are sanitized, but
766 all messages generated when acting as a client are not.
767 Note: Tor may not heed this option when logging at log levels below Notice.
770 [[User]] **User** __Username__::
771 On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary group.
772 Can not be changed while tor is running.
774 [[KeepBindCapabilities]] **KeepBindCapabilities** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
775 On Linux, when we are started as root and we switch our identity using
776 the **User** option, the **KeepBindCapabilities** option tells us whether to
777 try to retain our ability to bind to low ports. If this value is 1, we
778 try to keep the capability; if it is 0 we do not; and if it is **auto**,
779 we keep the capability only if we are configured to listen on a low port.
780 Can not be changed while tor is running.
783 [[HardwareAccel]] **HardwareAccel** **0**|**1**::
784 If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration when
785 available. Can not be changed while tor is running. (Default: 0)
787 [[AccelName]] **AccelName** __NAME__::
788 When using OpenSSL hardware crypto acceleration attempt to load the dynamic
789 engine of this name. This must be used for any dynamic hardware engine.
790 Names can be verified with the openssl engine command. Can not be changed
791 while tor is running.
793 [[AccelDir]] **AccelDir** __DIR__::
794 Specify this option if using dynamic hardware acceleration and the engine
795 implementation library resides somewhere other than the OpenSSL default.
796 Can not be changed while tor is running.
798 [[AvoidDiskWrites]] **AvoidDiskWrites** **0**|**1**::
799 If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise.
800 This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support
801 only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0)
803 [[CircuitPriorityHalflife]] **CircuitPriorityHalflife** __NUM__::
804 If this value is set, we override the default algorithm for choosing which
805 circuit's cell to deliver or relay next. It is delivered first to the
806 circuit that has the lowest weighted cell count, where cells are weighted
807 exponentially according to this value (in seconds). If the value is -1, it
808 is taken from the consensus if possible else it will fallback to the
809 default value of 30. Minimum: 1, Maximum: 2147483647. This can be defined
810 as a float value. This is an advanced option; you generally shouldn't have
811 to mess with it. (Default: -1)
813 [[CountPrivateBandwidth]] **CountPrivateBandwidth** **0**|**1**::
814 If this option is set, then Tor's rate-limiting applies not only to
815 remote connections, but also to connections to private addresses like
816 127.0.0.1 or 10.0.0.1. This is mostly useful for debugging
817 rate-limiting. (Default: 0)
819 [[ExtendByEd25519ID]] **ExtendByEd25519ID** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
820 If this option is set to 1, we always try to include a relay's Ed25519 ID
821 when telling the proceeding relay in a circuit to extend to it.
822 If this option is set to 0, we never include Ed25519 IDs when extending
823 circuits. If the option is set to "default", we obey a
824 parameter in the consensus document. (Default: auto)
826 [[NoExec]] **NoExec** **0**|**1**::
827 If this option is set to 1, then Tor will never launch another
828 executable, regardless of the settings of ClientTransportPlugin
829 or ServerTransportPlugin. Once this option has been set to 1,
830 it cannot be set back to 0 without restarting Tor. (Default: 0)
832 [[Schedulers]] **Schedulers** **KIST**|**KISTLite**|**Vanilla**::
833 Specify the scheduler type that tor should use. The scheduler is
834 responsible for moving data around within a Tor process. This is an ordered
835 list by priority which means that the first value will be tried first and if
836 unavailable, the second one is tried and so on. It is possible to change
837 these values at runtime. This option mostly effects relays, and most
838 operators should leave it set to its default value.
839 (Default: KIST,KISTLite,Vanilla)
841 The possible scheduler types are:
843 **KIST**: Kernel-Informed Socket Transport. Tor will use TCP information
844 from the kernel to make informed decisions regarding how much data to send
845 and when to send it. KIST also handles traffic in batches (see
846 KISTSchedRunInterval) in order to improve traffic prioritization decisions.
847 As implemented, KIST will only work on Linux kernel version 2.6.39 or
850 **KISTLite**: Same as KIST but without kernel support. Tor will use all
851 the same mechanics as with KIST, including the batching, but its decisions
852 regarding how much data to send will not be as good. KISTLite will work on
853 all kernels and operating systems, and the majority of the benefits of KIST
854 are still realized with KISTLite.
856 **Vanilla**: The scheduler that Tor used before KIST was implemented. It
857 sends as much data as possible, as soon as possible. Vanilla will work on
858 all kernels and operating systems.
860 [[KISTSchedRunInterval]] **KISTSchedRunInterval** __NUM__ **msec**::
861 If KIST or KISTLite is used in the Schedulers option, this controls at which
862 interval the scheduler tick is. If the value is 0 msec, the value is taken
863 from the consensus if possible else it will fallback to the default 10
864 msec. Maximum possible value is 100 msec. (Default: 0 msec)
866 [[KISTSockBufSizeFactor]] **KISTSockBufSizeFactor** __NUM__::
867 If KIST is used in Schedulers, this is a multiplier of the per-socket
868 limit calculation of the KIST algorithm. (Default: 1.0)
873 The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
874 **SocksPort**, **HTTPTunnelPort**, **TransPort**, **DNSPort**, or
875 **NATDPort** is non-zero):
877 [[Bridge]] **Bridge** [__transport__] __IP__:__ORPort__ [__fingerprint__]::
878 When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at
879 "IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint"
880 is provided (using the same format as for DirAuthority), we will verify that
881 the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use
882 fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if
883 it's provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too. +
885 If "transport" is provided, it must match a ClientTransportPlugin line. We
886 then use that pluggable transport's proxy to transfer data to the bridge,
887 rather than connecting to the bridge directly. Some transports use a
888 transport-specific method to work out the remote address to connect to.
889 These transports typically ignore the "IP:ORPort" specified in the bridge
892 Tor passes any "key=val" settings to the pluggable transport proxy as
893 per-connection arguments when connecting to the bridge. Consult
894 the documentation of the pluggable transport for details of what
895 arguments it supports.
897 [[LearnCircuitBuildTimeout]] **LearnCircuitBuildTimeout** **0**|**1**::
898 If 0, CircuitBuildTimeout adaptive learning is disabled. (Default: 1)
900 [[CircuitBuildTimeout]] **CircuitBuildTimeout** __NUM__::
902 Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn't
903 open in that time, give up on it. If LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 1, this
904 value serves as the initial value to use before a timeout is learned. If
905 LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 0, this value is the only value used.
906 (Default: 60 seconds)
908 [[CircuitsAvailableTimeout]] **CircuitsAvailableTimeout** __NUM__::
909 Tor will attempt to keep at least one open, unused circuit available for
910 this amount of time. This option governs how long idle circuits are kept
911 open, as well as the amount of time Tor will keep a circuit open to each
912 of the recently used ports. This way when the Tor client is entirely
913 idle, it can expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS
914 connections. Note that the actual timeout value is uniformly randomized
915 from the specified value to twice that amount. (Default: 30 minutes;
918 [[CircuitStreamTimeout]] **CircuitStreamTimeout** __NUM__::
919 If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule for how
920 many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try a new circuit.
921 If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set this to a
922 number like 60. (Default: 0)
924 [[ClientOnly]] **ClientOnly** **0**|**1**::
925 If set to 1, Tor will not run as a relay or serve
926 directory requests, even if the ORPort, ExtORPort, or DirPort options are
927 set. (This config option is
928 mostly unnecessary: we added it back when we were considering having
929 Tor clients auto-promote themselves to being relays if they were stable
930 and fast enough. The current behavior is simply that Tor is a client
931 unless ORPort, ExtORPort, or DirPort are configured.) (Default: 0)
933 [[ConnectionPadding]] **ConnectionPadding** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
934 This option governs Tor's use of padding to defend against some forms of
935 traffic analysis. If it is set to 'auto', Tor will send padding only
936 if both the client and the relay support it. If it is set to 0, Tor will
937 not send any padding cells. If it is set to 1, Tor will still send padding
938 for client connections regardless of relay support. Only clients may set
939 this option. This option should be offered via the UI to mobile users
940 for use where bandwidth may be expensive.
943 [[ReducedConnectionPadding]] **ReducedConnectionPadding** **0**|**1**::
944 If set to 1, Tor will not not hold OR connections open for very long,
945 and will send less padding on these connections. Only clients may set
946 this option. This option should be offered via the UI to mobile users
947 for use where bandwidth may be expensive. (Default: 0)
949 [[ExcludeNodes]] **ExcludeNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
950 A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
951 patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit. Country codes are
952 2-letter ISO3166 codes, and must
953 be wrapped in braces; fingerprints may be preceded by a dollar sign.
955 ExcludeNodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
957 By default, this option is treated as a preference that Tor is allowed
958 to override in order to keep working.
959 For example, if you try to connect to a hidden service,
960 but you have excluded all of the hidden service's introduction points,
961 Tor will connect to one of them anyway. If you do not want this
962 behavior, set the StrictNodes option (documented below). +
964 Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node selection
965 options below) only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you.
966 Clients can still build circuits through you to any node. Controllers
967 can tell Tor to build circuits through any node. +
969 Country codes are case-insensitive. The code "\{??}" refers to nodes whose
970 country can't be identified. No country code, including \{??}, works if
971 no GeoIPFile can be loaded. See also the GeoIPExcludeUnknown option below.
974 [[ExcludeExitNodes]] **ExcludeExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
975 A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
976 patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node---that is, a
977 node that delivers traffic for you *outside* the Tor network. Note that any
978 node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this
980 the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify
981 nodes. See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below.
983 [[GeoIPExcludeUnknown]] **GeoIPExcludeUnknown** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
984 If this option is set to 'auto', then whenever any country code is set in
985 ExcludeNodes or ExcludeExitNodes, all nodes with unknown country (\{??} and
986 possibly \{A1}) are treated as excluded as well. If this option is set to
987 '1', then all unknown countries are treated as excluded in ExcludeNodes
988 and ExcludeExitNodes. This option has no effect when a GeoIP file isn't
989 configured or can't be found. (Default: auto)
991 [[ExitNodes]] **ExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
992 A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
993 patterns of nodes to use as exit node---that is, a
994 node that delivers traffic for you *outside* the Tor network. See
995 the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify nodes. +
997 Note that if you list too few nodes here, or if you exclude too many exit
998 nodes with ExcludeExitNodes, you can degrade functionality. For example,
999 if none of the exits you list allows traffic on port 80 or 443, you won't
1000 be able to browse the web. +
1002 Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic *outside* of
1003 the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those
1004 used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches,
1005 those used for relay reachability self-tests, and so on) that end
1006 at a non-exit node. To
1007 keep a node from being used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes. +
1009 The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
1010 ExitNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. +
1012 The .exit address notation, if enabled via MapAddress, overrides
1015 [[EntryNodes]] **EntryNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
1016 A list of identity fingerprints and country codes of nodes
1017 to use for the first hop in your normal circuits.
1018 Normal circuits include all
1019 circuits except for direct connections to directory servers. The Bridge
1020 option overrides this option; if you have configured bridges and
1021 UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes. +
1023 The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
1024 EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. See
1025 the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify nodes.
1027 [[StrictNodes]] **StrictNodes** **0**|**1**::
1028 If StrictNodes is set to 1, Tor will treat solely the ExcludeNodes option
1029 as a requirement to follow for all the circuits you generate, even if
1030 doing so will break functionality for you (StrictNodes applies to neither
1031 ExcludeExitNodes nor to ExitNodes). If StrictNodes is set to 0, Tor will
1032 still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list, but it will err on the
1033 side of avoiding unexpected errors. Specifically, StrictNodes 0 tells Tor
1034 that it is okay to use an excluded node when it is *necessary* to perform
1035 relay reachability self-tests, connect to a hidden service, provide a
1036 hidden service to a client, fulfill a .exit request, upload directory
1037 information, or download directory information. (Default: 0)
1039 [[FascistFirewall]] **FascistFirewall** **0**|**1**::
1040 If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports
1041 that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see **FirewallPorts**).
1042 This will allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with
1043 restrictive policies, but will not allow you to run as a server behind such
1044 a firewall. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use
1045 ReachableAddresses instead.
1047 [[FirewallPorts]] **FirewallPorts** __PORTS__::
1048 A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when
1049 **FascistFirewall** is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses
1050 instead. (Default: 80, 443)
1052 [[ReachableAddresses]] **ReachableAddresses** __IP__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
1053 A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows
1054 you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except
1055 that "accept" is understood unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For
1056 example, \'ReachableAddresses 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept
1057 \*:80' means that your firewall allows connections to everything inside net
1058 99, rejects port 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port
1059 80 otherwise. (Default: \'accept \*:*'.)
1061 [[ReachableDirAddresses]] **ReachableDirAddresses** __IP__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
1062 Like **ReachableAddresses**, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
1063 these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP
1064 GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of
1065 **ReachableAddresses** is used. If **HTTPProxy** is set then these
1066 connections will go through that proxy. (DEPRECATED: This option has
1067 had no effect for some time.)
1069 [[ReachableORAddresses]] **ReachableORAddresses** __IP__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
1070 Like **ReachableAddresses**, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
1071 these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not
1072 set explicitly then the value of **ReachableAddresses** is used. If
1073 **HTTPSProxy** is set then these connections will go through that proxy. +
1075 The separation between **ReachableORAddresses** and
1076 **ReachableDirAddresses** is only interesting when you are connecting
1077 through proxies (see **HTTPProxy** and **HTTPSProxy**). Most proxies limit
1078 TLS connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443,
1079 and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory
1080 information) to port 80.
1082 [[HidServAuth]] **HidServAuth** __onion-address__ __auth-cookie__ [__service-name__]::
1083 Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16
1084 characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22
1085 characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal
1086 purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times
1087 for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and
1088 this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden
1089 services can be configured to require authorization using the
1090 **HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** option.
1092 [[ClientOnionAuthDir]] **ClientOnionAuthDir** __path__::
1093 Path to the directory containing the hidden service authorization file. The
1094 files MUST have the suffix ".auth_private". Each file is for a single
1095 onion address and their format is:
1097 <onion-address>:descriptor:x25519:<base32-encoded-privkey>
1099 The <onion-address> MUST NOT have the ".onion" suffix. See the
1100 rend-spec-v3.txt Appendix G for more information.
1102 [[LongLivedPorts]] **LongLivedPorts** __PORTS__::
1103 A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections
1104 (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these
1105 ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a node
1106 will go down before the stream is finished. Note that the list is also
1107 honored for circuits (both client and service side) involving hidden
1108 services whose virtual port is in this list. (Default: 21, 22, 706,
1109 1863, 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6523, 6667, 6697, 8300)
1111 [[MapAddress]] **MapAddress** __address__ __newaddress__::
1112 When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will transform to newaddress
1113 before processing it. For example, if you always want connections to
1114 www.example.com to exit via __torserver__ (where __torserver__ is the
1115 fingerprint of the server), use "MapAddress www.example.com
1116 www.example.com.torserver.exit". If the value is prefixed with a
1117 "\*.", matches an entire domain. For example, if you
1118 always want connections to example.com and any if its subdomains
1120 __torserver__ (where __torserver__ is the fingerprint of the server), use
1121 "MapAddress \*.example.com \*.example.com.torserver.exit". (Note the
1122 leading "*." in each part of the directive.) You can also redirect all
1123 subdomains of a domain to a single address. For example, "MapAddress
1124 *.example.com www.example.com". +
1128 1. When evaluating MapAddress expressions Tor stops when it hits the most
1129 recently added expression that matches the requested address. So if you
1130 have the following in your torrc, www.torproject.org will map to 1.1.1.1:
1132 MapAddress www.torproject.org 2.2.2.2
1133 MapAddress www.torproject.org 1.1.1.1
1135 2. Tor evaluates the MapAddress configuration until it finds no matches. So
1136 if you have the following in your torrc, www.torproject.org will map to
1139 MapAddress 1.1.1.1 2.2.2.2
1140 MapAddress www.torproject.org 1.1.1.1
1142 3. The following MapAddress expression is invalid (and will be
1143 ignored) because you cannot map from a specific address to a wildcard
1146 MapAddress www.torproject.org *.torproject.org.torserver.exit
1148 4. Using a wildcard to match only part of a string (as in *ample.com) is
1151 [[NewCircuitPeriod]] **NewCircuitPeriod** __NUM__::
1152 Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30
1155 [[MaxCircuitDirtiness]] **MaxCircuitDirtiness** __NUM__::
1156 Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago,
1157 but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old. For hidden
1158 services, this applies to the __last__ time a circuit was used, not the
1159 first. Circuits with streams constructed with SOCKS authentication via
1160 SocksPorts that have **KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth** also remain alive
1161 for MaxCircuitDirtiness seconds after carrying the last such stream.
1162 (Default: 10 minutes)
1164 [[MaxClientCircuitsPending]] **MaxClientCircuitsPending** __NUM__::
1165 Do not allow more than NUM circuits to be pending at a time for handling
1166 client streams. A circuit is pending if we have begun constructing it,
1167 but it has not yet been completely constructed. (Default: 32)
1169 [[NodeFamily]] **NodeFamily** __node__,__node__,__...__::
1170 The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints,
1171 constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered servers, so never use
1172 any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a NodeFamily is only needed
1173 when a server doesn't list the family itself (with MyFamily). This option
1174 can be used multiple times; each instance defines a separate family. In
1175 addition to nodes, you can also list IP address and ranges and country
1176 codes in {curly braces}. See the **ExcludeNodes** option for more
1177 information on how to specify nodes.
1179 [[EnforceDistinctSubnets]] **EnforceDistinctSubnets** **0**|**1**::
1180 If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too close" on
1181 the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in
1182 the same /16 range. (Default: 1)
1184 [[SocksPort]] **SocksPort** \['address':]__port__|**unix:**__path__|**auto** [_flags_] [_isolation flags_]::
1185 Open this port to listen for connections from SOCKS-speaking
1186 applications. Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow application
1187 connections via SOCKS. Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for
1188 you. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind
1189 to multiple addresses/ports. If a unix domain socket is used, you may
1190 quote the path using standard C escape sequences.
1193 NOTE: Although this option allows you to specify an IP address
1194 other than localhost, you should do so only with extreme caution.
1195 The SOCKS protocol is unencrypted and (as we use it)
1196 unauthenticated, so exposing it in this way could leak your
1197 information to anybody watching your network, and allow anybody
1198 to use your computer as an open proxy. +
1200 The _isolation flags_ arguments give Tor rules for which streams
1201 received on this SocksPort are allowed to share circuits with one
1202 another. Recognized isolation flags are:
1203 **IsolateClientAddr**;;
1204 Don't share circuits with streams from a different
1205 client address. (On by default and strongly recommended when
1206 supported; you can disable it with **NoIsolateClientAddr**.
1207 Unsupported and force-disabled when using Unix domain sockets.)
1208 **IsolateSOCKSAuth**;;
1209 Don't share circuits with streams for which different
1210 SOCKS authentication was provided. (For HTTPTunnelPort
1211 connections, this option looks at the Proxy-Authorization and
1212 X-Tor-Stream-Isolation headers. On by default;
1213 you can disable it with **NoIsolateSOCKSAuth**.)
1214 **IsolateClientProtocol**;;
1215 Don't share circuits with streams using a different protocol.
1216 (SOCKS 4, SOCKS 5, TransPort connections, NATDPort connections,
1217 and DNSPort requests are all considered to be different protocols.)
1218 **IsolateDestPort**;;
1219 Don't share circuits with streams targeting a different
1221 **IsolateDestAddr**;;
1222 Don't share circuits with streams targeting a different
1223 destination address.
1224 **KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth**;;
1225 If **IsolateSOCKSAuth** is enabled, keep alive circuits while they have
1226 at least one stream with SOCKS authentication active. After such a circuit
1227 is idle for more than MaxCircuitDirtiness seconds, it can be closed.
1228 **SessionGroup=**__INT__;;
1229 If no other isolation rules would prevent it, allow streams
1230 on this port to share circuits with streams from every other
1231 port with the same session group. (By default, streams received
1232 on different SocksPorts, TransPorts, etc are always isolated from one
1233 another. This option overrides that behavior.)
1235 // Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page.
1236 [[OtherSocksPortFlags]]::
1237 Other recognized __flags__ for a SocksPort are:
1239 Tell exits to not connect to IPv4 addresses in response to SOCKS
1240 requests on this connection.
1242 Tell exits to allow IPv6 addresses in response to SOCKS requests on
1243 this connection, so long as SOCKS5 is in use. (SOCKS4 can't handle
1246 Tells exits that, if a host has both an IPv4 and an IPv6 address,
1247 we would prefer to connect to it via IPv6. (IPv4 is the default.)
1249 Do not ask exits to resolve DNS addresses in SOCKS5 requests. Tor will
1250 connect to IPv4 addresses, IPv6 addresses (if IPv6Traffic is set) and
1252 **NoOnionTraffic**;;
1253 Do not connect to .onion addresses in SOCKS5 requests.
1254 **OnionTrafficOnly**;;
1255 Tell the tor client to only connect to .onion addresses in response to
1256 SOCKS5 requests on this connection. This is equivalent to NoDNSRequest,
1257 NoIPv4Traffic, NoIPv6Traffic. The corresponding NoOnionTrafficOnly
1258 flag is not supported.
1260 Tells the client to remember IPv4 DNS answers we receive from exit
1261 nodes via this connection.
1263 Tells the client to remember IPv6 DNS answers we receive from exit
1264 nodes via this connection.
1266 Unix domain sockets only: makes the socket get created as
1269 Unix domain sockets only: makes the socket get created as
1272 Tells the client to remember all DNS answers we receive from exit
1273 nodes via this connection.
1275 Tells the client to use any cached IPv4 DNS answers we have when making
1276 requests via this connection. (NOTE: This option, or UseIPv6Cache
1277 or UseDNSCache, can harm your anonymity, and probably
1278 won't help performance as much as you might expect. Use with care!)
1280 Tells the client to use any cached IPv6 DNS answers we have when making
1281 requests via this connection.
1283 Tells the client to use any cached DNS answers we have when making
1284 requests via this connection.
1285 **PreferIPv6Automap**;;
1286 When serving a hostname lookup request on this port that
1287 should get automapped (according to AutomapHostsOnResolve),
1288 if we could return either an IPv4 or an IPv6 answer, prefer
1289 an IPv6 answer. (On by default.)
1290 **PreferSOCKSNoAuth**;;
1291 Ordinarily, when an application offers both "username/password
1292 authentication" and "no authentication" to Tor via SOCKS5, Tor
1293 selects username/password authentication so that IsolateSOCKSAuth can
1294 work. This can confuse some applications, if they offer a
1295 username/password combination then get confused when asked for
1296 one. You can disable this behavior, so that Tor will select "No
1297 authentication" when IsolateSOCKSAuth is disabled, or when this
1300 // Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page.
1301 [[SocksPortFlagsMisc]]::
1302 Flags are processed left to right. If flags conflict, the last flag on the
1303 line is used, and all earlier flags are ignored. No error is issued for
1306 [[SocksPolicy]] **SocksPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
1307 Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
1308 SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as exit
1309 policies below, except that port specifiers are ignored. Any address
1310 not matched by some entry in the policy is accepted.
1312 [[SocksTimeout]] **SocksTimeout** __NUM__::
1313 Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds
1314 unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default:
1317 [[TokenBucketRefillInterval]] **TokenBucketRefillInterval** __NUM__ [**msec**|**second**]::
1318 Set the refill delay interval of Tor's token bucket to NUM milliseconds.
1319 NUM must be between 1 and 1000, inclusive. When Tor is out of bandwidth,
1320 on a connection or globally, it will wait up to this long before it tries
1321 to use that connection again.
1322 Note that bandwidth limits are still expressed in bytes per second: this
1323 option only affects the frequency with which Tor checks to see whether
1324 previously exhausted connections may read again.
1325 Can not be changed while tor is running. (Default: 100 msec)
1327 [[TrackHostExits]] **TrackHostExits** __host__,__.domain__,__...__::
1328 For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent
1329 connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse the same
1330 exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a \'.\', it is treated as
1331 matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a \'.', it means
1332 match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to sites
1333 that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if
1334 your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage
1335 of making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single
1336 user. However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it
1337 through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow.
1339 [[TrackHostExitsExpire]] **TrackHostExitsExpire** __NUM__::
1340 Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the
1341 association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default is
1342 1800 seconds (30 minutes).
1344 [[UpdateBridgesFromAuthority]] **UpdateBridgesFromAuthority** **0**|**1**::
1345 When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors
1346 from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back to
1347 a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0)
1349 [[UseBridges]] **UseBridges** **0**|**1**::
1350 When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge"
1351 config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory
1352 guards. (Default: 0)
1354 [[UseEntryGuards]] **UseEntryGuards** **0**|**1**::
1355 If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try
1356 to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers
1357 increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a
1358 fraction of your paths. Entry Guards can not be used by Directory
1359 Authorities or Single Onion Services. In these cases,
1360 this option is ignored. (Default: 1)
1362 [[GuardfractionFile]] **GuardfractionFile** __FILENAME__::
1363 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the location of the
1364 guardfraction file which contains information about how long relays
1365 have been guards. (Default: unset)
1367 [[UseGuardFraction]] **UseGuardFraction** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
1368 This option specifies whether clients should use the
1369 guardfraction information found in the consensus during path
1370 selection. If it's set to 'auto', clients will do what the
1371 UseGuardFraction consensus parameter tells them to do. (Default: auto)
1373 [[NumEntryGuards]] **NumEntryGuards** __NUM__::
1374 If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers
1375 as long-term entries for our circuits. If NUM is 0, we try to learn the
1376 number from the guard-n-primary-guards-to-use consensus parameter, and
1377 default to 1 if the consensus parameter isn't set. (Default: 0)
1379 [[NumPrimaryGuards]] **NumPrimaryGuards** __NUM__::
1380 If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick NUM routers for our
1381 primary guard list, which is the set of routers we strongly prefer when
1382 connecting to the Tor network. If NUM is 0, we try to learn the number from
1383 the guard-n-primary-guards consensus parameter, and default to 3 if the
1384 consensus parameter isn't set. (Default: 0)
1386 [[NumDirectoryGuards]] **NumDirectoryGuards** __NUM__::
1387 If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we try to make sure we have at least NUM
1388 routers to use as directory guards. If this option is set to 0, use the
1389 value from the guard-n-primary-dir-guards-to-use consensus parameter, and
1390 default to 3 if the consensus parameter isn't set. (Default: 0)
1392 [[GuardLifetime]] **GuardLifetime** __N__ **days**|**weeks**|**months**::
1393 If nonzero, and UseEntryGuards is set, minimum time to keep a guard before
1394 picking a new one. If zero, we use the GuardLifetime parameter from the
1395 consensus directory. No value here may be less than 1 month or greater
1396 than 5 years; out-of-range values are clamped. (Default: 0)
1398 [[SafeSocks]] **SafeSocks** **0**|**1**::
1399 When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that
1400 use unsafe variants of the socks protocol -- ones that only provide an IP
1401 address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first.
1402 Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS.
1405 [[TestSocks]] **TestSocks** **0**|**1**::
1406 When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for
1407 each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used a
1408 safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks). This
1409 helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking
1410 DNS requests. (Default: 0)
1412 [[VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4]] **VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4** __IPv4Address__/__bits__ +
1414 [[VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6]] **VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6** [__IPv6Address__]/__bits__::
1415 When Tor needs to assign a virtual (unused) address because of a MAPADDRESS
1416 command from the controller or the AutomapHostsOnResolve feature, Tor
1417 picks an unassigned address from this range. (Defaults:
1418 127.192.0.0/10 and [FE80::]/10 respectively.) +
1420 When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool
1421 like dns-proxy-tor, change the IPv4 network to "10.192.0.0/10" or
1422 "172.16.0.0/12" and change the IPv6 network to "[FC00::]/7".
1423 The default **VirtualAddrNetwork** address ranges on a
1424 properly configured machine will route to the loopback or link-local
1425 interface. The maximum number of bits for the network prefix is set to 104
1426 for IPv6 and 16 for IPv4. However, a wider network - smaller prefix length
1427 - is preferable since it reduces the chances for an attacker to guess the
1428 used IP. For local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting
1431 [[AllowNonRFC953Hostnames]] **AllowNonRFC953Hostnames** **0**|**1**::
1432 When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal
1433 characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be
1434 resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on.
1437 [[HTTPTunnelPort]] **HTTPTunnelPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
1438 Open this port to listen for proxy connections using the "HTTP CONNECT"
1439 protocol instead of SOCKS. Set this to
1440 0 if you don't want to allow "HTTP CONNECT" connections. Set the port
1441 to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be
1442 specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. See
1443 SOCKSPort for an explanation of isolation flags. (Default: 0)
1445 [[TransPort]] **TransPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
1446 Open this port to listen for transparent proxy connections. Set this to
1447 0 if you don't want to allow transparent proxy connections. Set the port
1448 to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be
1449 specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. See
1450 SOCKSPort for an explanation of isolation flags. +
1452 TransPort requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or
1453 Linux's IPTables. If you're planning to use Tor as a transparent proxy for
1454 a network, you'll want to examine and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the
1455 default setting. (Default: 0)
1457 [[TransProxyType]] **TransProxyType** **default**|**TPROXY**|**ipfw**|**pf-divert**::
1458 TransProxyType may only be enabled when there is transparent proxy listener
1461 Set this to "TPROXY" if you wish to be able to use the TPROXY Linux module
1462 to transparently proxy connections that are configured using the TransPort
1463 option. Detailed information on how to configure the TPROXY
1464 feature can be found in the Linux kernel source tree in the file
1465 Documentation/networking/tproxy.txt. +
1467 Set this option to "ipfw" to use the FreeBSD ipfw interface. +
1469 On *BSD operating systems when using pf, set this to "pf-divert" to take
1470 advantage of +divert-to+ rules, which do not modify the packets like
1471 +rdr-to+ rules do. Detailed information on how to configure pf to use
1472 +divert-to+ rules can be found in the pf.conf(5) manual page. On OpenBSD,
1473 +divert-to+ is available to use on versions greater than or equal to
1476 Set this to "default", or leave it unconfigured, to use regular IPTables
1477 on Linux, or to use pf +rdr-to+ rules on *BSD systems. +
1479 (Default: "default")
1481 [[NATDPort]] **NATDPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
1482 Open this port to listen for connections from old versions of ipfw (as
1483 included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc) using the NATD protocol.
1484 Use 0 if you don't want to allow NATD connections. Set the port
1485 to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be
1486 specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. See
1487 SocksPort for an explanation of isolation flags. +
1489 This option is only for people who cannot use TransPort. (Default: 0)
1491 [[AutomapHostsOnResolve]] **AutomapHostsOnResolve** **0**|**1**::
1492 When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address
1493 that ends with one of the suffixes in **AutomapHostsSuffixes**, we map an
1494 unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address.
1495 This is handy for making ".onion" addresses work with applications that
1496 resolve an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0)
1498 [[AutomapHostsSuffixes]] **AutomapHostsSuffixes** __SUFFIX__,__SUFFIX__,__...__::
1499 A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with **AutomapHostsOnResolve**.
1500 The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses." (Default: .exit,.onion).
1502 [[DNSPort]] **DNSPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
1503 If non-zero, open this port to listen for UDP DNS requests, and resolve
1504 them anonymously. This port only handles A, AAAA, and PTR requests---it
1505 doesn't handle arbitrary DNS request types. Set the port to "auto" to
1506 have Tor pick a port for
1507 you. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
1508 addresses/ports. See SocksPort for an explanation of isolation
1511 [[ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses]] **ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses** **0**|**1**::
1512 If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that
1513 tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or
1514 192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; it
1515 is not allowed to be set on the default network. (Default: 1)
1517 [[ClientRejectInternalAddresses]] **ClientRejectInternalAddresses** **0**|**1**::
1518 If true, Tor does not try to fulfill requests to connect to an internal
1519 address (like 127.0.0.1 or 192.168.0.1) __unless an exit node is
1520 specifically requested__ (for example, via a .exit hostname, or a
1521 controller request). If true, multicast DNS hostnames for machines on the
1522 local network (of the form *.local) are also rejected. (Default: 1)
1524 [[DownloadExtraInfo]] **DownloadExtraInfo** **0**|**1**::
1525 If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These documents
1526 contain information about servers other than the information in their
1527 regular server descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything
1528 itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0)
1530 [[WarnPlaintextPorts]] **WarnPlaintextPorts** __port__,__port__,__...__::
1531 Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous
1532 connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users
1533 to services that risk sending passwords in the clear. (Default:
1536 [[RejectPlaintextPorts]] **RejectPlaintextPorts** __port__,__port__,__...__::
1537 Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses, Tor
1538 will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default: None)
1540 [[OptimisticData]] **OptimisticData** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
1541 When this option is set, and Tor is using an exit node that supports
1542 the feature, it will try optimistically to send data to the exit node
1543 without waiting for the exit node to report whether the connection
1544 succeeded. This can save a round-trip time for protocols like HTTP
1545 where the client talks first. If OptimisticData is set to **auto**,
1546 Tor will look at the UseOptimisticData parameter in the networkstatus.
1549 [[HSLayer2Nodes]] **HSLayer2Nodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
1550 A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and
1551 address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the
1552 second hop in all client or service-side Onion Service circuits.
1553 This option mitigates attacks where the adversary runs middle nodes
1554 and induces your client or service to create many circuits, in order
1555 to discover your primary guard node.
1556 (Default: Any node in the network may be used in the second hop.)
1559 HSLayer2Nodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
1561 When this is set, the resulting hidden service paths will
1564 C - G - L2 - M - Rend +
1565 C - G - L2 - M - HSDir +
1566 C - G - L2 - M - Intro +
1567 S - G - L2 - M - Rend +
1568 S - G - L2 - M - HSDir +
1569 S - G - L2 - M - Intro +
1571 where C is this client, S is the service, G is the Guard node,
1572 L2 is a node from this option, and M is a random middle node.
1573 Rend, HSDir, and Intro point selection is not affected by this
1576 This option may be combined with HSLayer3Nodes to create
1579 C - G - L2 - L3 - Rend +
1580 C - G - L2 - L3 - M - HSDir +
1581 C - G - L2 - L3 - M - Intro +
1582 S - G - L2 - L3 - M - Rend +
1583 S - G - L2 - L3 - HSDir +
1584 S - G - L2 - L3 - Intro +
1586 ExcludeNodes have higher priority than HSLayer2Nodes,
1587 which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be
1590 When either this option or HSLayer3Nodes are set, the /16 subnet
1591 and node family restrictions are removed for hidden service
1592 circuits. Additionally, we allow the guard node to be present
1593 as the Rend, HSDir, and IP node, and as the hop before it. This
1594 is done to prevent the adversary from inferring information
1595 about our guard, layer2, and layer3 node choices at later points
1598 This option is meant to be managed by a Tor controller such as
1599 https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards that selects and
1600 updates this set of nodes for you. Hence it does not do load
1601 balancing if fewer than 20 nodes are selected, and if no nodes in
1602 HSLayer2Nodes are currently available for use, Tor will not work.
1603 Please use extreme care if you are setting this option manually.
1605 [[HSLayer3Nodes]] **HSLayer3Nodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
1606 A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and
1607 address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the
1608 third hop in all client and service-side Onion Service circuits.
1609 This option mitigates attacks where the adversary runs middle nodes
1610 and induces your client or service to create many circuits, in order
1611 to discover your primary or Layer2 guard nodes.
1612 (Default: Any node in the network may be used in the third hop.)
1615 HSLayer3Nodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
1617 When this is set by itself, the resulting hidden service paths
1619 C - G - M - L3 - Rend +
1620 C - G - M - L3 - M - HSDir +
1621 C - G - M - L3 - M - Intro +
1622 S - G - M - L3 - M - Rend +
1623 S - G - M - L3 - HSDir +
1624 S - G - M - L3 - Intro +
1625 where C is this client, S is the service, G is the Guard node,
1626 L2 is a node from this option, and M is a random middle node.
1627 Rend, HSDir, and Intro point selection is not affected by this
1630 While it is possible to use this option by itself, it should be
1631 combined with HSLayer2Nodes to create paths of the form:
1633 C - G - L2 - L3 - Rend +
1634 C - G - L2 - L3 - M - HSDir +
1635 C - G - L2 - L3 - M - Intro +
1636 S - G - L2 - L3 - M - Rend +
1637 S - G - L2 - L3 - HSDir +
1638 S - G - L2 - L3 - Intro +
1640 ExcludeNodes have higher priority than HSLayer3Nodes,
1641 which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be
1644 When either this option or HSLayer2Nodes are set, the /16 subnet
1645 and node family restrictions are removed for hidden service
1646 circuits. Additionally, we allow the guard node to be present
1647 as the Rend, HSDir, and IP node, and as the hop before it. This
1648 is done to prevent the adversary from inferring information
1649 about our guard, layer2, and layer3 node choices at later points
1652 This option is meant to be managed by a Tor controller such as
1653 https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards that selects and
1654 updates this set of nodes for you. Hence it does not do load
1655 balancing if fewer than 20 nodes are selected, and if no nodes in
1656 HSLayer3Nodes are currently available for use, Tor will not work.
1657 Please use extreme care if you are setting this option manually.
1659 [[UseMicrodescriptors]] **UseMicrodescriptors** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
1660 Microdescriptors are a smaller version of the information that Tor needs
1661 in order to build its circuits. Using microdescriptors makes Tor clients
1662 download less directory information, thus saving bandwidth. Directory
1663 caches need to fetch regular descriptors and microdescriptors, so this
1664 option doesn't save any bandwidth for them. For legacy reasons, auto is
1665 accepted, but it has the same effect as 1. (Default: auto)
1667 [[PathBiasCircThreshold]] **PathBiasCircThreshold** __NUM__ +
1669 [[PathBiasNoticeRate]] **PathBiasNoticeRate** __NUM__ +
1671 [[PathBiasWarnRate]] **PathBiasWarnRate** __NUM__ +
1673 [[PathBiasExtremeRate]] **PathBiasExtremeRate** __NUM__ +
1675 [[PathBiasDropGuards]] **PathBiasDropGuards** __NUM__ +
1677 [[PathBiasScaleThreshold]] **PathBiasScaleThreshold** __NUM__::
1678 These options override the default behavior of Tor's (**currently
1679 experimental**) path bias detection algorithm. To try to find broken or
1680 misbehaving guard nodes, Tor looks for nodes where more than a certain
1681 fraction of circuits through that guard fail to get built. +
1683 The PathBiasCircThreshold option controls how many circuits we need to build
1684 through a guard before we make these checks. The PathBiasNoticeRate,
1685 PathBiasWarnRate and PathBiasExtremeRate options control what fraction of
1686 circuits must succeed through a guard so we won't write log messages.
1687 If less than PathBiasExtremeRate circuits succeed *and* PathBiasDropGuards
1688 is set to 1, we disable use of that guard. +
1690 When we have seen more than PathBiasScaleThreshold
1691 circuits through a guard, we scale our observations by 0.5 (governed by
1692 the consensus) so that new observations don't get swamped by old ones. +
1694 By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options,
1695 Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document.
1696 If no defaults are available there, these options default to 150, .70,
1697 .50, .30, 0, and 300 respectively.
1699 [[PathBiasUseThreshold]] **PathBiasUseThreshold** __NUM__ +
1701 [[PathBiasNoticeUseRate]] **PathBiasNoticeUseRate** __NUM__ +
1703 [[PathBiasExtremeUseRate]] **PathBiasExtremeUseRate** __NUM__ +
1705 [[PathBiasScaleUseThreshold]] **PathBiasScaleUseThreshold** __NUM__::
1706 Similar to the above options, these options override the default behavior
1707 of Tor's (**currently experimental**) path use bias detection algorithm. +
1709 Where as the path bias parameters govern thresholds for successfully
1710 building circuits, these four path use bias parameters govern thresholds
1711 only for circuit usage. Circuits which receive no stream usage
1712 are not counted by this detection algorithm. A used circuit is considered
1713 successful if it is capable of carrying streams or otherwise receiving
1714 well-formed responses to RELAY cells. +
1716 By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options,
1717 Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document.
1718 If no defaults are available there, these options default to 20, .80,
1719 .60, and 100, respectively.
1721 [[ClientUseIPv4]] **ClientUseIPv4** **0**|**1**::
1722 If this option is set to 0, Tor will avoid connecting to directory servers
1723 and entry nodes over IPv4. Note that clients with an IPv4
1724 address in a **Bridge**, proxy, or pluggable transport line will try
1725 connecting over IPv4 even if **ClientUseIPv4** is set to 0. (Default: 1)
1727 [[ClientUseIPv6]] **ClientUseIPv6** **0**|**1**::
1728 If this option is set to 1, Tor might connect to directory servers or
1729 entry nodes over IPv6. For IPv6 only hosts, you need to also set
1730 **ClientUseIPv4** to 0 to disable IPv4. Note that clients configured with
1731 an IPv6 address in a **Bridge**, proxy, or pluggable transportline will
1732 try connecting over IPv6 even if **ClientUseIPv6** is set to 0. (Default: 0)
1734 [[ClientPreferIPv6DirPort]] **ClientPreferIPv6DirPort** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
1735 If this option is set to 1, Tor prefers a directory port with an IPv6
1736 address over one with IPv4, for direct connections, if a given directory
1737 server has both. (Tor also prefers an IPv6 DirPort if IPv4Client is set to
1738 0.) If this option is set to auto, clients prefer IPv4. Other things may
1739 influence the choice. This option breaks a tie to the favor of IPv6.
1740 (Default: auto) (DEPRECATED: This option has had no effect for some
1743 [[ClientPreferIPv6ORPort]] **ClientPreferIPv6ORPort** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
1744 If this option is set to 1, Tor prefers an OR port with an IPv6
1745 address over one with IPv4 if a given entry node has both. (Tor also
1746 prefers an IPv6 ORPort if IPv4Client is set to 0.) If this option is set
1747 to auto, Tor bridge clients prefer the configured bridge address, and
1748 other clients prefer IPv4. Other things may influence the choice. This
1749 option breaks a tie to the favor of IPv6. (Default: auto)
1751 [[PathsNeededToBuildCircuits]] **PathsNeededToBuildCircuits** __NUM__::
1752 Tor clients don't build circuits for user traffic until they know
1753 about enough of the network so that they could potentially construct
1754 enough of the possible paths through the network. If this option
1755 is set to a fraction between 0.25 and 0.95, Tor won't build circuits
1756 until it has enough descriptors or microdescriptors to construct
1757 that fraction of possible paths. Note that setting this option too low
1758 can make your Tor client less anonymous, and setting it too high can
1759 prevent your Tor client from bootstrapping. If this option is negative,
1760 Tor will use a default value chosen by the directory authorities. If the
1761 directory authorities do not choose a value, Tor will default to 0.6.
1764 [[ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityDownloadInitialDelay]] **ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
1765 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download consensuses from authorities
1766 if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably
1767 live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a list of fallback
1768 directory mirrors. This schedule is advanced by (potentially concurrent)
1769 connection attempts, unlike other schedules, which are advanced by
1770 connection failures. (Default: 6)
1772 [[ClientBootstrapConsensusFallbackDownloadInitialDelay]] **ClientBootstrapConsensusFallbackDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
1773 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download consensuses from fallback
1774 directory mirrors if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a
1775 usable, reasonably live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a
1776 list of fallback directory mirrors. This schedule is advanced by
1777 (potentially concurrent) connection attempts, unlike other schedules,
1778 which are advanced by connection failures. (Default: 0)
1780 [[ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyDownloadInitialDelay]] **ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
1781 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download consensuses from authorities
1782 if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably
1783 live consensus). Only used by clients which don't have or won't fetch
1784 from a list of fallback directory mirrors. This schedule is advanced by
1785 (potentially concurrent) connection attempts, unlike other schedules,
1786 which are advanced by connection failures. (Default: 0)
1788 [[ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxInProgressTries]] **ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxInProgressTries** __NUM__::
1789 Try this many simultaneous connections to download a consensus before
1790 waiting for one to complete, timeout, or error out. (Default: 3)
1795 The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if ORPort
1798 [[Address]] **Address** __address__::
1799 The IPv4 address of this server, or a fully qualified domain name of
1800 this server that resolves to an IPv4 address. You can leave this
1801 unset, and Tor will try to guess your IPv4 address. This IPv4
1802 address is the one used to tell clients and other servers where to
1803 find your Tor server; it doesn't affect the address that your server
1804 binds to. To bind to a different address, use the ORPort and
1805 OutboundBindAddress options.
1807 [[AssumeReachable]] **AssumeReachable** **0**|**1**::
1808 This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1,
1809 don't do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor
1810 immediately. If **AuthoritativeDirectory** is also set, this option
1811 instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and list
1812 all connected servers as running.
1814 [[BridgeRelay]] **BridgeRelay** **0**|**1**::
1815 Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections
1816 from bridge users to the Tor network. It mainly causes Tor to publish a
1817 server descriptor to the bridge database, rather than
1818 to the public directory authorities. +
1820 Note: make sure that no MyFamily lines are present in your torrc when
1821 relay is configured in bridge mode.
1823 [[BridgeDistribution]] **BridgeDistribution** __string__::
1824 If set along with BridgeRelay, Tor will include a new line in its
1825 bridge descriptor which indicates to the BridgeDB service how it
1826 would like its bridge address to be given out. Set it to "none" if
1827 you want BridgeDB to avoid distributing your bridge address, or "any" to
1828 let BridgeDB decide. (Default: any)
1830 Note: as of Oct 2017, the BridgeDB part of this option is not yet
1831 implemented. Until BridgeDB is updated to obey this option, your
1832 bridge will make this request, but it will not (yet) be obeyed.
1834 [[ContactInfo]] **ContactInfo** __email_address__::
1835 Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
1836 can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
1837 something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
1838 descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
1839 spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact
1840 that it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this
1843 ContactInfo **must** be set to a working address if you run more than one
1844 relay or bridge. (Really, everybody running a relay or bridge should set
1848 [[ExitRelay]] **ExitRelay** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
1849 Tells Tor whether to run as an exit relay. If Tor is running as a
1850 non-bridge server, and ExitRelay is set to 1, then Tor allows traffic to
1851 exit according to the ExitPolicy option (or the default ExitPolicy if
1852 none is specified). +
1854 If ExitRelay is set to 0, no traffic is allowed to
1855 exit, and the ExitPolicy option is ignored. +
1857 If ExitRelay is set to "auto", then Tor behaves as if it were set to 1, but
1858 warns the user if this would cause traffic to exit. In a future version,
1859 the default value will be 0. (Default: auto)
1861 [[ExitPolicy]] **ExitPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
1862 Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
1863 "**accept[6]**|**reject[6]** __ADDR__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]". If /__MASK__ is
1864 omitted then this policy just applies to the host given. Instead of giving
1865 a host or network you can also use "\*" to denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0
1866 and ::/0), or \*4 to denote all IPv4 addresses, and \*6 to denote all IPv6
1868 __PORT__ can be a single port number, an interval of ports
1869 "__FROM_PORT__-__TO_PORT__", or "\*". If __PORT__ is omitted, that means
1872 For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:\*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:\*,accept \*:\*" would
1873 reject any IPv4 traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and accept
1874 any other IPv4 or IPv6 traffic. +
1876 Tor also allows IPv6 exit policy entries. For instance, "reject6 [FC00::]/7:\*"
1877 rejects all destinations that share 7 most significant bit prefix with
1878 address FC00::. Respectively, "accept6 [C000::]/3:\*" accepts all destinations
1879 that share 3 most significant bit prefix with address C000::. +
1881 accept6 and reject6 only produce IPv6 exit policy entries. Using an IPv4
1882 address with accept6 or reject6 is ignored and generates a warning.
1883 accept/reject allows either IPv4 or IPv6 addresses. Use \*4 as an IPv4
1884 wildcard address, and \*6 as an IPv6 wildcard address. accept/reject *
1885 expands to matching IPv4 and IPv6 wildcard address rules. +
1887 To specify all IPv4 and IPv6 internal and link-local networks (including
1888 0.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8,
1889 172.16.0.0/12, [::]/8, [FC00::]/7, [FE80::]/10, [FEC0::]/10, [FF00::]/8,
1890 and [::]/127), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address.
1891 ("private" always produces rules for IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, even when
1892 used with accept6/reject6.) +
1894 Private addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your exit
1895 policy), along with any configured primary public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
1896 These private addresses are rejected unless you set the
1897 ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option to 0. For example, once you've done
1898 that, you could allow HTTP to 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to
1899 internal networks with "accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:\*", though that
1900 may also allow connections to your own computer that are addressed to its
1901 public (external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more details
1902 about internal and reserved IP address space. See
1903 ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces if you want to block every address on the
1904 relay, even those that aren't advertised in the descriptor. +
1906 This directive can be specified multiple times so you don't have to put it
1909 Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If you
1910 want to allow the same ports on IPv4 and IPv6, write your rules using
1911 accept/reject \*. If you want to allow different ports on IPv4 and IPv6,
1912 write your IPv6 rules using accept6/reject6 \*6, and your IPv4 rules using
1913 accept/reject \*4. If you want to \_replace_ the default exit policy, end
1914 your exit policy with either a reject \*:* or an accept \*:*. Otherwise,
1915 you're \_augmenting_ (prepending to) the default exit policy. +
1917 If you want to use a reduced exit policy rather than the default exit
1918 policy, set "ReducedExitPolicy 1". If you want to _replace_ the default
1919 exit policy with your custom exit policy, end your exit policy with either
1920 a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending
1921 to) the default or reduced exit policy. +
1923 The default exit policy is:
1937 // Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page.
1938 [[ExitPolicyDefault]]::
1939 Since the default exit policy uses accept/reject *, it applies to both
1940 IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
1942 [[ExitPolicyRejectPrivate]] **ExitPolicyRejectPrivate** **0**|**1**::
1943 Reject all private (local) networks, along with the relay's advertised
1944 public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, at the beginning of your exit policy.
1945 See above entry on ExitPolicy.
1948 [[ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces]] **ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces** **0**|**1**::
1949 Reject all IPv4 and IPv6 addresses that the relay knows about, at the
1950 beginning of your exit policy. This includes any OutboundBindAddress, the
1951 bind addresses of any port options, such as ControlPort or DNSPort, and any
1952 public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses on any interface on the relay. (If IPv6Exit
1953 is not set, all IPv6 addresses will be rejected anyway.)
1954 See above entry on ExitPolicy.
1955 This option is off by default, because it lists all public relay IP
1956 addresses in the ExitPolicy, even those relay operators might prefer not
1960 [[ReducedExitPolicy]] **ReducedExitPolicy** **0**|**1**::
1961 If set, use a reduced exit policy rather than the default one. +
1963 The reduced exit policy is an alternative to the default exit policy. It
1964 allows as many Internet services as possible while still blocking the
1965 majority of TCP ports. Currently, the policy allows approximately 65 ports.
1966 This reduces the odds that your node will be used for peer-to-peer
1969 The reduced exit policy is:
2053 [[IPv6Exit]] **IPv6Exit** **0**|**1**::
2054 If set, and we are an exit node, allow clients to use us for IPv6
2055 traffic. (Default: 0)
2057 [[MaxOnionQueueDelay]] **MaxOnionQueueDelay** __NUM__ [**msec**|**second**]::
2058 If we have more onionskins queued for processing than we can process in
2059 this amount of time, reject new ones. (Default: 1750 msec)
2061 [[MyFamily]] **MyFamily** __fingerprint__,__fingerprint__,...::
2062 Declare that this Tor relay is controlled or administered by a group or
2063 organization identical or similar to that of the other relays, defined by
2064 their (possibly $-prefixed) identity fingerprints.
2065 This option can be repeated many times, for
2066 convenience in defining large families: all fingerprints in all MyFamily
2067 lines are merged into one list.
2068 When two relays both declare that they are in the
2069 same \'family', Tor clients will not use them in the same circuit. (Each
2070 relay only needs to list the other servers in its family; it doesn't need to
2071 list itself, but it won't hurt if it does.) Do not list any bridge relay as it would
2072 compromise its concealment. +
2074 When listing a node, it's better to list it by fingerprint than by
2075 nickname: fingerprints are more reliable. +
2077 If you run more than one relay, the MyFamily option on each relay
2078 **must** list all other relays, as described above. +
2080 Note: do not use MyFamily when configuring your Tor instance as a
2083 [[Nickname]] **Nickname** __name__::
2084 Set the server's nickname to \'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19
2085 characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].
2086 If not set, **Unnamed** will be used. Relays can always be uniquely identified
2087 by their identity fingerprints.
2089 [[NumCPUs]] **NumCPUs** __num__::
2090 How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins and other
2091 parallelizable operations. If this is set to 0, Tor will try to detect
2092 how many CPUs you have, defaulting to 1 if it can't tell. (Default: 0)
2094 [[ORPort]] **ORPort** \['address':]__PORT__|**auto** [_flags_]::
2095 Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and
2096 servers. This option is required to be a Tor server.
2097 Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. Set it to 0 to not
2098 run an ORPort at all. This option can occur more than once. (Default: 0) +
2100 Tor recognizes these flags on each ORPort:
2102 By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If
2103 NoAdvertise is specified, we don't advertise, but listen anyway. This
2104 can be useful if the port everybody will be connecting to (for
2105 example, one that's opened on our firewall) is somewhere else.
2107 By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If
2108 NoListen is specified, we don't bind, but advertise anyway. This
2109 can be useful if something else (for example, a firewall's port
2110 forwarding configuration) is causing connections to reach us.
2112 If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6
2113 address, only listen to the IPv4 address.
2115 If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6
2116 address, only listen to the IPv6 address.
2118 // Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page.
2119 [[ORPortFlagsExclusive]]::
2120 For obvious reasons, NoAdvertise and NoListen are mutually exclusive, and
2121 IPv4Only and IPv6Only are mutually exclusive.
2123 [[PublishServerDescriptor]] **PublishServerDescriptor** **0**|**1**|**v3**|**bridge**,**...**::
2124 This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish when acting as
2126 choose multiple arguments, separated by commas. +
2128 If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its
2129 descriptors to any directories. (This is useful if you're testing
2130 out your server, or if you're using a Tor controller that handles
2131 directory publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its
2132 descriptors of all type(s) specified. The default is "1", which
2133 means "if running as a relay or bridge, publish descriptors to the
2134 appropriate authorities". Other possibilities are "v3", meaning
2135 "publish as if you're a relay", and "bridge", meaning "publish as
2136 if you're a bridge".
2138 [[ShutdownWaitLength]] **ShutdownWaitLength** __NUM__::
2139 When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down:
2140 we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After **NUM**
2141 seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immediately.
2142 (Default: 30 seconds)
2144 [[SSLKeyLifetime]] **SSLKeyLifetime** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
2145 When creating a link certificate for our outermost SSL handshake,
2146 set its lifetime to this amount of time. If set to 0, Tor will choose
2147 some reasonable random defaults. (Default: 0)
2149 [[HeartbeatPeriod]] **HeartbeatPeriod** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
2150 Log a heartbeat message every **HeartbeatPeriod** seconds. This is
2151 a log level __notice__ message, designed to let you know your Tor
2152 server is still alive and doing useful things. Settings this
2153 to 0 will disable the heartbeat. Otherwise, it must be at least 30
2154 minutes. (Default: 6 hours)
2156 [[MainloopStats]] **MainloopStats** **0**|**1**::
2157 Log main loop statistics every **HeartbeatPeriod** seconds. This is a log
2158 level __notice__ message designed to help developers instrumenting Tor's
2159 main event loop. (Default: 0)
2161 [[AccountingMax]] **AccountingMax** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
2162 Limits the max number of bytes sent and received within a set time period
2163 using a given calculation rule (see: AccountingStart, AccountingRule).
2164 Useful if you need to stay under a specific bandwidth. By default, the
2165 number used for calculation is the max of either the bytes sent or
2166 received. For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 GByte, a server
2167 could send 900 MBytes and receive 800 MBytes and continue running.
2168 It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 GByte. This can
2169 be changed to use the sum of the both bytes received and sent by setting
2170 the AccountingRule option to "sum" (total bandwidth in/out). When the
2171 number of bytes remaining gets low, Tor will stop accepting new connections
2172 and circuits. When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate
2173 until some time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers
2174 from waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point
2175 in each period before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues,
2176 enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since
2177 it provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some
2178 of the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are
2181 [[AccountingRule]] **AccountingRule** **sum**|**max**|**in**|**out**::
2182 How we determine when our AccountingMax has been reached (when we
2183 should hibernate) during a time interval. Set to "max" to calculate
2184 using the higher of either the sent or received bytes (this is the
2185 default functionality). Set to "sum" to calculate using the sent
2186 plus received bytes. Set to "in" to calculate using only the
2187 received bytes. Set to "out" to calculate using only the sent bytes.
2190 [[AccountingStart]] **AccountingStart** **day**|**week**|**month** [__day__] __HH:MM__::
2191 Specify how long accounting periods last. If **month** is given,
2192 each accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ on the __dayth__ day of one
2193 month to the same day and time of the next. The relay will go at full speed,
2194 use all the quota you specify, then hibernate for the rest of the period. (The
2195 day must be between 1 and 28.) If **week** is given, each accounting period
2196 runs from the time __HH:MM__ of the __dayth__ day of one week to the same day
2197 and time of the next week, with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If **day**
2198 is given, each accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ each day to the
2199 same time on the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time.
2200 (Default: "month 1 0:00")
2202 [[RefuseUnknownExits]] **RefuseUnknownExits** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
2203 Prevent nodes that don't appear in the consensus from exiting using this
2204 relay. If the option is 1, we always block exit attempts from such
2205 nodes; if it's 0, we never do, and if the option is "auto", then we do
2206 whatever the authorities suggest in the consensus (and block if the consensus
2207 is quiet on the issue). (Default: auto)
2209 [[ServerDNSResolvConfFile]] **ServerDNSResolvConfFile** __filename__::
2210 Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in
2211 __filename__. The file format is the same as the standard Unix
2212 "**resolv.conf**" file (7). This option, like all other ServerDNS options,
2213 only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients.
2214 (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.)
2216 [[ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig]] **ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig** **0**|**1**::
2217 If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems
2218 parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers.
2219 Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until
2220 it eventually succeeds. (Default: 1)
2222 [[ServerDNSSearchDomains]] **ServerDNSSearchDomains** **0**|**1**::
2223 If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain.
2224 For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in
2225 "example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be
2226 connected to "www.example.com". This option only affects name lookups that
2227 your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)
2229 [[ServerDNSDetectHijacking]] **ServerDNSDetectHijacking** **0**|**1**::
2230 When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine
2231 whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS
2232 requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to
2233 correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
2234 on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)
2236 [[ServerDNSTestAddresses]] **ServerDNSTestAddresses** __hostname__,__hostname__,__...__::
2237 When we're detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these __valid__ addresses
2238 aren't getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless,
2239 and we'll reset our exit policy to "reject \*:*". This option only affects
2240 name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default:
2241 "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org")
2243 [[ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames]] **ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames** **0**|**1**::
2244 When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames
2245 containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an
2246 exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve
2247 URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
2248 on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)
2250 [[BridgeRecordUsageByCountry]] **BridgeRecordUsageByCountry** **0**|**1**::
2251 When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have
2252 GeoIP data, Tor keeps a per-country count of how many client
2253 addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess
2254 which countries have blocked access to it. (Default: 1)
2256 [[ServerDNSRandomizeCase]] **ServerDNSRandomizeCase** **0**|**1**::
2257 When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in
2258 outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies.
2259 This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack.
2260 For more information, see "Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through
2261 0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects name lookups that your server
2262 does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)
2264 [[GeoIPFile]] **GeoIPFile** __filename__::
2265 A filename containing IPv4 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics.
2267 [[GeoIPv6File]] **GeoIPv6File** __filename__::
2268 A filename containing IPv6 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics.
2270 [[CellStatistics]] **CellStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2272 When this option is enabled, Tor collects statistics about cell
2273 processing (i.e. mean time a cell is spending in a queue, mean
2274 number of cells in a queue and mean number of processed cells per
2275 circuit) and writes them into disk every 24 hours. Onion router
2276 operators may use the statistics for performance monitoring.
2277 If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will published as part of
2278 extra-info document. (Default: 0)
2280 [[PaddingStatistics]] **PaddingStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2282 When this option is enabled, Tor collects statistics for padding cells
2283 sent and received by this relay, in addition to total cell counts.
2284 These statistics are rounded, and omitted if traffic is low. This
2285 information is important for load balancing decisions related to padding.
2286 If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will be published
2287 as a part of extra-info document. (Default: 1)
2289 [[DirReqStatistics]] **DirReqStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2290 Relays and bridges only.
2291 When this option is enabled, a Tor directory writes statistics on the
2292 number and response time of network status requests to disk every 24
2293 hours. Enables relay and bridge operators to monitor how much their
2294 server is being used by clients to learn about Tor network.
2295 If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will published as part of
2296 extra-info document. (Default: 1)
2298 [[EntryStatistics]] **EntryStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2300 When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of
2301 directly connecting clients to disk every 24 hours. Enables relay
2302 operators to monitor how much inbound traffic that originates from
2303 Tor clients passes through their server to go further down the
2304 Tor network. If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will be published
2305 as part of extra-info document. (Default: 0)
2307 [[ExitPortStatistics]] **ExitPortStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2309 When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of
2310 relayed bytes and opened stream per exit port to disk every 24 hours.
2311 Enables exit relay operators to measure and monitor amounts of traffic
2312 that leaves Tor network through their exit node. If ExtraInfoStatistics
2313 is enabled, it will be published as part of extra-info document.
2316 [[ConnDirectionStatistics]] **ConnDirectionStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2318 When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the amounts of
2319 traffic it passes between itself and other relays to disk every 24
2320 hours. Enables relay operators to monitor how much their relay is
2321 being used as middle node in the circuit. If ExtraInfoStatistics is
2322 enabled, it will be published as part of extra-info document.
2325 [[HiddenServiceStatistics]] **HiddenServiceStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2327 When this option is enabled, a Tor relay writes obfuscated
2328 statistics on its role as hidden-service directory, introduction
2329 point, or rendezvous point to disk every 24 hours. If
2330 ExtraInfoStatistics is also enabled, these statistics are further
2331 published to the directory authorities. (Default: 1)
2333 [[ExtraInfoStatistics]] **ExtraInfoStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2334 When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously gathered statistics in
2335 its extra-info documents that it uploads to the directory authorities.
2338 [[ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses]] **ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses** **0**|**1**::
2339 When this option is enabled, Tor will connect to relays on localhost,
2340 RFC1918 addresses, and so on. In particular, Tor will make direct OR
2341 connections, and Tor routers allow EXTEND requests, to these private
2342 addresses. (Tor will always allow connections to bridges, proxies, and
2343 pluggable transports configured on private addresses.) Enabling this
2344 option can create security issues; you should probably leave it off.
2347 [[MaxMemInQueues]] **MaxMemInQueues** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**::
2348 This option configures a threshold above which Tor will assume that it
2349 needs to stop queueing or buffering data because it's about to run out of
2350 memory. If it hits this threshold, it will begin killing circuits until
2351 it has recovered at least 10% of this memory. Do not set this option too
2352 low, or your relay may be unreliable under load. This option only
2353 affects some queues, so the actual process size will be larger than
2354 this. If this option is set to 0, Tor will try to pick a reasonable
2355 default based on your system's physical memory. (Default: 0)
2357 [[DisableOOSCheck]] **DisableOOSCheck** **0**|**1**::
2358 This option disables the code that closes connections when Tor notices
2359 that it is running low on sockets. Right now, it is on by default,
2360 since the existing out-of-sockets mechanism tends to kill OR connections
2361 more than it should. (Default: 1)
2363 [[SigningKeyLifetime]] **SigningKeyLifetime** __N__ **days**|**weeks**|**months**::
2364 For how long should each Ed25519 signing key be valid? Tor uses a
2365 permanent master identity key that can be kept offline, and periodically
2366 generates new "signing" keys that it uses online. This option
2367 configures their lifetime.
2370 [[OfflineMasterKey]] **OfflineMasterKey** **0**|**1**::
2371 If non-zero, the Tor relay will never generate or load its master secret
2372 key. Instead, you'll have to use "tor --keygen" to manage the permanent
2373 ed25519 master identity key, as well as the corresponding temporary
2374 signing keys and certificates. (Default: 0)
2376 [[KeyDirectory]] **KeyDirectory** __DIR__::
2377 Store secret keys in DIR. Can not be changed while tor is
2379 (Default: the "keys" subdirectory of DataDirectory.)
2381 [[KeyDirectoryGroupReadable]] **KeyDirectoryGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
2382 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
2383 KeywDirectory. If the option is set to 1, make the KeyDirectory readable
2384 by the default GID. (Default: 0)
2386 [[RephistTrackTime]] **RephistTrackTime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
2387 Tells an authority, or other node tracking node reliability and history,
2388 that fine-grained information about nodes can be discarded when it hasn't
2389 changed for a given amount of time. (Default: 24 hours)
2392 DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS
2393 ------------------------
2395 The following options are useful only for directory servers. (Relays with
2396 enough bandwidth automatically become directory servers; see DirCache for
2399 [[DirPortFrontPage]] **DirPortFrontPage** __FILENAME__::
2400 When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on
2401 the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing
2402 to set up a separate webserver. There's a sample disclaimer in
2403 contrib/operator-tools/tor-exit-notice.html.
2405 [[DirPort]] **DirPort** \['address':]__PORT__|**auto** [_flags_]::
2406 If this option is nonzero, advertise the directory service on this port.
2407 Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This option can occur
2408 more than once, but only one advertised DirPort is supported: all
2409 but one DirPort must have the **NoAdvertise** flag set. (Default: 0) +
2411 The same flags are supported here as are supported by ORPort.
2413 [[DirPolicy]] **DirPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
2414 Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
2415 directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above,
2416 except that port specifiers are ignored. Any address not matched by
2417 some entry in the policy is accepted.
2419 [[DirCache]] **DirCache** **0**|**1**::
2420 When this option is set, Tor caches all current directory documents except
2421 extra info documents, and accepts client requests for them. If
2422 **DownloadExtraInfo** is set, cached extra info documents are also cached.
2423 Setting **DirPort** is not required for **DirCache**, because clients
2424 connect via the ORPort by default. Setting either DirPort or BridgeRelay
2425 and setting DirCache to 0 is not supported. (Default: 1)
2427 [[MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs]] **MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
2428 When this option is nonzero, Tor caches will not try to generate
2429 consensus diffs for any consensus older than this amount of time.
2430 If this option is set to zero, Tor will pick a reasonable default from
2431 the current networkstatus document. You should not set this
2432 option unless your cache is severely low on disk space or CPU.
2433 If you need to set it, keeping it above 3 or 4 hours will help clients
2434 much more than setting it to zero.
2438 DENIAL OF SERVICE MITIGATION OPTIONS
2439 ------------------------------------
2441 Tor has three built-in mitigation options that can be individually
2442 enabled/disabled and fine-tuned, but by default Tor directory authorities will
2443 define reasonable values for relays and no explicit configuration is required
2444 to make use of these protections. The mitigations take place at relays,
2447 1. If a single client address makes too many concurrent connections (this is
2448 configurable via DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount), hang up on further
2451 2. If a single client IP address (v4 or v6) makes circuits too quickly
2452 (default values are more than 3 per second, with an allowed burst of 90,
2453 see DoSCircuitCreationRate and DoSCircuitCreationBurst) while also having
2454 too many connections open (default is 3, see
2455 DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections), tor will refuse any new circuit (CREATE
2456 cells) for the next while (random value between 1 and 2 hours).
2458 3. If a client asks to establish a rendezvous point to you directly (ex:
2459 Tor2Web client), ignore the request.
2461 These defenses can be manually controlled by torrc options, but relays will
2462 also take guidance from consensus parameters using these same names, so there's
2463 no need to configure anything manually. In doubt, do not change those values.
2465 The values set by the consensus, if any, can be found here:
2466 https://consensus-health.torproject.org/#consensusparams
2468 If any of the DoS mitigations are enabled, a heartbeat message will appear in
2469 your log at NOTICE level which looks like:
2471 DoS mitigation since startup: 429042 circuits rejected, 17 marked addresses.
2472 2238 connections closed. 8052 single hop clients refused.
2474 The following options are useful only for a public relay. They control the
2475 Denial of Service mitigation subsystem described above.
2477 [[DoSCircuitCreationEnabled]] **DoSCircuitCreationEnabled** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
2479 Enable circuit creation DoS mitigation. If set to 1 (enabled), tor will
2480 cache client IPs along with statistics in order to detect circuit DoS
2481 attacks. If an address is positively identified, tor will activate
2482 defenses against the address. See the DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType option
2483 for more details. This is a client to relay detection only. "auto" means
2484 use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 0.
2487 [[DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections]] **DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections** __NUM__::
2489 Minimum threshold of concurrent connections before a client address can be
2490 flagged as executing a circuit creation DoS. In other words, once a client
2491 address reaches the circuit rate and has a minimum of NUM concurrent
2492 connections, a detection is positive. "0" means use the consensus
2493 parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 3.
2496 [[DoSCircuitCreationRate]] **DoSCircuitCreationRate** __NUM__::
2498 The allowed circuit creation rate per second applied per client IP
2499 address. If this option is 0, it obeys a consensus parameter. If not
2500 defined in the consensus, the value is 3.
2503 [[DoSCircuitCreationBurst]] **DoSCircuitCreationBurst** __NUM__::
2505 The allowed circuit creation burst per client IP address. If the circuit
2506 rate and the burst are reached, a client is marked as executing a circuit
2507 creation DoS. "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the
2508 consensus, the value is 90.
2511 [[DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType]] **DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType** __NUM__::
2513 This is the type of defense applied to a detected client address. The
2514 possible values are:
2518 2: Refuse circuit creation for the DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod period of time.
2520 "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 2.
2523 [[DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod]] **DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::
2525 The base time period in seconds that the DoS defense is activated for. The
2526 actual value is selected randomly for each activation from N+1 to 3/2 * N.
2527 "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus,
2528 the value is 3600 seconds (1 hour).
2531 [[DoSConnectionEnabled]] **DoSConnectionEnabled** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
2533 Enable the connection DoS mitigation. If set to 1 (enabled), for client
2534 address only, this allows tor to mitigate against large number of
2535 concurrent connections made by a single IP address. "auto" means use the
2536 consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 0.
2539 [[DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount]] **DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount** __NUM__::
2541 The maximum threshold of concurrent connection from a client IP address.
2542 Above this limit, a defense selected by DoSConnectionDefenseType is
2543 applied. "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the
2544 consensus, the value is 100.
2547 [[DoSConnectionDefenseType]] **DoSConnectionDefenseType** __NUM__::
2549 This is the type of defense applied to a detected client address for the
2550 connection mitigation. The possible values are:
2554 2: Immediately close new connections.
2556 "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 2.
2559 [[DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous]] **DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
2561 Refuse establishment of rendezvous points for single hop clients. In other
2562 words, if a client directly connects to the relay and sends an
2563 ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell, it is silently dropped. "auto" means use the
2564 consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 0.
2568 DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS
2569 ----------------------------------
2571 The following options enable operation as a directory authority, and
2572 control how Tor behaves as a directory authority. You should not need
2573 to adjust any of them if you're running a regular relay or exit server
2574 on the public Tor network.
2576 [[AuthoritativeDirectory]] **AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
2577 When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative directory
2578 server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its own list of
2579 good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients. Unless the clients
2580 already have you listed as a trusted directory, you probably do not want
2583 [[V3AuthoritativeDirectory]] **V3AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
2584 When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
2585 generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
2586 described in dir-spec.txt file of https://spec.torproject.org/[torspec]
2587 (for Tor clients and servers running at least 0.2.0.x).
2589 [[VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory]] **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
2590 When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on which versions of
2591 Tor are still believed safe for use to the published directory. Each
2592 version 1 authority is automatically a versioning authority; version 2
2593 authorities provide this service optionally. See **RecommendedVersions**,
2594 **RecommendedClientVersions**, and **RecommendedServerVersions**.
2596 [[RecommendedVersions]] **RecommendedVersions** __STRING__::
2597 STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
2598 safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which pull down the
2599 directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This option can appear
2600 multiple times: the values from multiple lines are spliced together. When
2601 this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should be set too.
2603 [[RecommendedPackages]] **RecommendedPackages** __PACKAGENAME__ __VERSION__ __URL__ __DIGESTTYPE__**=**__DIGEST__ ::
2604 Adds "package" line to the directory authority's vote. This information
2605 is used to vote on the correct URL and digest for the released versions
2606 of different Tor-related packages, so that the consensus can certify
2607 them. This line may appear any number of times.
2609 [[RecommendedClientVersions]] **RecommendedClientVersions** __STRING__::
2610 STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
2611 safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2
2612 directories. If this is not set then the value of **RecommendedVersions**
2613 is used. When this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should
2616 [[BridgeAuthoritativeDir]] **BridgeAuthoritativeDir** **0**|**1**::
2617 When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
2618 accepts and serves server descriptors, but it caches and serves the main
2619 networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0)
2621 [[MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2]] **MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
2622 Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as such by
2623 authoritative directories. (Default: 25 hours)
2625 [[RecommendedServerVersions]] **RecommendedServerVersions** __STRING__::
2626 STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
2627 safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2
2628 directories. If this is not set then the value of **RecommendedVersions**
2629 is used. When this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should
2632 [[ConsensusParams]] **ConsensusParams** __STRING__::
2633 STRING is a space-separated list of key=value pairs that Tor will include
2634 in the "params" line of its networkstatus vote.
2636 [[DirAllowPrivateAddresses]] **DirAllowPrivateAddresses** **0**|**1**::
2637 If set to 1, Tor will accept server descriptors with arbitrary "Address"
2638 elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private IP
2639 address, it will reject the server descriptor. Additionally, Tor
2640 will allow exit policies for private networks to fulfill Exit flag
2641 requirements. (Default: 0)
2643 [[AuthDirBadExit]] **AuthDirBadExit** __AddressPattern...__::
2644 Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
2645 will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority
2646 publishes, if **AuthDirListBadExits** is set. +
2648 (The address pattern syntax here and in the options below
2649 is the same as for exit policies, except that you don't need to say
2650 "accept" or "reject", and ports are not needed.)
2652 [[AuthDirInvalid]] **AuthDirInvalid** __AddressPattern...__::
2653 Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
2654 will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this
2655 authority publishes.
2657 [[AuthDirReject]] **AuthDirReject** __AddressPattern__...::
2658 Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
2659 will never be listed at all in any network status document that this
2660 authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor
2661 submitted for publication by this authority.
2663 [[AuthDirBadExitCCs]] **AuthDirBadExitCCs** __CC__,... +
2665 [[AuthDirInvalidCCs]] **AuthDirInvalidCCs** __CC__,... +
2667 [[AuthDirRejectCCs]] **AuthDirRejectCCs** __CC__,...::
2668 Authoritative directories only. These options contain a comma-separated
2669 list of country codes such that any server in one of those country codes
2670 will be marked as a bad exit/invalid for use, or rejected
2673 [[AuthDirListBadExits]] **AuthDirListBadExits** **0**|**1**::
2674 Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some
2675 opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not set this to
2676 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad; otherwise, you are
2677 effectively voting in favor of every declared exit as an exit.)
2679 [[AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr]] **AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr** __NUM__::
2680 Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of servers that we will
2681 list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to "0" for "no limit".
2684 [[AuthDirFastGuarantee]] **AuthDirFastGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
2685 Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, always vote the
2686 Fast flag for any relay advertising this amount of capacity or
2687 more. (Default: 100 KBytes)
2689 [[AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee]] **AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
2690 Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, this advertised capacity
2691 or more is always sufficient to satisfy the bandwidth requirement
2692 for the Guard flag. (Default: 2 MBytes)
2694 [[AuthDirPinKeys]] **AuthDirPinKeys** **0**|**1**::
2695 Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, do not allow any relay to
2696 publish a descriptor if any other relay has reserved its <Ed25519,RSA>
2697 identity keypair. In all cases, Tor records every keypair it accepts
2698 in a journal if it is new, or if it differs from the most recently
2699 accepted pinning for one of the keys it contains. (Default: 1)
2701 [[AuthDirSharedRandomness]] **AuthDirSharedRandomness** **0**|**1**::
2702 Authoritative directories only. Switch for the shared random protocol.
2703 If zero, the authority won't participate in the protocol. If non-zero
2704 (default), the flag "shared-rand-participate" is added to the authority
2705 vote indicating participation in the protocol. (Default: 1)
2707 [[AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys]] **AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys** **0**|**1**::
2708 Authoritative directories only. If this option is set to 0, then we treat
2709 relays as "Running" if their RSA key is correct when we probe them,
2710 regardless of their Ed25519 key. We should only ever set this option to 0
2711 if there is some major bug in Ed25519 link authentication that causes us
2712 to label all the relays as not Running. (Default: 1)
2714 [[BridgePassword]] **BridgePassword** __Password__::
2715 If set, contains an HTTP authenticator that tells a bridge authority to
2716 serve all requested bridge information. Used by the (only partially
2717 implemented) "bridge community" design, where a community of bridge
2718 relay operators all use an alternate bridge directory authority,
2719 and their target user audience can periodically fetch the list of
2720 available community bridges to stay up-to-date. (Default: not set)
2722 [[V3AuthVotingInterval]] **V3AuthVotingInterval** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
2723 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred voting
2724 interval. Note that voting will __actually__ happen at an interval chosen
2725 by consensus from all the authorities' preferred intervals. This time
2726 SHOULD divide evenly into a day. (Default: 1 hour)
2728 [[V3AuthVoteDelay]] **V3AuthVoteDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
2729 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred delay
2730 between publishing its vote and assuming it has all the votes from all the
2731 other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server's
2732 preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes)
2734 [[V3AuthDistDelay]] **V3AuthDistDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
2735 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred delay
2736 between publishing its consensus and signature and assuming it has all the
2737 signatures from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used
2738 is not the server's preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences.
2739 (Default: 5 minutes)
2741 [[V3AuthNIntervalsValid]] **V3AuthNIntervalsValid** __NUM__::
2742 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number of VotingIntervals
2743 for which each consensus should be valid for. Choosing high numbers
2744 increases network partitioning risks; choosing low numbers increases
2745 directory traffic. Note that the actual number of intervals used is not the
2746 server's preferred number, but the consensus of all preferences. Must be at
2747 least 2. (Default: 3)
2749 [[V3BandwidthsFile]] **V3BandwidthsFile** __FILENAME__::
2750 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the location of the
2751 bandwidth-authority generated file storing information on relays' measured
2752 bandwidth capacities. To avoid inconsistent reads, bandwidth data should
2753 be written to temporary file, then renamed to the configured filename.
2756 [[V3AuthUseLegacyKey]] **V3AuthUseLegacyKey** **0**|**1**::
2757 If set, the directory authority will sign consensuses not only with its
2758 own signing key, but also with a "legacy" key and certificate with a
2759 different identity. This feature is used to migrate directory authority
2760 keys in the event of a compromise. (Default: 0)
2762 [[AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity]] **AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity** **0**|**1**::
2763 Authoritative directories only. When set to 0, OR ports with an
2764 IPv6 address are not included in the authority's votes. When set to 1,
2765 IPv6 OR ports are tested for reachability like IPv4 OR ports. If the
2766 reachability test succeeds, the authority votes for the IPv6 ORPort, and
2767 votes Running for the relay. If the reachability test fails, the authority
2768 does not vote for the IPv6 ORPort, and does not vote Running (Default: 0) +
2770 The content of the consensus depends on the number of voting authorities
2771 that set AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity:
2773 If no authorities set AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity 1, there will be no
2774 IPv6 ORPorts in the consensus.
2776 If a minority of authorities set AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity 1,
2777 unreachable IPv6 ORPorts will be removed from the consensus. But the
2778 majority of IPv4-only authorities will still vote the relay as Running.
2779 Reachable IPv6 ORPort lines will be included in the consensus
2781 If a majority of voting authorities set AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity 1,
2782 relays with unreachable IPv6 ORPorts will not be listed as Running.
2783 Reachable IPv6 ORPort lines will be included in the consensus
2784 (To ensure that any valid majority will vote relays with unreachable
2785 IPv6 ORPorts not Running, 75% of authorities must set
2786 AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity 1.)
2788 [[MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised]] **MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised** __N__::
2789 A total value, in abstract bandwidth units, describing how much
2790 measured total bandwidth an authority should have observed on the network
2791 before it will treat advertised bandwidths as wholly
2792 unreliable. (Default: 500)
2794 HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS
2795 ----------------------
2797 The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
2799 [[HiddenServiceDir]] **HiddenServiceDir** __DIRECTORY__::
2800 Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden service
2801 must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple times to
2802 specify multiple services. If DIRECTORY does not exist, Tor will create it.
2803 (Note: in current versions of Tor, if DIRECTORY is a relative path,
2804 it will be relative to the current
2805 working directory of Tor instance, not to its DataDirectory. Do not
2806 rely on this behavior; it is not guaranteed to remain the same in future
2809 [[HiddenServicePort]] **HiddenServicePort** __VIRTPORT__ [__TARGET__]::
2810 Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this
2811 option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most
2812 recent HiddenServiceDir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to
2813 the same port on 127.0.0.1 over TCP. You may override the target port,
2814 address, or both by specifying a target of addr, port, addr:port, or
2815 **unix:**__path__. (You can specify an IPv6 target as [addr]:port. Unix
2816 paths may be quoted, and may use standard C escapes.)
2817 You may also have multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user
2818 connects to that VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be
2819 chosen at random. Note that address-port pairs have to be comma-separated.
2821 [[PublishHidServDescriptors]] **PublishHidServDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
2822 If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won't
2823 advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful if
2824 you're using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you.
2827 [[HiddenServiceVersion]] **HiddenServiceVersion** **2**|**3**::
2828 A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden
2829 service. Currently, versions 2 and 3 are supported. (Default: 3)
2831 [[HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient]] **HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** __auth-type__ __client-name__,__client-name__,__...__::
2832 If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients
2833 only. The auth-type can either be \'basic' for a general-purpose
2834 authorization protocol or \'stealth' for a less scalable protocol that also
2835 hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are
2836 listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names
2837 are 1 to 16 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no
2838 spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible for
2839 clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data can be
2840 found in the hostname file. Clients need to put this authorization data in
2841 their configuration file using **HidServAuth**. This option is only for v2
2844 [[HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts]] **HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts** **0**|**1**::
2845 If set to 1, then connections to unrecognized ports do not cause the
2846 current hidden service to close rendezvous circuits. (Setting this to 0 is
2847 not an authorization mechanism; it is instead meant to be a mild
2848 inconvenience to port-scanners.) (Default: 0)
2850 [[HiddenServiceExportCircuitID]] **HiddenServiceExportCircuitID** __protocol__::
2851 The onion service will use the given protocol to expose the global circuit
2852 identifier of each inbound client circuit via the selected protocol. The only
2853 protocol supported right now \'haproxy'. This option is only for v3
2854 services. (Default: none) +
2856 The haproxy option works in the following way: when the feature is
2857 enabled, the Tor process will write a header line when a client is connecting
2858 to the onion service. The header will look like this: +
2860 "PROXY TCP6 fc00:dead:beef:4dad::ffff:ffff ::1 65535 42\r\n" +
2862 We encode the "global circuit identifier" as the last 32-bits of the first
2863 IPv6 address. All other values in the header can safely be ignored. You can
2864 compute the global circuit identifier using the following formula given the
2865 IPv6 address "fc00:dead:beef:4dad::AABB:CCDD": +
2867 global_circuit_id = (0xAA << 24) + (0xBB << 16) + (0xCC << 8) + 0xDD; +
2869 In the case above, where the last 32-bit is 0xffffffff, the global circuit
2870 identifier would be 4294967295. You can use this value together with Tor's
2871 control port where it is possible to terminate a circuit given the global
2872 circuit identifier. For more information about this see controls-spec.txt. +
2874 The HAProxy version 1 proxy protocol is described in detail at
2875 https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/doc/proxy-protocol.txt
2877 [[HiddenServiceMaxStreams]] **HiddenServiceMaxStreams** __N__::
2878 The maximum number of simultaneous streams (connections) per rendezvous
2879 circuit. The maximum value allowed is 65535. (Setting this to 0 will allow
2880 an unlimited number of simultaneous streams.) (Default: 0)
2882 [[HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit]] **HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit** **0**|**1**::
2883 If set to 1, then exceeding **HiddenServiceMaxStreams** will cause the
2884 offending rendezvous circuit to be torn down, as opposed to stream creation
2885 requests that exceed the limit being silently ignored. (Default: 0)
2887 [[RendPostPeriod]] **RendPostPeriod** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
2888 Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous
2889 service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also
2890 uploaded whenever it changes. Minimum value allowed is 10 minutes and
2891 maximum is 3.5 days. This option is only for v2 services.
2894 [[HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable]] **HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
2895 If this option is set to 1, allow the filesystem group to read the
2896 hidden service directory and hostname file. If the option is set to 0,
2897 only owner is able to read the hidden service directory. (Default: 0)
2898 Has no effect on Windows.
2900 [[HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints]] **HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints** __NUM__::
2901 Number of introduction points the hidden service will have. You can't
2902 have more than 10 for v2 service and 20 for v3. (Default: 3)
2904 [[HiddenServiceSingleHopMode]] **HiddenServiceSingleHopMode** **0**|**1**::
2905 **Experimental - Non Anonymous** Hidden Services on a tor instance in
2906 HiddenServiceSingleHopMode make one-hop (direct) circuits between the onion
2907 service server, and the introduction and rendezvous points. (Onion service
2908 descriptors are still posted using 3-hop paths, to avoid onion service
2909 directories blocking the service.)
2910 This option makes every hidden service instance hosted by a tor instance a
2911 Single Onion Service. One-hop circuits make Single Onion servers easily
2912 locatable, but clients remain location-anonymous. However, the fact that a
2913 client is accessing a Single Onion rather than a Hidden Service may be
2914 statistically distinguishable. +
2916 **WARNING:** Once a hidden service directory has been used by a tor
2917 instance in HiddenServiceSingleHopMode, it can **NEVER** be used again for
2918 a hidden service. It is best practice to create a new hidden service
2919 directory, key, and address for each new Single Onion Service and Hidden
2920 Service. It is not possible to run Single Onion Services and Hidden
2921 Services from the same tor instance: they should be run on different
2922 servers with different IP addresses. +
2924 HiddenServiceSingleHopMode requires HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode to be set
2925 to 1. Since a Single Onion service is non-anonymous, you can not configure
2926 a SOCKSPort on a tor instance that is running in
2927 **HiddenServiceSingleHopMode**. Can not be changed while tor is running.
2930 [[HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode]] **HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode** **0**|**1**::
2931 Makes hidden services non-anonymous on this tor instance. Allows the
2932 non-anonymous HiddenServiceSingleHopMode. Enables direct connections in the
2933 server-side hidden service protocol. If you are using this option,
2934 you need to disable all client-side services on your Tor instance,
2935 including setting SOCKSPort to "0". Can not be changed while tor is
2936 running. (Default: 0)
2938 Client Authorization
2939 --------------------
2943 To configure client authorization on the service side, the
2944 "<HiddenServiceDir>/authorized_clients/" needs to exists. Each file in that
2945 directory should be suffixed with ".auth" (the file name is irrelevant) and
2946 its content format MUST be:
2948 <auth-type>:<key-type>:<base32-encoded-public-key>
2950 The supported <auth-type> are: "descriptor". The supported <key-type> are:
2951 "x25519". Each file MUST contain one line only. Any malformed file will be
2954 Note that once you've configured client authorization, anyone else with the
2955 address won't be able to access it from this point on. If no authorization is
2956 configured, the service will be accessible to all.
2958 TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS
2959 -----------------------
2961 The following options are used for running a testing Tor network.
2963 [[TestingTorNetwork]] **TestingTorNetwork** **0**|**1**::
2964 If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below,
2965 so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if
2966 non-default set of DirAuthorities is set. Cannot be unset while Tor is
2970 ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1
2971 DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1
2972 EnforceDistinctSubnets 0
2974 AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0
2975 AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0
2976 ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityDownloadInitialDelay 0
2977 ClientBootstrapConsensusFallbackDownloadInitialDelay 0
2978 ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyDownloadInitialDelay 0
2979 ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0
2980 ClientRejectInternalAddresses 0
2981 CountPrivateBandwidth 1
2982 ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0
2983 ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses 1
2984 V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes
2985 V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds
2986 V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds
2987 MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 0 seconds
2988 TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes
2989 TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds
2990 TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds
2991 TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes
2992 TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes
2993 TestingServerDownloadInitialDelay 0
2994 TestingClientDownloadInitialDelay 0
2995 TestingServerConsensusDownloadInitialDelay 0
2996 TestingClientConsensusDownloadInitialDelay 0
2997 TestingBridgeDownloadInitialDelay 10
2998 TestingBridgeBootstrapDownloadInitialDelay 0
2999 TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest 5 seconds
3000 TestingDirConnectionMaxStall 30 seconds
3001 TestingEnableConnBwEvent 1
3002 TestingEnableCellStatsEvent 1
3004 [[TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval]] **TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
3005 Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before the first
3006 consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
3007 **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
3009 [[TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay]] **TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
3010 Like V3AuthVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before
3011 the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
3012 **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
3014 [[TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay]] **TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
3015 Like V3AuthDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before
3016 the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
3017 **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
3019 [[TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset]] **TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::
3020 Directory authorities offset voting start time by this much.
3021 Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)
3023 [[TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability]] **TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
3024 After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers
3025 are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this requires
3026 that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
3028 [[TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime]] **TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
3029 Clients try downloading server descriptors from directory caches after this
3030 time. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default:
3033 [[TestingMinFastFlagThreshold]] **TestingMinFastFlagThreshold** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
3034 Minimum value for the Fast flag. Overrides the ordinary minimum taken
3035 from the consensus when TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 0.)
3037 [[TestingServerDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingServerDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
3038 Initial delay in seconds for when servers should download things in general. Changing this
3039 requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)
3041 [[TestingClientDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingClientDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
3042 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download things in general. Changing this
3043 requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)
3045 [[TestingServerConsensusDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingServerConsensusDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
3046 Initial delay in seconds for when servers should download consensuses. Changing this
3047 requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)
3049 [[TestingClientConsensusDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingClientConsensusDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
3050 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download consensuses. Changing this
3051 requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)
3053 [[TestingBridgeDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingBridgeDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
3054 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download each bridge descriptor when they
3055 know that one or more of their configured bridges are running. Changing
3056 this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 10800)
3058 [[TestingBridgeBootstrapDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingBridgeBootstrapDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
3059 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download each bridge descriptor when they
3060 have just started, or when they can not contact any of their bridges.
3061 Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)
3063 [[TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest]] **TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**::
3064 When directory clients have only a few descriptors to request, they batch
3065 them until they have more, or until this amount of time has passed.
3066 Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 10
3069 [[TestingDirConnectionMaxStall]] **TestingDirConnectionMaxStall** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**::
3070 Let a directory connection stall this long before expiring it.
3071 Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default:
3074 [[TestingDirAuthVoteExit]] **TestingDirAuthVoteExit** __node__,__node__,__...__::
3075 A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and
3076 address patterns of nodes to vote Exit for regardless of their
3077 uptime, bandwidth, or exit policy. See the **ExcludeNodes**
3078 option for more information on how to specify nodes. +
3080 In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
3081 has to be set. See the **ExcludeNodes** option for more
3082 information on how to specify nodes.
3084 [[TestingDirAuthVoteExitIsStrict]] **TestingDirAuthVoteExitIsStrict** **0**|**1** ::
3085 If True (1), a node will never receive the Exit flag unless it is specified
3086 in the **TestingDirAuthVoteExit** list, regardless of its uptime, bandwidth,
3089 In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
3092 [[TestingDirAuthVoteGuard]] **TestingDirAuthVoteGuard** __node__,__node__,__...__::
3093 A list of identity fingerprints and country codes and
3094 address patterns of nodes to vote Guard for regardless of their
3095 uptime and bandwidth. See the **ExcludeNodes** option for more
3096 information on how to specify nodes. +
3098 In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
3101 [[TestingDirAuthVoteGuardIsStrict]] **TestingDirAuthVoteGuardIsStrict** **0**|**1** ::
3102 If True (1), a node will never receive the Guard flag unless it is specified
3103 in the **TestingDirAuthVoteGuard** list, regardless of its uptime and bandwidth. +
3105 In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
3108 [[TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir]] **TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir** __node__,__node__,__...__::
3109 A list of identity fingerprints and country codes and
3110 address patterns of nodes to vote HSDir for regardless of their
3111 uptime and DirPort. See the **ExcludeNodes** option for more
3112 information on how to specify nodes. +
3114 In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
3117 [[TestingDirAuthVoteHSDirIsStrict]] **TestingDirAuthVoteHSDirIsStrict** **0**|**1** ::
3118 If True (1), a node will never receive the HSDir flag unless it is specified
3119 in the **TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir** list, regardless of its uptime and DirPort. +
3121 In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
3124 [[TestingEnableConnBwEvent]] **TestingEnableConnBwEvent** **0**|**1**::
3125 If this option is set, then Tor controllers may register for CONN_BW
3126 events. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set.
3129 [[TestingEnableCellStatsEvent]] **TestingEnableCellStatsEvent** **0**|**1**::
3130 If this option is set, then Tor controllers may register for CELL_STATS
3131 events. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set.
3134 [[TestingMinExitFlagThreshold]] **TestingMinExitFlagThreshold** __N__ **KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
3135 Sets a lower-bound for assigning an exit flag when running as an
3136 authority on a testing network. Overrides the usual default lower bound
3137 of 4 KB. (Default: 0)
3139 [[TestingLinkCertLifetime]] **TestingLinkCertLifetime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**|**months**::
3140 Overrides the default lifetime for the certificates used to authenticate
3141 our X509 link cert with our ed25519 signing key.
3144 [[TestingAuthKeyLifetime]] **TestingAuthKeyLifetime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**|**months**::
3145 Overrides the default lifetime for a signing Ed25519 TLS Link authentication
3149 [[TestingLinkKeySlop]] **TestingLinkKeySlop** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours** +
3151 [[TestingAuthKeySlop]] **TestingAuthKeySlop** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours** +
3153 [[TestingSigningKeySlop]] **TestingSigningKeySlop** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::
3154 How early before the official expiration of a an Ed25519 signing key do
3155 we replace it and issue a new key?
3156 (Default: 3 hours for link and auth; 1 day for signing.)
3158 NON-PERSISTENT OPTIONS
3159 ----------------------
3161 These options are not saved to the torrc file by the "SAVECONF" controller
3162 command. Other options of this type are documented in control-spec.txt,
3163 section 5.4. End-users should mostly ignore them.
3165 [[UnderscorePorts]] **\_\_ControlPort**, **\_\_DirPort**, **\_\_DNSPort**, **\_\_ExtORPort**, **\_\_NATDPort**, **\_\_ORPort**, **\_\_SocksPort**, **\_\_TransPort**::
3166 These underscore-prefixed options are variants of the regular Port
3167 options. They behave the same, except they are not saved to the
3168 torrc file by the controller's SAVECONF command.
3174 Tor catches the following signals:
3176 [[SIGTERM]] **SIGTERM**::
3177 Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit.
3179 [[SIGINT]] **SIGINT**::
3180 Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled
3181 slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting.
3182 (The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.)
3184 [[SIGHUP]] **SIGHUP**::
3185 The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing and
3186 reopening logs), and kill and restart its helper processes if applicable.
3188 [[SIGUSR1]] **SIGUSR1**::
3189 Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and throughput.
3191 [[SIGUSR2]] **SIGUSR2**::
3192 Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels by
3195 [[SIGCHLD]] **SIGCHLD**::
3196 Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited, so it
3199 [[SIGPIPE]] **SIGPIPE**::
3200 Tor catches this signal and ignores it.
3202 [[SIGXFSZ]] **SIGXFSZ**::
3203 If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it.
3208 **@CONFDIR@/torrc**::
3209 The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs.
3212 Fallback location for torrc, if @CONFDIR@/torrc is not found.
3214 **@LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/**::
3215 The tor process stores keys and other data here.
3218 __CacheDirectory__**/cached-certs**::
3219 This file holds downloaded directory key certificates that are used to
3220 verify authenticity of documents generated by Tor directory authorities.
3222 __CacheDirectory__**/cached-consensus** and/or **cached-microdesc-consensus**::
3223 The most recent consensus network status document we've downloaded.
3225 __CacheDirectory__**/cached-descriptors** and **cached-descriptors.new**::
3226 These files hold downloaded router statuses. Some routers may appear more
3227 than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is used. Lines
3228 beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about
3229 a given router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets
3230 too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-descriptors file.
3232 __CacheDirectory__**/cached-extrainfo** and **cached-extrainfo.new**::
3233 As "cached-descriptors", but holds optionally-downloaded "extra-info"
3234 documents. Relays use these documents to send inessential information
3235 about statistics, bandwidth history, and network health to the
3236 authorities. They aren't fetched by default; see the DownloadExtraInfo
3237 option for more info.
3239 __CacheDirectory__**/cached-microdescs** and **cached-microdescs.new**::
3240 These files hold downloaded microdescriptors. Lines beginning with
3241 @-signs are annotations that contain more information about a given
3242 router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets too
3243 large, all entries are merged into a new cached-microdescs file.
3245 __CacheDirectory__**/cached-routers** and **cached-routers.new**::
3246 Obsolete versions of cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new. When
3247 Tor can't find the newer files, it looks here instead.
3249 __DataDirectory__**/state**::
3250 A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are documented in
3251 the file. These include:
3252 - The current entry guards and their status.
3253 - The current bandwidth accounting values.
3254 - When the file was last written
3255 - What version of Tor generated the state file
3256 - A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the server
3259 __DataDirectory__**/sr-state**::
3260 Authority only. State file used to record information about the current
3261 status of the shared-random-value voting state.
3263 __CacheDirectory__**/diff-cache**::
3264 Directory cache only. Holds older consensuses, and diffs from older
3265 consensuses to the most recent consensus of each type, compressed
3266 in various ways. Each file contains a set of key-value arguments
3267 describing its contents, followed by a single NUL byte, followed by the
3270 __DataDirectory__**/bw_accounting**::
3271 Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period starts
3272 and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period). This file
3273 is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the \'state' file instead.
3275 __DataDirectory__**/control_auth_cookie**::
3276 Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be
3277 overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on startup. See
3278 control-spec.txt in https://spec.torproject.org/[torspec] for details.
3279 Only used when cookie authentication is enabled.
3281 __DataDirectory__**/lock**::
3282 This file is used to prevent two Tor instances from using same data
3283 directory. If access to this file is locked, data directory is already
3286 __DataDirectory__**/key-pinning-journal**::
3287 Used by authorities. A line-based file that records mappings between
3288 RSA1024 identity keys and Ed25519 identity keys. Authorities enforce
3289 these mappings, so that once a relay has picked an Ed25519 key, stealing
3290 or factoring the RSA1024 key will no longer let an attacker impersonate
3293 __KeyDirectory__**/authority_identity_key**::
3294 A v3 directory authority's master identity key, used to authenticate its
3295 signing key. Tor doesn't use this while it's running. The tor-gencert
3296 program uses this. If you're running an authority, you should keep this
3297 key offline, and not actually put it here.
3299 __KeyDirectory__**/authority_certificate**::
3300 A v3 directory authority's certificate, which authenticates the authority's
3301 current vote- and consensus-signing key using its master identity key.
3302 Only directory authorities use this file.
3304 __KeyDirectory__**/authority_signing_key**::
3305 A v3 directory authority's signing key, used to sign votes and consensuses.
3306 Only directory authorities use this file. Corresponds to the
3307 **authority_certificate** cert.
3309 __KeyDirectory__**/legacy_certificate**::
3310 As authority_certificate: used only when V3AuthUseLegacyKey is set.
3311 See documentation for V3AuthUseLegacyKey.
3313 __KeyDirectory__**/legacy_signing_key**::
3314 As authority_signing_key: used only when V3AuthUseLegacyKey is set.
3315 See documentation for V3AuthUseLegacyKey.
3317 __KeyDirectory__**/secret_id_key**::
3318 A relay's RSA1024 permanent identity key, including private and public
3319 components. Used to sign router descriptors, and to sign other keys.
3321 __KeyDirectory__**/ed25519_master_id_public_key**::
3322 The public part of a relay's Ed25519 permanent identity key.
3324 __KeyDirectory__**/ed25519_master_id_secret_key**::
3325 The private part of a relay's Ed25519 permanent identity key. This key
3326 is used to sign the medium-term ed25519 signing key. This file can be
3327 kept offline, or kept encrypted. If so, Tor will not be able to generate
3328 new signing keys itself; you'll need to use tor --keygen yourself to do
3331 __KeyDirectory__**/ed25519_signing_secret_key**::
3332 The private and public components of a relay's medium-term Ed25519 signing
3333 key. This key is authenticated by the Ed25519 master key, in turn
3334 authenticates other keys (and router descriptors).
3336 __KeyDirectory__**/ed25519_signing_cert**::
3337 The certificate which authenticates "ed25519_signing_secret_key" as
3338 having been signed by the Ed25519 master key.
3340 __KeyDirectory__**/secret_onion_key** and **secret_onion_key.old**::
3341 A relay's RSA1024 short-term onion key. Used to decrypt old-style ("TAP")
3342 circuit extension requests. The ".old" file holds the previously
3343 generated key, which the relay uses to handle any requests that were
3344 made by clients that didn't have the new one.
3346 __KeyDirectory__**/secret_onion_key_ntor** and **secret_onion_key_ntor.old**::
3347 A relay's Curve25519 short-term onion key. Used to handle modern ("ntor")
3348 circuit extension requests. The ".old" file holds the previously
3349 generated key, which the relay uses to handle any requests that were
3350 made by clients that didn't have the new one.
3352 __DataDirectory__**/fingerprint**::
3353 Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the server's identity key.
3355 __DataDirectory__**/hashed-fingerprint**::
3356 Only used by bridges. Holds the hashed fingerprint of the bridge's
3357 identity key. (That is, the hash of the hash of the identity key.)
3359 __DataDirectory__**/approved-routers**::
3360 Only used by authoritative directory servers. This file lists
3361 the status of routers by their identity fingerprint.
3362 Each line lists a status and a fingerprint separated by
3363 whitespace. See your **fingerprint** file in the __DataDirectory__ for an
3364 example line. If the status is **!reject** then descriptors from the
3365 given identity (fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is
3366 **!invalid** then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as
3367 not valid, that is, not recommended.
3369 __DataDirectory__**/v3-status-votes**::
3370 Only for v3 authoritative directory servers. This file contains
3371 status votes from all the authoritative directory servers.
3373 __CacheDirectory__**/unverified-consensus**::
3374 This file contains a network consensus document that has been downloaded,
3375 but which we didn't have the right certificates to check yet.
3377 __CacheDirectory__**/unverified-microdesc-consensus**::
3378 This file contains a microdescriptor-flavored network consensus document
3379 that has been downloaded, but which we didn't have the right certificates
3382 __DataDirectory__**/unparseable-desc**::
3383 Onion server descriptors that Tor was unable to parse are dumped to this
3384 file. Only used for debugging.
3386 __DataDirectory__**/router-stability**::
3387 Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements for
3388 router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a good idea of
3389 how to set their Stable flags.
3391 __DataDirectory__**/stats/dirreq-stats**::
3392 Only used by directory caches and authorities. This file is used to
3393 collect directory request statistics.
3395 __DataDirectory__**/stats/entry-stats**::
3396 Only used by servers. This file is used to collect incoming connection
3397 statistics by Tor entry nodes.
3399 __DataDirectory__**/stats/bridge-stats**::
3400 Only used by servers. This file is used to collect incoming connection
3401 statistics by Tor bridges.
3403 __DataDirectory__**/stats/exit-stats**::
3404 Only used by servers. This file is used to collect outgoing connection
3405 statistics by Tor exit routers.
3407 __DataDirectory__**/stats/buffer-stats**::
3408 Only used by servers. This file is used to collect buffer usage
3411 __DataDirectory__**/stats/conn-stats**::
3412 Only used by servers. This file is used to collect approximate connection
3413 history (number of active connections over time).
3415 __DataDirectory__**/stats/hidserv-stats**::
3416 Only used by servers. This file is used to collect approximate counts
3417 of what fraction of the traffic is hidden service rendezvous traffic, and
3418 approximately how many hidden services the relay has seen.
3420 __DataDirectory__**/networkstatus-bridges**::
3421 Only used by authoritative bridge directories. Contains information
3422 about bridges that have self-reported themselves to the bridge
3425 __DataDirectory__**/approved-routers**::
3426 Authorities only. This file is used to configure which relays are
3427 known to be valid, invalid, and so forth.
3429 __HiddenServiceDirectory__**/hostname**::
3430 The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service.
3431 If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file
3432 also contains authorization data for all clients.
3434 Note that clients will ignore any extra subdomains prepended to a hidden
3435 service hostname. So if you have "xyz.onion" as your hostname, you
3436 can tell clients to connect to "www.xyz.onion" or "irc.xyz.onion"
3437 for virtual-hosting purposes.
3439 __HiddenServiceDirectory__**/private_key**::
3440 The private key for this hidden service.
3442 __HiddenServiceDirectory__**/client_keys**::
3443 Authorization data for a hidden service that is only accessible by
3446 __HiddenServiceDirectory__**/onion_service_non_anonymous**::
3447 This file is present if a hidden service key was created in
3448 **HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode**.
3452 **torsocks**(1), **torify**(1) +
3454 **https://www.torproject.org/**
3456 **torspec: https://spec.torproject.org **
3461 Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them at https://trac.torproject.org/.
3465 Roger Dingledine [arma at mit.edu], Nick Mathewson [nickm at alum.mit.edu].