1 /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
2 * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
3 * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
4 * Copyright (c) 2007-2011, The Tor Project, Inc. */
5 /* See LICENSE for licensing information */
8 * \file connection_or.c
9 * \brief Functions to handle OR connections, TLS handshaking, and
10 * cells on the network.
15 #include "circuitbuild.h"
18 #include "connection.h"
19 #include "connection_or.h"
24 #include "networkstatus.h"
29 #include "routerlist.h"
31 static int connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t
*conn
);
32 static int connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(or_connection_t
*conn
);
33 static int connection_or_send_versions(or_connection_t
*conn
);
34 static int connection_init_or_handshake_state(or_connection_t
*conn
,
36 static int connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t
*conn
,
38 char *digest_rcvd_out
);
40 /**************************************************************/
42 /** Map from identity digest of connected OR or desired OR to a connection_t
43 * with that identity digest. If there is more than one such connection_t,
44 * they form a linked list, with next_with_same_id as the next pointer. */
45 static digestmap_t
*orconn_identity_map
= NULL
;
47 /** If conn is listed in orconn_identity_map, remove it, and clear
48 * conn->identity_digest. Otherwise do nothing. */
50 connection_or_remove_from_identity_map(or_connection_t
*conn
)
54 if (!orconn_identity_map
)
56 tmp
= digestmap_get(orconn_identity_map
, conn
->identity_digest
);
58 if (!tor_digest_is_zero(conn
->identity_digest
)) {
59 log_warn(LD_BUG
, "Didn't find connection '%s' on identity map when "
60 "trying to remove it.",
61 conn
->nickname
? conn
->nickname
: "NULL");
66 if (conn
->next_with_same_id
)
67 digestmap_set(orconn_identity_map
, conn
->identity_digest
,
68 conn
->next_with_same_id
);
70 digestmap_remove(orconn_identity_map
, conn
->identity_digest
);
72 while (tmp
->next_with_same_id
) {
73 if (tmp
->next_with_same_id
== conn
) {
74 tmp
->next_with_same_id
= conn
->next_with_same_id
;
77 tmp
= tmp
->next_with_same_id
;
80 memset(conn
->identity_digest
, 0, DIGEST_LEN
);
81 conn
->next_with_same_id
= NULL
;
84 /** Remove all entries from the identity-to-orconn map, and clear
85 * all identities in OR conns.*/
87 connection_or_clear_identity_map(void)
89 smartlist_t
*conns
= get_connection_array();
90 SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conns
, connection_t
*, conn
,
92 if (conn
->type
== CONN_TYPE_OR
) {
93 or_connection_t
*or_conn
= TO_OR_CONN(conn
);
94 memset(or_conn
->identity_digest
, 0, DIGEST_LEN
);
95 or_conn
->next_with_same_id
= NULL
;
99 digestmap_free(orconn_identity_map
, NULL
);
100 orconn_identity_map
= NULL
;
103 /** Change conn->identity_digest to digest, and add conn into
104 * orconn_digest_map. */
106 connection_or_set_identity_digest(or_connection_t
*conn
, const char *digest
)
108 or_connection_t
*tmp
;
112 if (!orconn_identity_map
)
113 orconn_identity_map
= digestmap_new();
114 if (!memcmp(conn
->identity_digest
, digest
, DIGEST_LEN
))
117 /* If the identity was set previously, remove the old mapping. */
118 if (! tor_digest_is_zero(conn
->identity_digest
))
119 connection_or_remove_from_identity_map(conn
);
121 memcpy(conn
->identity_digest
, digest
, DIGEST_LEN
);
123 /* If we're setting the ID to zero, don't add a mapping. */
124 if (tor_digest_is_zero(digest
))
127 tmp
= digestmap_set(orconn_identity_map
, digest
, conn
);
128 conn
->next_with_same_id
= tmp
;
131 /* Testing code to check for bugs in representation. */
132 for (; tmp
; tmp
= tmp
->next_with_same_id
) {
133 tor_assert(!memcmp(tmp
->identity_digest
, digest
, DIGEST_LEN
));
134 tor_assert(tmp
!= conn
);
139 /** Pack the cell_t host-order structure <b>src</b> into network-order
140 * in the buffer <b>dest</b>. See tor-spec.txt for details about the
143 * Note that this function doesn't touch <b>dst</b>-\>next: the caller
144 * should set it or clear it as appropriate.
147 cell_pack(packed_cell_t
*dst
, const cell_t
*src
)
149 char *dest
= dst
->body
;
150 set_uint16(dest
, htons(src
->circ_id
));
151 *(uint8_t*)(dest
+2) = src
->command
;
152 memcpy(dest
+3, src
->payload
, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE
);
155 /** Unpack the network-order buffer <b>src</b> into a host-order
156 * cell_t structure <b>dest</b>.
159 cell_unpack(cell_t
*dest
, const char *src
)
161 dest
->circ_id
= ntohs(get_uint16(src
));
162 dest
->command
= *(uint8_t*)(src
+2);
163 memcpy(dest
->payload
, src
+3, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE
);
166 /** Write the header of <b>cell</b> into the first VAR_CELL_HEADER_SIZE
167 * bytes of <b>hdr_out</b>. */
169 var_cell_pack_header(const var_cell_t
*cell
, char *hdr_out
)
171 set_uint16(hdr_out
, htons(cell
->circ_id
));
172 set_uint8(hdr_out
+2, cell
->command
);
173 set_uint16(hdr_out
+3, htons(cell
->payload_len
));
176 /** Allocate and return a new var_cell_t with <b>payload_len</b> bytes of
179 var_cell_new(uint16_t payload_len
)
181 var_cell_t
*cell
= tor_malloc(sizeof(var_cell_t
)+payload_len
-1);
182 cell
->payload_len
= payload_len
;
188 /** Release all space held by <b>cell</b>. */
190 var_cell_free(var_cell_t
*cell
)
195 /** We've received an EOF from <b>conn</b>. Mark it for close and return. */
197 connection_or_reached_eof(or_connection_t
*conn
)
199 log_info(LD_OR
,"OR connection reached EOF. Closing.");
200 connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn
));
204 /** Handle any new bytes that have come in on connection <b>conn</b>.
205 * If conn is in 'open' state, hand it to
206 * connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf()
210 connection_or_process_inbuf(or_connection_t
*conn
)
215 switch (conn
->_base
.state
) {
216 case OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING
:
217 ret
= connection_read_proxy_handshake(TO_CONN(conn
));
219 /* start TLS after handshake completion, or deal with error */
221 tor_assert(TO_CONN(conn
)->proxy_state
== PROXY_CONNECTED
);
222 if (connection_tls_start_handshake(conn
, 0) < 0)
226 connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn
));
230 case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN
:
231 case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING
:
232 return connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(conn
);
234 return 0; /* don't do anything */
238 /** When adding cells to an OR connection's outbuf, keep adding until the
239 * outbuf is at least this long, or we run out of cells. */
240 #define OR_CONN_HIGHWATER (32*1024)
242 /** Add cells to an OR connection's outbuf whenever the outbuf's data length
243 * drops below this size. */
244 #define OR_CONN_LOWWATER (16*1024)
246 /** Called whenever we have flushed some data on an or_conn: add more data
247 * from active circuits. */
249 connection_or_flushed_some(or_connection_t
*conn
)
251 size_t datalen
= buf_datalen(conn
->_base
.outbuf
);
252 /* If we're under the low water mark, add cells until we're just over the
253 * high water mark. */
254 if (datalen
< OR_CONN_LOWWATER
) {
255 ssize_t n
= CEIL_DIV(OR_CONN_HIGHWATER
- datalen
, CELL_NETWORK_SIZE
);
256 time_t now
= approx_time();
257 while (conn
->active_circuits
&& n
> 0) {
259 flushed
= connection_or_flush_from_first_active_circuit(conn
, 1, now
);
266 /** Connection <b>conn</b> has finished writing and has no bytes left on
269 * Otherwise it's in state "open": stop writing and return.
271 * If <b>conn</b> is broken, mark it for close and return -1, else
275 connection_or_finished_flushing(or_connection_t
*conn
)
278 assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(conn
),0);
280 switch (conn
->_base
.state
) {
281 case OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING
:
282 case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN
:
283 case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING
:
284 connection_stop_writing(TO_CONN(conn
));
287 log_err(LD_BUG
,"Called in unexpected state %d.", conn
->_base
.state
);
288 tor_fragile_assert();
294 /** Connected handler for OR connections: begin the TLS handshake.
297 connection_or_finished_connecting(or_connection_t
*or_conn
)
302 conn
= TO_CONN(or_conn
);
303 tor_assert(conn
->state
== OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING
);
305 log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE
,"OR connect() to router at %s:%u finished.",
306 conn
->address
,conn
->port
);
307 control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_HANDSHAKE
, 0);
309 proxy_type
= PROXY_NONE
;
311 if (get_options()->HTTPSProxy
)
312 proxy_type
= PROXY_CONNECT
;
313 else if (get_options()->Socks4Proxy
)
314 proxy_type
= PROXY_SOCKS4
;
315 else if (get_options()->Socks5Proxy
)
316 proxy_type
= PROXY_SOCKS5
;
318 if (proxy_type
!= PROXY_NONE
) {
319 /* start proxy handshake */
320 if (connection_proxy_connect(conn
, proxy_type
) < 0) {
321 connection_mark_for_close(conn
);
325 connection_start_reading(conn
);
326 conn
->state
= OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING
;
330 if (connection_tls_start_handshake(or_conn
, 0) < 0) {
331 /* TLS handshaking error of some kind. */
332 connection_mark_for_close(conn
);
338 /** Return 1 if identity digest <b>id_digest</b> is known to be a
339 * currently or recently running relay. Otherwise return 0. */
341 connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(const char *id_digest
)
343 if (router_get_consensus_status_by_id(id_digest
))
344 return 1; /* It's in the consensus: "yes" */
345 if (router_get_by_digest(id_digest
))
346 return 1; /* Not in the consensus, but we have a descriptor for
347 * it. Probably it was in a recent consensus. "Yes". */
351 /** Set the per-conn read and write limits for <b>conn</b>. If it's a known
352 * relay, we will rely on the global read and write buckets, so give it
353 * per-conn limits that are big enough they'll never matter. But if it's
354 * not a known relay, first check if we set PerConnBwRate/Burst, then
355 * check if the consensus sets them, else default to 'big enough'.
357 * If <b>reset</b> is true, set the bucket to be full. Otherwise, just
358 * clip the bucket if it happens to be <em>too</em> full.
361 connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper(or_connection_t
*conn
, int reset
,
362 or_options_t
*options
)
364 int rate
, burst
; /* per-connection rate limiting params */
365 if (connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(conn
->identity_digest
)) {
366 /* It's in the consensus, or we have a descriptor for it meaning it
367 * was probably in a recent consensus. It's a recognized relay:
368 * give it full bandwidth. */
369 rate
= (int)options
->BandwidthRate
;
370 burst
= (int)options
->BandwidthBurst
;
372 /* Not a recognized relay. Squeeze it down based on the suggested
373 * bandwidth parameters in the consensus, but allow local config
374 * options to override. */
375 rate
= options
->PerConnBWRate
? (int)options
->PerConnBWRate
:
376 networkstatus_get_param(NULL
, "perconnbwrate",
377 (int)options
->BandwidthRate
, 1, INT32_MAX
);
378 burst
= options
->PerConnBWBurst
? (int)options
->PerConnBWBurst
:
379 networkstatus_get_param(NULL
, "perconnbwburst",
380 (int)options
->BandwidthBurst
, 1, INT32_MAX
);
383 conn
->bandwidthrate
= rate
;
384 conn
->bandwidthburst
= burst
;
385 if (reset
) { /* set up the token buckets to be full */
386 conn
->read_bucket
= conn
->write_bucket
= burst
;
389 /* If the new token bucket is smaller, take out the extra tokens.
390 * (If it's larger, don't -- the buckets can grow to reach the cap.) */
391 if (conn
->read_bucket
> burst
)
392 conn
->read_bucket
= burst
;
393 if (conn
->write_bucket
> burst
)
394 conn
->write_bucket
= burst
;
397 /** Either our set of relays or our per-conn rate limits have changed.
398 * Go through all the OR connections and update their token buckets to make
399 * sure they don't exceed their maximum values. */
401 connection_or_update_token_buckets(smartlist_t
*conns
, or_options_t
*options
)
403 SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conns
, connection_t
*, conn
,
405 if (connection_speaks_cells(conn
))
406 connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper(TO_OR_CONN(conn
), 0, options
);
410 /** If we don't necessarily know the router we're connecting to, but we
411 * have an addr/port/id_digest, then fill in as much as we can. Start
412 * by checking to see if this describes a router we know. */
414 connection_or_init_conn_from_address(or_connection_t
*conn
,
415 const tor_addr_t
*addr
, uint16_t port
,
416 const char *id_digest
,
419 routerinfo_t
*r
= router_get_by_digest(id_digest
);
420 connection_or_set_identity_digest(conn
, id_digest
);
421 connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper(conn
, 1, get_options());
423 conn
->_base
.port
= port
;
424 tor_addr_copy(&conn
->_base
.addr
, addr
);
425 tor_addr_copy(&conn
->real_addr
, addr
);
427 /* XXXX proposal 118 will make this more complex. */
428 if (tor_addr_eq_ipv4h(&conn
->_base
.addr
, r
->addr
))
429 conn
->is_canonical
= 1;
431 /* Override the addr/port, so our log messages will make sense.
432 * This is dangerous, since if we ever try looking up a conn by
433 * its actual addr/port, we won't remember. Careful! */
434 /* XXXX arma: this is stupid, and it's the reason we need real_addr
435 * to track is_canonical properly. What requires it? */
436 /* XXXX <arma> i believe the reason we did this, originally, is because
437 * we wanted to log what OR a connection was to, and if we logged the
438 * right IP address and port 56244, that wouldn't be as helpful. now we
439 * log the "right" port too, so we know if it's moria1 or moria2.
441 tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&conn
->_base
.addr
, r
->addr
);
442 conn
->_base
.port
= r
->or_port
;
444 conn
->nickname
= tor_strdup(r
->nickname
);
445 tor_free(conn
->_base
.address
);
446 conn
->_base
.address
= tor_strdup(r
->address
);
449 /* If we're an authoritative directory server, we may know a
450 * nickname for this router. */
451 n
= dirserv_get_nickname_by_digest(id_digest
);
453 conn
->nickname
= tor_strdup(n
);
455 conn
->nickname
= tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN
+2);
456 conn
->nickname
[0] = '$';
457 base16_encode(conn
->nickname
+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN
+1,
458 conn
->identity_digest
, DIGEST_LEN
);
460 tor_free(conn
->_base
.address
);
461 conn
->_base
.address
= tor_dup_addr(addr
);
465 /** Return true iff <b>a</b> is "better" than <b>b</b> for new circuits.
467 * A more canonical connection is always better than a less canonical
468 * connection. That aside, a connection is better if it has circuits and the
469 * other does not, or if it was created more recently.
471 * Requires that both input connections are open; not is_bad_for_new_circs,
472 * and not impossibly non-canonical.
474 * If <b>forgive_new_connections</b> is true, then we do not call
475 * <b>a</b>better than <b>b</b> simply because b has no circuits,
476 * unless b is also relatively old.
479 connection_or_is_better(time_t now
,
480 const or_connection_t
*a
,
481 const or_connection_t
*b
,
482 int forgive_new_connections
)
485 /** Do not definitively deprecate a new connection with no circuits on it
486 * until this much time has passed. */
487 #define NEW_CONN_GRACE_PERIOD (15*60)
489 if (b
->is_canonical
&& !a
->is_canonical
)
490 return 0; /* A canonical connection is better than a non-canonical
491 * one, no matter how new it is or which has circuits. */
493 newer
= b
->_base
.timestamp_created
< a
->_base
.timestamp_created
;
496 /* We prefer canonical connections regardless of newness. */
497 (!b
->is_canonical
&& a
->is_canonical
) ||
498 /* If both have circuits we prefer the newer: */
499 (b
->n_circuits
&& a
->n_circuits
&& newer
) ||
500 /* If neither has circuits we prefer the newer: */
501 (!b
->n_circuits
&& !a
->n_circuits
&& newer
))
504 /* If one has no circuits and the other does... */
505 if (!b
->n_circuits
&& a
->n_circuits
) {
506 /* Then it's bad, unless it's in its grace period and we're forgiving. */
507 if (forgive_new_connections
&&
508 now
< b
->_base
.timestamp_created
+ NEW_CONN_GRACE_PERIOD
)
517 /** Return the OR connection we should use to extend a circuit to the router
518 * whose identity is <b>digest</b>, and whose address we believe (or have been
519 * told in an extend cell) is <b>target_addr</b>. If there is no good
520 * connection, set *<b>msg_out</b> to a message describing the connection's
521 * state and our next action, and set <b>launch_out</b> to a boolean for
522 * whether we should launch a new connection or not.
525 connection_or_get_for_extend(const char *digest
,
526 const tor_addr_t
*target_addr
,
527 const char **msg_out
,
530 or_connection_t
*conn
, *best
=NULL
;
531 int n_inprogress_goodaddr
= 0, n_old
= 0, n_noncanonical
= 0, n_possible
= 0;
532 time_t now
= approx_time();
535 tor_assert(launch_out
);
537 if (!orconn_identity_map
) {
538 *msg_out
= "Router not connected (nothing is). Connecting.";
543 conn
= digestmap_get(orconn_identity_map
, digest
);
545 for (; conn
; conn
= conn
->next_with_same_id
) {
546 tor_assert(conn
->_base
.magic
== OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC
);
547 tor_assert(conn
->_base
.type
== CONN_TYPE_OR
);
548 tor_assert(!memcmp(conn
->identity_digest
, digest
, DIGEST_LEN
));
549 if (conn
->_base
.marked_for_close
)
551 /* Never return a non-open connection. */
552 if (conn
->_base
.state
!= OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN
) {
553 /* If the address matches, don't launch a new connection for this
555 if (!tor_addr_compare(&conn
->real_addr
, target_addr
, CMP_EXACT
))
556 ++n_inprogress_goodaddr
;
559 /* Never return a connection that shouldn't be used for circs. */
560 if (conn
->is_bad_for_new_circs
) {
564 /* Never return a non-canonical connection using a recent link protocol
565 * if the address is not what we wanted.
567 * (For old link protocols, we can't rely on is_canonical getting
568 * set properly if we're talking to the right address, since we might
569 * have an out-of-date descriptor, and we will get no NETINFO cell to
570 * tell us about the right address.) */
571 if (!conn
->is_canonical
&& conn
->link_proto
>= 2 &&
572 tor_addr_compare(&conn
->real_addr
, target_addr
, CMP_EXACT
)) {
580 best
= conn
; /* If we have no 'best' so far, this one is good enough. */
584 if (connection_or_is_better(now
, conn
, best
, 0))
589 *msg_out
= "Connection is fine; using it.";
592 } else if (n_inprogress_goodaddr
) {
593 *msg_out
= "Connection in progress; waiting.";
596 } else if (n_old
|| n_noncanonical
) {
597 *msg_out
= "Connections all too old, or too non-canonical. "
598 " Launching a new one.";
602 *msg_out
= "Not connected. Connecting.";
608 /** How old do we let a connection to an OR get before deciding it's
609 * too old for new circuits? */
610 #define TIME_BEFORE_OR_CONN_IS_TOO_OLD (60*60*24*7)
612 /** Given the head of the linked list for all the or_connections with a given
613 * identity, set elements of that list as is_bad_for_new_circs as
614 * appropriate. Helper for connection_or_set_bad_connections().
616 * Specifically, we set the is_bad_for_new_circs flag on:
617 * - all connections if <b>force</b> is true.
618 * - all connections that are too old.
619 * - all open non-canonical connections for which a canonical connection
620 * exists to the same router.
621 * - all open canonical connections for which a 'better' canonical
622 * connection exists to the same router.
623 * - all open non-canonical connections for which a 'better' non-canonical
624 * connection exists to the same router at the same address.
626 * See connection_or_is_better() for our idea of what makes one OR connection
627 * better than another.
630 connection_or_group_set_badness(or_connection_t
*head
, int force
)
632 or_connection_t
*or_conn
= NULL
, *best
= NULL
;
633 int n_old
= 0, n_inprogress
= 0, n_canonical
= 0, n_other
= 0;
634 time_t now
= time(NULL
);
636 /* Pass 1: expire everything that's old, and see what the status of
637 * everything else is. */
638 for (or_conn
= head
; or_conn
; or_conn
= or_conn
->next_with_same_id
) {
639 if (or_conn
->_base
.marked_for_close
||
640 or_conn
->is_bad_for_new_circs
)
643 or_conn
->_base
.timestamp_created
+ TIME_BEFORE_OR_CONN_IS_TOO_OLD
646 "Marking OR conn to %s:%d as too old for new circuits "
647 "(fd %d, %d secs old).",
648 or_conn
->_base
.address
, or_conn
->_base
.port
, or_conn
->_base
.s
,
649 (int)(now
- or_conn
->_base
.timestamp_created
));
650 or_conn
->is_bad_for_new_circs
= 1;
653 if (or_conn
->is_bad_for_new_circs
) {
655 } else if (or_conn
->_base
.state
!= OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN
) {
657 } else if (or_conn
->is_canonical
) {
664 /* Pass 2: We know how about how good the best connection is.
665 * expire everything that's worse, and find the very best if we can. */
666 for (or_conn
= head
; or_conn
; or_conn
= or_conn
->next_with_same_id
) {
667 if (or_conn
->_base
.marked_for_close
||
668 or_conn
->is_bad_for_new_circs
)
669 continue; /* This one doesn't need to be marked bad. */
670 if (or_conn
->_base
.state
!= OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN
)
671 continue; /* Don't mark anything bad until we have seen what happens
672 * when the connection finishes. */
673 if (n_canonical
&& !or_conn
->is_canonical
) {
674 /* We have at least one open canonical connection to this router,
675 * and this one is open but not canonical. Mark it bad. */
677 "Marking OR conn to %s:%d as unsuitable for new circuits: "
678 "(fd %d, %d secs old). It is not canonical, and we have "
679 "another connection to that OR that is.",
680 or_conn
->_base
.address
, or_conn
->_base
.port
, or_conn
->_base
.s
,
681 (int)(now
- or_conn
->_base
.timestamp_created
));
682 or_conn
->is_bad_for_new_circs
= 1;
686 if (!best
|| connection_or_is_better(now
, or_conn
, best
, 0))
693 /* Pass 3: One connection to OR is best. If it's canonical, mark as bad
694 * every other open connection. If it's non-canonical, mark as bad
695 * every other open connection to the same address.
697 * XXXX This isn't optimal; if we have connections to an OR at multiple
698 * addresses, we'd like to pick the best _for each address_, and mark as
699 * bad every open connection that isn't best for its address. But this
700 * can only occur in cases where the other OR is old (so we have no
701 * canonical connection to it), or where all the connections to the OR are
702 * at noncanonical addresses and we have no good direct connection (which
703 * means we aren't at risk of attaching circuits to it anyway). As
704 * 0.1.2.x dies out, the first case will go away, and the second one is
705 * "mostly harmless", so a fix can wait until somebody is bored.
707 for (or_conn
= head
; or_conn
; or_conn
= or_conn
->next_with_same_id
) {
708 if (or_conn
->_base
.marked_for_close
||
709 or_conn
->is_bad_for_new_circs
||
710 or_conn
->_base
.state
!= OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN
)
712 if (or_conn
!= best
&& connection_or_is_better(now
, best
, or_conn
, 1)) {
713 /* This isn't the best conn, _and_ the best conn is better than it,
714 even when we're being forgiving. */
715 if (best
->is_canonical
) {
717 "Marking OR conn to %s:%d as unsuitable for new circuits: "
718 "(fd %d, %d secs old). We have a better canonical one "
719 "(fd %d; %d secs old).",
720 or_conn
->_base
.address
, or_conn
->_base
.port
, or_conn
->_base
.s
,
721 (int)(now
- or_conn
->_base
.timestamp_created
),
722 best
->_base
.s
, (int)(now
- best
->_base
.timestamp_created
));
723 or_conn
->is_bad_for_new_circs
= 1;
724 } else if (!tor_addr_compare(&or_conn
->real_addr
,
725 &best
->real_addr
, CMP_EXACT
)) {
727 "Marking OR conn to %s:%d as unsuitable for new circuits: "
728 "(fd %d, %d secs old). We have a better one with the "
729 "same address (fd %d; %d secs old).",
730 or_conn
->_base
.address
, or_conn
->_base
.port
, or_conn
->_base
.s
,
731 (int)(now
- or_conn
->_base
.timestamp_created
),
732 best
->_base
.s
, (int)(now
- best
->_base
.timestamp_created
));
733 or_conn
->is_bad_for_new_circs
= 1;
739 /** Go through all the OR connections (or if <b>digest</b> is non-NULL, just
740 * the OR connections with that digest), and set the is_bad_for_new_circs
741 * flag based on the rules in connection_or_group_set_badness() (or just
742 * always set it if <b>force</b> is true).
745 connection_or_set_bad_connections(const char *digest
, int force
)
747 if (!orconn_identity_map
)
750 DIGESTMAP_FOREACH(orconn_identity_map
, identity
, or_connection_t
*, conn
) {
751 if (!digest
|| !memcmp(digest
, conn
->identity_digest
, DIGEST_LEN
))
752 connection_or_group_set_badness(conn
, force
);
753 } DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_END
;
756 /** <b>conn</b> is in the 'connecting' state, and it failed to complete
757 * a TCP connection. Send notifications appropriately.
759 * <b>reason</b> specifies the or_conn_end_reason for the failure;
760 * <b>msg</b> specifies the strerror-style error message.
763 connection_or_connect_failed(or_connection_t
*conn
,
764 int reason
, const char *msg
)
766 control_event_or_conn_status(conn
, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED
, reason
);
767 if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(get_options()))
768 control_event_bootstrap_problem(msg
, reason
);
771 /** Launch a new OR connection to <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b> and expect to
772 * handshake with an OR with identity digest <b>id_digest</b>.
774 * If <b>id_digest</b> is me, do nothing. If we're already connected to it,
775 * return that connection. If the connect() is in progress, set the
776 * new conn's state to 'connecting' and return it. If connect() succeeds,
777 * call connection_tls_start_handshake() on it.
779 * This function is called from router_retry_connections(), for
780 * ORs connecting to ORs, and circuit_establish_circuit(), for
781 * OPs connecting to ORs.
783 * Return the launched conn, or NULL if it failed.
786 connection_or_connect(const tor_addr_t
*_addr
, uint16_t port
,
787 const char *id_digest
)
789 or_connection_t
*conn
;
790 or_options_t
*options
= get_options();
791 int socket_error
= 0;
796 tor_assert(id_digest
);
797 tor_addr_copy(&addr
, _addr
);
799 if (server_mode(options
) && router_digest_is_me(id_digest
)) {
800 log_info(LD_PROTOCOL
,"Client asked me to connect to myself. Refusing.");
804 conn
= or_connection_new(AF_INET
);
806 /* set up conn so it's got all the data we need to remember */
807 connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn
, &addr
, port
, id_digest
, 1);
808 conn
->_base
.state
= OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING
;
809 control_event_or_conn_status(conn
, OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED
, 0);
811 /* use a proxy server if available */
812 if (options
->HTTPSProxy
) {
814 tor_addr_copy(&addr
, &options
->HTTPSProxyAddr
);
815 port
= options
->HTTPSProxyPort
;
816 } else if (options
->Socks4Proxy
) {
818 tor_addr_copy(&addr
, &options
->Socks4ProxyAddr
);
819 port
= options
->Socks4ProxyPort
;
820 } else if (options
->Socks5Proxy
) {
822 tor_addr_copy(&addr
, &options
->Socks5ProxyAddr
);
823 port
= options
->Socks5ProxyPort
;
826 switch (connection_connect(TO_CONN(conn
), conn
->_base
.address
,
827 &addr
, port
, &socket_error
)) {
829 /* If the connection failed immediately, and we're using
830 * a proxy, our proxy is down. Don't blame the Tor server. */
832 entry_guard_register_connect_status(conn
->identity_digest
,
834 connection_or_connect_failed(conn
,
835 errno_to_orconn_end_reason(socket_error
),
836 tor_socket_strerror(socket_error
));
837 connection_free(TO_CONN(conn
));
840 connection_watch_events(TO_CONN(conn
), READ_EVENT
| WRITE_EVENT
);
841 /* writable indicates finish, readable indicates broken link,
842 error indicates broken link on windows */
844 /* case 1: fall through */
847 if (connection_or_finished_connecting(conn
) < 0) {
848 /* already marked for close */
854 /** Begin the tls handshake with <b>conn</b>. <b>receiving</b> is 0 if
855 * we initiated the connection, else it's 1.
857 * Assign a new tls object to conn->tls, begin reading on <b>conn</b>, and
858 * pass <b>conn</b> to connection_tls_continue_handshake().
860 * Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0.
863 connection_tls_start_handshake(or_connection_t
*conn
, int receiving
)
865 conn
->_base
.state
= OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING
;
866 conn
->tls
= tor_tls_new(conn
->_base
.s
, receiving
);
867 tor_tls_set_logged_address(conn
->tls
, // XXX client and relay?
868 escaped_safe_str(conn
->_base
.address
));
870 log_warn(LD_BUG
,"tor_tls_new failed. Closing.");
873 connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn
));
874 log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE
,"starting TLS handshake on fd %d", conn
->_base
.s
);
875 note_crypto_pk_op(receiving
? TLS_HANDSHAKE_S
: TLS_HANDSHAKE_C
);
877 if (connection_tls_continue_handshake(conn
) < 0) {
883 /** Invoked on the server side from inside tor_tls_read() when the server
884 * gets a successful TLS renegotiation from the client. */
886 connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb(tor_tls_t
*tls
, void *_conn
)
888 or_connection_t
*conn
= _conn
;
891 /* Don't invoke this again. */
892 tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tls
, NULL
, NULL
);
893 tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tls
);
895 if (connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn
) < 0) {
896 /* XXXX_TLS double-check that it's ok to do this from inside read. */
897 /* XXXX_TLS double-check that this verifies certificates. */
898 connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn
));
902 /** Move forward with the tls handshake. If it finishes, hand
903 * <b>conn</b> to connection_tls_finish_handshake().
905 * Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0.
908 connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t
*conn
)
911 check_no_tls_errors();
913 if (conn
->_base
.state
== OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING
) {
914 // log_notice(LD_OR, "Renegotiate with %p", conn->tls);
915 result
= tor_tls_renegotiate(conn
->tls
);
916 // log_notice(LD_OR, "Result: %d", result);
918 tor_assert(conn
->_base
.state
== OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING
);
919 // log_notice(LD_OR, "Continue handshake with %p", conn->tls);
920 result
= tor_tls_handshake(conn
->tls
);
921 // log_notice(LD_OR, "Result: %d", result);
924 CASE_TOR_TLS_ERROR_ANY
:
925 log_info(LD_OR
,"tls error [%s]. breaking connection.",
926 tor_tls_err_to_string(result
));
929 if (! tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn
->tls
)) {
930 if (!tor_tls_is_server(conn
->tls
)) {
931 if (conn
->_base
.state
== OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING
) {
932 // log_notice(LD_OR,"Done. state was TLS_HANDSHAKING.");
933 conn
->_base
.state
= OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING
;
936 // log_notice(LD_OR,"Done. state was %d.", conn->_base.state);
938 /* improved handshake, but not a client. */
939 tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(conn
->tls
,
940 connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb
,
942 conn
->_base
.state
= OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING
;
943 connection_stop_writing(TO_CONN(conn
));
944 connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn
));
948 return connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn
);
949 case TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE
:
950 connection_start_writing(TO_CONN(conn
));
951 log_debug(LD_OR
,"wanted write");
953 case TOR_TLS_WANTREAD
: /* handshaking conns are *always* reading */
954 log_debug(LD_OR
,"wanted read");
957 log_info(LD_OR
,"tls closed. breaking connection.");
963 /** Return 1 if we initiated this connection, or 0 if it started
964 * out as an incoming connection.
967 connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_connection_t
*conn
)
969 tor_assert(conn
->_base
.type
== CONN_TYPE_OR
);
971 return 1; /* it's still in proxy states or something */
972 if (conn
->handshake_state
)
973 return conn
->handshake_state
->started_here
;
974 return !tor_tls_is_server(conn
->tls
);
977 /** <b>Conn</b> just completed its handshake. Return 0 if all is well, and
978 * return -1 if he is lying, broken, or otherwise something is wrong.
980 * If we initiated this connection (<b>started_here</b> is true), make sure
981 * the other side sent a correctly formed certificate. If I initiated the
982 * connection, make sure it's the right guy.
984 * Otherwise (if we _didn't_ initiate this connection), it's okay for
985 * the certificate to be weird or absent.
987 * If we return 0, and the certificate is as expected, write a hash of the
988 * identity key into <b>digest_rcvd_out</b>, which must have DIGEST_LEN
990 * If the certificate is invalid or missing on an incoming connection,
991 * we return 0 and set <b>digest_rcvd_out</b> to DIGEST_LEN NUL bytes.
992 * (If we return -1, the contents of this buffer are undefined.)
995 * 1) Set conn->circ_id_type according to tor-spec.txt.
996 * 2) If we're an authdirserver and we initiated the connection: drop all
997 * descriptors that claim to be on that IP/port but that aren't
998 * this guy; and note that this guy is reachable.
999 * 3) If this is a bridge and we didn't configure its identity
1000 * fingerprint, remember the keyid we just learned.
1003 connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t
*conn
,
1005 char *digest_rcvd_out
)
1007 crypto_pk_env_t
*identity_rcvd
=NULL
;
1008 or_options_t
*options
= get_options();
1009 int severity
= server_mode(options
) ? LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN
: LOG_WARN
;
1010 const char *safe_address
=
1011 started_here
? conn
->_base
.address
:
1012 safe_str_client(conn
->_base
.address
);
1013 const char *conn_type
= started_here
? "outgoing" : "incoming";
1014 crypto_pk_env_t
*our_identity
=
1015 started_here
? get_tlsclient_identity_key() :
1016 get_server_identity_key();
1017 int has_cert
= 0, has_identity
=0;
1019 check_no_tls_errors();
1020 has_cert
= tor_tls_peer_has_cert(conn
->tls
);
1021 if (started_here
&& !has_cert
) {
1022 log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE
,"Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but it didn't "
1023 "send a cert! Closing.",
1024 safe_address
, conn
->_base
.port
);
1026 } else if (!has_cert
) {
1027 log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE
,"Got incoming connection with no certificate. "
1030 check_no_tls_errors();
1033 int v
= tor_tls_verify(started_here
?severity
:LOG_INFO
,
1034 conn
->tls
, &identity_rcvd
);
1035 if (started_here
&& v
<0) {
1036 log_fn(severity
,LD_HANDSHAKE
,"Tried connecting to router at %s:%d: It"
1037 " has a cert but it's invalid. Closing.",
1038 safe_address
, conn
->_base
.port
);
1041 log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE
,"Incoming connection gave us an invalid cert "
1042 "chain; ignoring.");
1044 log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE
,
1045 "The certificate seems to be valid on %s connection "
1046 "with %s:%d", conn_type
, safe_address
, conn
->_base
.port
);
1048 check_no_tls_errors();
1051 if (identity_rcvd
) {
1053 crypto_pk_get_digest(identity_rcvd
, digest_rcvd_out
);
1054 if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(our_identity
, identity_rcvd
)<0) {
1055 conn
->circ_id_type
= CIRC_ID_TYPE_LOWER
;
1057 conn
->circ_id_type
= CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER
;
1059 crypto_free_pk_env(identity_rcvd
);
1061 memset(digest_rcvd_out
, 0, DIGEST_LEN
);
1062 conn
->circ_id_type
= CIRC_ID_TYPE_NEITHER
;
1065 if (started_here
&& tor_digest_is_zero(conn
->identity_digest
)) {
1066 connection_or_set_identity_digest(conn
, digest_rcvd_out
);
1067 tor_free(conn
->nickname
);
1068 conn
->nickname
= tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN
+2);
1069 conn
->nickname
[0] = '$';
1070 base16_encode(conn
->nickname
+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN
+1,
1071 conn
->identity_digest
, DIGEST_LEN
);
1072 log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE
, "Connected to router %s at %s:%d without knowing "
1073 "its key. Hoping for the best.",
1074 conn
->nickname
, conn
->_base
.address
, conn
->_base
.port
);
1075 /* if it's a bridge and we didn't know its identity fingerprint, now
1076 * we do -- remember it for future attempts. */
1077 learned_router_identity(&conn
->_base
.addr
, conn
->_base
.port
,
1082 int as_advertised
= 1;
1083 tor_assert(has_cert
);
1084 tor_assert(has_identity
);
1085 if (memcmp(digest_rcvd_out
, conn
->identity_digest
, DIGEST_LEN
)) {
1086 /* I was aiming for a particular digest. I didn't get it! */
1087 char seen
[HEX_DIGEST_LEN
+1];
1088 char expected
[HEX_DIGEST_LEN
+1];
1089 base16_encode(seen
, sizeof(seen
), digest_rcvd_out
, DIGEST_LEN
);
1090 base16_encode(expected
, sizeof(expected
), conn
->identity_digest
,
1092 log_fn(severity
, LD_HANDSHAKE
,
1093 "Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but identity key was not "
1094 "as expected: wanted %s but got %s.",
1095 conn
->_base
.address
, conn
->_base
.port
, expected
, seen
);
1096 entry_guard_register_connect_status(conn
->identity_digest
, 0, 1,
1098 control_event_or_conn_status(conn
, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED
,
1099 END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY
);
1100 if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options
))
1101 control_event_bootstrap_problem("foo", END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY
);
1104 if (authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options
)) {
1105 dirserv_orconn_tls_done(conn
->_base
.address
, conn
->_base
.port
,
1106 digest_rcvd_out
, as_advertised
);
1114 /** The tls handshake is finished.
1116 * Make sure we are happy with the person we just handshaked with.
1118 * If he initiated the connection, make sure he's not already connected,
1119 * then initialize conn from the information in router.
1121 * If all is successful, call circuit_n_conn_done() to handle events
1122 * that have been pending on the <tls handshake completion. Also set the
1123 * directory to be dirty (only matters if I'm an authdirserver).
1126 connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t
*conn
)
1128 char digest_rcvd
[DIGEST_LEN
];
1129 int started_here
= connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn
);
1131 log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE
,"tls handshake with %s done. verifying.",
1132 safe_str_client(conn
->_base
.address
));
1134 directory_set_dirty();
1136 if (connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(conn
, started_here
,
1140 circuit_build_times_network_is_live(&circ_times
);
1142 if (tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn
->tls
)) {
1143 conn
->link_proto
= 1;
1144 if (!started_here
) {
1145 connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn
, &conn
->_base
.addr
,
1146 conn
->_base
.port
, digest_rcvd
, 0);
1148 tor_tls_block_renegotiation(conn
->tls
);
1149 return connection_or_set_state_open(conn
);
1151 conn
->_base
.state
= OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING
;
1152 if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(conn
, started_here
) < 0)
1154 if (!started_here
) {
1155 connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn
, &conn
->_base
.addr
,
1156 conn
->_base
.port
, digest_rcvd
, 0);
1158 return connection_or_send_versions(conn
);
1162 /** Allocate a new connection handshake state for the connection
1163 * <b>conn</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
1165 connection_init_or_handshake_state(or_connection_t
*conn
, int started_here
)
1167 or_handshake_state_t
*s
;
1168 s
= conn
->handshake_state
= tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_handshake_state_t
));
1169 s
->started_here
= started_here
? 1 : 0;
1173 /** Free all storage held by <b>state</b>. */
1175 or_handshake_state_free(or_handshake_state_t
*state
)
1179 memset(state
, 0xBE, sizeof(or_handshake_state_t
));
1183 /** Set <b>conn</b>'s state to OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN, and tell other subsystems
1184 * as appropriate. Called when we are done with all TLS and OR handshaking.
1187 connection_or_set_state_open(or_connection_t
*conn
)
1189 int started_here
= connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn
);
1190 time_t now
= time(NULL
);
1191 conn
->_base
.state
= OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN
;
1192 control_event_or_conn_status(conn
, OR_CONN_EVENT_CONNECTED
, 0);
1195 circuit_build_times_network_is_live(&circ_times
);
1196 rep_hist_note_connect_succeeded(conn
->identity_digest
, now
);
1197 if (entry_guard_register_connect_status(conn
->identity_digest
,
1199 /* Close any circuits pending on this conn. We leave it in state
1200 * 'open' though, because it didn't actually *fail* -- we just
1201 * chose not to use it. (Otherwise
1202 * connection_about_to_close_connection() will call a big pile of
1203 * functions to indicate we shouldn't try it again.) */
1204 log_debug(LD_OR
, "New entry guard was reachable, but closing this "
1205 "connection so we can retry the earlier entry guards.");
1206 circuit_n_conn_done(conn
, 0);
1209 router_set_status(conn
->identity_digest
, 1);
1211 /* only report it to the geoip module if it's not a known router */
1212 if (!router_get_by_digest(conn
->identity_digest
)) {
1213 if (tor_addr_family(&TO_CONN(conn
)->addr
) == AF_INET
) {
1214 /*XXXX IP6 support ipv6 geoip.*/
1215 uint32_t a
= tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&TO_CONN(conn
)->addr
);
1216 geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT
, a
, now
);
1221 or_handshake_state_free(conn
->handshake_state
);
1222 conn
->handshake_state
= NULL
;
1224 connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn
));
1225 circuit_n_conn_done(conn
, 1); /* send the pending creates, if any. */
1230 /** Pack <b>cell</b> into wire-format, and write it onto <b>conn</b>'s outbuf.
1231 * For cells that use or affect a circuit, this should only be called by
1232 * connection_or_flush_from_first_active_circuit().
1235 connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(const cell_t
*cell
, or_connection_t
*conn
)
1237 packed_cell_t networkcell
;
1242 cell_pack(&networkcell
, cell
);
1244 connection_write_to_buf(networkcell
.body
, CELL_NETWORK_SIZE
, TO_CONN(conn
));
1246 if (cell
->command
!= CELL_PADDING
)
1247 conn
->timestamp_last_added_nonpadding
= approx_time();
1250 /** Pack a variable-length <b>cell</b> into wire-format, and write it onto
1251 * <b>conn</b>'s outbuf. Right now, this <em>DOES NOT</em> support cells that
1255 connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(const var_cell_t
*cell
,
1256 or_connection_t
*conn
)
1258 char hdr
[VAR_CELL_HEADER_SIZE
];
1261 var_cell_pack_header(cell
, hdr
);
1262 connection_write_to_buf(hdr
, sizeof(hdr
), TO_CONN(conn
));
1263 connection_write_to_buf((char*)cell
->payload
,
1264 cell
->payload_len
, TO_CONN(conn
));
1265 if (cell
->command
!= CELL_PADDING
)
1266 conn
->timestamp_last_added_nonpadding
= approx_time();
1269 /** See whether there's a variable-length cell waiting on <b>conn</b>'s
1270 * inbuf. Return values as for fetch_var_cell_from_buf(). */
1272 connection_fetch_var_cell_from_buf(or_connection_t
*conn
, var_cell_t
**out
)
1274 return fetch_var_cell_from_buf(conn
->_base
.inbuf
, out
, conn
->link_proto
);
1277 /** Process cells from <b>conn</b>'s inbuf.
1279 * Loop: while inbuf contains a cell, pull it off the inbuf, unpack it,
1280 * and hand it to command_process_cell().
1285 connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(or_connection_t
*conn
)
1287 var_cell_t
*var_cell
;
1291 "%d: starting, inbuf_datalen %d (%d pending in tls object).",
1292 conn
->_base
.s
,(int)buf_datalen(conn
->_base
.inbuf
),
1293 tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(conn
->tls
));
1294 if (connection_fetch_var_cell_from_buf(conn
, &var_cell
)) {
1296 return 0; /* not yet. */
1297 circuit_build_times_network_is_live(&circ_times
);
1298 command_process_var_cell(var_cell
, conn
);
1299 var_cell_free(var_cell
);
1301 char buf
[CELL_NETWORK_SIZE
];
1303 if (buf_datalen(conn
->_base
.inbuf
) < CELL_NETWORK_SIZE
) /* whole response
1305 return 0; /* not yet */
1307 circuit_build_times_network_is_live(&circ_times
);
1308 connection_fetch_from_buf(buf
, CELL_NETWORK_SIZE
, TO_CONN(conn
));
1310 /* retrieve cell info from buf (create the host-order struct from the
1311 * network-order string) */
1312 cell_unpack(&cell
, buf
);
1314 command_process_cell(&cell
, conn
);
1319 /** Write a destroy cell with circ ID <b>circ_id</b> and reason <b>reason</b>
1320 * onto OR connection <b>conn</b>. Don't perform range-checking on reason:
1321 * we may want to propagate reasons from other cells.
1326 connection_or_send_destroy(circid_t circ_id
, or_connection_t
*conn
, int reason
)
1332 memset(&cell
, 0, sizeof(cell_t
));
1333 cell
.circ_id
= circ_id
;
1334 cell
.command
= CELL_DESTROY
;
1335 cell
.payload
[0] = (uint8_t) reason
;
1336 log_debug(LD_OR
,"Sending destroy (circID %d).", circ_id
);
1338 connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell
, conn
);
1342 /** Array of recognized link protocol versions. */
1343 static const uint16_t or_protocol_versions
[] = { 1, 2 };
1344 /** Number of versions in <b>or_protocol_versions</b>. */
1345 static const int n_or_protocol_versions
=
1346 (int)( sizeof(or_protocol_versions
)/sizeof(uint16_t) );
1348 /** Return true iff <b>v</b> is a link protocol version that this Tor
1349 * implementation believes it can support. */
1351 is_or_protocol_version_known(uint16_t v
)
1354 for (i
= 0; i
< n_or_protocol_versions
; ++i
) {
1355 if (or_protocol_versions
[i
] == v
)
1361 /** Send a VERSIONS cell on <b>conn</b>, telling the other host about the
1362 * link protocol versions that this Tor can support. */
1364 connection_or_send_versions(or_connection_t
*conn
)
1368 tor_assert(conn
->handshake_state
&&
1369 !conn
->handshake_state
->sent_versions_at
);
1370 cell
= var_cell_new(n_or_protocol_versions
* 2);
1371 cell
->command
= CELL_VERSIONS
;
1372 for (i
= 0; i
< n_or_protocol_versions
; ++i
) {
1373 uint16_t v
= or_protocol_versions
[i
];
1374 set_uint16(cell
->payload
+(2*i
), htons(v
));
1377 connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell
, conn
);
1378 conn
->handshake_state
->sent_versions_at
= time(NULL
);
1380 var_cell_free(cell
);
1384 /** Send a NETINFO cell on <b>conn</b>, telling the other server what we know
1385 * about their address, our address, and the current time. */
1387 connection_or_send_netinfo(or_connection_t
*conn
)
1390 time_t now
= time(NULL
);
1395 memset(&cell
, 0, sizeof(cell_t
));
1396 cell
.command
= CELL_NETINFO
;
1399 set_uint32(cell
.payload
, htonl((uint32_t)now
));
1401 /* Their address. */
1402 out
= cell
.payload
+ 4;
1403 len
= append_address_to_payload(out
, &conn
->_base
.addr
);
1409 if ((me
= router_get_my_routerinfo())) {
1411 *out
++ = 1; /* only one address is supported. */
1413 tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&my_addr
, me
->addr
);
1414 len
= append_address_to_payload(out
, &my_addr
);
1422 connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell
, conn
);