src/or/onion_tap.c

   1 /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
   2  * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
   3  * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
   4  * Copyright (c) 2007-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */
   5 /* See LICENSE for licensing information */
   6
   7 /**
   8  * \file onion_tap.c
   9  * \brief Functions to implement the original Tor circuit extension handshake
  10  * (a.k.a TAP).
  11  *
  12  * We didn't call it "TAP" ourselves -- Ian Goldberg named it in "On the
  13  * Security of the Tor Authentication Protocol".  (Spoiler: it's secure, but
  14  * its security is kind of fragile and implementation dependent.  Never modify
  15  * this implementation without reading and understanding that paper at least.)
  16  **/
  17
  18 #include "or.h"
  19 #include "config.h"
  20 #include "onion_tap.h"
  21 #include "rephist.h"
  22
  23 /*----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
  24
  25 /** Given a router's 128 byte public key,
  26  * stores the following in onion_skin_out:
  27  *   - [42 bytes] OAEP padding
  28  *   - [16 bytes] Symmetric key for encrypting blob past RSA
  29  *   - [70 bytes] g^x part 1 (inside the RSA)
  30  *   - [58 bytes] g^x part 2 (symmetrically encrypted)
  31  *
  32  * Stores the DH private key into handshake_state_out for later completion
  33  * of the handshake.
  34  *
  35  * The meeting point/cookies and auth are zeroed out for now.
  36  */
  37 int
  38 onion_skin_TAP_create(crypto_pk_t *dest_router_key,
  39                   crypto_dh_t **handshake_state_out,
  40                   char *onion_skin_out) /* TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN bytes */
  41 {
  42   char challenge[DH_KEY_LEN];
  43   crypto_dh_t *dh = NULL;
  44   int dhbytes, pkbytes;
  45
  46   tor_assert(dest_router_key);
  47   tor_assert(handshake_state_out);
  48   tor_assert(onion_skin_out);
  49   *handshake_state_out = NULL;
  50   memset(onion_skin_out, 0, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
  51
  52   if (!(dh = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_CIRCUIT)))
  53     goto err;
  54
  55   dhbytes = crypto_dh_get_bytes(dh);
  56   pkbytes = (int) crypto_pk_keysize(dest_router_key);
  57   tor_assert(dhbytes == 128);
  58   tor_assert(pkbytes == 128);
  59
  60   if (crypto_dh_get_public(dh, challenge, dhbytes))
  61     goto err;
  62
  63   note_crypto_pk_op(ENC_ONIONSKIN);
  64
  65   /* set meeting point, meeting cookie, etc here. Leave zero for now. */
  66   if (crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(dest_router_key, onion_skin_out,
  67                                       TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN,
  68                                       challenge, DH_KEY_LEN,
  69                                       PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 1)<0)
  70     goto err;
  71
  72   memwipe(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge));
  73   *handshake_state_out = dh;
  74
  75   return 0;
  76  err:
  77   memwipe(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge));
  78   if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh);
  79   return -1;
  80 }
  81
  82 /** Given an encrypted DH public key as generated by onion_skin_create,
  83  * and the private key for this onion router, generate the reply (128-byte
  84  * DH plus the first 20 bytes of shared key material), and store the
  85  * next key_out_len bytes of key material in key_out.
  86  */
  87 int
  88 onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(
  89                             /*TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN*/
  90                             const char *onion_skin,
  91                             crypto_pk_t *private_key,
  92                             crypto_pk_t *prev_private_key,
  93                             /*TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN*/
  94                             char *handshake_reply_out,
  95                             char *key_out,
  96                             size_t key_out_len)
  97 {
  98   char challenge[TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN];
  99   crypto_dh_t *dh = NULL;
 100   ssize_t len;
 101   char *key_material=NULL;
 102   size_t key_material_len=0;
 103   int i;
 104   crypto_pk_t *k;
 105
 106   len = -1;
 107   for (i=0;i<2;++i) {
 108     k = i==0?private_key:prev_private_key;
 109     if (!k)
 110       break;
 111     note_crypto_pk_op(DEC_ONIONSKIN);
 112     len = crypto_pk_private_hybrid_decrypt(k, challenge,
 113                                            TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN,
 114                                            onion_skin,
 115                                            TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN,
 116                                            PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING,0);
 117     if (len>0)
 118       break;
 119   }
 120   if (len<0) {
 121     log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,
 122              "Couldn't decrypt onionskin: client may be using old onion key");
 123     goto err;
 124   } else if (len != DH_KEY_LEN) {
 125     log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unexpected onionskin length after decryption: %ld",
 126              (long)len);
 127     goto err;
 128   }
 129
 130   dh = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_CIRCUIT);
 131   if (!dh) {
 132     log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't allocate DH key");
 133     goto err;
 134   }
 135   if (crypto_dh_get_public(dh, handshake_reply_out, DH_KEY_LEN)) {
 136     log_info(LD_GENERAL, "crypto_dh_get_public failed.");
 137     goto err;
 138   }
 139
 140   key_material_len = DIGEST_LEN+key_out_len;
 141   key_material = tor_malloc(key_material_len);
 142   len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, dh, challenge,
 143                                  DH_KEY_LEN, key_material,
 144                                  key_material_len);
 145   if (len < 0) {
 146     log_info(LD_GENERAL, "crypto_dh_compute_secret failed.");
 147     goto err;
 148   }
 149
 150   /* send back H(K|0) as proof that we learned K. */
 151   memcpy(handshake_reply_out+DH_KEY_LEN, key_material, DIGEST_LEN);
 152
 153   /* use the rest of the key material for our shared keys, digests, etc */
 154   memcpy(key_out, key_material+DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len);
 155
 156   memwipe(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge));
 157   memwipe(key_material, 0, key_material_len);
 158   tor_free(key_material);
 159   crypto_dh_free(dh);
 160   return 0;
 161  err:
 162   memwipe(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge));
 163   if (key_material) {
 164     memwipe(key_material, 0, key_material_len);
 165     tor_free(key_material);
 166   }
 167   if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh);
 168
 169   return -1;
 170 }
 171
 172 /** Finish the client side of the DH handshake.
 173  * Given the 128 byte DH reply + 20 byte hash as generated by
 174  * onion_skin_server_handshake and the handshake state generated by
 175  * onion_skin_create, verify H(K) with the first 20 bytes of shared
 176  * key material, then generate key_out_len more bytes of shared key
 177  * material and store them in key_out.
 178  *
 179  * After the invocation, call crypto_dh_free on handshake_state.
 180  */
 181 int
 182 onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(crypto_dh_t *handshake_state,
 183             const char *handshake_reply, /* TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN bytes */
 184             char *key_out,
 185             size_t key_out_len)
 186 {
 187   ssize_t len;
 188   char *key_material=NULL;
 189   size_t key_material_len;
 190   tor_assert(crypto_dh_get_bytes(handshake_state) == DH_KEY_LEN);
 191
 192   key_material_len = DIGEST_LEN + key_out_len;
 193   key_material = tor_malloc(key_material_len);
 194   len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, handshake_state,
 195                                  handshake_reply, DH_KEY_LEN, key_material,
 196                                  key_material_len);
 197   if (len < 0)
 198     goto err;
 199
 200   if (tor_memneq(key_material, handshake_reply+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN)) {
 201     /* H(K) does *not* match. Something fishy. */
 202     log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"Digest DOES NOT MATCH on onion handshake. "
 203              "Bug or attack.");
 204     goto err;
 205   }
 206
 207   /* use the rest of the key material for our shared keys, digests, etc */
 208   memcpy(key_out, key_material+DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len);
 209
 210   memwipe(key_material, 0, key_material_len);
 211   tor_free(key_material);
 212   return 0;
 213  err:
 214   memwipe(key_material, 0, key_material_len);
 215   tor_free(key_material);
 216   return -1;
 217 }
 218