1 // Copyright (c) The Tor Project, Inc.
2 // See LICENSE for licensing information
3 // This is an asciidoc file used to generate the manpage/html reference.
4 // Learn asciidoc on http://www.methods.co.nz/asciidoc/userguide.html
6 :man manual: Tor Manual
12 tor - The second-generation onion router
17 **tor** [__OPTION__ __value__]...
21 Tor is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication
22 service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and
23 negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node
24 knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down
25 the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals
26 the downstream node. +
28 Basically, Tor provides a distributed network of servers or relays ("onion routers").
29 Users bounce their TCP streams -- web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc. -- around the
30 network, and recipients, observers, and even the relays themselves have
31 difficulty tracking the source of the stream.
33 By default, **tor** will act as a client only. To help the network
34 by providing bandwidth as a relay, change the **ORPort** configuration
35 option -- see below. Please also consult the documentation on the Tor
40 [[opt-h]] **-h**, **-help**::
41 Display a short help message and exit.
43 [[opt-f]] **-f** __FILE__::
44 Specify a new configuration file to contain further Tor configuration
45 options OR pass *-* to make Tor read its configuration from standard
46 input. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc, or $HOME/.torrc if that file is not
49 [[opt-allow-missing-torrc]] **--allow-missing-torrc**::
50 Do not require that configuration file specified by **-f** exist if
51 default torrc can be accessed.
53 [[opt-defaults-torrc]] **--defaults-torrc** __FILE__::
54 Specify a file in which to find default values for Tor options. The
55 contents of this file are overridden by those in the regular
56 configuration file, and by those on the command line. (Default:
57 @CONFDIR@/torrc-defaults.)
59 [[opt-ignore-missing-torrc]] **--ignore-missing-torrc**::
60 Specifies that Tor should treat a missing torrc file as though it
61 were empty. Ordinarily, Tor does this for missing default torrc files,
62 but not for those specified on the command line.
64 [[opt-hash-password]] **--hash-password** __PASSWORD__::
65 Generates a hashed password for control port access.
67 [[opt-list-fingerprint]] **--list-fingerprint**::
68 Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint.
70 [[opt-verify-config]] **--verify-config**::
71 Verify the configuration file is valid.
73 [[opt-serviceinstall]] **--service install** [**--options** __command-line options__]::
74 Install an instance of Tor as a Windows service, with the provided
75 command-line options. Current instructions can be found at
76 https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#NTService
78 [[opt-service]] **--service** **remove**|**start**|**stop**::
79 Remove, start, or stop a configured Tor Windows service.
81 [[opt-nt-service]] **--nt-service**::
82 Used internally to implement a Windows service.
84 [[opt-list-torrc-options]] **--list-torrc-options**::
85 List all valid options.
87 [[opt-list-deprecated-options]] **--list-deprecated-options**::
88 List all valid options that are scheduled to become obsolete in a
89 future version. (This is a warning, not a promise.)
91 [[opt-list-modules]] **--list-modules**::
92 For each optional module, list whether or not it has been compiled
93 into Tor. (Any module not listed is not optional in this version of Tor.)
95 [[opt-version]] **--version**::
96 Display Tor version and exit. The output is a single line of the format
97 "Tor version [version number]." (The version number format
98 is as specified in version-spec.txt.)
100 [[opt-quiet]] **--quiet**|**--hush**::
101 Override the default console log. By default, Tor starts out logging
102 messages at level "notice" and higher to the console. It stops doing so
103 after it parses its configuration, if the configuration tells it to log
104 anywhere else. You can override this behavior with the **--hush** option,
105 which tells Tor to only send warnings and errors to the console, or with
106 the **--quiet** option, which tells Tor not to log to the console at all.
108 [[opt-keygen]] **--keygen** [**--newpass**]::
109 Running "tor --keygen" creates a new ed25519 master identity key for a
110 relay, or only a fresh temporary signing key and certificate, if you
111 already have a master key. Optionally you can encrypt the master identity
112 key with a passphrase: Tor will ask you for one. If you don't want to
113 encrypt the master key, just don't enter any passphrase when asked. +
115 The **--newpass** option should be used with --keygen only when you need
116 to add, change, or remove a passphrase on an existing ed25519 master
117 identity key. You will be prompted for the old passphase (if any),
118 and the new passphrase (if any). +
120 When generating a master key, you will probably want to use
121 **--DataDirectory** to control where the keys
122 and certificates will be stored, and **--SigningKeyLifetime** to
123 control their lifetimes. Their behavior is as documented in the
124 server options section below. (You must have write access to the specified
127 To use the generated files, you must copy them to the DataDirectory/keys
128 directory of your Tor daemon, and make sure that they are owned by the
129 user actually running the Tor daemon on your system.
131 **--passphrase-fd** __FILEDES__::
132 Filedescriptor to read the passphrase from. Note that unlike with the
133 tor-gencert program, the entire file contents are read and used as
134 the passphrase, including any trailing newlines.
135 Default: read from the terminal.
137 [[opt-key-expiration]] **--key-expiration** [**purpose**]::
138 The **purpose** specifies which type of key certificate to determine
139 the expiration of. The only currently recognised **purpose** is
142 Running "tor --key-expiration sign" will attempt to find your signing
143 key certificate and will output, both in the logs as well as to stdout,
144 the signing key certificate's expiration time in ISO-8601 format.
145 For example, the output sent to stdout will be of the form:
146 "signing-cert-expiry: 2017-07-25 08:30:15 UTC"
148 Other options can be specified on the command-line in the format "--option
149 value", in the format "option value", or in a configuration file. For
150 instance, you can tell Tor to start listening for SOCKS connections on port
151 9999 by passing --SocksPort 9999 or SocksPort 9999 to it on the command line,
152 or by putting "SocksPort 9999" in the configuration file. You will need to
153 quote options with spaces in them: if you want Tor to log all debugging
154 messages to debug.log, you will probably need to say --Log 'debug file
157 Options on the command line override those in configuration files. See the
158 next section for more information.
160 THE CONFIGURATION FILE FORMAT
161 -----------------------------
163 All configuration options in a configuration are written on a single line by
164 default. They take the form of an option name and a value, or an option name
165 and a quoted value (option value or option "value"). Anything after a #
166 character is treated as a comment. Options are
167 case-insensitive. C-style escaped characters are allowed inside quoted
168 values. To split one configuration entry into multiple lines, use a single
169 backslash character (\) before the end of the line. Comments can be used in
170 such multiline entries, but they must start at the beginning of a line.
172 Configuration options can be imported from files or folders using the %include
173 option with the value being a path. If the path is a file, the options from the
174 file will be parsed as if they were written where the %include option is. If
175 the path is a folder, all files on that folder will be parsed following lexical
176 order. Files starting with a dot are ignored. Files on subfolders are ignored.
177 The %include option can be used recursively.
179 By default, an option on the command line overrides an option found in the
180 configuration file, and an option in a configuration file overrides one in
183 This rule is simple for options that take a single value, but it can become
184 complicated for options that are allowed to occur more than once: if you
185 specify four SocksPorts in your configuration file, and one more SocksPort on
186 the command line, the option on the command line will replace __all__ of the
187 SocksPorts in the configuration file. If this isn't what you want, prefix
188 the option name with a plus sign (+), and it will be appended to the previous
189 set of options instead. For example, setting SocksPort 9100 will use only
190 port 9100, but setting +SocksPort 9100 will use ports 9100 and 9050 (because
191 this is the default).
193 Alternatively, you might want to remove every instance of an option in the
194 configuration file, and not replace it at all: you might want to say on the
195 command line that you want no SocksPorts at all. To do that, prefix the
196 option name with a forward slash (/). You can use the plus sign (+) and the
197 forward slash (/) in the configuration file and on the command line.
202 [[BandwidthRate]] **BandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
203 A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node
204 to the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing
205 bandwidth usage to that same value. If you want to run a relay in the
206 public network, this needs to be _at the very least_ 75 KBytes for a
207 relay (that is, 600 kbits) or 50 KBytes for a bridge (400 kbits) -- but of
208 course, more is better; we recommend at least 250 KBytes (2 mbits) if
209 possible. (Default: 1 GByte) +
211 Note that this option, and other bandwidth-limiting options, apply to TCP
212 data only: They do not count TCP headers or DNS traffic. +
214 With this option, and in other options that take arguments in bytes,
215 KBytes, and so on, other formats are also supported. Notably, "KBytes" can
216 also be written as "kilobytes" or "kb"; "MBytes" can be written as
217 "megabytes" or "MB"; "kbits" can be written as "kilobits"; and so forth.
218 Tor also accepts "byte" and "bit" in the singular.
219 The prefixes "tera" and "T" are also recognized.
220 If no units are given, we default to bytes.
221 To avoid confusion, we recommend writing "bytes" or "bits" explicitly,
222 since it's easy to forget that "B" means bytes, not bits.
224 [[BandwidthBurst]] **BandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
225 Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given
226 number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 1 GByte)
228 [[MaxAdvertisedBandwidth]] **MaxAdvertisedBandwidth** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
229 If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our
230 BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients
231 who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to
232 advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server
233 without impacting network performance.
235 [[RelayBandwidthRate]] **RelayBandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
236 If not 0, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth
237 usage for \_relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes
238 per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value.
239 Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory
240 requests, but that may change in future versions. They do not include directory
241 fetches by the relay (from authority or other relays), because that is considered
242 "client" activity. (Default: 0)
244 [[RelayBandwidthBurst]] **RelayBandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
245 If not 0, limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for
246 \_relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction.
247 They do not include directory fetches by the relay (from authority
248 or other relays), because that is considered "client" activity. (Default: 0)
250 [[PerConnBWRate]] **PerConnBWRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
251 If this option is set manually, or via the "perconnbwrate" consensus
252 field, Tor will use it for separate rate limiting for each connection
253 from a non-relay. (Default: 0)
255 [[PerConnBWBurst]] **PerConnBWBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
256 If this option is set manually, or via the "perconnbwburst" consensus
257 field, Tor will use it for separate rate limiting for each connection
258 from a non-relay. (Default: 0)
260 [[ClientTransportPlugin]] **ClientTransportPlugin** __transport__ socks4|socks5 __IP__:__PORT__::
261 **ClientTransportPlugin** __transport__ exec __path-to-binary__ [options]::
262 In its first form, when set along with a corresponding Bridge line, the Tor
263 client forwards its traffic to a SOCKS-speaking proxy on "IP:PORT".
264 (IPv4 addresses should written as-is; IPv6 addresses should be wrapped in
265 square brackets.) It's the
266 duty of that proxy to properly forward the traffic to the bridge. +
268 In its second form, when set along with a corresponding Bridge line, the Tor
269 client launches the pluggable transport proxy executable in
270 __path-to-binary__ using __options__ as its command-line options, and
271 forwards its traffic to it. It's the duty of that proxy to properly forward
272 the traffic to the bridge.
274 [[ServerTransportPlugin]] **ServerTransportPlugin** __transport__ exec __path-to-binary__ [options]::
275 The Tor relay launches the pluggable transport proxy in __path-to-binary__
276 using __options__ as its command-line options, and expects to receive
277 proxied client traffic from it.
279 [[ServerTransportListenAddr]] **ServerTransportListenAddr** __transport__ __IP__:__PORT__::
280 When this option is set, Tor will suggest __IP__:__PORT__ as the
281 listening address of any pluggable transport proxy that tries to
282 launch __transport__. (IPv4 addresses should written as-is; IPv6
283 addresses should be wrapped in square brackets.)
285 [[ServerTransportOptions]] **ServerTransportOptions** __transport__ __k=v__ __k=v__ ...::
286 When this option is set, Tor will pass the __k=v__ parameters to
287 any pluggable transport proxy that tries to launch __transport__. +
288 (Example: ServerTransportOptions obfs45 shared-secret=bridgepasswd cache=/var/lib/tor/cache)
290 [[ExtORPort]] **ExtORPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto**::
291 Open this port to listen for Extended ORPort connections from your
292 pluggable transports.
294 [[ExtORPortCookieAuthFile]] **ExtORPortCookieAuthFile** __Path__::
295 If set, this option overrides the default location and file name
296 for the Extended ORPort's cookie file -- the cookie file is needed
297 for pluggable transports to communicate through the Extended ORPort.
299 [[ExtORPortCookieAuthFileGroupReadable]] **ExtORPortCookieAuthFileGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
300 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
301 Extended OR Port cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie
302 file readable by the default GID. [Making the file readable by other
303 groups is not yet implemented; let us know if you need this for some
304 reason.] (Default: 0)
306 [[ConnLimit]] **ConnLimit** __NUM__::
307 The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to the Tor
308 process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as many file
309 descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by "ulimit -H -n").
310 If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor will refuse to start. +
312 Tor relays need thousands of sockets, to connect to every other relay.
313 If you are running a private bridge, you can reduce the number of sockets
314 that Tor uses. For example, to limit Tor to 500 sockets, run
315 "ulimit -n 500" in a shell. Then start tor in the same shell, with
316 **ConnLimit 500**. You may also need to set **DisableOOSCheck 0**. +
318 Unless you have severely limited sockets, you probably don't need to
319 adjust **ConnLimit** itself. It has no effect on Windows, since that
320 platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)
322 [[DisableNetwork]] **DisableNetwork** **0**|**1**::
323 When this option is set, we don't listen for or accept any connections
324 other than controller connections, and we close (and don't reattempt)
326 connections. Controllers sometimes use this option to avoid using
327 the network until Tor is fully configured. Tor will make still certain
328 network-related calls (like DNS lookups) as a part of its configuration
329 process, even if DisableNetwork is set. (Default: 0)
331 [[ConstrainedSockets]] **ConstrainedSockets** **0**|**1**::
332 If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all
333 sockets to the size specified in **ConstrainedSockSize**. This is useful for
334 virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP buffers may
335 be limited. If you're on a virtual server, and you encounter the "Error
336 creating network socket: No buffer space available" message, you are
337 likely experiencing this problem. +
339 The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for
340 the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility;
341 this configuration option is a second-resort. +
343 The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The
344 cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates
347 You should **not** enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer
348 space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for
349 the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip
350 time on long paths. (Default: 0)
352 [[ConstrainedSockSize]] **ConstrainedSockSize** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**::
353 When **ConstrainedSockets** is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for
354 all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048 and
355 262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended.
357 [[ControlPort]] **ControlPort** \['address':]__port__|**unix:**__path__|**auto** [__flags__]::
358 If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those
359 connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol
360 (described in control-spec.txt in
361 https://spec.torproject.org[torspec]). Note: unless you also
362 specify one or more of **HashedControlPassword** or
363 **CookieAuthentication**, setting this option will cause Tor to allow
364 any process on the local host to control it. (Setting both authentication
365 methods means either method is sufficient to authenticate to Tor.) This
366 option is required for many Tor controllers; most use the value of 9051.
367 If a unix domain socket is used, you may quote the path using standard
368 C escape sequences. You can specify this directive multiple times, to
369 bind to multiple address/port pairs.
370 Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. (Default: 0) +
372 Recognized flags are...
374 Unix domain sockets only: makes the socket get created as
377 Unix domain sockets only: makes the socket get created as
379 **RelaxDirModeCheck**;;
380 Unix domain sockets only: Do not insist that the directory
381 that holds the socket be read-restricted.
383 [[ControlSocket]] **ControlSocket** __Path__::
384 Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP
385 socket. '0' disables ControlSocket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.)
388 [[ControlSocketsGroupWritable]] **ControlSocketsGroupWritable** **0**|**1**::
389 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read and
390 write unix sockets (e.g. ControlSocket). If the option is set to 1, make
391 the control socket readable and writable by the default GID. (Default: 0)
393 [[HashedControlPassword]] **HashedControlPassword** __hashed_password__::
394 Allow connections on the control port if they present
395 the password whose one-way hash is __hashed_password__. You
396 can compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password
397 __password__". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using more
398 than one HashedControlPassword line.
400 [[CookieAuthentication]] **CookieAuthentication** **0**|**1**::
401 If this option is set to 1, allow connections on the control port
402 when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named
403 "control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This
404 authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem
405 security. (Default: 0)
407 [[CookieAuthFile]] **CookieAuthFile** __Path__::
408 If set, this option overrides the default location and file name
409 for Tor's cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.)
411 [[CookieAuthFileGroupReadable]] **CookieAuthFileGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
412 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
413 cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file readable by
414 the default GID. [Making the file readable by other groups is not yet
415 implemented; let us know if you need this for some reason.] (Default: 0)
417 [[ControlPortWriteToFile]] **ControlPortWriteToFile** __Path__::
418 If set, Tor writes the address and port of any control port it opens to
419 this address. Usable by controllers to learn the actual control port
420 when ControlPort is set to "auto".
422 [[ControlPortFileGroupReadable]] **ControlPortFileGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
423 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
424 control port file. If the option is set to 1, make the control port
425 file readable by the default GID. (Default: 0)
427 [[DataDirectory]] **DataDirectory** __DIR__::
428 Store working data in DIR. Can not be changed while tor is running.
429 (Default: ~/.tor if your home directory is not /; otherwise,
430 @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor. On Windows, the default is
431 your ApplicationData folder.)
433 [[DataDirectoryGroupReadable]] **DataDirectoryGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
434 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
435 DataDirectory. If the option is set to 1, make the DataDirectory readable
436 by the default GID. (Default: 0)
438 [[CacheDirectory]] **CacheDirectory** __DIR__::
439 Store cached directory data in DIR. Can not be changed while tor is
441 (Default: uses the value of DataDirectory.)
443 [[CacheDirectoryGroupReadable]] **CacheDirectoryGroupReadable** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
444 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
445 CacheDirectory. If the option is set to 1, make the CacheDirectory readable
446 by the default GID. If the option is "auto", then we use the
447 setting for DataDirectoryGroupReadable when the CacheDirectory is the
448 same as the DataDirectory, and 0 otherwise. (Default: auto)
450 [[FallbackDir]] **FallbackDir** __ipv4address__:__port__ orport=__port__ id=__fingerprint__ [weight=__num__] [ipv6=**[**__ipv6address__**]**:__orport__]::
451 When we're unable to connect to any directory cache for directory info
452 (usually because we don't know about any yet) we try a directory authority.
453 Clients also simultaneously try a FallbackDir, to avoid hangs on client
454 startup if a directory authority is down. Clients retry FallbackDirs more
455 often than directory authorities, to reduce the load on the directory
457 By default, the directory authorities are also FallbackDirs. Specifying a
458 FallbackDir replaces Tor's default hard-coded FallbackDirs (if any).
459 (See the **DirAuthority** entry for an explanation of each flag.)
461 [[UseDefaultFallbackDirs]] **UseDefaultFallbackDirs** **0**|**1**::
462 Use Tor's default hard-coded FallbackDirs (if any). (When a
463 FallbackDir line is present, it replaces the hard-coded FallbackDirs,
464 regardless of the value of UseDefaultFallbackDirs.) (Default: 1)
466 [[DirAuthority]] **DirAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __ipv4address__:__port__ __fingerprint__::
467 Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address
468 and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated
469 many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are
470 separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an authority this directory
471 is. By default, an authority is not authoritative for any directory style
472 or version unless an appropriate flag is given.
473 Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the
474 "bridge" flag is set. If a flag "orport=**port**" is given, Tor will use the
475 given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. If a flag
476 "weight=**num**" is given, then the directory server is chosen randomly
477 with probability proportional to that weight (default 1.0). If a
478 flag "v3ident=**fp**" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority
479 whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint **fp**. Lastly,
480 if an "ipv6=**[**__ipv6address__**]**:__orport__" flag is present, then
482 authority is listening for IPv6 connections on the indicated IPv6 address
485 Tor will contact the authority at __ipv4address__ to
486 download directory documents. The provided __port__ value is a dirport;
487 clients ignore this in favor of the specified "orport=" value. If an
488 IPv6 ORPort is supplied, Tor will
489 also download directory documents at the IPv6 ORPort. +
491 If no **DirAuthority** line is given, Tor will use the default directory
492 authorities. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor
493 network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be
494 distinguishable from other users, because you won't believe the same
497 [[DirAuthorityFallbackRate]] **DirAuthorityFallbackRate** __NUM__::
498 When configured to use both directory authorities and fallback
499 directories, the directory authorities also work as fallbacks. They are
500 chosen with their regular weights, multiplied by this number, which
501 should be 1.0 or less. The default is less than 1, to reduce load on
502 authorities. (Default: 0.1)
504 [[AlternateDirAuthority]] **AlternateDirAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __ipv4address__:__port__ __fingerprint__ +
506 [[AlternateBridgeAuthority]] **AlternateBridgeAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __ipv4address__:__port__ __ fingerprint__::
507 These options behave as DirAuthority, but they replace fewer of the
508 default directory authorities. Using
509 AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but
510 leaves the default bridge authorities in
512 AlternateBridgeAuthority replaces the default bridge authority,
513 but leaves the directory authorities alone.
515 [[DisableAllSwap]] **DisableAllSwap** **0**|**1**::
516 If set to 1, Tor will attempt to lock all current and future memory pages,
517 so that memory cannot be paged out. Windows, OS X and Solaris are currently
518 not supported. We believe that this feature works on modern Gnu/Linux
519 distributions, and that it should work on *BSD systems (untested). This
520 option requires that you start your Tor as root, and you should use the
521 **User** option to properly reduce Tor's privileges.
522 Can not be changed while tor is running. (Default: 0)
524 [[DisableDebuggerAttachment]] **DisableDebuggerAttachment** **0**|**1**::
525 If set to 1, Tor will attempt to prevent basic debugging attachment attempts
526 by other processes. This may also keep Tor from generating core files if
527 it crashes. It has no impact for users who wish to attach if they
528 have CAP_SYS_PTRACE or if they are root. We believe that this feature
529 works on modern Gnu/Linux distributions, and that it may also work on *BSD
530 systems (untested). Some modern Gnu/Linux systems such as Ubuntu have the
531 kernel.yama.ptrace_scope sysctl and by default enable it as an attempt to
532 limit the PTRACE scope for all user processes by default. This feature will
533 attempt to limit the PTRACE scope for Tor specifically - it will not attempt
534 to alter the system wide ptrace scope as it may not even exist. If you wish
535 to attach to Tor with a debugger such as gdb or strace you will want to set
536 this to 0 for the duration of your debugging. Normal users should leave it
537 on. Disabling this option while Tor is running is prohibited. (Default: 1)
539 [[FetchDirInfoEarly]] **FetchDirInfoEarly** **0**|**1**::
540 If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other
541 directory caches, even if you don't meet the normal criteria for fetching
542 early. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0)
544 [[FetchDirInfoExtraEarly]] **FetchDirInfoExtraEarly** **0**|**1**::
545 If set to 1, Tor will fetch directory information before other directory
546 caches. It will attempt to download directory information closer to the
547 start of the consensus period. Normal users should leave it off.
550 [[FetchHidServDescriptors]] **FetchHidServDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
551 If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from the
552 rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you're using a Tor
553 controller that handles hidden service fetches for you. (Default: 1)
555 [[FetchServerDescriptors]] **FetchServerDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
556 If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server
557 descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if
558 you're using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you.
561 [[FetchUselessDescriptors]] **FetchUselessDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
562 If set to 1, Tor will fetch every consensus flavor, and all server
563 descriptors and authority certificates referenced by those consensuses,
564 except for extra info descriptors. When this option is 1, Tor will also
565 keep fetching descriptors, even when idle.
566 If set to 0, Tor will avoid fetching useless descriptors: flavors that it
567 is not using to build circuits, and authority certificates it does not
568 trust. When Tor hasn't built any application circuits, it will go idle,
569 and stop fetching descriptors. This option is useful if you're using a
570 tor client with an external parser that uses a full consensus.
571 This option fetches all documents except extrainfo descriptors,
572 **DirCache** fetches and serves all documents except extrainfo
573 descriptors, **DownloadExtraInfo*** fetches extrainfo documents, and serves
574 them if **DirCache** is on, and **UseMicrodescriptors** changes the
575 flavour of consensues and descriptors that is fetched and used for
576 building circuits. (Default: 0)
578 [[HTTPProxy]] **HTTPProxy** __host__[:__port__]::
579 Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port (or host:80
580 if port is not specified), rather than connecting directly to any directory
581 servers. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.3.1.0-alpha you should use HTTPSProxy.)
583 [[HTTPProxyAuthenticator]] **HTTPProxyAuthenticator** __username:password__::
584 If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy
585 authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTP
586 proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you
587 want it to support others. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.3.1.0-alpha you should use
588 HTTPSProxyAuthenticator.)
590 [[HTTPSProxy]] **HTTPSProxy** __host__[:__port__]::
591 Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port (or
592 host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than connecting
593 directly to servers. You may want to set **FascistFirewall** to restrict
594 the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy only
595 allows connecting to certain ports.
597 [[HTTPSProxyAuthenticator]] **HTTPSProxyAuthenticator** __username:password__::
598 If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS proxy
599 authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTPS
600 proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you
601 want it to support others.
603 [[Sandbox]] **Sandbox** **0**|**1**::
604 If set to 1, Tor will run securely through the use of a syscall sandbox.
605 Otherwise the sandbox will be disabled. The option is currently an
606 experimental feature. It only works on Linux-based operating systems,
607 and only when Tor has been built with the libseccomp library. This option
608 can not be changed while tor is running. +
610 When the **Sandbox** is 1, the following options can not be changed when tor
615 **DirPortFrontPage**,
616 **ExtORPortCookieAuthFile**,
618 **ServerDNSResolvConfFile**,
619 **ClientOnionAuthDir** (and any files in it won't reload on HUP signal).
621 Launching new Onion Services through the control port is not supported
622 with current syscall sandboxing implementation.
624 Tor must remain in client or server mode (some changes to **ClientOnly**
625 and **ORPort** are not allowed). Currently, if **Sandbox** is 1,
626 **ControlPort** command "GETINFO address" will not work.
630 [[Socks4Proxy]] **Socks4Proxy** __host__[:__port__]::
631 Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 4 proxy at host:port
632 (or host:1080 if port is not specified).
634 [[Socks5Proxy]] **Socks5Proxy** __host__[:__port__]::
635 Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 5 proxy at host:port
636 (or host:1080 if port is not specified).
638 [[Socks5ProxyUsername]] **Socks5ProxyUsername** __username__ +
640 [[Socks5ProxyPassword]] **Socks5ProxyPassword** __password__::
641 If defined, authenticate to the SOCKS 5 server using username and password
642 in accordance to RFC 1929. Both username and password must be between 1 and
645 [[UnixSocksGroupWritable]] **UnixSocksGroupWritable** **0**|**1**::
646 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read and
647 write unix sockets (e.g. SocksPort unix:). If the option is set to 1, make
648 the Unix socket readable and writable by the default GID. (Default: 0)
650 [[KeepalivePeriod]] **KeepalivePeriod** __NUM__::
651 To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell
652 every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. (Default: 5 minutes)
654 [[Log]] **Log** __minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] **stderr**|**stdout**|**syslog**::
655 Send all messages between __minSeverity__ and __maxSeverity__ to the standard
656 output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system log. (The
657 "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized severity levels are
658 debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using "notice" in most cases,
659 since anything more verbose may provide sensitive information to an
660 attacker who obtains the logs. If only one severity level is given, all
661 messages of that level or higher will be sent to the listed destination.
663 [[Log2]] **Log** __minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] **file** __FILENAME__::
664 As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The
665 "Log" option may appear more than once in a configuration file.
666 Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity
669 [[Log3]] **Log** **[**__domain__,...**]**__minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] ... **file** __FILENAME__ +
671 [[Log4]] **Log** **[**__domain__,...**]**__minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] ... **stderr**|**stdout**|**syslog**::
672 As above, but select messages by range of log severity __and__ by a
673 set of "logging domains". Each logging domain corresponds to an area of
674 functionality inside Tor. You can specify any number of severity ranges
675 for a single log statement, each of them prefixed by a comma-separated
676 list of logging domains. You can prefix a domain with $$~$$ to indicate
677 negation, and use * to indicate "all domains". If you specify a severity
678 range without a list of domains, it matches all domains. +
680 This is an advanced feature which is most useful for debugging one or two
681 of Tor's subsystems at a time. +
683 The currently recognized domains are: general, crypto, net, config, fs,
684 protocol, mm, http, app, control, circ, rend, bug, dir, dirserv, or, edge,
685 acct, hist, handshake, heartbeat, channel, sched, guard, consdiff, dos,
686 process, pt, and btrack.
687 Domain names are case-insensitive. +
689 For example, "`Log [handshake]debug [~net,~mm]info notice stdout`" sends
690 to stdout: all handshake messages of any severity, all info-and-higher
691 messages from domains other than networking and memory management, and all
692 messages of severity notice or higher.
694 [[LogMessageDomains]] **LogMessageDomains** **0**|**1**::
695 If 1, Tor includes message domains with each log message. Every log
696 message currently has at least one domain; most currently have exactly
697 one. This doesn't affect controller log messages. (Default: 0)
699 [[MaxUnparseableDescSizeToLog]] **MaxUnparseableDescSizeToLog** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**::
700 Unparseable descriptors (e.g. for votes, consensuses, routers) are logged
701 in separate files by hash, up to the specified size in total. Note that
702 only files logged during the lifetime of this Tor process count toward the
703 total; this is intended to be used to debug problems without opening live
704 servers to resource exhaustion attacks. (Default: 10 MB)
706 [[OutboundBindAddress]] **OutboundBindAddress** __IP__::
707 Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This
708 is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all
709 of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one. This option may
710 be used twice, once with an IPv4 address and once with an IPv6 address.
711 IPv6 addresses should be wrapped in square brackets.
712 This setting will be ignored for connections to the loopback addresses
713 (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1), and is not used for DNS requests as well.
715 [[OutboundBindAddressOR]] **OutboundBindAddressOR** __IP__::
716 Make all outbound non-exit (relay and other) connections
717 originate from the IP address specified. This option overrides
718 **OutboundBindAddress** for the same IP version. This option may
719 be used twice, once with an IPv4 address and once with an IPv6
720 address. IPv6 addresses should be wrapped in square brackets.
721 This setting will be ignored for connections to the loopback
722 addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).
724 [[OutboundBindAddressExit]] **OutboundBindAddressExit** __IP__::
725 Make all outbound exit connections originate from the IP address
726 specified. This option overrides **OutboundBindAddress** for the
727 same IP version. This option may be used twice, once with an IPv4
728 address and once with an IPv6 address.
729 IPv6 addresses should be wrapped in square brackets.
730 This setting will be ignored
731 for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).
733 [[PidFile]] **PidFile** __FILE__::
734 On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove
735 FILE. Can not be changed while tor is running.
737 [[ProtocolWarnings]] **ProtocolWarnings** **0**|**1**::
738 If 1, Tor will log with severity \'warn' various cases of other parties not
739 following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with severity
740 \'info'. (Default: 0)
742 [[RunAsDaemon]] **RunAsDaemon** **0**|**1**::
743 If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect
744 on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option.
745 Can not be changed while tor is running.
748 [[LogTimeGranularity]] **LogTimeGranularity** __NUM__::
749 Set the resolution of timestamps in Tor's logs to NUM milliseconds.
750 NUM must be positive and either a divisor or a multiple of 1 second.
751 Note that this option only controls the granularity written by Tor to
752 a file or console log. Tor does not (for example) "batch up" log
753 messages to affect times logged by a controller, times attached to
754 syslog messages, or the mtime fields on log files. (Default: 1 second)
756 [[TruncateLogFile]] **TruncateLogFile** **0**|**1**::
757 If 1, Tor will overwrite logs at startup and in response to a HUP signal,
758 instead of appending to them. (Default: 0)
760 [[SyslogIdentityTag]] **SyslogIdentityTag** __tag__::
761 When logging to syslog, adds a tag to the syslog identity such that
762 log entries are marked with "Tor-__tag__". Can not be changed while tor is
763 running. (Default: none)
765 [[AndroidIdentityTag]] **AndroidIdentityTag** __tag__::
766 When logging to Android's logging subsystem, adds a tag to the log identity
767 such that log entries are marked with "Tor-__tag__". Can not be changed while
768 tor is running. (Default: none)
770 [[SafeLogging]] **SafeLogging** **0**|**1**|**relay**::
771 Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages (e.g.
772 addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can
773 still be useful, but they don't leave behind personally identifying
774 information about what sites a user might have visited. +
776 If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is
777 set to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. If it is set to
778 relay, all log messages generated when acting as a relay are sanitized, but
779 all messages generated when acting as a client are not.
780 Note: Tor may not heed this option when logging at log levels below Notice.
783 [[User]] **User** __Username__::
784 On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary group.
785 Can not be changed while tor is running.
787 [[KeepBindCapabilities]] **KeepBindCapabilities** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
788 On Linux, when we are started as root and we switch our identity using
789 the **User** option, the **KeepBindCapabilities** option tells us whether to
790 try to retain our ability to bind to low ports. If this value is 1, we
791 try to keep the capability; if it is 0 we do not; and if it is **auto**,
792 we keep the capability only if we are configured to listen on a low port.
793 Can not be changed while tor is running.
796 [[HardwareAccel]] **HardwareAccel** **0**|**1**::
797 If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration when
798 available. Can not be changed while tor is running. (Default: 0)
800 [[AccelName]] **AccelName** __NAME__::
801 When using OpenSSL hardware crypto acceleration attempt to load the dynamic
802 engine of this name. This must be used for any dynamic hardware engine.
803 Names can be verified with the openssl engine command. Can not be changed
804 while tor is running.
806 [[AccelDir]] **AccelDir** __DIR__::
807 Specify this option if using dynamic hardware acceleration and the engine
808 implementation library resides somewhere other than the OpenSSL default.
809 Can not be changed while tor is running.
811 [[AvoidDiskWrites]] **AvoidDiskWrites** **0**|**1**::
812 If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise.
813 This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support
814 only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0)
816 [[CircuitPriorityHalflife]] **CircuitPriorityHalflife** __NUM__::
817 If this value is set, we override the default algorithm for choosing which
818 circuit's cell to deliver or relay next. It is delivered first to the
819 circuit that has the lowest weighted cell count, where cells are weighted
820 exponentially according to this value (in seconds). If the value is -1, it
821 is taken from the consensus if possible else it will fallback to the
822 default value of 30. Minimum: 1, Maximum: 2147483647. This can be defined
823 as a float value. This is an advanced option; you generally shouldn't have
824 to mess with it. (Default: -1)
826 [[CountPrivateBandwidth]] **CountPrivateBandwidth** **0**|**1**::
827 If this option is set, then Tor's rate-limiting applies not only to
828 remote connections, but also to connections to private addresses like
829 127.0.0.1 or 10.0.0.1. This is mostly useful for debugging
830 rate-limiting. (Default: 0)
832 [[ExtendByEd25519ID]] **ExtendByEd25519ID** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
833 If this option is set to 1, we always try to include a relay's Ed25519 ID
834 when telling the proceeding relay in a circuit to extend to it.
835 If this option is set to 0, we never include Ed25519 IDs when extending
836 circuits. If the option is set to "default", we obey a
837 parameter in the consensus document. (Default: auto)
839 [[NoExec]] **NoExec** **0**|**1**::
840 If this option is set to 1, then Tor will never launch another
841 executable, regardless of the settings of ClientTransportPlugin
842 or ServerTransportPlugin. Once this option has been set to 1,
843 it cannot be set back to 0 without restarting Tor. (Default: 0)
845 [[Schedulers]] **Schedulers** **KIST**|**KISTLite**|**Vanilla**::
846 Specify the scheduler type that tor should use. The scheduler is
847 responsible for moving data around within a Tor process. This is an ordered
848 list by priority which means that the first value will be tried first and if
849 unavailable, the second one is tried and so on. It is possible to change
850 these values at runtime. This option mostly effects relays, and most
851 operators should leave it set to its default value.
852 (Default: KIST,KISTLite,Vanilla)
854 The possible scheduler types are:
856 **KIST**: Kernel-Informed Socket Transport. Tor will use TCP information
857 from the kernel to make informed decisions regarding how much data to send
858 and when to send it. KIST also handles traffic in batches (see
859 KISTSchedRunInterval) in order to improve traffic prioritization decisions.
860 As implemented, KIST will only work on Linux kernel version 2.6.39 or
863 **KISTLite**: Same as KIST but without kernel support. Tor will use all
864 the same mechanics as with KIST, including the batching, but its decisions
865 regarding how much data to send will not be as good. KISTLite will work on
866 all kernels and operating systems, and the majority of the benefits of KIST
867 are still realized with KISTLite.
869 **Vanilla**: The scheduler that Tor used before KIST was implemented. It
870 sends as much data as possible, as soon as possible. Vanilla will work on
871 all kernels and operating systems.
873 [[KISTSchedRunInterval]] **KISTSchedRunInterval** __NUM__ **msec**::
874 If KIST or KISTLite is used in the Schedulers option, this controls at which
875 interval the scheduler tick is. If the value is 0 msec, the value is taken
876 from the consensus if possible else it will fallback to the default 10
877 msec. Maximum possible value is 100 msec. (Default: 0 msec)
879 [[KISTSockBufSizeFactor]] **KISTSockBufSizeFactor** __NUM__::
880 If KIST is used in Schedulers, this is a multiplier of the per-socket
881 limit calculation of the KIST algorithm. (Default: 1.0)
886 The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
887 **SocksPort**, **HTTPTunnelPort**, **TransPort**, **DNSPort**, or
888 **NATDPort** is non-zero):
890 [[Bridge]] **Bridge** [__transport__] __IP__:__ORPort__ [__fingerprint__]::
891 When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at
892 "IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint"
893 is provided (using the same format as for DirAuthority), we will verify that
894 the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use
895 fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if
896 it's provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too. +
898 If "transport" is provided, it must match a ClientTransportPlugin line. We
899 then use that pluggable transport's proxy to transfer data to the bridge,
900 rather than connecting to the bridge directly. Some transports use a
901 transport-specific method to work out the remote address to connect to.
902 These transports typically ignore the "IP:ORPort" specified in the bridge
905 Tor passes any "key=val" settings to the pluggable transport proxy as
906 per-connection arguments when connecting to the bridge. Consult
907 the documentation of the pluggable transport for details of what
908 arguments it supports.
910 [[LearnCircuitBuildTimeout]] **LearnCircuitBuildTimeout** **0**|**1**::
911 If 0, CircuitBuildTimeout adaptive learning is disabled. (Default: 1)
913 [[CircuitBuildTimeout]] **CircuitBuildTimeout** __NUM__::
915 Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn't
916 open in that time, give up on it. If LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 1, this
917 value serves as the initial value to use before a timeout is learned. If
918 LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 0, this value is the only value used.
919 (Default: 60 seconds)
921 [[CircuitsAvailableTimeout]] **CircuitsAvailableTimeout** __NUM__::
922 Tor will attempt to keep at least one open, unused circuit available for
923 this amount of time. This option governs how long idle circuits are kept
924 open, as well as the amount of time Tor will keep a circuit open to each
925 of the recently used ports. This way when the Tor client is entirely
926 idle, it can expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS
927 connections. Note that the actual timeout value is uniformly randomized
928 from the specified value to twice that amount. (Default: 30 minutes;
931 [[CircuitStreamTimeout]] **CircuitStreamTimeout** __NUM__::
932 If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule for how
933 many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try a new circuit.
934 If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set this to a
935 number like 60. (Default: 0)
937 [[ClientOnly]] **ClientOnly** **0**|**1**::
938 If set to 1, Tor will not run as a relay or serve
939 directory requests, even if the ORPort, ExtORPort, or DirPort options are
940 set. (This config option is
941 mostly unnecessary: we added it back when we were considering having
942 Tor clients auto-promote themselves to being relays if they were stable
943 and fast enough. The current behavior is simply that Tor is a client
944 unless ORPort, ExtORPort, or DirPort are configured.) (Default: 0)
946 [[ConnectionPadding]] **ConnectionPadding** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
947 This option governs Tor's use of padding to defend against some forms of
948 traffic analysis. If it is set to 'auto', Tor will send padding only
949 if both the client and the relay support it. If it is set to 0, Tor will
950 not send any padding cells. If it is set to 1, Tor will still send padding
951 for client connections regardless of relay support. Only clients may set
952 this option. This option should be offered via the UI to mobile users
953 for use where bandwidth may be expensive.
956 [[ReducedConnectionPadding]] **ReducedConnectionPadding** **0**|**1**::
957 If set to 1, Tor will not not hold OR connections open for very long,
958 and will send less padding on these connections. Only clients may set
959 this option. This option should be offered via the UI to mobile users
960 for use where bandwidth may be expensive. (Default: 0)
962 [[ExcludeNodes]] **ExcludeNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
963 A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
964 patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit. Country codes are
965 2-letter ISO3166 codes, and must
966 be wrapped in braces; fingerprints may be preceded by a dollar sign.
968 ExcludeNodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
970 By default, this option is treated as a preference that Tor is allowed
971 to override in order to keep working.
972 For example, if you try to connect to a hidden service,
973 but you have excluded all of the hidden service's introduction points,
974 Tor will connect to one of them anyway. If you do not want this
975 behavior, set the StrictNodes option (documented below). +
977 Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node selection
978 options below) only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you.
979 Clients can still build circuits through you to any node. Controllers
980 can tell Tor to build circuits through any node. +
982 Country codes are case-insensitive. The code "\{??}" refers to nodes whose
983 country can't be identified. No country code, including \{??}, works if
984 no GeoIPFile can be loaded. See also the GeoIPExcludeUnknown option below.
987 [[ExcludeExitNodes]] **ExcludeExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
988 A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
989 patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node---that is, a
990 node that delivers traffic for you *outside* the Tor network. Note that any
991 node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this
993 the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify
994 nodes. See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below.
996 [[GeoIPExcludeUnknown]] **GeoIPExcludeUnknown** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
997 If this option is set to 'auto', then whenever any country code is set in
998 ExcludeNodes or ExcludeExitNodes, all nodes with unknown country (\{??} and
999 possibly \{A1}) are treated as excluded as well. If this option is set to
1000 '1', then all unknown countries are treated as excluded in ExcludeNodes
1001 and ExcludeExitNodes. This option has no effect when a GeoIP file isn't
1002 configured or can't be found. (Default: auto)
1004 [[ExitNodes]] **ExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
1005 A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
1006 patterns of nodes to use as exit node---that is, a
1007 node that delivers traffic for you *outside* the Tor network. See
1008 the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify nodes. +
1010 Note that if you list too few nodes here, or if you exclude too many exit
1011 nodes with ExcludeExitNodes, you can degrade functionality. For example,
1012 if none of the exits you list allows traffic on port 80 or 443, you won't
1013 be able to browse the web. +
1015 Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic *outside* of
1016 the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those
1017 used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches,
1018 those used for relay reachability self-tests, and so on) that end
1019 at a non-exit node. To
1020 keep a node from being used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes. +
1022 The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
1023 ExitNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. +
1025 The .exit address notation, if enabled via MapAddress, overrides
1028 [[MiddleNodes]] **MiddleNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
1029 A list of identity fingerprints and country codes of nodes
1030 to use for "middle" hops in your normal circuits.
1031 Normal circuits include all circuits except for direct connections
1032 to directory servers. Middle hops are all hops other than exit and entry. +
1034 This is an **experimental** feature that is meant to be used by researchers
1035 and developers to test new features in the Tor network safely. Using it
1036 without care will strongly influence your anonymity. This feature might get
1037 removed in the future.
1039 The HSLayer2Node and HSLayer3Node options override this option for onion
1040 service circuits, if they are set. The vanguards addon will read this
1041 option, and if set, it will set HSLayer2Nodes and HSLayer3Nodes to nodes
1044 The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
1045 MiddleNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. See
1046 the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify nodes.
1048 [[EntryNodes]] **EntryNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
1049 A list of identity fingerprints and country codes of nodes
1050 to use for the first hop in your normal circuits.
1051 Normal circuits include all
1052 circuits except for direct connections to directory servers. The Bridge
1053 option overrides this option; if you have configured bridges and
1054 UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes. +
1056 The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
1057 EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. See
1058 the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify nodes.
1060 [[StrictNodes]] **StrictNodes** **0**|**1**::
1061 If StrictNodes is set to 1, Tor will treat solely the ExcludeNodes option
1062 as a requirement to follow for all the circuits you generate, even if
1063 doing so will break functionality for you (StrictNodes applies to neither
1064 ExcludeExitNodes nor to ExitNodes, nor to MiddleNodes). If StrictNodes
1065 is set to 0, Tor will still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list,
1066 but it will err on the side of avoiding unexpected errors.
1067 Specifically, StrictNodes 0 tells Tor that it is okay to use an excluded
1068 node when it is *necessary* to perform relay reachability self-tests,
1069 connect to a hidden service, provide a hidden service to a client,
1070 fulfill a .exit request, upload directory information, or download
1071 directory information. (Default: 0)
1073 [[FascistFirewall]] **FascistFirewall** **0**|**1**::
1074 If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports
1075 that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see **FirewallPorts**).
1076 This will allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with
1077 restrictive policies, but will not allow you to run as a server behind such
1078 a firewall. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use
1079 ReachableAddresses instead.
1081 [[FirewallPorts]] **FirewallPorts** __PORTS__::
1082 A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when
1083 **FascistFirewall** is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses
1084 instead. (Default: 80, 443)
1086 [[ReachableAddresses]] **ReachableAddresses** __IP__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
1087 A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows
1088 you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except
1089 that "accept" is understood unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For
1090 example, \'ReachableAddresses 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept
1091 \*:80' means that your firewall allows connections to everything inside net
1092 99, rejects port 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port
1093 80 otherwise. (Default: \'accept \*:*'.)
1095 [[ReachableDirAddresses]] **ReachableDirAddresses** __IP__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
1096 Like **ReachableAddresses**, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
1097 these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP
1098 GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of
1099 **ReachableAddresses** is used. If **HTTPProxy** is set then these
1100 connections will go through that proxy. (DEPRECATED: This option has
1101 had no effect for some time.)
1103 [[ReachableORAddresses]] **ReachableORAddresses** __IP__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
1104 Like **ReachableAddresses**, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
1105 these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not
1106 set explicitly then the value of **ReachableAddresses** is used. If
1107 **HTTPSProxy** is set then these connections will go through that proxy. +
1109 The separation between **ReachableORAddresses** and
1110 **ReachableDirAddresses** is only interesting when you are connecting
1111 through proxies (see **HTTPProxy** and **HTTPSProxy**). Most proxies limit
1112 TLS connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443,
1113 and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory
1114 information) to port 80.
1116 [[HidServAuth]] **HidServAuth** __onion-address__ __auth-cookie__ [__service-name__]::
1117 Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16
1118 characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22
1119 characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal
1120 purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times
1121 for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and
1122 this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden
1123 services can be configured to require authorization using the
1124 **HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** option.
1126 [[ClientOnionAuthDir]] **ClientOnionAuthDir** __path__::
1127 Path to the directory containing v3 hidden service authorization files.
1128 Each file is for a single onion address, and the files MUST have the suffix
1129 ".auth_private" (i.e. "bob_onion.auth_private"). The content format MUST be:
1131 <onion-address>:descriptor:x25519:<base32-encoded-privkey>
1133 The <onion-address> MUST NOT have the ".onion" suffix. The
1134 <base32-encoded-privkey> is the base32 representation of the raw key bytes
1135 only (32 bytes for x25519). See Appendix G in the rend-spec-v3.txt file of
1136 https://spec.torproject.org/[torspec] for more information.
1138 [[LongLivedPorts]] **LongLivedPorts** __PORTS__::
1139 A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections
1140 (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these
1141 ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a node
1142 will go down before the stream is finished. Note that the list is also
1143 honored for circuits (both client and service side) involving hidden
1144 services whose virtual port is in this list. (Default: 21, 22, 706,
1145 1863, 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6523, 6667, 6697, 8300)
1147 [[MapAddress]] **MapAddress** __address__ __newaddress__::
1148 When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will transform to newaddress
1149 before processing it. For example, if you always want connections to
1150 www.example.com to exit via __torserver__ (where __torserver__ is the
1151 fingerprint of the server), use "MapAddress www.example.com
1152 www.example.com.torserver.exit". If the value is prefixed with a
1153 "\*.", matches an entire domain. For example, if you
1154 always want connections to example.com and any if its subdomains
1156 __torserver__ (where __torserver__ is the fingerprint of the server), use
1157 "MapAddress \*.example.com \*.example.com.torserver.exit". (Note the
1158 leading "*." in each part of the directive.) You can also redirect all
1159 subdomains of a domain to a single address. For example, "MapAddress
1160 *.example.com www.example.com". +
1164 1. When evaluating MapAddress expressions Tor stops when it hits the most
1165 recently added expression that matches the requested address. So if you
1166 have the following in your torrc, www.torproject.org will map to
1169 MapAddress www.torproject.org 192.0.2.1
1170 MapAddress www.torproject.org 198.51.100.1
1172 2. Tor evaluates the MapAddress configuration until it finds no matches. So
1173 if you have the following in your torrc, www.torproject.org will map to
1176 MapAddress 198.51.100.1 203.0.113.1
1177 MapAddress www.torproject.org 198.51.100.1
1179 3. The following MapAddress expression is invalid (and will be
1180 ignored) because you cannot map from a specific address to a wildcard
1183 MapAddress www.torproject.org *.torproject.org.torserver.exit
1185 4. Using a wildcard to match only part of a string (as in *ample.com) is
1188 [[NewCircuitPeriod]] **NewCircuitPeriod** __NUM__::
1189 Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30
1192 [[MaxCircuitDirtiness]] **MaxCircuitDirtiness** __NUM__::
1193 Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago,
1194 but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old. For hidden
1195 services, this applies to the __last__ time a circuit was used, not the
1196 first. Circuits with streams constructed with SOCKS authentication via
1197 SocksPorts that have **KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth** also remain alive
1198 for MaxCircuitDirtiness seconds after carrying the last such stream.
1199 (Default: 10 minutes)
1201 [[MaxClientCircuitsPending]] **MaxClientCircuitsPending** __NUM__::
1202 Do not allow more than NUM circuits to be pending at a time for handling
1203 client streams. A circuit is pending if we have begun constructing it,
1204 but it has not yet been completely constructed. (Default: 32)
1206 [[NodeFamily]] **NodeFamily** __node__,__node__,__...__::
1207 The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints,
1208 constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered servers, so never use
1209 any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a NodeFamily is only needed
1210 when a server doesn't list the family itself (with MyFamily). This option
1211 can be used multiple times; each instance defines a separate family. In
1212 addition to nodes, you can also list IP address and ranges and country
1213 codes in {curly braces}. See the **ExcludeNodes** option for more
1214 information on how to specify nodes.
1216 [[EnforceDistinctSubnets]] **EnforceDistinctSubnets** **0**|**1**::
1217 If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too close" on
1218 the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in
1219 the same /16 range. (Default: 1)
1221 [[SocksPort]] **SocksPort** \['address':]__port__|**unix:**__path__|**auto** [_flags_] [_isolation flags_]::
1222 Open this port to listen for connections from SOCKS-speaking
1223 applications. Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow application
1224 connections via SOCKS. Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for
1225 you. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind
1226 to multiple addresses/ports. If a unix domain socket is used, you may
1227 quote the path using standard C escape sequences.
1230 NOTE: Although this option allows you to specify an IP address
1231 other than localhost, you should do so only with extreme caution.
1232 The SOCKS protocol is unencrypted and (as we use it)
1233 unauthenticated, so exposing it in this way could leak your
1234 information to anybody watching your network, and allow anybody
1235 to use your computer as an open proxy. +
1237 If multiple entries of this option are present in your configuration
1238 file, Tor will perform stream isolation between listeners by default.
1239 The _isolation flags_ arguments give Tor rules for which streams
1240 received on this SocksPort are allowed to share circuits with one
1241 another. Recognized isolation flags are:
1242 **IsolateClientAddr**;;
1243 Don't share circuits with streams from a different
1244 client address. (On by default and strongly recommended when
1245 supported; you can disable it with **NoIsolateClientAddr**.
1246 Unsupported and force-disabled when using Unix domain sockets.)
1247 **IsolateSOCKSAuth**;;
1248 Don't share circuits with streams for which different
1249 SOCKS authentication was provided. (For HTTPTunnelPort
1250 connections, this option looks at the Proxy-Authorization and
1251 X-Tor-Stream-Isolation headers. On by default;
1252 you can disable it with **NoIsolateSOCKSAuth**.)
1253 **IsolateClientProtocol**;;
1254 Don't share circuits with streams using a different protocol.
1255 (SOCKS 4, SOCKS 5, TransPort connections, NATDPort connections,
1256 and DNSPort requests are all considered to be different protocols.)
1257 **IsolateDestPort**;;
1258 Don't share circuits with streams targeting a different
1260 **IsolateDestAddr**;;
1261 Don't share circuits with streams targeting a different
1262 destination address.
1263 **KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth**;;
1264 If **IsolateSOCKSAuth** is enabled, keep alive circuits while they have
1265 at least one stream with SOCKS authentication active. After such a circuit
1266 is idle for more than MaxCircuitDirtiness seconds, it can be closed.
1267 **SessionGroup=**__INT__;;
1268 If no other isolation rules would prevent it, allow streams
1269 on this port to share circuits with streams from every other
1270 port with the same session group. (By default, streams received
1271 on different SocksPorts, TransPorts, etc are always isolated from one
1272 another. This option overrides that behavior.)
1274 // Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page.
1275 [[OtherSocksPortFlags]]::
1276 Other recognized __flags__ for a SocksPort are:
1278 Tell exits to not connect to IPv4 addresses in response to SOCKS
1279 requests on this connection.
1281 Tell exits to allow IPv6 addresses in response to SOCKS requests on
1282 this connection, so long as SOCKS5 is in use. (SOCKS4 can't handle
1285 Tells exits that, if a host has both an IPv4 and an IPv6 address,
1286 we would prefer to connect to it via IPv6. (IPv4 is the default.)
1288 Do not ask exits to resolve DNS addresses in SOCKS5 requests. Tor will
1289 connect to IPv4 addresses, IPv6 addresses (if IPv6Traffic is set) and
1291 **NoOnionTraffic**;;
1292 Do not connect to .onion addresses in SOCKS5 requests.
1293 **OnionTrafficOnly**;;
1294 Tell the tor client to only connect to .onion addresses in response to
1295 SOCKS5 requests on this connection. This is equivalent to NoDNSRequest,
1296 NoIPv4Traffic, NoIPv6Traffic. The corresponding NoOnionTrafficOnly
1297 flag is not supported.
1299 Tells the client to remember IPv4 DNS answers we receive from exit
1300 nodes via this connection.
1302 Tells the client to remember IPv6 DNS answers we receive from exit
1303 nodes via this connection.
1305 Unix domain sockets only: makes the socket get created as
1308 Unix domain sockets only: makes the socket get created as
1311 Tells the client to remember all DNS answers we receive from exit
1312 nodes via this connection.
1314 Tells the client to use any cached IPv4 DNS answers we have when making
1315 requests via this connection. (NOTE: This option, or UseIPv6Cache
1316 or UseDNSCache, can harm your anonymity, and probably
1317 won't help performance as much as you might expect. Use with care!)
1319 Tells the client to use any cached IPv6 DNS answers we have when making
1320 requests via this connection.
1322 Tells the client to use any cached DNS answers we have when making
1323 requests via this connection.
1324 **PreferIPv6Automap**;;
1325 When serving a hostname lookup request on this port that
1326 should get automapped (according to AutomapHostsOnResolve),
1327 if we could return either an IPv4 or an IPv6 answer, prefer
1328 an IPv6 answer. (On by default.)
1329 **PreferSOCKSNoAuth**;;
1330 Ordinarily, when an application offers both "username/password
1331 authentication" and "no authentication" to Tor via SOCKS5, Tor
1332 selects username/password authentication so that IsolateSOCKSAuth can
1333 work. This can confuse some applications, if they offer a
1334 username/password combination then get confused when asked for
1335 one. You can disable this behavior, so that Tor will select "No
1336 authentication" when IsolateSOCKSAuth is disabled, or when this
1339 // Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page.
1340 [[SocksPortFlagsMisc]]::
1341 Flags are processed left to right. If flags conflict, the last flag on the
1342 line is used, and all earlier flags are ignored. No error is issued for
1345 [[SocksPolicy]] **SocksPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
1346 Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
1347 SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as exit
1348 policies below, except that port specifiers are ignored. Any address
1349 not matched by some entry in the policy is accepted.
1351 [[SocksTimeout]] **SocksTimeout** __NUM__::
1352 Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds
1353 unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default:
1356 [[TokenBucketRefillInterval]] **TokenBucketRefillInterval** __NUM__ [**msec**|**second**]::
1357 Set the refill delay interval of Tor's token bucket to NUM milliseconds.
1358 NUM must be between 1 and 1000, inclusive. When Tor is out of bandwidth,
1359 on a connection or globally, it will wait up to this long before it tries
1360 to use that connection again.
1361 Note that bandwidth limits are still expressed in bytes per second: this
1362 option only affects the frequency with which Tor checks to see whether
1363 previously exhausted connections may read again.
1364 Can not be changed while tor is running. (Default: 100 msec)
1366 [[TrackHostExits]] **TrackHostExits** __host__,__.domain__,__...__::
1367 For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent
1368 connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse the same
1369 exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a \'.\', it is treated as
1370 matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a \'.', it means
1371 match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to sites
1372 that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if
1373 your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage
1374 of making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single
1375 user. However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it
1376 through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow.
1378 [[TrackHostExitsExpire]] **TrackHostExitsExpire** __NUM__::
1379 Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the
1380 association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default is
1381 1800 seconds (30 minutes).
1383 [[UpdateBridgesFromAuthority]] **UpdateBridgesFromAuthority** **0**|**1**::
1384 When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors
1385 from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back to
1386 a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0)
1388 [[UseBridges]] **UseBridges** **0**|**1**::
1389 When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge"
1390 config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory
1391 guards. (Default: 0)
1393 [[UseEntryGuards]] **UseEntryGuards** **0**|**1**::
1394 If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try
1395 to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers
1396 increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a
1397 fraction of your paths. Entry Guards can not be used by Directory
1398 Authorities or Single Onion Services. In these cases,
1399 this option is ignored. (Default: 1)
1401 [[GuardfractionFile]] **GuardfractionFile** __FILENAME__::
1402 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the location of the
1403 guardfraction file which contains information about how long relays
1404 have been guards. (Default: unset)
1406 [[UseGuardFraction]] **UseGuardFraction** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
1407 This option specifies whether clients should use the
1408 guardfraction information found in the consensus during path
1409 selection. If it's set to 'auto', clients will do what the
1410 UseGuardFraction consensus parameter tells them to do. (Default: auto)
1412 [[NumEntryGuards]] **NumEntryGuards** __NUM__::
1413 If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers
1414 as long-term entries for our circuits. If NUM is 0, we try to learn the
1415 number from the guard-n-primary-guards-to-use consensus parameter, and
1416 default to 1 if the consensus parameter isn't set. (Default: 0)
1418 [[NumPrimaryGuards]] **NumPrimaryGuards** __NUM__::
1419 If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick NUM routers for our
1420 primary guard list, which is the set of routers we strongly prefer when
1421 connecting to the Tor network. If NUM is 0, we try to learn the number from
1422 the guard-n-primary-guards consensus parameter, and default to 3 if the
1423 consensus parameter isn't set. (Default: 0)
1425 [[NumDirectoryGuards]] **NumDirectoryGuards** __NUM__::
1426 If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we try to make sure we have at least NUM
1427 routers to use as directory guards. If this option is set to 0, use the
1428 value from the guard-n-primary-dir-guards-to-use consensus parameter, and
1429 default to 3 if the consensus parameter isn't set. (Default: 0)
1431 [[GuardLifetime]] **GuardLifetime** __N__ **days**|**weeks**|**months**::
1432 If nonzero, and UseEntryGuards is set, minimum time to keep a guard before
1433 picking a new one. If zero, we use the GuardLifetime parameter from the
1434 consensus directory. No value here may be less than 1 month or greater
1435 than 5 years; out-of-range values are clamped. (Default: 0)
1437 [[SafeSocks]] **SafeSocks** **0**|**1**::
1438 When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that
1439 use unsafe variants of the socks protocol -- ones that only provide an IP
1440 address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first.
1441 Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS.
1444 [[TestSocks]] **TestSocks** **0**|**1**::
1445 When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for
1446 each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used a
1447 safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks). This
1448 helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking
1449 DNS requests. (Default: 0)
1451 [[VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4]] **VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4** __IPv4Address__/__bits__ +
1453 [[VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6]] **VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6** [__IPv6Address__]/__bits__::
1454 When Tor needs to assign a virtual (unused) address because of a MAPADDRESS
1455 command from the controller or the AutomapHostsOnResolve feature, Tor
1456 picks an unassigned address from this range. (Defaults:
1457 127.192.0.0/10 and [FE80::]/10 respectively.) +
1459 When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool
1460 like dns-proxy-tor, change the IPv4 network to "10.192.0.0/10" or
1461 "172.16.0.0/12" and change the IPv6 network to "[FC00::]/7".
1462 The default **VirtualAddrNetwork** address ranges on a
1463 properly configured machine will route to the loopback or link-local
1464 interface. The maximum number of bits for the network prefix is set to 104
1465 for IPv6 and 16 for IPv4. However, a wider network - smaller prefix length
1466 - is preferable since it reduces the chances for an attacker to guess the
1467 used IP. For local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting
1470 [[AllowNonRFC953Hostnames]] **AllowNonRFC953Hostnames** **0**|**1**::
1471 When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal
1472 characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be
1473 resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on.
1476 [[HTTPTunnelPort]] **HTTPTunnelPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
1477 Open this port to listen for proxy connections using the "HTTP CONNECT"
1478 protocol instead of SOCKS. Set this to
1479 0 if you don't want to allow "HTTP CONNECT" connections. Set the port
1480 to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be
1481 specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. If multiple
1482 entries of this option are present in your configuration file, Tor will
1483 perform stream isolation between listeners by default. See
1484 SOCKSPort for an explanation of isolation flags. (Default: 0)
1486 [[TransPort]] **TransPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
1487 Open this port to listen for transparent proxy connections. Set this to
1488 0 if you don't want to allow transparent proxy connections. Set the port
1489 to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be
1490 specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. If multiple
1491 entries of this option are present in your configuration file, Tor will
1492 perform stream isolation between listeners by default. See
1493 SOCKSPort for an explanation of isolation flags. +
1495 TransPort requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or
1496 Linux's IPTables. If you're planning to use Tor as a transparent proxy for
1497 a network, you'll want to examine and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the
1498 default setting. (Default: 0)
1500 [[TransProxyType]] **TransProxyType** **default**|**TPROXY**|**ipfw**|**pf-divert**::
1501 TransProxyType may only be enabled when there is transparent proxy listener
1504 Set this to "TPROXY" if you wish to be able to use the TPROXY Linux module
1505 to transparently proxy connections that are configured using the TransPort
1506 option. Detailed information on how to configure the TPROXY
1507 feature can be found in the Linux kernel source tree in the file
1508 Documentation/networking/tproxy.txt. +
1510 Set this option to "ipfw" to use the FreeBSD ipfw interface. +
1512 On *BSD operating systems when using pf, set this to "pf-divert" to take
1513 advantage of +divert-to+ rules, which do not modify the packets like
1514 +rdr-to+ rules do. Detailed information on how to configure pf to use
1515 +divert-to+ rules can be found in the pf.conf(5) manual page. On OpenBSD,
1516 +divert-to+ is available to use on versions greater than or equal to
1519 Set this to "default", or leave it unconfigured, to use regular IPTables
1520 on Linux, or to use pf +rdr-to+ rules on *BSD systems. +
1522 (Default: "default")
1524 [[NATDPort]] **NATDPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
1525 Open this port to listen for connections from old versions of ipfw (as
1526 included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc) using the NATD protocol.
1527 Use 0 if you don't want to allow NATD connections. Set the port
1528 to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be
1529 specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. If multiple
1530 entries of this option are present in your configuration file, Tor will
1531 perform stream isolation between listeners by default. See
1532 SocksPort for an explanation of isolation flags. +
1534 This option is only for people who cannot use TransPort. (Default: 0)
1536 [[AutomapHostsOnResolve]] **AutomapHostsOnResolve** **0**|**1**::
1537 When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address
1538 that ends with one of the suffixes in **AutomapHostsSuffixes**, we map an
1539 unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address.
1540 This is handy for making ".onion" addresses work with applications that
1541 resolve an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0)
1543 [[AutomapHostsSuffixes]] **AutomapHostsSuffixes** __SUFFIX__,__SUFFIX__,__...__::
1544 A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with **AutomapHostsOnResolve**.
1545 The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses." (Default: .exit,.onion).
1547 [[DNSPort]] **DNSPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
1548 If non-zero, open this port to listen for UDP DNS requests, and resolve
1549 them anonymously. This port only handles A, AAAA, and PTR requests---it
1550 doesn't handle arbitrary DNS request types. Set the port to "auto" to
1551 have Tor pick a port for
1552 you. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
1553 addresses/ports. See SocksPort for an explanation of isolation
1556 [[ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses]] **ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses** **0**|**1**::
1557 If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that
1558 tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or
1559 192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; it
1560 is not allowed to be set on the default network. (Default: 1)
1562 [[ClientRejectInternalAddresses]] **ClientRejectInternalAddresses** **0**|**1**::
1563 If true, Tor does not try to fulfill requests to connect to an internal
1564 address (like 127.0.0.1 or 192.168.0.1) __unless an exit node is
1565 specifically requested__ (for example, via a .exit hostname, or a
1566 controller request). If true, multicast DNS hostnames for machines on the
1567 local network (of the form *.local) are also rejected. (Default: 1)
1569 [[DownloadExtraInfo]] **DownloadExtraInfo** **0**|**1**::
1570 If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These documents
1571 contain information about servers other than the information in their
1572 regular server descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything
1573 itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0)
1575 [[WarnPlaintextPorts]] **WarnPlaintextPorts** __port__,__port__,__...__::
1576 Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous
1577 connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users
1578 to services that risk sending passwords in the clear. (Default:
1581 [[RejectPlaintextPorts]] **RejectPlaintextPorts** __port__,__port__,__...__::
1582 Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses, Tor
1583 will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default: None)
1585 [[OptimisticData]] **OptimisticData** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
1586 When this option is set, and Tor is using an exit node that supports
1587 the feature, it will try optimistically to send data to the exit node
1588 without waiting for the exit node to report whether the connection
1589 succeeded. This can save a round-trip time for protocols like HTTP
1590 where the client talks first. If OptimisticData is set to **auto**,
1591 Tor will look at the UseOptimisticData parameter in the networkstatus.
1594 [[HSLayer2Nodes]] **HSLayer2Nodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
1595 A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and
1596 address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the
1597 second hop in all client or service-side Onion Service circuits.
1598 This option mitigates attacks where the adversary runs middle nodes
1599 and induces your client or service to create many circuits, in order
1600 to discover your primary guard node.
1601 (Default: Any node in the network may be used in the second hop.)
1604 HSLayer2Nodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
1606 When this is set, the resulting hidden service paths will
1609 C - G - L2 - M - Rend +
1610 C - G - L2 - M - HSDir +
1611 C - G - L2 - M - Intro +
1612 S - G - L2 - M - Rend +
1613 S - G - L2 - M - HSDir +
1614 S - G - L2 - M - Intro +
1616 where C is this client, S is the service, G is the Guard node,
1617 L2 is a node from this option, and M is a random middle node.
1618 Rend, HSDir, and Intro point selection is not affected by this
1621 This option may be combined with HSLayer3Nodes to create
1624 C - G - L2 - L3 - Rend +
1625 C - G - L2 - L3 - M - HSDir +
1626 C - G - L2 - L3 - M - Intro +
1627 S - G - L2 - L3 - M - Rend +
1628 S - G - L2 - L3 - HSDir +
1629 S - G - L2 - L3 - Intro +
1631 ExcludeNodes have higher priority than HSLayer2Nodes,
1632 which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be
1635 When either this option or HSLayer3Nodes are set, the /16 subnet
1636 and node family restrictions are removed for hidden service
1637 circuits. Additionally, we allow the guard node to be present
1638 as the Rend, HSDir, and IP node, and as the hop before it. This
1639 is done to prevent the adversary from inferring information
1640 about our guard, layer2, and layer3 node choices at later points
1643 This option is meant to be managed by a Tor controller such as
1644 https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards that selects and
1645 updates this set of nodes for you. Hence it does not do load
1646 balancing if fewer than 20 nodes are selected, and if no nodes in
1647 HSLayer2Nodes are currently available for use, Tor will not work.
1648 Please use extreme care if you are setting this option manually.
1650 [[HSLayer3Nodes]] **HSLayer3Nodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
1651 A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and
1652 address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the
1653 third hop in all client and service-side Onion Service circuits.
1654 This option mitigates attacks where the adversary runs middle nodes
1655 and induces your client or service to create many circuits, in order
1656 to discover your primary or Layer2 guard nodes.
1657 (Default: Any node in the network may be used in the third hop.)
1660 HSLayer3Nodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
1662 When this is set by itself, the resulting hidden service paths
1664 C - G - M - L3 - Rend +
1665 C - G - M - L3 - M - HSDir +
1666 C - G - M - L3 - M - Intro +
1667 S - G - M - L3 - M - Rend +
1668 S - G - M - L3 - HSDir +
1669 S - G - M - L3 - Intro +
1670 where C is this client, S is the service, G is the Guard node,
1671 L2 is a node from this option, and M is a random middle node.
1672 Rend, HSDir, and Intro point selection is not affected by this
1675 While it is possible to use this option by itself, it should be
1676 combined with HSLayer2Nodes to create paths of the form:
1678 C - G - L2 - L3 - Rend +
1679 C - G - L2 - L3 - M - HSDir +
1680 C - G - L2 - L3 - M - Intro +
1681 S - G - L2 - L3 - M - Rend +
1682 S - G - L2 - L3 - HSDir +
1683 S - G - L2 - L3 - Intro +
1685 ExcludeNodes have higher priority than HSLayer3Nodes,
1686 which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be
1689 When either this option or HSLayer2Nodes are set, the /16 subnet
1690 and node family restrictions are removed for hidden service
1691 circuits. Additionally, we allow the guard node to be present
1692 as the Rend, HSDir, and IP node, and as the hop before it. This
1693 is done to prevent the adversary from inferring information
1694 about our guard, layer2, and layer3 node choices at later points
1697 This option is meant to be managed by a Tor controller such as
1698 https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards that selects and
1699 updates this set of nodes for you. Hence it does not do load
1700 balancing if fewer than 20 nodes are selected, and if no nodes in
1701 HSLayer3Nodes are currently available for use, Tor will not work.
1702 Please use extreme care if you are setting this option manually.
1704 [[UseMicrodescriptors]] **UseMicrodescriptors** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
1705 Microdescriptors are a smaller version of the information that Tor needs
1706 in order to build its circuits. Using microdescriptors makes Tor clients
1707 download less directory information, thus saving bandwidth. Directory
1708 caches need to fetch regular descriptors and microdescriptors, so this
1709 option doesn't save any bandwidth for them. For legacy reasons, auto is
1710 accepted, but it has the same effect as 1. (Default: auto)
1712 [[PathBiasCircThreshold]] **PathBiasCircThreshold** __NUM__ +
1714 [[PathBiasNoticeRate]] **PathBiasNoticeRate** __NUM__ +
1716 [[PathBiasWarnRate]] **PathBiasWarnRate** __NUM__ +
1718 [[PathBiasExtremeRate]] **PathBiasExtremeRate** __NUM__ +
1720 [[PathBiasDropGuards]] **PathBiasDropGuards** __NUM__ +
1722 [[PathBiasScaleThreshold]] **PathBiasScaleThreshold** __NUM__::
1723 These options override the default behavior of Tor's (**currently
1724 experimental**) path bias detection algorithm. To try to find broken or
1725 misbehaving guard nodes, Tor looks for nodes where more than a certain
1726 fraction of circuits through that guard fail to get built. +
1728 The PathBiasCircThreshold option controls how many circuits we need to build
1729 through a guard before we make these checks. The PathBiasNoticeRate,
1730 PathBiasWarnRate and PathBiasExtremeRate options control what fraction of
1731 circuits must succeed through a guard so we won't write log messages.
1732 If less than PathBiasExtremeRate circuits succeed *and* PathBiasDropGuards
1733 is set to 1, we disable use of that guard. +
1735 When we have seen more than PathBiasScaleThreshold
1736 circuits through a guard, we scale our observations by 0.5 (governed by
1737 the consensus) so that new observations don't get swamped by old ones. +
1739 By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options,
1740 Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document.
1741 If no defaults are available there, these options default to 150, .70,
1742 .50, .30, 0, and 300 respectively.
1744 [[PathBiasUseThreshold]] **PathBiasUseThreshold** __NUM__ +
1746 [[PathBiasNoticeUseRate]] **PathBiasNoticeUseRate** __NUM__ +
1748 [[PathBiasExtremeUseRate]] **PathBiasExtremeUseRate** __NUM__ +
1750 [[PathBiasScaleUseThreshold]] **PathBiasScaleUseThreshold** __NUM__::
1751 Similar to the above options, these options override the default behavior
1752 of Tor's (**currently experimental**) path use bias detection algorithm. +
1754 Where as the path bias parameters govern thresholds for successfully
1755 building circuits, these four path use bias parameters govern thresholds
1756 only for circuit usage. Circuits which receive no stream usage
1757 are not counted by this detection algorithm. A used circuit is considered
1758 successful if it is capable of carrying streams or otherwise receiving
1759 well-formed responses to RELAY cells. +
1761 By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options,
1762 Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document.
1763 If no defaults are available there, these options default to 20, .80,
1764 .60, and 100, respectively.
1766 [[ClientUseIPv4]] **ClientUseIPv4** **0**|**1**::
1767 If this option is set to 0, Tor will avoid connecting to directory servers
1768 and entry nodes over IPv4. Note that clients with an IPv4
1769 address in a **Bridge**, proxy, or pluggable transport line will try
1770 connecting over IPv4 even if **ClientUseIPv4** is set to 0. (Default: 1)
1772 [[ClientUseIPv6]] **ClientUseIPv6** **0**|**1**::
1773 If this option is set to 1, Tor might connect to directory servers or
1774 entry nodes over IPv6. For IPv6 only hosts, you need to also set
1775 **ClientUseIPv4** to 0 to disable IPv4. Note that clients configured with
1776 an IPv6 address in a **Bridge**, proxy, or pluggable transportline will
1777 try connecting over IPv6 even if **ClientUseIPv6** is set to 0. (Default: 0)
1779 [[ClientPreferIPv6DirPort]] **ClientPreferIPv6DirPort** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
1780 If this option is set to 1, Tor prefers a directory port with an IPv6
1781 address over one with IPv4, for direct connections, if a given directory
1782 server has both. (Tor also prefers an IPv6 DirPort if IPv4Client is set to
1783 0.) If this option is set to auto, clients prefer IPv4. Other things may
1784 influence the choice. This option breaks a tie to the favor of IPv6.
1785 (Default: auto) (DEPRECATED: This option has had no effect for some
1788 [[ClientPreferIPv6ORPort]] **ClientPreferIPv6ORPort** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
1789 If this option is set to 1, Tor prefers an OR port with an IPv6
1790 address over one with IPv4 if a given entry node has both. (Tor also
1791 prefers an IPv6 ORPort if IPv4Client is set to 0.) If this option is set
1792 to auto, Tor bridge clients prefer the configured bridge address, and
1793 other clients prefer IPv4. Other things may influence the choice. This
1794 option breaks a tie to the favor of IPv6. (Default: auto)
1796 [[ClientAutoIPv6ORPort]] **ClientAutoIPv6ORPort** **0**|**1**::
1797 If this option is set to 1, Tor clients randomly prefer a node's IPv4 or
1798 IPv6 ORPort. The random preference is set every time a node is loaded
1799 from a new consensus or bridge config. When this option is set to 1,
1800 **ClientPreferIPv6ORPort** is ignored. (Default: 0)
1802 [[PathsNeededToBuildCircuits]] **PathsNeededToBuildCircuits** __NUM__::
1803 Tor clients don't build circuits for user traffic until they know
1804 about enough of the network so that they could potentially construct
1805 enough of the possible paths through the network. If this option
1806 is set to a fraction between 0.25 and 0.95, Tor won't build circuits
1807 until it has enough descriptors or microdescriptors to construct
1808 that fraction of possible paths. Note that setting this option too low
1809 can make your Tor client less anonymous, and setting it too high can
1810 prevent your Tor client from bootstrapping. If this option is negative,
1811 Tor will use a default value chosen by the directory authorities. If the
1812 directory authorities do not choose a value, Tor will default to 0.6.
1815 [[ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityDownloadInitialDelay]] **ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
1816 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download consensuses from authorities
1817 if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably
1818 live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a list of fallback
1819 directory mirrors. This schedule is advanced by (potentially concurrent)
1820 connection attempts, unlike other schedules, which are advanced by
1821 connection failures. (Default: 6)
1823 [[ClientBootstrapConsensusFallbackDownloadInitialDelay]] **ClientBootstrapConsensusFallbackDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
1824 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download consensuses from fallback
1825 directory mirrors if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a
1826 usable, reasonably live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a
1827 list of fallback directory mirrors. This schedule is advanced by
1828 (potentially concurrent) connection attempts, unlike other schedules,
1829 which are advanced by connection failures. (Default: 0)
1831 [[ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyDownloadInitialDelay]] **ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
1832 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download consensuses from authorities
1833 if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably
1834 live consensus). Only used by clients which don't have or won't fetch
1835 from a list of fallback directory mirrors. This schedule is advanced by
1836 (potentially concurrent) connection attempts, unlike other schedules,
1837 which are advanced by connection failures. (Default: 0)
1839 [[ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxInProgressTries]] **ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxInProgressTries** __NUM__::
1840 Try this many simultaneous connections to download a consensus before
1841 waiting for one to complete, timeout, or error out. (Default: 3)
1843 [[DormantClientTimeout]] **DormantClientTimeout** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
1844 If Tor spends this much time without any client activity,
1845 enter a dormant state where automatic circuits are not built, and
1846 directory information is not fetched.
1847 Does not affect servers or onion services. Must be at least 10 minutes.
1850 [[DormantTimeoutDisabledByIdleStreams]] **DormantTimeoutDisabledByIdleStreams** **0**|**1**::
1851 If true, then any open client stream (even one not reading or writing)
1852 counts as client activity for the purpose of DormantClientTimeout.
1853 If false, then only network activity counts. (Default: 1)
1855 [[DormantOnFirstStartup]] **DormantOnFirstStartup** **0**|**1**::
1856 If true, then the first time Tor starts up with a fresh DataDirectory,
1857 it starts in dormant mode, and takes no actions until the user has made
1858 a request. (This mode is recommended if installing a Tor client for a
1859 user who might not actually use it.) If false, Tor bootstraps the first
1860 time it is started, whether it sees a user request or not.
1862 After the first time Tor starts, it begins in dormant mode if it was
1863 dormant before, and not otherwise. (Default: 0)
1865 [[DormantCanceledByStartup]] **DormantCanceledByStartup** **0**|**1**::
1866 By default, Tor starts in active mode if it was active the last time
1867 it was shut down, and in dormant mode if it was dormant. But if
1868 this option is true, Tor treats every startup event as user
1869 activity, and Tor will never start in Dormant mode, even if it has
1870 been unused for a long time on previous runs. (Default: 0)
1872 Note: Packagers and application developers should change the value of
1873 this option only with great caution: it has the potential to
1874 create spurious traffic on the network. This option should only
1875 be used if Tor is started by an affirmative user activity (like
1876 clicking on an applcation or running a command), and not if Tor
1877 is launched for some other reason (for example, by a startup
1878 process, or by an application that launches itself on every login.)
1883 The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if ORPort
1886 [[Address]] **Address** __address__::
1887 The IPv4 address of this server, or a fully qualified domain name of
1888 this server that resolves to an IPv4 address. You can leave this
1889 unset, and Tor will try to guess your IPv4 address. This IPv4
1890 address is the one used to tell clients and other servers where to
1891 find your Tor server; it doesn't affect the address that your server
1892 binds to. To bind to a different address, use the ORPort and
1893 OutboundBindAddress options.
1895 [[AssumeReachable]] **AssumeReachable** **0**|**1**::
1896 This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1,
1897 don't do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor
1898 immediately. If **AuthoritativeDirectory** is also set, this option
1899 instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and list
1900 all connected servers as running.
1902 [[BridgeRelay]] **BridgeRelay** **0**|**1**::
1903 Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections
1904 from bridge users to the Tor network. It mainly causes Tor to publish a
1905 server descriptor to the bridge database, rather than
1906 to the public directory authorities. +
1908 Note: make sure that no MyFamily lines are present in your torrc when
1909 relay is configured in bridge mode.
1911 [[BridgeDistribution]] **BridgeDistribution** __string__::
1912 If set along with BridgeRelay, Tor will include a new line in its
1913 bridge descriptor which indicates to the BridgeDB service how it
1914 would like its bridge address to be given out. Set it to "none" if
1915 you want BridgeDB to avoid distributing your bridge address, or "any" to
1916 let BridgeDB decide. (Default: any)
1918 Note: as of Oct 2017, the BridgeDB part of this option is not yet
1919 implemented. Until BridgeDB is updated to obey this option, your
1920 bridge will make this request, but it will not (yet) be obeyed.
1922 [[ContactInfo]] **ContactInfo** __email_address__::
1923 Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
1924 can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
1925 something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
1926 descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
1927 spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact
1928 that it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this
1931 ContactInfo **must** be set to a working address if you run more than one
1932 relay or bridge. (Really, everybody running a relay or bridge should set
1936 [[ExitRelay]] **ExitRelay** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
1937 Tells Tor whether to run as an exit relay. If Tor is running as a
1938 non-bridge server, and ExitRelay is set to 1, then Tor allows traffic to
1939 exit according to the ExitPolicy option, the ReducedExitPolicy option,
1940 or the default ExitPolicy (if no other exit policy option is specified). +
1942 If ExitRelay is set to 0, no traffic is allowed to
1943 exit, and the ExitPolicy and ReducedExitPolicy options are ignored. +
1945 If ExitRelay is set to "auto", then Tor checks the ExitPolicy and
1946 ReducedExitPolicy options. If either is set, Tor behaves as if ExitRelay
1947 were set to 1. If neither exit policy option is set, Tor behaves as if
1948 ExitRelay were set to 0. (Default: auto)
1950 [[ExitPolicy]] **ExitPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
1951 Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
1952 "**accept[6]**|**reject[6]** __ADDR__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]". If /__MASK__ is
1953 omitted then this policy just applies to the host given. Instead of giving
1954 a host or network you can also use "\*" to denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0
1955 and ::/0), or \*4 to denote all IPv4 addresses, and \*6 to denote all IPv6
1957 __PORT__ can be a single port number, an interval of ports
1958 "__FROM_PORT__-__TO_PORT__", or "\*". If __PORT__ is omitted, that means
1961 For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:\*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:\*,accept \*:\*" would
1962 reject any IPv4 traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and accept
1963 any other IPv4 or IPv6 traffic. +
1965 Tor also allows IPv6 exit policy entries. For instance, "reject6 [FC00::]/7:\*"
1966 rejects all destinations that share 7 most significant bit prefix with
1967 address FC00::. Respectively, "accept6 [C000::]/3:\*" accepts all destinations
1968 that share 3 most significant bit prefix with address C000::. +
1970 accept6 and reject6 only produce IPv6 exit policy entries. Using an IPv4
1971 address with accept6 or reject6 is ignored and generates a warning.
1972 accept/reject allows either IPv4 or IPv6 addresses. Use \*4 as an IPv4
1973 wildcard address, and \*6 as an IPv6 wildcard address. accept/reject *
1974 expands to matching IPv4 and IPv6 wildcard address rules. +
1976 To specify all IPv4 and IPv6 internal and link-local networks (including
1977 0.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8,
1978 172.16.0.0/12, [::]/8, [FC00::]/7, [FE80::]/10, [FEC0::]/10, [FF00::]/8,
1979 and [::]/127), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address.
1980 ("private" always produces rules for IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, even when
1981 used with accept6/reject6.) +
1983 Private addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your exit
1984 policy), along with any configured primary public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
1985 These private addresses are rejected unless you set the
1986 ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option to 0. For example, once you've done
1987 that, you could allow HTTP to 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to
1988 internal networks with "accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:\*", though that
1989 may also allow connections to your own computer that are addressed to its
1990 public (external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more details
1991 about internal and reserved IP address space. See
1992 ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces if you want to block every address on the
1993 relay, even those that aren't advertised in the descriptor. +
1995 This directive can be specified multiple times so you don't have to put it
1998 Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If you
1999 want to allow the same ports on IPv4 and IPv6, write your rules using
2000 accept/reject \*. If you want to allow different ports on IPv4 and IPv6,
2001 write your IPv6 rules using accept6/reject6 \*6, and your IPv4 rules using
2002 accept/reject \*4. If you want to \_replace_ the default exit policy, end
2003 your exit policy with either a reject \*:* or an accept \*:*. Otherwise,
2004 you're \_augmenting_ (prepending to) the default exit policy. +
2006 If you want to use a reduced exit policy rather than the default exit
2007 policy, set "ReducedExitPolicy 1". If you want to _replace_ the default
2008 exit policy with your custom exit policy, end your exit policy with either
2009 a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending
2010 to) the default or reduced exit policy. +
2012 The default exit policy is:
2026 // Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page.
2027 [[ExitPolicyDefault]]::
2028 Since the default exit policy uses accept/reject *, it applies to both
2029 IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
2031 [[ExitPolicyRejectPrivate]] **ExitPolicyRejectPrivate** **0**|**1**::
2032 Reject all private (local) networks, along with the relay's advertised
2033 public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, at the beginning of your exit policy.
2034 See above entry on ExitPolicy.
2037 [[ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces]] **ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces** **0**|**1**::
2038 Reject all IPv4 and IPv6 addresses that the relay knows about, at the
2039 beginning of your exit policy. This includes any OutboundBindAddress, the
2040 bind addresses of any port options, such as ControlPort or DNSPort, and any
2041 public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses on any interface on the relay. (If IPv6Exit
2042 is not set, all IPv6 addresses will be rejected anyway.)
2043 See above entry on ExitPolicy.
2044 This option is off by default, because it lists all public relay IP
2045 addresses in the ExitPolicy, even those relay operators might prefer not
2049 [[ReducedExitPolicy]] **ReducedExitPolicy** **0**|**1**::
2050 If set, use a reduced exit policy rather than the default one. +
2052 The reduced exit policy is an alternative to the default exit policy. It
2053 allows as many Internet services as possible while still blocking the
2054 majority of TCP ports. Currently, the policy allows approximately 65 ports.
2055 This reduces the odds that your node will be used for peer-to-peer
2058 The reduced exit policy is:
2142 [[IPv6Exit]] **IPv6Exit** **0**|**1**::
2143 If set, and we are an exit node, allow clients to use us for IPv6
2144 traffic. (Default: 0)
2146 [[MaxOnionQueueDelay]] **MaxOnionQueueDelay** __NUM__ [**msec**|**second**]::
2147 If we have more onionskins queued for processing than we can process in
2148 this amount of time, reject new ones. (Default: 1750 msec)
2150 [[MyFamily]] **MyFamily** __fingerprint__,__fingerprint__,...::
2151 Declare that this Tor relay is controlled or administered by a group or
2152 organization identical or similar to that of the other relays, defined by
2153 their (possibly $-prefixed) identity fingerprints.
2154 This option can be repeated many times, for
2155 convenience in defining large families: all fingerprints in all MyFamily
2156 lines are merged into one list.
2157 When two relays both declare that they are in the
2158 same \'family', Tor clients will not use them in the same circuit. (Each
2159 relay only needs to list the other servers in its family; it doesn't need to
2160 list itself, but it won't hurt if it does.) Do not list any bridge relay as it would
2161 compromise its concealment. +
2163 When listing a node, it's better to list it by fingerprint than by
2164 nickname: fingerprints are more reliable. +
2166 If you run more than one relay, the MyFamily option on each relay
2167 **must** list all other relays, as described above. +
2169 Note: do not use MyFamily when configuring your Tor instance as a
2172 [[Nickname]] **Nickname** __name__::
2173 Set the server's nickname to \'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19
2174 characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].
2175 If not set, **Unnamed** will be used. Relays can always be uniquely identified
2176 by their identity fingerprints.
2178 [[NumCPUs]] **NumCPUs** __num__::
2179 How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins and other
2180 parallelizable operations. If this is set to 0, Tor will try to detect
2181 how many CPUs you have, defaulting to 1 if it can't tell. (Default: 0)
2183 [[ORPort]] **ORPort** \['address':]__PORT__|**auto** [_flags_]::
2184 Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and
2185 servers. This option is required to be a Tor server.
2186 Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. Set it to 0 to not
2187 run an ORPort at all. This option can occur more than once. (Default: 0) +
2189 Tor recognizes these flags on each ORPort:
2191 By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If
2192 NoAdvertise is specified, we don't advertise, but listen anyway. This
2193 can be useful if the port everybody will be connecting to (for
2194 example, one that's opened on our firewall) is somewhere else.
2196 By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If
2197 NoListen is specified, we don't bind, but advertise anyway. This
2198 can be useful if something else (for example, a firewall's port
2199 forwarding configuration) is causing connections to reach us.
2201 If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6
2202 address, only listen to the IPv4 address.
2204 If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6
2205 address, only listen to the IPv6 address.
2207 // Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page.
2208 [[ORPortFlagsExclusive]]::
2209 For obvious reasons, NoAdvertise and NoListen are mutually exclusive, and
2210 IPv4Only and IPv6Only are mutually exclusive.
2212 [[PublishServerDescriptor]] **PublishServerDescriptor** **0**|**1**|**v3**|**bridge**,**...**::
2213 This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish when acting as
2215 choose multiple arguments, separated by commas. +
2217 If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its
2218 descriptors to any directories. (This is useful if you're testing
2219 out your server, or if you're using a Tor controller that handles
2220 directory publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its
2221 descriptors of all type(s) specified. The default is "1", which
2222 means "if running as a relay or bridge, publish descriptors to the
2223 appropriate authorities". Other possibilities are "v3", meaning
2224 "publish as if you're a relay", and "bridge", meaning "publish as
2225 if you're a bridge".
2227 [[ShutdownWaitLength]] **ShutdownWaitLength** __NUM__::
2228 When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down:
2229 we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After **NUM**
2230 seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immediately.
2231 (Default: 30 seconds)
2233 [[SSLKeyLifetime]] **SSLKeyLifetime** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
2234 When creating a link certificate for our outermost SSL handshake,
2235 set its lifetime to this amount of time. If set to 0, Tor will choose
2236 some reasonable random defaults. (Default: 0)
2238 [[HeartbeatPeriod]] **HeartbeatPeriod** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
2239 Log a heartbeat message every **HeartbeatPeriod** seconds. This is
2240 a log level __notice__ message, designed to let you know your Tor
2241 server is still alive and doing useful things. Settings this
2242 to 0 will disable the heartbeat. Otherwise, it must be at least 30
2243 minutes. (Default: 6 hours)
2245 [[MainloopStats]] **MainloopStats** **0**|**1**::
2246 Log main loop statistics every **HeartbeatPeriod** seconds. This is a log
2247 level __notice__ message designed to help developers instrumenting Tor's
2248 main event loop. (Default: 0)
2250 [[AccountingMax]] **AccountingMax** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
2251 Limits the max number of bytes sent and received within a set time period
2252 using a given calculation rule (see: AccountingStart, AccountingRule).
2253 Useful if you need to stay under a specific bandwidth. By default, the
2254 number used for calculation is the max of either the bytes sent or
2255 received. For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 GByte, a server
2256 could send 900 MBytes and receive 800 MBytes and continue running.
2257 It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 GByte. This can
2258 be changed to use the sum of the both bytes received and sent by setting
2259 the AccountingRule option to "sum" (total bandwidth in/out). When the
2260 number of bytes remaining gets low, Tor will stop accepting new connections
2261 and circuits. When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate
2262 until some time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers
2263 from waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point
2264 in each period before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues,
2265 enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since
2266 it provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some
2267 of the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are
2270 [[AccountingRule]] **AccountingRule** **sum**|**max**|**in**|**out**::
2271 How we determine when our AccountingMax has been reached (when we
2272 should hibernate) during a time interval. Set to "max" to calculate
2273 using the higher of either the sent or received bytes (this is the
2274 default functionality). Set to "sum" to calculate using the sent
2275 plus received bytes. Set to "in" to calculate using only the
2276 received bytes. Set to "out" to calculate using only the sent bytes.
2279 [[AccountingStart]] **AccountingStart** **day**|**week**|**month** [__day__] __HH:MM__::
2280 Specify how long accounting periods last. If **month** is given,
2281 each accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ on the __dayth__ day of one
2282 month to the same day and time of the next. The relay will go at full speed,
2283 use all the quota you specify, then hibernate for the rest of the period. (The
2284 day must be between 1 and 28.) If **week** is given, each accounting period
2285 runs from the time __HH:MM__ of the __dayth__ day of one week to the same day
2286 and time of the next week, with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If **day**
2287 is given, each accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ each day to the
2288 same time on the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time.
2289 (Default: "month 1 0:00")
2291 [[RefuseUnknownExits]] **RefuseUnknownExits** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
2292 Prevent nodes that don't appear in the consensus from exiting using this
2293 relay. If the option is 1, we always block exit attempts from such
2294 nodes; if it's 0, we never do, and if the option is "auto", then we do
2295 whatever the authorities suggest in the consensus (and block if the consensus
2296 is quiet on the issue). (Default: auto)
2298 [[ServerDNSResolvConfFile]] **ServerDNSResolvConfFile** __filename__::
2299 Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in
2300 __filename__. The file format is the same as the standard Unix
2301 "**resolv.conf**" file (7). This option, like all other ServerDNS options,
2302 only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients.
2303 (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration or a localhost DNS service
2304 in case no nameservers are found in a given configuration.)
2306 [[ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig]] **ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig** **0**|**1**::
2307 If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems
2308 parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers.
2309 Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until
2310 it eventually succeeds. (Default: 1)
2312 [[ServerDNSSearchDomains]] **ServerDNSSearchDomains** **0**|**1**::
2313 If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain.
2314 For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in
2315 "example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be
2316 connected to "www.example.com". This option only affects name lookups that
2317 your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)
2319 [[ServerDNSDetectHijacking]] **ServerDNSDetectHijacking** **0**|**1**::
2320 When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine
2321 whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS
2322 requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to
2323 correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
2324 on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)
2326 [[ServerDNSTestAddresses]] **ServerDNSTestAddresses** __hostname__,__hostname__,__...__::
2327 When we're detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these __valid__ addresses
2328 aren't getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless,
2329 and we'll reset our exit policy to "reject \*:*". This option only affects
2330 name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default:
2331 "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org")
2333 [[ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames]] **ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames** **0**|**1**::
2334 When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames
2335 containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an
2336 exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve
2337 URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
2338 on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)
2340 [[BridgeRecordUsageByCountry]] **BridgeRecordUsageByCountry** **0**|**1**::
2341 When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have
2342 GeoIP data, Tor keeps a per-country count of how many client
2343 addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess
2344 which countries have blocked access to it. (Default: 1)
2346 [[ServerDNSRandomizeCase]] **ServerDNSRandomizeCase** **0**|**1**::
2347 When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in
2348 outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies.
2349 This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack.
2350 For more information, see "Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through
2351 0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects name lookups that your server
2352 does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)
2354 [[GeoIPFile]] **GeoIPFile** __filename__::
2355 A filename containing IPv4 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics.
2357 [[GeoIPv6File]] **GeoIPv6File** __filename__::
2358 A filename containing IPv6 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics.
2360 [[CellStatistics]] **CellStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2362 When this option is enabled, Tor collects statistics about cell
2363 processing (i.e. mean time a cell is spending in a queue, mean
2364 number of cells in a queue and mean number of processed cells per
2365 circuit) and writes them into disk every 24 hours. Onion router
2366 operators may use the statistics for performance monitoring.
2367 If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will published as part of
2368 extra-info document. (Default: 0)
2370 [[PaddingStatistics]] **PaddingStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2371 Relays and bridges only.
2372 When this option is enabled, Tor collects statistics for padding cells
2373 sent and received by this relay, in addition to total cell counts.
2374 These statistics are rounded, and omitted if traffic is low. This
2375 information is important for load balancing decisions related to padding.
2376 If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will be published
2377 as a part of extra-info document. (Default: 1)
2379 [[DirReqStatistics]] **DirReqStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2380 Relays and bridges only.
2381 When this option is enabled, a Tor directory writes statistics on the
2382 number and response time of network status requests to disk every 24
2383 hours. Enables relay and bridge operators to monitor how much their
2384 server is being used by clients to learn about Tor network.
2385 If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will published as part of
2386 extra-info document. (Default: 1)
2388 [[EntryStatistics]] **EntryStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2390 When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of
2391 directly connecting clients to disk every 24 hours. Enables relay
2392 operators to monitor how much inbound traffic that originates from
2393 Tor clients passes through their server to go further down the
2394 Tor network. If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will be published
2395 as part of extra-info document. (Default: 0)
2397 [[ExitPortStatistics]] **ExitPortStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2399 When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of
2400 relayed bytes and opened stream per exit port to disk every 24 hours.
2401 Enables exit relay operators to measure and monitor amounts of traffic
2402 that leaves Tor network through their exit node. If ExtraInfoStatistics
2403 is enabled, it will be published as part of extra-info document.
2406 [[ConnDirectionStatistics]] **ConnDirectionStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2408 When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the amounts of
2409 traffic it passes between itself and other relays to disk every 24
2410 hours. Enables relay operators to monitor how much their relay is
2411 being used as middle node in the circuit. If ExtraInfoStatistics is
2412 enabled, it will be published as part of extra-info document.
2415 [[HiddenServiceStatistics]] **HiddenServiceStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2417 When this option is enabled, a Tor relay writes obfuscated
2418 statistics on its role as hidden-service directory, introduction
2419 point, or rendezvous point to disk every 24 hours. If
2420 ExtraInfoStatistics is also enabled, these statistics are further
2421 published to the directory authorities. (Default: 1)
2423 [[ExtraInfoStatistics]] **ExtraInfoStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2424 When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously gathered statistics in
2425 its extra-info documents that it uploads to the directory authorities.
2428 [[ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses]] **ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses** **0**|**1**::
2429 When this option is enabled, Tor will connect to relays on localhost,
2430 RFC1918 addresses, and so on. In particular, Tor will make direct OR
2431 connections, and Tor routers allow EXTEND requests, to these private
2432 addresses. (Tor will always allow connections to bridges, proxies, and
2433 pluggable transports configured on private addresses.) Enabling this
2434 option can create security issues; you should probably leave it off.
2437 [[MaxMemInQueues]] **MaxMemInQueues** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**::
2438 This option configures a threshold above which Tor will assume that it
2439 needs to stop queueing or buffering data because it's about to run out of
2440 memory. If it hits this threshold, it will begin killing circuits until
2441 it has recovered at least 10% of this memory. Do not set this option too
2442 low, or your relay may be unreliable under load. This option only
2443 affects some queues, so the actual process size will be larger than
2444 this. If this option is set to 0, Tor will try to pick a reasonable
2445 default based on your system's physical memory. (Default: 0)
2447 [[DisableOOSCheck]] **DisableOOSCheck** **0**|**1**::
2448 This option disables the code that closes connections when Tor notices
2449 that it is running low on sockets. Right now, it is on by default,
2450 since the existing out-of-sockets mechanism tends to kill OR connections
2451 more than it should. (Default: 1)
2453 [[SigningKeyLifetime]] **SigningKeyLifetime** __N__ **days**|**weeks**|**months**::
2454 For how long should each Ed25519 signing key be valid? Tor uses a
2455 permanent master identity key that can be kept offline, and periodically
2456 generates new "signing" keys that it uses online. This option
2457 configures their lifetime.
2460 [[OfflineMasterKey]] **OfflineMasterKey** **0**|**1**::
2461 If non-zero, the Tor relay will never generate or load its master secret
2462 key. Instead, you'll have to use "tor --keygen" to manage the permanent
2463 ed25519 master identity key, as well as the corresponding temporary
2464 signing keys and certificates. (Default: 0)
2466 [[KeyDirectory]] **KeyDirectory** __DIR__::
2467 Store secret keys in DIR. Can not be changed while tor is
2469 (Default: the "keys" subdirectory of DataDirectory.)
2471 [[KeyDirectoryGroupReadable]] **KeyDirectoryGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
2472 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
2473 KeywDirectory. If the option is set to 1, make the KeyDirectory readable
2474 by the default GID. (Default: 0)
2476 [[RephistTrackTime]] **RephistTrackTime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
2477 Tells an authority, or other node tracking node reliability and history,
2478 that fine-grained information about nodes can be discarded when it hasn't
2479 changed for a given amount of time. (Default: 24 hours)
2482 DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS
2483 ------------------------
2485 The following options are useful only for directory servers. (Relays with
2486 enough bandwidth automatically become directory servers; see DirCache for
2489 [[DirPortFrontPage]] **DirPortFrontPage** __FILENAME__::
2490 When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on
2491 the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing
2492 to set up a separate webserver. There's a sample disclaimer in
2493 contrib/operator-tools/tor-exit-notice.html.
2495 [[DirPort]] **DirPort** \['address':]__PORT__|**auto** [_flags_]::
2496 If this option is nonzero, advertise the directory service on this port.
2497 Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This option can occur
2498 more than once, but only one advertised DirPort is supported: all
2499 but one DirPort must have the **NoAdvertise** flag set. (Default: 0) +
2501 The same flags are supported here as are supported by ORPort.
2503 [[DirPolicy]] **DirPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
2504 Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
2505 directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above,
2506 except that port specifiers are ignored. Any address not matched by
2507 some entry in the policy is accepted.
2509 [[DirCache]] **DirCache** **0**|**1**::
2510 When this option is set, Tor caches all current directory documents except
2511 extra info documents, and accepts client requests for them. If
2512 **DownloadExtraInfo** is set, cached extra info documents are also cached.
2513 Setting **DirPort** is not required for **DirCache**, because clients
2514 connect via the ORPort by default. Setting either DirPort or BridgeRelay
2515 and setting DirCache to 0 is not supported. (Default: 1)
2517 [[MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs]] **MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
2518 When this option is nonzero, Tor caches will not try to generate
2519 consensus diffs for any consensus older than this amount of time.
2520 If this option is set to zero, Tor will pick a reasonable default from
2521 the current networkstatus document. You should not set this
2522 option unless your cache is severely low on disk space or CPU.
2523 If you need to set it, keeping it above 3 or 4 hours will help clients
2524 much more than setting it to zero.
2528 DENIAL OF SERVICE MITIGATION OPTIONS
2529 ------------------------------------
2531 Tor has three built-in mitigation options that can be individually
2532 enabled/disabled and fine-tuned, but by default Tor directory authorities will
2533 define reasonable values for relays and no explicit configuration is required
2534 to make use of these protections. The mitigations take place at relays,
2537 1. If a single client address makes too many concurrent connections (this is
2538 configurable via DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount), hang up on further
2541 2. If a single client IP address (v4 or v6) makes circuits too quickly
2542 (default values are more than 3 per second, with an allowed burst of 90,
2543 see DoSCircuitCreationRate and DoSCircuitCreationBurst) while also having
2544 too many connections open (default is 3, see
2545 DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections), tor will refuse any new circuit (CREATE
2546 cells) for the next while (random value between 1 and 2 hours).
2548 3. If a client asks to establish a rendezvous point to you directly (ex:
2549 Tor2Web client), ignore the request.
2551 These defenses can be manually controlled by torrc options, but relays will
2552 also take guidance from consensus parameters using these same names, so there's
2553 no need to configure anything manually. In doubt, do not change those values.
2555 The values set by the consensus, if any, can be found here:
2556 https://consensus-health.torproject.org/#consensusparams
2558 If any of the DoS mitigations are enabled, a heartbeat message will appear in
2559 your log at NOTICE level which looks like:
2561 DoS mitigation since startup: 429042 circuits rejected, 17 marked addresses.
2562 2238 connections closed. 8052 single hop clients refused.
2564 The following options are useful only for a public relay. They control the
2565 Denial of Service mitigation subsystem described above.
2567 [[DoSCircuitCreationEnabled]] **DoSCircuitCreationEnabled** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
2569 Enable circuit creation DoS mitigation. If set to 1 (enabled), tor will
2570 cache client IPs along with statistics in order to detect circuit DoS
2571 attacks. If an address is positively identified, tor will activate
2572 defenses against the address. See the DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType option
2573 for more details. This is a client to relay detection only. "auto" means
2574 use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 0.
2577 [[DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections]] **DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections** __NUM__::
2579 Minimum threshold of concurrent connections before a client address can be
2580 flagged as executing a circuit creation DoS. In other words, once a client
2581 address reaches the circuit rate and has a minimum of NUM concurrent
2582 connections, a detection is positive. "0" means use the consensus
2583 parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 3.
2586 [[DoSCircuitCreationRate]] **DoSCircuitCreationRate** __NUM__::
2588 The allowed circuit creation rate per second applied per client IP
2589 address. If this option is 0, it obeys a consensus parameter. If not
2590 defined in the consensus, the value is 3.
2593 [[DoSCircuitCreationBurst]] **DoSCircuitCreationBurst** __NUM__::
2595 The allowed circuit creation burst per client IP address. If the circuit
2596 rate and the burst are reached, a client is marked as executing a circuit
2597 creation DoS. "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the
2598 consensus, the value is 90.
2601 [[DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType]] **DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType** __NUM__::
2603 This is the type of defense applied to a detected client address. The
2604 possible values are:
2608 2: Refuse circuit creation for the DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod period of time.
2610 "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 2.
2613 [[DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod]] **DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::
2615 The base time period in seconds that the DoS defense is activated for. The
2616 actual value is selected randomly for each activation from N+1 to 3/2 * N.
2617 "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus,
2618 the value is 3600 seconds (1 hour).
2621 [[DoSConnectionEnabled]] **DoSConnectionEnabled** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
2623 Enable the connection DoS mitigation. If set to 1 (enabled), for client
2624 address only, this allows tor to mitigate against large number of
2625 concurrent connections made by a single IP address. "auto" means use the
2626 consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 0.
2629 [[DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount]] **DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount** __NUM__::
2631 The maximum threshold of concurrent connection from a client IP address.
2632 Above this limit, a defense selected by DoSConnectionDefenseType is
2633 applied. "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the
2634 consensus, the value is 100.
2637 [[DoSConnectionDefenseType]] **DoSConnectionDefenseType** __NUM__::
2639 This is the type of defense applied to a detected client address for the
2640 connection mitigation. The possible values are:
2644 2: Immediately close new connections.
2646 "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 2.
2649 [[DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous]] **DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
2651 Refuse establishment of rendezvous points for single hop clients. In other
2652 words, if a client directly connects to the relay and sends an
2653 ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell, it is silently dropped. "auto" means use the
2654 consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 0.
2658 DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS
2659 ----------------------------------
2661 The following options enable operation as a directory authority, and
2662 control how Tor behaves as a directory authority. You should not need
2663 to adjust any of them if you're running a regular relay or exit server
2664 on the public Tor network.
2666 [[AuthoritativeDirectory]] **AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
2667 When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative directory
2668 server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its own list of
2669 good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients. Unless the clients
2670 already have you listed as a trusted directory, you probably do not want
2673 [[V3AuthoritativeDirectory]] **V3AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
2674 When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
2675 generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
2676 described in dir-spec.txt file of https://spec.torproject.org/[torspec]
2677 (for Tor clients and servers running at least 0.2.0.x).
2679 [[VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory]] **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
2680 When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on which versions of
2681 Tor are still believed safe for use to the published directory. Each
2682 version 1 authority is automatically a versioning authority; version 2
2683 authorities provide this service optionally. See **RecommendedVersions**,
2684 **RecommendedClientVersions**, and **RecommendedServerVersions**.
2686 [[RecommendedVersions]] **RecommendedVersions** __STRING__::
2687 STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
2688 safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which pull down the
2689 directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This option can appear
2690 multiple times: the values from multiple lines are spliced together. When
2691 this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should be set too.
2693 [[RecommendedPackages]] **RecommendedPackages** __PACKAGENAME__ __VERSION__ __URL__ __DIGESTTYPE__**=**__DIGEST__ ::
2694 Adds "package" line to the directory authority's vote. This information
2695 is used to vote on the correct URL and digest for the released versions
2696 of different Tor-related packages, so that the consensus can certify
2697 them. This line may appear any number of times.
2699 [[RecommendedClientVersions]] **RecommendedClientVersions** __STRING__::
2700 STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
2701 safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2
2702 directories. If this is not set then the value of **RecommendedVersions**
2703 is used. When this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should
2706 [[BridgeAuthoritativeDir]] **BridgeAuthoritativeDir** **0**|**1**::
2707 When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
2708 accepts and serves server descriptors, but it caches and serves the main
2709 networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0)
2711 [[MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2]] **MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
2712 Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as such by
2713 authoritative directories. (Default: 25 hours)
2715 [[RecommendedServerVersions]] **RecommendedServerVersions** __STRING__::
2716 STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
2717 safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2
2718 directories. If this is not set then the value of **RecommendedVersions**
2719 is used. When this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should
2722 [[ConsensusParams]] **ConsensusParams** __STRING__::
2723 STRING is a space-separated list of key=value pairs that Tor will include
2724 in the "params" line of its networkstatus vote.
2726 [[DirAllowPrivateAddresses]] **DirAllowPrivateAddresses** **0**|**1**::
2727 If set to 1, Tor will accept server descriptors with arbitrary "Address"
2728 elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private IP
2729 address, it will reject the server descriptor. Additionally, Tor
2730 will allow exit policies for private networks to fulfill Exit flag
2731 requirements. (Default: 0)
2733 [[AuthDirBadExit]] **AuthDirBadExit** __AddressPattern...__::
2734 Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
2735 will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority
2736 publishes, if **AuthDirListBadExits** is set. +
2738 (The address pattern syntax here and in the options below
2739 is the same as for exit policies, except that you don't need to say
2740 "accept" or "reject", and ports are not needed.)
2742 [[AuthDirInvalid]] **AuthDirInvalid** __AddressPattern...__::
2743 Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
2744 will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this
2745 authority publishes.
2747 [[AuthDirReject]] **AuthDirReject** __AddressPattern__...::
2748 Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
2749 will never be listed at all in any network status document that this
2750 authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor
2751 submitted for publication by this authority.
2753 [[AuthDirBadExitCCs]] **AuthDirBadExitCCs** __CC__,... +
2755 [[AuthDirInvalidCCs]] **AuthDirInvalidCCs** __CC__,... +
2757 [[AuthDirRejectCCs]] **AuthDirRejectCCs** __CC__,...::
2758 Authoritative directories only. These options contain a comma-separated
2759 list of country codes such that any server in one of those country codes
2760 will be marked as a bad exit/invalid for use, or rejected
2763 [[AuthDirListBadExits]] **AuthDirListBadExits** **0**|**1**::
2764 Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some
2765 opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not set this to
2766 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad; otherwise, you are
2767 effectively voting in favor of every declared exit as an exit.)
2769 [[AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr]] **AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr** __NUM__::
2770 Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of servers that we will
2771 list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to "0" for "no limit".
2774 [[AuthDirFastGuarantee]] **AuthDirFastGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
2775 Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, always vote the
2776 Fast flag for any relay advertising this amount of capacity or
2777 more. (Default: 100 KBytes)
2779 [[AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee]] **AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
2780 Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, this advertised capacity
2781 or more is always sufficient to satisfy the bandwidth requirement
2782 for the Guard flag. (Default: 2 MBytes)
2784 [[AuthDirPinKeys]] **AuthDirPinKeys** **0**|**1**::
2785 Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, do not allow any relay to
2786 publish a descriptor if any other relay has reserved its <Ed25519,RSA>
2787 identity keypair. In all cases, Tor records every keypair it accepts
2788 in a journal if it is new, or if it differs from the most recently
2789 accepted pinning for one of the keys it contains. (Default: 1)
2791 [[AuthDirSharedRandomness]] **AuthDirSharedRandomness** **0**|**1**::
2792 Authoritative directories only. Switch for the shared random protocol.
2793 If zero, the authority won't participate in the protocol. If non-zero
2794 (default), the flag "shared-rand-participate" is added to the authority
2795 vote indicating participation in the protocol. (Default: 1)
2797 [[AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys]] **AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys** **0**|**1**::
2798 Authoritative directories only. If this option is set to 0, then we treat
2799 relays as "Running" if their RSA key is correct when we probe them,
2800 regardless of their Ed25519 key. We should only ever set this option to 0
2801 if there is some major bug in Ed25519 link authentication that causes us
2802 to label all the relays as not Running. (Default: 1)
2804 [[BridgePassword]] **BridgePassword** __Password__::
2805 If set, contains an HTTP authenticator that tells a bridge authority to
2806 serve all requested bridge information. Used by the (only partially
2807 implemented) "bridge community" design, where a community of bridge
2808 relay operators all use an alternate bridge directory authority,
2809 and their target user audience can periodically fetch the list of
2810 available community bridges to stay up-to-date. (Default: not set)
2812 [[V3AuthVotingInterval]] **V3AuthVotingInterval** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
2813 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred voting
2814 interval. Note that voting will __actually__ happen at an interval chosen
2815 by consensus from all the authorities' preferred intervals. This time
2816 SHOULD divide evenly into a day. (Default: 1 hour)
2818 [[V3AuthVoteDelay]] **V3AuthVoteDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
2819 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred delay
2820 between publishing its vote and assuming it has all the votes from all the
2821 other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server's
2822 preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes)
2824 [[V3AuthDistDelay]] **V3AuthDistDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
2825 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred delay
2826 between publishing its consensus and signature and assuming it has all the
2827 signatures from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used
2828 is not the server's preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences.
2829 (Default: 5 minutes)
2831 [[V3AuthNIntervalsValid]] **V3AuthNIntervalsValid** __NUM__::
2832 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number of VotingIntervals
2833 for which each consensus should be valid for. Choosing high numbers
2834 increases network partitioning risks; choosing low numbers increases
2835 directory traffic. Note that the actual number of intervals used is not the
2836 server's preferred number, but the consensus of all preferences. Must be at
2837 least 2. (Default: 3)
2839 [[V3BandwidthsFile]] **V3BandwidthsFile** __FILENAME__::
2840 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the location of the
2841 bandwidth-authority generated file storing information on relays' measured
2842 bandwidth capacities. To avoid inconsistent reads, bandwidth data should
2843 be written to temporary file, then renamed to the configured filename.
2846 [[V3AuthUseLegacyKey]] **V3AuthUseLegacyKey** **0**|**1**::
2847 If set, the directory authority will sign consensuses not only with its
2848 own signing key, but also with a "legacy" key and certificate with a
2849 different identity. This feature is used to migrate directory authority
2850 keys in the event of a compromise. (Default: 0)
2852 [[AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity]] **AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity** **0**|**1**::
2853 Authoritative directories only. When set to 0, OR ports with an
2854 IPv6 address are not included in the authority's votes. When set to 1,
2855 IPv6 OR ports are tested for reachability like IPv4 OR ports. If the
2856 reachability test succeeds, the authority votes for the IPv6 ORPort, and
2857 votes Running for the relay. If the reachability test fails, the authority
2858 does not vote for the IPv6 ORPort, and does not vote Running (Default: 0) +
2860 The content of the consensus depends on the number of voting authorities
2861 that set AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity:
2863 If no authorities set AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity 1, there will be no
2864 IPv6 ORPorts in the consensus.
2866 If a minority of authorities set AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity 1,
2867 unreachable IPv6 ORPorts will be removed from the consensus. But the
2868 majority of IPv4-only authorities will still vote the relay as Running.
2869 Reachable IPv6 ORPort lines will be included in the consensus
2871 If a majority of voting authorities set AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity 1,
2872 relays with unreachable IPv6 ORPorts will not be listed as Running.
2873 Reachable IPv6 ORPort lines will be included in the consensus
2874 (To ensure that any valid majority will vote relays with unreachable
2875 IPv6 ORPorts not Running, 75% of authorities must set
2876 AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity 1.)
2878 [[MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised]] **MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised** __N__::
2879 A total value, in abstract bandwidth units, describing how much
2880 measured total bandwidth an authority should have observed on the network
2881 before it will treat advertised bandwidths as wholly
2882 unreliable. (Default: 500)
2884 HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS
2885 ----------------------
2887 The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
2889 [[HiddenServiceDir]] **HiddenServiceDir** __DIRECTORY__::
2890 Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden service
2891 must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple times to
2892 specify multiple services. If DIRECTORY does not exist, Tor will create it.
2893 Please note that you cannot add new Onion Service to already running Tor
2894 instance if **Sandbox** is enabled.
2895 (Note: in current versions of Tor, if DIRECTORY is a relative path,
2896 it will be relative to the current
2897 working directory of Tor instance, not to its DataDirectory. Do not
2898 rely on this behavior; it is not guaranteed to remain the same in future
2901 [[HiddenServicePort]] **HiddenServicePort** __VIRTPORT__ [__TARGET__]::
2902 Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this
2903 option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most
2904 recent HiddenServiceDir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to
2905 the same port on 127.0.0.1 over TCP. You may override the target port,
2906 address, or both by specifying a target of addr, port, addr:port, or
2907 **unix:**__path__. (You can specify an IPv6 target as [addr]:port. Unix
2908 paths may be quoted, and may use standard C escapes.)
2909 You may also have multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user
2910 connects to that VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be
2911 chosen at random. Note that address-port pairs have to be comma-separated.
2913 [[PublishHidServDescriptors]] **PublishHidServDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
2914 If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won't
2915 advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful if
2916 you're using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you.
2919 [[HiddenServiceVersion]] **HiddenServiceVersion** **2**|**3**::
2920 A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden
2921 service. Currently, versions 2 and 3 are supported. (Default: 3)
2923 [[HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient]] **HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** __auth-type__ __client-name__,__client-name__,__...__::
2924 If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients
2925 only. The auth-type can either be \'basic' for a general-purpose
2926 authorization protocol or \'stealth' for a less scalable protocol that also
2927 hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are
2928 listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names
2929 are 1 to 16 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no
2930 spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible for
2931 clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data can be
2932 found in the hostname file. Clients need to put this authorization data in
2933 their configuration file using **HidServAuth**. This option is only for v2
2934 services; v3 services configure client authentication in a subdirectory of
2935 HiddenServiceDir instead (see the **Client Authorization** section).
2937 [[HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts]] **HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts** **0**|**1**::
2938 If set to 1, then connections to unrecognized ports do not cause the
2939 current hidden service to close rendezvous circuits. (Setting this to 0 is
2940 not an authorization mechanism; it is instead meant to be a mild
2941 inconvenience to port-scanners.) (Default: 0)
2943 [[HiddenServiceExportCircuitID]] **HiddenServiceExportCircuitID** __protocol__::
2944 The onion service will use the given protocol to expose the global circuit
2945 identifier of each inbound client circuit via the selected protocol. The only
2946 protocol supported right now \'haproxy'. This option is only for v3
2947 services. (Default: none) +
2949 The haproxy option works in the following way: when the feature is
2950 enabled, the Tor process will write a header line when a client is connecting
2951 to the onion service. The header will look like this: +
2953 "PROXY TCP6 fc00:dead:beef:4dad::ffff:ffff ::1 65535 42\r\n" +
2955 We encode the "global circuit identifier" as the last 32-bits of the first
2956 IPv6 address. All other values in the header can safely be ignored. You can
2957 compute the global circuit identifier using the following formula given the
2958 IPv6 address "fc00:dead:beef:4dad::AABB:CCDD": +
2960 global_circuit_id = (0xAA << 24) + (0xBB << 16) + (0xCC << 8) + 0xDD; +
2962 In the case above, where the last 32-bit is 0xffffffff, the global circuit
2963 identifier would be 4294967295. You can use this value together with Tor's
2964 control port where it is possible to terminate a circuit given the global
2965 circuit identifier. For more information about this see controls-spec.txt. +
2967 The HAProxy version 1 proxy protocol is described in detail at
2968 https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/doc/proxy-protocol.txt
2970 [[HiddenServiceMaxStreams]] **HiddenServiceMaxStreams** __N__::
2971 The maximum number of simultaneous streams (connections) per rendezvous
2972 circuit. The maximum value allowed is 65535. (Setting this to 0 will allow
2973 an unlimited number of simultaneous streams.) (Default: 0)
2975 [[HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit]] **HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit** **0**|**1**::
2976 If set to 1, then exceeding **HiddenServiceMaxStreams** will cause the
2977 offending rendezvous circuit to be torn down, as opposed to stream creation
2978 requests that exceed the limit being silently ignored. (Default: 0)
2980 [[RendPostPeriod]] **RendPostPeriod** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
2981 Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous
2982 service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also
2983 uploaded whenever it changes. Minimum value allowed is 10 minutes and
2984 maximum is 3.5 days. This option is only for v2 services.
2987 [[HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable]] **HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
2988 If this option is set to 1, allow the filesystem group to read the
2989 hidden service directory and hostname file. If the option is set to 0,
2990 only owner is able to read the hidden service directory. (Default: 0)
2991 Has no effect on Windows.
2993 [[HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints]] **HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints** __NUM__::
2994 Number of introduction points the hidden service will have. You can't
2995 have more than 10 for v2 service and 20 for v3. (Default: 3)
2997 [[HiddenServiceSingleHopMode]] **HiddenServiceSingleHopMode** **0**|**1**::
2998 **Experimental - Non Anonymous** Hidden Services on a tor instance in
2999 HiddenServiceSingleHopMode make one-hop (direct) circuits between the onion
3000 service server, and the introduction and rendezvous points. (Onion service
3001 descriptors are still posted using 3-hop paths, to avoid onion service
3002 directories blocking the service.)
3003 This option makes every hidden service instance hosted by a tor instance a
3004 Single Onion Service. One-hop circuits make Single Onion servers easily
3005 locatable, but clients remain location-anonymous. However, the fact that a
3006 client is accessing a Single Onion rather than a Hidden Service may be
3007 statistically distinguishable. +
3009 **WARNING:** Once a hidden service directory has been used by a tor
3010 instance in HiddenServiceSingleHopMode, it can **NEVER** be used again for
3011 a hidden service. It is best practice to create a new hidden service
3012 directory, key, and address for each new Single Onion Service and Hidden
3013 Service. It is not possible to run Single Onion Services and Hidden
3014 Services from the same tor instance: they should be run on different
3015 servers with different IP addresses. +
3017 HiddenServiceSingleHopMode requires HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode to be set
3018 to 1. Since a Single Onion service is non-anonymous, you can not configure
3019 a SOCKSPort on a tor instance that is running in
3020 **HiddenServiceSingleHopMode**. Can not be changed while tor is running.
3023 [[HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode]] **HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode** **0**|**1**::
3024 Makes hidden services non-anonymous on this tor instance. Allows the
3025 non-anonymous HiddenServiceSingleHopMode. Enables direct connections in the
3026 server-side hidden service protocol. If you are using this option,
3027 you need to disable all client-side services on your Tor instance,
3028 including setting SOCKSPort to "0". Can not be changed while tor is
3029 running. (Default: 0)
3031 Client Authorization
3032 --------------------
3036 To configure client authorization on the service side, the
3037 "<HiddenServiceDir>/authorized_clients/" directory needs to exist. Each file
3038 in that directory should be suffixed with ".auth" (i.e. "alice.auth"; the
3039 file name is irrelevant) and its content format MUST be:
3041 <auth-type>:<key-type>:<base32-encoded-public-key>
3043 The supported <auth-type> are: "descriptor". The supported <key-type> are:
3044 "x25519". The <base32-encoded-public-key> is the base32 representation of
3045 the raw key bytes only (32 bytes for x25519).
3047 Each file MUST contain one line only. Any malformed file will be
3048 ignored. Client authorization will only be enabled for the service if tor
3049 successfully loads at least one authorization file.
3051 Note that once you've configured client authorization, anyone else with the
3052 address won't be able to access it from this point on. If no authorization is
3053 configured, the service will be accessible to anyone with the onion address.
3055 Revoking a client can be done by removing their ".auth" file, however the
3056 revocation will be in effect only after the tor process gets restarted even if
3057 a SIGHUP takes place.
3059 See the Appendix G in the rend-spec-v3.txt file of
3060 https://spec.torproject.org/[torspec] for more information.
3062 TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS
3063 -----------------------
3065 The following options are used for running a testing Tor network.
3067 [[TestingTorNetwork]] **TestingTorNetwork** **0**|**1**::
3068 If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below,
3069 so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if
3070 non-default set of DirAuthorities is set. Cannot be unset while Tor is
3074 ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1
3075 DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1
3076 EnforceDistinctSubnets 0
3078 AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0
3079 AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0
3080 ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityDownloadInitialDelay 0
3081 ClientBootstrapConsensusFallbackDownloadInitialDelay 0
3082 ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyDownloadInitialDelay 0
3083 ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0
3084 ClientRejectInternalAddresses 0
3085 CountPrivateBandwidth 1
3086 ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0
3087 ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses 1
3088 V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes
3089 V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds
3090 V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds
3091 MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 0 seconds
3092 TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes
3093 TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds
3094 TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds
3095 TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes
3096 TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes
3097 TestingServerDownloadInitialDelay 0
3098 TestingClientDownloadInitialDelay 0
3099 TestingServerConsensusDownloadInitialDelay 0
3100 TestingClientConsensusDownloadInitialDelay 0
3101 TestingBridgeDownloadInitialDelay 10
3102 TestingBridgeBootstrapDownloadInitialDelay 0
3103 TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest 5 seconds
3104 TestingDirConnectionMaxStall 30 seconds
3105 TestingEnableConnBwEvent 1
3106 TestingEnableCellStatsEvent 1
3108 [[TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval]] **TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
3109 Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before the first
3110 consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
3111 **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
3113 [[TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay]] **TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
3114 Like V3AuthVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before
3115 the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
3116 **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
3118 [[TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay]] **TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
3119 Like V3AuthDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before
3120 the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
3121 **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
3123 [[TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset]] **TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::
3124 Directory authorities offset voting start time by this much.
3125 Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)
3127 [[TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability]] **TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
3128 After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers
3129 are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this requires
3130 that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
3132 [[TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime]] **TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
3133 Clients try downloading server descriptors from directory caches after this
3134 time. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default:
3137 [[TestingMinFastFlagThreshold]] **TestingMinFastFlagThreshold** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
3138 Minimum value for the Fast flag. Overrides the ordinary minimum taken
3139 from the consensus when TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 0.)
3141 [[TestingServerDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingServerDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
3142 Initial delay in seconds for when servers should download things in general. Changing this
3143 requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)
3145 [[TestingClientDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingClientDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
3146 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download things in general. Changing this
3147 requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)
3149 [[TestingServerConsensusDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingServerConsensusDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
3150 Initial delay in seconds for when servers should download consensuses. Changing this
3151 requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)
3153 [[TestingClientConsensusDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingClientConsensusDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
3154 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download consensuses. Changing this
3155 requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)
3157 [[TestingBridgeDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingBridgeDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
3158 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download each bridge descriptor when they
3159 know that one or more of their configured bridges are running. Changing
3160 this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 10800)
3162 [[TestingBridgeBootstrapDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingBridgeBootstrapDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
3163 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download each bridge descriptor when they
3164 have just started, or when they can not contact any of their bridges.
3165 Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)
3167 [[TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest]] **TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**::
3168 When directory clients have only a few descriptors to request, they batch
3169 them until they have more, or until this amount of time has passed.
3170 Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 10
3173 [[TestingDirConnectionMaxStall]] **TestingDirConnectionMaxStall** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**::
3174 Let a directory connection stall this long before expiring it.
3175 Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default:
3178 [[TestingDirAuthVoteExit]] **TestingDirAuthVoteExit** __node__,__node__,__...__::
3179 A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and
3180 address patterns of nodes to vote Exit for regardless of their
3181 uptime, bandwidth, or exit policy. See the **ExcludeNodes**
3182 option for more information on how to specify nodes. +
3184 In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
3185 has to be set. See the **ExcludeNodes** option for more
3186 information on how to specify nodes.
3188 [[TestingDirAuthVoteExitIsStrict]] **TestingDirAuthVoteExitIsStrict** **0**|**1** ::
3189 If True (1), a node will never receive the Exit flag unless it is specified
3190 in the **TestingDirAuthVoteExit** list, regardless of its uptime, bandwidth,
3193 In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
3196 [[TestingDirAuthVoteGuard]] **TestingDirAuthVoteGuard** __node__,__node__,__...__::
3197 A list of identity fingerprints and country codes and
3198 address patterns of nodes to vote Guard for regardless of their
3199 uptime and bandwidth. See the **ExcludeNodes** option for more
3200 information on how to specify nodes. +
3202 In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
3205 [[TestingDirAuthVoteGuardIsStrict]] **TestingDirAuthVoteGuardIsStrict** **0**|**1** ::
3206 If True (1), a node will never receive the Guard flag unless it is specified
3207 in the **TestingDirAuthVoteGuard** list, regardless of its uptime and bandwidth. +
3209 In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
3212 [[TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir]] **TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir** __node__,__node__,__...__::
3213 A list of identity fingerprints and country codes and
3214 address patterns of nodes to vote HSDir for regardless of their
3215 uptime and DirPort. See the **ExcludeNodes** option for more
3216 information on how to specify nodes. +
3218 In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
3221 [[TestingDirAuthVoteHSDirIsStrict]] **TestingDirAuthVoteHSDirIsStrict** **0**|**1** ::
3222 If True (1), a node will never receive the HSDir flag unless it is specified
3223 in the **TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir** list, regardless of its uptime and DirPort. +
3225 In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
3228 [[TestingEnableConnBwEvent]] **TestingEnableConnBwEvent** **0**|**1**::
3229 If this option is set, then Tor controllers may register for CONN_BW
3230 events. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set.
3233 [[TestingEnableCellStatsEvent]] **TestingEnableCellStatsEvent** **0**|**1**::
3234 If this option is set, then Tor controllers may register for CELL_STATS
3235 events. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set.
3238 [[TestingMinExitFlagThreshold]] **TestingMinExitFlagThreshold** __N__ **KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
3239 Sets a lower-bound for assigning an exit flag when running as an
3240 authority on a testing network. Overrides the usual default lower bound
3241 of 4 KB. (Default: 0)
3243 [[TestingLinkCertLifetime]] **TestingLinkCertLifetime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**|**months**::
3244 Overrides the default lifetime for the certificates used to authenticate
3245 our X509 link cert with our ed25519 signing key.
3248 [[TestingAuthKeyLifetime]] **TestingAuthKeyLifetime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**|**months**::
3249 Overrides the default lifetime for a signing Ed25519 TLS Link authentication
3253 [[TestingLinkKeySlop]] **TestingLinkKeySlop** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours** +
3255 [[TestingAuthKeySlop]] **TestingAuthKeySlop** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours** +
3257 [[TestingSigningKeySlop]] **TestingSigningKeySlop** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::
3258 How early before the official expiration of a an Ed25519 signing key do
3259 we replace it and issue a new key?
3260 (Default: 3 hours for link and auth; 1 day for signing.)
3262 NON-PERSISTENT OPTIONS
3263 ----------------------
3265 These options are not saved to the torrc file by the "SAVECONF" controller
3266 command. Other options of this type are documented in control-spec.txt,
3267 section 5.4. End-users should mostly ignore them.
3269 [[UnderscorePorts]] **\_\_ControlPort**, **\_\_DirPort**, **\_\_DNSPort**, **\_\_ExtORPort**, **\_\_NATDPort**, **\_\_ORPort**, **\_\_SocksPort**, **\_\_TransPort**::
3270 These underscore-prefixed options are variants of the regular Port
3271 options. They behave the same, except they are not saved to the
3272 torrc file by the controller's SAVECONF command.
3278 Tor catches the following signals:
3280 [[SIGTERM]] **SIGTERM**::
3281 Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit.
3283 [[SIGINT]] **SIGINT**::
3284 Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled
3285 slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting.
3286 (The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.)
3288 [[SIGHUP]] **SIGHUP**::
3289 The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing and
3290 reopening logs), and kill and restart its helper processes if applicable.
3292 [[SIGUSR1]] **SIGUSR1**::
3293 Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and throughput.
3295 [[SIGUSR2]] **SIGUSR2**::
3296 Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels by
3299 [[SIGCHLD]] **SIGCHLD**::
3300 Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited, so it
3303 [[SIGPIPE]] **SIGPIPE**::
3304 Tor catches this signal and ignores it.
3306 [[SIGXFSZ]] **SIGXFSZ**::
3307 If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it.
3312 **@CONFDIR@/torrc**::
3313 The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs.
3316 Fallback location for torrc, if @CONFDIR@/torrc is not found.
3318 **@LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/**::
3319 The tor process stores keys and other data here.
3322 __CacheDirectory__**/cached-certs**::
3323 This file holds downloaded directory key certificates that are used to
3324 verify authenticity of documents generated by Tor directory authorities.
3326 __CacheDirectory__**/cached-consensus** and/or **cached-microdesc-consensus**::
3327 The most recent consensus network status document we've downloaded.
3329 __CacheDirectory__**/cached-descriptors** and **cached-descriptors.new**::
3330 These files hold downloaded router statuses. Some routers may appear more
3331 than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is used. Lines
3332 beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about
3333 a given router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets
3334 too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-descriptors file.
3336 __CacheDirectory__**/cached-extrainfo** and **cached-extrainfo.new**::
3337 As "cached-descriptors", but holds optionally-downloaded "extra-info"
3338 documents. Relays use these documents to send inessential information
3339 about statistics, bandwidth history, and network health to the
3340 authorities. They aren't fetched by default; see the DownloadExtraInfo
3341 option for more info.
3343 __CacheDirectory__**/cached-microdescs** and **cached-microdescs.new**::
3344 These files hold downloaded microdescriptors. Lines beginning with
3345 @-signs are annotations that contain more information about a given
3346 router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets too
3347 large, all entries are merged into a new cached-microdescs file.
3349 __DataDirectory__**/state**::
3350 A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are documented in
3351 the file. These include:
3352 - The current entry guards and their status.
3353 - The current bandwidth accounting values.
3354 - When the file was last written
3355 - What version of Tor generated the state file
3356 - A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the server
3359 __DataDirectory__**/sr-state**::
3360 Authority only. State file used to record information about the current
3361 status of the shared-random-value voting state.
3363 __CacheDirectory__**/diff-cache**::
3364 Directory cache only. Holds older consensuses, and diffs from older
3365 consensuses to the most recent consensus of each type, compressed
3366 in various ways. Each file contains a set of key-value arguments
3367 describing its contents, followed by a single NUL byte, followed by the
3370 __DataDirectory__**/bw_accounting**::
3371 Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period starts
3372 and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period). This file
3373 is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the \'state' file instead.
3375 __DataDirectory__**/control_auth_cookie**::
3376 Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be
3377 overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on startup. See
3378 control-spec.txt in https://spec.torproject.org/[torspec] for details.
3379 Only used when cookie authentication is enabled.
3381 __DataDirectory__**/lock**::
3382 This file is used to prevent two Tor instances from using same data
3383 directory. If access to this file is locked, data directory is already
3386 __DataDirectory__**/key-pinning-journal**::
3387 Used by authorities. A line-based file that records mappings between
3388 RSA1024 identity keys and Ed25519 identity keys. Authorities enforce
3389 these mappings, so that once a relay has picked an Ed25519 key, stealing
3390 or factoring the RSA1024 key will no longer let an attacker impersonate
3393 __KeyDirectory__**/authority_identity_key**::
3394 A v3 directory authority's master identity key, used to authenticate its
3395 signing key. Tor doesn't use this while it's running. The tor-gencert
3396 program uses this. If you're running an authority, you should keep this
3397 key offline, and not actually put it here.
3399 __KeyDirectory__**/authority_certificate**::
3400 A v3 directory authority's certificate, which authenticates the authority's
3401 current vote- and consensus-signing key using its master identity key.
3402 Only directory authorities use this file.
3404 __KeyDirectory__**/authority_signing_key**::
3405 A v3 directory authority's signing key, used to sign votes and consensuses.
3406 Only directory authorities use this file. Corresponds to the
3407 **authority_certificate** cert.
3409 __KeyDirectory__**/legacy_certificate**::
3410 As authority_certificate: used only when V3AuthUseLegacyKey is set.
3411 See documentation for V3AuthUseLegacyKey.
3413 __KeyDirectory__**/legacy_signing_key**::
3414 As authority_signing_key: used only when V3AuthUseLegacyKey is set.
3415 See documentation for V3AuthUseLegacyKey.
3417 __KeyDirectory__**/secret_id_key**::
3418 A relay's RSA1024 permanent identity key, including private and public
3419 components. Used to sign router descriptors, and to sign other keys.
3421 __KeyDirectory__**/ed25519_master_id_public_key**::
3422 The public part of a relay's Ed25519 permanent identity key.
3424 __KeyDirectory__**/ed25519_master_id_secret_key**::
3425 The private part of a relay's Ed25519 permanent identity key. This key
3426 is used to sign the medium-term ed25519 signing key. This file can be
3427 kept offline, or kept encrypted. If so, Tor will not be able to generate
3428 new signing keys itself; you'll need to use tor --keygen yourself to do
3431 __KeyDirectory__**/ed25519_signing_secret_key**::
3432 The private and public components of a relay's medium-term Ed25519 signing
3433 key. This key is authenticated by the Ed25519 master key, in turn
3434 authenticates other keys (and router descriptors).
3436 __KeyDirectory__**/ed25519_signing_cert**::
3437 The certificate which authenticates "ed25519_signing_secret_key" as
3438 having been signed by the Ed25519 master key.
3440 __KeyDirectory__**/secret_onion_key** and **secret_onion_key.old**::
3441 A relay's RSA1024 short-term onion key. Used to decrypt old-style ("TAP")
3442 circuit extension requests. The ".old" file holds the previously
3443 generated key, which the relay uses to handle any requests that were
3444 made by clients that didn't have the new one.
3446 __KeyDirectory__**/secret_onion_key_ntor** and **secret_onion_key_ntor.old**::
3447 A relay's Curve25519 short-term onion key. Used to handle modern ("ntor")
3448 circuit extension requests. The ".old" file holds the previously
3449 generated key, which the relay uses to handle any requests that were
3450 made by clients that didn't have the new one.
3452 __DataDirectory__**/fingerprint**::
3453 Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the server's identity key.
3455 __DataDirectory__**/hashed-fingerprint**::
3456 Only used by bridges. Holds the hashed fingerprint of the bridge's
3457 identity key. (That is, the hash of the hash of the identity key.)
3459 __DataDirectory__**/approved-routers**::
3460 Only used by authoritative directory servers. This file lists
3461 the status of routers by their identity fingerprint.
3462 Each line lists a status and a fingerprint separated by
3463 whitespace. See your **fingerprint** file in the __DataDirectory__ for an
3464 example line. If the status is **!reject** then descriptors from the
3465 given identity (fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is
3466 **!invalid** then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as
3467 not valid, that is, not recommended.
3469 __DataDirectory__**/v3-status-votes**::
3470 Only for v3 authoritative directory servers. This file contains
3471 status votes from all the authoritative directory servers.
3473 __CacheDirectory__**/unverified-consensus**::
3474 This file contains a network consensus document that has been downloaded,
3475 but which we didn't have the right certificates to check yet.
3477 __CacheDirectory__**/unverified-microdesc-consensus**::
3478 This file contains a microdescriptor-flavored network consensus document
3479 that has been downloaded, but which we didn't have the right certificates
3482 __DataDirectory__**/unparseable-desc**::
3483 Onion server descriptors that Tor was unable to parse are dumped to this
3484 file. Only used for debugging.
3486 __DataDirectory__**/router-stability**::
3487 Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements for
3488 router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a good idea of
3489 how to set their Stable flags.
3491 __DataDirectory__**/stats/dirreq-stats**::
3492 Only used by directory caches and authorities. This file is used to
3493 collect directory request statistics.
3495 __DataDirectory__**/stats/entry-stats**::
3496 Only used by servers. This file is used to collect incoming connection
3497 statistics by Tor entry nodes.
3499 __DataDirectory__**/stats/bridge-stats**::
3500 Only used by servers. This file is used to collect incoming connection
3501 statistics by Tor bridges.
3503 __DataDirectory__**/stats/exit-stats**::
3504 Only used by servers. This file is used to collect outgoing connection
3505 statistics by Tor exit routers.
3507 __DataDirectory__**/stats/buffer-stats**::
3508 Only used by servers. This file is used to collect buffer usage
3511 __DataDirectory__**/stats/conn-stats**::
3512 Only used by servers. This file is used to collect approximate connection
3513 history (number of active connections over time).
3515 __DataDirectory__**/stats/hidserv-stats**::
3516 Only used by servers. This file is used to collect approximate counts
3517 of what fraction of the traffic is hidden service rendezvous traffic, and
3518 approximately how many hidden services the relay has seen.
3520 __DataDirectory__**/networkstatus-bridges**::
3521 Only used by authoritative bridge directories. Contains information
3522 about bridges that have self-reported themselves to the bridge
3525 __DataDirectory__**/approved-routers**::
3526 Authorities only. This file is used to configure which relays are
3527 known to be valid, invalid, and so forth.
3529 __HiddenServiceDirectory__**/hostname**::
3530 The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service.
3531 If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file
3532 also contains authorization data for all clients.
3534 Note that clients will ignore any extra subdomains prepended to a hidden
3535 service hostname. So if you have "xyz.onion" as your hostname, you
3536 can tell clients to connect to "www.xyz.onion" or "irc.xyz.onion"
3537 for virtual-hosting purposes.
3539 __HiddenServiceDirectory__**/private_key**::
3540 The private key for this hidden service.
3542 __HiddenServiceDirectory__**/client_keys**::
3543 Authorization data for a hidden service that is only accessible by
3546 __HiddenServiceDirectory__**/onion_service_non_anonymous**::
3547 This file is present if a hidden service key was created in
3548 **HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode**.
3552 **torsocks**(1), **torify**(1) +
3554 **https://www.torproject.org/**
3556 **torspec: https://spec.torproject.org **
3561 Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them at https://trac.torproject.org/.
3565 Roger Dingledine [arma at mit.edu], Nick Mathewson [nickm at alum.mit.edu].