1 // Copyright (c) The Tor Project, Inc.
2 // See LICENSE for licensing information
3 // This is an asciidoc file used to generate the manpage/html reference.
4 // Learn asciidoc on http://www.methods.co.nz/asciidoc/userguide.html
6 :man manual: Tor Manual
12 tor - The second-generation onion router
17 **tor** [__OPTION__ __value__]...
21 Tor is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication
22 service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and
23 negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node
24 knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down
25 the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals
26 the downstream node. +
28 Basically, Tor provides a distributed network of servers or relays ("onion routers").
29 Users bounce their TCP streams -- web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc. -- around the
30 network, and recipients, observers, and even the relays themselves have
31 difficulty tracking the source of the stream.
33 By default, **tor** will act as a client only. To help the network
34 by providing bandwidth as a relay, change the **ORPort** configuration
35 option -- see below. Please also consult the documentation on the Tor
40 [[opt-h]] **-h**, **-help**::
41 Display a short help message and exit.
43 [[opt-f]] **-f** __FILE__::
44 Specify a new configuration file to contain further Tor configuration
45 options OR pass *-* to make Tor read its configuration from standard
46 input. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc, or $HOME/.torrc if that file is not
49 [[opt-allow-missing-torrc]] **--allow-missing-torrc**::
50 Do not require that configuration file specified by **-f** exist if
51 default torrc can be accessed.
53 [[opt-defaults-torrc]] **--defaults-torrc** __FILE__::
54 Specify a file in which to find default values for Tor options. The
55 contents of this file are overridden by those in the regular
56 configuration file, and by those on the command line. (Default:
57 @CONFDIR@/torrc-defaults.)
59 [[opt-ignore-missing-torrc]] **--ignore-missing-torrc**::
60 Specifies that Tor should treat a missing torrc file as though it
61 were empty. Ordinarily, Tor does this for missing default torrc files,
62 but not for those specified on the command line.
64 [[opt-hash-password]] **--hash-password** __PASSWORD__::
65 Generates a hashed password for control port access.
67 [[opt-list-fingerprint]] **--list-fingerprint**::
68 Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint.
70 [[opt-verify-config]] **--verify-config**::
71 Verify the configuration file is valid.
73 [[opt-serviceinstall]] **--service install** [**--options** __command-line options__]::
74 Install an instance of Tor as a Windows service, with the provided
75 command-line options. Current instructions can be found at
76 https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#NTService
78 [[opt-service]] **--service** **remove**|**start**|**stop**::
79 Remove, start, or stop a configured Tor Windows service.
81 [[opt-nt-service]] **--nt-service**::
82 Used internally to implement a Windows service.
84 [[opt-list-torrc-options]] **--list-torrc-options**::
85 List all valid options.
87 [[opt-list-deprecated-options]] **--list-deprecated-options**::
88 List all valid options that are scheduled to become obsolete in a
89 future version. (This is a warning, not a promise.)
91 [[opt-version]] **--version**::
92 Display Tor version and exit.
94 [[opt-quiet]] **--quiet**|**--hush**::
95 Override the default console log. By default, Tor starts out logging
96 messages at level "notice" and higher to the console. It stops doing so
97 after it parses its configuration, if the configuration tells it to log
98 anywhere else. You can override this behavior with the **--hush** option,
99 which tells Tor to only send warnings and errors to the console, or with
100 the **--quiet** option, which tells Tor not to log to the console at all.
102 [[opt-keygen]] **--keygen** [**--newpass**]::
103 Running "tor --keygen" creates a new ed25519 master identity key for a
104 relay, or only a fresh temporary signing key and certificate, if you
105 already have a master key. Optionally you can encrypt the master identity
106 key with a passphrase: Tor will ask you for one. If you don't want to
107 encrypt the master key, just don't enter any passphrase when asked. +
109 The **--newpass** option should be used with --keygen only when you need
110 to add, change, or remove a passphrase on an existing ed25519 master
111 identity key. You will be prompted for the old passphase (if any),
112 and the new passphrase (if any). +
114 When generating a master key, you will probably want to use
115 **--DataDirectory** to control where the keys
116 and certificates will be stored, and **--SigningKeyLifetime** to
117 control their lifetimes. Their behavior is as documented in the
118 server options section below. (You must have write access to the specified
121 To use the generated files, you must copy them to the DataDirectory/keys
122 directory of your Tor daemon, and make sure that they are owned by the
123 user actually running the Tor daemon on your system.
125 **--passphrase-fd** __FILEDES__::
126 Filedescriptor to read the passphrase from. Note that unlike with the
127 tor-gencert program, the entire file contents are read and used as
128 the passphrase, including any trailing newlines.
129 Default: read from the terminal.
131 [[opt-key-expiration]] **--key-expiration** [**purpose**]::
132 The **purpose** specifies which type of key certificate to determine
133 the expiration of. The only currently recognised **purpose** is
136 Running "tor --key-expiration sign" will attempt to find your signing
137 key certificate and will output, both in the logs as well as to stdout,
138 the signing key certificate's expiration time in ISO-8601 format.
139 For example, the output sent to stdout will be of the form:
140 "signing-cert-expiry: 2017-07-25 08:30:15 UTC"
142 Other options can be specified on the command-line in the format "--option
143 value", in the format "option value", or in a configuration file. For
144 instance, you can tell Tor to start listening for SOCKS connections on port
145 9999 by passing --SocksPort 9999 or SocksPort 9999 to it on the command line,
146 or by putting "SocksPort 9999" in the configuration file. You will need to
147 quote options with spaces in them: if you want Tor to log all debugging
148 messages to debug.log, you will probably need to say --Log 'debug file
151 Options on the command line override those in configuration files. See the
152 next section for more information.
154 THE CONFIGURATION FILE FORMAT
155 -----------------------------
157 All configuration options in a configuration are written on a single line by
158 default. They take the form of an option name and a value, or an option name
159 and a quoted value (option value or option "value"). Anything after a #
160 character is treated as a comment. Options are
161 case-insensitive. C-style escaped characters are allowed inside quoted
162 values. To split one configuration entry into multiple lines, use a single
163 backslash character (\) before the end of the line. Comments can be used in
164 such multiline entries, but they must start at the beginning of a line.
166 Configuration options can be imported from files or folders using the %include
167 option with the value being a path. If the path is a file, the options from the
168 file will be parsed as if they were written where the %include option is. If
169 the path is a folder, all files on that folder will be parsed following lexical
170 order. Files starting with a dot are ignored. Files on subfolders are ignored.
171 The %include option can be used recursively.
173 By default, an option on the command line overrides an option found in the
174 configuration file, and an option in a configuration file overrides one in
177 This rule is simple for options that take a single value, but it can become
178 complicated for options that are allowed to occur more than once: if you
179 specify four SocksPorts in your configuration file, and one more SocksPort on
180 the command line, the option on the command line will replace __all__ of the
181 SocksPorts in the configuration file. If this isn't what you want, prefix
182 the option name with a plus sign (+), and it will be appended to the previous
183 set of options instead. For example, setting SocksPort 9100 will use only
184 port 9100, but setting +SocksPort 9100 will use ports 9100 and 9050 (because
185 this is the default).
187 Alternatively, you might want to remove every instance of an option in the
188 configuration file, and not replace it at all: you might want to say on the
189 command line that you want no SocksPorts at all. To do that, prefix the
190 option name with a forward slash (/). You can use the plus sign (+) and the
191 forward slash (/) in the configuration file and on the command line.
196 [[BandwidthRate]] **BandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
197 A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node
198 to the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing
199 bandwidth usage to that same value. If you want to run a relay in the
200 public network, this needs to be _at the very least_ 75 KBytes for a
201 relay (that is, 600 kbits) or 50 KBytes for a bridge (400 kbits) -- but of
202 course, more is better; we recommend at least 250 KBytes (2 mbits) if
203 possible. (Default: 1 GByte) +
205 Note that this option, and other bandwidth-limiting options, apply to TCP
206 data only: They do not count TCP headers or DNS traffic. +
208 With this option, and in other options that take arguments in bytes,
209 KBytes, and so on, other formats are also supported. Notably, "KBytes" can
210 also be written as "kilobytes" or "kb"; "MBytes" can be written as
211 "megabytes" or "MB"; "kbits" can be written as "kilobits"; and so forth.
212 Tor also accepts "byte" and "bit" in the singular.
213 The prefixes "tera" and "T" are also recognized.
214 If no units are given, we default to bytes.
215 To avoid confusion, we recommend writing "bytes" or "bits" explicitly,
216 since it's easy to forget that "B" means bytes, not bits.
218 [[BandwidthBurst]] **BandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
219 Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given
220 number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 1 GByte)
222 [[MaxAdvertisedBandwidth]] **MaxAdvertisedBandwidth** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
223 If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our
224 BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients
225 who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to
226 advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server
227 without impacting network performance.
229 [[RelayBandwidthRate]] **RelayBandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
230 If not 0, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth
231 usage for \_relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes
232 per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value.
233 Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory
234 requests, but that may change in future versions. They do not include directory
235 fetches by the relay (from authority or other relays), because that is considered
236 "client" activity. (Default: 0)
238 [[RelayBandwidthBurst]] **RelayBandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
239 If not 0, limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for
240 \_relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction.
241 They do not include directory fetches by the relay (from authority
242 or other relays), because that is considered "client" activity. (Default: 0)
244 [[PerConnBWRate]] **PerConnBWRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
245 If this option is set manually, or via the "perconnbwrate" consensus
246 field, Tor will use it for separate rate limiting for each connection
247 from a non-relay. (Default: 0)
249 [[PerConnBWBurst]] **PerConnBWBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
250 If this option is set manually, or via the "perconnbwburst" consensus
251 field, Tor will use it for separate rate limiting for each connection
252 from a non-relay. (Default: 0)
254 [[ClientTransportPlugin]] **ClientTransportPlugin** __transport__ socks4|socks5 __IP__:__PORT__::
255 **ClientTransportPlugin** __transport__ exec __path-to-binary__ [options]::
256 In its first form, when set along with a corresponding Bridge line, the Tor
257 client forwards its traffic to a SOCKS-speaking proxy on "IP:PORT".
258 (IPv4 addresses should written as-is; IPv6 addresses should be wrapped in
259 square brackets.) It's the
260 duty of that proxy to properly forward the traffic to the bridge. +
262 In its second form, when set along with a corresponding Bridge line, the Tor
263 client launches the pluggable transport proxy executable in
264 __path-to-binary__ using __options__ as its command-line options, and
265 forwards its traffic to it. It's the duty of that proxy to properly forward
266 the traffic to the bridge.
268 [[ServerTransportPlugin]] **ServerTransportPlugin** __transport__ exec __path-to-binary__ [options]::
269 The Tor relay launches the pluggable transport proxy in __path-to-binary__
270 using __options__ as its command-line options, and expects to receive
271 proxied client traffic from it.
273 [[ServerTransportListenAddr]] **ServerTransportListenAddr** __transport__ __IP__:__PORT__::
274 When this option is set, Tor will suggest __IP__:__PORT__ as the
275 listening address of any pluggable transport proxy that tries to
276 launch __transport__. (IPv4 addresses should written as-is; IPv6
277 addresses should be wrapped in square brackets.)
279 [[ServerTransportOptions]] **ServerTransportOptions** __transport__ __k=v__ __k=v__ ...::
280 When this option is set, Tor will pass the __k=v__ parameters to
281 any pluggable transport proxy that tries to launch __transport__. +
282 (Example: ServerTransportOptions obfs45 shared-secret=bridgepasswd cache=/var/lib/tor/cache)
284 [[ExtORPort]] **ExtORPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto**::
285 Open this port to listen for Extended ORPort connections from your
286 pluggable transports.
288 [[ExtORPortCookieAuthFile]] **ExtORPortCookieAuthFile** __Path__::
289 If set, this option overrides the default location and file name
290 for the Extended ORPort's cookie file -- the cookie file is needed
291 for pluggable transports to communicate through the Extended ORPort.
293 [[ExtORPortCookieAuthFileGroupReadable]] **ExtORPortCookieAuthFileGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
294 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
295 Extended OR Port cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie
296 file readable by the default GID. [Making the file readable by other
297 groups is not yet implemented; let us know if you need this for some
298 reason.] (Default: 0)
300 [[ConnLimit]] **ConnLimit** __NUM__::
301 The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to the Tor
302 process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as many file
303 descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by "ulimit -H -n").
304 If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor will refuse to start. +
306 You probably don't need to adjust this. It has no effect on Windows
307 since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)
309 [[DisableNetwork]] **DisableNetwork** **0**|**1**::
310 When this option is set, we don't listen for or accept any connections
311 other than controller connections, and we close (and don't reattempt)
313 connections. Controllers sometimes use this option to avoid using
314 the network until Tor is fully configured. Tor will make still certain
315 network-related calls (like DNS lookups) as a part of its configuration
316 process, even if DisableNetwork is set. (Default: 0)
318 [[ConstrainedSockets]] **ConstrainedSockets** **0**|**1**::
319 If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all
320 sockets to the size specified in **ConstrainedSockSize**. This is useful for
321 virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP buffers may
322 be limited. If you're on a virtual server, and you encounter the "Error
323 creating network socket: No buffer space available" message, you are
324 likely experiencing this problem. +
326 The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for
327 the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility;
328 this configuration option is a second-resort. +
330 The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The
331 cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates
334 You should **not** enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer
335 space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for
336 the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip
337 time on long paths. (Default: 0)
339 [[ConstrainedSockSize]] **ConstrainedSockSize** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**::
340 When **ConstrainedSockets** is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for
341 all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048 and
342 262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended.
344 [[ControlPort]] **ControlPort** __PORT__|**unix:**__path__|**auto** [__flags__]::
345 If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those
346 connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol
347 (described in control-spec.txt in
348 https://spec.torproject.org[torspec]). Note: unless you also
349 specify one or more of **HashedControlPassword** or
350 **CookieAuthentication**, setting this option will cause Tor to allow
351 any process on the local host to control it. (Setting both authentication
352 methods means either method is sufficient to authenticate to Tor.) This
353 option is required for many Tor controllers; most use the value of 9051.
354 If a unix domain socket is used, you may quote the path using standard
356 Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. (Default: 0) +
358 Recognized flags are...
360 Unix domain sockets only: makes the socket get created as
363 Unix domain sockets only: makes the socket get created as
365 **RelaxDirModeCheck**;;
366 Unix domain sockets only: Do not insist that the directory
367 that holds the socket be read-restricted.
369 [[ControlSocket]] **ControlSocket** __Path__::
370 Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP
371 socket. '0' disables ControlSocket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.)
374 [[ControlSocketsGroupWritable]] **ControlSocketsGroupWritable** **0**|**1**::
375 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read and
376 write unix sockets (e.g. ControlSocket). If the option is set to 1, make
377 the control socket readable and writable by the default GID. (Default: 0)
379 [[HashedControlPassword]] **HashedControlPassword** __hashed_password__::
380 Allow connections on the control port if they present
381 the password whose one-way hash is __hashed_password__. You
382 can compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password
383 __password__". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using more
384 than one HashedControlPassword line.
386 [[CookieAuthentication]] **CookieAuthentication** **0**|**1**::
387 If this option is set to 1, allow connections on the control port
388 when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named
389 "control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This
390 authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem
391 security. (Default: 0)
393 [[CookieAuthFile]] **CookieAuthFile** __Path__::
394 If set, this option overrides the default location and file name
395 for Tor's cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.)
397 [[CookieAuthFileGroupReadable]] **CookieAuthFileGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
398 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
399 cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file readable by
400 the default GID. [Making the file readable by other groups is not yet
401 implemented; let us know if you need this for some reason.] (Default: 0)
403 [[ControlPortWriteToFile]] **ControlPortWriteToFile** __Path__::
404 If set, Tor writes the address and port of any control port it opens to
405 this address. Usable by controllers to learn the actual control port
406 when ControlPort is set to "auto".
408 [[ControlPortFileGroupReadable]] **ControlPortFileGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
409 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
410 control port file. If the option is set to 1, make the control port
411 file readable by the default GID. (Default: 0)
413 [[DataDirectory]] **DataDirectory** __DIR__::
414 Store working data in DIR. Can not be changed while tor is running.
415 (Default: ~/.tor if your home directory is not /; otherwise,
416 @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor. On Windows, the default is
417 your ApplicationData folder.)
419 [[DataDirectoryGroupReadable]] **DataDirectoryGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
420 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
421 DataDirectory. If the option is set to 1, make the DataDirectory readable
422 by the default GID. (Default: 0)
424 [[CacheDirectory]] **CacheDirectory** __DIR__::
425 Store cached directory data in DIR. Can not be changed while tor is
427 (Default: uses the value of DataDirectory.)
429 [[CacheDirectoryGroupReadable]] **CacheDirectoryGroupReadable** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
430 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
431 CacheDirectory. If the option is set to 1, make the CacheDirectory readable
432 by the default GID. If the option is "auto", then we use the
433 setting for DataDirectoryGroupReadable when the CacheDirectory is the
434 same as the DataDirectory, and 0 otherwise. (Default: auto)
436 [[FallbackDir]] **FallbackDir** __ipv4address__:__port__ orport=__port__ id=__fingerprint__ [weight=__num__] [ipv6=**[**__ipv6address__**]**:__orport__]::
437 When we're unable to connect to any directory cache for directory info
438 (usually because we don't know about any yet) we try a directory authority.
439 Clients also simultaneously try a FallbackDir, to avoid hangs on client
440 startup if a directory authority is down. Clients retry FallbackDirs more
441 often than directory authorities, to reduce the load on the directory
443 By default, the directory authorities are also FallbackDirs. Specifying a
444 FallbackDir replaces Tor's default hard-coded FallbackDirs (if any).
445 (See the **DirAuthority** entry for an explanation of each flag.)
447 [[UseDefaultFallbackDirs]] **UseDefaultFallbackDirs** **0**|**1**::
448 Use Tor's default hard-coded FallbackDirs (if any). (When a
449 FallbackDir line is present, it replaces the hard-coded FallbackDirs,
450 regardless of the value of UseDefaultFallbackDirs.) (Default: 1)
452 [[DirAuthority]] **DirAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __ipv4address__:__port__ __fingerprint__::
453 Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address
454 and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated
455 many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are
456 separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an authority this directory
457 is. By default, an authority is not authoritative for any directory style
458 or version unless an appropriate flag is given.
459 Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the
460 "bridge" flag is set. If a flag "orport=**port**" is given, Tor will use the
461 given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. If a flag
462 "weight=**num**" is given, then the directory server is chosen randomly
463 with probability proportional to that weight (default 1.0). If a
464 flag "v3ident=**fp**" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority
465 whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint **fp**. Lastly,
466 if an "ipv6=**[**__ipv6address__**]**:__orport__" flag is present, then
468 authority is listening for IPv6 connections on the indicated IPv6 address
471 Tor will contact the authority at __ipv4address__ to
472 download directory documents. The provided __port__ value is a dirport;
473 clients ignore this in favor of the specified "orport=" value. If an
474 IPv6 ORPort is supplied, Tor will
475 also download directory documents at the IPv6 ORPort. +
477 If no **DirAuthority** line is given, Tor will use the default directory
478 authorities. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor
479 network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be
480 distinguishable from other users, because you won't believe the same
483 [[DirAuthorityFallbackRate]] **DirAuthorityFallbackRate** __NUM__::
484 When configured to use both directory authorities and fallback
485 directories, the directory authorities also work as fallbacks. They are
486 chosen with their regular weights, multiplied by this number, which
487 should be 1.0 or less. The default is less than 1, to reduce load on
488 authorities. (Default: 0.1)
490 [[AlternateDirAuthority]] **AlternateDirAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __ipv4address__:__port__ __fingerprint__ +
492 [[AlternateBridgeAuthority]] **AlternateBridgeAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __ipv4address__:__port__ __ fingerprint__::
493 These options behave as DirAuthority, but they replace fewer of the
494 default directory authorities. Using
495 AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but
496 leaves the default bridge authorities in
498 AlternateBridgeAuthority replaces the default bridge authority,
499 but leaves the directory authorities alone.
501 [[DisableAllSwap]] **DisableAllSwap** **0**|**1**::
502 If set to 1, Tor will attempt to lock all current and future memory pages,
503 so that memory cannot be paged out. Windows, OS X and Solaris are currently
504 not supported. We believe that this feature works on modern Gnu/Linux
505 distributions, and that it should work on *BSD systems (untested). This
506 option requires that you start your Tor as root, and you should use the
507 **User** option to properly reduce Tor's privileges.
508 Can not be changed while tor is running. (Default: 0)
510 [[DisableDebuggerAttachment]] **DisableDebuggerAttachment** **0**|**1**::
511 If set to 1, Tor will attempt to prevent basic debugging attachment attempts
512 by other processes. This may also keep Tor from generating core files if
513 it crashes. It has no impact for users who wish to attach if they
514 have CAP_SYS_PTRACE or if they are root. We believe that this feature
515 works on modern Gnu/Linux distributions, and that it may also work on *BSD
516 systems (untested). Some modern Gnu/Linux systems such as Ubuntu have the
517 kernel.yama.ptrace_scope sysctl and by default enable it as an attempt to
518 limit the PTRACE scope for all user processes by default. This feature will
519 attempt to limit the PTRACE scope for Tor specifically - it will not attempt
520 to alter the system wide ptrace scope as it may not even exist. If you wish
521 to attach to Tor with a debugger such as gdb or strace you will want to set
522 this to 0 for the duration of your debugging. Normal users should leave it
523 on. Disabling this option while Tor is running is prohibited. (Default: 1)
525 [[FetchDirInfoEarly]] **FetchDirInfoEarly** **0**|**1**::
526 If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other
527 directory caches, even if you don't meet the normal criteria for fetching
528 early. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0)
530 [[FetchDirInfoExtraEarly]] **FetchDirInfoExtraEarly** **0**|**1**::
531 If set to 1, Tor will fetch directory information before other directory
532 caches. It will attempt to download directory information closer to the
533 start of the consensus period. Normal users should leave it off.
536 [[FetchHidServDescriptors]] **FetchHidServDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
537 If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from the
538 rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you're using a Tor
539 controller that handles hidden service fetches for you. (Default: 1)
541 [[FetchServerDescriptors]] **FetchServerDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
542 If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server
543 descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if
544 you're using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you.
547 [[FetchUselessDescriptors]] **FetchUselessDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
548 If set to 1, Tor will fetch every consensus flavor, and all server
549 descriptors and authority certificates referenced by those consensuses,
550 except for extra info descriptors. When this option is 1, Tor will also
551 keep fetching descriptors, even when idle.
552 If set to 0, Tor will avoid fetching useless descriptors: flavors that it
553 is not using to build circuits, and authority certificates it does not
554 trust. When Tor hasn't built any application circuits, it will go idle,
555 and stop fetching descriptors. This option is useful if you're using a
556 tor client with an external parser that uses a full consensus.
557 This option fetches all documents except extrainfo descriptors,
558 **DirCache** fetches and serves all documents except extrainfo
559 descriptors, **DownloadExtraInfo*** fetches extrainfo documents, and serves
560 them if **DirCache** is on, and **UseMicrodescriptors** changes the
561 flavour of consensues and descriptors that is fetched and used for
562 building circuits. (Default: 0)
564 [[HTTPProxy]] **HTTPProxy** __host__[:__port__]::
565 Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port (or host:80
566 if port is not specified), rather than connecting directly to any directory
567 servers. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.3.1.0-alpha you should use HTTPSProxy.)
569 [[HTTPProxyAuthenticator]] **HTTPProxyAuthenticator** __username:password__::
570 If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy
571 authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTP
572 proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you
573 want it to support others. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.3.1.0-alpha you should use
574 HTTPSProxyAuthenticator.)
576 [[HTTPSProxy]] **HTTPSProxy** __host__[:__port__]::
577 Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port (or
578 host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than connecting
579 directly to servers. You may want to set **FascistFirewall** to restrict
580 the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy only
581 allows connecting to certain ports.
583 [[HTTPSProxyAuthenticator]] **HTTPSProxyAuthenticator** __username:password__::
584 If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS proxy
585 authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTPS
586 proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you
587 want it to support others.
589 [[Sandbox]] **Sandbox** **0**|**1**::
590 If set to 1, Tor will run securely through the use of a syscall sandbox.
591 Otherwise the sandbox will be disabled. The option is currently an
592 experimental feature. It only works on Linux-based operating systems,
593 and only when Tor has been built with the libseccomp library. This option
594 can not be changed while tor is running.
596 When the Sandbox is 1, the following options can not be changed when tor
602 ExtORPortCookieAuthFile
604 ServerDNSResolvConfFile
605 Tor must remain in client or server mode (some changes to ClientOnly and
606 ORPort are not allowed).
609 [[Socks4Proxy]] **Socks4Proxy** __host__[:__port__]::
610 Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 4 proxy at host:port
611 (or host:1080 if port is not specified).
613 [[Socks5Proxy]] **Socks5Proxy** __host__[:__port__]::
614 Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 5 proxy at host:port
615 (or host:1080 if port is not specified).
617 [[Socks5ProxyUsername]] **Socks5ProxyUsername** __username__ +
619 [[Socks5ProxyPassword]] **Socks5ProxyPassword** __password__::
620 If defined, authenticate to the SOCKS 5 server using username and password
621 in accordance to RFC 1929. Both username and password must be between 1 and
624 [[UnixSocksGroupWritable]] **UnixSocksGroupWritable** **0**|**1**::
625 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read and
626 write unix sockets (e.g. SocksPort unix:). If the option is set to 1, make
627 the Unix socket readable and writable by the default GID. (Default: 0)
629 [[KeepalivePeriod]] **KeepalivePeriod** __NUM__::
630 To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell
631 every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the connection
632 has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM seconds of
633 idleness. (Default: 5 minutes)
635 [[Log]] **Log** __minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] **stderr**|**stdout**|**syslog**::
636 Send all messages between __minSeverity__ and __maxSeverity__ to the standard
637 output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system log. (The
638 "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized severity levels are
639 debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using "notice" in most cases,
640 since anything more verbose may provide sensitive information to an
641 attacker who obtains the logs. If only one severity level is given, all
642 messages of that level or higher will be sent to the listed destination.
644 [[Log2]] **Log** __minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] **file** __FILENAME__::
645 As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The
646 "Log" option may appear more than once in a configuration file.
647 Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity
650 [[Log3]] **Log** **[**__domain__,...**]**__minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] ... **file** __FILENAME__ +
652 [[Log4]] **Log** **[**__domain__,...**]**__minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] ... **stderr**|**stdout**|**syslog**::
653 As above, but select messages by range of log severity __and__ by a
654 set of "logging domains". Each logging domain corresponds to an area of
655 functionality inside Tor. You can specify any number of severity ranges
656 for a single log statement, each of them prefixed by a comma-separated
657 list of logging domains. You can prefix a domain with $$~$$ to indicate
658 negation, and use * to indicate "all domains". If you specify a severity
659 range without a list of domains, it matches all domains. +
661 This is an advanced feature which is most useful for debugging one or two
662 of Tor's subsystems at a time. +
664 The currently recognized domains are: general, crypto, net, config, fs,
665 protocol, mm, http, app, control, circ, rend, bug, dir, dirserv, or, edge,
666 acct, hist, handshake, heartbeat, channel, sched, guard, consdiff, and dos.
667 Domain names are case-insensitive. +
669 For example, "`Log [handshake]debug [~net,~mm]info notice stdout`" sends
670 to stdout: all handshake messages of any severity, all info-and-higher
671 messages from domains other than networking and memory management, and all
672 messages of severity notice or higher.
674 [[LogMessageDomains]] **LogMessageDomains** **0**|**1**::
675 If 1, Tor includes message domains with each log message. Every log
676 message currently has at least one domain; most currently have exactly
677 one. This doesn't affect controller log messages. (Default: 0)
679 [[MaxUnparseableDescSizeToLog]] **MaxUnparseableDescSizeToLog** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**::
680 Unparseable descriptors (e.g. for votes, consensuses, routers) are logged
681 in separate files by hash, up to the specified size in total. Note that
682 only files logged during the lifetime of this Tor process count toward the
683 total; this is intended to be used to debug problems without opening live
684 servers to resource exhaustion attacks. (Default: 10 MB)
686 [[OutboundBindAddress]] **OutboundBindAddress** __IP__::
687 Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This
688 is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all
689 of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one. This option may
690 be used twice, once with an IPv4 address and once with an IPv6 address.
691 IPv6 addresses should be wrapped in square brackets.
692 This setting will be ignored for connections to the loopback addresses
693 (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1), and is not used for DNS requests as well.
695 [[OutboundBindAddressOR]] **OutboundBindAddressOR** __IP__::
696 Make all outbound non-exit (relay and other) connections
697 originate from the IP address specified. This option overrides
698 **OutboundBindAddress** for the same IP version. This option may
699 be used twice, once with an IPv4 address and once with an IPv6
700 address. IPv6 addresses should be wrapped in square brackets.
701 This setting will be ignored for connections to the loopback
702 addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).
704 [[OutboundBindAddressExit]] **OutboundBindAddressExit** __IP__::
705 Make all outbound exit connections originate from the IP address
706 specified. This option overrides **OutboundBindAddress** for the
707 same IP version. This option may be used twice, once with an IPv4
708 address and once with an IPv6 address.
709 IPv6 addresses should be wrapped in square brackets.
710 This setting will be ignored
711 for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).
713 [[PidFile]] **PidFile** __FILE__::
714 On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove
715 FILE. Can not be changed while tor is running.
717 [[ProtocolWarnings]] **ProtocolWarnings** **0**|**1**::
718 If 1, Tor will log with severity \'warn' various cases of other parties not
719 following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with severity
720 \'info'. (Default: 0)
722 [[RunAsDaemon]] **RunAsDaemon** **0**|**1**::
723 If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect
724 on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option.
725 Can not be changed while tor is running.
728 [[LogTimeGranularity]] **LogTimeGranularity** __NUM__::
729 Set the resolution of timestamps in Tor's logs to NUM milliseconds.
730 NUM must be positive and either a divisor or a multiple of 1 second.
731 Note that this option only controls the granularity written by Tor to
732 a file or console log. Tor does not (for example) "batch up" log
733 messages to affect times logged by a controller, times attached to
734 syslog messages, or the mtime fields on log files. (Default: 1 second)
736 [[TruncateLogFile]] **TruncateLogFile** **0**|**1**::
737 If 1, Tor will overwrite logs at startup and in response to a HUP signal,
738 instead of appending to them. (Default: 0)
740 [[SyslogIdentityTag]] **SyslogIdentityTag** __tag__::
741 When logging to syslog, adds a tag to the syslog identity such that
742 log entries are marked with "Tor-__tag__". Can not be changed while tor is
743 running. (Default: none)
745 [[AndroidIdentityTag]] **AndroidIdentityTag** __tag__::
746 When logging to Android's logging subsystem, adds a tag to the log identity
747 such that log entries are marked with "Tor-__tag__". Can not be changed while
748 tor is running. (Default: none)
750 [[SafeLogging]] **SafeLogging** **0**|**1**|**relay**::
751 Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages (e.g.
752 addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can
753 still be useful, but they don't leave behind personally identifying
754 information about what sites a user might have visited. +
756 If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is
757 set to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. If it is set to
758 relay, all log messages generated when acting as a relay are sanitized, but
759 all messages generated when acting as a client are not. (Default: 1)
761 [[User]] **User** __Username__::
762 On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary group.
763 Can not be changed while tor is running.
765 [[KeepBindCapabilities]] **KeepBindCapabilities** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
766 On Linux, when we are started as root and we switch our identity using
767 the **User** option, the **KeepBindCapabilities** option tells us whether to
768 try to retain our ability to bind to low ports. If this value is 1, we
769 try to keep the capability; if it is 0 we do not; and if it is **auto**,
770 we keep the capability only if we are configured to listen on a low port.
771 Can not be changed while tor is running.
774 [[HardwareAccel]] **HardwareAccel** **0**|**1**::
775 If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration when
776 available. Can not be changed while tor is running. (Default: 0)
778 [[AccelName]] **AccelName** __NAME__::
779 When using OpenSSL hardware crypto acceleration attempt to load the dynamic
780 engine of this name. This must be used for any dynamic hardware engine.
781 Names can be verified with the openssl engine command. Can not be changed
782 while tor is running.
784 [[AccelDir]] **AccelDir** __DIR__::
785 Specify this option if using dynamic hardware acceleration and the engine
786 implementation library resides somewhere other than the OpenSSL default.
787 Can not be changed while tor is running.
789 [[AvoidDiskWrites]] **AvoidDiskWrites** **0**|**1**::
790 If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise.
791 This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support
792 only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0)
794 [[CircuitPriorityHalflife]] **CircuitPriorityHalflife** __NUM__::
795 If this value is set, we override the default algorithm for choosing which
796 circuit's cell to deliver or relay next. It is delivered first to the
797 circuit that has the lowest weighted cell count, where cells are weighted
798 exponentially according to this value (in seconds). If the value is -1, it
799 is taken from the consensus if possible else it will fallback to the
800 default value of 30. Minimum: 1, Maximum: 2147483647. This can be defined
801 as a float value. This is an advanced option; you generally shouldn't have
802 to mess with it. (Default: -1)
804 [[CountPrivateBandwidth]] **CountPrivateBandwidth** **0**|**1**::
805 If this option is set, then Tor's rate-limiting applies not only to
806 remote connections, but also to connections to private addresses like
807 127.0.0.1 or 10.0.0.1. This is mostly useful for debugging
808 rate-limiting. (Default: 0)
810 [[ExtendByEd25519ID]] **ExtendByEd25519ID** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
811 If this option is set to 1, we always try to include a relay's Ed25519 ID
812 when telling the proceeding relay in a circuit to extend to it.
813 If this option is set to 0, we never include Ed25519 IDs when extending
814 circuits. If the option is set to "default", we obey a
815 parameter in the consensus document. (Default: auto)
817 [[NoExec]] **NoExec** **0**|**1**::
818 If this option is set to 1, then Tor will never launch another
819 executable, regardless of the settings of ClientTransportPlugin
820 or ServerTransportPlugin. Once this option has been set to 1,
821 it cannot be set back to 0 without restarting Tor. (Default: 0)
823 [[Schedulers]] **Schedulers** **KIST**|**KISTLite**|**Vanilla**::
824 Specify the scheduler type that tor should use. The scheduler is
825 responsible for moving data around within a Tor process. This is an ordered
826 list by priority which means that the first value will be tried first and if
827 unavailable, the second one is tried and so on. It is possible to change
828 these values at runtime. This option mostly effects relays, and most
829 operators should leave it set to its default value.
830 (Default: KIST,KISTLite,Vanilla)
832 The possible scheduler types are:
834 **KIST**: Kernel-Informed Socket Transport. Tor will use TCP information
835 from the kernel to make informed decisions regarding how much data to send
836 and when to send it. KIST also handles traffic in batches (see
837 KISTSchedRunInterval) in order to improve traffic prioritization decisions.
838 As implemented, KIST will only work on Linux kernel version 2.6.39 or
841 **KISTLite**: Same as KIST but without kernel support. Tor will use all
842 the same mechanics as with KIST, including the batching, but its decisions
843 regarding how much data to send will not be as good. KISTLite will work on
844 all kernels and operating systems, and the majority of the benefits of KIST
845 are still realized with KISTLite.
847 **Vanilla**: The scheduler that Tor used before KIST was implemented. It
848 sends as much data as possible, as soon as possible. Vanilla will work on
849 all kernels and operating systems.
851 [[KISTSchedRunInterval]] **KISTSchedRunInterval** __NUM__ **msec**::
852 If KIST or KISTLite is used in the Schedulers option, this controls at which
853 interval the scheduler tick is. If the value is 0 msec, the value is taken
854 from the consensus if possible else it will fallback to the default 10
855 msec. Maximum possible value is 100 msec. (Default: 0 msec)
857 [[KISTSockBufSizeFactor]] **KISTSockBufSizeFactor** __NUM__::
858 If KIST is used in Schedulers, this is a multiplier of the per-socket
859 limit calculation of the KIST algorithm. (Default: 1.0)
864 The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
865 **SocksPort**, **HTTPTunnelPort**, **TransPort**, **DNSPort**, or
866 **NATDPort** is non-zero):
868 [[Bridge]] **Bridge** [__transport__] __IP__:__ORPort__ [__fingerprint__]::
869 When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at
870 "IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint"
871 is provided (using the same format as for DirAuthority), we will verify that
872 the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use
873 fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if
874 it's provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too. +
876 If "transport" is provided, it must match a ClientTransportPlugin line. We
877 then use that pluggable transport's proxy to transfer data to the bridge,
878 rather than connecting to the bridge directly. Some transports use a
879 transport-specific method to work out the remote address to connect to.
880 These transports typically ignore the "IP:ORPort" specified in the bridge
883 Tor passes any "key=val" settings to the pluggable transport proxy as
884 per-connection arguments when connecting to the bridge. Consult
885 the documentation of the pluggable transport for details of what
886 arguments it supports.
888 [[LearnCircuitBuildTimeout]] **LearnCircuitBuildTimeout** **0**|**1**::
889 If 0, CircuitBuildTimeout adaptive learning is disabled. (Default: 1)
891 [[CircuitBuildTimeout]] **CircuitBuildTimeout** __NUM__::
893 Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn't
894 open in that time, give up on it. If LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 1, this
895 value serves as the initial value to use before a timeout is learned. If
896 LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 0, this value is the only value used.
897 (Default: 60 seconds)
899 [[CircuitsAvailableTimeout]] **CircuitsAvailableTimeout** __NUM__::
900 Tor will attempt to keep at least one open, unused circuit available for
901 this amount of time. This option governs how long idle circuits are kept
902 open, as well as the amount of time Tor will keep a circuit open to each
903 of the recently used ports. This way when the Tor client is entirely
904 idle, it can expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS
905 connections. Note that the actual timeout value is uniformly randomized
906 from the specified value to twice that amount. (Default: 30 minutes;
909 [[CircuitStreamTimeout]] **CircuitStreamTimeout** __NUM__::
910 If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule for how
911 many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try a new circuit.
912 If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set this to a
913 number like 60. (Default: 0)
915 [[ClientOnly]] **ClientOnly** **0**|**1**::
916 If set to 1, Tor will not run as a relay or serve
917 directory requests, even if the ORPort, ExtORPort, or DirPort options are
918 set. (This config option is
919 mostly unnecessary: we added it back when we were considering having
920 Tor clients auto-promote themselves to being relays if they were stable
921 and fast enough. The current behavior is simply that Tor is a client
922 unless ORPort, ExtORPort, or DirPort are configured.) (Default: 0)
924 [[ConnectionPadding]] **ConnectionPadding** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
925 This option governs Tor's use of padding to defend against some forms of
926 traffic analysis. If it is set to 'auto', Tor will send padding only
927 if both the client and the relay support it. If it is set to 0, Tor will
928 not send any padding cells. If it is set to 1, Tor will still send padding
929 for client connections regardless of relay support. Only clients may set
930 this option. This option should be offered via the UI to mobile users
931 for use where bandwidth may be expensive.
934 [[ReducedConnectionPadding]] **ReducedConnectionPadding** **0**|**1**::
935 If set to 1, Tor will not not hold OR connections open for very long,
936 and will send less padding on these connections. Only clients may set
937 this option. This option should be offered via the UI to mobile users
938 for use where bandwidth may be expensive. (Default: 0)
940 [[ExcludeNodes]] **ExcludeNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
941 A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
942 patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit. Country codes are
943 2-letter ISO3166 codes, and must
944 be wrapped in braces; fingerprints may be preceded by a dollar sign.
946 ExcludeNodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
948 By default, this option is treated as a preference that Tor is allowed
949 to override in order to keep working.
950 For example, if you try to connect to a hidden service,
951 but you have excluded all of the hidden service's introduction points,
952 Tor will connect to one of them anyway. If you do not want this
953 behavior, set the StrictNodes option (documented below). +
955 Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node selection
956 options below) only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you.
957 Clients can still build circuits through you to any node. Controllers
958 can tell Tor to build circuits through any node. +
960 Country codes are case-insensitive. The code "\{??}" refers to nodes whose
961 country can't be identified. No country code, including \{??}, works if
962 no GeoIPFile can be loaded. See also the GeoIPExcludeUnknown option below.
965 [[ExcludeExitNodes]] **ExcludeExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
966 A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
967 patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node---that is, a
968 node that delivers traffic for you *outside* the Tor network. Note that any
969 node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this
971 the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify
972 nodes. See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below.
974 [[GeoIPExcludeUnknown]] **GeoIPExcludeUnknown** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
975 If this option is set to 'auto', then whenever any country code is set in
976 ExcludeNodes or ExcludeExitNodes, all nodes with unknown country (\{??} and
977 possibly \{A1}) are treated as excluded as well. If this option is set to
978 '1', then all unknown countries are treated as excluded in ExcludeNodes
979 and ExcludeExitNodes. This option has no effect when a GeoIP file isn't
980 configured or can't be found. (Default: auto)
982 [[ExitNodes]] **ExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
983 A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
984 patterns of nodes to use as exit node---that is, a
985 node that delivers traffic for you *outside* the Tor network. See
986 the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify nodes. +
988 Note that if you list too few nodes here, or if you exclude too many exit
989 nodes with ExcludeExitNodes, you can degrade functionality. For example,
990 if none of the exits you list allows traffic on port 80 or 443, you won't
991 be able to browse the web. +
993 Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic *outside* of
994 the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those
995 used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches,
996 those used for relay reachability self-tests, and so on) that end
997 at a non-exit node. To
998 keep a node from being used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes. +
1000 The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
1001 ExitNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. +
1003 The .exit address notation, if enabled via MapAddress, overrides
1006 [[EntryNodes]] **EntryNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
1007 A list of identity fingerprints and country codes of nodes
1008 to use for the first hop in your normal circuits.
1009 Normal circuits include all
1010 circuits except for direct connections to directory servers. The Bridge
1011 option overrides this option; if you have configured bridges and
1012 UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes. +
1014 The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
1015 EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. See
1016 the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify nodes.
1018 [[StrictNodes]] **StrictNodes** **0**|**1**::
1019 If StrictNodes is set to 1, Tor will treat solely the ExcludeNodes option
1020 as a requirement to follow for all the circuits you generate, even if
1021 doing so will break functionality for you (StrictNodes applies to neither
1022 ExcludeExitNodes nor to ExitNodes). If StrictNodes is set to 0, Tor will
1023 still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list, but it will err on the
1024 side of avoiding unexpected errors. Specifically, StrictNodes 0 tells Tor
1025 that it is okay to use an excluded node when it is *necessary* to perform
1026 relay reachability self-tests, connect to a hidden service, provide a
1027 hidden service to a client, fulfill a .exit request, upload directory
1028 information, or download directory information. (Default: 0)
1030 [[FascistFirewall]] **FascistFirewall** **0**|**1**::
1031 If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports
1032 that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see **FirewallPorts**).
1033 This will allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with
1034 restrictive policies, but will not allow you to run as a server behind such
1035 a firewall. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use
1036 ReachableAddresses instead.
1038 [[FirewallPorts]] **FirewallPorts** __PORTS__::
1039 A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when
1040 **FascistFirewall** is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses
1041 instead. (Default: 80, 443)
1043 [[ReachableAddresses]] **ReachableAddresses** __IP__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
1044 A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows
1045 you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except
1046 that "accept" is understood unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For
1047 example, \'ReachableAddresses 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept
1048 \*:80' means that your firewall allows connections to everything inside net
1049 99, rejects port 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port
1050 80 otherwise. (Default: \'accept \*:*'.)
1052 [[ReachableDirAddresses]] **ReachableDirAddresses** __IP__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
1053 Like **ReachableAddresses**, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
1054 these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP
1055 GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of
1056 **ReachableAddresses** is used. If **HTTPProxy** is set then these
1057 connections will go through that proxy. (DEPRECATED: This option has
1058 had no effect for some time.)
1060 [[ReachableORAddresses]] **ReachableORAddresses** __IP__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
1061 Like **ReachableAddresses**, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
1062 these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not
1063 set explicitly then the value of **ReachableAddresses** is used. If
1064 **HTTPSProxy** is set then these connections will go through that proxy. +
1066 The separation between **ReachableORAddresses** and
1067 **ReachableDirAddresses** is only interesting when you are connecting
1068 through proxies (see **HTTPProxy** and **HTTPSProxy**). Most proxies limit
1069 TLS connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443,
1070 and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory
1071 information) to port 80.
1073 [[HidServAuth]] **HidServAuth** __onion-address__ __auth-cookie__ [__service-name__]::
1074 Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16
1075 characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22
1076 characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal
1077 purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times
1078 for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and
1079 this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden
1080 services can be configured to require authorization using the
1081 **HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** option.
1083 [[LongLivedPorts]] **LongLivedPorts** __PORTS__::
1084 A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections
1085 (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these
1086 ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a node
1087 will go down before the stream is finished. Note that the list is also
1088 honored for circuits (both client and service side) involving hidden
1089 services whose virtual port is in this list. (Default: 21, 22, 706,
1090 1863, 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6523, 6667, 6697, 8300)
1092 [[MapAddress]] **MapAddress** __address__ __newaddress__::
1093 When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will transform to newaddress
1094 before processing it. For example, if you always want connections to
1095 www.example.com to exit via __torserver__ (where __torserver__ is the
1096 fingerprint of the server), use "MapAddress www.example.com
1097 www.example.com.torserver.exit". If the value is prefixed with a
1098 "\*.", matches an entire domain. For example, if you
1099 always want connections to example.com and any if its subdomains
1101 __torserver__ (where __torserver__ is the fingerprint of the server), use
1102 "MapAddress \*.example.com \*.example.com.torserver.exit". (Note the
1103 leading "*." in each part of the directive.) You can also redirect all
1104 subdomains of a domain to a single address. For example, "MapAddress
1105 *.example.com www.example.com". +
1109 1. When evaluating MapAddress expressions Tor stops when it hits the most
1110 recently added expression that matches the requested address. So if you
1111 have the following in your torrc, www.torproject.org will map to 1.1.1.1:
1113 MapAddress www.torproject.org 2.2.2.2
1114 MapAddress www.torproject.org 1.1.1.1
1116 2. Tor evaluates the MapAddress configuration until it finds no matches. So
1117 if you have the following in your torrc, www.torproject.org will map to
1120 MapAddress 1.1.1.1 2.2.2.2
1121 MapAddress www.torproject.org 1.1.1.1
1123 3. The following MapAddress expression is invalid (and will be
1124 ignored) because you cannot map from a specific address to a wildcard
1127 MapAddress www.torproject.org *.torproject.org.torserver.exit
1129 4. Using a wildcard to match only part of a string (as in *ample.com) is
1132 [[NewCircuitPeriod]] **NewCircuitPeriod** __NUM__::
1133 Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30
1136 [[MaxCircuitDirtiness]] **MaxCircuitDirtiness** __NUM__::
1137 Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago,
1138 but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old. For hidden
1139 services, this applies to the __last__ time a circuit was used, not the
1140 first. Circuits with streams constructed with SOCKS authentication via
1141 SocksPorts that have **KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth** also remain alive
1142 for MaxCircuitDirtiness seconds after carrying the last such stream.
1143 (Default: 10 minutes)
1145 [[MaxClientCircuitsPending]] **MaxClientCircuitsPending** __NUM__::
1146 Do not allow more than NUM circuits to be pending at a time for handling
1147 client streams. A circuit is pending if we have begun constructing it,
1148 but it has not yet been completely constructed. (Default: 32)
1150 [[NodeFamily]] **NodeFamily** __node__,__node__,__...__::
1151 The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints,
1152 constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered servers, so never use
1153 any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a NodeFamily is only needed
1154 when a server doesn't list the family itself (with MyFamily). This option
1155 can be used multiple times; each instance defines a separate family. In
1156 addition to nodes, you can also list IP address and ranges and country
1157 codes in {curly braces}. See the **ExcludeNodes** option for more
1158 information on how to specify nodes.
1160 [[EnforceDistinctSubnets]] **EnforceDistinctSubnets** **0**|**1**::
1161 If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too close" on
1162 the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in
1163 the same /16 range. (Default: 1)
1165 [[SocksPort]] **SocksPort** \['address':]__port__|**unix:**__path__|**auto** [_flags_] [_isolation flags_]::
1166 Open this port to listen for connections from SOCKS-speaking
1167 applications. Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow application
1168 connections via SOCKS. Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for
1169 you. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind
1170 to multiple addresses/ports. If a unix domain socket is used, you may
1171 quote the path using standard C escape sequences.
1174 NOTE: Although this option allows you to specify an IP address
1175 other than localhost, you should do so only with extreme caution.
1176 The SOCKS protocol is unencrypted and (as we use it)
1177 unauthenticated, so exposing it in this way could leak your
1178 information to anybody watching your network, and allow anybody
1179 to use your computer as an open proxy. +
1181 The _isolation flags_ arguments give Tor rules for which streams
1182 received on this SocksPort are allowed to share circuits with one
1183 another. Recognized isolation flags are:
1184 **IsolateClientAddr**;;
1185 Don't share circuits with streams from a different
1186 client address. (On by default and strongly recommended when
1187 supported; you can disable it with **NoIsolateClientAddr**.
1188 Unsupported and force-disabled when using Unix domain sockets.)
1189 **IsolateSOCKSAuth**;;
1190 Don't share circuits with streams for which different
1191 SOCKS authentication was provided. (For HTTPTunnelPort
1192 connections, this option looks at the Proxy-Authorization and
1193 X-Tor-Stream-Isolation headers. On by default;
1194 you can disable it with **NoIsolateSOCKSAuth**.)
1195 **IsolateClientProtocol**;;
1196 Don't share circuits with streams using a different protocol.
1197 (SOCKS 4, SOCKS 5, TransPort connections, NATDPort connections,
1198 and DNSPort requests are all considered to be different protocols.)
1199 **IsolateDestPort**;;
1200 Don't share circuits with streams targeting a different
1202 **IsolateDestAddr**;;
1203 Don't share circuits with streams targeting a different
1204 destination address.
1205 **KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth**;;
1206 If **IsolateSOCKSAuth** is enabled, keep alive circuits while they have
1207 at least one stream with SOCKS authentication active. After such a circuit
1208 is idle for more than MaxCircuitDirtiness seconds, it can be closed.
1209 **SessionGroup=**__INT__;;
1210 If no other isolation rules would prevent it, allow streams
1211 on this port to share circuits with streams from every other
1212 port with the same session group. (By default, streams received
1213 on different SocksPorts, TransPorts, etc are always isolated from one
1214 another. This option overrides that behavior.)
1216 // Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page.
1217 [[OtherSocksPortFlags]]::
1218 Other recognized __flags__ for a SocksPort are:
1220 Tell exits to not connect to IPv4 addresses in response to SOCKS
1221 requests on this connection.
1223 Tell exits to allow IPv6 addresses in response to SOCKS requests on
1224 this connection, so long as SOCKS5 is in use. (SOCKS4 can't handle
1227 Tells exits that, if a host has both an IPv4 and an IPv6 address,
1228 we would prefer to connect to it via IPv6. (IPv4 is the default.)
1230 Do not ask exits to resolve DNS addresses in SOCKS5 requests. Tor will
1231 connect to IPv4 addresses, IPv6 addresses (if IPv6Traffic is set) and
1233 **NoOnionTraffic**;;
1234 Do not connect to .onion addresses in SOCKS5 requests.
1235 **OnionTrafficOnly**;;
1236 Tell the tor client to only connect to .onion addresses in response to
1237 SOCKS5 requests on this connection. This is equivalent to NoDNSRequest,
1238 NoIPv4Traffic, NoIPv6Traffic. The corresponding NoOnionTrafficOnly
1239 flag is not supported.
1241 Tells the client to remember IPv4 DNS answers we receive from exit
1242 nodes via this connection.
1244 Tells the client to remember IPv6 DNS answers we receive from exit
1245 nodes via this connection.
1247 Unix domain sockets only: makes the socket get created as
1250 Unix domain sockets only: makes the socket get created as
1253 Tells the client to remember all DNS answers we receive from exit
1254 nodes via this connection.
1256 Tells the client to use any cached IPv4 DNS answers we have when making
1257 requests via this connection. (NOTE: This option, or UseIPv6Cache
1258 or UseDNSCache, can harm your anonymity, and probably
1259 won't help performance as much as you might expect. Use with care!)
1261 Tells the client to use any cached IPv6 DNS answers we have when making
1262 requests via this connection.
1264 Tells the client to use any cached DNS answers we have when making
1265 requests via this connection.
1266 **PreferIPv6Automap**;;
1267 When serving a hostname lookup request on this port that
1268 should get automapped (according to AutomapHostsOnResolve),
1269 if we could return either an IPv4 or an IPv6 answer, prefer
1270 an IPv6 answer. (On by default.)
1271 **PreferSOCKSNoAuth**;;
1272 Ordinarily, when an application offers both "username/password
1273 authentication" and "no authentication" to Tor via SOCKS5, Tor
1274 selects username/password authentication so that IsolateSOCKSAuth can
1275 work. This can confuse some applications, if they offer a
1276 username/password combination then get confused when asked for
1277 one. You can disable this behavior, so that Tor will select "No
1278 authentication" when IsolateSOCKSAuth is disabled, or when this
1281 // Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page.
1282 [[SocksPortFlagsMisc]]::
1283 Flags are processed left to right. If flags conflict, the last flag on the
1284 line is used, and all earlier flags are ignored. No error is issued for
1287 [[SocksPolicy]] **SocksPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
1288 Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
1289 SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as exit
1290 policies below, except that port specifiers are ignored. Any address
1291 not matched by some entry in the policy is accepted.
1293 [[SocksTimeout]] **SocksTimeout** __NUM__::
1294 Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds
1295 unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default:
1298 [[TokenBucketRefillInterval]] **TokenBucketRefillInterval** __NUM__ [**msec**|**second**]::
1299 Set the refill delay interval of Tor's token bucket to NUM milliseconds.
1300 NUM must be between 1 and 1000, inclusive. When Tor is out of bandwidth,
1301 on a connection or globally, it will wait up to this long before it tries
1302 to use that connection again.
1303 Note that bandwidth limits are still expressed in bytes per second: this
1304 option only affects the frequency with which Tor checks to see whether
1305 previously exhausted connections may read again.
1306 Can not be changed while tor is running. (Default: 100 msec)
1308 [[TrackHostExits]] **TrackHostExits** __host__,__.domain__,__...__::
1309 For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent
1310 connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse the same
1311 exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a \'.\', it is treated as
1312 matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a \'.', it means
1313 match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to sites
1314 that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if
1315 your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage
1316 of making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single
1317 user. However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it
1318 through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow.
1320 [[TrackHostExitsExpire]] **TrackHostExitsExpire** __NUM__::
1321 Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the
1322 association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default is
1323 1800 seconds (30 minutes).
1325 [[UpdateBridgesFromAuthority]] **UpdateBridgesFromAuthority** **0**|**1**::
1326 When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors
1327 from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back to
1328 a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0)
1330 [[UseBridges]] **UseBridges** **0**|**1**::
1331 When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge"
1332 config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory
1333 guards. (Default: 0)
1335 [[UseEntryGuards]] **UseEntryGuards** **0**|**1**::
1336 If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try
1337 to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers
1338 increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a
1339 fraction of your paths. Entry Guards can not be used by Directory
1340 Authorities, Single Onion Services, and Tor2web clients. In these cases,
1341 the this option is ignored. (Default: 1)
1343 [[GuardfractionFile]] **GuardfractionFile** __FILENAME__::
1344 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the location of the
1345 guardfraction file which contains information about how long relays
1346 have been guards. (Default: unset)
1348 [[UseGuardFraction]] **UseGuardFraction** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
1349 This torrc option specifies whether clients should use the
1350 guardfraction information found in the consensus during path
1351 selection. If it's set to 'auto', clients will do what the
1352 UseGuardFraction consensus parameter tells them to do. (Default: auto)
1354 [[NumEntryGuards]] **NumEntryGuards** __NUM__::
1355 If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers
1356 as long-term entries for our circuits. If NUM is 0, we try to learn the
1357 number from the guard-n-primary-guards-to-use consensus parameter, and
1358 default to 1 if the consensus parameter isn't set. (Default: 0)
1360 [[NumPrimaryGuards]] **NumPrimaryGuards** __NUM__::
1361 If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick NUM routers for our
1362 primary guard list, which is the set of routers we strongly prefer when
1363 connecting to the Tor network. If NUM is 0, we try to learn the number from
1364 the guard-n-primary-guards consensus parameter, and default to 3 if the
1365 consensus parameter isn't set. (Default: 0)
1367 [[NumDirectoryGuards]] **NumDirectoryGuards** __NUM__::
1368 If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we try to make sure we have at least NUM
1369 routers to use as directory guards. If this option is set to 0, use the
1370 value from the guard-n-primary-dir-guards-to-use consensus parameter, and
1371 default to 3 if the consensus parameter isn't set. (Default: 0)
1373 [[GuardLifetime]] **GuardLifetime** __N__ **days**|**weeks**|**months**::
1374 If nonzero, and UseEntryGuards is set, minimum time to keep a guard before
1375 picking a new one. If zero, we use the GuardLifetime parameter from the
1376 consensus directory. No value here may be less than 1 month or greater
1377 than 5 years; out-of-range values are clamped. (Default: 0)
1379 [[SafeSocks]] **SafeSocks** **0**|**1**::
1380 When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that
1381 use unsafe variants of the socks protocol -- ones that only provide an IP
1382 address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first.
1383 Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS.
1386 [[TestSocks]] **TestSocks** **0**|**1**::
1387 When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for
1388 each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used a
1389 safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks). This
1390 helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking
1391 DNS requests. (Default: 0)
1393 [[VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4]] **VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4** __IPv4Address__/__bits__ +
1395 [[VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6]] **VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6** [__IPv6Address__]/__bits__::
1396 When Tor needs to assign a virtual (unused) address because of a MAPADDRESS
1397 command from the controller or the AutomapHostsOnResolve feature, Tor
1398 picks an unassigned address from this range. (Defaults:
1399 127.192.0.0/10 and [FE80::]/10 respectively.) +
1401 When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool
1402 like dns-proxy-tor, change the IPv4 network to "10.192.0.0/10" or
1403 "172.16.0.0/12" and change the IPv6 network to "[FC00::]/7".
1404 The default **VirtualAddrNetwork** address ranges on a
1405 properly configured machine will route to the loopback or link-local
1406 interface. The maximum number of bits for the network prefix is set to 104
1407 for IPv6 and 16 for IPv4. However, a wider network - smaller prefix length
1408 - is preferable since it reduces the chances for an attacker to guess the
1409 used IP. For local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting
1412 [[AllowNonRFC953Hostnames]] **AllowNonRFC953Hostnames** **0**|**1**::
1413 When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal
1414 characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be
1415 resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on.
1418 [[HTTPTunnelPort]] **HTTPTunnelPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
1419 Open this port to listen for proxy connections using the "HTTP CONNECT"
1420 protocol instead of SOCKS. Set this to
1421 0 if you don't want to allow "HTTP CONNECT" connections. Set the port
1422 to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be
1423 specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. See
1424 SOCKSPort for an explanation of isolation flags. (Default: 0)
1426 [[TransPort]] **TransPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
1427 Open this port to listen for transparent proxy connections. Set this to
1428 0 if you don't want to allow transparent proxy connections. Set the port
1429 to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be
1430 specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. See
1431 SOCKSPort for an explanation of isolation flags. +
1433 TransPort requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or
1434 Linux's IPTables. If you're planning to use Tor as a transparent proxy for
1435 a network, you'll want to examine and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the
1436 default setting. (Default: 0)
1438 [[TransProxyType]] **TransProxyType** **default**|**TPROXY**|**ipfw**|**pf-divert**::
1439 TransProxyType may only be enabled when there is transparent proxy listener
1442 Set this to "TPROXY" if you wish to be able to use the TPROXY Linux module
1443 to transparently proxy connections that are configured using the TransPort
1444 option. Detailed information on how to configure the TPROXY
1445 feature can be found in the Linux kernel source tree in the file
1446 Documentation/networking/tproxy.txt. +
1448 Set this option to "ipfw" to use the FreeBSD ipfw interface. +
1450 On *BSD operating systems when using pf, set this to "pf-divert" to take
1451 advantage of +divert-to+ rules, which do not modify the packets like
1452 +rdr-to+ rules do. Detailed information on how to configure pf to use
1453 +divert-to+ rules can be found in the pf.conf(5) manual page. On OpenBSD,
1454 +divert-to+ is available to use on versions greater than or equal to
1457 Set this to "default", or leave it unconfigured, to use regular IPTables
1458 on Linux, or to use pf +rdr-to+ rules on *BSD systems. +
1460 (Default: "default")
1462 [[NATDPort]] **NATDPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
1463 Open this port to listen for connections from old versions of ipfw (as
1464 included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc) using the NATD protocol.
1465 Use 0 if you don't want to allow NATD connections. Set the port
1466 to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be
1467 specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. See
1468 SocksPort for an explanation of isolation flags. +
1470 This option is only for people who cannot use TransPort. (Default: 0)
1472 [[AutomapHostsOnResolve]] **AutomapHostsOnResolve** **0**|**1**::
1473 When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address
1474 that ends with one of the suffixes in **AutomapHostsSuffixes**, we map an
1475 unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address.
1476 This is handy for making ".onion" addresses work with applications that
1477 resolve an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0)
1479 [[AutomapHostsSuffixes]] **AutomapHostsSuffixes** __SUFFIX__,__SUFFIX__,__...__::
1480 A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with **AutomapHostsOnResolve**.
1481 The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses." (Default: .exit,.onion).
1483 [[DNSPort]] **DNSPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
1484 If non-zero, open this port to listen for UDP DNS requests, and resolve
1485 them anonymously. This port only handles A, AAAA, and PTR requests---it
1486 doesn't handle arbitrary DNS request types. Set the port to "auto" to
1487 have Tor pick a port for
1488 you. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
1489 addresses/ports. See SocksPort for an explanation of isolation
1492 [[ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses]] **ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses** **0**|**1**::
1493 If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that
1494 tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or
1495 192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; it
1496 is not allowed to be set on the default network. (Default: 1)
1498 [[ClientRejectInternalAddresses]] **ClientRejectInternalAddresses** **0**|**1**::
1499 If true, Tor does not try to fulfill requests to connect to an internal
1500 address (like 127.0.0.1 or 192.168.0.1) __unless an exit node is
1501 specifically requested__ (for example, via a .exit hostname, or a
1502 controller request). If true, multicast DNS hostnames for machines on the
1503 local network (of the form *.local) are also rejected. (Default: 1)
1505 [[DownloadExtraInfo]] **DownloadExtraInfo** **0**|**1**::
1506 If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These documents
1507 contain information about servers other than the information in their
1508 regular server descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything
1509 itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0)
1511 [[WarnPlaintextPorts]] **WarnPlaintextPorts** __port__,__port__,__...__::
1512 Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous
1513 connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users
1514 to services that risk sending passwords in the clear. (Default:
1517 [[RejectPlaintextPorts]] **RejectPlaintextPorts** __port__,__port__,__...__::
1518 Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses, Tor
1519 will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default: None)
1521 [[OptimisticData]] **OptimisticData** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
1522 When this option is set, and Tor is using an exit node that supports
1523 the feature, it will try optimistically to send data to the exit node
1524 without waiting for the exit node to report whether the connection
1525 succeeded. This can save a round-trip time for protocols like HTTP
1526 where the client talks first. If OptimisticData is set to **auto**,
1527 Tor will look at the UseOptimisticData parameter in the networkstatus.
1530 [[Tor2webMode]] **Tor2webMode** **0**|**1**::
1531 When this option is set, Tor connects to hidden services
1532 **non-anonymously**. This option also disables client connections to
1533 non-hidden-service hostnames through Tor. It **must only** be used when
1534 running a tor2web Hidden Service web proxy.
1535 To enable this option the compile time flag --enable-tor2web-mode must be
1536 specified. Since Tor2webMode is non-anonymous, you can not run an
1537 anonymous Hidden Service on a tor version compiled with Tor2webMode.
1540 [[Tor2webRendezvousPoints]] **Tor2webRendezvousPoints** __node__,__node__,__...__::
1541 A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and
1542 address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as RPs
1543 in HS circuits; any other nodes will not be used as RPs.
1545 Tor2webRendezvousPoints Fastyfasty, ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
1547 This feature can only be used if Tor2webMode is also enabled. +
1549 ExcludeNodes have higher priority than Tor2webRendezvousPoints,
1550 which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be
1553 If no nodes in Tor2webRendezvousPoints are currently available for
1554 use, Tor will choose a random node when building HS circuits.
1556 [[HSLayer2Nodes]] **HSLayer2Nodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
1557 A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and
1558 address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the
1559 second hop in all client or service-side Onion Service circuits.
1560 This option mitigates attacks where the adversary runs middle nodes
1561 and induces your client or service to create many circuits, in order
1562 to discover your primary guard node.
1563 (Default: Any node in the network may be used in the second hop.)
1566 HSLayer2Nodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
1568 When this is set, the resulting hidden service paths will
1571 C - G - L2 - M - Rend +
1572 C - G - L2 - M - HSDir +
1573 C - G - L2 - M - Intro +
1574 S - G - L2 - M - Rend +
1575 S - G - L2 - M - HSDir +
1576 S - G - L2 - M - Intro +
1578 where C is this client, S is the service, G is the Guard node,
1579 L2 is a node from this option, and M is a random middle node.
1580 Rend, HSDir, and Intro point selection is not affected by this
1583 This option may be combined with HSLayer3Nodes to create
1586 C - G - L2 - L3 - Rend +
1587 C - G - L2 - L3 - M - HSDir +
1588 C - G - L2 - L3 - M - Intro +
1589 S - G - L2 - L3 - M - Rend +
1590 S - G - L2 - L3 - HSDir +
1591 S - G - L2 - L3 - Intro +
1593 ExcludeNodes have higher priority than HSLayer2Nodes,
1594 which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be
1597 When either this option or HSLayer3Nodes are set, the /16 subnet
1598 and node family restrictions are removed for hidden service
1599 circuits. Additionally, we allow the guard node to be present
1600 as the Rend, HSDir, and IP node, and as the hop before it. This
1601 is done to prevent the adversary from inferring information
1602 about our guard, layer2, and layer3 node choices at later points
1605 This option is meant to be managed by a Tor controller such as
1606 https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards that selects and
1607 updates this set of nodes for you. Hence it does not do load
1608 balancing if fewer than 20 nodes are selected, and if no nodes in
1609 HSLayer2Nodes are currently available for use, Tor will not work.
1610 Please use extreme care if you are setting this option manually.
1612 [[HSLayer3Nodes]] **HSLayer3Nodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
1613 A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and
1614 address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the
1615 third hop in all client and service-side Onion Service circuits.
1616 This option mitigates attacks where the adversary runs middle nodes
1617 and induces your client or service to create many circuits, in order
1618 to discover your primary or Layer2 guard nodes.
1619 (Default: Any node in the network may be used in the third hop.)
1622 HSLayer3Nodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
1624 When this is set by itself, the resulting hidden service paths
1626 C - G - M - L3 - Rend +
1627 C - G - M - L3 - M - HSDir +
1628 C - G - M - L3 - M - Intro +
1629 S - G - M - L3 - M - Rend +
1630 S - G - M - L3 - HSDir +
1631 S - G - M - L3 - Intro +
1632 where C is this client, S is the service, G is the Guard node,
1633 L2 is a node from this option, and M is a random middle node.
1634 Rend, HSDir, and Intro point selection is not affected by this
1637 While it is possible to use this option by itself, it should be
1638 combined with HSLayer2Nodes to create paths of the form:
1640 C - G - L2 - L3 - Rend +
1641 C - G - L2 - L3 - M - HSDir +
1642 C - G - L2 - L3 - M - Intro +
1643 S - G - L2 - L3 - M - Rend +
1644 S - G - L2 - L3 - HSDir +
1645 S - G - L2 - L3 - Intro +
1647 ExcludeNodes have higher priority than HSLayer3Nodes,
1648 which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be
1651 When either this option or HSLayer2Nodes are set, the /16 subnet
1652 and node family restrictions are removed for hidden service
1653 circuits. Additionally, we allow the guard node to be present
1654 as the Rend, HSDir, and IP node, and as the hop before it. This
1655 is done to prevent the adversary from inferring information
1656 about our guard, layer2, and layer3 node choices at later points
1659 This option is meant to be managed by a Tor controller such as
1660 https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards that selects and
1661 updates this set of nodes for you. Hence it does not do load
1662 balancing if fewer than 20 nodes are selected, and if no nodes in
1663 HSLayer3Nodes are currently available for use, Tor will not work.
1664 Please use extreme care if you are setting this option manually.
1666 [[UseMicrodescriptors]] **UseMicrodescriptors** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
1667 Microdescriptors are a smaller version of the information that Tor needs
1668 in order to build its circuits. Using microdescriptors makes Tor clients
1669 download less directory information, thus saving bandwidth. Directory
1670 caches need to fetch regular descriptors and microdescriptors, so this
1671 option doesn't save any bandwidth for them. For legacy reasons, auto is
1672 accepted, but it has the same effect as 1. (Default: auto)
1674 [[PathBiasCircThreshold]] **PathBiasCircThreshold** __NUM__ +
1676 [[PathBiasNoticeRate]] **PathBiasNoticeRate** __NUM__ +
1678 [[PathBiasWarnRate]] **PathBiasWarnRate** __NUM__ +
1680 [[PathBiasExtremeRate]] **PathBiasExtremeRate** __NUM__ +
1682 [[PathBiasDropGuards]] **PathBiasDropGuards** __NUM__ +
1684 [[PathBiasScaleThreshold]] **PathBiasScaleThreshold** __NUM__::
1685 These options override the default behavior of Tor's (**currently
1686 experimental**) path bias detection algorithm. To try to find broken or
1687 misbehaving guard nodes, Tor looks for nodes where more than a certain
1688 fraction of circuits through that guard fail to get built. +
1690 The PathBiasCircThreshold option controls how many circuits we need to build
1691 through a guard before we make these checks. The PathBiasNoticeRate,
1692 PathBiasWarnRate and PathBiasExtremeRate options control what fraction of
1693 circuits must succeed through a guard so we won't write log messages.
1694 If less than PathBiasExtremeRate circuits succeed *and* PathBiasDropGuards
1695 is set to 1, we disable use of that guard. +
1697 When we have seen more than PathBiasScaleThreshold
1698 circuits through a guard, we scale our observations by 0.5 (governed by
1699 the consensus) so that new observations don't get swamped by old ones. +
1701 By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options,
1702 Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document.
1703 If no defaults are available there, these options default to 150, .70,
1704 .50, .30, 0, and 300 respectively.
1706 [[PathBiasUseThreshold]] **PathBiasUseThreshold** __NUM__ +
1708 [[PathBiasNoticeUseRate]] **PathBiasNoticeUseRate** __NUM__ +
1710 [[PathBiasExtremeUseRate]] **PathBiasExtremeUseRate** __NUM__ +
1712 [[PathBiasScaleUseThreshold]] **PathBiasScaleUseThreshold** __NUM__::
1713 Similar to the above options, these options override the default behavior
1714 of Tor's (**currently experimental**) path use bias detection algorithm. +
1716 Where as the path bias parameters govern thresholds for successfully
1717 building circuits, these four path use bias parameters govern thresholds
1718 only for circuit usage. Circuits which receive no stream usage
1719 are not counted by this detection algorithm. A used circuit is considered
1720 successful if it is capable of carrying streams or otherwise receiving
1721 well-formed responses to RELAY cells. +
1723 By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options,
1724 Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document.
1725 If no defaults are available there, these options default to 20, .80,
1726 .60, and 100, respectively.
1728 [[ClientUseIPv4]] **ClientUseIPv4** **0**|**1**::
1729 If this option is set to 0, Tor will avoid connecting to directory servers
1730 and entry nodes over IPv4. Note that clients with an IPv4
1731 address in a **Bridge**, proxy, or pluggable transport line will try
1732 connecting over IPv4 even if **ClientUseIPv4** is set to 0. (Default: 1)
1734 [[ClientUseIPv6]] **ClientUseIPv6** **0**|**1**::
1735 If this option is set to 1, Tor might connect to directory servers or
1736 entry nodes over IPv6. Note that clients configured with an IPv6 address
1737 in a **Bridge**, proxy, or pluggable transport line will try connecting
1738 over IPv6 even if **ClientUseIPv6** is set to 0. (Default: 0)
1740 [[ClientPreferIPv6DirPort]] **ClientPreferIPv6DirPort** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
1741 If this option is set to 1, Tor prefers a directory port with an IPv6
1742 address over one with IPv4, for direct connections, if a given directory
1743 server has both. (Tor also prefers an IPv6 DirPort if IPv4Client is set to
1744 0.) If this option is set to auto, clients prefer IPv4. Other things may
1745 influence the choice. This option breaks a tie to the favor of IPv6.
1746 (Default: auto) (DEPRECATED: This option has had no effect for some
1749 [[ClientPreferIPv6ORPort]] **ClientPreferIPv6ORPort** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
1750 If this option is set to 1, Tor prefers an OR port with an IPv6
1751 address over one with IPv4 if a given entry node has both. (Tor also
1752 prefers an IPv6 ORPort if IPv4Client is set to 0.) If this option is set
1753 to auto, Tor bridge clients prefer the configured bridge address, and
1754 other clients prefer IPv4. Other things may influence the choice. This
1755 option breaks a tie to the favor of IPv6. (Default: auto)
1757 [[PathsNeededToBuildCircuits]] **PathsNeededToBuildCircuits** __NUM__::
1758 Tor clients don't build circuits for user traffic until they know
1759 about enough of the network so that they could potentially construct
1760 enough of the possible paths through the network. If this option
1761 is set to a fraction between 0.25 and 0.95, Tor won't build circuits
1762 until it has enough descriptors or microdescriptors to construct
1763 that fraction of possible paths. Note that setting this option too low
1764 can make your Tor client less anonymous, and setting it too high can
1765 prevent your Tor client from bootstrapping. If this option is negative,
1766 Tor will use a default value chosen by the directory authorities. If the
1767 directory authorities do not choose a value, Tor will default to 0.6.
1770 [[ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityDownloadInitialDelay]] **ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
1771 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download consensuses from authorities
1772 if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably
1773 live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a list of fallback
1774 directory mirrors. This schedule is advanced by (potentially concurrent)
1775 connection attempts, unlike other schedules, which are advanced by
1776 connection failures. (Default: 6)
1778 [[ClientBootstrapConsensusFallbackDownloadInitialDelay]] **ClientBootstrapConsensusFallbackDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
1779 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download consensuses from fallback
1780 directory mirrors if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a
1781 usable, reasonably live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a
1782 list of fallback directory mirrors. This schedule is advanced by
1783 (potentially concurrent) connection attempts, unlike other schedules,
1784 which are advanced by connection failures. (Default: 0)
1786 [[ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyDownloadInitialDelay]] **ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
1787 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download consensuses from authorities
1788 if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably
1789 live consensus). Only used by clients which don't have or won't fetch
1790 from a list of fallback directory mirrors. This schedule is advanced by
1791 (potentially concurrent) connection attempts, unlike other schedules,
1792 which are advanced by connection failures. (Default: 0)
1794 [[ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxInProgressTries]] **ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxInProgressTries** __NUM__::
1795 Try this many simultaneous connections to download a consensus before
1796 waiting for one to complete, timeout, or error out. (Default: 3)
1801 The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if ORPort
1804 [[Address]] **Address** __address__::
1805 The IPv4 address of this server, or a fully qualified domain name of
1806 this server that resolves to an IPv4 address. You can leave this
1807 unset, and Tor will try to guess your IPv4 address. This IPv4
1808 address is the one used to tell clients and other servers where to
1809 find your Tor server; it doesn't affect the address that your server
1810 binds to. To bind to a different address, use the ORPort and
1811 OutboundBindAddress options.
1813 [[AssumeReachable]] **AssumeReachable** **0**|**1**::
1814 This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1,
1815 don't do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor
1816 immediately. If **AuthoritativeDirectory** is also set, this option
1817 instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and list
1818 all connected servers as running.
1820 [[BridgeRelay]] **BridgeRelay** **0**|**1**::
1821 Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections
1822 from bridge users to the Tor network. It mainly causes Tor to publish a
1823 server descriptor to the bridge database, rather than
1824 to the public directory authorities.
1826 [[BridgeDistribution]] **BridgeDistribution** __string__::
1827 If set along with BridgeRelay, Tor will include a new line in its
1828 bridge descriptor which indicates to the BridgeDB service how it
1829 would like its bridge address to be given out. Set it to "none" if
1830 you want BridgeDB to avoid distributing your bridge address, or "any" to
1831 let BridgeDB decide. (Default: any)
1833 Note: as of Oct 2017, the BridgeDB part of this option is not yet
1834 implemented. Until BridgeDB is updated to obey this option, your
1835 bridge will make this request, but it will not (yet) be obeyed.
1837 [[ContactInfo]] **ContactInfo** __email_address__::
1838 Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
1839 can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
1840 something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
1841 descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
1842 spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact
1843 that it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this
1846 ContactInfo **must** be set to a working address if you run more than one
1847 relay or bridge. (Really, everybody running a relay or bridge should set
1851 [[ExitRelay]] **ExitRelay** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
1852 Tells Tor whether to run as an exit relay. If Tor is running as a
1853 non-bridge server, and ExitRelay is set to 1, then Tor allows traffic to
1854 exit according to the ExitPolicy option (or the default ExitPolicy if
1855 none is specified). +
1857 If ExitRelay is set to 0, no traffic is allowed to
1858 exit, and the ExitPolicy option is ignored. +
1860 If ExitRelay is set to "auto", then Tor behaves as if it were set to 1, but
1861 warns the user if this would cause traffic to exit. In a future version,
1862 the default value will be 0. (Default: auto)
1864 [[ExitPolicy]] **ExitPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
1865 Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
1866 "**accept[6]**|**reject[6]** __ADDR__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]". If /__MASK__ is
1867 omitted then this policy just applies to the host given. Instead of giving
1868 a host or network you can also use "\*" to denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0
1869 and ::/0), or \*4 to denote all IPv4 addresses, and \*6 to denote all IPv6
1871 __PORT__ can be a single port number, an interval of ports
1872 "__FROM_PORT__-__TO_PORT__", or "\*". If __PORT__ is omitted, that means
1875 For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:\*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:\*,accept \*:\*" would
1876 reject any IPv4 traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and accept
1877 any other IPv4 or IPv6 traffic. +
1879 Tor also allows IPv6 exit policy entries. For instance, "reject6 [FC00::]/7:\*"
1880 rejects all destinations that share 7 most significant bit prefix with
1881 address FC00::. Respectively, "accept6 [C000::]/3:\*" accepts all destinations
1882 that share 3 most significant bit prefix with address C000::. +
1884 accept6 and reject6 only produce IPv6 exit policy entries. Using an IPv4
1885 address with accept6 or reject6 is ignored and generates a warning.
1886 accept/reject allows either IPv4 or IPv6 addresses. Use \*4 as an IPv4
1887 wildcard address, and \*6 as an IPv6 wildcard address. accept/reject *
1888 expands to matching IPv4 and IPv6 wildcard address rules. +
1890 To specify all IPv4 and IPv6 internal and link-local networks (including
1891 0.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8,
1892 172.16.0.0/12, [::]/8, [FC00::]/7, [FE80::]/10, [FEC0::]/10, [FF00::]/8,
1893 and [::]/127), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address.
1894 ("private" always produces rules for IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, even when
1895 used with accept6/reject6.) +
1897 Private addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your exit
1898 policy), along with any configured primary public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
1899 These private addresses are rejected unless you set the
1900 ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option to 0. For example, once you've done
1901 that, you could allow HTTP to 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to
1902 internal networks with "accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:\*", though that
1903 may also allow connections to your own computer that are addressed to its
1904 public (external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more details
1905 about internal and reserved IP address space. See
1906 ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces if you want to block every address on the
1907 relay, even those that aren't advertised in the descriptor. +
1909 This directive can be specified multiple times so you don't have to put it
1912 Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If you
1913 want to allow the same ports on IPv4 and IPv6, write your rules using
1914 accept/reject \*. If you want to allow different ports on IPv4 and IPv6,
1915 write your IPv6 rules using accept6/reject6 \*6, and your IPv4 rules using
1916 accept/reject \*4. If you want to \_replace_ the default exit policy, end
1917 your exit policy with either a reject \*:* or an accept \*:*. Otherwise,
1918 you're \_augmenting_ (prepending to) the default exit policy. +
1920 If you want to use a reduced exit policy rather than the default exit
1921 policy, set "ReducedExitPolicy 1". If you want to _replace_ the default
1922 exit policy with your custom exit policy, end your exit policy with either
1923 a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending
1924 to) the default or reduced exit policy. +
1926 The default exit policy is:
1940 // Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page.
1941 [[ExitPolicyDefault]]::
1942 Since the default exit policy uses accept/reject *, it applies to both
1943 IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
1945 [[ExitPolicyRejectPrivate]] **ExitPolicyRejectPrivate** **0**|**1**::
1946 Reject all private (local) networks, along with the relay's advertised
1947 public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, at the beginning of your exit policy.
1948 See above entry on ExitPolicy.
1951 [[ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces]] **ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces** **0**|**1**::
1952 Reject all IPv4 and IPv6 addresses that the relay knows about, at the
1953 beginning of your exit policy. This includes any OutboundBindAddress, the
1954 bind addresses of any port options, such as ControlPort or DNSPort, and any
1955 public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses on any interface on the relay. (If IPv6Exit
1956 is not set, all IPv6 addresses will be rejected anyway.)
1957 See above entry on ExitPolicy.
1958 This option is off by default, because it lists all public relay IP
1959 addresses in the ExitPolicy, even those relay operators might prefer not
1963 [[ReducedExitPolicy]] **ReducedExitPolicy** **0**|**1**::
1964 If set, use a reduced exit policy rather than the default one. +
1966 The reduced exit policy is an alternative to the default exit policy. It
1967 allows as many Internet services as possible while still blocking the
1968 majority of TCP ports. Currently, the policy allows approximately 65 ports.
1969 This reduces the odds that your node will be used for peer-to-peer
1972 The reduced exit policy is:
2056 [[IPv6Exit]] **IPv6Exit** **0**|**1**::
2057 If set, and we are an exit node, allow clients to use us for IPv6
2058 traffic. (Default: 0)
2060 [[MaxOnionQueueDelay]] **MaxOnionQueueDelay** __NUM__ [**msec**|**second**]::
2061 If we have more onionskins queued for processing than we can process in
2062 this amount of time, reject new ones. (Default: 1750 msec)
2064 [[MyFamily]] **MyFamily** __fingerprint__,__fingerprint__,...::
2065 Declare that this Tor relay is controlled or administered by a group or
2066 organization identical or similar to that of the other relays, defined by
2067 their (possibly $-prefixed) identity fingerprints.
2068 This option can be repeated many times, for
2069 convenience in defining large families: all fingerprints in all MyFamily
2070 lines are merged into one list.
2071 When two relays both declare that they are in the
2072 same \'family', Tor clients will not use them in the same circuit. (Each
2073 relay only needs to list the other servers in its family; it doesn't need to
2074 list itself, but it won't hurt if it does.) Do not list any bridge relay as it would
2075 compromise its concealment. +
2077 When listing a node, it's better to list it by fingerprint than by
2078 nickname: fingerprints are more reliable. +
2080 If you run more than one relay, the MyFamily option on each relay
2081 **must** list all other relays, as described above.
2083 [[Nickname]] **Nickname** __name__::
2084 Set the server's nickname to \'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19
2085 characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].
2086 If not set, **Unnamed** will be used. Relays can always be uniquely identified
2087 by their identity fingerprints.
2089 [[NumCPUs]] **NumCPUs** __num__::
2090 How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins and other
2091 parallelizable operations. If this is set to 0, Tor will try to detect
2092 how many CPUs you have, defaulting to 1 if it can't tell. (Default: 0)
2094 [[ORPort]] **ORPort** \['address':]__PORT__|**auto** [_flags_]::
2095 Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and
2096 servers. This option is required to be a Tor server.
2097 Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. Set it to 0 to not
2098 run an ORPort at all. This option can occur more than once. (Default: 0) +
2100 Tor recognizes these flags on each ORPort:
2102 By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If
2103 NoAdvertise is specified, we don't advertise, but listen anyway. This
2104 can be useful if the port everybody will be connecting to (for
2105 example, one that's opened on our firewall) is somewhere else.
2107 By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If
2108 NoListen is specified, we don't bind, but advertise anyway. This
2109 can be useful if something else (for example, a firewall's port
2110 forwarding configuration) is causing connections to reach us.
2112 If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6
2113 address, only listen to the IPv4 address.
2115 If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6
2116 address, only listen to the IPv6 address.
2118 // Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page.
2119 [[ORPortFlagsExclusive]]::
2120 For obvious reasons, NoAdvertise and NoListen are mutually exclusive, and
2121 IPv4Only and IPv6Only are mutually exclusive.
2123 [[PublishServerDescriptor]] **PublishServerDescriptor** **0**|**1**|**v3**|**bridge**,**...**::
2124 This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish when acting as
2126 choose multiple arguments, separated by commas. +
2128 If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its
2129 descriptors to any directories. (This is useful if you're testing
2130 out your server, or if you're using a Tor controller that handles
2131 directory publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its
2132 descriptors of all type(s) specified. The default is "1", which
2133 means "if running as a relay or bridge, publish descriptors to the
2134 appropriate authorities". Other possibilities are "v3", meaning
2135 "publish as if you're a relay", and "bridge", meaning "publish as
2136 if you're a bridge".
2138 [[ShutdownWaitLength]] **ShutdownWaitLength** __NUM__::
2139 When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down:
2140 we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After **NUM**
2141 seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immediately.
2142 (Default: 30 seconds)
2144 [[SSLKeyLifetime]] **SSLKeyLifetime** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
2145 When creating a link certificate for our outermost SSL handshake,
2146 set its lifetime to this amount of time. If set to 0, Tor will choose
2147 some reasonable random defaults. (Default: 0)
2149 [[HeartbeatPeriod]] **HeartbeatPeriod** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
2150 Log a heartbeat message every **HeartbeatPeriod** seconds. This is
2151 a log level __notice__ message, designed to let you know your Tor
2152 server is still alive and doing useful things. Settings this
2153 to 0 will disable the heartbeat. Otherwise, it must be at least 30
2154 minutes. (Default: 6 hours)
2156 [[MainloopStats]] **MainloopStats** **0**|**1**::
2157 Log main loop statistics every **HeartbeatPeriod** seconds. This is a log
2158 level __notice__ message designed to help developers instrumenting Tor's
2159 main event loop. (Default: 0)
2161 [[AccountingMax]] **AccountingMax** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
2162 Limits the max number of bytes sent and received within a set time period
2163 using a given calculation rule (see: AccountingStart, AccountingRule).
2164 Useful if you need to stay under a specific bandwidth. By default, the
2165 number used for calculation is the max of either the bytes sent or
2166 received. For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 GByte, a server
2167 could send 900 MBytes and receive 800 MBytes and continue running.
2168 It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 GByte. This can
2169 be changed to use the sum of the both bytes received and sent by setting
2170 the AccountingRule option to "sum" (total bandwidth in/out). When the
2171 number of bytes remaining gets low, Tor will stop accepting new connections
2172 and circuits. When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate
2173 until some time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers
2174 from waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point
2175 in each period before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues,
2176 enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since
2177 it provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some
2178 of the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are
2181 [[AccountingRule]] **AccountingRule** **sum**|**max**|**in**|**out**::
2182 How we determine when our AccountingMax has been reached (when we
2183 should hibernate) during a time interval. Set to "max" to calculate
2184 using the higher of either the sent or received bytes (this is the
2185 default functionality). Set to "sum" to calculate using the sent
2186 plus received bytes. Set to "in" to calculate using only the
2187 received bytes. Set to "out" to calculate using only the sent bytes.
2190 [[AccountingStart]] **AccountingStart** **day**|**week**|**month** [__day__] __HH:MM__::
2191 Specify how long accounting periods last. If **month** is given,
2192 each accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ on the __dayth__ day of one
2193 month to the same day and time of the next. The relay will go at full speed,
2194 use all the quota you specify, then hibernate for the rest of the period. (The
2195 day must be between 1 and 28.) If **week** is given, each accounting period
2196 runs from the time __HH:MM__ of the __dayth__ day of one week to the same day
2197 and time of the next week, with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If **day**
2198 is given, each accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ each day to the
2199 same time on the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time.
2200 (Default: "month 1 0:00")
2202 [[RefuseUnknownExits]] **RefuseUnknownExits** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
2203 Prevent nodes that don't appear in the consensus from exiting using this
2204 relay. If the option is 1, we always block exit attempts from such
2205 nodes; if it's 0, we never do, and if the option is "auto", then we do
2206 whatever the authorities suggest in the consensus (and block if the consensus
2207 is quiet on the issue). (Default: auto)
2209 [[ServerDNSResolvConfFile]] **ServerDNSResolvConfFile** __filename__::
2210 Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in
2211 __filename__. The file format is the same as the standard Unix
2212 "**resolv.conf**" file (7). This option, like all other ServerDNS options,
2213 only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients.
2214 (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.)
2216 [[ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig]] **ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig** **0**|**1**::
2217 If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems
2218 parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers.
2219 Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until
2220 it eventually succeeds. (Default: 1)
2222 [[ServerDNSSearchDomains]] **ServerDNSSearchDomains** **0**|**1**::
2223 If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain.
2224 For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in
2225 "example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be
2226 connected to "www.example.com". This option only affects name lookups that
2227 your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)
2229 [[ServerDNSDetectHijacking]] **ServerDNSDetectHijacking** **0**|**1**::
2230 When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine
2231 whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS
2232 requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to
2233 correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
2234 on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)
2236 [[ServerDNSTestAddresses]] **ServerDNSTestAddresses** __hostname__,__hostname__,__...__::
2237 When we're detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these __valid__ addresses
2238 aren't getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless,
2239 and we'll reset our exit policy to "reject \*:*". This option only affects
2240 name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default:
2241 "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org")
2243 [[ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames]] **ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames** **0**|**1**::
2244 When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames
2245 containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an
2246 exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve
2247 URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
2248 on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)
2250 [[BridgeRecordUsageByCountry]] **BridgeRecordUsageByCountry** **0**|**1**::
2251 When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have
2252 GeoIP data, Tor keeps a per-country count of how many client
2253 addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess
2254 which countries have blocked access to it. (Default: 1)
2256 [[ServerDNSRandomizeCase]] **ServerDNSRandomizeCase** **0**|**1**::
2257 When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in
2258 outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies.
2259 This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack.
2260 For more information, see "Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through
2261 0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects name lookups that your server
2262 does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)
2264 [[GeoIPFile]] **GeoIPFile** __filename__::
2265 A filename containing IPv4 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics.
2267 [[GeoIPv6File]] **GeoIPv6File** __filename__::
2268 A filename containing IPv6 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics.
2270 [[CellStatistics]] **CellStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2272 When this option is enabled, Tor collects statistics about cell
2273 processing (i.e. mean time a cell is spending in a queue, mean
2274 number of cells in a queue and mean number of processed cells per
2275 circuit) and writes them into disk every 24 hours. Onion router
2276 operators may use the statistics for performance monitoring.
2277 If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will published as part of
2278 extra-info document. (Default: 0)
2280 [[PaddingStatistics]] **PaddingStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2282 When this option is enabled, Tor collects statistics for padding cells
2283 sent and received by this relay, in addition to total cell counts.
2284 These statistics are rounded, and omitted if traffic is low. This
2285 information is important for load balancing decisions related to padding.
2286 If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will be published
2287 as a part of extra-info document. (Default: 1)
2289 [[DirReqStatistics]] **DirReqStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2290 Relays and bridges only.
2291 When this option is enabled, a Tor directory writes statistics on the
2292 number and response time of network status requests to disk every 24
2293 hours. Enables relay and bridge operators to monitor how much their
2294 server is being used by clients to learn about Tor network.
2295 If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will published as part of
2296 extra-info document. (Default: 1)
2298 [[EntryStatistics]] **EntryStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2300 When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of
2301 directly connecting clients to disk every 24 hours. Enables relay
2302 operators to monitor how much inbound traffic that originates from
2303 Tor clients passes through their server to go further down the
2304 Tor network. If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will be published
2305 as part of extra-info document. (Default: 0)
2307 [[ExitPortStatistics]] **ExitPortStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2309 When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of
2310 relayed bytes and opened stream per exit port to disk every 24 hours.
2311 Enables exit relay operators to measure and monitor amounts of traffic
2312 that leaves Tor network through their exit node. If ExtraInfoStatistics
2313 is enabled, it will be published as part of extra-info document.
2316 [[ConnDirectionStatistics]] **ConnDirectionStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2318 When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the amounts of
2319 traffic it passes between itself and other relays to disk every 24
2320 hours. Enables relay operators to monitor how much their relay is
2321 being used as middle node in the circuit. If ExtraInfoStatistics is
2322 enabled, it will be published as part of extra-info document.
2325 [[HiddenServiceStatistics]] **HiddenServiceStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2327 When this option is enabled, a Tor relay writes obfuscated
2328 statistics on its role as hidden-service directory, introduction
2329 point, or rendezvous point to disk every 24 hours. If
2330 ExtraInfoStatistics is also enabled, these statistics are further
2331 published to the directory authorities. (Default: 1)
2333 [[ExtraInfoStatistics]] **ExtraInfoStatistics** **0**|**1**::
2334 When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously gathered statistics in
2335 its extra-info documents that it uploads to the directory authorities.
2338 [[ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses]] **ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses** **0**|**1**::
2339 When this option is enabled, Tor will connect to relays on localhost,
2340 RFC1918 addresses, and so on. In particular, Tor will make direct OR
2341 connections, and Tor routers allow EXTEND requests, to these private
2342 addresses. (Tor will always allow connections to bridges, proxies, and
2343 pluggable transports configured on private addresses.) Enabling this
2344 option can create security issues; you should probably leave it off.
2347 [[MaxMemInQueues]] **MaxMemInQueues** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**::
2348 This option configures a threshold above which Tor will assume that it
2349 needs to stop queueing or buffering data because it's about to run out of
2350 memory. If it hits this threshold, it will begin killing circuits until
2351 it has recovered at least 10% of this memory. Do not set this option too
2352 low, or your relay may be unreliable under load. This option only
2353 affects some queues, so the actual process size will be larger than
2354 this. If this option is set to 0, Tor will try to pick a reasonable
2355 default based on your system's physical memory. (Default: 0)
2357 [[DisableOOSCheck]] **DisableOOSCheck** **0**|**1**::
2358 This option disables the code that closes connections when Tor notices
2359 that it is running low on sockets. Right now, it is on by default,
2360 since the existing out-of-sockets mechanism tends to kill OR connections
2361 more than it should. (Default: 1)
2363 [[SigningKeyLifetime]] **SigningKeyLifetime** __N__ **days**|**weeks**|**months**::
2364 For how long should each Ed25519 signing key be valid? Tor uses a
2365 permanent master identity key that can be kept offline, and periodically
2366 generates new "signing" keys that it uses online. This option
2367 configures their lifetime.
2370 [[OfflineMasterKey]] **OfflineMasterKey** **0**|**1**::
2371 If non-zero, the Tor relay will never generate or load its master secret
2372 key. Instead, you'll have to use "tor --keygen" to manage the permanent
2373 ed25519 master identity key, as well as the corresponding temporary
2374 signing keys and certificates. (Default: 0)
2376 [[KeyDirectory]] **KeyDirectory** __DIR__::
2377 Store secret keys in DIR. Can not be changed while tor is
2379 (Default: the "keys" subdirectory of DataDirectory.)
2381 [[KeyDirectoryGroupReadable]] **KeyDirectoryGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
2382 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
2383 KeywDirectory. If the option is set to 1, make the KeyDirectory readable
2384 by the default GID. (Default: 0)
2386 [[RephistTrackTime]] **RephistTrackTime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
2387 Tells an authority, or other node tracking node reliability and history,
2388 that fine-grained information about nodes can be discarded when it hasn't
2389 changed for a given amount of time. (Default: 24 hours)
2392 DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS
2393 ------------------------
2395 The following options are useful only for directory servers. (Relays with
2396 enough bandwidth automatically become directory servers; see DirCache for
2399 [[DirPortFrontPage]] **DirPortFrontPage** __FILENAME__::
2400 When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on
2401 the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing
2402 to set up a separate webserver. There's a sample disclaimer in
2403 contrib/operator-tools/tor-exit-notice.html.
2405 [[DirPort]] **DirPort** \['address':]__PORT__|**auto** [_flags_]::
2406 If this option is nonzero, advertise the directory service on this port.
2407 Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This option can occur
2408 more than once, but only one advertised DirPort is supported: all
2409 but one DirPort must have the **NoAdvertise** flag set. (Default: 0) +
2411 The same flags are supported here as are supported by ORPort.
2413 [[DirPolicy]] **DirPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
2414 Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
2415 directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above,
2416 except that port specifiers are ignored. Any address not matched by
2417 some entry in the policy is accepted.
2419 [[DirCache]] **DirCache** **0**|**1**::
2420 When this option is set, Tor caches all current directory documents except
2421 extra info documents, and accepts client requests for them. If
2422 **DownloadExtraInfo** is set, cached extra info documents are also cached.
2423 Setting **DirPort** is not required for **DirCache**, because clients
2424 connect via the ORPort by default. Setting either DirPort or BridgeRelay
2425 and setting DirCache to 0 is not supported. (Default: 1)
2427 [[MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs]] **MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
2428 When this option is nonzero, Tor caches will not try to generate
2429 consensus diffs for any consensus older than this amount of time.
2430 If this option is set to zero, Tor will pick a reasonable default from
2431 the current networkstatus document. You should not set this
2432 option unless your cache is severely low on disk space or CPU.
2433 If you need to set it, keeping it above 3 or 4 hours will help clients
2434 much more than setting it to zero.
2438 DENIAL OF SERVICE MITIGATION OPTIONS
2439 ------------------------------------
2441 Tor has three built-in mitigation options that can be individually
2442 enabled/disabled and fine-tuned, but by default Tor directory authorities will
2443 define reasonable values for relays and no explicit configuration is required
2444 to make use of these protections. The mitigations take place at relays,
2447 1. If a single client address makes too many concurrent connections (this is
2448 configurable via DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount), hang up on further
2451 2. If a single client IP address (v4 or v6) makes circuits too quickly
2452 (default values are more than 3 per second, with an allowed burst of 90,
2453 see DoSCircuitCreationRate and DoSCircuitCreationBurst) while also having
2454 too many connections open (default is 3, see
2455 DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections), tor will refuse any new circuit (CREATE
2456 cells) for the next while (random value between 1 and 2 hours).
2458 3. If a client asks to establish a rendezvous point to you directly (ex:
2459 Tor2Web client), ignore the request.
2461 These defenses can be manually controlled by torrc options, but relays will
2462 also take guidance from consensus parameters using these same names, so there's
2463 no need to configure anything manually. In doubt, do not change those values.
2465 The values set by the consensus, if any, can be found here:
2466 https://consensus-health.torproject.org/#consensusparams
2468 If any of the DoS mitigations are enabled, a heartbeat message will appear in
2469 your log at NOTICE level which looks like:
2471 DoS mitigation since startup: 429042 circuits rejected, 17 marked addresses.
2472 2238 connections closed. 8052 single hop clients refused.
2474 The following options are useful only for a public relay. They control the
2475 Denial of Service mitigation subsystem described above.
2477 [[DoSCircuitCreationEnabled]] **DoSCircuitCreationEnabled** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
2479 Enable circuit creation DoS mitigation. If set to 1 (enabled), tor will
2480 cache client IPs along with statistics in order to detect circuit DoS
2481 attacks. If an address is positively identified, tor will activate
2482 defenses against the address. See the DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType option
2483 for more details. This is a client to relay detection only. "auto" means
2484 use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 0.
2487 [[DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections]] **DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections** __NUM__::
2489 Minimum threshold of concurrent connections before a client address can be
2490 flagged as executing a circuit creation DoS. In other words, once a client
2491 address reaches the circuit rate and has a minimum of NUM concurrent
2492 connections, a detection is positive. "0" means use the consensus
2493 parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 3.
2496 [[DoSCircuitCreationRate]] **DoSCircuitCreationRate** __NUM__::
2498 The allowed circuit creation rate per second applied per client IP
2499 address. If this option is 0, it obeys a consensus parameter. If not
2500 defined in the consensus, the value is 3.
2503 [[DoSCircuitCreationBurst]] **DoSCircuitCreationBurst** __NUM__::
2505 The allowed circuit creation burst per client IP address. If the circuit
2506 rate and the burst are reached, a client is marked as executing a circuit
2507 creation DoS. "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the
2508 consensus, the value is 90.
2511 [[DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType]] **DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType** __NUM__::
2513 This is the type of defense applied to a detected client address. The
2514 possible values are:
2518 2: Refuse circuit creation for the DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod period of time.
2520 "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 2.
2523 [[DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod]] **DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::
2525 The base time period in seconds that the DoS defense is activated for. The
2526 actual value is selected randomly for each activation from N+1 to 3/2 * N.
2527 "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus,
2528 the value is 3600 seconds (1 hour).
2531 [[DoSConnectionEnabled]] **DoSConnectionEnabled** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
2533 Enable the connection DoS mitigation. If set to 1 (enabled), for client
2534 address only, this allows tor to mitigate against large number of
2535 concurrent connections made by a single IP address. "auto" means use the
2536 consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 0.
2539 [[DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount]] **DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount** __NUM__::
2541 The maximum threshold of concurrent connection from a client IP address.
2542 Above this limit, a defense selected by DoSConnectionDefenseType is
2543 applied. "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the
2544 consensus, the value is 100.
2547 [[DoSConnectionDefenseType]] **DoSConnectionDefenseType** __NUM__::
2549 This is the type of defense applied to a detected client address for the
2550 connection mitigation. The possible values are:
2554 2: Immediately close new connections.
2556 "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 2.
2559 [[DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous]] **DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
2561 Refuse establishment of rendezvous points for single hop clients. In other
2562 words, if a client directly connects to the relay and sends an
2563 ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell, it is silently dropped. "auto" means use the
2564 consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 0.
2568 DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS
2569 ----------------------------------
2571 The following options enable operation as a directory authority, and
2572 control how Tor behaves as a directory authority. You should not need
2573 to adjust any of them if you're running a regular relay or exit server
2574 on the public Tor network.
2576 [[AuthoritativeDirectory]] **AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
2577 When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative directory
2578 server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its own list of
2579 good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients. Unless the clients
2580 already have you listed as a trusted directory, you probably do not want
2583 [[V3AuthoritativeDirectory]] **V3AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
2584 When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
2585 generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
2586 described in dir-spec.txt file of https://spec.torproject.org/[torspec]
2587 (for Tor clients and servers running at least 0.2.0.x).
2589 [[VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory]] **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
2590 When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on which versions of
2591 Tor are still believed safe for use to the published directory. Each
2592 version 1 authority is automatically a versioning authority; version 2
2593 authorities provide this service optionally. See **RecommendedVersions**,
2594 **RecommendedClientVersions**, and **RecommendedServerVersions**.
2596 [[RecommendedVersions]] **RecommendedVersions** __STRING__::
2597 STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
2598 safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which pull down the
2599 directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This option can appear
2600 multiple times: the values from multiple lines are spliced together. When
2601 this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should be set too.
2603 [[RecommendedPackages]] **RecommendedPackages** __PACKAGENAME__ __VERSION__ __URL__ __DIGESTTYPE__**=**__DIGEST__ ::
2604 Adds "package" line to the directory authority's vote. This information
2605 is used to vote on the correct URL and digest for the released versions
2606 of different Tor-related packages, so that the consensus can certify
2607 them. This line may appear any number of times.
2609 [[RecommendedClientVersions]] **RecommendedClientVersions** __STRING__::
2610 STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
2611 safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2
2612 directories. If this is not set then the value of **RecommendedVersions**
2613 is used. When this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should
2616 [[BridgeAuthoritativeDir]] **BridgeAuthoritativeDir** **0**|**1**::
2617 When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
2618 accepts and serves server descriptors, but it caches and serves the main
2619 networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0)
2621 [[MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2]] **MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
2622 Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as such by
2623 authoritative directories. (Default: 25 hours)
2625 [[RecommendedServerVersions]] **RecommendedServerVersions** __STRING__::
2626 STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
2627 safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2
2628 directories. If this is not set then the value of **RecommendedVersions**
2629 is used. When this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should
2632 [[ConsensusParams]] **ConsensusParams** __STRING__::
2633 STRING is a space-separated list of key=value pairs that Tor will include
2634 in the "params" line of its networkstatus vote.
2636 [[DirAllowPrivateAddresses]] **DirAllowPrivateAddresses** **0**|**1**::
2637 If set to 1, Tor will accept server descriptors with arbitrary "Address"
2638 elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private IP
2639 address, it will reject the server descriptor. Additionally, Tor
2640 will allow exit policies for private networks to fulfill Exit flag
2641 requirements. (Default: 0)
2643 [[AuthDirBadExit]] **AuthDirBadExit** __AddressPattern...__::
2644 Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
2645 will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority
2646 publishes, if **AuthDirListBadExits** is set. +
2648 (The address pattern syntax here and in the options below
2649 is the same as for exit policies, except that you don't need to say
2650 "accept" or "reject", and ports are not needed.)
2652 [[AuthDirInvalid]] **AuthDirInvalid** __AddressPattern...__::
2653 Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
2654 will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this
2655 authority publishes.
2657 [[AuthDirReject]] **AuthDirReject** __AddressPattern__...::
2658 Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
2659 will never be listed at all in any network status document that this
2660 authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor
2661 submitted for publication by this authority.
2663 [[AuthDirBadExitCCs]] **AuthDirBadExitCCs** __CC__,... +
2665 [[AuthDirInvalidCCs]] **AuthDirInvalidCCs** __CC__,... +
2667 [[AuthDirRejectCCs]] **AuthDirRejectCCs** __CC__,...::
2668 Authoritative directories only. These options contain a comma-separated
2669 list of country codes such that any server in one of those country codes
2670 will be marked as a bad exit/invalid for use, or rejected
2673 [[AuthDirListBadExits]] **AuthDirListBadExits** **0**|**1**::
2674 Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some
2675 opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not set this to
2676 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad; otherwise, you are
2677 effectively voting in favor of every declared exit as an exit.)
2679 [[AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr]] **AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr** __NUM__::
2680 Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of servers that we will
2681 list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to "0" for "no limit".
2684 [[AuthDirFastGuarantee]] **AuthDirFastGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
2685 Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, always vote the
2686 Fast flag for any relay advertising this amount of capacity or
2687 more. (Default: 100 KBytes)
2689 [[AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee]] **AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
2690 Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, this advertised capacity
2691 or more is always sufficient to satisfy the bandwidth requirement
2692 for the Guard flag. (Default: 2 MBytes)
2694 [[AuthDirPinKeys]] **AuthDirPinKeys** **0**|**1**::
2695 Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, do not allow any relay to
2696 publish a descriptor if any other relay has reserved its <Ed25519,RSA>
2697 identity keypair. In all cases, Tor records every keypair it accepts
2698 in a journal if it is new, or if it differs from the most recently
2699 accepted pinning for one of the keys it contains. (Default: 1)
2701 [[AuthDirSharedRandomness]] **AuthDirSharedRandomness** **0**|**1**::
2702 Authoritative directories only. Switch for the shared random protocol.
2703 If zero, the authority won't participate in the protocol. If non-zero
2704 (default), the flag "shared-rand-participate" is added to the authority
2705 vote indicating participation in the protocol. (Default: 1)
2707 [[AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys]] **AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys** **0**|**1**::
2708 Authoritative directories only. If this option is set to 0, then we treat
2709 relays as "Running" if their RSA key is correct when we probe them,
2710 regardless of their Ed25519 key. We should only ever set this option to 0
2711 if there is some major bug in Ed25519 link authentication that causes us
2712 to label all the relays as not Running. (Default: 1)
2714 [[BridgePassword]] **BridgePassword** __Password__::
2715 If set, contains an HTTP authenticator that tells a bridge authority to
2716 serve all requested bridge information. Used by the (only partially
2717 implemented) "bridge community" design, where a community of bridge
2718 relay operators all use an alternate bridge directory authority,
2719 and their target user audience can periodically fetch the list of
2720 available community bridges to stay up-to-date. (Default: not set)
2722 [[V3AuthVotingInterval]] **V3AuthVotingInterval** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
2723 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred voting
2724 interval. Note that voting will __actually__ happen at an interval chosen
2725 by consensus from all the authorities' preferred intervals. This time
2726 SHOULD divide evenly into a day. (Default: 1 hour)
2728 [[V3AuthVoteDelay]] **V3AuthVoteDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
2729 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred delay
2730 between publishing its vote and assuming it has all the votes from all the
2731 other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server's
2732 preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes)
2734 [[V3AuthDistDelay]] **V3AuthDistDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
2735 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred delay
2736 between publishing its consensus and signature and assuming it has all the
2737 signatures from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used
2738 is not the server's preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences.
2739 (Default: 5 minutes)
2741 [[V3AuthNIntervalsValid]] **V3AuthNIntervalsValid** __NUM__::
2742 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number of VotingIntervals
2743 for which each consensus should be valid for. Choosing high numbers
2744 increases network partitioning risks; choosing low numbers increases
2745 directory traffic. Note that the actual number of intervals used is not the
2746 server's preferred number, but the consensus of all preferences. Must be at
2747 least 2. (Default: 3)
2749 [[V3BandwidthsFile]] **V3BandwidthsFile** __FILENAME__::
2750 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the location of the
2751 bandwidth-authority generated file storing information on relays' measured
2752 bandwidth capacities. (Default: unset)
2754 [[V3AuthUseLegacyKey]] **V3AuthUseLegacyKey** **0**|**1**::
2755 If set, the directory authority will sign consensuses not only with its
2756 own signing key, but also with a "legacy" key and certificate with a
2757 different identity. This feature is used to migrate directory authority
2758 keys in the event of a compromise. (Default: 0)
2760 [[AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity]] **AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity** **0**|**1**::
2761 Authoritative directories only. When set to 0, OR ports with an
2762 IPv6 address are not included in the authority's votes. When set to 1,
2763 IPv6 OR ports are tested for reachability like IPv4 OR ports. If the
2764 reachability test succeeds, the authority votes for the IPv6 ORPort, and
2765 votes Running for the relay. If the reachability test fails, the authority
2766 does not vote for the IPv6 ORPort, and does not vote Running (Default: 0) +
2768 The content of the consensus depends on the number of voting authorities
2769 that set AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity:
2771 If no authorities set AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity 1, there will be no
2772 IPv6 ORPorts in the consensus.
2774 If a minority of authorities set AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity 1,
2775 unreachable IPv6 ORPorts will be removed from the consensus. But the
2776 majority of IPv4-only authorities will still vote the relay as Running.
2777 Reachable IPv6 ORPort lines will be included in the consensus
2779 If a majority of voting authorities set AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity 1,
2780 relays with unreachable IPv6 ORPorts will not be listed as Running.
2781 Reachable IPv6 ORPort lines will be included in the consensus
2782 (To ensure that any valid majority will vote relays with unreachable
2783 IPv6 ORPorts not Running, 75% of authorities must set
2784 AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity 1.)
2786 [[MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised]] **MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised** __N__::
2787 A total value, in abstract bandwidth units, describing how much
2788 measured total bandwidth an authority should have observed on the network
2789 before it will treat advertised bandwidths as wholly
2790 unreliable. (Default: 500)
2792 HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS
2793 ----------------------
2795 The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
2797 [[HiddenServiceDir]] **HiddenServiceDir** __DIRECTORY__::
2798 Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden service
2799 must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple times to
2800 specify multiple services. If DIRECTORY does not exist, Tor will create it.
2801 (Note: in current versions of Tor, if DIRECTORY is a relative path,
2802 it will be relative to the current
2803 working directory of Tor instance, not to its DataDirectory. Do not
2804 rely on this behavior; it is not guaranteed to remain the same in future
2807 [[HiddenServicePort]] **HiddenServicePort** __VIRTPORT__ [__TARGET__]::
2808 Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this
2809 option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most
2810 recent HiddenServiceDir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to
2811 the same port on 127.0.0.1 over TCP. You may override the target port,
2812 address, or both by specifying a target of addr, port, addr:port, or
2813 **unix:**__path__. (You can specify an IPv6 target as [addr]:port. Unix
2814 paths may be quoted, and may use standard C escapes.)
2815 You may also have multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user
2816 connects to that VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be
2819 [[PublishHidServDescriptors]] **PublishHidServDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
2820 If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won't
2821 advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful if
2822 you're using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you.
2825 [[HiddenServiceVersion]] **HiddenServiceVersion** **2**|**3**::
2826 A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden
2827 service. Currently, versions 2 and 3 are supported. (Default: 2)
2829 [[HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient]] **HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** __auth-type__ __client-name__,__client-name__,__...__::
2830 If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients
2831 only. The auth-type can either be \'basic' for a general-purpose
2832 authorization protocol or \'stealth' for a less scalable protocol that also
2833 hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are
2834 listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names
2835 are 1 to 16 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no
2836 spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible for
2837 clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data can be
2838 found in the hostname file. Clients need to put this authorization data in
2839 their configuration file using **HidServAuth**. This option is only for v2
2842 [[HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts]] **HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts** **0**|**1**::
2843 If set to 1, then connections to unrecognized ports do not cause the
2844 current hidden service to close rendezvous circuits. (Setting this to 0 is
2845 not an authorization mechanism; it is instead meant to be a mild
2846 inconvenience to port-scanners.) (Default: 0)
2848 [[HiddenServiceMaxStreams]] **HiddenServiceMaxStreams** __N__::
2849 The maximum number of simultaneous streams (connections) per rendezvous
2850 circuit. The maximum value allowed is 65535. (Setting this to 0 will allow
2851 an unlimited number of simultaneous streams.) (Default: 0)
2853 [[HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit]] **HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit** **0**|**1**::
2854 If set to 1, then exceeding **HiddenServiceMaxStreams** will cause the
2855 offending rendezvous circuit to be torn down, as opposed to stream creation
2856 requests that exceed the limit being silently ignored. (Default: 0)
2858 [[RendPostPeriod]] **RendPostPeriod** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
2859 Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous
2860 service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also
2861 uploaded whenever it changes. Minimum value allowed is 10 minutes and
2862 maximum is 3.5 days. This option is only for v2 services.
2865 [[HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable]] **HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
2866 If this option is set to 1, allow the filesystem group to read the
2867 hidden service directory and hostname file. If the option is set to 0,
2868 only owner is able to read the hidden service directory. (Default: 0)
2869 Has no effect on Windows.
2871 [[HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints]] **HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints** __NUM__::
2872 Number of introduction points the hidden service will have. You can't
2873 have more than 10 for v2 service and 20 for v3. (Default: 3)
2875 [[HiddenServiceSingleHopMode]] **HiddenServiceSingleHopMode** **0**|**1**::
2876 **Experimental - Non Anonymous** Hidden Services on a tor instance in
2877 HiddenServiceSingleHopMode make one-hop (direct) circuits between the onion
2878 service server, and the introduction and rendezvous points. (Onion service
2879 descriptors are still posted using 3-hop paths, to avoid onion service
2880 directories blocking the service.)
2881 This option makes every hidden service instance hosted by a tor instance a
2882 Single Onion Service. One-hop circuits make Single Onion servers easily
2883 locatable, but clients remain location-anonymous. However, the fact that a
2884 client is accessing a Single Onion rather than a Hidden Service may be
2885 statistically distinguishable. +
2887 **WARNING:** Once a hidden service directory has been used by a tor
2888 instance in HiddenServiceSingleHopMode, it can **NEVER** be used again for
2889 a hidden service. It is best practice to create a new hidden service
2890 directory, key, and address for each new Single Onion Service and Hidden
2891 Service. It is not possible to run Single Onion Services and Hidden
2892 Services from the same tor instance: they should be run on different
2893 servers with different IP addresses. +
2895 HiddenServiceSingleHopMode requires HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode to be set
2896 to 1. Since a Single Onion service is non-anonymous, you can not configure
2897 a SOCKSPort on a tor instance that is running in
2898 **HiddenServiceSingleHopMode**. Can not be changed while tor is running.
2901 [[HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode]] **HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode** **0**|**1**::
2902 Makes hidden services non-anonymous on this tor instance. Allows the
2903 non-anonymous HiddenServiceSingleHopMode. Enables direct connections in the
2904 server-side hidden service protocol. If you are using this option,
2905 you need to disable all client-side services on your Tor instance,
2906 including setting SOCKSPort to "0". Can not be changed while tor is
2907 running. (Default: 0)
2909 TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS
2910 -----------------------
2912 The following options are used for running a testing Tor network.
2914 [[TestingTorNetwork]] **TestingTorNetwork** **0**|**1**::
2915 If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below,
2916 so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if
2917 non-default set of DirAuthorities is set. Cannot be unset while Tor is
2921 ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1
2922 DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1
2923 EnforceDistinctSubnets 0
2925 AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0
2926 AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0
2927 ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityDownloadInitialDelay 0
2928 ClientBootstrapConsensusFallbackDownloadInitialDelay 0
2929 ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyDownloadInitialDelay 0
2930 ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0
2931 ClientRejectInternalAddresses 0
2932 CountPrivateBandwidth 1
2933 ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0
2934 ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses 1
2935 V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes
2936 V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds
2937 V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds
2938 MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 0 seconds
2939 TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes
2940 TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds
2941 TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds
2942 TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes
2943 TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes
2944 TestingServerDownloadInitialDelay 0
2945 TestingClientDownloadInitialDelay 0
2946 TestingServerConsensusDownloadInitialDelay 0
2947 TestingClientConsensusDownloadInitialDelay 0
2948 TestingBridgeDownloadInitialDelay 10
2949 TestingBridgeBootstrapDownloadInitialDelay 0
2950 TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest 5 seconds
2951 TestingDirConnectionMaxStall 30 seconds
2952 TestingEnableConnBwEvent 1
2953 TestingEnableCellStatsEvent 1
2955 [[TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval]] **TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
2956 Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before the first
2957 consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
2958 **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
2960 [[TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay]] **TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
2961 Like V3AuthVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before
2962 the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
2963 **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
2965 [[TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay]] **TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
2966 Like V3AuthDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before
2967 the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
2968 **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
2970 [[TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset]] **TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::
2971 Directory authorities offset voting start time by this much.
2972 Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)
2974 [[TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability]] **TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
2975 After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers
2976 are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this requires
2977 that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
2979 [[TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime]] **TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
2980 Clients try downloading server descriptors from directory caches after this
2981 time. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default:
2984 [[TestingMinFastFlagThreshold]] **TestingMinFastFlagThreshold** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
2985 Minimum value for the Fast flag. Overrides the ordinary minimum taken
2986 from the consensus when TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 0.)
2988 [[TestingServerDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingServerDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
2989 Initial delay in seconds for when servers should download things in general. Changing this
2990 requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)
2992 [[TestingClientDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingClientDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
2993 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download things in general. Changing this
2994 requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)
2996 [[TestingServerConsensusDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingServerConsensusDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
2997 Initial delay in seconds for when servers should download consensuses. Changing this
2998 requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)
3000 [[TestingClientConsensusDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingClientConsensusDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
3001 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download consensuses. Changing this
3002 requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)
3004 [[TestingBridgeDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingBridgeDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
3005 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download each bridge descriptor when they
3006 know that one or more of their configured bridges are running. Changing
3007 this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 10800)
3009 [[TestingBridgeBootstrapDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingBridgeBootstrapDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
3010 Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download each bridge descriptor when they
3011 have just started, or when they can not contact any of their bridges.
3012 Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)
3014 [[TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest]] **TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**::
3015 When directory clients have only a few descriptors to request, they batch
3016 them until they have more, or until this amount of time has passed.
3017 Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 10
3020 [[TestingDirConnectionMaxStall]] **TestingDirConnectionMaxStall** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**::
3021 Let a directory connection stall this long before expiring it.
3022 Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default:
3025 [[TestingDirAuthVoteExit]] **TestingDirAuthVoteExit** __node__,__node__,__...__::
3026 A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and
3027 address patterns of nodes to vote Exit for regardless of their
3028 uptime, bandwidth, or exit policy. See the **ExcludeNodes**
3029 option for more information on how to specify nodes. +
3031 In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
3032 has to be set. See the **ExcludeNodes** option for more
3033 information on how to specify nodes.
3035 [[TestingDirAuthVoteExitIsStrict]] **TestingDirAuthVoteExitIsStrict** **0**|**1** ::
3036 If True (1), a node will never receive the Exit flag unless it is specified
3037 in the **TestingDirAuthVoteExit** list, regardless of its uptime, bandwidth,
3040 In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
3043 [[TestingDirAuthVoteGuard]] **TestingDirAuthVoteGuard** __node__,__node__,__...__::
3044 A list of identity fingerprints and country codes and
3045 address patterns of nodes to vote Guard for regardless of their
3046 uptime and bandwidth. See the **ExcludeNodes** option for more
3047 information on how to specify nodes. +
3049 In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
3052 [[TestingDirAuthVoteGuardIsStrict]] **TestingDirAuthVoteGuardIsStrict** **0**|**1** ::
3053 If True (1), a node will never receive the Guard flag unless it is specified
3054 in the **TestingDirAuthVoteGuard** list, regardless of its uptime and bandwidth. +
3056 In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
3059 [[TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir]] **TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir** __node__,__node__,__...__::
3060 A list of identity fingerprints and country codes and
3061 address patterns of nodes to vote HSDir for regardless of their
3062 uptime and DirPort. See the **ExcludeNodes** option for more
3063 information on how to specify nodes. +
3065 In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
3068 [[TestingDirAuthVoteHSDirIsStrict]] **TestingDirAuthVoteHSDirIsStrict** **0**|**1** ::
3069 If True (1), a node will never receive the HSDir flag unless it is specified
3070 in the **TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir** list, regardless of its uptime and DirPort. +
3072 In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
3075 [[TestingEnableConnBwEvent]] **TestingEnableConnBwEvent** **0**|**1**::
3076 If this option is set, then Tor controllers may register for CONN_BW
3077 events. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set.
3080 [[TestingEnableCellStatsEvent]] **TestingEnableCellStatsEvent** **0**|**1**::
3081 If this option is set, then Tor controllers may register for CELL_STATS
3082 events. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set.
3085 [[TestingMinExitFlagThreshold]] **TestingMinExitFlagThreshold** __N__ **KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
3086 Sets a lower-bound for assigning an exit flag when running as an
3087 authority on a testing network. Overrides the usual default lower bound
3088 of 4 KB. (Default: 0)
3090 [[TestingLinkCertLifetime]] **TestingLinkCertLifetime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**|**months**::
3091 Overrides the default lifetime for the certificates used to authenticate
3092 our X509 link cert with our ed25519 signing key.
3095 [[TestingAuthKeyLifetime]] **TestingAuthKeyLifetime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**|**months**::
3096 Overrides the default lifetime for a signing Ed25519 TLS Link authentication
3100 [[TestingLinkKeySlop]] **TestingLinkKeySlop** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours** +
3102 [[TestingAuthKeySlop]] **TestingAuthKeySlop** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours** +
3104 [[TestingSigningKeySlop]] **TestingSigningKeySlop** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::
3105 How early before the official expiration of a an Ed25519 signing key do
3106 we replace it and issue a new key?
3107 (Default: 3 hours for link and auth; 1 day for signing.)
3109 NON-PERSISTENT OPTIONS
3110 ----------------------
3112 These options are not saved to the torrc file by the "SAVECONF" controller
3113 command. Other options of this type are documented in control-spec.txt,
3114 section 5.4. End-users should mostly ignore them.
3116 [[UnderscorePorts]] **\_\_ControlPort**, **\_\_DirPort**, **\_\_DNSPort**, **\_\_ExtORPort**, **\_\_NATDPort**, **\_\_ORPort**, **\_\_SocksPort**, **\_\_TransPort**::
3117 These underscore-prefixed options are variants of the regular Port
3118 options. They behave the same, except they are not saved to the
3119 torrc file by the controller's SAVECONF command.
3125 Tor catches the following signals:
3127 [[SIGTERM]] **SIGTERM**::
3128 Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit.
3130 [[SIGINT]] **SIGINT**::
3131 Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled
3132 slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting.
3133 (The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.)
3135 [[SIGHUP]] **SIGHUP**::
3136 The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing and
3137 reopening logs), and kill and restart its helper processes if applicable.
3139 [[SIGUSR1]] **SIGUSR1**::
3140 Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and throughput.
3142 [[SIGUSR2]] **SIGUSR2**::
3143 Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels by
3146 [[SIGCHLD]] **SIGCHLD**::
3147 Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited, so it
3150 [[SIGPIPE]] **SIGPIPE**::
3151 Tor catches this signal and ignores it.
3153 [[SIGXFSZ]] **SIGXFSZ**::
3154 If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it.
3159 **@CONFDIR@/torrc**::
3160 The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs.
3163 Fallback location for torrc, if @CONFDIR@/torrc is not found.
3165 **@LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/**::
3166 The tor process stores keys and other data here.
3169 __CacheDirectory__**/cached-certs**::
3170 This file holds downloaded directory key certificates that are used to
3171 verify authenticity of documents generated by Tor directory authorities.
3173 __CacheDirectory__**/cached-consensus** and/or **cached-microdesc-consensus**::
3174 The most recent consensus network status document we've downloaded.
3176 __CacheDirectory__**/cached-descriptors** and **cached-descriptors.new**::
3177 These files hold downloaded router statuses. Some routers may appear more
3178 than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is used. Lines
3179 beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about
3180 a given router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets
3181 too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-descriptors file.
3183 __CacheDirectory__**/cached-extrainfo** and **cached-extrainfo.new**::
3184 As "cached-descriptors", but holds optionally-downloaded "extra-info"
3185 documents. Relays use these documents to send inessential information
3186 about statistics, bandwidth history, and network health to the
3187 authorities. They aren't fetched by default; see the DownloadExtraInfo
3188 option for more info.
3190 __CacheDirectory__**/cached-microdescs** and **cached-microdescs.new**::
3191 These files hold downloaded microdescriptors. Lines beginning with
3192 @-signs are annotations that contain more information about a given
3193 router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets too
3194 large, all entries are merged into a new cached-microdescs file.
3196 __CacheDirectory__**/cached-routers** and **cached-routers.new**::
3197 Obsolete versions of cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new. When
3198 Tor can't find the newer files, it looks here instead.
3200 __DataDirectory__**/state**::
3201 A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are documented in
3202 the file. These include:
3203 - The current entry guards and their status.
3204 - The current bandwidth accounting values.
3205 - When the file was last written
3206 - What version of Tor generated the state file
3207 - A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the server
3210 __DataDirectory__**/sr-state**::
3211 Authority only. State file used to record information about the current
3212 status of the shared-random-value voting state.
3214 __CacheDirectory__**/diff-cache**::
3215 Directory cache only. Holds older consensuses, and diffs from older
3216 consensuses to the most recent consensus of each type, compressed
3217 in various ways. Each file contains a set of key-value arguments
3218 describing its contents, followed by a single NUL byte, followed by the
3221 __DataDirectory__**/bw_accounting**::
3222 Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period starts
3223 and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period). This file
3224 is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the \'state' file instead.
3226 __DataDirectory__**/control_auth_cookie**::
3227 Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be
3228 overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on startup. See
3229 control-spec.txt in https://spec.torproject.org/[torspec] for details.
3230 Only used when cookie authentication is enabled.
3232 __DataDirectory__**/lock**::
3233 This file is used to prevent two Tor instances from using same data
3234 directory. If access to this file is locked, data directory is already
3237 __DataDirectory__**/key-pinning-journal**::
3238 Used by authorities. A line-based file that records mappings between
3239 RSA1024 identity keys and Ed25519 identity keys. Authorities enforce
3240 these mappings, so that once a relay has picked an Ed25519 key, stealing
3241 or factoring the RSA1024 key will no longer let an attacker impersonate
3244 __KeyDirectory__**/authority_identity_key**::
3245 A v3 directory authority's master identity key, used to authenticate its
3246 signing key. Tor doesn't use this while it's running. The tor-gencert
3247 program uses this. If you're running an authority, you should keep this
3248 key offline, and not actually put it here.
3250 __KeyDirectory__**/authority_certificate**::
3251 A v3 directory authority's certificate, which authenticates the authority's
3252 current vote- and consensus-signing key using its master identity key.
3253 Only directory authorities use this file.
3255 __KeyDirectory__**/authority_signing_key**::
3256 A v3 directory authority's signing key, used to sign votes and consensuses.
3257 Only directory authorities use this file. Corresponds to the
3258 **authority_certificate** cert.
3260 __KeyDirectory__**/legacy_certificate**::
3261 As authority_certificate: used only when V3AuthUseLegacyKey is set.
3262 See documentation for V3AuthUseLegacyKey.
3264 __KeyDirectory__**/legacy_signing_key**::
3265 As authority_signing_key: used only when V3AuthUseLegacyKey is set.
3266 See documentation for V3AuthUseLegacyKey.
3268 __KeyDirectory__**/secret_id_key**::
3269 A relay's RSA1024 permanent identity key, including private and public
3270 components. Used to sign router descriptors, and to sign other keys.
3272 __KeyDirectory__**/ed25519_master_id_public_key**::
3273 The public part of a relay's Ed25519 permanent identity key.
3275 __KeyDirectory__**/ed25519_master_id_secret_key**::
3276 The private part of a relay's Ed25519 permanent identity key. This key
3277 is used to sign the medium-term ed25519 signing key. This file can be
3278 kept offline, or kept encrypted. If so, Tor will not be able to generate
3279 new signing keys itself; you'll need to use tor --keygen yourself to do
3282 __KeyDirectory__**/ed25519_signing_secret_key**::
3283 The private and public components of a relay's medium-term Ed25519 signing
3284 key. This key is authenticated by the Ed25519 master key, in turn
3285 authenticates other keys (and router descriptors).
3287 __KeyDirectory__**/ed25519_signing_cert**::
3288 The certificate which authenticates "ed25519_signing_secret_key" as
3289 having been signed by the Ed25519 master key.
3291 __KeyDirectory__**/secret_onion_key** and **secret_onion_key.old**::
3292 A relay's RSA1024 short-term onion key. Used to decrypt old-style ("TAP")
3293 circuit extension requests. The ".old" file holds the previously
3294 generated key, which the relay uses to handle any requests that were
3295 made by clients that didn't have the new one.
3297 __KeyDirectory__**/secret_onion_key_ntor** and **secret_onion_key_ntor.old**::
3298 A relay's Curve25519 short-term onion key. Used to handle modern ("ntor")
3299 circuit extension requests. The ".old" file holds the previously
3300 generated key, which the relay uses to handle any requests that were
3301 made by clients that didn't have the new one.
3303 __DataDirectory__**/fingerprint**::
3304 Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the server's identity key.
3306 __DataDirectory__**/hashed-fingerprint**::
3307 Only used by bridges. Holds the hashed fingerprint of the bridge's
3308 identity key. (That is, the hash of the hash of the identity key.)
3310 __DataDirectory__**/approved-routers**::
3311 Only used by authoritative directory servers. This file lists
3312 the status of routers by their identity fingerprint.
3313 Each line lists a status and a fingerprint separated by
3314 whitespace. See your **fingerprint** file in the __DataDirectory__ for an
3315 example line. If the status is **!reject** then descriptors from the
3316 given identity (fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is
3317 **!invalid** then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as
3318 not valid, that is, not recommended.
3320 __DataDirectory__**/v3-status-votes**::
3321 Only for v3 authoritative directory servers. This file contains
3322 status votes from all the authoritative directory servers.
3324 __CacheDirectory__**/unverified-consensus**::
3325 This file contains a network consensus document that has been downloaded,
3326 but which we didn't have the right certificates to check yet.
3328 __CacheDirectory__**/unverified-microdesc-consensus**::
3329 This file contains a microdescriptor-flavored network consensus document
3330 that has been downloaded, but which we didn't have the right certificates
3333 __DataDirectory__**/unparseable-desc**::
3334 Onion server descriptors that Tor was unable to parse are dumped to this
3335 file. Only used for debugging.
3337 __DataDirectory__**/router-stability**::
3338 Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements for
3339 router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a good idea of
3340 how to set their Stable flags.
3342 __DataDirectory__**/stats/dirreq-stats**::
3343 Only used by directory caches and authorities. This file is used to
3344 collect directory request statistics.
3346 __DataDirectory__**/stats/entry-stats**::
3347 Only used by servers. This file is used to collect incoming connection
3348 statistics by Tor entry nodes.
3350 __DataDirectory__**/stats/bridge-stats**::
3351 Only used by servers. This file is used to collect incoming connection
3352 statistics by Tor bridges.
3354 __DataDirectory__**/stats/exit-stats**::
3355 Only used by servers. This file is used to collect outgoing connection
3356 statistics by Tor exit routers.
3358 __DataDirectory__**/stats/buffer-stats**::
3359 Only used by servers. This file is used to collect buffer usage
3362 __DataDirectory__**/stats/conn-stats**::
3363 Only used by servers. This file is used to collect approximate connection
3364 history (number of active connections over time).
3366 __DataDirectory__**/stats/hidserv-stats**::
3367 Only used by servers. This file is used to collect approximate counts
3368 of what fraction of the traffic is hidden service rendezvous traffic, and
3369 approximately how many hidden services the relay has seen.
3371 __DataDirectory__**/networkstatus-bridges**::
3372 Only used by authoritative bridge directories. Contains information
3373 about bridges that have self-reported themselves to the bridge
3376 __DataDirectory__**/approved-routers**::
3377 Authorities only. This file is used to configure which relays are
3378 known to be valid, invalid, and so forth.
3380 __HiddenServiceDirectory__**/hostname**::
3381 The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service.
3382 If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file
3383 also contains authorization data for all clients.
3385 Note that clients will ignore any extra subdomains prepended to a hidden
3386 service hostname. So if you have "xyz.onion" as your hostname, you
3387 can tell clients to connect to "www.xyz.onion" or "irc.xyz.onion"
3388 for virtual-hosting purposes.
3390 __HiddenServiceDirectory__**/private_key**::
3391 The private key for this hidden service.
3393 __HiddenServiceDirectory__**/client_keys**::
3394 Authorization data for a hidden service that is only accessible by
3397 __HiddenServiceDirectory__**/onion_service_non_anonymous**::
3398 This file is present if a hidden service key was created in
3399 **HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode**.
3403 **torsocks**(1), **torify**(1) +
3405 **https://www.torproject.org/**
3407 **torspec: https://spec.torproject.org **
3412 Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them at https://trac.torproject.org/.
3416 Roger Dingledine [arma at mit.edu], Nick Mathewson [nickm at alum.mit.edu].