1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
174 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
176 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
184 ssl_undefined_function
,
185 ssl3_get_server_method
)
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
190 unsigned long alg_k
,Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
);
191 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
193 int new_state
,state
,skip
=0;
195 RAND_add(&Time
,sizeof(Time
),0);
199 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
201 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
202 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
204 /* init things to blank */
206 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) SSL_clear(s
);
210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
220 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
222 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
226 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
227 case SSL_ST_OK
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
230 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
232 if ((s
->version
>>8) != 3)
234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
237 s
->type
=SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
239 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
)
241 if ((buf
=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
)
246 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
))
254 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
262 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
)
264 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
265 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
267 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
,1)) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
269 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
270 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
271 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
273 else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
274 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
))
276 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
277 * client that doesn't support secure
280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
281 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
287 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
288 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
289 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
290 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
294 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
295 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
298 ret
=ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
299 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
300 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
301 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
304 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
307 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
311 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
312 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
313 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
316 ret
=ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
317 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
320 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
324 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
326 ret
=ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
327 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
331 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
332 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
334 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
338 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
341 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
345 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
347 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
348 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
349 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
350 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)
351 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
353 ret
=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
354 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
355 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
356 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
357 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
359 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
364 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
371 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
376 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
377 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
378 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
380 /* clear this, it may get reset by
381 * send_server_key_exchange */
382 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
)
383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
384 && !(alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
385 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
387 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
388 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
389 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
390 * be able to handle this) */
391 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
393 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=0;
396 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
397 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
399 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
401 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
402 * message only if the cipher suite is either
403 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
404 * server certificate contains the server's
405 * public key for key exchange.
407 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
408 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
409 * hint if provided */
410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
411 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
413 || (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
|SSL_kEDH
))
414 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
415 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
416 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
417 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
418 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
424 ret
=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
425 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
430 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
434 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
435 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
436 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
437 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
438 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
439 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
440 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
441 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
442 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
443 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
444 * and in RFC 2246): */
445 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
446 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
447 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
448 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
449 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
450 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
)
451 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
452 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
453 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
455 /* no cert request */
457 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=0;
458 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
462 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=1;
463 ret
=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
464 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
465 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
466 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
468 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
469 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
475 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
476 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
477 ret
=ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
478 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
479 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
480 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
484 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
486 /* This code originally checked to see if
487 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
488 * and then flushed. This caused problems
489 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
490 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
491 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
492 * still exist. So instead we just flush
496 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
497 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0)
502 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
504 s
->state
=s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
507 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
508 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
509 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
510 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
514 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
516 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
518 ret
=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
519 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
522 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
526 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
527 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
528 ret
=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
533 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
534 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
535 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
536 * message is not sent.
537 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
538 * the client uses its key from the certificate
541 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
549 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
552 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
553 * a client cert, it can be verified
554 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
555 * should be generalized. But it is next step
557 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
558 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
560 for (dgst_num
=0; dgst_num
<SSL_MAX_DIGEST
;dgst_num
++)
561 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
])
565 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]),&(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[offset
]));
566 dgst_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
577 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
578 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
580 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
581 ret
=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
582 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
584 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
588 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
589 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
590 ret
=ssl3_get_finished(s
,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
591 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
592 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
594 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
595 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
603 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
608 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
609 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
610 ret
=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
611 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
612 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
616 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
617 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
618 ret
=ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
619 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
620 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
626 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
627 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
629 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
630 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
631 { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
633 ret
=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
634 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
636 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
637 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
640 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
641 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
649 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
650 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
651 ret
=ssl3_send_finished(s
,
652 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
653 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
654 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
655 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
656 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
658 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
660 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL_ST_OK
;
665 /* clean a few things up */
666 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
668 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
671 /* remove buffering on output */
672 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
676 if (s
->new_session
== 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
678 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
679 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
683 ssl_update_cache(s
,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
685 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
687 s
->handshake_func
=ssl3_accept
;
689 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
,1);
697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
703 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
)
707 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
712 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
))
716 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
,1);
723 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
727 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
,ret
);
731 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
735 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
)
737 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
738 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
743 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
744 /* number of bytes to write */
749 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
750 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
753 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
758 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
759 * so permit appropriate message length */
760 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
766 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
767 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
768 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
)
770 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
771 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
772 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
773 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
775 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
777 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
778 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
786 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
788 int i
,j
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
789 unsigned int cookie_len
;
792 unsigned char *p
,*d
,*q
;
794 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
797 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
=NULL
;
799 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
800 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
801 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
802 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
805 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
807 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
810 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
811 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
812 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
813 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
814 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
817 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
819 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
821 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
822 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
823 s
->client_version
=(((int)p
[0])<<8)|(int)p
[1];
826 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
> s
->version
) ||
827 (s
->version
!= DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
< s
->version
))
829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
830 if ((s
->client_version
>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
)
832 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
833 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
835 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
839 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
840 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
841 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
843 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)
845 unsigned int session_length
, cookie_length
;
847 session_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
848 cookie_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1);
850 if (cookie_length
== 0)
854 /* load the client random */
855 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
,p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
858 /* get the session-id */
862 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
863 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
864 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
865 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
866 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
867 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
868 * an earlier library version)
870 if ((s
->new_session
&& (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
)))
872 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
877 i
=ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
879 { /* previous session */
886 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
893 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
899 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
900 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
901 * does not cause an overflow.
903 if ( cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
))
906 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
911 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
912 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) &&
915 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
917 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
)
919 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
922 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
924 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
927 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
929 else if ( memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
930 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) /* default verification */
932 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
934 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
945 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0))
947 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
948 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
954 /* not enough data */
955 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
959 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
,p
,i
,&(ciphers
))
966 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
967 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0))
970 id
=s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
973 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers
));
975 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++)
977 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,i
);
979 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
980 i
,sk_num(ciphers
),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
988 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
989 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
992 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1))
994 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
995 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
996 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
997 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
998 * enabled, though. */
999 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
1000 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0)
1002 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
1009 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1010 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1011 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1021 /* not enough data */
1022 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1029 if (p
[j
] == 0) break;
1036 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1043 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
)
1045 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
,&p
,d
,n
, &al
))
1047 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1052 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1057 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1058 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1059 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1060 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1064 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1065 pos
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1067 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1069 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1074 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
)
1076 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
=NULL
;
1078 s
->session
->master_key_length
=sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1079 if(s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1080 ciphers
, &pref_cipher
, s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
))
1083 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1084 s
->session
->verify_result
=X509_V_OK
;
1088 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1089 pref_cipher
=pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1090 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1092 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1097 s
->session
->cipher
=pref_cipher
;
1100 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1102 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1103 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1105 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1106 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1111 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1112 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1113 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1114 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=NULL
;
1115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1116 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1117 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1119 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1120 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1121 /* Can't disable compression */
1122 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1124 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1128 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1129 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++)
1131 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1132 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
)
1134 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1138 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1140 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1144 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1145 for (m
= 0; m
< i
; m
++)
1147 if (q
[m
] == comp_id
)
1152 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1159 else if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
1160 { /* See if we have a match */
1161 int m
,nn
,o
,v
,done
=0;
1163 nn
=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1164 for (m
=0; m
<nn
; m
++)
1166 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1179 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1184 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1185 * using compression.
1187 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1189 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1195 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1200 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1201 s
->session
->compress_meth
=0;
1203 s
->session
->compress_meth
=(comp
== NULL
)?0:comp
->id
;
1205 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1206 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1207 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1208 if (ciphers
== NULL
)
1210 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
1215 c
=ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,s
->session
->ciphers
,
1216 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1220 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1224 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=c
;
1228 /* Session-id reuse */
1229 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1230 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1231 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
=NULL
;
1232 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
=NULL
;
1234 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1236 sk
=s
->session
->ciphers
;
1237 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++)
1239 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
,i
);
1240 if (c
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_eNULL
)
1242 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1246 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=nc
;
1247 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1248 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=ec
;
1250 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1254 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1257 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1260 /* we now have the following setup.
1262 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1263 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1264 * compression - basically ignored right now
1265 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1266 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1267 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1268 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1275 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1278 if (ciphers
!= NULL
) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1282 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1285 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1288 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1292 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1294 buf
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1295 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1296 p
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1297 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1298 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1300 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1303 /* Do the message type and length last */
1306 *(p
++)=s
->version
>>8;
1307 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1310 memcpy(p
,s
->s3
->server_random
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1311 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1313 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1314 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1315 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1316 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1317 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1318 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1319 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1321 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1322 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1323 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1324 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1325 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1328 if (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1330 s
->session
->session_id_length
=0;
1332 sl
=s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1333 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
))
1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1339 memcpy(p
,s
->session
->session_id
,sl
);
1342 /* put the cipher */
1343 i
=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,p
);
1346 /* put the compression method */
1347 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1350 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1353 *(p
++)=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1355 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1356 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0)
1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1361 if ((p
= ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) == NULL
)
1363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1370 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1373 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1374 /* number of bytes to write */
1379 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1380 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1383 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1387 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
)
1389 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1392 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1397 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1398 /* number of bytes to write */
1403 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1404 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1407 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1413 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1420 EC_KEY
*ecdh
=NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1421 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1424 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1427 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1437 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1438 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
)
1440 type
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1445 r
[0]=r
[1]=r
[2]=r
[3]=NULL
;
1447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1448 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
)
1451 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1453 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1454 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1455 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1458 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1467 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1473 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
1477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1478 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
)
1481 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1482 dhp
=s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1483 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1484 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1487 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1492 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1499 if ((dh
=DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
)
1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1506 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1507 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1508 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
)))
1510 if(!DH_generate_key(dh
))
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1519 dh
->pub_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1520 dh
->priv_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1521 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1522 (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1535 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1537 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1539 ecdhp
=cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1540 if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1542 ecdhp
=s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1543 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1544 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1548 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1553 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
1555 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1560 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1566 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp
))
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1573 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
=ecdh
;
1574 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1575 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1576 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
))
1578 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
))
1580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1585 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1586 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1587 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
))
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1593 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1594 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163))
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1600 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1601 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1602 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1605 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1612 /* Encode the public key.
1613 * First check the size of encoding and
1614 * allocate memory accordingly.
1616 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1617 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1618 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1621 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1622 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
*sizeof(unsigned char));
1623 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1624 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
))
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1631 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1632 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1633 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1634 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1636 if (encodedlen
== 0)
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1642 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
); bn_ctx
=NULL
;
1644 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1645 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1646 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1647 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1652 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1653 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1661 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1663 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1665 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1666 n
+=2+strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1669 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1671 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1675 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1677 nr
[i
]=BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1681 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
1682 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
1684 if ((pkey
=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
,s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
))
1687 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1690 kn
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1698 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,n
+4+kn
))
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1703 d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1706 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1714 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1716 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1717 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1718 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1719 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1720 * the actual encoded point itself
1722 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1730 memcpy((unsigned char*)p
,
1731 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
,
1733 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1739 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1741 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1742 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1743 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
, strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
1744 p
+=strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1751 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1752 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1754 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1758 for (num
=2; num
> 0; num
--)
1760 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,(num
== 2)
1761 ?s
->ctx
->md5
:s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1762 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1763 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1764 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1765 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
,q
,
1766 (unsigned int *)&i
);
1770 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
1771 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0)
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_RSA
);
1781 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1782 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
1785 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
,EVP_dss1(), NULL
);
1786 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1787 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1788 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1789 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1790 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_DSA
);
1800 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1801 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
1803 /* let's do ECDSA */
1804 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL
);
1805 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1806 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1807 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1808 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1809 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_ECDSA
);
1820 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1821 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
1827 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
1830 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1836 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
1837 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1838 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1840 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1843 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1844 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1846 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1850 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
1852 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1854 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
=NULL
;
1858 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
)
1862 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4]);
1864 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1866 n
=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
,p
);
1875 sk
=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
1879 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++)
1881 name
=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
,i
);
1882 j
=i2d_X509_NAME(name
,NULL
);
1883 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,4+n
+j
+2))
1885 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
1888 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+n
]);
1889 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
1892 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
1899 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
1900 j
-=2; s2n(j
,d
); j
+=2;
1906 /* else no CA names */
1907 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+off
]);
1910 d
=(unsigned char *)buf
->data
;
1911 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
1914 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1919 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1920 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
1923 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1930 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
1933 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1934 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1939 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1943 unsigned long alg_k
;
1945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1947 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
1949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1955 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1957 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1958 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
1959 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
1960 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1961 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1964 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1965 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
1966 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
1967 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1971 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
1972 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1974 alg_k
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1977 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
1979 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1980 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
)
1982 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
1983 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
1984 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1985 * be sent already */
1988 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
1996 pkey
=s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
1997 if ( (pkey
== NULL
) ||
1998 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) ||
1999 (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
))
2001 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2008 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2009 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
2014 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
))
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2026 i
=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
,p
,p
,rsa
,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2030 if (i
!= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2032 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2033 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2036 if ((al
== -1) && !((p
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2038 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2039 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2040 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2041 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2042 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2044 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2045 if (!((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) &&
2046 (p
[0] == (s
->version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->version
& 0xff))))
2048 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2049 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2051 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2052 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2053 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2054 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2055 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2056 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2057 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2063 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2064 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2065 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2067 i
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2068 p
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2069 p
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2070 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
+2, i
-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2074 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2075 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2076 s
->session
->master_key
,
2078 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2082 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2083 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEDH
|SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
))
2088 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
))
2090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2100 if (n
== 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2102 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS
);
2108 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
)
2110 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2115 dh_srvr
=s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2118 pub
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
);
2121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2125 i
=DH_compute_key(p
,pub
,dh_srvr
);
2129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2133 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2138 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2139 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2140 s
->session
->master_key
,p
,i
);
2141 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2146 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
2148 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2149 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2150 krb5_data authenticator
;
2152 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2153 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2154 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2155 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2156 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2157 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2159 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2160 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2162 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2164 if (!kssl_ctx
) kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2167 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2169 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ 6))
2171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2172 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2176 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2177 p
+=enc_ticket
.length
;
2180 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2182 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6))
2184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2185 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2189 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2190 p
+=authenticator
.length
;
2194 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2197 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2200 if(enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
)
2202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2203 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2207 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2208 enc_pms
.length
+ 6))
2210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2211 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2215 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2219 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2220 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2222 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2223 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2229 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2230 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2232 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2233 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0)
2236 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2237 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2239 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2240 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2246 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0)
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2253 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2254 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2256 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2260 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2262 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
,enc
,NULL
,kssl_ctx
->key
,iv
))
2264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2265 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2268 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
,&outl
,
2269 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2272 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2275 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2278 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2281 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
,&(pms
[outl
]),&padl
))
2283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2284 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2288 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2291 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2294 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2296 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2297 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2298 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2299 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2300 * the protocol version.
2301 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2302 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2304 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
))
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2307 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2312 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2314 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2315 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2316 s
->session
->master_key
, pms
, outl
);
2318 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
)
2320 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2321 if ( len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
)
2323 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2324 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
,kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,len
);
2329 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2330 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2331 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2332 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2336 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2339 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEECDH
|SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2344 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2345 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2347 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2348 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
)
2350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2351 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2355 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2356 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2358 /* use the certificate */
2359 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2363 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2364 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2366 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2369 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2370 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2372 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2373 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
))
2375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2380 /* Let's get client's public key */
2381 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
)
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2384 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2390 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2392 if (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
2394 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2398 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2400 (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
))
2402 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2403 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2404 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2405 * never executed. When that support is
2406 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2407 * received in the certificate is
2408 * authorized for key agreement.
2409 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2410 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2413 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2415 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2419 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2420 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) == 0)
2422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2426 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2430 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2431 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2433 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2436 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2440 /* Get encoded point length */
2443 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
,
2444 clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0)
2446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2450 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2451 * currently, so set it to the start
2453 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2456 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2457 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2458 if (field_size
<= 0)
2460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2464 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, NULL
);
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2472 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2473 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2474 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2475 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2476 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2477 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2479 /* Compute the master secret */
2480 s
->session
->master_key_length
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
-> \
2481 generate_master_secret(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, p
, i
);
2483 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2489 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)
2491 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2492 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
*2+4];
2493 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2495 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1];
2497 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2503 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2506 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
)
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2509 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2512 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
)
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2515 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2519 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2520 * string for the callback */
2521 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2522 memset(tmp_id
+i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1-i
);
2523 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2524 psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2525 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1);
2527 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
)
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2530 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2533 else if (psk_len
== 0)
2535 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2537 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2538 al
=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2542 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2543 pre_ms_len
=2+psk_len
+2+psk_len
;
2545 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+psk_len
+4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2547 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2551 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2552 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2553 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup((char *)p
);
2554 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
)
2556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2557 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2561 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2562 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2563 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2564 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2565 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2568 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2572 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2573 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2574 s
->session
->master_key
, psk_or_pre_ms
, pre_ms_len
);
2577 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2583 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
)
2586 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2587 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2588 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2589 size_t outlen
=32, inlen
;
2590 unsigned long alg_a
;
2592 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2593 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2594 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST94
)
2595 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST94
].privatekey
;
2596 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
)
2597 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2599 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
,NULL
);
2600 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2601 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2602 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2603 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2604 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2605 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2606 if (client_pub_pkey
)
2608 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2611 /* Decrypt session key */
2612 if ((*p
!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)))
2614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2622 else if (p
[1] < 0x80)
2629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2632 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
,premaster_secret
,&outlen
,start
,inlen
) <=0)
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2638 /* Generate master secret */
2639 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2640 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2641 s
->session
->master_key
,premaster_secret
,32);
2642 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2643 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2648 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
2649 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2657 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2659 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2665 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2666 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2670 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2671 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2672 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2673 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2674 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2679 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2681 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2688 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2689 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2690 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2695 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2697 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
2699 peer
=s
->session
->peer
;
2700 pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2701 type
=X509_certificate_type(peer
,pkey
);
2709 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
)
2711 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2712 if ((peer
!= NULL
) && (type
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2714 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
2725 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2729 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2732 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2736 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
2739 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2743 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2744 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2745 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2746 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2747 * signature without length field */
2748 if (n
==64 && (pkey
->type
==NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
2749 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) )
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2760 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2764 j
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2765 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0))
2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
2768 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2773 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2775 i
=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
2776 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
2780 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
2786 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
2793 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2794 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2796 j
=DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
2797 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
2798 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
2802 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
2809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2810 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2812 j
=ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
2813 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
2814 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
2818 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
2820 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
2826 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
|| pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)
2827 { unsigned char signature
[64];
2829 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
,NULL
);
2830 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
);
2832 fprintf(stderr
,"GOST signature length is %d",i
);
2834 for (idx
=0;idx
<64;idx
++) {
2835 signature
[63-idx
]=p
[idx
];
2837 j
=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
,signature
,64,s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,32);
2838 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2841 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
2843 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2850 al
=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
2859 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2862 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2866 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2868 int i
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
2870 unsigned long l
,nc
,llen
,n
;
2871 const unsigned char *p
,*q
;
2873 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
=NULL
;
2875 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2882 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2884 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
)
2886 if ( (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
2887 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
2890 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2893 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2894 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
2897 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2900 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2904 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
)
2906 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
2910 p
=d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2912 if ((sk
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
)
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2921 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2925 for (nc
=0; nc
<llen
; )
2928 if ((l
+nc
+3) > llen
)
2930 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2936 x
=d2i_X509(NULL
,&p
,l
);
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2944 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2948 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
,x
))
2950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2957 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0)
2959 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2960 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
2962 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
2966 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2967 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
2968 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
2970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
2971 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2977 i
=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
,sk
);
2980 al
=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
2981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED
);
2986 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
2987 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
2988 s
->session
->peer
=sk_X509_shift(sk
);
2989 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
2991 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2992 * when we arrive here. */
2993 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
2995 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
2996 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
2998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3002 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
3003 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
3004 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
=sk
;
3005 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3006 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3014 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3017 if (x
!= NULL
) X509_free(x
);
3018 if (sk
!= NULL
) sk_X509_pop_free(sk
,X509_free
);
3022 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3027 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
)
3029 x
=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s
);
3032 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3033 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
3034 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
))
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3041 l
=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,x
);
3042 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
3047 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3048 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3050 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3051 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3053 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
)
3055 unsigned char *p
, *senc
, *macstart
;
3060 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3061 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3062 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3064 /* get session encoding length */
3065 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3066 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3071 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3072 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3073 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3074 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3075 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3076 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3078 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3079 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+
3080 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3082 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen
);
3086 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
);
3088 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3090 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
3091 /* Skip message length for now */
3093 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3094 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3095 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3096 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3099 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
)
3101 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3110 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv
, 16);
3111 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3112 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
);
3113 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3114 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
);
3115 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3117 l2n(s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
, p
);
3118 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3120 /* Output key name */
3122 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3125 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3126 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3127 /* Encrypt session data */
3128 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
);
3130 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
);
3132 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3134 HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
);
3135 HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
);
3136 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3139 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3141 len
= p
- (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3142 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ 1;
3143 l2n3(len
- 4, p
); /* Message length */
3145 s2n(len
- 10, p
); /* Ticket length */
3147 /* number of bytes to write */
3149 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3154 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3155 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3158 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3160 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
)
3163 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3164 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3165 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3168 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
))
3171 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3174 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3175 /* message length */
3176 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3178 *(p
++)= s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3179 /* length of OCSP response */
3180 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3181 /* actual response */
3182 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3183 /* number of bytes to write */
3184 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3185 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3189 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3190 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));