2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
135 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
136 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
);
137 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL
*s
);
139 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, int n
, int max
, int extend
)
142 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
143 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
144 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
145 * s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
146 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
158 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
162 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
163 align
= (long)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
164 align
= (-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
168 /* start with empty packet ... */
171 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
173 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
176 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
177 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
178 && (pkt
[3] << 8 | pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
180 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
181 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
182 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
183 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
184 * overrun can be triggered.
186 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
190 s
->packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
191 s
->packet_length
= 0;
192 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
196 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
197 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
200 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
201 if (left
== 0 && extend
)
203 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
207 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
209 s
->packet_length
+= n
;
215 /* else we need to read more data */
217 len
= s
->packet_length
;
218 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
220 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
221 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
223 if (s
->packet
!= pkt
) { /* len > 0 */
224 memmove(pkt
, s
->packet
, len
+ left
);
226 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
229 if (n
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)) { /* does not happen */
230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
234 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
235 if (!s
->read_ahead
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
236 /* ignore max parameter */
241 if (max
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
))
242 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
247 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
248 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
253 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
254 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
255 i
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
263 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
265 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
270 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
271 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
272 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
274 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
276 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
280 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
283 s
->packet_length
+= n
;
284 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
289 * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
290 * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
291 * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
292 * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
294 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
297 * Call this to get a new input record.
298 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
299 * or non-blocking IO.
300 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
301 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
302 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
303 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
305 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
306 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL
*s
)
308 int ssl_major
, ssl_minor
, al
;
309 int enc_err
, n
, i
, ret
= -1;
313 unsigned char md
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
315 unsigned mac_size
, orig_len
;
317 unsigned empty_record_count
= 0;
322 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
)
323 extra
= SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA
;
326 if (extra
&& !s
->s3
->init_extra
) {
328 * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after
329 * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done
331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
336 /* check if we have the header */
337 if ((s
->rstate
!= SSL_ST_READ_BODY
) ||
338 (s
->packet_length
< SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
339 n
= ssl3_read_n(s
, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
, 0);
341 return (n
); /* error or non-blocking */
342 s
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_BODY
;
346 s
->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, p
, 5, s
,
347 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
349 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
353 version
= (ssl_major
<< 8) | ssl_minor
;
356 fprintf(stderr
, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr
->type
, rr
->length
);
359 /* Lets check version */
360 if (!s
->first_packet
) {
361 if (version
!= s
->version
) {
362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
363 if ((s
->version
& 0xFF00) == (version
& 0xFF00)
364 && !s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
) {
365 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
367 * The record is using an incorrect version number, but
368 * what we've got appears to be an alert. We haven't
369 * read the body yet to check whether its a fatal or
370 * not - but chances are it is. We probably shouldn't
371 * send a fatal alert back. We'll just end.
376 * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
378 s
->version
= (unsigned short)version
;
380 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
385 if ((version
>> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
) {
386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
390 if (rr
->length
> s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
- SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
391 al
= SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
396 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
399 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
401 if (rr
->length
> s
->packet_length
- SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
402 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
404 n
= ssl3_read_n(s
, i
, i
, 1);
406 return (n
); /* error or non-blocking io */
408 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
413 s
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
; /* set state for later operations */
416 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
417 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
419 rr
->input
= &(s
->packet
[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
]);
422 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
423 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
424 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
425 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
429 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
430 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
433 /* check is not needed I believe */
434 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
+ extra
) {
435 al
= SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
440 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
441 rr
->data
= rr
->input
;
443 enc_err
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, 0);
446 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
447 * 1: if the padding is valid
448 * -1: if the padding is invalid
451 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED
;
452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG
);
456 printf("dec %d\n", rr
->length
);
459 for (z
= 0; z
< rr
->length
; z
++)
460 printf("%02X%c", rr
->data
[z
], ((z
+ 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
465 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
466 if ((sess
!= NULL
) &&
467 (s
->enc_read_ctx
!= NULL
) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->read_hash
) != NULL
)) {
468 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
469 unsigned char *mac
= NULL
;
470 unsigned char mac_tmp
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
471 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->read_hash
);
472 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
475 * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type
477 orig_len
= rr
->length
+ ((unsigned int)rr
->type
>> 8);
480 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
481 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
482 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
483 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
485 if (orig_len
< mac_size
||
486 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
487 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_read_ctx
) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
&&
488 orig_len
< mac_size
+ 1)) {
489 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
494 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_read_ctx
) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
496 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
497 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
498 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
499 * contents of the padding bytes.
502 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp
, rr
, mac_size
, orig_len
);
503 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
506 * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals
507 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
510 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
511 mac
= &rr
->data
[rr
->length
];
514 i
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, md
, 0 /* not send */ );
515 if (i
< 0 || mac
== NULL
516 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md
, mac
, (size_t)mac_size
) != 0)
518 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+ extra
+ mac_size
)
524 * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
525 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
526 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
527 * not reveal which kind of error occured -- this might become
528 * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
530 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC
;
531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,
532 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC
);
536 /* r->length is now just compressed */
537 if (s
->expand
!= NULL
) {
538 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+ extra
) {
539 al
= SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
543 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s
)) {
544 al
= SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE
;
545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION
);
550 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+ extra
) {
551 al
= SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
558 * So at this point the following is true
559 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
560 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
561 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
562 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
566 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
567 s
->packet_length
= 0;
569 /* just read a 0 length packet */
570 if (rr
->length
== 0) {
571 empty_record_count
++;
572 if (empty_record_count
> MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS
) {
573 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL
);
580 fprintf(stderr
, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr
->type
,
587 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
592 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL
*ssl
)
594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
598 rr
= &(ssl
->s3
->rrec
);
599 i
= COMP_expand_block(ssl
->expand
, rr
->comp
,
600 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
, rr
->data
,
611 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL
*ssl
)
613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
617 wr
= &(ssl
->s3
->wrec
);
618 i
= COMP_compress_block(ssl
->compress
, wr
->data
,
619 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
,
620 wr
->input
, (int)wr
->length
);
626 wr
->input
= wr
->data
;
632 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
633 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
635 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, int len
)
637 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
640 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
641 unsigned int max_send_fragment
;
643 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
646 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
647 OPENSSL_assert(s
->s3
->wnum
<= INT_MAX
);
651 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !s
->in_handshake
) {
652 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
662 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
663 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
664 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
665 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
666 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
667 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
668 * report the error in a way the user will notice
671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
676 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
677 * will happen with non blocking IO
680 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], s
->s3
->wpend_tot
);
682 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
686 tot
+= i
; /* this might be last fragment */
688 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
690 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
691 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
692 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
693 * compromise is considered worthy.
695 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
696 len
>= 4 * (int)(max_send_fragment
= s
->max_send_fragment
) &&
697 s
->compress
== NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
== NULL
&&
698 SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
699 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s
->enc_write_ctx
->cipher
) &
700 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
) {
701 unsigned char aad
[13];
702 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
705 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
706 if ((max_send_fragment
& 0xfff) == 0)
707 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
709 if (tot
== 0 || wb
->buf
== NULL
) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
710 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
712 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
713 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
714 max_send_fragment
, NULL
);
716 if (len
>= 8 * (int)max_send_fragment
)
721 wb
->buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(packlen
);
723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
727 } else if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
728 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
735 if (n
< 4 * max_send_fragment
) {
736 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
741 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
742 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
749 if (n
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
750 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 8);
752 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 4);
754 memcpy(aad
, s
->s3
->write_sequence
, 8);
756 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
757 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
764 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
765 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
766 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
768 if (packlen
<= 0 || packlen
> (int)wb
->len
) { /* never happens */
769 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
774 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
775 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
778 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
779 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
780 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
) <= 0)
783 s
->s3
->write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
784 if (s
->s3
->write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
786 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->s3
->write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
792 s
->s3
->wpend_tot
= nw
;
793 s
->s3
->wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
794 s
->s3
->wpend_type
= type
;
795 s
->s3
->wpend_ret
= nw
;
797 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], nw
);
799 if (i
< 0 && (!s
->wbio
|| !BIO_should_retry(s
->wbio
))) {
800 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
);
807 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
816 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
817 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
818 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
825 if (n
> s
->max_send_fragment
)
826 nw
= s
->max_send_fragment
;
830 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), nw
, 0);
832 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
838 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
839 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
841 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
842 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
844 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
846 if ((i
== (int)n
) && s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
848 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
858 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
859 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
)
861 unsigned char *p
, *plen
;
862 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
867 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
871 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
872 * will happen with non blocking IO
875 return (ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, len
));
877 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
878 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
879 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
882 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
886 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
))
889 if (len
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
895 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
896 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) ||
897 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
899 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
905 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
911 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
913 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
) {
915 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
916 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
919 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
921 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
922 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
923 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
926 prefix_len
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, 0, 1);
931 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
))
933 /* insufficient space */
934 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
939 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
942 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
943 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
945 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
946 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
947 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
949 align
= (long)wb
->buf
+ 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
950 align
= (-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
954 } else if (prefix_len
) {
955 p
= wb
->buf
+ wb
->offset
+ prefix_len
;
957 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
958 align
= (long)wb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
959 align
= (-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
965 /* write the header */
967 *(p
++) = type
& 0xff;
970 *(p
++) = (s
->version
>> 8);
972 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
973 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
975 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
976 && !s
->renegotiate
&& TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
)
979 *(p
++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
981 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
984 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
985 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
)) {
986 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
987 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
988 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
992 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
993 else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
)
994 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
1000 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1001 wr
->data
= p
+ eivlen
;
1002 wr
->length
= (int)len
;
1003 wr
->input
= (unsigned char *)buf
;
1006 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
1009 /* first we compress */
1010 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
1011 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
)) {
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
1016 memcpy(wr
->data
, wr
->input
, wr
->length
);
1017 wr
->input
= wr
->data
;
1021 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
1022 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
1026 if (mac_size
!= 0) {
1027 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, &(p
[wr
->length
+ eivlen
]), 1) < 0)
1029 wr
->length
+= mac_size
;
1037 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
1039 wr
->length
+= eivlen
;
1042 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, 1) < 1)
1045 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1046 s2n(wr
->length
, plen
);
1048 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1049 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, plen
- 5, 5, s
,
1050 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1053 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1056 wr
->type
= type
; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1057 wr
->length
+= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1059 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
1061 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1067 /* now let's set up wb */
1068 wb
->left
= prefix_len
+ wr
->length
;
1071 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1074 s
->s3
->wpend_tot
= len
;
1075 s
->s3
->wpend_buf
= buf
;
1076 s
->s3
->wpend_type
= type
;
1077 s
->s3
->wpend_ret
= len
;
1079 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1080 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, len
);
1085 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
1086 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
1090 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
1093 if ((s
->s3
->wpend_tot
> (int)len
)
1094 || ((s
->s3
->wpend_buf
!= buf
) &&
1095 !(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
))
1096 || (s
->s3
->wpend_type
!= type
)) {
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
1103 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
1104 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
1105 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
,
1106 (char *)&(wb
->buf
[wb
->offset
]),
1107 (unsigned int)wb
->left
);
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
1112 if (i
== wb
->left
) {
1115 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1116 return (s
->s3
->wpend_ret
);
1117 } else if (i
<= 0) {
1118 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1120 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1121 * using a datagram service
1133 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1134 * 'type' is one of the following:
1136 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1137 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1138 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1140 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1141 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1143 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1144 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1145 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1146 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1147 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1148 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1149 * Change cipher spec protocol
1150 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1152 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1153 * Handshake protocol
1154 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1155 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1156 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1157 * Application data protocol
1158 * none of our business
1160 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, unsigned char *buf
, int len
, int peek
)
1165 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
1167 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.buf
== NULL
) /* Not initialized yet */
1168 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
1171 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1172 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) || (peek
1174 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1179 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1180 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1182 unsigned char *src
= s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
1183 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1188 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1191 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
--;
1194 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1195 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1196 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1201 * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1204 if (!s
->in_handshake
&& SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1205 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1206 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1215 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1218 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1219 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1220 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1221 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
1223 rr
= &(s
->s3
->rrec
);
1225 /* get new packet if necessary */
1226 if ((rr
->length
== 0) || (s
->rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)) {
1227 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
1232 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1234 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1235 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1236 && (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
1237 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1243 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1246 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
1248 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1252 if (type
== rr
->type
) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1253 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1255 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1256 * doing a handshake for the first time
1258 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1259 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1260 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1268 if ((unsigned int)len
> rr
->length
)
1271 n
= (unsigned int)len
;
1273 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1277 if (rr
->length
== 0) {
1278 s
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1280 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
1281 && s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0)
1282 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1289 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1290 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
1294 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1295 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1298 unsigned int dest_maxlen
= 0;
1299 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
1300 unsigned int *dest_len
= NULL
;
1302 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1303 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
1304 dest
= s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
1305 dest_len
= &s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
;
1306 } else if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1307 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->s3
->alert_fragment
;
1308 dest
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
;
1309 dest_len
= &s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
;
1311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1312 else if (rr
->type
== TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
) {
1313 tls1_process_heartbeat(s
);
1315 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1317 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1318 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1319 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1324 if (dest_maxlen
> 0) {
1325 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1327 n
= rr
->length
; /* available bytes */
1329 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1331 dest
[(*dest_len
)++] = rr
->data
[rr
->off
++];
1335 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1336 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1341 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1342 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1343 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1346 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1348 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1349 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) &&
1350 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)) {
1351 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
1353 if ((s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[1] != 0) ||
1354 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[2] != 0) ||
1355 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[3] != 0)) {
1356 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST
);
1361 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1362 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1363 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
, 4, s
,
1364 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1366 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1367 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
) &&
1368 !s
->s3
->renegotiate
) {
1369 ssl3_renegotiate(s
);
1370 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
)) {
1371 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1376 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1380 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1381 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1384 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1385 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1386 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1387 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1389 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1390 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1391 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1392 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1399 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1400 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1405 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1406 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1407 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1410 SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1411 !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
1412 (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) &&
1413 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1414 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) &&
1415 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) &&
1416 !(s
->ctx
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
1418 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1421 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1424 if (s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
>= 2) {
1425 int alert_level
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
[0];
1426 int alert_descr
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
[1];
1428 s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
1430 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1431 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
,
1432 s
->s3
->alert_fragment
, 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1434 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1435 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1436 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1437 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1440 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1441 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1444 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
1445 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1446 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
) {
1447 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1451 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1452 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1453 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1454 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1455 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1456 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1458 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1459 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1463 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1464 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
)
1467 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1470 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1471 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1473 BIO_snprintf(tmp
, sizeof tmp
, "%d", alert_descr
);
1474 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp
);
1475 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1476 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
, s
->session
);
1479 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1487 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) { /* but we have not received a
1489 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1494 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1496 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1497 * what the record payload has to look like
1499 if ((rr
->length
!= 1) || (rr
->off
!= 0) ||
1500 (rr
->data
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
1501 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1506 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1507 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
1508 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1513 if (!(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
)) {
1514 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1519 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
1523 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1524 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
1525 rr
->data
, 1, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1527 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
1528 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
))
1535 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1537 if ((s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) && !s
->in_handshake
) {
1538 if (((s
->state
& SSL_ST_MASK
) == SSL_ST_OK
) &&
1539 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
)) {
1540 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences
1541 * are not as expected (and because this is
1542 * not really needed for clients except for
1543 * detecting protocol violations): */
1544 s
->state
= SSL_ST_BEFORE
| (s
->server
)
1545 ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT
: SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
1547 s
->state
= s
->server
? SSL_ST_ACCEPT
: SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
1552 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1560 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1561 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1564 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1565 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1566 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1567 * problems in the blocking world
1569 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1570 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1571 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1572 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1583 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1584 * an unexpected message alert.
1586 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->version
<= TLS1_1_VERSION
) {
1591 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1594 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1596 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1598 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1599 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1600 * happen when type != rr->type
1602 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1605 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1607 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1608 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1609 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1610 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1611 * started), we will indulge it.
1613 if (s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
&&
1614 (s
->s3
->total_renegotiations
!= 0) &&
1615 (((s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
) &&
1616 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) &&
1617 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1618 ) || ((s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
) &&
1619 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
) &&
1620 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
1623 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1626 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1634 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1639 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
)
1645 if (s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
)
1646 i
= SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
;
1648 i
= SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
;
1650 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.key_block
== NULL
) {
1651 if (s
->session
== NULL
|| s
->session
->master_key_length
== 0) {
1652 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
1654 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1658 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
1659 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
1663 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
, i
))
1667 * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it
1668 * before we read the finished message
1670 if (s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
) {
1671 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
1672 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
1674 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
1675 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
1678 i
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
1680 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1685 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= i
;
1690 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL
*s
, int level
, int desc
)
1692 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1693 desc
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->alert_value(desc
);
1694 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
&& desc
== SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
)
1695 desc
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
; /* SSL 3.0 does not have
1696 * protocol_version alerts */
1699 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1700 if ((level
== 2) && (s
->session
!= NULL
))
1701 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
, s
->session
);
1703 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
= 1;
1704 s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] = level
;
1705 s
->s3
->send_alert
[1] = desc
;
1706 if (s
->s3
->wbuf
.left
== 0) /* data still being written out? */
1707 return s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
1709 * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in
1715 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL
*s
)
1718 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
1720 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
= 0;
1721 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, &s
->s3
->send_alert
[0], 2, 0);
1723 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
= 1;
1726 * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the
1727 * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not
1730 if (s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
)
1731 (void)BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
1733 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1734 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, s
->s3
->send_alert
,
1735 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1737 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1738 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1739 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1740 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1743 j
= (s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] << 8) | s
->s3
->send_alert
[1];
1744 cb(s
, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT
, j
);