OpenSSL 1.0.2f
[tomato.git] / release / src / router / openssl / ssl / s3_pkt.c
blob379890237e8663b72a68f38a6e472a1d019e4312
1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <limits.h>
114 #include <errno.h>
115 #define USE_SOCKETS
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
123 #endif
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
133 #endif
135 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
136 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
137 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
139 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
142 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
143 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
144 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
145 * s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
146 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
148 int i, len, left;
149 long align = 0;
150 unsigned char *pkt;
151 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
153 if (n <= 0)
154 return n;
156 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
157 if (rb->buf == NULL)
158 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
159 return -1;
161 left = rb->left;
162 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
163 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
164 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
165 #endif
167 if (!extend) {
168 /* start with empty packet ... */
169 if (left == 0)
170 rb->offset = align;
171 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
173 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
174 * alignment...
176 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
177 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
178 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
180 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
181 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
182 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
183 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
184 * overrun can be triggered.
186 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
187 rb->offset = align;
190 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
191 s->packet_length = 0;
192 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
196 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
197 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
198 * the buffer).
200 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
201 if (left == 0 && extend)
202 return 0;
203 if (left > 0 && n > left)
204 n = left;
207 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
208 if (left >= n) {
209 s->packet_length += n;
210 rb->left = left - n;
211 rb->offset += n;
212 return (n);
215 /* else we need to read more data */
217 len = s->packet_length;
218 pkt = rb->buf + align;
220 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
221 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
223 if (s->packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */
224 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left);
225 s->packet = pkt;
226 rb->offset = len + align;
229 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
231 return -1;
234 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
235 if (!s->read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
236 /* ignore max parameter */
237 max = n;
238 else {
239 if (max < n)
240 max = n;
241 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
242 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
245 while (left < n) {
247 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
248 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
249 * possible)
252 clear_sys_error();
253 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
254 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
255 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
256 } else {
257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
258 i = -1;
261 if (i <= 0) {
262 rb->left = left;
263 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
264 if (len + left == 0)
265 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
266 return (i);
268 left += i;
270 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
271 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
272 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
274 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
275 if (n > left)
276 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
280 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
281 rb->offset += n;
282 rb->left = left - n;
283 s->packet_length += n;
284 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
285 return (n);
289 * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
290 * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
291 * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
292 * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
294 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
297 * Call this to get a new input record.
298 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
299 * or non-blocking IO.
300 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
301 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
302 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
303 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
305 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
306 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
308 int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
309 int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
310 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
311 SSL_SESSION *sess;
312 unsigned char *p;
313 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
314 short version;
315 unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
316 size_t extra;
317 unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
319 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
320 sess = s->session;
322 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
323 extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
324 else
325 extra = 0;
326 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) {
328 * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after
329 * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done
331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
332 return -1;
335 again:
336 /* check if we have the header */
337 if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
338 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
339 n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
340 if (n <= 0)
341 return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
342 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
344 p = s->packet;
345 if (s->msg_callback)
346 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
347 s->msg_callback_arg);
349 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
350 rr->type = *(p++);
351 ssl_major = *(p++);
352 ssl_minor = *(p++);
353 version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
354 n2s(p, rr->length);
355 #if 0
356 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
357 #endif
359 /* Lets check version */
360 if (!s->first_packet) {
361 if (version != s->version) {
362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
363 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
364 && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
365 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
367 * The record is using an incorrect version number, but
368 * what we've got appears to be an alert. We haven't
369 * read the body yet to check whether its a fatal or
370 * not - but chances are it is. We probably shouldn't
371 * send a fatal alert back. We'll just end.
373 goto err;
376 * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
378 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
380 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
381 goto f_err;
385 if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
387 goto err;
390 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
391 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
393 goto f_err;
396 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
399 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
401 if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
402 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
403 i = rr->length;
404 n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
405 if (n <= 0)
406 return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */
408 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
409 * + rr->length
413 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
416 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
417 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
419 rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
422 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
423 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
424 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
425 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
429 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
430 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
433 /* check is not needed I believe */
434 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) {
435 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
437 goto f_err;
440 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
441 rr->data = rr->input;
443 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
445 * enc_err is:
446 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
447 * 1: if the padding is valid
448 * -1: if the padding is invalid
450 if (enc_err == 0) {
451 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
453 goto f_err;
455 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
456 printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
458 unsigned int z;
459 for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
460 printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
462 printf("\n");
463 #endif
465 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
466 if ((sess != NULL) &&
467 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
468 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
469 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
470 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
471 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
472 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
475 * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type
477 orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8);
480 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
481 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
482 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
483 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
485 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
486 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
487 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
488 orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
489 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
491 goto f_err;
494 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
496 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
497 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
498 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
499 * contents of the padding bytes.
501 mac = mac_tmp;
502 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
503 rr->length -= mac_size;
504 } else {
506 * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals
507 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
508 * |mac_size| above.
510 rr->length -= mac_size;
511 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
514 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
515 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
516 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
517 enc_err = -1;
518 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size)
519 enc_err = -1;
522 if (enc_err < 0) {
524 * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
525 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
526 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
527 * not reveal which kind of error occured -- this might become
528 * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
530 al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
532 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
533 goto f_err;
536 /* r->length is now just compressed */
537 if (s->expand != NULL) {
538 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) {
539 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
541 goto f_err;
543 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
544 al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
546 goto f_err;
550 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) {
551 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
553 goto f_err;
556 rr->off = 0;
558 * So at this point the following is true
559 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
560 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
561 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
562 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
563 * after use :-).
566 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
567 s->packet_length = 0;
569 /* just read a 0 length packet */
570 if (rr->length == 0) {
571 empty_record_count++;
572 if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
573 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
575 goto f_err;
577 goto again;
579 #if 0
580 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type,
581 rr->length);
582 #endif
584 return (1);
586 f_err:
587 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
588 err:
589 return (ret);
592 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
595 int i;
596 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
598 rr = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
599 i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
600 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data,
601 (int)rr->length);
602 if (i < 0)
603 return (0);
604 else
605 rr->length = i;
606 rr->data = rr->comp;
607 #endif
608 return (1);
611 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
614 int i;
615 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
617 wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
618 i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
619 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
620 wr->input, (int)wr->length);
621 if (i < 0)
622 return (0);
623 else
624 wr->length = i;
626 wr->input = wr->data;
627 #endif
628 return (1);
632 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
633 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
635 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
637 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
638 int tot;
639 unsigned int n, nw;
640 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
641 unsigned int max_send_fragment;
642 #endif
643 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
644 int i;
646 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
647 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
648 tot = s->s3->wnum;
649 s->s3->wnum = 0;
651 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
652 i = s->handshake_func(s);
653 if (i < 0)
654 return (i);
655 if (i == 0) {
656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
657 return -1;
662 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
663 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
664 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
665 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
666 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
667 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
668 * report the error in a way the user will notice
670 if (len < tot) {
671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
672 return (-1);
676 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
677 * will happen with non blocking IO
679 if (wb->left != 0) {
680 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->s3->wpend_tot);
681 if (i <= 0) {
682 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
683 s->s3->wnum = tot;
684 return i;
686 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
688 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
690 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
691 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
692 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
693 * compromise is considered worthy.
695 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
696 len >= 4 * (int)(max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
697 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
698 SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
699 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) &
700 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
701 unsigned char aad[13];
702 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
703 int packlen;
705 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
706 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
707 max_send_fragment -= 512;
709 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
710 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
712 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
713 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
714 max_send_fragment, NULL);
716 if (len >= 8 * (int)max_send_fragment)
717 packlen *= 8;
718 else
719 packlen *= 4;
721 wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
722 if (!wb->buf) {
723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
724 return -1;
726 wb->len = packlen;
727 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
728 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
729 wb->buf = NULL;
730 return tot;
733 n = (len - tot);
734 for (;;) {
735 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
736 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
737 wb->buf = NULL;
738 break;
741 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
742 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
743 if (i <= 0) {
744 s->s3->wnum = tot;
745 return i;
749 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
750 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
751 else
752 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
754 memcpy(aad, s->s3->write_sequence, 8);
755 aad[8] = type;
756 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
757 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
758 aad[11] = 0;
759 aad[12] = 0;
760 mb_param.out = NULL;
761 mb_param.inp = aad;
762 mb_param.len = nw;
764 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
765 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
766 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
768 if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
769 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
770 wb->buf = NULL;
771 break;
774 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
775 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
776 mb_param.len = nw;
778 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
779 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
780 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
781 return -1;
783 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
784 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
785 int j = 6;
786 while (j >= 0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
789 wb->offset = 0;
790 wb->left = packlen;
792 s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
793 s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
794 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
795 s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
797 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
798 if (i <= 0) {
799 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
800 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
801 wb->buf = NULL;
803 s->s3->wnum = tot;
804 return i;
806 if (i == (int)n) {
807 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
808 wb->buf = NULL;
809 return tot + i;
811 n -= i;
812 tot += i;
814 } else
815 #endif
816 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
817 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
818 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
820 return tot;
823 n = (len - tot);
824 for (;;) {
825 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
826 nw = s->max_send_fragment;
827 else
828 nw = n;
830 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
831 if (i <= 0) {
832 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
833 s->s3->wnum = tot;
834 return i;
837 if ((i == (int)n) ||
838 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
839 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
841 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
842 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
844 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
846 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
847 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
848 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
850 return tot + i;
853 n -= i;
854 tot += i;
858 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
859 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
861 unsigned char *p, *plen;
862 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
863 int prefix_len = 0;
864 int eivlen;
865 long align = 0;
866 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
867 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
868 SSL_SESSION *sess;
871 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
872 * will happen with non blocking IO
874 if (wb->left != 0)
875 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
877 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
878 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
879 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
880 if (i <= 0)
881 return (i);
882 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
885 if (wb->buf == NULL)
886 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
887 return -1;
889 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
890 return 0;
892 wr = &(s->s3->wrec);
893 sess = s->session;
895 if ((sess == NULL) ||
896 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
897 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
898 #if 1
899 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
900 #else
901 clear = 1;
902 #endif
903 mac_size = 0;
904 } else {
905 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
906 if (mac_size < 0)
907 goto err;
911 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
913 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
915 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
916 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
919 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
921 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
922 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
923 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
924 * payload)
926 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
927 if (prefix_len <= 0)
928 goto err;
930 if (prefix_len >
931 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
933 /* insufficient space */
934 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
935 goto err;
939 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
942 if (create_empty_fragment) {
943 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
945 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
946 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
947 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
949 align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
950 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
951 #endif
952 p = wb->buf + align;
953 wb->offset = align;
954 } else if (prefix_len) {
955 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
956 } else {
957 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
958 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
959 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
960 #endif
961 p = wb->buf + align;
962 wb->offset = align;
965 /* write the header */
967 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
968 wr->type = type;
970 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
972 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
973 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
975 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
976 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
977 *(p++) = 0x1;
978 else
979 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
981 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
982 plen = p;
983 p += 2;
984 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
985 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
986 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
987 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
988 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
989 if (eivlen <= 1)
990 eivlen = 0;
992 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
993 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
994 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
995 else
996 eivlen = 0;
997 } else
998 eivlen = 0;
1000 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1001 wr->data = p + eivlen;
1002 wr->length = (int)len;
1003 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
1006 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
1009 /* first we compress */
1010 if (s->compress != NULL) {
1011 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1013 goto err;
1015 } else {
1016 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
1017 wr->input = wr->data;
1021 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
1022 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
1023 * wb->buf
1026 if (mac_size != 0) {
1027 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
1028 goto err;
1029 wr->length += mac_size;
1032 wr->input = p;
1033 wr->data = p;
1035 if (eivlen) {
1037 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
1039 wr->length += eivlen;
1042 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
1043 goto err;
1045 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1046 s2n(wr->length, plen);
1048 if (s->msg_callback)
1049 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s,
1050 s->msg_callback_arg);
1053 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1054 * wr->length long
1056 wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1057 wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1059 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1061 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1062 * out anything here
1064 return wr->length;
1067 /* now let's set up wb */
1068 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1071 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1072 * retries later
1074 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
1075 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
1076 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
1077 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
1079 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1080 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
1081 err:
1082 return -1;
1085 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
1086 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1087 unsigned int len)
1089 int i;
1090 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
1092 /* XXXX */
1093 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
1094 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
1095 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1096 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1098 return (-1);
1101 for (;;) {
1102 clear_sys_error();
1103 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1104 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1105 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
1106 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
1107 (unsigned int)wb->left);
1108 } else {
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1110 i = -1;
1112 if (i == wb->left) {
1113 wb->left = 0;
1114 wb->offset += i;
1115 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1116 return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
1117 } else if (i <= 0) {
1118 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1120 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1121 * using a datagram service
1123 wb->left = 0;
1125 return (i);
1127 wb->offset += i;
1128 wb->left -= i;
1133 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1134 * 'type' is one of the following:
1136 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1137 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1138 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1140 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1141 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1143 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1144 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1145 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1146 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1147 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1148 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1149 * Change cipher spec protocol
1150 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1151 * Alert protocol
1152 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1153 * Handshake protocol
1154 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1155 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1156 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1157 * Application data protocol
1158 * none of our business
1160 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
1162 int al, i, j, ret;
1163 unsigned int n;
1164 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
1165 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1167 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
1168 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1169 return (-1);
1171 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1172 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1173 && (type !=
1174 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1176 return -1;
1179 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1180 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1182 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1183 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1184 unsigned int k;
1186 /* peek == 0 */
1187 n = 0;
1188 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1189 *dst++ = *src++;
1190 len--;
1191 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
1192 n++;
1194 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1195 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1196 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1197 return n;
1201 * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1204 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1205 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1206 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1207 if (i < 0)
1208 return (i);
1209 if (i == 0) {
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1211 return (-1);
1214 start:
1215 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1218 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1219 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1220 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1221 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
1223 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1225 /* get new packet if necessary */
1226 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
1227 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1228 if (ret <= 0)
1229 return (ret);
1232 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1234 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1235 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1236 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1237 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1239 goto f_err;
1243 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1244 * 'peek' mode)
1246 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1247 rr->length = 0;
1248 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1249 return (0);
1252 if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1253 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1255 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1256 * doing a handshake for the first time
1258 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1259 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1260 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1262 goto f_err;
1265 if (len <= 0)
1266 return (len);
1268 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1269 n = rr->length;
1270 else
1271 n = (unsigned int)len;
1273 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1274 if (!peek) {
1275 rr->length -= n;
1276 rr->off += n;
1277 if (rr->length == 0) {
1278 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1279 rr->off = 0;
1280 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
1281 && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1282 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1285 return (n);
1289 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1290 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
1294 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1295 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1298 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1299 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1300 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1302 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1303 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1304 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1305 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1306 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1307 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1308 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1309 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1312 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
1313 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1315 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1316 rr->length = 0;
1317 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1318 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1319 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1320 return (-1);
1322 #endif
1324 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1325 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1326 if (rr->length < n)
1327 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1329 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1330 while (n-- > 0) {
1331 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1332 rr->length--;
1335 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1336 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1341 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1342 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1343 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1346 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1347 if ((!s->server) &&
1348 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1349 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1350 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1351 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1353 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1354 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1355 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1356 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1358 goto f_err;
1361 if (s->msg_callback)
1362 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1363 s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1364 s->msg_callback_arg);
1366 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1367 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1368 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1369 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1370 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1371 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1372 if (i < 0)
1373 return (i);
1374 if (i == 0) {
1375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1376 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1377 return (-1);
1380 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1381 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1382 BIO *bio;
1384 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1385 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1386 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1387 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1389 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1390 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1391 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1392 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1393 return (-1);
1399 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1400 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1402 goto start;
1405 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1406 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1407 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1409 if (s->server &&
1410 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1411 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1412 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1413 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1414 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1415 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1416 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1418 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1420 rr->length = 0;
1421 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1422 goto start;
1424 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1425 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1426 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1428 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1430 if (s->msg_callback)
1431 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1432 s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1434 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1435 cb = s->info_callback;
1436 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1437 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1439 if (cb != NULL) {
1440 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1441 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1444 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1445 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1446 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1447 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1448 return (0);
1451 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1452 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1453 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1454 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1455 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1456 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1458 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1459 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1461 goto f_err;
1463 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1464 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1465 return (0);
1466 #endif
1467 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1468 char tmp[16];
1470 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1471 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1473 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1474 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1475 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1476 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1477 return (0);
1478 } else {
1479 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1481 goto f_err;
1484 goto start;
1487 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1488 * shutdown */
1489 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1490 rr->length = 0;
1491 return (0);
1494 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1496 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1497 * what the record payload has to look like
1499 if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1500 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1501 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1503 goto f_err;
1506 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1507 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
1508 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1510 goto f_err;
1513 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) {
1514 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1516 goto f_err;
1519 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1521 rr->length = 0;
1523 if (s->msg_callback)
1524 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1525 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1527 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1528 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1529 goto err;
1530 else
1531 goto start;
1535 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1537 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) {
1538 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1539 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1540 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences
1541 * are not as expected (and because this is
1542 * not really needed for clients except for
1543 * detecting protocol violations): */
1544 s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server)
1545 ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1546 #else
1547 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1548 #endif
1549 s->renegotiate = 1;
1550 s->new_session = 1;
1552 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1553 if (i < 0)
1554 return (i);
1555 if (i == 0) {
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1557 return (-1);
1560 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1561 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1562 BIO *bio;
1564 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1565 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1566 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1567 * problems in the blocking world
1569 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1570 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1571 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1572 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1573 return (-1);
1576 goto start;
1579 switch (rr->type) {
1580 default:
1581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1583 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1584 * an unexpected message alert.
1586 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1587 rr->length = 0;
1588 goto start;
1590 #endif
1591 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1593 goto f_err;
1594 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1595 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1596 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1598 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1599 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1600 * happen when type != rr->type
1602 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1604 goto f_err;
1605 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1607 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1608 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1609 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1610 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1611 * started), we will indulge it.
1613 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1614 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1615 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1616 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1617 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1618 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1619 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1620 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1622 )) {
1623 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1624 return (-1);
1625 } else {
1626 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1628 goto f_err;
1631 /* not reached */
1633 f_err:
1634 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1635 err:
1636 return (-1);
1639 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1641 int i;
1642 const char *sender;
1643 int slen;
1645 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1646 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1647 else
1648 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1650 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) {
1651 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
1652 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1654 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1655 return (0);
1658 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1659 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
1660 return (0);
1663 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i))
1664 return (0);
1667 * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it
1668 * before we read the finished message
1670 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
1671 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1672 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1673 } else {
1674 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1675 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1678 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1679 sender, slen,
1680 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1681 if (i == 0) {
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1683 return 0;
1685 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1687 return (1);
1690 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1692 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1693 desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1694 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1695 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have
1696 * protocol_version alerts */
1697 if (desc < 0)
1698 return -1;
1699 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1700 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1701 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1703 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1704 s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
1705 s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
1706 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1707 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1709 * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in
1710 * the future
1712 return -1;
1715 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1717 int i, j;
1718 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1720 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1721 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1722 if (i <= 0) {
1723 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1724 } else {
1726 * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the
1727 * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not
1728 * worry too much.
1730 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1731 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1733 if (s->msg_callback)
1734 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1735 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1737 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1738 cb = s->info_callback;
1739 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1740 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1742 if (cb != NULL) {
1743 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
1744 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
1747 return (i);