2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
160 # include <openssl/fips.h>
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
163 # include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #include <openssl/bn.h>
166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
167 # include <openssl/engine.h>
170 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
173 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_client_method(int ver
)
175 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
176 return (SSLv3_client_method());
181 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method
,
182 ssl_undefined_function
,
183 ssl3_connect
, ssl3_get_client_method
)
185 int ssl3_connect(SSL
*s
)
188 unsigned long Time
= (unsigned long)time(NULL
);
189 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
191 int new_state
, state
, skip
= 0;
193 RAND_add(&Time
, sizeof(Time
), 0);
197 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
198 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
199 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
200 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
203 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
))
206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
208 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
209 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
212 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
) {
213 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
222 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
224 s
->state
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
225 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
++;
229 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
230 case SSL_ST_OK
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
234 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
, 1);
236 if ((s
->version
& 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
242 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
243 s
->type
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
245 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
) {
246 if ((buf
= BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
) {
250 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
258 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
)) {
263 /* setup buffing BIO */
264 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
, 0)) {
269 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
271 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
273 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
274 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
++;
276 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
278 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
280 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
283 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
284 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
287 ret
= ssl3_client_hello(s
);
290 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
293 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
294 if (s
->bbio
!= s
->wbio
)
295 s
->wbio
= BIO_push(s
->bbio
, s
->wbio
);
299 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
300 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
301 ret
= ssl3_get_server_hello(s
);
306 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
308 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
309 /* receive renewed session ticket */
310 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
314 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
;
318 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
:
319 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B
:
320 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
324 new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
325 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
326 ret
= ssl3_get_server_certificate(s
);
329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
330 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
331 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
;
333 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
336 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
342 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
347 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
348 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
349 ret
= ssl3_get_key_exchange(s
);
352 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
;
356 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
359 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
365 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
:
366 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
:
367 ret
= ssl3_get_certificate_request(s
);
370 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
;
374 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
:
375 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
:
376 ret
= ssl3_get_server_done(s
);
379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
380 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
381 if ((ret
= SRP_Calc_A_param(s
)) <= 0) {
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
383 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
388 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
389 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
;
391 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
396 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
:
397 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
:
398 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
:
399 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
:
400 ret
= ssl3_send_client_certificate(s
);
403 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
407 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
408 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
409 ret
= ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s
);
413 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
416 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
417 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
420 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
421 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
422 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
423 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
425 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
426 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
;
428 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
430 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
431 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
437 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
:
438 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
:
439 ret
= ssl3_send_client_verify(s
);
442 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
446 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
:
447 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
:
448 ret
= ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
450 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
);
454 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
455 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
457 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
458 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
460 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
464 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
465 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
466 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
468 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
469 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
471 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
473 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
478 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
479 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
487 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
488 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
489 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
490 ret
= ssl3_send_next_proto(s
);
493 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
497 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
:
498 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
:
499 ret
= ssl3_send_finished(s
,
500 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
,
501 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
,
503 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
,
505 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
);
508 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
;
511 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
;
513 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
514 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED
) {
515 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
516 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
;
517 s
->s3
->delay_buf_pop_ret
= 0;
520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
522 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
524 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
525 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
529 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
535 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
536 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
537 ret
= ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s
);
540 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
544 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
:
545 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
:
546 ret
= ssl3_get_cert_status(s
);
549 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
554 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
:
555 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
:
556 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
557 ret
= ssl3_get_finished(s
, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
,
558 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
);
563 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
565 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
569 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
:
570 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
571 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0) {
575 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
576 s
->state
= s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
580 /* clean a few things up */
581 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
583 if (s
->init_buf
!= NULL
) {
584 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
589 * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
592 if (!(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
))
593 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
594 /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
600 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
602 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
606 s
->handshake_func
= ssl3_connect
;
607 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
610 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
622 /* did we do anything */
623 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
) {
625 if ((ret
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
629 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
)) {
630 new_state
= s
->state
;
632 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP
, 1);
633 s
->state
= new_state
;
643 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT
, ret
);
647 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
650 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
659 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
660 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) {
661 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
662 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
663 (sess
->ssl_version
!= s
->version
) ||
664 !sess
->session_id_length
|| (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
665 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
668 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
669 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
670 int options
= s
->options
;
671 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
672 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
) {
673 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
,
675 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
679 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
681 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
) {
682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
686 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
688 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
689 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
692 * We only support one version: update method
694 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
)
695 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
696 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
698 s
->client_version
= s
->version
;
700 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
702 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
705 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
706 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
708 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
711 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
720 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
,
721 sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
724 /* Do the message type and length last */
725 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
728 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
729 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
730 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
731 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
732 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
733 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
734 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
735 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
738 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
739 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
740 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
741 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
742 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
743 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
744 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
745 * know that is maximum server supports.
746 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
747 * containing version 1.0.
749 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
750 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
751 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
752 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
753 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
754 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
755 * the negotiated version.
758 *(p
++) = s
->version
>> 8;
759 *(p
++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
760 s
->client_version
= s
->version
;
762 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
>> 8;
763 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
767 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
768 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
774 i
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
777 if (i
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
781 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, i
);
785 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
786 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
787 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
791 *(p
++) = s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
792 memcpy(p
, s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
793 p
+= s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
796 /* Ciphers supported */
797 i
= ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), &(p
[2]), 0);
799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
802 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
804 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
805 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
808 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
809 && i
> OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
)
810 i
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
816 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
820 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
821 || !s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
824 j
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
826 for (i
= 0; i
< j
; i
++) {
827 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
831 *(p
++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
835 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
840 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
842 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
849 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
, l
);
850 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
853 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
854 return ssl_do_write(s
);
859 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
861 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
864 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
865 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ok
;
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
872 * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
873 * first packet if we're negotiating version.
878 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
879 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
,
880 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
, -1, 20000, &ok
);
885 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
887 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
888 if (s
->d1
->send_cookie
== 0) {
889 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
891 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
893 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
900 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
901 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
906 d
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
907 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
908 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
909 int hversion
= (p
[0] << 8) | p
[1];
910 int options
= s
->options
;
911 if (hversion
== DTLS1_2_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
))
912 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
913 else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
915 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
916 s
->version
= hversion
;
917 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
919 } else if (hversion
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
))
920 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
923 s
->version
= hversion
;
924 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
927 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
930 if ((p
[0] != (s
->version
>> 8)) || (p
[1] != (s
->version
& 0xff))) {
931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
932 s
->version
= (s
->version
& 0xff00) | p
[1];
933 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
938 /* load the server hello data */
939 /* load the server random */
940 memcpy(s
->s3
->server_random
, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
941 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
945 /* get the session-id */
948 if ((j
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
) || (j
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
)) {
949 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
955 * check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared
958 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
) {
959 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
960 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
961 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
962 &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
964 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
965 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
966 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, p
+ j
);
970 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
972 if (!s
->hit
&& j
!= 0 && j
== s
->session
->session_id_length
973 && memcmp(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, j
) == 0) {
974 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
975 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
976 /* actually a client application bug */
977 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
978 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
979 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
984 /* a miss or crap from the other end */
987 * If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new SSL_SESSION so
988 * we don't stuff up other people
990 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
991 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
995 s
->session
->session_id_length
= j
;
996 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, p
, j
); /* j could be 0 */
999 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, p
);
1001 /* unknown cipher */
1002 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1007 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1010 if (c
->algorithm_ssl
& ct
->mask_ssl
||
1011 c
->algorithm_mkey
& ct
->mask_k
|| c
->algorithm_auth
& ct
->mask_a
) {
1012 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1016 p
+= ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
1018 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1019 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1021 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1022 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1028 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1029 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1030 * set and use it for comparison.
1032 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1033 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1034 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1035 /* Workaround is now obsolete */
1037 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
))
1040 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1042 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1046 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1048 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1051 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1053 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1055 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1057 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1059 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1063 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1064 * using compression.
1066 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1072 if (s
->hit
&& j
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1073 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1075 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1080 else if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) {
1081 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1085 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, j
);
1087 if ((j
!= 0) && (comp
== NULL
)) {
1088 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1090 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1093 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1098 /* TLS extensions */
1099 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s
, &p
, d
, n
)) {
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1106 /* wrong packet length */
1107 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
);
1114 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1119 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
1121 int al
, i
, ok
, ret
= -1;
1122 unsigned long n
, nc
, llen
, l
;
1124 const unsigned char *q
, *p
;
1126 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1128 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1129 int need_cert
= 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
1132 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1135 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1140 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) ||
1141 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
) &&
1142 (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
))) {
1143 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1147 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
1148 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
1152 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1154 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1160 if (llen
+ 3 != n
) {
1161 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1165 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
1167 if ((l
+ nc
+ 3) > llen
) {
1168 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1170 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1175 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, &q
, l
);
1177 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1182 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1184 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1187 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1196 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1197 if ((s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
) && (i
<= 0)
1198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1199 && !((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
) &&
1200 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
1201 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1203 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1205 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1208 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1210 sc
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1214 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
)
1215 ssl_sess_cert_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
);
1216 s
->session
->sess_cert
= sc
;
1218 sc
->cert_chain
= sk
;
1220 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1221 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1223 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1226 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1229 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(x
);
1231 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
1232 need_cert
= ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
) &&
1233 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
1237 fprintf(stderr
, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey
, x
);
1238 fprintf(stderr
, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
));
1239 fprintf(stderr
, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
1240 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->name
,
1241 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
,
1242 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
, need_cert
);
1243 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1245 if (need_cert
&& ((pkey
== NULL
) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))) {
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1249 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1253 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1254 if (need_cert
&& i
< 0) {
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1258 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1263 int exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1264 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
) {
1266 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1268 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1271 sc
->peer_cert_type
= i
;
1272 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1274 * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
1277 if (sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
!= NULL
)
1278 X509_free(sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
);
1279 sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
= x
;
1280 sc
->peer_key
= &(sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
]);
1282 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
1283 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1284 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1285 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1287 sc
->peer_cert_type
= i
;
1288 sc
->peer_key
= NULL
;
1290 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
1291 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1292 s
->session
->peer
= NULL
;
1294 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1300 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1303 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1305 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1309 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1312 unsigned char *q
, md_buf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
* 2];
1315 unsigned char *param
, *p
;
1317 long i
, param_len
, n
, alg_k
, alg_a
;
1318 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1319 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1327 EC_KEY
*ecdh
= NULL
;
1328 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1329 EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1331 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
1334 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1337 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1338 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1340 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1341 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
1342 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
1343 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1347 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1349 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
1351 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1354 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) {
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1356 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1361 * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
1362 * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
1365 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1366 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1367 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
1368 OPENSSL_free(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1369 s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1372 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1376 param
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1377 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
!= NULL
) {
1378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1379 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
!= NULL
) {
1380 RSA_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
);
1381 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
= NULL
;
1384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1385 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
) {
1386 DH_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
);
1387 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
= NULL
;
1390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1391 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
) {
1392 EC_KEY_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
);
1393 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= NULL
;
1397 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1400 /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
1403 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
1405 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1408 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1409 char tmp_id_hint
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
1412 if (param_len
> n
) {
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1419 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1420 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1421 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1424 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1425 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1429 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1431 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH
);
1437 * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
1438 * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
1439 * so create a NULL-terminated string.
1441 memcpy(tmp_id_hint
, p
, i
);
1442 memset(tmp_id_hint
+ i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1 - i
);
1443 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
1444 OPENSSL_free(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1445 s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint
);
1446 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
1447 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1455 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1457 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1459 if (param_len
> n
) {
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1465 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH
);
1471 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.N
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1477 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1485 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH
);
1491 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.g
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1497 if (1 > n
- param_len
) {
1498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1503 i
= (unsigned int)(p
[0]);
1506 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH
);
1512 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.s
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1518 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1526 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH
);
1532 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.B
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1539 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, &al
)) {
1540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1544 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1545 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1546 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1548 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1549 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1553 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1554 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1556 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1557 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
].
1561 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1563 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
1564 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1565 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
1566 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1570 if ((rsa
= RSA_new()) == NULL
) {
1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1576 if (param_len
> n
) {
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1582 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH
);
1588 if (!(rsa
->n
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, rsa
->n
))) {
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1594 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1602 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH
);
1608 if (!(rsa
->e
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, rsa
->e
))) {
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1615 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1616 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1618 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1619 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1624 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
= rsa
;
1627 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1631 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kEDH
) {
1632 if ((dh
= DH_new()) == NULL
) {
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1638 if (param_len
> n
) {
1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1644 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH
);
1650 if (!(dh
->p
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1656 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1664 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH
);
1670 if (!(dh
->g
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1676 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1684 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH
);
1690 if (!(dh
->pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1697 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1698 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1700 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1701 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1705 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1706 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1708 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1709 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
].
1712 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1714 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
= dh
;
1716 } else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
)) {
1717 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1719 SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER
);
1722 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1725 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
) {
1727 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1729 if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1735 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1736 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1737 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1741 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1742 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
1743 * byte for the length of the encoded point
1746 if (param_len
> n
) {
1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1751 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1752 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1754 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, p
, 3)) {
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1759 if ((curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p
+ 2))) == 0) {
1760 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1762 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1766 ngroup
= EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid
);
1767 if (ngroup
== NULL
) {
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1771 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh
, ngroup
) == 0) {
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1775 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup
);
1777 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
);
1779 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1780 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163)) {
1781 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
1782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1783 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1789 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1790 if (((srvr_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) ||
1791 ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)) {
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1796 encoded_pt_len
= *p
; /* length of encoded point */
1799 if ((encoded_pt_len
> n
- param_len
) ||
1800 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
, srvr_ecpoint
,
1801 p
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
) == 0)) {
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1805 param_len
+= encoded_pt_len
;
1808 p
+= encoded_pt_len
;
1811 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1812 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1816 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1817 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1819 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1820 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1822 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1823 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1825 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1826 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].x509
);
1828 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1829 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh
, srvr_ecpoint
);
1830 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= ecdh
;
1832 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1834 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
1835 srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1837 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1841 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1843 /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
1845 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1847 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1853 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, p
, pkey
);
1860 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1873 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1876 * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
1878 if ((i
!= n
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0)) {
1879 /* wrong packet length */
1880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
1883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1884 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1890 for (num
= 2; num
> 0; num
--) {
1891 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1892 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
, (num
== 2)
1893 ? s
->ctx
->md5
: s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1894 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1896 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1898 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
);
1899 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
, q
, &size
);
1903 i
= RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
, p
, n
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
);
1905 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
1911 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1918 EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
1919 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1921 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1923 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
);
1924 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx
, p
, (int)n
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1926 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1932 /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
1933 if (!(alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) && !(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
1934 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1935 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
))
1936 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1940 /* still data left over */
1942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
1946 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1947 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1950 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1952 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1957 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1962 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1963 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
1967 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1971 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
1974 unsigned long n
, nc
, l
;
1975 unsigned int llen
, ctype_num
, i
;
1976 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
1977 const unsigned char *p
, *q
;
1979 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
1981 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1982 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
,
1983 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
,
1984 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1989 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
1991 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
1992 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1994 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
1995 * wont be doing client auth.
1997 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
1998 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
2004 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
2005 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2006 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
2010 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2011 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2012 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) {
2013 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2015 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER
);
2020 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2022 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2027 /* get the certificate types */
2029 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
) {
2030 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
2031 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
2033 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
2034 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2035 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
2036 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, p
, ctype_num
);
2037 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= (size_t)ctype_num
;
2038 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
2040 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
2041 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = p
[i
];
2043 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2046 * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
2049 if ((unsigned long)(p
- d
+ llen
+ 2) > n
) {
2050 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2052 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2055 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2056 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
2057 s
->cert
->pkeys
[i
].digest
= NULL
;
2058 s
->cert
->pkeys
[i
].valid_flags
= 0;
2060 if ((llen
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, p
, llen
)) {
2061 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2062 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2063 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2066 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2067 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2074 /* get the CA RDNs */
2079 out
= fopen("/tmp/vsign.der", "w");
2080 fwrite(p
, 1, llen
, out
);
2085 if ((unsigned long)(p
- d
+ llen
) != n
) {
2086 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2091 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
2093 if ((l
+ nc
+ 2) > llen
) {
2094 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
2095 goto cont
; /* netscape bugs */
2096 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG
);
2103 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &q
, l
)) == NULL
) {
2104 /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
2105 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
)
2108 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2115 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2117 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2120 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2134 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2135 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2136 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
2137 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
!= NULL
)
2138 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2139 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2145 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2149 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2151 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
2154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2155 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
)
2157 int ok
, al
, ret
= 0, ticklen
;
2159 const unsigned char *p
;
2162 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2163 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
,
2164 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
,
2165 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, 16384, &ok
);
2171 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
2172 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2177 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2178 n2l(p
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
);
2180 /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
2181 if (ticklen
+ 6 != n
) {
2182 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2186 if (s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
2187 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
2188 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
2190 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2191 if (!s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
2192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2195 memcpy(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, p
, ticklen
);
2196 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
2198 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2199 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2200 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2201 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2202 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2203 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2204 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2205 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2206 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2208 EVP_Digest(p
, ticklen
,
2209 s
->session
->session_id
, &s
->session
->session_id_length
,
2210 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2211 EVP_sha256(), NULL
);
2218 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2223 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
2226 unsigned long resplen
, n
;
2227 const unsigned char *p
;
2229 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2230 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
,
2231 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
,
2232 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
, 16384, &ok
);
2237 /* need at least status type + length */
2238 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2242 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2243 if (*p
++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2244 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2249 if (resplen
+ 4 != n
) {
2250 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2254 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
)
2255 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
);
2256 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= BUF_memdup(p
, resplen
);
2257 if (!s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
) {
2258 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2262 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
2263 if (s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
2265 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2267 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2272 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2279 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2284 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL
*s
)
2289 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2290 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2291 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
,
2292 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
,
2293 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 30, &ok
);
2298 /* should contain no data */
2299 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2307 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2311 unsigned long alg_k
;
2312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2314 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2318 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2319 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2320 EC_KEY
*clnt_ecdh
= NULL
;
2321 const EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2322 EVP_PKEY
*srvr_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2323 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2324 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2325 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2328 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
) {
2329 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2331 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2333 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2337 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
2339 unsigned char tmp_buf
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2341 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
2343 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2346 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2350 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
!= NULL
)
2351 rsa
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
2354 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
2355 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].
2357 if ((pkey
== NULL
) || (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2358 || (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
)) {
2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2360 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2363 rsa
= pkey
->pkey
.rsa
;
2364 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2367 tmp_buf
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2368 tmp_buf
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2369 if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf
[2]), sizeof tmp_buf
- 2) <= 0)
2372 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof tmp_buf
;
2375 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2376 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
2378 n
= RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf
,
2379 tmp_buf
, p
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2381 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2383 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2388 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2392 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2393 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2398 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2399 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2401 session
->master_key
,
2404 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf
, sizeof tmp_buf
);
2407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2408 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
) {
2409 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2410 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2411 /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
2412 krb5_data
*enc_ticket
;
2413 krb5_data authenticator
, *authp
= NULL
;
2414 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2415 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2416 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2417 unsigned char tmp_buf
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2418 unsigned char epms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2419 int padl
, outl
= sizeof(epms
);
2421 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2424 fprintf(stderr
, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
2426 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2429 # ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
2431 authp
= &authenticator
;
2432 # endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
2434 krb5rc
= kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, authp
, &kssl_err
);
2435 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2440 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc
);
2441 if (krb5rc
&& kssl_err
.text
)
2442 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
2445 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2448 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2454 * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
2455 * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
2457 * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
2458 * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
2459 * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
2460 * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
2461 * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
2463 * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
2464 * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
2465 * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
2466 * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
2468 * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
2469 * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
2470 * optional authenticator omitted.
2473 /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
2474 s2n(enc_ticket
->length
, p
);
2475 memcpy(p
, enc_ticket
->data
, enc_ticket
->length
);
2476 p
+= enc_ticket
->length
;
2477 n
= enc_ticket
->length
+ 2;
2479 /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
2480 if (authp
&& authp
->length
) {
2481 s2n(authp
->length
, p
);
2482 memcpy(p
, authp
->data
, authp
->length
);
2484 n
+= authp
->length
+ 2;
2490 s2n(0, p
); /* null authenticator length */
2494 tmp_buf
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2495 tmp_buf
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2496 if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf
[2]), sizeof tmp_buf
- 2) <= 0)
2500 * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
2501 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
2502 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
2503 * kssl_ctx->length);
2504 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
2507 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2508 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
, enc
, NULL
, kssl_ctx
->key
, iv
);
2509 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, epms
, &outl
, tmp_buf
,
2511 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
, &(epms
[outl
]), &padl
);
2513 if (outl
> (int)sizeof epms
) {
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2515 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2518 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2520 /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
2522 memcpy(p
, epms
, outl
);
2526 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2527 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2529 session
->master_key
,
2533 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf
, sizeof tmp_buf
);
2534 OPENSSL_cleanse(epms
, outl
);
2537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2538 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEDH
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
2539 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
;
2540 SESS_CERT
*scert
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
2542 if (scert
== NULL
) {
2543 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2545 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2549 if (scert
->peer_dh_tmp
!= NULL
)
2550 dh_srvr
= scert
->peer_dh_tmp
;
2552 /* we get them from the cert */
2553 int idx
= scert
->peer_cert_type
;
2554 EVP_PKEY
*spkey
= NULL
;
2557 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(scert
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
);
2559 dh_srvr
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey
);
2560 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
2562 if (dh_srvr
== NULL
) {
2563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2564 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2568 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
2569 /* Use client certificate key */
2570 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2573 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2574 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2576 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2580 /* generate a new random key */
2581 if ((dh_clnt
= DHparams_dup(dh_srvr
)) == NULL
) {
2582 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2585 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt
)) {
2586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2593 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2594 * clear it out afterwards
2597 n
= DH_compute_key(p
, dh_srvr
->pub_key
, dh_clnt
);
2598 if (scert
->peer_dh_tmp
== NULL
)
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2607 /* generate master key from the result */
2608 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2609 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2611 session
->master_key
,
2616 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
)
2619 /* send off the data */
2620 n
= BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt
->pub_key
);
2622 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt
->pub_key
, p
);
2628 /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2633 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEECDH
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2634 const EC_GROUP
*srvr_group
= NULL
;
2636 int ecdh_clnt_cert
= 0;
2639 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
2640 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2642 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2647 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2648 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2649 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2651 if ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) && (s
->cert
!= NULL
)) {
2653 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2654 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2655 * To add such support, one needs to add
2656 * code that checks for appropriate
2657 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2658 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2659 * key on the same curve as the server's
2660 * and the key should be authorized for
2663 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2664 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2667 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2668 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2669 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2670 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2674 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
!= NULL
) {
2675 tkey
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
;
2677 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2679 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
2680 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].x509
);
2681 if ((srvr_pub_pkey
== NULL
)
2682 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2683 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
== NULL
)) {
2684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2685 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2689 tkey
= srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
;
2692 srvr_group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2693 srvr_ecpoint
= EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey
);
2695 if ((srvr_group
== NULL
) || (srvr_ecpoint
== NULL
)) {
2696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2697 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2701 if ((clnt_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
2702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2703 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2707 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh
, srvr_group
)) {
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2711 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2713 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2714 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2716 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2717 tkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2718 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2719 if (priv_key
== NULL
) {
2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2721 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2724 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh
, priv_key
)) {
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2729 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2730 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh
))) {
2731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2738 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2739 * clear it out afterwards
2742 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group
);
2743 if (field_size
<= 0) {
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2747 n
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+ 7) / 8, srvr_ecpoint
,
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2754 /* generate master key from the result */
2755 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2756 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2758 session
->master_key
,
2761 memset(p
, 0, n
); /* clean up */
2763 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2764 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2768 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2772 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2773 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2774 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2777 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
2778 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len
* sizeof(unsigned char));
2779 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
2780 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
)) {
2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2782 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2786 /* Encode the public key */
2787 n
= EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2788 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2789 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2790 encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
);
2792 *p
= n
; /* length of encoded point */
2793 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2795 /* copy the point */
2796 memcpy((unsigned char *)p
, encodedPoint
, n
);
2797 /* increment n to account for length field */
2801 /* Free allocated memory */
2802 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2803 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
)
2804 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2805 if (clnt_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2806 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
2807 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
2809 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
2810 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2811 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2812 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2815 unsigned int md_len
;
2817 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2818 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
;
2822 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2826 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[(keytype
= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
)].x509
;
2830 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[(keytype
= SSL_PKEY_GOST94
)].x509
;
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2833 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2837 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key
=
2838 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2840 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2842 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2843 * certificate key for key exchange
2846 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2848 EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2849 /* Generate session key */
2850 RAND_bytes(premaster_secret
, 32);
2852 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2854 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
&& s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) {
2855 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2856 (pkey_ctx
, s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) <= 0) {
2858 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2865 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2868 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2869 EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
,
2870 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94
));
2871 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2873 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2875 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
);
2876 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash
);
2877 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2878 (pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8,
2880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2884 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2886 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2888 *(p
++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
;
2890 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, premaster_secret
, 32)
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2896 if (msglen
>= 0x80) {
2898 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2901 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2904 memcpy(p
, tmp
, msglen
);
2905 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2906 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2907 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0) {
2908 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2909 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
2911 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2912 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2913 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2915 session
->master_key
,
2918 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key
);
2921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2922 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2923 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
!= NULL
) {
2924 /* send off the data */
2925 n
= BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
);
2927 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, p
);
2930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2931 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2934 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2935 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2936 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2937 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2939 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2943 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2944 SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s
,
2945 s
->session
->master_key
)) <
2947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2948 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2954 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2956 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2957 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2960 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 2];
2961 size_t identity_len
;
2962 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2963 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
* 2 + 4];
2964 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2968 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2970 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2974 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2975 psk_len
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
,
2976 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2978 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2979 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2981 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2983 } else if (psk_len
== 0) {
2984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2985 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2988 identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1] = '\0';
2989 identity_len
= strlen(identity
);
2990 if (identity_len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2992 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2995 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2996 pre_ms_len
= 2 + psk_len
+ 2 + psk_len
;
2998 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+ psk_len
+ 4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
3000 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
3004 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
3005 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
3006 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
=
3007 BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
3008 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
3009 && s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3011 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3015 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
3016 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
3017 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup(identity
);
3018 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3020 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3024 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3025 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
3027 session
->master_key
,
3030 s2n(identity_len
, p
);
3031 memcpy(p
, identity
, identity_len
);
3032 n
= 2 + identity_len
;
3035 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
3036 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
3038 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3044 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3049 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
);
3050 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
3053 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
3054 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3056 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3057 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
3058 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
)
3059 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3060 if (clnt_ecdh
!= NULL
)
3061 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
3062 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
3067 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL
*s
)
3070 unsigned char data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
3072 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
3078 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
3080 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
) {
3081 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3082 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3083 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3084 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3085 EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx
);
3086 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx
, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3087 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3088 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3091 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]));
3096 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3097 * digest and cached handshake records.
3099 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3102 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->cert
->key
->digest
;
3103 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3104 if (hdatalen
<= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
3105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3110 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3113 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3114 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
3115 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx
, p
+ 2, &u
, pkey
)) {
3116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3121 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
3124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3125 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
3126 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
, NID_md5
, &(data
[0]));
3127 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, data
,
3128 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,
3129 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0) {
3130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_RSA_LIB
);
3137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3138 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
3139 if (!DSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3140 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3141 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3142 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.dsa
)) {
3143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_DSA_LIB
);
3150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3151 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3152 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3153 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3154 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3155 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) {
3156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB
);
3163 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
3164 || pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
3165 unsigned char signbuf
[64];
3167 size_t sigsize
= 64;
3168 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3169 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, data
);
3170 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx
, signbuf
, &sigsize
, data
, 32) <= 0) {
3171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3174 for (i
= 63, j
= 0; i
>= 0; j
++, i
--) {
3175 p
[2 + j
] = signbuf
[i
];
3180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3183 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
, n
);
3184 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
;
3186 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3187 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3188 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3190 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3191 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3196 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3197 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3198 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3200 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3202 unsigned long alg_k
;
3203 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
3205 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3206 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->cert
->key
->digest
)
3209 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3210 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3212 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3213 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3215 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3216 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3217 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3218 SESS_CERT
*scert
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
3219 int i
= scert
->peer_cert_type
;
3220 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= NULL
, *spkey
= NULL
;
3221 clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3222 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3223 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey
) != EVP_PKEY_DH
)
3226 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(scert
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
);
3228 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3229 i
= EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, spkey
);
3230 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
3234 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
3239 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3242 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3245 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
) {
3246 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3247 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3248 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3250 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3254 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3257 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3259 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3260 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3262 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3265 /* We need to get a client cert */
3266 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
) {
3268 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3269 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3272 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3274 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3277 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3278 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3279 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3280 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3282 } else if (i
== 1) {
3284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3285 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3291 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3292 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3295 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3296 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3297 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3300 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3304 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3305 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3308 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
) {
3309 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
;
3310 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,
3311 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
==
3312 2) ? NULL
: s
->cert
->key
)) {
3313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3314 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3318 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3319 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3322 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3324 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3328 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3337 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3338 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3340 /* we don't have a certificate */
3341 if ((alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aKRB5
)) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
3344 sc
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
3346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3350 rsa
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
3352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3353 dh
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
;
3356 /* This is the passed certificate */
3358 idx
= sc
->peer_cert_type
;
3359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3360 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
3361 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
, s
) == 0) {
3363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3368 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3370 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3372 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
3373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT
);
3377 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
);
3378 i
= X509_certificate_type(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
, pkey
);
3379 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3381 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3382 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3384 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3388 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3390 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3395 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) &&
3396 !(has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
) || (rsa
!= NULL
))) {
3397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3398 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3403 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kEDH
) &&
3404 !(has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKT_EXCH
) || (dh
!= NULL
))) {
3405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY
);
3407 } else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3408 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_RSA
)) {
3409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3410 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT
);
3413 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3414 else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3415 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_DSA
)) {
3416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3417 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT
);
3423 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PKT_EXP
)) {
3424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3425 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
3427 || RSA_size(rsa
) * 8 >
3428 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3430 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
3435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3436 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEDH
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3438 || DH_size(dh
) * 8 >
3439 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3441 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3448 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
3454 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3459 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
3460 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3462 unsigned int len
, padding_len
;
3465 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
) {
3466 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
3467 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3468 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3470 memcpy(d
+ 5, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
);
3471 d
[5 + len
] = padding_len
;
3472 memset(d
+ 6 + len
, 0, padding_len
);
3473 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
3474 l2n3(2 + len
+ padding_len
, d
);
3475 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
;
3476 s
->init_num
= 4 + 2 + len
+ padding_len
;
3480 return ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
);
3482 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT &&
3483 * !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
3485 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3489 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3490 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3491 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3492 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3497 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3498 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);