1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
176 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
178 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
186 ssl_undefined_function
, ssl3_get_server_method
)
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
191 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
193 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
195 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
196 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
197 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
203 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
205 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, al
);
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
215 unsigned long alg_k
, Time
= (unsigned long)time(NULL
);
216 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
218 int new_state
, state
, skip
= 0;
220 RAND_add(&Time
, sizeof(Time
), 0);
224 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
225 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
226 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
227 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
))
234 if (s
->cert
== NULL
) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
) {
245 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
| SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
261 case SSL_ST_OK
| SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
265 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
, 1);
267 if ((s
->version
>> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
269 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
272 s
->type
= SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
274 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
) {
275 if ((buf
= BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
) {
277 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
283 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
)) {
291 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
296 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
297 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
301 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
303 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
) {
305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
, 1)) {
310 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
315 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
316 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
317 } else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
322 * support secure renegotiation.
324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,
325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
326 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
328 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
335 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
336 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
344 ret
= ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
347 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
348 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
355 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
363 ret
= ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
367 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D
;
368 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D
:
371 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
, &al
)) < 0) {
373 * callback indicates firther work to be done
375 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
378 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
) {
379 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
384 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
386 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
388 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
395 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
400 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
401 ret
= ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
406 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
407 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
409 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
413 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
416 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
421 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
422 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
423 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
426 new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aKRB5
|
428 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
429 ret
= ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
433 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
434 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
436 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
439 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
445 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
451 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
452 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
455 * clear this, it may get reset by
456 * send_server_key_exchange
458 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
= 0;
461 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
462 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
463 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
464 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
465 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
470 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
474 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
477 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
478 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
480 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEDH
)
481 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
482 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
483 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
484 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
485 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
486 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
) *
487 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
492 ret
= ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
498 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
504 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
505 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
507 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
508 * during re-negotiation:
510 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
511 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
513 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
514 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
517 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
519 * ... except when the application insists on
520 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
523 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
525 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
527 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
) ||
528 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
529 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
531 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
534 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
535 /* no cert request */
537 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
538 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
539 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
540 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
541 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
546 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
547 ret
= ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
550 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
551 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
553 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
554 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
562 ret
= ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
565 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
566 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
570 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
573 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
574 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
575 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
576 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
577 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
581 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
582 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0) {
586 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
588 s
->state
= s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
592 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
593 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
594 ret
= ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
599 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
602 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
603 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
604 ret
= ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
609 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
610 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
611 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
612 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
614 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
615 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
617 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
618 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
620 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
623 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
624 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
626 if (!s
->session
->peer
)
629 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
630 * digest cached records.
632 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
634 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
637 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
638 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
639 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
646 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
650 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
651 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
652 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
655 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
656 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
657 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
661 for (dgst_num
= 0; dgst_num
< SSL_MAX_DIGEST
; dgst_num
++)
662 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]) {
665 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
674 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
676 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
685 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
686 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
687 ret
= ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
691 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
692 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
694 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
695 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
697 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
702 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
703 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
704 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
706 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
707 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
708 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
710 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
711 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
712 * the client's Finished message is read.
714 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
715 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
717 ret
= ssl3_get_next_proto(s
);
721 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
725 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
726 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
728 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
729 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
730 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
731 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
732 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
733 * the client's Finished message is read.
735 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
736 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
737 ret
= ssl3_get_finished(s
, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
738 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
742 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
744 else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
745 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
748 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
752 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
753 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
754 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
755 ret
= ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
758 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
762 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
763 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
764 ret
= ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
767 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
773 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
774 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
776 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
777 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
779 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
783 ret
= ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
785 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
789 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
792 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
793 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
796 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
802 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
803 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
804 ret
= ssl3_send_finished(s
,
805 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,
806 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
808 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
810 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
813 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
815 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
816 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
818 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
) {
819 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
821 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
824 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
829 /* clean a few things up */
830 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
832 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
835 /* remove buffering on output */
836 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
840 if (s
->renegotiate
== 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
845 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
847 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
849 s
->handshake_func
= ssl3_accept
;
852 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
867 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
) {
869 if ((ret
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
873 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
)) {
874 new_state
= s
->state
;
876 cb(s
, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
, 1);
877 s
->state
= new_state
;
883 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
887 cb(s
, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
, ret
);
891 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
894 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
) {
895 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
, 0);
896 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
899 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
900 return ssl_do_write(s
);
903 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
905 int i
, j
, ok
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ret
= -1;
906 unsigned int cookie_len
;
909 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
913 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
915 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
917 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
&& !s
->first_packet
)
921 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
922 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
923 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
924 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
926 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
) {
927 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
930 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
931 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
932 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
933 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
934 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
, &ok
);
939 d
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
942 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
943 * for session id length
945 if (n
< 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ 1) {
946 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
952 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
953 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
955 s
->client_version
= (((int)p
[0]) << 8) | (int)p
[1];
958 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) ? (s
->client_version
> s
->version
&&
959 s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
)
960 : (s
->client_version
< s
->version
)) {
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
962 if ((s
->client_version
>> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
&&
963 !s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
) {
965 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
968 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
970 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
975 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
976 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
979 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
980 unsigned int session_length
, cookie_length
;
982 session_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
984 if (p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1 >= d
+ n
) {
985 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
986 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
989 cookie_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1);
991 if (cookie_length
== 0)
995 /* load the client random */
996 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
997 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
999 /* get the session-id */
1002 if (p
+ j
> d
+ n
) {
1003 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1010 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1011 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1012 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1013 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1014 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1015 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1016 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1017 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1018 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1019 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1022 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1023 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1026 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
1028 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1030 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1031 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1032 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1033 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1034 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1036 if (i
== 1 && s
->version
== s
->session
->ssl_version
) { /* previous
1043 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1050 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1052 if (p
+ 1 > d
+ n
) {
1053 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1057 cookie_len
= *(p
++);
1059 if (p
+ cookie_len
> d
+ n
) {
1060 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1066 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1067 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1068 * does not cause an overflow.
1070 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
)) {
1072 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1077 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1078 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) && cookie_len
> 0) {
1079 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
1081 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1082 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
1084 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1086 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1089 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1091 /* default verification */
1092 else if (memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1093 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1094 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1098 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1103 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1104 /* Select version to use */
1105 if (s
->client_version
<= DTLS1_2_VERSION
&&
1106 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
)) {
1107 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
1108 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1109 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1111 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
1112 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1113 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1115 } else if (s
->client_version
<= DTLS1_VERSION
&&
1116 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
)) {
1117 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
1118 s
->method
= DTLSv1_server_method();
1120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1121 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
1122 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1123 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1126 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1130 if (p
+ 2 > d
+ n
) {
1131 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1138 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
1143 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1144 if ((p
+ i
+ 1) > (d
+ n
)) {
1145 /* not enough data */
1146 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1150 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, p
, i
, &(ciphers
)) == NULL
) {
1155 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1158 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1161 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1162 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1164 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1165 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1167 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1168 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1176 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1180 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1181 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1)) {
1183 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1184 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1185 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1186 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1187 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1189 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
1190 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0) {
1191 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
1198 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1201 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1203 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1210 if ((p
+ i
) > (d
+ n
)) {
1211 /* not enough data */
1212 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1219 for (j
= 0; j
< i
; j
++) {
1227 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1232 /* TLS extensions */
1233 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1234 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
, &p
, d
, n
)) {
1235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1241 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1242 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1243 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1244 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1248 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1249 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0) {
1254 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
) {
1255 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1257 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1258 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1259 &s
->session
->master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1261 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
1263 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1264 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1268 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1270 pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,
1275 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1276 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1281 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1284 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1286 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1287 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1289 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1290 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1296 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1297 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1298 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1300 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1302 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1303 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1304 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1305 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1306 /* Can't disable compression */
1307 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) {
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1309 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1312 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1313 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1314 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1315 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1316 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1320 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1322 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1325 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1326 for (m
= 0; m
< i
; m
++) {
1327 if (q
[m
] == comp_id
)
1331 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1333 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1338 else if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1339 /* See if we have a match */
1340 int m
, nn
, o
, v
, done
= 0;
1342 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1343 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1344 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1346 for (o
= 0; o
< i
; o
++) {
1356 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1362 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1363 * using compression.
1365 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1372 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1376 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1377 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
1379 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
1381 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1382 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1383 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1384 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
1385 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1390 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
1391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1394 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1396 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
1397 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
1399 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
1404 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1407 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1409 c
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1412 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1416 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1418 /* Session-id reuse */
1419 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1420 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1421 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
= NULL
;
1422 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
= NULL
;
1424 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) {
1425 sk
= s
->session
->ciphers
;
1426 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++) {
1427 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
1428 if (c
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_eNULL
)
1430 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1434 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= nc
;
1435 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1436 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= ec
;
1438 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1441 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1444 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
1445 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1450 * we now have the following setup.
1452 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1453 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1454 * compression - basically ignored right now
1455 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1456 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1457 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1458 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1461 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1462 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1463 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s
) <= 0) {
1464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1473 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1475 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1478 if (ciphers
!= NULL
)
1479 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1480 return ret
< 0 ? -1 : ret
;
1483 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1486 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1491 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
) {
1492 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1493 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1494 p
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1495 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0) {
1496 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1500 /* Do the message type and length last */
1501 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1503 *(p
++) = s
->version
>> 8;
1504 *(p
++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
1507 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1508 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1511 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1512 * back in the server hello:
1513 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1514 * we send back the old session ID.
1515 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1516 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1517 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1518 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1520 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1521 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1522 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1523 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1526 if (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1528 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
1530 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1531 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1533 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1537 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, sl
);
1540 /* put the cipher */
1541 i
= ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, p
);
1544 /* put the compression method */
1545 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1548 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1551 *(p
++) = s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1554 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1556 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1560 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
1562 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1564 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1570 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
, l
);
1571 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1574 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1575 return ssl_do_write(s
);
1578 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1581 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
) {
1582 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 0);
1583 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1586 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1587 return ssl_do_write(s
);
1590 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1596 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1600 DH
*dh
= NULL
, *dhp
;
1602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1603 EC_KEY
*ecdh
= NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1604 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1607 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1610 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1611 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1621 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1622 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
) {
1623 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1628 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1631 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
) {
1632 rsa
= cert
->rsa_tmp
;
1633 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
1634 rsa
= s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1635 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->
1637 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->
1640 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1642 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1646 cert
->rsa_tmp
= rsa
;
1649 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1651 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1656 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
= 1;
1659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1660 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
) {
1662 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1663 dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1664 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->
1666 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->
1669 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1671 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1675 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
) {
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1677 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1681 if ((dh
= DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
) {
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1687 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1688 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1689 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
))) {
1690 if (!DH_generate_key(dh
)) {
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1695 dh
->pub_key
= BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1696 dh
->priv_key
= BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1697 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) || (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
)) {
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1708 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
) {
1709 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1711 ecdhp
= cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1712 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
) {
1713 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1714 int nid
= tls1_shared_curve(s
, -2);
1715 if (nid
!= NID_undef
)
1716 ecdhp
= EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid
);
1717 } else if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
) {
1718 ecdhp
= s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1719 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->
1721 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->
1722 s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1724 if (ecdhp
== NULL
) {
1725 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1727 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1731 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
) {
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1733 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1737 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1738 if (ecdhp
== NULL
) {
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1742 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
)
1744 else if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp
)) == NULL
) {
1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1749 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= ecdh
;
1750 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1751 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1752 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
)) {
1753 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
)) {
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1760 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1761 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1762 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
)) {
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1767 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1768 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163)) {
1769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1770 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1775 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1776 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1780 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1783 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1788 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1789 * allocate memory accordingly.
1791 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1792 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1793 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1796 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1797 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
* sizeof(unsigned char));
1798 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1799 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1801 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1805 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1806 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1807 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1808 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1810 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1815 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1819 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1820 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1821 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1827 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1828 * can set these to NULLs
1835 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1837 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1839 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1841 n
+= 2 + strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1843 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1844 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1845 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1846 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1847 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1848 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1850 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1853 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
1854 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
1855 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
1856 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
1860 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1862 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1865 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1866 nr
[i
] = BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1868 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1875 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
1876 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
1877 if ((pkey
= ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
, s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, &md
))
1879 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1882 kn
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1888 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, n
+ SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + kn
)) {
1889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1892 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1894 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1896 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1907 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
) {
1909 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1910 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1911 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1912 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1914 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1922 memcpy((unsigned char *)p
,
1923 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
, encodedlen
);
1924 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1925 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1931 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1932 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1933 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1934 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
,
1935 strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
1936 p
+= strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1943 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1944 * points to the space at the end.
1946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1947 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1950 for (num
= 2; num
> 0; num
--) {
1951 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
,
1952 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1953 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
, (num
== 2)
1954 ? s
->ctx
->md5
: s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1955 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1957 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1959 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, d
, n
);
1960 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
, q
, (unsigned int *)&i
);
1964 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
1965 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0) {
1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_RSA
);
1974 /* send signature algorithm */
1975 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1976 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
1977 /* Should never happen */
1978 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1980 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1986 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1988 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
1989 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1991 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1993 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, d
, n
);
1994 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
, &(p
[2]),
1995 (unsigned int *)&i
, pkey
)) {
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_EVP
);
2001 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2004 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2005 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2006 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2007 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
2012 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
);
2015 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
2016 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2017 return ssl_do_write(s
);
2019 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2021 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2022 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
)
2023 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2024 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2026 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2027 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2031 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2033 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
2034 int i
, j
, nl
, off
, n
;
2035 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
= NULL
;
2039 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
) {
2042 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2044 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2046 n
= ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, p
);
2051 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2052 const unsigned char *psigs
;
2053 nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &psigs
);
2055 memcpy(p
, psigs
, nl
);
2064 sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2067 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++) {
2068 name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
, i
);
2069 j
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
);
2070 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2071 (buf
, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + n
+ j
+ 2)) {
2072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2076 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + n
;
2077 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
)) {
2079 i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &p
);
2084 i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &p
);
2093 /* else no CA names */
2094 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + off
;
2097 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, n
);
2099 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2100 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2101 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, s
->init_num
+ 4)) {
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
2105 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
2107 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
2115 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
2118 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2119 return ssl_do_write(s
);
2121 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2125 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2129 unsigned long alg_k
;
2131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2133 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2137 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
= NULL
;
2139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2141 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2144 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
2145 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2146 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2147 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2150 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2151 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
2152 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
2153 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, 2048, &ok
);
2157 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2159 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2162 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
2163 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2165 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2168 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2169 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
) {
2170 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
2171 rsa
= s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
2173 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2176 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2178 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
2183 pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
2184 if ((pkey
== NULL
) ||
2185 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) || (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
)) {
2186 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2188 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2191 rsa
= pkey
->pkey
.rsa
;
2194 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2195 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2198 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
)) {
2199 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2201 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2210 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2211 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2212 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2213 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2214 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2216 if (n
< SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2217 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2219 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2224 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2225 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2226 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2227 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2228 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2232 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2234 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
,
2235 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0)
2238 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
, p
, p
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2242 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2243 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2246 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len
, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
);
2249 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2250 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2251 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2252 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2253 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2254 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2257 constant_time_eq_8(p
[0], (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
2259 constant_time_eq_8(p
[1], (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
2262 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2263 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2264 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2265 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2266 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2267 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2270 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
2271 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2273 constant_time_eq_8(p
[0], (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
2275 constant_time_eq_8(p
[1], (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
2276 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
2280 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2281 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2283 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
2286 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2287 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2288 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2289 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2291 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
2292 p
[j
] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
, p
[j
],
2293 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
2296 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2297 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2299 session
->master_key
,
2302 (rand_premaster_secret
));
2303 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
));
2306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2307 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEDH
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
2309 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2313 if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) {
2314 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2316 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2321 if (n
&& n
!= i
+ 2) {
2322 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
)) {
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2324 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2331 if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
)
2332 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA
;
2333 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
)
2334 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA
;
2336 skey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
;
2337 if ((skey
== NULL
) ||
2338 (skey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_DH
) || (skey
->pkey
.dh
== NULL
)) {
2339 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2341 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2344 dh_srvr
= skey
->pkey
.dh
;
2345 } else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
) {
2346 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2348 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2351 dh_srvr
= s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2354 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2355 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2357 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, skey
) == 1)
2358 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2360 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2361 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2363 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2366 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey
);
2367 pub
= dh_clnt
->pub_key
;
2369 pub
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
);
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2375 i
= DH_compute_key(p
, pub
, dh_srvr
);
2378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2383 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2384 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
2390 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2391 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2393 session
->master_key
,
2395 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2401 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
) {
2402 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2403 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2404 krb5_data authenticator
;
2406 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2407 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2408 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2409 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2410 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2412 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2413 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2416 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2419 kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2422 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2424 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ 6)) {
2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2426 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2430 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2431 p
+= enc_ticket
.length
;
2434 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2436 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6)) {
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2438 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2442 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2443 p
+= authenticator
.length
;
2447 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2448 p
+= enc_pms
.length
;
2451 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2453 if (enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
) {
2454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2455 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2459 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2460 enc_pms
.length
+ 6)) {
2461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2462 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2466 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2469 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2470 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2472 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2473 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2479 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2480 * return authtime == 0.
2482 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2483 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0) {
2485 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2486 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2488 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2489 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2494 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0) {
2495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2499 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2500 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2502 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2506 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2508 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
, enc
, NULL
, kssl_ctx
->key
, iv
)) {
2509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2510 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2513 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
, &outl
,
2514 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2517 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2521 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2523 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2527 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
, &(pms
[outl
]), &padl
)) {
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2529 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2534 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2536 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2540 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>> 8))
2541 && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff)))) {
2543 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2544 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2545 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2546 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2547 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2548 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2549 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2552 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
)) {
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2554 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2560 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2562 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2563 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2565 session
->master_key
,
2568 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
) {
2569 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2570 if (len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
) {
2571 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2572 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
, kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,
2577 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2578 * but it caused problems for apache.
2579 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2580 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2584 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms
, sizeof(pms
));
2588 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2591 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEECDH
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2595 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2596 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2598 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2599 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
2600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2604 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2605 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2606 /* use the certificate */
2607 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2610 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2611 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2613 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2616 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2617 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2619 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2620 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
)) {
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2625 /* Let's get client's public key */
2626 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) {
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2632 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2634 if (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
) {
2635 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2637 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2640 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2641 == NULL
) || (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
)) {
2643 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2644 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2645 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2646 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2647 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2648 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2650 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2652 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2656 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2657 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->
2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2662 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2665 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2666 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2668 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
) {
2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2670 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2674 /* Get encoded point length */
2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2681 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
, clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0) {
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2686 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2689 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2692 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2693 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2694 if (field_size
<= 0) {
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2698 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+ 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
,
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2705 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2706 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2707 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2708 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2709 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2710 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2712 /* Compute the master secret */
2713 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2714 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2716 session
->master_key
,
2719 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2724 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2725 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2726 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
* 2 + 4];
2727 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2729 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2731 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2738 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2740 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2743 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2745 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2750 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2752 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2753 memset(tmp_id
+ i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1 - i
);
2754 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2756 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2757 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1);
2759 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2762 } else if (psk_len
== 0) {
2764 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2767 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2768 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2772 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2773 pre_ms_len
= 2 + psk_len
+ 2 + psk_len
;
2775 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+ psk_len
+ 4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2777 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2781 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2782 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2783 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup((char *)p
);
2784 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2789 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2790 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2791 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2792 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2793 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
2794 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2798 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2799 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2801 session
->master_key
,
2806 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2812 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2817 if (param_len
> n
) {
2818 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2820 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2823 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2827 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0
2828 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
2829 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2831 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
2834 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2835 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2836 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2837 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2842 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2843 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s
,
2844 s
->session
->master_key
)) < 0) {
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2851 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2852 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2854 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2855 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2856 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2857 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
2858 unsigned long alg_a
;
2862 /* Get our certificate private key */
2863 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2864 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST94
)
2865 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST94
].privatekey
;
2866 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
)
2867 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2869 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
2870 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2872 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2873 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2874 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2875 * client certificate for authorization only.
2877 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2878 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
2879 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2882 /* Decrypt session key */
2884 ((const unsigned char **)&p
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
, &Tclass
,
2885 n
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
|| Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2886 || Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
) {
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2888 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2893 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2894 (pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
, inlen
) <= 0) {
2895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2896 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2899 /* Generate master secret */
2900 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2901 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2903 session
->master_key
,
2904 premaster_secret
, 32);
2905 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret
, sizeof(premaster_secret
));
2906 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2907 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2908 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2913 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
2914 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2920 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2927 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2928 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2932 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2933 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2934 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2935 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2936 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2938 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2942 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2944 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2946 int al
, ok
, ret
= 0;
2950 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2952 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
2955 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2956 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2957 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2958 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2959 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2960 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
2962 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2967 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2968 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2969 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2970 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
,
2971 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
, &ok
);
2976 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
2977 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2978 type
= X509_certificate_type(peer
, pkey
);
2980 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
2982 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2983 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2987 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2988 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2989 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2991 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2994 if (n
== 64 && (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
2995 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)) {
2998 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2999 int rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, p
, pkey
);
3001 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3003 } else if (rv
== 0) {
3004 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3008 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
3016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3017 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3021 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
3022 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0)) {
3023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
3024 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3028 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3031 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3032 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
3033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3034 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3038 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3041 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3042 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)) {
3043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3044 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3048 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx
, p
, i
, pkey
) <= 0) {
3049 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
3054 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3055 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
3056 i
= RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3057 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
3060 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
3065 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
3071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3072 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
3073 j
= DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3074 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3075 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
, pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
3078 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
3084 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3085 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3086 j
= ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3087 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3088 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
3091 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3097 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
3098 || pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
3099 unsigned char signature
[64];
3101 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3102 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
);
3104 fprintf(stderr
, "GOST signature length is %d", i
);
3106 for (idx
= 0; idx
< 64; idx
++) {
3107 signature
[63 - idx
] = p
[idx
];
3109 j
= EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
, signature
, 64, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3111 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3113 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3119 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
3126 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3127 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3130 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
3131 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3132 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3133 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3135 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3136 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3140 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3142 int i
, ok
, al
, ret
= -1;
3144 unsigned long l
, nc
, llen
, n
;
3145 const unsigned char *p
, *q
;
3147 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3149 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3152 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
3157 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
3158 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3159 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3161 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3162 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3166 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3168 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
3169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3170 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
3171 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3174 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
3178 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
3179 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
3183 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3185 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3191 if (llen
+ 3 != n
) {
3192 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3196 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
3198 if ((l
+ nc
+ 3) > llen
) {
3199 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3201 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3206 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, &p
, l
);
3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3212 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3214 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3217 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3225 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3226 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3227 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3228 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3230 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3233 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3234 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3235 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3237 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3238 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3241 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3242 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
3243 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3247 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3249 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3251 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3256 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
3257 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3258 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3259 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3262 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3265 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
3266 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
3267 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
3268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3272 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
3273 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
3274 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
= sk
;
3276 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3277 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3285 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3287 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3293 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
3297 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3301 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
) {
3302 cpk
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
3304 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3305 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
3306 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
)) {
3307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
3308 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3309 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3314 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, cpk
)) {
3315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3316 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3319 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
3322 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3323 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3327 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3328 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3330 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3334 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
) {
3335 unsigned char *p
, *macstart
;
3336 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3337 int len
, slen_full
, slen
;
3340 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3341 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3342 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3344 /* get session encoding length */
3345 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3347 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3350 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3351 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3354 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3356 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3360 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3361 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3364 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
))
3368 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3371 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3374 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3376 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3377 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3378 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3382 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3383 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3386 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3389 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3390 * follows handshake_header_length +
3391 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3392 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3393 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3394 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3396 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3397 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+
3398 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3401 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3403 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3404 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3406 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
) {
3407 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3411 if (RAND_bytes(iv
, 16) <= 0)
3413 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3414 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
))
3416 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3417 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
))
3419 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3423 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3424 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3425 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3427 l2n(s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
, p
);
3429 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3431 /* Output key name */
3433 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3436 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3437 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3438 /* Encrypt session data */
3439 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
))
3442 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
))
3446 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
))
3448 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
))
3451 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3452 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3455 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3457 len
= p
- ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3458 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3459 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + 4;
3461 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, len
);
3462 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3466 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3467 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3471 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3472 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3473 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3477 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3479 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
) {
3482 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3483 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3484 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3487 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
)) {
3488 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3492 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3495 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3496 /* message length */
3497 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3499 *(p
++) = s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3500 /* length of OCSP response */
3501 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3502 /* actual response */
3503 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3504 /* number of bytes to write */
3505 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3506 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3510 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3511 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3514 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3516 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3517 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3519 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3522 int proto_len
, padding_len
;
3524 const unsigned char *p
;
3527 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3528 * extension in their ClientHello
3530 if (!s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
) {
3531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,
3532 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION
);
3533 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3537 /* See the payload format below */
3538 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3539 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
,
3540 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
,
3541 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
, 514, &ok
);
3547 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3548 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3549 * ssl3_get_finished).
3551 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
3552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
3553 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3558 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3559 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3562 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3565 * The payload looks like:
3567 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3568 * uint8 padding_len;
3569 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3572 if (proto_len
+ 2 > s
->init_num
) {
3573 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3576 padding_len
= p
[proto_len
+ 1];
3577 if (proto_len
+ padding_len
+ 2 != s
->init_num
) {
3578 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3582 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len
);
3583 if (!s
->next_proto_negotiated
) {
3584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3585 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3588 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, p
+ 1, proto_len
);
3589 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= proto_len
;