1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
74 /* CRL score values */
76 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
78 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
80 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
82 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
86 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
88 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
90 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
92 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
94 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
96 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
98 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
100 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
102 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
104 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
106 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
108 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
110 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
112 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
);
113 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
);
114 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
);
115 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
116 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
117 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
118 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
119 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
120 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
121 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
123 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
124 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
);
125 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
126 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
);
127 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
,
128 int *pcrl_score
, X509_CRL
*base
,
129 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
);
130 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
**pissuer
,
132 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
133 unsigned int *preasons
);
134 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
135 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
136 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
137 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
);
139 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
140 const char X509_version
[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT
;
142 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
)
148 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509
**a
, X509
**b
)
150 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a
, *b
);
153 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
154 static int cert_self_signed(X509
*x
)
156 X509_check_purpose(x
, -1, 0);
157 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SS
)
163 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
165 static X509
*lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
167 STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
;
170 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
171 certs
= ctx
->lookup_certs(ctx
, X509_get_subject_name(x
));
174 /* Look for exact match */
175 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(certs
); i
++) {
176 xtmp
= sk_X509_value(certs
, i
);
177 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp
, x
))
180 if (i
< sk_X509_num(certs
))
181 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
184 sk_X509_pop_free(certs
, X509_free
);
188 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
190 X509
*x
, *xtmp
, *xtmp2
, *chain_ss
= NULL
;
192 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
= ctx
->param
;
193 int depth
, i
, ok
= 0;
195 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
196 STACK_OF(X509
) *sktmp
= NULL
;
197 if (ctx
->cert
== NULL
) {
198 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY
);
205 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
206 * the first entry is in place
208 if (ctx
->chain
== NULL
) {
209 if (((ctx
->chain
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) ||
210 (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, ctx
->cert
))) {
211 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
214 CRYPTO_add(&ctx
->cert
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
215 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 1;
218 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
219 if (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
220 && (sktmp
= sk_X509_dup(ctx
->untrusted
)) == NULL
) {
221 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
225 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
226 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
227 depth
= param
->depth
;
230 /* If we have enough, we break */
232 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
233 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
234 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
237 /* If we are self signed, we break */
238 if (cert_self_signed(x
))
241 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
243 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
) {
244 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
248 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
257 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
258 if (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
) {
259 xtmp
= find_issuer(ctx
, sktmp
, x
);
261 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, xtmp
)) {
262 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
265 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
266 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp
, xtmp
);
267 ctx
->last_untrusted
++;
271 * reparse the full chain for the next one
279 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
282 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
283 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
289 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
291 i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
292 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
- 1);
293 if (cert_self_signed(x
)) {
294 /* we have a self signed certificate */
295 if (sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1) {
297 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
298 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
299 * possible impersonation.
301 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
302 if ((ok
<= 0) || X509_cmp(x
, xtmp
)) {
303 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
;
304 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
305 ctx
->error_depth
= i
- 1;
314 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
315 * version so we get any trust settings.
319 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, i
- 1, x
);
320 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 0;
324 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
326 chain_ss
= sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
327 ctx
->last_untrusted
--;
330 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
333 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
335 /* If we have enough, we break */
338 /* If we are self signed, we break */
339 if (cert_self_signed(x
))
341 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
348 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, x
)) {
350 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
356 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
357 i
= check_trust(ctx
);
359 /* If explicitly rejected error */
360 if (i
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
)
363 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
364 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
365 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
369 if (i
!= X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
370 && !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
)
371 && !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS
)) {
373 xtmp2
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
- 1);
374 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, xtmp2
);
377 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
380 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
385 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
389 xtmp
= sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
392 ctx
->last_untrusted
--;
402 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
403 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
404 * and set bad_chain == 1
406 if (i
!= X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
&& !bad_chain
) {
407 if ((chain_ss
== NULL
) || !ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, chain_ss
)) {
408 if (ctx
->last_untrusted
>= num
)
409 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
;
411 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
;
412 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
415 sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, chain_ss
);
417 ctx
->last_untrusted
= num
;
418 ctx
->current_cert
= chain_ss
;
419 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
;
423 ctx
->error_depth
= num
- 1;
430 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
431 ok
= check_chain_extensions(ctx
);
436 /* Check name constraints */
438 ok
= check_name_constraints(ctx
);
448 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
449 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
452 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
453 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
456 ok
= ctx
->check_revocation(ctx
);
460 i
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx
->error_depth
, NULL
, ctx
->chain
,
462 if (i
!= X509_V_OK
) {
464 ctx
->current_cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, ctx
->error_depth
);
470 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
471 if (ctx
->verify
!= NULL
)
472 ok
= ctx
->verify(ctx
);
474 ok
= internal_verify(ctx
);
478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
479 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
480 ok
= v3_asid_validate_path(ctx
);
483 ok
= v3_addr_validate_path(ctx
);
488 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
489 if (!bad_chain
&& (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK
))
490 ok
= ctx
->check_policy(ctx
);
495 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
499 if (chain_ss
!= NULL
)
505 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
508 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
)
512 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
513 issuer
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
514 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, issuer
))
520 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
522 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
)
525 ret
= X509_check_issued(issuer
, x
);
526 if (ret
== X509_V_OK
)
528 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
529 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK
))
533 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
534 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
535 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
538 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
540 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
542 *issuer
= find_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->other_ctx
, x
);
544 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer
)->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
551 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
555 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
557 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
560 int i
, ok
= 0, must_be_ca
, plen
= 0;
562 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
563 int proxy_path_length
= 0;
565 int allow_proxy_certs
;
569 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
570 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
571 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
572 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
573 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
574 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
575 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
579 /* CRL path validation */
581 allow_proxy_certs
= 0;
582 purpose
= X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN
;
585 ! !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS
);
587 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
590 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
591 allow_proxy_certs
= 1;
592 purpose
= ctx
->param
->purpose
;
595 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
596 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->last_untrusted
; i
++) {
598 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
599 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
600 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
601 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
;
602 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
603 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
608 if (!allow_proxy_certs
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)) {
609 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED
;
610 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
611 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
616 ret
= X509_check_ca(x
);
617 switch (must_be_ca
) {
619 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
620 && (ret
!= 1) && (ret
!= 0)) {
622 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
629 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA
;
635 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
638 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
644 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
645 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
650 if (ctx
->param
->purpose
> 0) {
651 ret
= X509_check_purpose(x
, purpose
, must_be_ca
> 0);
653 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
655 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
;
656 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
657 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
663 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
664 if ((i
> 1) && !(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
)
665 && (x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1)
666 && (plen
> (x
->ex_pathlen
+ proxy_path_length
+ 1))) {
667 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
668 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
669 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
674 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
675 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
678 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
679 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
680 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
682 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
683 if (x
->ex_pcpathlen
!= -1 && i
> x
->ex_pcpathlen
) {
684 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
685 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
686 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
702 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
706 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
707 for (i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; i
>= 0; i
--) {
708 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
709 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
710 if (i
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
713 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
714 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
715 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
718 for (j
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; j
> i
; j
--) {
719 NAME_CONSTRAINTS
*nc
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
)->nc
;
721 rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x
, nc
);
722 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
724 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
725 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
726 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
735 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int errcode
)
737 ctx
->error
= errcode
;
738 ctx
->current_cert
= ctx
->cert
;
739 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
740 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
743 static int check_hosts(X509
*x
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID
*id
)
746 int n
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id
->hosts
);
749 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; ++i
) {
750 name
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id
->hosts
, i
);
751 if (X509_check_host(x
, name
, 0, id
->hostflags
, &id
->peername
) > 0)
757 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
759 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
= ctx
->param
;
760 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID
*id
= vpm
->id
;
762 if (id
->hosts
&& check_hosts(x
, id
) <= 0) {
763 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
))
766 if (id
->email
&& X509_check_email(x
, id
->email
, id
->emaillen
, 0) <= 0) {
767 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
))
770 if (id
->ip
&& X509_check_ip(x
, id
->ip
, id
->iplen
, 0) <= 0) {
771 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
))
777 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
781 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
783 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
784 for (i
= ctx
->last_untrusted
; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
785 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
786 ok
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
787 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
788 if (ok
== X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
)
789 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
791 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
794 if (ok
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
) {
795 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
796 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
797 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
;
800 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
804 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
807 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
809 if (ctx
->last_untrusted
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
))
810 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
811 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, 0);
812 mx
= lookup_cert_match(ctx
, x
);
814 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, 0, mx
);
816 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 0;
817 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
822 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
823 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
825 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
828 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
831 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
))
833 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL
)
834 last
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
836 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
841 for (i
= 0; i
<= last
; i
++) {
842 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
843 ok
= check_cert(ctx
);
850 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
852 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
855 unsigned int last_reasons
;
856 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
857 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
);
858 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
859 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
860 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
861 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
862 while (ctx
->current_reasons
!= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS
) {
863 last_reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
864 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
866 ok
= ctx
->get_crl(ctx
, &crl
, x
);
868 ok
= get_crl_delta(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, x
);
870 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
873 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
;
874 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
877 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
878 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, crl
);
883 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, dcrl
);
886 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, dcrl
, x
);
892 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
894 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, crl
, x
);
904 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
907 if (last_reasons
== ctx
->current_reasons
) {
908 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
;
909 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
917 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
922 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
924 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int notify
)
929 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
930 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
931 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
935 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
939 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
;
940 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
947 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
;
948 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
952 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
)) {
953 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
958 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
;
959 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
962 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
963 if ((i
< 0) && !(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
)) {
966 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
;
967 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
973 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
978 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
,
979 X509
**pissuer
, int *pscore
, unsigned int *preasons
,
980 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
982 int i
, crl_score
, best_score
= *pscore
;
983 unsigned int reasons
, best_reasons
= 0;
984 X509
*x
= ctx
->current_cert
;
985 X509_CRL
*crl
, *best_crl
= NULL
;
986 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
, *best_crl_issuer
= NULL
;
988 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
989 crl
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
991 crl_score
= get_crl_score(ctx
, &crl_issuer
, &reasons
, crl
, x
);
993 if (crl_score
> best_score
) {
995 best_crl_issuer
= crl_issuer
;
996 best_score
= crl_score
;
997 best_reasons
= reasons
;
1003 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl
);
1005 *pissuer
= best_crl_issuer
;
1006 *pscore
= best_score
;
1007 *preasons
= best_reasons
;
1008 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL
);
1010 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl
);
1013 get_delta_sk(ctx
, pdcrl
, pscore
, best_crl
, crls
);
1016 if (best_score
>= CRL_SCORE_VALID
)
1023 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1024 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1027 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL
*a
, X509_CRL
*b
, int nid
)
1029 ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*exta
, *extb
;
1031 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, -1);
1033 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1034 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1036 exta
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a
, i
));
1040 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, -1);
1044 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1046 extb
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b
, i
));
1056 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta
, extb
))
1062 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1064 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL
*delta
, X509_CRL
*base
)
1066 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1067 if (!delta
->base_crl_number
)
1069 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1070 if (!base
->crl_number
)
1072 /* Issuer names must match */
1073 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta
)))
1075 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1076 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_authority_key_identifier
))
1078 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
))
1080 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1081 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->base_crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1083 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1084 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1090 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1091 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1094 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
, int *pscore
,
1095 X509_CRL
*base
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1099 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS
))
1101 if (!((ctx
->current_cert
->ex_flags
| base
->flags
) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST
))
1103 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1104 delta
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1105 if (check_delta_base(delta
, base
)) {
1106 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, delta
, 0))
1107 *pscore
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
;
1108 CRYPTO_add(&delta
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL
);
1117 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1118 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1119 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1120 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1121 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1124 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
1125 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1129 unsigned int tmp_reasons
= *preasons
, crl_reasons
;
1131 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1133 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1134 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
)
1136 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1137 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
)) {
1138 if (crl
->idp_flags
& (IDP_INDIRECT
| IDP_REASONS
))
1140 } else if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_REASONS
) {
1141 /* If no new reasons reject */
1142 if (!(crl
->idp_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1145 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1146 else if (crl
->base_crl_number
)
1148 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1149 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
))) {
1150 if (!(crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INDIRECT
))
1153 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
;
1155 if (!(crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
))
1156 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL
;
1159 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 0))
1160 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME
;
1162 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1163 crl_akid_check(ctx
, crl
, pissuer
, &crl_score
);
1165 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1167 if (!(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_AKID
))
1170 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1172 if (crl_crldp_check(x
, crl
, crl_score
, &crl_reasons
)) {
1173 /* If no new reasons reject */
1174 if (!(crl_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1176 tmp_reasons
|= crl_reasons
;
1177 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
;
1180 *preasons
= tmp_reasons
;
1186 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
,
1187 X509
**pissuer
, int *pcrl_score
)
1189 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1190 X509_NAME
*cnm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1191 int cidx
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1194 if (cidx
!= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1)
1197 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1199 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1200 if (*pcrl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
) {
1201 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT
;
1202 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1207 for (cidx
++; cidx
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); cidx
++) {
1208 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1209 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1211 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1212 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
;
1213 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1218 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1220 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
))
1224 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1225 * untrusted certificates.
1227 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->untrusted
); i
++) {
1228 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->untrusted
, i
);
1229 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1231 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1232 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1233 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
;
1240 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1241 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1242 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1243 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1246 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1248 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx
;
1250 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1253 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->ctx
, x
, ctx
->untrusted
))
1256 crl_ctx
.crls
= ctx
->crls
;
1257 /* Copy verify params across */
1258 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->param
);
1260 crl_ctx
.parent
= ctx
;
1261 crl_ctx
.verify_cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1263 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1264 ret
= X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx
);
1269 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1271 ret
= check_crl_chain(ctx
, ctx
->chain
, crl_ctx
.chain
);
1273 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx
);
1278 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1279 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1280 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1281 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1282 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1286 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1287 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
1288 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
)
1290 X509
*cert_ta
, *crl_ta
;
1291 cert_ta
= sk_X509_value(cert_path
, sk_X509_num(cert_path
) - 1);
1292 crl_ta
= sk_X509_value(crl_path
, sk_X509_num(crl_path
) - 1);
1293 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta
, crl_ta
))
1299 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1300 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1301 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1302 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1303 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1306 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME
*a
, DIST_POINT_NAME
*b
)
1308 X509_NAME
*nm
= NULL
;
1309 GENERAL_NAMES
*gens
= NULL
;
1310 GENERAL_NAME
*gena
, *genb
;
1317 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1321 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a
->dpname
, b
->dpname
))
1326 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1328 gens
= b
->name
.fullname
;
1329 } else if (b
->type
== 1) {
1332 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1333 gens
= a
->name
.fullname
;
1337 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1339 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens
); i
++) {
1340 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens
, i
);
1341 if (gena
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1343 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, gena
->d
.directoryName
))
1349 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1351 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a
->name
.fullname
); i
++) {
1352 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a
->name
.fullname
, i
);
1353 for (j
= 0; j
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b
->name
.fullname
); j
++) {
1354 genb
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b
->name
.fullname
, j
);
1355 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena
, genb
))
1364 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT
*dp
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
)
1367 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1368 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1370 return ! !(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
);
1371 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp
->CRLissuer
); i
++) {
1372 GENERAL_NAME
*gen
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp
->CRLissuer
, i
);
1373 if (gen
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1375 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen
->d
.directoryName
, nm
))
1381 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1383 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
1384 unsigned int *preasons
)
1387 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYATTR
)
1389 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) {
1390 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYUSER
)
1393 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYCA
)
1396 *preasons
= crl
->idp_reasons
;
1397 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_DIST_POINT_num(x
->crldp
); i
++) {
1398 DIST_POINT
*dp
= sk_DIST_POINT_value(x
->crldp
, i
);
1399 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp
, crl
, crl_score
)) {
1400 if (!crl
->idp
|| idp_check_dp(dp
->distpoint
, crl
->idp
->distpoint
)) {
1401 *preasons
&= dp
->dp_reasons
;
1406 if ((!crl
->idp
|| !crl
->idp
->distpoint
)
1407 && (crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
))
1413 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1414 * to find a delta CRL too
1417 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1418 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
)
1421 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1423 unsigned int reasons
;
1424 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
1425 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *skcrl
;
1426 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1427 reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
1428 ok
= get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
,
1429 &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, ctx
->crls
);
1434 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1436 skcrl
= ctx
->lookup_crls(ctx
, nm
);
1438 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1442 get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, skcrl
);
1444 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl
, X509_CRL_free
);
1448 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1450 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
1451 ctx
->current_crl_score
= crl_score
;
1452 ctx
->current_reasons
= reasons
;
1461 /* Check CRL validity */
1462 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
)
1464 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1465 EVP_PKEY
*ikey
= NULL
;
1466 int ok
= 0, chnum
, cnum
;
1467 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1468 chnum
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1469 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1470 if (ctx
->current_issuer
)
1471 issuer
= ctx
->current_issuer
;
1474 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1475 * certificate in chain.
1477 else if (cnum
< chnum
)
1478 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
+ 1);
1480 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, chnum
);
1481 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1482 if (!ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, issuer
, issuer
)) {
1483 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
;
1484 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1492 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1494 if (!crl
->base_crl_number
) {
1495 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1496 if ((issuer
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) &&
1497 !(issuer
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
)) {
1498 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN
;
1499 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1504 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
)) {
1505 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE
;
1506 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1511 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
)) {
1512 if (check_crl_path(ctx
, ctx
->current_issuer
) <= 0) {
1513 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR
;
1514 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1520 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
) {
1521 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION
;
1522 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1529 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME
)) {
1530 ok
= check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 1);
1535 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1536 ikey
= X509_get_pubkey(issuer
);
1539 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
1540 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1545 rv
= X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl
, ikey
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1546 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
1548 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1552 /* Verify CRL signature */
1553 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl
, ikey
) <= 0) {
1554 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1555 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1565 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey
);
1569 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1570 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1575 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1576 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1577 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1578 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1580 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
1581 && (crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
1582 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION
;
1583 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1588 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1589 * is not removeFromCRL.
1591 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl
, &rev
, x
)) {
1592 if (rev
->reason
== CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL
)
1594 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
;
1595 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1603 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1608 ret
= X509_policy_check(&ctx
->tree
, &ctx
->explicit_policy
, ctx
->chain
,
1609 ctx
->param
->policies
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1611 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1614 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1617 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1621 for (i
= 1; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
1622 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
1623 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY
))
1625 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1626 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION
;
1627 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1633 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1634 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY
;
1635 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1638 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY
) {
1639 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1640 ctx
->error
= X509_V_OK
;
1641 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(2, ctx
))
1648 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1653 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
1654 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
1658 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x
), ptime
);
1660 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
;
1661 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1662 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1667 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
;
1668 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1669 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1673 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x
), ptime
);
1675 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
;
1676 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1677 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1682 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
;
1683 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1684 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1691 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1695 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1696 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
1698 cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1700 n
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
1701 ctx
->error_depth
= n
- 1;
1703 xi
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1705 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, xi
, xi
))
1708 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
1713 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
;
1714 ctx
->current_cert
= xi
;
1719 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1720 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1724 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1726 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1729 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1730 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1735 || (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE
))) {
1736 if ((pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(xi
)) == NULL
) {
1737 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
1738 ctx
->current_cert
= xi
;
1739 ok
= (*cb
) (0, ctx
);
1742 } else if (X509_verify(xs
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1743 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1744 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1745 ok
= (*cb
) (0, ctx
);
1747 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1751 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1758 ok
= check_cert_time(ctx
, xs
);
1762 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1763 ctx
->current_issuer
= xi
;
1764 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1765 ok
= (*cb
) (1, ctx
);
1772 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1780 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
)
1782 return X509_cmp_time(ctm
, NULL
);
1785 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
, time_t *cmp_time
)
1790 char buff1
[24], buff2
[24], *p
;
1791 int i
, j
, remaining
;
1794 remaining
= ctm
->length
;
1795 str
= (char *)ctm
->data
;
1797 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1798 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1799 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1800 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1802 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
) {
1803 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1804 int min_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1805 int max_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1806 if (remaining
< min_length
|| remaining
> max_length
)
1813 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1814 int min_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1815 int max_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1816 if (remaining
< min_length
|| remaining
> max_length
)
1824 if ((*str
== 'Z') || (*str
== '-') || (*str
== '+')) {
1835 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1836 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1837 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1839 if (remaining
&& *str
== '.') {
1842 for (i
= 0; i
< 3 && remaining
; i
++, str
++, remaining
--) {
1843 if (*str
< '0' || *str
> '9')
1852 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1861 if ((*str
!= '+') && (*str
!= '-'))
1863 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
1866 if (str
[1] < '0' || str
[1] > '9' || str
[2] < '0' || str
[2] > '9' ||
1867 str
[3] < '0' || str
[3] > '9' || str
[4] < '0' || str
[4] > '9')
1869 offset
= ((str
[1] - '0') * 10 + (str
[2] - '0')) * 60;
1870 offset
+= (str
[3] - '0') * 10 + (str
[4] - '0');
1874 atm
.type
= ctm
->type
;
1876 atm
.length
= sizeof(buff2
);
1877 atm
.data
= (unsigned char *)buff2
;
1879 if (X509_time_adj(&atm
, offset
* 60, cmp_time
) == NULL
)
1882 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
) {
1883 i
= (buff1
[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1
[1] - '0');
1885 i
+= 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1886 j
= (buff2
[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2
[1] - '0');
1895 i
= strcmp(buff1
, buff2
);
1896 if (i
== 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1902 ASN1_TIME
*X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long adj
)
1904 return X509_time_adj(s
, adj
, NULL
);
1907 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1909 return X509_time_adj_ex(s
, 0, offset_sec
, in_tm
);
1912 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME
*s
,
1913 int offset_day
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1922 if (s
&& !(s
->flags
& ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING
)) {
1923 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
1924 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1925 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
)
1926 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1928 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1931 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
1933 EVP_PKEY
*ktmp
= NULL
, *ktmp2
;
1936 if ((pkey
!= NULL
) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))
1939 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
1940 ktmp
= X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, i
));
1942 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1943 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1946 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp
))
1949 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp
);
1954 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1955 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN
);
1959 /* first, populate the other certs */
1960 for (j
= i
- 1; j
>= 0; j
--) {
1961 ktmp2
= X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, j
));
1962 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2
, ktmp
);
1963 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2
);
1967 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey
, ktmp
);
1968 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp
);
1972 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1974 X509_CRL
*X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL
*base
, X509_CRL
*newer
,
1975 EVP_PKEY
*skey
, const EVP_MD
*md
, unsigned int flags
)
1977 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
;
1979 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED
) *revs
= NULL
;
1980 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1981 if (base
->base_crl_number
|| newer
->base_crl_number
) {
1982 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA
);
1985 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1986 if (!base
->crl_number
|| !newer
->crl_number
) {
1987 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER
);
1990 /* Issuer names must match */
1991 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
))) {
1992 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH
);
1995 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1996 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_authority_key_identifier
)) {
1997 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH
);
2000 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
)) {
2001 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH
);
2004 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2005 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) <= 0) {
2006 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER
);
2009 /* CRLs must verify */
2010 if (skey
&& (X509_CRL_verify(base
, skey
) <= 0 ||
2011 X509_CRL_verify(newer
, skey
) <= 0)) {
2012 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE
);
2015 /* Create new CRL */
2016 crl
= X509_CRL_new();
2017 if (!crl
|| !X509_CRL_set_version(crl
, 1))
2019 /* Set issuer name */
2020 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl
, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
)))
2023 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer
)))
2025 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer
)))
2028 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2030 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl
, NID_delta_crl
, base
->crl_number
, 1, 0))
2034 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2035 * number to correct value too.
2038 for (i
= 0; i
< X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer
); i
++) {
2039 X509_EXTENSION
*ext
;
2040 ext
= X509_CRL_get_ext(newer
, i
);
2041 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl
, ext
, -1))
2045 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2047 revs
= X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer
);
2049 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs
); i
++) {
2050 X509_REVOKED
*rvn
, *rvtmp
;
2051 rvn
= sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs
, i
);
2053 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2054 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2056 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base
, &rvtmp
, rvn
->serialNumber
)) {
2057 rvtmp
= X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn
);
2060 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl
, rvtmp
)) {
2061 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp
);
2066 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2068 if (skey
&& md
&& !X509_CRL_sign(crl
, skey
, md
))
2074 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2080 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl
, void *argp
,
2081 CRYPTO_EX_new
*new_func
,
2082 CRYPTO_EX_dup
*dup_func
,
2083 CRYPTO_EX_free
*free_func
)
2086 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2087 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2089 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, argl
, argp
,
2090 new_func
, dup_func
, free_func
);
2093 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
, void *data
)
2095 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
, data
);
2098 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
)
2100 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
);
2103 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2108 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
2113 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2115 return ctx
->error_depth
;
2118 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2120 return ctx
->current_cert
;
2123 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2128 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2132 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx
->chain
);
2135 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2137 return ctx
->current_issuer
;
2140 X509_CRL
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2142 return ctx
->current_crl
;
2145 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2150 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2155 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2157 ctx
->untrusted
= sk
;
2160 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *sk
)
2165 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int purpose
)
2167 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, purpose
, 0);
2170 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int trust
)
2172 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, 0, trust
);
2176 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2177 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2178 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2179 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2180 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2181 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2182 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2186 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int def_purpose
,
2187 int purpose
, int trust
)
2190 /* If purpose not set use default */
2192 purpose
= def_purpose
;
2193 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2196 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose
);
2198 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2199 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2202 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2203 if (ptmp
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2204 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose
);
2206 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2207 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2210 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2212 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2214 trust
= ptmp
->trust
;
2217 idx
= X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust
);
2219 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2220 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID
);
2225 if (purpose
&& !ctx
->param
->purpose
)
2226 ctx
->param
->purpose
= purpose
;
2227 if (trust
&& !ctx
->param
->trust
)
2228 ctx
->param
->trust
= trust
;
2232 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2234 X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
;
2235 ctx
= (X509_STORE_CTX
*)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX
));
2237 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2240 memset(ctx
, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX
));
2244 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2248 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2252 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*store
, X509
*x509
,
2253 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2257 ctx
->current_method
= 0;
2259 ctx
->untrusted
= chain
;
2261 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 0;
2262 ctx
->other_ctx
= NULL
;
2266 ctx
->explicit_policy
= 0;
2267 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2268 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
2269 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
2270 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
2271 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
2272 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
2276 ctx
->param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2279 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2284 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2288 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, store
->param
);
2290 ctx
->param
->inh_flags
|= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT
| X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE
;
2293 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2294 ctx
->cleanup
= store
->cleanup
;
2299 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
,
2300 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2303 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2307 if (store
&& store
->check_issued
)
2308 ctx
->check_issued
= store
->check_issued
;
2310 ctx
->check_issued
= check_issued
;
2312 if (store
&& store
->get_issuer
)
2313 ctx
->get_issuer
= store
->get_issuer
;
2315 ctx
->get_issuer
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer
;
2317 if (store
&& store
->verify_cb
)
2318 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2320 ctx
->verify_cb
= null_callback
;
2322 if (store
&& store
->verify
)
2323 ctx
->verify
= store
->verify
;
2325 ctx
->verify
= internal_verify
;
2327 if (store
&& store
->check_revocation
)
2328 ctx
->check_revocation
= store
->check_revocation
;
2330 ctx
->check_revocation
= check_revocation
;
2332 if (store
&& store
->get_crl
)
2333 ctx
->get_crl
= store
->get_crl
;
2335 ctx
->get_crl
= NULL
;
2337 if (store
&& store
->check_crl
)
2338 ctx
->check_crl
= store
->check_crl
;
2340 ctx
->check_crl
= check_crl
;
2342 if (store
&& store
->cert_crl
)
2343 ctx
->cert_crl
= store
->cert_crl
;
2345 ctx
->cert_crl
= cert_crl
;
2347 if (store
&& store
->lookup_certs
)
2348 ctx
->lookup_certs
= store
->lookup_certs
;
2350 ctx
->lookup_certs
= X509_STORE_get1_certs
;
2352 if (store
&& store
->lookup_crls
)
2353 ctx
->lookup_crls
= store
->lookup_crls
;
2355 ctx
->lookup_crls
= X509_STORE_get1_crls
;
2357 ctx
->check_policy
= check_policy
;
2360 * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2361 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2362 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation.
2364 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2365 if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
,
2368 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2375 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2376 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2379 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2381 ctx
->other_ctx
= sk
;
2382 ctx
->get_issuer
= get_issuer_sk
;
2385 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2389 if (ctx
->param
!= NULL
) {
2390 if (ctx
->parent
== NULL
)
2391 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2394 if (ctx
->tree
!= NULL
) {
2395 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx
->tree
);
2398 if (ctx
->chain
!= NULL
) {
2399 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2402 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
, &(ctx
->ex_data
));
2403 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA
));
2406 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2408 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx
->param
, depth
);
2411 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
)
2413 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx
->param
, flags
);
2416 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
,
2419 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx
->param
, t
);
2422 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2423 int (*verify_cb
) (int, X509_STORE_CTX
*))
2425 ctx
->verify_cb
= verify_cb
;
2428 X509_POLICY_TREE
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2433 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2435 return ctx
->explicit_policy
;
2438 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
2440 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
;
2441 param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name
);
2444 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, param
);
2447 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2452 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
)
2455 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2459 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509
)
2461 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509
)
2463 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME
)
2465 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE
)
2467 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE
)