1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
74 /* CRL score values */
76 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
78 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
80 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
82 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
86 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
88 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
90 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
92 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
94 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
96 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
98 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
100 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
102 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
104 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
106 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
108 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
110 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
112 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
);
113 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
);
114 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
);
115 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
116 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
117 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
118 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
119 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
120 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
121 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
123 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
124 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
);
125 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
126 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
);
127 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
,
128 int *pcrl_score
, X509_CRL
*base
,
129 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
);
130 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
**pissuer
,
132 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
133 unsigned int *preasons
);
134 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
135 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
136 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
137 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
);
139 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
140 const char X509_version
[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT
;
142 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
)
148 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509
**a
, X509
**b
)
150 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a
, *b
);
153 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
154 static int cert_self_signed(X509
*x
)
156 X509_check_purpose(x
, -1, 0);
157 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SS
)
163 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
165 static X509
*lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
167 STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
;
170 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
171 certs
= ctx
->lookup_certs(ctx
, X509_get_subject_name(x
));
174 /* Look for exact match */
175 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(certs
); i
++) {
176 xtmp
= sk_X509_value(certs
, i
);
177 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp
, x
))
180 if (i
< sk_X509_num(certs
))
181 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
184 sk_X509_pop_free(certs
, X509_free
);
188 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
190 X509
*x
, *xtmp
, *xtmp2
, *chain_ss
= NULL
;
192 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
= ctx
->param
;
193 int depth
, i
, ok
= 0;
195 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
196 STACK_OF(X509
) *sktmp
= NULL
;
197 if (ctx
->cert
== NULL
) {
198 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY
);
201 if (ctx
->chain
!= NULL
) {
203 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
204 * cannot do another one.
206 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
213 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
214 * the first entry is in place
216 if (((ctx
->chain
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) ||
217 (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, ctx
->cert
))) {
218 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
221 CRYPTO_add(&ctx
->cert
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
222 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 1;
224 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
225 if (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
226 && (sktmp
= sk_X509_dup(ctx
->untrusted
)) == NULL
) {
227 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
231 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
232 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
233 depth
= param
->depth
;
236 /* If we have enough, we break */
238 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
239 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
240 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
243 /* If we are self signed, we break */
244 if (cert_self_signed(x
))
247 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
249 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
) {
250 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
254 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
263 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
264 if (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
) {
265 xtmp
= find_issuer(ctx
, sktmp
, x
);
267 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, xtmp
)) {
268 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
271 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
272 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp
, xtmp
);
273 ctx
->last_untrusted
++;
277 * reparse the full chain for the next one
285 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
288 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
289 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
295 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
297 i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
298 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
- 1);
299 if (cert_self_signed(x
)) {
300 /* we have a self signed certificate */
301 if (sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1) {
303 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
304 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
305 * possible impersonation.
307 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
308 if ((ok
<= 0) || X509_cmp(x
, xtmp
)) {
309 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
;
310 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
311 ctx
->error_depth
= i
- 1;
320 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
321 * version so we get any trust settings.
325 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, i
- 1, x
);
326 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 0;
330 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
332 chain_ss
= sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
333 ctx
->last_untrusted
--;
336 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
339 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
341 /* If we have enough, we break */
344 /* If we are self signed, we break */
345 if (cert_self_signed(x
))
347 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
354 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, x
)) {
356 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
362 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
363 i
= check_trust(ctx
);
365 /* If explicitly rejected error */
366 if (i
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
)
369 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
370 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
371 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
375 if (i
!= X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
376 && !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
)
377 && !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS
)) {
379 xtmp2
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
- 1);
380 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, xtmp2
);
383 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
386 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
391 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
395 xtmp
= sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
399 ctx
->last_untrusted
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
408 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
409 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
410 * and set bad_chain == 1
412 if (i
!= X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
&& !bad_chain
) {
413 if ((chain_ss
== NULL
) || !ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, chain_ss
)) {
414 if (ctx
->last_untrusted
>= num
)
415 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
;
417 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
;
418 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
421 sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, chain_ss
);
423 ctx
->last_untrusted
= num
;
424 ctx
->current_cert
= chain_ss
;
425 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
;
429 ctx
->error_depth
= num
- 1;
436 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
437 ok
= check_chain_extensions(ctx
);
442 /* Check name constraints */
444 ok
= check_name_constraints(ctx
);
454 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
455 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
458 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
459 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
462 ok
= ctx
->check_revocation(ctx
);
466 i
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx
->error_depth
, NULL
, ctx
->chain
,
468 if (i
!= X509_V_OK
) {
470 ctx
->current_cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, ctx
->error_depth
);
476 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
477 if (ctx
->verify
!= NULL
)
478 ok
= ctx
->verify(ctx
);
480 ok
= internal_verify(ctx
);
484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
485 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
486 ok
= v3_asid_validate_path(ctx
);
489 ok
= v3_addr_validate_path(ctx
);
494 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
495 if (!bad_chain
&& (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK
))
496 ok
= ctx
->check_policy(ctx
);
501 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
505 if (chain_ss
!= NULL
)
511 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
514 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
)
518 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
519 issuer
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
520 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, issuer
))
526 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
528 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
)
531 ret
= X509_check_issued(issuer
, x
);
532 if (ret
== X509_V_OK
)
534 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
535 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK
))
539 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
540 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
541 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
544 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
546 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
548 *issuer
= find_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->other_ctx
, x
);
550 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer
)->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
557 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
561 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
563 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
566 int i
, ok
= 0, must_be_ca
, plen
= 0;
568 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
569 int proxy_path_length
= 0;
571 int allow_proxy_certs
;
575 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
576 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
577 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
578 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
579 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
580 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
581 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
585 /* CRL path validation */
587 allow_proxy_certs
= 0;
588 purpose
= X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN
;
591 ! !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS
);
593 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
596 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
597 allow_proxy_certs
= 1;
598 purpose
= ctx
->param
->purpose
;
601 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
602 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->last_untrusted
; i
++) {
604 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
605 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
606 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
607 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
;
608 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
609 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
614 if (!allow_proxy_certs
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)) {
615 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED
;
616 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
617 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
622 ret
= X509_check_ca(x
);
623 switch (must_be_ca
) {
625 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
626 && (ret
!= 1) && (ret
!= 0)) {
628 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
635 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA
;
641 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
644 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
650 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
651 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
656 if (ctx
->param
->purpose
> 0) {
657 ret
= X509_check_purpose(x
, purpose
, must_be_ca
> 0);
659 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
661 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
;
662 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
663 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
669 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
670 if ((i
> 1) && !(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
)
671 && (x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1)
672 && (plen
> (x
->ex_pathlen
+ proxy_path_length
+ 1))) {
673 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
674 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
675 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
680 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
681 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
684 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
685 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
686 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
688 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
689 if (x
->ex_pcpathlen
!= -1 && i
> x
->ex_pcpathlen
) {
690 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
691 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
692 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
708 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
712 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
713 for (i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; i
>= 0; i
--) {
714 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
715 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
716 if (i
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
719 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
720 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
721 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
724 for (j
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; j
> i
; j
--) {
725 NAME_CONSTRAINTS
*nc
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
)->nc
;
727 rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x
, nc
);
728 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
730 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
731 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
732 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
741 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int errcode
)
743 ctx
->error
= errcode
;
744 ctx
->current_cert
= ctx
->cert
;
745 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
746 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
749 static int check_hosts(X509
*x
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID
*id
)
752 int n
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id
->hosts
);
755 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; ++i
) {
756 name
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id
->hosts
, i
);
757 if (X509_check_host(x
, name
, 0, id
->hostflags
, &id
->peername
) > 0)
763 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
765 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
= ctx
->param
;
766 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID
*id
= vpm
->id
;
768 if (id
->hosts
&& check_hosts(x
, id
) <= 0) {
769 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
))
772 if (id
->email
&& X509_check_email(x
, id
->email
, id
->emaillen
, 0) <= 0) {
773 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
))
776 if (id
->ip
&& X509_check_ip(x
, id
->ip
, id
->iplen
, 0) <= 0) {
777 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
))
783 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
787 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
789 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
790 for (i
= ctx
->last_untrusted
; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
791 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
792 ok
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
793 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
794 if (ok
== X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
)
795 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
797 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
800 if (ok
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
) {
801 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
802 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
803 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
;
806 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
810 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
813 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
815 if (ctx
->last_untrusted
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
))
816 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
817 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, 0);
818 mx
= lookup_cert_match(ctx
, x
);
820 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, 0, mx
);
822 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 0;
823 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
828 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
829 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
831 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
834 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
837 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
))
839 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL
)
840 last
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
842 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
847 for (i
= 0; i
<= last
; i
++) {
848 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
849 ok
= check_cert(ctx
);
856 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
858 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
861 unsigned int last_reasons
;
862 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
863 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
);
864 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
865 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
866 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
867 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
868 while (ctx
->current_reasons
!= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS
) {
869 last_reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
870 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
872 ok
= ctx
->get_crl(ctx
, &crl
, x
);
874 ok
= get_crl_delta(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, x
);
876 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
879 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
;
880 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
883 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
884 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, crl
);
889 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, dcrl
);
892 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, dcrl
, x
);
898 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
900 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, crl
, x
);
910 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
913 if (last_reasons
== ctx
->current_reasons
) {
914 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
;
915 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
923 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
928 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
930 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int notify
)
935 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
936 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
937 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
941 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
945 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
;
946 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
953 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
;
954 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
958 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
)) {
959 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
964 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
;
965 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
968 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
969 if ((i
< 0) && !(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
)) {
972 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
;
973 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
979 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
984 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
,
985 X509
**pissuer
, int *pscore
, unsigned int *preasons
,
986 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
988 int i
, crl_score
, best_score
= *pscore
;
989 unsigned int reasons
, best_reasons
= 0;
990 X509
*x
= ctx
->current_cert
;
991 X509_CRL
*crl
, *best_crl
= NULL
;
992 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
, *best_crl_issuer
= NULL
;
994 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
995 crl
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
997 crl_score
= get_crl_score(ctx
, &crl_issuer
, &reasons
, crl
, x
);
999 if (crl_score
> best_score
) {
1001 best_crl_issuer
= crl_issuer
;
1002 best_score
= crl_score
;
1003 best_reasons
= reasons
;
1009 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl
);
1011 *pissuer
= best_crl_issuer
;
1012 *pscore
= best_score
;
1013 *preasons
= best_reasons
;
1014 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL
);
1016 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl
);
1019 get_delta_sk(ctx
, pdcrl
, pscore
, best_crl
, crls
);
1022 if (best_score
>= CRL_SCORE_VALID
)
1029 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1030 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1033 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL
*a
, X509_CRL
*b
, int nid
)
1035 ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*exta
, *extb
;
1037 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, -1);
1039 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1040 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1042 exta
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a
, i
));
1046 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, -1);
1050 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1052 extb
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b
, i
));
1062 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta
, extb
))
1068 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1070 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL
*delta
, X509_CRL
*base
)
1072 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1073 if (!delta
->base_crl_number
)
1075 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1076 if (!base
->crl_number
)
1078 /* Issuer names must match */
1079 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta
)))
1081 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1082 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_authority_key_identifier
))
1084 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
))
1086 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1087 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->base_crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1089 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1090 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1096 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1097 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1100 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
, int *pscore
,
1101 X509_CRL
*base
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1105 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS
))
1107 if (!((ctx
->current_cert
->ex_flags
| base
->flags
) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST
))
1109 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1110 delta
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1111 if (check_delta_base(delta
, base
)) {
1112 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, delta
, 0))
1113 *pscore
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
;
1114 CRYPTO_add(&delta
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL
);
1123 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1124 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1125 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1126 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1127 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1130 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
1131 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1135 unsigned int tmp_reasons
= *preasons
, crl_reasons
;
1137 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1139 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1140 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
)
1142 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1143 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
)) {
1144 if (crl
->idp_flags
& (IDP_INDIRECT
| IDP_REASONS
))
1146 } else if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_REASONS
) {
1147 /* If no new reasons reject */
1148 if (!(crl
->idp_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1151 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1152 else if (crl
->base_crl_number
)
1154 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1155 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
))) {
1156 if (!(crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INDIRECT
))
1159 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
;
1161 if (!(crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
))
1162 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL
;
1165 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 0))
1166 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME
;
1168 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1169 crl_akid_check(ctx
, crl
, pissuer
, &crl_score
);
1171 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1173 if (!(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_AKID
))
1176 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1178 if (crl_crldp_check(x
, crl
, crl_score
, &crl_reasons
)) {
1179 /* If no new reasons reject */
1180 if (!(crl_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1182 tmp_reasons
|= crl_reasons
;
1183 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
;
1186 *preasons
= tmp_reasons
;
1192 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
,
1193 X509
**pissuer
, int *pcrl_score
)
1195 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1196 X509_NAME
*cnm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1197 int cidx
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1200 if (cidx
!= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1)
1203 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1205 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1206 if (*pcrl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
) {
1207 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT
;
1208 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1213 for (cidx
++; cidx
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); cidx
++) {
1214 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1215 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1217 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1218 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
;
1219 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1224 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1226 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
))
1230 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1231 * untrusted certificates.
1233 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->untrusted
); i
++) {
1234 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->untrusted
, i
);
1235 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1237 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1238 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1239 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
;
1246 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1247 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1248 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1249 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1252 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1254 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx
;
1256 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1259 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->ctx
, x
, ctx
->untrusted
))
1262 crl_ctx
.crls
= ctx
->crls
;
1263 /* Copy verify params across */
1264 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->param
);
1266 crl_ctx
.parent
= ctx
;
1267 crl_ctx
.verify_cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1269 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1270 ret
= X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx
);
1275 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1277 ret
= check_crl_chain(ctx
, ctx
->chain
, crl_ctx
.chain
);
1279 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx
);
1284 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1285 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1286 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1287 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1288 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1292 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1293 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
1294 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
)
1296 X509
*cert_ta
, *crl_ta
;
1297 cert_ta
= sk_X509_value(cert_path
, sk_X509_num(cert_path
) - 1);
1298 crl_ta
= sk_X509_value(crl_path
, sk_X509_num(crl_path
) - 1);
1299 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta
, crl_ta
))
1305 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1306 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1307 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1308 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1309 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1312 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME
*a
, DIST_POINT_NAME
*b
)
1314 X509_NAME
*nm
= NULL
;
1315 GENERAL_NAMES
*gens
= NULL
;
1316 GENERAL_NAME
*gena
, *genb
;
1323 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1327 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a
->dpname
, b
->dpname
))
1332 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1334 gens
= b
->name
.fullname
;
1335 } else if (b
->type
== 1) {
1338 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1339 gens
= a
->name
.fullname
;
1343 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1345 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens
); i
++) {
1346 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens
, i
);
1347 if (gena
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1349 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, gena
->d
.directoryName
))
1355 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1357 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a
->name
.fullname
); i
++) {
1358 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a
->name
.fullname
, i
);
1359 for (j
= 0; j
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b
->name
.fullname
); j
++) {
1360 genb
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b
->name
.fullname
, j
);
1361 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena
, genb
))
1370 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT
*dp
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
)
1373 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1374 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1376 return ! !(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
);
1377 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp
->CRLissuer
); i
++) {
1378 GENERAL_NAME
*gen
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp
->CRLissuer
, i
);
1379 if (gen
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1381 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen
->d
.directoryName
, nm
))
1387 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1389 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
1390 unsigned int *preasons
)
1393 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYATTR
)
1395 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) {
1396 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYUSER
)
1399 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYCA
)
1402 *preasons
= crl
->idp_reasons
;
1403 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_DIST_POINT_num(x
->crldp
); i
++) {
1404 DIST_POINT
*dp
= sk_DIST_POINT_value(x
->crldp
, i
);
1405 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp
, crl
, crl_score
)) {
1406 if (!crl
->idp
|| idp_check_dp(dp
->distpoint
, crl
->idp
->distpoint
)) {
1407 *preasons
&= dp
->dp_reasons
;
1412 if ((!crl
->idp
|| !crl
->idp
->distpoint
)
1413 && (crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
))
1419 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1420 * to find a delta CRL too
1423 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1424 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
)
1427 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1429 unsigned int reasons
;
1430 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
1431 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *skcrl
;
1432 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1433 reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
1434 ok
= get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
,
1435 &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, ctx
->crls
);
1440 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1442 skcrl
= ctx
->lookup_crls(ctx
, nm
);
1444 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1448 get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, skcrl
);
1450 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl
, X509_CRL_free
);
1454 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1456 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
1457 ctx
->current_crl_score
= crl_score
;
1458 ctx
->current_reasons
= reasons
;
1467 /* Check CRL validity */
1468 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
)
1470 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1471 EVP_PKEY
*ikey
= NULL
;
1472 int ok
= 0, chnum
, cnum
;
1473 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1474 chnum
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1475 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1476 if (ctx
->current_issuer
)
1477 issuer
= ctx
->current_issuer
;
1480 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1481 * certificate in chain.
1483 else if (cnum
< chnum
)
1484 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
+ 1);
1486 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, chnum
);
1487 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1488 if (!ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, issuer
, issuer
)) {
1489 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
;
1490 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1498 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1500 if (!crl
->base_crl_number
) {
1501 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1502 if ((issuer
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) &&
1503 !(issuer
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
)) {
1504 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN
;
1505 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1510 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
)) {
1511 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE
;
1512 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1517 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
)) {
1518 if (check_crl_path(ctx
, ctx
->current_issuer
) <= 0) {
1519 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR
;
1520 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1526 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
) {
1527 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION
;
1528 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1535 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME
)) {
1536 ok
= check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 1);
1541 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1542 ikey
= X509_get_pubkey(issuer
);
1545 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
1546 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1551 rv
= X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl
, ikey
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1552 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
1554 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1558 /* Verify CRL signature */
1559 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl
, ikey
) <= 0) {
1560 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1561 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1571 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey
);
1575 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1576 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1581 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1582 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1583 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1584 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1586 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
1587 && (crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
1588 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION
;
1589 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1594 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1595 * is not removeFromCRL.
1597 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl
, &rev
, x
)) {
1598 if (rev
->reason
== CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL
)
1600 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
;
1601 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1609 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1614 ret
= X509_policy_check(&ctx
->tree
, &ctx
->explicit_policy
, ctx
->chain
,
1615 ctx
->param
->policies
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1617 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1620 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1623 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1627 for (i
= 1; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
1628 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
1629 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY
))
1631 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1632 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION
;
1633 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1639 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1640 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY
;
1641 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1644 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY
) {
1645 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1646 ctx
->error
= X509_V_OK
;
1647 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(2, ctx
))
1654 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1659 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
1660 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
1664 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x
), ptime
);
1666 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
;
1667 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1668 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1673 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
;
1674 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1675 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1679 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x
), ptime
);
1681 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
;
1682 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1683 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1688 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
;
1689 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1690 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1697 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1701 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1702 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
1704 cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1706 n
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
1707 ctx
->error_depth
= n
- 1;
1709 xi
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1711 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, xi
, xi
))
1714 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
1719 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
;
1720 ctx
->current_cert
= xi
;
1725 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1726 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1730 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1732 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1735 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1736 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1741 || (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE
))) {
1742 if ((pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(xi
)) == NULL
) {
1743 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
1744 ctx
->current_cert
= xi
;
1745 ok
= (*cb
) (0, ctx
);
1748 } else if (X509_verify(xs
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1749 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1750 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1751 ok
= (*cb
) (0, ctx
);
1753 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1757 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1764 ok
= check_cert_time(ctx
, xs
);
1768 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1769 ctx
->current_issuer
= xi
;
1770 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1771 ok
= (*cb
) (1, ctx
);
1778 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1786 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
)
1788 return X509_cmp_time(ctm
, NULL
);
1791 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
, time_t *cmp_time
)
1796 char buff1
[24], buff2
[24], *p
;
1797 int i
, j
, remaining
;
1800 remaining
= ctm
->length
;
1801 str
= (char *)ctm
->data
;
1803 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1804 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1805 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1806 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1808 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
) {
1809 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1810 int min_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1811 int max_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1812 if (remaining
< min_length
|| remaining
> max_length
)
1819 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1820 int min_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1821 int max_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1822 if (remaining
< min_length
|| remaining
> max_length
)
1830 if ((*str
== 'Z') || (*str
== '-') || (*str
== '+')) {
1841 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1842 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1843 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1845 if (remaining
&& *str
== '.') {
1848 for (i
= 0; i
< 3 && remaining
; i
++, str
++, remaining
--) {
1849 if (*str
< '0' || *str
> '9')
1858 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1867 if ((*str
!= '+') && (*str
!= '-'))
1869 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
1872 if (str
[1] < '0' || str
[1] > '9' || str
[2] < '0' || str
[2] > '9' ||
1873 str
[3] < '0' || str
[3] > '9' || str
[4] < '0' || str
[4] > '9')
1875 offset
= ((str
[1] - '0') * 10 + (str
[2] - '0')) * 60;
1876 offset
+= (str
[3] - '0') * 10 + (str
[4] - '0');
1880 atm
.type
= ctm
->type
;
1882 atm
.length
= sizeof(buff2
);
1883 atm
.data
= (unsigned char *)buff2
;
1885 if (X509_time_adj(&atm
, offset
* 60, cmp_time
) == NULL
)
1888 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
) {
1889 i
= (buff1
[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1
[1] - '0');
1891 i
+= 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1892 j
= (buff2
[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2
[1] - '0');
1901 i
= strcmp(buff1
, buff2
);
1902 if (i
== 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1908 ASN1_TIME
*X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long adj
)
1910 return X509_time_adj(s
, adj
, NULL
);
1913 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1915 return X509_time_adj_ex(s
, 0, offset_sec
, in_tm
);
1918 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME
*s
,
1919 int offset_day
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1928 if (s
&& !(s
->flags
& ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING
)) {
1929 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
1930 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1931 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
)
1932 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1934 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1937 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
1939 EVP_PKEY
*ktmp
= NULL
, *ktmp2
;
1942 if ((pkey
!= NULL
) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))
1945 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
1946 ktmp
= X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, i
));
1948 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1949 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1952 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp
))
1955 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp
);
1960 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1961 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN
);
1965 /* first, populate the other certs */
1966 for (j
= i
- 1; j
>= 0; j
--) {
1967 ktmp2
= X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, j
));
1968 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2
, ktmp
);
1969 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2
);
1973 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey
, ktmp
);
1974 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp
);
1978 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1980 X509_CRL
*X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL
*base
, X509_CRL
*newer
,
1981 EVP_PKEY
*skey
, const EVP_MD
*md
, unsigned int flags
)
1983 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
;
1985 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED
) *revs
= NULL
;
1986 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1987 if (base
->base_crl_number
|| newer
->base_crl_number
) {
1988 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA
);
1991 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1992 if (!base
->crl_number
|| !newer
->crl_number
) {
1993 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER
);
1996 /* Issuer names must match */
1997 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
))) {
1998 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH
);
2001 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2002 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_authority_key_identifier
)) {
2003 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH
);
2006 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
)) {
2007 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH
);
2010 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2011 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) <= 0) {
2012 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER
);
2015 /* CRLs must verify */
2016 if (skey
&& (X509_CRL_verify(base
, skey
) <= 0 ||
2017 X509_CRL_verify(newer
, skey
) <= 0)) {
2018 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE
);
2021 /* Create new CRL */
2022 crl
= X509_CRL_new();
2023 if (!crl
|| !X509_CRL_set_version(crl
, 1))
2025 /* Set issuer name */
2026 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl
, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
)))
2029 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer
)))
2031 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer
)))
2034 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2036 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl
, NID_delta_crl
, base
->crl_number
, 1, 0))
2040 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2041 * number to correct value too.
2044 for (i
= 0; i
< X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer
); i
++) {
2045 X509_EXTENSION
*ext
;
2046 ext
= X509_CRL_get_ext(newer
, i
);
2047 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl
, ext
, -1))
2051 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2053 revs
= X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer
);
2055 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs
); i
++) {
2056 X509_REVOKED
*rvn
, *rvtmp
;
2057 rvn
= sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs
, i
);
2059 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2060 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2062 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base
, &rvtmp
, rvn
->serialNumber
)) {
2063 rvtmp
= X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn
);
2066 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl
, rvtmp
)) {
2067 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp
);
2072 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2074 if (skey
&& md
&& !X509_CRL_sign(crl
, skey
, md
))
2080 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2086 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl
, void *argp
,
2087 CRYPTO_EX_new
*new_func
,
2088 CRYPTO_EX_dup
*dup_func
,
2089 CRYPTO_EX_free
*free_func
)
2092 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2093 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2095 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, argl
, argp
,
2096 new_func
, dup_func
, free_func
);
2099 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
, void *data
)
2101 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
, data
);
2104 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
)
2106 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
);
2109 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2114 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
2119 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2121 return ctx
->error_depth
;
2124 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2126 return ctx
->current_cert
;
2129 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2134 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2138 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx
->chain
);
2141 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2143 return ctx
->current_issuer
;
2146 X509_CRL
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2148 return ctx
->current_crl
;
2151 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2156 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2161 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2163 ctx
->untrusted
= sk
;
2166 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *sk
)
2171 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int purpose
)
2173 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, purpose
, 0);
2176 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int trust
)
2178 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, 0, trust
);
2182 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2183 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2184 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2185 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2186 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2187 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2188 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2192 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int def_purpose
,
2193 int purpose
, int trust
)
2196 /* If purpose not set use default */
2198 purpose
= def_purpose
;
2199 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2202 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose
);
2204 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2205 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2208 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2209 if (ptmp
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2210 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose
);
2212 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2213 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2216 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2218 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2220 trust
= ptmp
->trust
;
2223 idx
= X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust
);
2225 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2226 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID
);
2231 if (purpose
&& !ctx
->param
->purpose
)
2232 ctx
->param
->purpose
= purpose
;
2233 if (trust
&& !ctx
->param
->trust
)
2234 ctx
->param
->trust
= trust
;
2238 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2240 X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
;
2241 ctx
= (X509_STORE_CTX
*)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX
));
2243 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2246 memset(ctx
, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX
));
2250 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2254 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2258 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*store
, X509
*x509
,
2259 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2263 ctx
->current_method
= 0;
2265 ctx
->untrusted
= chain
;
2267 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 0;
2268 ctx
->other_ctx
= NULL
;
2272 ctx
->explicit_policy
= 0;
2273 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2274 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
2275 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
2276 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
2277 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
2278 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
2282 ctx
->param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2285 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2290 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2294 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, store
->param
);
2296 ctx
->param
->inh_flags
|= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT
| X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE
;
2299 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2300 ctx
->cleanup
= store
->cleanup
;
2305 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
,
2306 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2309 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2313 if (store
&& store
->check_issued
)
2314 ctx
->check_issued
= store
->check_issued
;
2316 ctx
->check_issued
= check_issued
;
2318 if (store
&& store
->get_issuer
)
2319 ctx
->get_issuer
= store
->get_issuer
;
2321 ctx
->get_issuer
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer
;
2323 if (store
&& store
->verify_cb
)
2324 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2326 ctx
->verify_cb
= null_callback
;
2328 if (store
&& store
->verify
)
2329 ctx
->verify
= store
->verify
;
2331 ctx
->verify
= internal_verify
;
2333 if (store
&& store
->check_revocation
)
2334 ctx
->check_revocation
= store
->check_revocation
;
2336 ctx
->check_revocation
= check_revocation
;
2338 if (store
&& store
->get_crl
)
2339 ctx
->get_crl
= store
->get_crl
;
2341 ctx
->get_crl
= NULL
;
2343 if (store
&& store
->check_crl
)
2344 ctx
->check_crl
= store
->check_crl
;
2346 ctx
->check_crl
= check_crl
;
2348 if (store
&& store
->cert_crl
)
2349 ctx
->cert_crl
= store
->cert_crl
;
2351 ctx
->cert_crl
= cert_crl
;
2353 if (store
&& store
->lookup_certs
)
2354 ctx
->lookup_certs
= store
->lookup_certs
;
2356 ctx
->lookup_certs
= X509_STORE_get1_certs
;
2358 if (store
&& store
->lookup_crls
)
2359 ctx
->lookup_crls
= store
->lookup_crls
;
2361 ctx
->lookup_crls
= X509_STORE_get1_crls
;
2363 ctx
->check_policy
= check_policy
;
2366 * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2367 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2368 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation.
2370 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2371 if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
,
2374 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2381 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2382 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2385 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2387 ctx
->other_ctx
= sk
;
2388 ctx
->get_issuer
= get_issuer_sk
;
2391 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2395 if (ctx
->param
!= NULL
) {
2396 if (ctx
->parent
== NULL
)
2397 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2400 if (ctx
->tree
!= NULL
) {
2401 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx
->tree
);
2404 if (ctx
->chain
!= NULL
) {
2405 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2408 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
, &(ctx
->ex_data
));
2409 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA
));
2412 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2414 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx
->param
, depth
);
2417 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
)
2419 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx
->param
, flags
);
2422 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
,
2425 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx
->param
, t
);
2428 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2429 int (*verify_cb
) (int, X509_STORE_CTX
*))
2431 ctx
->verify_cb
= verify_cb
;
2434 X509_POLICY_TREE
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2439 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2441 return ctx
->explicit_policy
;
2444 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
2446 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
;
2447 param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name
);
2450 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, param
);
2453 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2458 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
)
2461 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2465 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509
)
2467 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509
)
2469 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME
)
2471 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE
)
2473 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE
)