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OpenSSL 1.0.1j
[tomato.git] / release / src / router / openssl / ssl / t1_lib.c
blobd6aff4b682f234499862819c4a68b15e6a869fe9
1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
119
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 #endif
127
128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
129 tls1_enc,
130 tls1_mac,
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
139 tls1_alert_code,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
141 };
142
143 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
144 {
145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
147 return(60*60*2);
148 }
149
150 int tls1_new(SSL *s)
151 {
152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
153 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
154 return(1);
155 }
156
157 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
158 {
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
161 {
162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
163 }
164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
165 ssl3_free(s);
166 }
167
168 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
169 {
170 ssl3_clear(s);
171 s->version = s->method->version;
172 }
173
174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
175
176 static int nid_list[] =
177 {
178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
203 };
204
205 static int pref_list[] =
206 {
207 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
208 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
209 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
210 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
211 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
212 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
213 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
214 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
215 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
216 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
217 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
221 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
222 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
223 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
224 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
225 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
230 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
231 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
232 };
233
234 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
235 {
236 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
237 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
238 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
239 return 0;
240 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
241 }
242
243 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
244 {
245 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
246 switch (nid)
247 {
248 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
249 return 1;
250 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
251 return 2;
252 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
253 return 3;
254 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
255 return 4;
256 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
257 return 5;
258 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
259 return 6;
260 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
261 return 7;
262 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
263 return 8;
264 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
265 return 9;
266 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
267 return 10;
268 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
269 return 11;
270 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
271 return 12;
272 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
273 return 13;
274 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 return 14;
276 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
277 return 15;
278 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
279 return 16;
280 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
281 return 17;
282 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
283 return 18;
284 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 return 19;
286 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
287 return 20;
288 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
289 return 21;
290 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
291 return 22;
292 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
293 return 23;
294 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
295 return 24;
296 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
297 return 25;
298 default:
299 return 0;
300 }
301 }
302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
303
304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
305
306 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
307 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
308 */
309
310 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
311 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
312 #else
313 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
314 #endif
315
316 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
317 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
318 #else
319 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
320 #endif
321
322 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
323 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
324 #else
325 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
326 #endif
327
328 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
329 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
330 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
331 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
332
333 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
335 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
336 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
337 #endif
338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
340 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
341 #endif
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
343 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
344 #endif
345 };
346
347 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
348 {
349 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
350 if (p)
351 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
352 return (int)slen;
353 }
354
355 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
356 {
357 int extdatalen=0;
358 unsigned char *orig = buf;
359 unsigned char *ret = buf;
360
361 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
362 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
363 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
364 return orig;
365
366 ret+=2;
367
368 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
369
370 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
371 {
372 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
373 unsigned long size_str;
374 long lenmax;
375
376 /* check for enough space.
377 4 for the servername type and entension length
378 2 for servernamelist length
379 1 for the hostname type
380 2 for hostname length
381 + hostname length
382 */
383
384 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
385 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
386 return NULL;
387
388 /* extension type and length */
389 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
390 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
391
392 /* length of servername list */
393 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
394
395 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
396 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
397 s2n(size_str,ret);
398 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
399 ret+=size_str;
400 }
401
402 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
403 if (s->renegotiate)
404 {
405 int el;
406
407 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
408 {
409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
410 return NULL;
411 }
412
413 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
414
415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
416 s2n(el,ret);
417
418 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
419 {
420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
421 return NULL;
422 }
423
424 ret += el;
425 }
426
427 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
428 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
429 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
430 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
431
432 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
433 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
434 {
435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
436 return NULL;
437 }
438
439 /* check for enough space.
440 4 for the srp type type and entension length
441 1 for the srp user identity
442 + srp user identity length
443 */
444 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
445
446 /* fill in the extension */
447 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
448 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
449 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
450 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
451 ret+=login_len;
452 }
453 #endif
454
455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
456 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
457 {
458 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
459 long lenmax;
460
461 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
462 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
463 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
464 {
465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
466 return NULL;
467 }
468
469 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
470 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
471 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
472 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
473 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
474 }
475 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
476 {
477 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
478 long lenmax;
479
480 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
481 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
482 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
483 {
484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
485 return NULL;
486 }
487
488 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
489 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
490
491 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
492 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
493 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
494 * resolves this to two bytes.
495 */
496 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
497 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
498 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
499 }
500 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
501
502 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
503 {
504 int ticklen;
505 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
506 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
507 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
508 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
509 {
510 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
511 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
512 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
513 return NULL;
514 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
515 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
516 ticklen);
517 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
518 }
519 else
520 ticklen = 0;
521 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
522 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
523 goto skip_ext;
524 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
525 * rest for ticket
526 */
527 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
528 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
529 s2n(ticklen,ret);
530 if (ticklen)
531 {
532 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
533 ret += ticklen;
534 }
535 }
536 skip_ext:
537
538 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
539 {
540 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
541 return NULL;
542 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
543 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
544 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
545 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
546 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
547 }
548
549 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
550 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
551 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
552 {
553 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
554
555 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
556 return NULL;
557 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
558 return NULL;
559
560 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
561 s2n(col + 2, ret);
562 s2n(col, ret);
563 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
564 ret += col;
565 }
566 #endif
567
568 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
569 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
570 {
571 int i;
572 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
573 OCSP_RESPID *id;
574
575 idlen = 0;
576 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
577 {
578 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
579 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
580 if (itmp <= 0)
581 return NULL;
582 idlen += itmp + 2;
583 }
584
585 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
586 {
587 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
588 if (extlen < 0)
589 return NULL;
590 }
591 else
592 extlen = 0;
593
594 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
595 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
596 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
597 return NULL;
598 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
599 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
600 s2n(idlen, ret);
601 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
602 {
603 /* save position of id len */
604 unsigned char *q = ret;
605 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
606 /* skip over id len */
607 ret += 2;
608 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
609 /* write id len */
610 s2n(itmp, q);
611 }
612 s2n(extlen, ret);
613 if (extlen > 0)
614 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
615 }
616
617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
618 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
619 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
620 return NULL;
621 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
622 s2n(1,ret);
623 /* Set mode:
624 * 1: peer may send requests
625 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
626 */
627 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
628 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
629 else
630 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
631 #endif
632
633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
634 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
635 {
636 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
637 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
638 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
639 return NULL;
640 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
641 s2n(0,ret);
642 }
643 #endif
644
645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
646 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
647 {
648 int el;
649
650 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
651
652 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
653
654 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
655 s2n(el,ret);
656
657 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
658 {
659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
660 return NULL;
661 }
662 ret += el;
663 }
664 #endif
665 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
666 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
667 *
668 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
669 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
670 */
671 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
672 {
673 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
674 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
675 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
676 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
677 */
678 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
679 hlen -= 5;
680 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
681 {
682 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
683 if (hlen >= 4)
684 hlen -= 4;
685 else
686 hlen = 0;
687
688 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
689 s2n(hlen, ret);
690 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
691 ret += hlen;
692 }
693 }
694
695 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
696 return orig;
697
698 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
699 return ret;
700 }
701
702 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
703 {
704 int extdatalen=0;
705 unsigned char *orig = buf;
706 unsigned char *ret = buf;
707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
708 int next_proto_neg_seen;
709 #endif
710
711 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
712 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
713 return orig;
714
715 ret+=2;
716 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
717
718 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
719 {
720 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
721
722 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
723 s2n(0,ret);
724 }
725
726 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
727 {
728 int el;
729
730 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
731 {
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
733 return NULL;
734 }
735
736 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
737
738 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
739 s2n(el,ret);
740
741 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
742 {
743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
744 return NULL;
745 }
746
747 ret += el;
748 }
749
750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
751 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
752 {
753 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
754 long lenmax;
755
756 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
757 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
758 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
759 {
760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
761 return NULL;
762 }
763
764 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
765 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
766 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
767 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
768 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
769
770 }
771 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
772 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
773
774 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
775 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
776 {
777 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
778 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
779 s2n(0,ret);
780 }
781
782 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
783 {
784 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
785 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
786 s2n(0,ret);
787 }
788
789 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
790 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
791 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
792 {
793 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
794
795 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
796 return NULL;
797 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
798 return NULL;
799
800 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
801 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
802 s2n(sol, ret);
803 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
804 ret += sol;
805 }
806 #endif
807
808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
809 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
810 {
811 int el;
812
813 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
814
815 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
816
817 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
818 s2n(el,ret);
819
820 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
821 {
822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
823 return NULL;
824 }
825 ret+=el;
826 }
827 #endif
828
829 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
830 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
831 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
832 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
833 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
834 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
835 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
836 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
837 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
838 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
839 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
840 ret+=36;
841
842 }
843
844 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
845 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
846 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
847 {
848 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
849 return NULL;
850 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
851 s2n(1,ret);
852 /* Set mode:
853 * 1: peer may send requests
854 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
855 */
856 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
857 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
858 else
859 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
860
861 }
862 #endif
863
864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
865 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
866 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
867 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
868 {
869 const unsigned char *npa;
870 unsigned int npalen;
871 int r;
872
873 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
874 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
875 {
876 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
877 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
878 s2n(npalen,ret);
879 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
880 ret += npalen;
881 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
882 }
883 }
884 #endif
885
886 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
887 return orig;
888
889 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
890 return ret;
891 }
892
893 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
894 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
895 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
896 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
897 * SNI,
898 * elliptic_curves
899 * ec_point_formats
900 *
901 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
902 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
903 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
904 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
905 */
906 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
907 unsigned short type, size;
908 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
909 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
910 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
911 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
912 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
913 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
914 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
915
916 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
917 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
918 0x01, /* 1 point format */
919 0x00, /* uncompressed */
920 };
921
922 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
923 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
924 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
925 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
926 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
927 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
928 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
929 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
930 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
931 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
932 };
933
934 if (data >= (d+n-2))
935 return;
936 data += 2;
937
938 if (data > (d+n-4))
939 return;
940 n2s(data,type);
941 n2s(data,size);
942
943 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
944 return;
945
946 if (data+size > d+n)
947 return;
948 data += size;
949
950 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
951 {
952 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
953 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
954
955 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
956 return;
957 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
958 return;
959 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
960 return;
961 }
962 else
963 {
964 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
965
966 if (data + len != d+n)
967 return;
968 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
969 return;
970 }
971
972 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
973 }
974 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
975
976 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
977 {
978 unsigned short type;
979 unsigned short size;
980 unsigned short len;
981 unsigned char *data = *p;
982 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
983 int sigalg_seen = 0;
984
985 s->servername_done = 0;
986 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
988 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
989 #endif
990
991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
992 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
993 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
994 #endif
995
996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
997 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
998 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
999 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1000
1001 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1002 goto ri_check;
1003 n2s(data,len);
1004
1005 if (data > (d+n-len))
1006 goto ri_check;
1007
1008 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1009 {
1010 n2s(data,type);
1011 n2s(data,size);
1012
1013 if (data+size > (d+n))
1014 goto ri_check;
1015 #if 0
1016 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1017 #endif
1018 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1019 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1020 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1021 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1022
1023 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1024 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1025 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1026 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1027 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1028 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1029 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1030 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1031 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1032 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1033 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1034 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1035 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1036 the value of the Host: field.
1037 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1038 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1039 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1040 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1041
1042 */
1043
1044 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1045 {
1046 unsigned char *sdata;
1047 int servname_type;
1048 int dsize;
1049
1050 if (size < 2)
1051 {
1052 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1053 return 0;
1054 }
1055 n2s(data,dsize);
1056 size -= 2;
1057 if (dsize > size )
1058 {
1059 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1060 return 0;
1061 }
1062
1063 sdata = data;
1064 while (dsize > 3)
1065 {
1066 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1067 n2s(sdata,len);
1068 dsize -= 3;
1069
1070 if (len > dsize)
1071 {
1072 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1073 return 0;
1074 }
1075 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1076 switch (servname_type)
1077 {
1078 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1079 if (!s->hit)
1080 {
1081 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1082 {
1083 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1084 return 0;
1085 }
1086 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1087 {
1088 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1089 return 0;
1090 }
1091 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1092 {
1093 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1094 return 0;
1095 }
1096 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1097 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1098 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1099 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1100 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1101 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1102 return 0;
1103 }
1104 s->servername_done = 1;
1105
1106 }
1107 else
1108 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1109 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1110 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1111
1112 break;
1113
1114 default:
1115 break;
1116 }
1117
1118 dsize -= len;
1119 }
1120 if (dsize != 0)
1121 {
1122 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1123 return 0;
1124 }
1125
1126 }
1127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1128 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1129 {
1130 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1131 {
1132 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1133 return 0;
1134 }
1135 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1136 {
1137 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1138 return 0;
1139 }
1140 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1141 return -1;
1142 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1143 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1144
1145 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1146 {
1147 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1148 return 0;
1149 }
1150 }
1151 #endif
1152
1153 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1154 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1155 {
1156 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1157 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1158
1159 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1160 {
1161 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1162 return 0;
1163 }
1164 if (!s->hit)
1165 {
1166 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1167 {
1168 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1169 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1170 }
1171 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1172 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1173 {
1174 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1175 return 0;
1176 }
1177 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1178 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1179 }
1180 #if 0
1181 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1182 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1183 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1184 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1185 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1186 #endif
1187 }
1188 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
1189 {
1190 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1191 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1192 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1193
1194 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1195 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1196 {
1197 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1198 return 0;
1199 }
1200 if (!s->hit)
1201 {
1202 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1203 {
1204 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1205 return 0;
1206 }
1207 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1208 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1209 {
1210 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1211 return 0;
1212 }
1213 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1214 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1215 }
1216 #if 0
1217 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1218 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1219 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1220 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1221 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1222 #endif
1223 }
1224 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1225 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1226 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1227 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1228 {
1229 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1230
1231 if (size < 2)
1232 {
1233 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1234 return 0;
1235 }
1236 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1237 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1238 {
1239 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1240 return 0;
1241 }
1242
1243 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1244 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1245 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1246 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1247 else
1248 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1249 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1250 {
1251 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1252 return 0;
1253 }
1254 }
1255 #endif
1256 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1257 {
1258 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1259 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1260 {
1261 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1262 return 0;
1263 }
1264 }
1265 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1266 {
1267 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1268 return 0;
1269 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1270 }
1271 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1272 {
1273 int dsize;
1274 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1275 {
1276 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1277 return 0;
1278 }
1279 sigalg_seen = 1;
1280 n2s(data,dsize);
1281 size -= 2;
1282 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1283 {
1284 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1285 return 0;
1286 }
1287 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1288 {
1289 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1290 return 0;
1291 }
1292 }
1293 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1294 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1295 {
1296
1297 if (size < 5)
1298 {
1299 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1300 return 0;
1301 }
1302
1303 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1304 size--;
1305 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1306 {
1307 const unsigned char *sdata;
1308 int dsize;
1309 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1310 n2s(data,dsize);
1311 size -= 2;
1312 if (dsize > size )
1313 {
1314 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1315 return 0;
1316 }
1317 while (dsize > 0)
1318 {
1319 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1320 int idsize;
1321 if (dsize < 4)
1322 {
1323 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1324 return 0;
1325 }
1326 n2s(data, idsize);
1327 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1328 size -= 2 + idsize;
1329 if (dsize < 0)
1330 {
1331 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1332 return 0;
1333 }
1334 sdata = data;
1335 data += idsize;
1336 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1337 &sdata, idsize);
1338 if (!id)
1339 {
1340 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1341 return 0;
1342 }
1343 if (data != sdata)
1344 {
1345 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1346 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1347 return 0;
1348 }
1349 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1350 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1351 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1352 {
1353 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1354 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1355 return 0;
1356 }
1357 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1358 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1359 {
1360 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1361 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1362 return 0;
1363 }
1364 }
1365
1366 /* Read in request_extensions */
1367 if (size < 2)
1368 {
1369 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1370 return 0;
1371 }
1372 n2s(data,dsize);
1373 size -= 2;
1374 if (dsize != size)
1375 {
1376 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1377 return 0;
1378 }
1379 sdata = data;
1380 if (dsize > 0)
1381 {
1382 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1383 {
1384 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1385 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1386 }
1387
1388 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1389 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1390 &sdata, dsize);
1391 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1392 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1393 {
1394 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1395 return 0;
1396 }
1397 }
1398 }
1399 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1400 * so ignore it.
1401 */
1402 else
1403 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1404 }
1405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1406 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1407 {
1408 switch(data[0])
1409 {
1410 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1411 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1412 break;
1413 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1414 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1415 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1416 break;
1417 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1418 return 0;
1419 }
1420 }
1421 #endif
1422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1423 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1424 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1425 {
1426 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1427 * renegotiation.
1428 *
1429 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1430 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1431 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1432 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1433 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1434 * anything like that, but this might change).
1435
1436 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1437 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1438 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1439 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1440 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1441 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1442 }
1443 #endif
1444
1445 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1447 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
1448 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1449 {
1450 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1451 al))
1452 return 0;
1453 }
1454 #endif
1455
1456 data+=size;
1457 }
1458
1459 *p = data;
1460
1461 ri_check:
1462
1463 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1464
1465 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1466 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1467 {
1468 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1470 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1471 return 0;
1472 }
1473
1474 return 1;
1475 }
1476
1477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1478 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1479 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1480 * the length of the block. */
1481 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1482 {
1483 unsigned int off = 0;
1484
1485 while (off < len)
1486 {
1487 if (d[off] == 0)
1488 return 0;
1489 off += d[off];
1490 off++;
1491 }
1492
1493 return off == len;
1494 }
1495 #endif
1496
1497 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1498 {
1499 unsigned short length;
1500 unsigned short type;
1501 unsigned short size;
1502 unsigned char *data = *p;
1503 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1504 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1505
1506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1507 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1508 #endif
1509
1510 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1511 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1512 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1513 #endif
1514
1515 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1516 goto ri_check;
1517
1518 n2s(data,length);
1519 if (data+length != d+n)
1520 {
1521 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1522 return 0;
1523 }
1524
1525 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1526 {
1527 n2s(data,type);
1528 n2s(data,size);
1529
1530 if (data+size > (d+n))
1531 goto ri_check;
1532
1533 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1534 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1535 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1536
1537 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1538 {
1539 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1540 {
1541 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1542 return 0;
1543 }
1544 tlsext_servername = 1;
1545 }
1546
1547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1548 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1549 {
1550 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1551 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1552
1553 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1554 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1555 {
1556 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1557 return 0;
1558 }
1559 if (!s->hit)
1560 {
1561 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1562 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1563 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1564 {
1565 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1566 return 0;
1567 }
1568 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1569 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1570 }
1571 #if 0
1572 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1573 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1574 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1575 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1576 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1577 #endif
1578 }
1579 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1580
1581 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1582 {
1583 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1584 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1585 {
1586 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1587 return 0;
1588 }
1589 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1590 || (size > 0))
1591 {
1592 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1593 return 0;
1594 }
1595 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1596 }
1597 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1598 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1599 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1600 {
1601 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1602
1603 if (size < 2)
1604 {
1605 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1606 return 0;
1607 }
1608 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1609 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1610 {
1611 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1612 return 0;
1613 }
1614
1615 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1616 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1617 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1618 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1619 else
1620 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1621
1622 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1623 {
1624 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1625 return 0;
1626 }
1627 }
1628 #endif
1629 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1630 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1631 {
1632 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1633 * a status request message.
1634 */
1635 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1636 {
1637 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1638 return 0;
1639 }
1640 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1641 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1642 }
1643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1644 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1645 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1646 {
1647 unsigned char *selected;
1648 unsigned char selected_len;
1649
1650 /* We must have requested it. */
1651 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
1652 {
1653 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1654 return 0;
1655 }
1656 /* The data must be valid */
1657 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1658 {
1659 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1660 return 0;
1661 }
1662 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1663 {
1664 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1665 return 0;
1666 }
1667 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1668 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1669 {
1670 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1671 return 0;
1672 }
1673 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1674 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1675 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1676 }
1677 #endif
1678 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1679 {
1680 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1681 return 0;
1682 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1683 }
1684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1685 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1686 {
1687 switch(data[0])
1688 {
1689 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1690 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1691 break;
1692 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1693 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1694 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1695 break;
1696 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1697 return 0;
1698 }
1699 }
1700 #endif
1701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1702 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1703 {
1704 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1705 al))
1706 return 0;
1707 }
1708 #endif
1709
1710 data+=size;
1711 }
1712
1713 if (data != d+n)
1714 {
1715 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1716 return 0;
1717 }
1718
1719 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1720 {
1721 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1722 {
1723 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1724 {
1725 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1726 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1727 {
1728 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1729 return 0;
1730 }
1731 }
1732 else
1733 {
1734 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1735 return 0;
1736 }
1737 }
1738 }
1739
1740 *p = data;
1741
1742 ri_check:
1743
1744 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1745 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1746 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1747 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1748 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1749 * absence on initial connect only.
1750 */
1751 if (!renegotiate_seen
1752 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1753 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1754 {
1755 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1757 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1758 return 0;
1759 }
1760
1761 return 1;
1762 }
1763
1764
1765 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1766 {
1767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1768 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1769 * and elliptic curves we support.
1770 */
1771 int using_ecc = 0;
1772 int i;
1773 unsigned char *j;
1774 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1775 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1776
1777 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1778 {
1779 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1780
1781 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1782 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1783 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1784 {
1785 using_ecc = 1;
1786 break;
1787 }
1788 }
1789 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1790 if (using_ecc)
1791 {
1792 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1793 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1794 {
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1796 return -1;
1797 }
1798 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1799 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1800 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1801 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1802
1803 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1804 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1805 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
1806 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1807 {
1808 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1810 return -1;
1811 }
1812 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
1813 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
1814 {
1815 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1816 s2n(id,j);
1817 }
1818 }
1819 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1820
1821 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1822 {
1823 int r = 1;
1824
1825 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1826 {
1827 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1828 if (!r)
1829 return -1;
1830 }
1831
1832 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1833 {
1834 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1835 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1836
1837 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1838 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1839 else
1840 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1841 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1842 {
1843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1844 return -1;
1845 }
1846 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1847 }
1848
1849 if (r == 2)
1850 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1851 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1852 }
1853 #endif
1854
1855 return 1;
1856 }
1857
1858 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1859 {
1860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1861 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1862 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1863 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1864 */
1865
1866 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1867 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1868 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1869 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1870
1871 if (using_ecc)
1872 {
1873 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1874 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1875 {
1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1877 return -1;
1878 }
1879 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1880 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1881 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1882 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1883 }
1884 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1885
1886 return 1;
1887 }
1888
1889 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
1890 {
1891 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1892 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1893
1894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1895 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1896 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1897 */
1898 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1899 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1900 */
1901 #endif
1902
1903 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1904 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1905 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1906 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1907
1908 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1909 {
1910 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1911 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1912 * so this has to happen here in
1913 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
1914
1915 int r = 1;
1916
1917 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1918 {
1919 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1920 if (!r)
1921 {
1922 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1923 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1924 goto err;
1925 }
1926 }
1927
1928 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1929 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1930 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1931
1932 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1933 {
1934 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1935 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1936 {
1937 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1938 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1939
1940 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1941 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1942 else
1943 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1944 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1945 {
1946 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1947 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1948 goto err;
1949 }
1950 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1951 }
1952 }
1953
1954 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1955 {
1956 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1957 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1958 * abort the handshake.
1959 */
1960 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1961 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1962 }
1963 }
1964
1965 err:
1966 #endif
1967 switch (ret)
1968 {
1969 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1970 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1971 return -1;
1972
1973 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1974 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1975 return 1;
1976
1977 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1978 s->servername_done=0;
1979 default:
1980 return 1;
1981 }
1982 }
1983
1984 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
1985 {
1986 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1987 int al;
1988
1989 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1990 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1991 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
1992 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
1993 */
1994 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1995 {
1996 int r;
1997 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
1998 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
1999 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2000 if (certpkey == NULL)
2001 {
2002 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2003 return 1;
2004 }
2005 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2006 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2007 */
2008 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2009 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2010 switch (r)
2011 {
2012 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2013 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2014 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2015 break;
2016 /* status request response should be sent */
2017 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2018 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2019 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2020 else
2021 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2022 break;
2023 /* something bad happened */
2024 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2025 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2026 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2027 goto err;
2028 }
2029 }
2030 else
2031 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2032
2033 err:
2034 switch (ret)
2035 {
2036 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2037 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2038 return -1;
2039
2040 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2041 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2042 return 1;
2043
2044 default:
2045 return 1;
2046 }
2047 }
2048
2049 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2050 {
2051 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2052 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2053
2054 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2055 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2056 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2057 * it must contain uncompressed.
2058 */
2059 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2060 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2061 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2062 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2063 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2064 {
2065 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2066 size_t i;
2067 unsigned char *list;
2068 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2069 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2070 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2071 {
2072 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2073 {
2074 found_uncompressed = 1;
2075 break;
2076 }
2077 }
2078 if (!found_uncompressed)
2079 {
2080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2081 return -1;
2082 }
2083 }
2084 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2085 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2086
2087 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2088 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2089 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2090 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2091
2092 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2093 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2094 {
2095 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2096 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2097
2098 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2099 {
2100 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2101 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2102 }
2103
2104 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2105 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2106 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2107 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2108 {
2109 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2110 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2111 }
2112 }
2113 #endif
2114
2115 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2116 * tell the callback
2117 */
2118 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2119 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2120 {
2121 int r;
2122 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2123 * there is no response.
2124 */
2125 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2126 {
2127 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2128 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2129 }
2130 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2131 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2132 if (r == 0)
2133 {
2134 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2135 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2136 }
2137 if (r < 0)
2138 {
2139 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2140 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2141 }
2142 }
2143
2144 switch (ret)
2145 {
2146 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2147 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2148 return -1;
2149
2150 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2151 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2152 return 1;
2153
2154 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2155 s->servername_done=0;
2156 default:
2157 return 1;
2158 }
2159 }
2160
2161 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2162 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2163 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2164 *
2165 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2166 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2167 * extension, if any.
2168 * len: the length of the session ID.
2169 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2170 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2171 * point to the resulting session.
2172 *
2173 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2174 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2175 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2176 *
2177 * Returns:
2178 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2179 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2180 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2181 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2182 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2183 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2184 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2185 *
2186 * Side effects:
2187 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2188 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2189 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2190 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2191 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2192 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2193 */
2194 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2195 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2196 {
2197 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2198 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2199 unsigned short i;
2200
2201 *ret = NULL;
2202 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2203
2204 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2205 * to permit stateful resumption.
2206 */
2207 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2208 return 0;
2209 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2210 return 0;
2211 if (p >= limit)
2212 return -1;
2213 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2214 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2215 {
2216 i = *(p++);
2217 p+= i;
2218 if (p >= limit)
2219 return -1;
2220 }
2221 /* Skip past cipher list */
2222 n2s(p, i);
2223 p+= i;
2224 if (p >= limit)
2225 return -1;
2226 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2227 i = *(p++);
2228 p += i;
2229 if (p > limit)
2230 return -1;
2231 /* Now at start of extensions */
2232 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2233 return 0;
2234 n2s(p, i);
2235 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2236 {
2237 unsigned short type, size;
2238 n2s(p, type);
2239 n2s(p, size);
2240 if (p + size > limit)
2241 return 0;
2242 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2243 {
2244 int r;
2245 if (size == 0)
2246 {
2247 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2248 * currently have one. */
2249 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2250 return 1;
2251 }
2252 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2253 {
2254 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2255 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2256 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2257 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2258 * calculate the master secret later. */
2259 return 2;
2260 }
2261 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2262 switch (r)
2263 {
2264 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2265 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2266 return 2;
2267 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2268 return r;
2269 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2270 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2271 return 3;
2272 default: /* fatal error */
2273 return -1;
2274 }
2275 }
2276 p += size;
2277 }
2278 return 0;
2279 }
2280
2281 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2282 *
2283 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2284 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2285 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2286 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2287 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2288 * point to the resulting session.
2289 *
2290 * Returns:
2291 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2292 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2293 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2294 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2295 */
2296 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2297 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2298 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2299 {
2300 SSL_SESSION *sess;
2301 unsigned char *sdec;
2302 const unsigned char *p;
2303 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2304 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2305 HMAC_CTX hctx;
2306 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
2307 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2308 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2309 if (eticklen < 48)
2310 return 2;
2311 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2312 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2313 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2314 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2315 {
2316 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2317 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2318 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
2319 if (rv < 0)
2320 return -1;
2321 if (rv == 0)
2322 return 2;
2323 if (rv == 2)
2324 renew_ticket = 1;
2325 }
2326 else
2327 {
2328 /* Check key name matches */
2329 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2330 return 2;
2331 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2332 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2333 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2334 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2335 }
2336 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2337 * integrity checks on ticket.
2338 */
2339 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2340 if (mlen < 0)
2341 {
2342 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2343 return -1;
2344 }
2345 eticklen -= mlen;
2346 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2347 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2348 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2349 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2350 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2351 {
2352 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2353 return 2;
2354 }
2355 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2356 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2357 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2358 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2359 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2360 if (!sdec)
2361 {
2362 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2363 return -1;
2364 }
2365 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2366 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2367 {
2368 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2369 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
2370 return 2;
2371 }
2372 slen += mlen;
2373 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2374 p = sdec;
2375
2376 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2377 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
2378 if (sess)
2379 {
2380 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2381 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2382 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2383 * as required by standard.
2384 */
2385 if (sesslen)
2386 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2387 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2388 *psess = sess;
2389 if (renew_ticket)
2390 return 4;
2391 else
2392 return 3;
2393 }
2394 ERR_clear_error();
2395 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2396 * ticket. */
2397 return 2;
2398 }
2399
2400 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2401
2402 typedef struct
2403 {
2404 int nid;
2405 int id;
2406 } tls12_lookup;
2407
2408 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2410 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2411 #endif
2412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2413 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2414 #endif
2415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2416 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2417 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2418 #endif
2419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2420 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2421 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2422 #endif
2423 };
2424
2425 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2427 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2428 #endif
2429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2430 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2431 #endif
2432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2433 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2434 #endif
2435 };
2436
2437 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2438 {
2439 size_t i;
2440 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2441 {
2442 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2443 return table[i].id;
2444 }
2445 return -1;
2446 }
2447 #if 0
2448 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2449 {
2450 size_t i;
2451 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2452 {
2453 if (table[i].id == id)
2454 return table[i].nid;
2455 }
2456 return -1;
2457 }
2458 #endif
2459
2460 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2461 {
2462 int sig_id, md_id;
2463 if (!md)
2464 return 0;
2465 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2466 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2467 if (md_id == -1)
2468 return 0;
2469 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2470 if (sig_id == -1)
2471 return 0;
2472 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2473 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2474 return 1;
2475 }
2476
2477 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2478 {
2479 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2480 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2481 }
2482
2483 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2484 {
2485 switch(hash_alg)
2486 {
2487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2488 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2489 return EVP_sha1();
2490 #endif
2491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2492 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2493 return EVP_sha224();
2494
2495 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2496 return EVP_sha256();
2497 #endif
2498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2499 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2500 return EVP_sha384();
2501
2502 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2503 return EVP_sha512();
2504 #endif
2505 default:
2506 return NULL;
2507
2508 }
2509 }
2510
2511 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2512
2513 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2514 {
2515 int i, idx;
2516 const EVP_MD *md;
2517 CERT *c = s->cert;
2518 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2519 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2520 return 1;
2521 /* Should never happen */
2522 if (!c)
2523 return 0;
2524
2525 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2526 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2527 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2528 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2529
2530 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2531 {
2532 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2533
2534 switch(sig_alg)
2535 {
2536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2537 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2538 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2539 break;
2540 #endif
2541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2542 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2543 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2544 break;
2545 #endif
2546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2547 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2548 idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
2549 break;
2550 #endif
2551 default:
2552 continue;
2553 }
2554
2555 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2556 {
2557 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2558 if (md)
2559 {
2560 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2561 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2562 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2563 }
2564 }
2565
2566 }
2567
2568
2569 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2570 * supported it stays as NULL.
2571 */
2572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2573 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2574 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2575 #endif
2576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2577 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2578 {
2579 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2580 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2581 }
2582 #endif
2583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2584 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2585 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2586 #endif
2587 return 1;
2588 }
2589
2590 #endif
2591
2592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2593 int
2594 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2595 {
2596 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2597 unsigned short hbtype;
2598 unsigned int payload;
2599 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2600
2601 if (s->msg_callback)
2602 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2603 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2604 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2605
2606 /* Read type and payload length first */
2607 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2608 return 0; /* silently discard */
2609 hbtype = *p++;
2610 n2s(p, payload);
2611 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2612 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
2613 pl = p;
2614
2615 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
2616 {
2617 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2618 int r;
2619
2620 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
2621 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
2622 * payload, plus padding
2623 */
2624 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2625 bp = buffer;
2626
2627 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2628 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2629 s2n(payload, bp);
2630 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2631 bp += payload;
2632 /* Random padding */
2633 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
2634
2635 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
2636
2637 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2638 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2639 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2640 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2641
2642 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2643
2644 if (r < 0)
2645 return r;
2646 }
2647 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
2648 {
2649 unsigned int seq;
2650
2651 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
2652 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
2653 * sequence number */
2654 n2s(pl, seq);
2655
2656 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
2657 {
2658 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
2659 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2660 }
2661 }
2662
2663 return 0;
2664 }
2665
2666 int
2667 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2668 {
2669 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2670 int ret;
2671 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2672 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2673
2674 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2675 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2676 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
2677 {
2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2679 return -1;
2680 }
2681
2682 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2683 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
2684 {
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2686 return -1;
2687 }
2688
2689 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2690 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
2691 {
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2693 return -1;
2694 }
2695
2696 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
2697 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2698 */
2699 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2700
2701 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2702 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2703 * some random stuff.
2704 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2705 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2706 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2707 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2708 * - Padding
2709 */
2710 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2711 p = buf;
2712 /* Message Type */
2713 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2714 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2715 s2n(payload, p);
2716 /* Sequence number */
2717 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2718 /* 16 random bytes */
2719 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2720 p += 16;
2721 /* Random padding */
2722 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
2723
2724 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2725 if (ret >= 0)
2726 {
2727 if (s->msg_callback)
2728 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2729 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2730 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2731
2732 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
2733 }
2734
2735 OPENSSL_free(buf);
2736
2737 return ret;
2738 }
2739 #endif
Tomato firmware and modifications.