2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
122 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
);
123 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL
*s
);
125 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, int n
, int max
, int extend
)
127 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
128 * packet by another n bytes.
129 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
130 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
131 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
132 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
139 if (n
<= 0) return n
;
143 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
147 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
148 align
= (long)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
149 align
= (-align
)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
-1);
154 /* start with empty packet ... */
157 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)
159 /* check if next packet length is large
160 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
161 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
162 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
163 && (pkt
[3]<<8|pkt
[4]) >= 128)
165 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
166 * and its length field is insane, we can
167 * only be led to wrong decision about
168 * whether memmove will occur or not.
169 * Header values has no effect on memmove
170 * arguments and therefore no buffer
171 * overrun can be triggered. */
172 memmove (rb
->buf
+align
,pkt
,left
);
176 s
->packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
177 s
->packet_length
= 0;
178 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
181 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
182 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
183 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
184 if (SSL_version(s
) == DTLS1_VERSION
|| SSL_version(s
) == DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
186 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
190 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
199 /* else we need to read more data */
201 len
= s
->packet_length
;
203 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
204 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
205 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
206 if (s
->packet
!= pkt
) /* len > 0 */
208 memmove(pkt
, s
->packet
, len
+left
);
210 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
213 if (n
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)) /* does not happen */
215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
220 /* ignore max parameter */
226 if (max
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
))
227 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
232 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
233 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
234 * len+max if possible) */
239 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
240 i
=BIO_read(s
->rbio
,pkt
+len
+left
, max
-left
);
244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
251 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
252 SSL_version(s
) != DTLS1_VERSION
&& SSL_version(s
) != DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
254 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
258 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
259 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
260 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
261 if (SSL_version(s
) == DTLS1_VERSION
|| SSL_version(s
) == DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
264 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
268 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
271 s
->packet_length
+= n
;
272 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
276 /* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
277 * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
278 * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
279 * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
280 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
282 /* Call this to get a new input record.
283 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
284 * or non-blocking IO.
285 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
286 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
287 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
288 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
290 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
291 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL
*s
)
293 int ssl_major
,ssl_minor
,al
;
294 int enc_err
,n
,i
,ret
= -1;
298 unsigned char md
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
300 unsigned mac_size
, orig_len
;
302 unsigned empty_record_count
= 0;
307 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
)
308 extra
=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA
;
311 if (extra
&& !s
->s3
->init_extra
)
313 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
314 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
320 /* check if we have the header */
321 if ( (s
->rstate
!= SSL_ST_READ_BODY
) ||
322 (s
->packet_length
< SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
))
324 n
=ssl3_read_n(s
, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
, 0);
325 if (n
<= 0) return(n
); /* error or non-blocking */
326 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_BODY
;
330 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
334 version
=(ssl_major
<<8)|ssl_minor
;
337 fprintf(stderr
, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr
->type
, rr
->length
);
340 /* Lets check version */
341 if (!s
->first_packet
)
343 if (version
!= s
->version
)
345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
346 if ((s
->version
& 0xFF00) == (version
& 0xFF00) && !s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
)
347 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
348 s
->version
= (unsigned short)version
;
349 al
=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
354 if ((version
>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
)
356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
360 if (rr
->length
> s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
- SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)
362 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
367 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
370 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
372 if (rr
->length
> s
->packet_length
-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)
374 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
376 n
=ssl3_read_n(s
,i
,i
,1);
377 if (n
<= 0) return(n
); /* error or non-blocking io */
378 /* now n == rr->length,
379 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
382 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
; /* set state for later operations */
384 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
385 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
387 rr
->input
= &(s
->packet
[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
]);
389 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
390 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
391 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
392 * the decryption or by the decompression
393 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
394 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
396 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
397 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
399 /* check is not needed I believe */
400 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
+extra
)
402 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
407 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
410 enc_err
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
,0);
412 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
413 * 1: if the padding is valid
414 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
417 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED
;
418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG
);
423 printf("dec %d\n",rr
->length
);
424 { unsigned int z
; for (z
=0; z
<rr
->length
; z
++) printf("%02X%c",rr
->data
[z
],((z
+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
428 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
429 if ((sess
!= NULL
) &&
430 (s
->enc_read_ctx
!= NULL
) &&
431 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->read_hash
) != NULL
))
433 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
434 unsigned char *mac
= NULL
;
435 unsigned char mac_tmp
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
436 mac_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->read_hash
);
437 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
439 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
440 orig_len
= rr
->length
+((unsigned int)rr
->type
>>8);
442 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
443 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
444 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
445 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
447 if (orig_len
< mac_size
||
448 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
449 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_read_ctx
) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
&&
450 orig_len
< mac_size
+1))
452 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
457 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_read_ctx
) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
)
459 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
460 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
461 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
462 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
465 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp
, rr
, mac_size
, orig_len
);
466 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
470 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
471 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
472 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
473 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
474 mac
= &rr
->data
[rr
->length
];
477 i
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
,md
,0 /* not send */);
478 if (i
< 0 || mac
== NULL
|| CRYPTO_memcmp(md
, mac
, (size_t)mac_size
) != 0)
480 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+extra
+mac_size
)
486 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
487 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
488 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
489 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
490 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
491 al
=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC
;
492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC
);
496 /* r->length is now just compressed */
497 if (s
->expand
!= NULL
)
499 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+extra
)
501 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
505 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s
))
507 al
=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE
;
508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION
);
513 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+extra
)
515 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
521 /* So at this point the following is true
522 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
523 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
524 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
525 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
529 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
532 /* just read a 0 length packet */
535 empty_record_count
++;
536 if (empty_record_count
> MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS
)
538 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL
);
546 fprintf(stderr
, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr
->type
, rr
->length
);
552 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
557 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL
*ssl
)
559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
563 rr
= &(ssl
->s3
->rrec
);
564 i
=COMP_expand_block(ssl
->expand
,rr
->comp
,
565 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,rr
->data
,(int)rr
->length
);
575 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL
*ssl
)
577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
581 wr
= &(ssl
->s3
->wrec
);
582 i
=COMP_compress_block(ssl
->compress
,wr
->data
,
583 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
,
584 wr
->input
,(int)wr
->length
);
595 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
596 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
598 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, int len
)
600 const unsigned char *buf
=buf_
;
604 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
605 OPENSSL_assert(s
->s3
->wnum
<= INT_MAX
);
609 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !s
->in_handshake
)
611 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
612 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
620 /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write
621 * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete
622 * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding
623 * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
624 * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
625 * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
626 * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
639 if (n
> s
->max_send_fragment
)
640 nw
=s
->max_send_fragment
;
644 i
=do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), nw
, 0);
652 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
653 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
)))
655 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
656 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
657 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
667 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
668 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
)
670 unsigned char *p
,*plen
;
671 int i
,mac_size
,clear
=0;
676 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
=&(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
680 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
681 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
683 return(ssl3_write_pending(s
,type
,buf
,len
));
685 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
686 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
)
688 i
=s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
691 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
695 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
))
698 if (len
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
704 if ( (sess
== NULL
) ||
705 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) ||
706 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
))
709 clear
=s
->enc_write_ctx
?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
717 mac_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
722 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
723 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
)
725 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
726 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
728 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
730 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
731 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
732 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
733 * together with the actual payload) */
734 prefix_len
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, 0, 1);
739 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
))
741 /* insufficient space */
742 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
747 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
750 if (create_empty_fragment
)
752 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
753 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
754 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
755 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
756 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
757 align
= (long)wb
->buf
+ 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
758 align
= (-align
)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
-1);
765 p
= wb
->buf
+ wb
->offset
+ prefix_len
;
769 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
770 align
= (long)wb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
771 align
= (-align
)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
-1);
777 /* write the header */
782 *(p
++)=(s
->version
>>8);
783 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
784 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
786 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
788 && TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
)
791 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
793 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
796 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
797 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_1_VERSION
)
799 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
800 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
)
802 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
806 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
807 else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
)
808 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
815 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
818 wr
->input
=(unsigned char *)buf
;
820 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
823 /* first we compress */
824 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
)
826 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
))
828 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
834 memcpy(wr
->data
,wr
->input
,wr
->length
);
838 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
839 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
840 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
844 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
,&(p
[wr
->length
+ eivlen
]),1) < 0)
846 wr
->length
+=mac_size
;
854 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
856 wr
->length
+= eivlen
;
859 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
860 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
,1);
862 /* record length after mac and block padding */
863 s2n(wr
->length
,plen
);
865 /* we should now have
866 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
868 wr
->type
=type
; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
869 wr
->length
+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
871 if (create_empty_fragment
)
873 /* we are in a recursive call;
874 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
879 /* now let's set up wb */
880 wb
->left
= prefix_len
+ wr
->length
;
882 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
883 s
->s3
->wpend_tot
=len
;
884 s
->s3
->wpend_buf
=buf
;
885 s
->s3
->wpend_type
=type
;
886 s
->s3
->wpend_ret
=len
;
888 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
889 return ssl3_write_pending(s
,type
,buf
,len
);
894 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
895 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
899 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
=&(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
902 if ((s
->s3
->wpend_tot
> (int)len
)
903 || ((s
->s3
->wpend_buf
!= buf
) &&
904 !(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
))
905 || (s
->s3
->wpend_type
!= type
))
907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
916 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
918 (char *)&(wb
->buf
[wb
->offset
]),
919 (unsigned int)wb
->left
);
923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
930 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
931 SSL_version(s
) != DTLS1_VERSION
&& SSL_version(s
) != DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
932 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
933 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
934 return(s
->s3
->wpend_ret
);
937 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
||
938 s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
939 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
940 point in using a datagram service */
950 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
951 * 'type' is one of the following:
953 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
954 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
955 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
957 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
958 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
960 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
961 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
962 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
963 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
964 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
965 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
966 * Change cipher spec protocol
967 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
969 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
971 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
972 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
973 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
974 * Application data protocol
975 * none of our business
977 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, unsigned char *buf
, int len
, int peek
)
982 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type2
,int val
)=NULL
;
984 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.buf
== NULL
) /* Not initialized yet */
985 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
988 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) ||
989 (peek
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)))
991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
995 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
996 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
998 unsigned char *src
= s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
999 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1004 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1007 len
--; s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
--;
1010 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1011 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1012 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1016 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
1018 if (!s
->in_handshake
&& SSL_in_init(s
))
1020 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1021 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
1022 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1030 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1032 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1033 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1034 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1035 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
1036 rr
= &(s
->s3
->rrec
);
1038 /* get new packet if necessary */
1039 if ((rr
->length
== 0) || (s
->rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
))
1041 ret
=ssl3_get_record(s
);
1042 if (ret
<= 0) return(ret
);
1045 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1047 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1048 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1049 && (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
))
1051 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1056 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1057 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1058 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
)
1061 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1066 if (type
== rr
->type
) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1068 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1069 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1070 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1071 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
))
1073 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1078 if (len
<= 0) return(len
);
1080 if ((unsigned int)len
> rr
->length
)
1083 n
= (unsigned int)len
;
1085 memcpy(buf
,&(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]),n
);
1090 if (rr
->length
== 0)
1092 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1094 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0)
1095 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1102 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1103 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1105 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1106 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1109 unsigned int dest_maxlen
= 0;
1110 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
1111 unsigned int *dest_len
= NULL
;
1113 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
1115 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
1116 dest
= s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
1117 dest_len
= &s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
;
1119 else if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
)
1121 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->s3
->alert_fragment
;
1122 dest
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
;
1123 dest_len
= &s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
;
1125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1126 else if (rr
->type
== TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
)
1128 tls1_process_heartbeat(s
);
1130 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1132 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
1133 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1134 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1139 if (dest_maxlen
> 0)
1141 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1143 n
= rr
->length
; /* available bytes */
1145 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1148 dest
[(*dest_len
)++] = rr
->data
[rr
->off
++];
1152 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1153 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1157 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1158 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1159 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1161 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1163 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1164 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) &&
1165 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
))
1167 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
1169 if ((s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[1] != 0) ||
1170 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[2] != 0) ||
1171 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[3] != 0))
1173 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST
);
1178 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1179 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
, 4, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1181 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1182 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
) &&
1183 !s
->s3
->renegotiate
)
1185 ssl3_renegotiate(s
);
1186 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
))
1188 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
1189 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1196 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
))
1198 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1201 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1202 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1203 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1204 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1205 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
1206 bio
=SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1207 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1208 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1214 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1215 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1218 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1219 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1220 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1223 SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1224 !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
1225 (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) &&
1226 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1227 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) &&
1228 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) &&
1229 !(s
->ctx
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
))
1232 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1234 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1237 if (s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
>= 2)
1239 int alert_level
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
[0];
1240 int alert_descr
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
[1];
1242 s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
1244 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1245 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, s
->s3
->alert_fragment
, 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1247 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1248 cb
=s
->info_callback
;
1249 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1250 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1254 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1255 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1258 if (alert_level
== 1) /* warning */
1260 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1261 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
)
1263 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1266 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1267 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1268 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1269 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1270 * expects it to succeed.
1272 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1273 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1275 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)
1277 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1281 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1282 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
)
1286 else if (alert_level
== 2) /* fatal */
1290 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1291 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1293 BIO_snprintf(tmp
,sizeof tmp
,"%d",alert_descr
);
1294 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp
);
1295 s
->shutdown
|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1296 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
,s
->session
);
1301 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1309 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1311 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1316 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
)
1318 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1319 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1320 if ( (rr
->length
!= 1) || (rr
->off
!= 0) ||
1321 (rr
->data
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
))
1323 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1328 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1329 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
1331 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1336 if (!(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
))
1338 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1343 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
1347 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1348 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, rr
->data
, 1, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1350 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
=1;
1351 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
))
1357 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1358 if ((s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) && !s
->in_handshake
)
1360 if (((s
->state
&SSL_ST_MASK
) == SSL_ST_OK
) &&
1361 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
))
1363 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1364 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1365 * protocol violations): */
1366 s
->state
=SSL_ST_BEFORE
|(s
->server
)
1370 s
->state
= s
->server
? SSL_ST_ACCEPT
: SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
1375 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
1376 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1383 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
))
1385 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1388 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1389 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1390 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1391 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1392 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
1393 bio
=SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1394 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1395 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1406 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1407 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1409 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->version
<= TLS1_1_VERSION
)
1415 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1418 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1420 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1421 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1422 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1423 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1424 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1427 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1428 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1429 * but have application data. If the library was
1430 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1431 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1432 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1433 * we will indulge it.
1435 if (s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
&&
1436 (s
->s3
->total_renegotiations
!= 0) &&
1438 (s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
) &&
1439 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) &&
1440 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1442 (s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
) &&
1443 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
) &&
1444 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
1448 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
=2;
1453 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1461 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1466 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
)
1472 if (s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
)
1473 i
=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
;
1475 i
=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
;
1477 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.key_block
== NULL
)
1479 if (s
->session
== NULL
|| s
->session
->master_key_length
== 0)
1481 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1486 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
1487 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) return(0);
1490 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,i
))
1493 /* we have to record the message digest at
1494 * this point so we can get it before we read
1495 * the finished message */
1496 if (s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
)
1498 sender
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
1499 slen
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
1503 sender
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
1504 slen
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
1507 i
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
1508 sender
,slen
,s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1514 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= i
;
1519 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL
*s
, int level
, int desc
)
1521 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1522 desc
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->alert_value(desc
);
1523 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
&& desc
== SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
)
1524 desc
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1525 if (desc
< 0) return -1;
1526 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1527 if ((level
== 2) && (s
->session
!= NULL
))
1528 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
,s
->session
);
1530 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
=1;
1531 s
->s3
->send_alert
[0]=level
;
1532 s
->s3
->send_alert
[1]=desc
;
1533 if (s
->s3
->wbuf
.left
== 0) /* data still being written out? */
1534 return s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
1535 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1536 * some time in the future */
1540 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL
*s
)
1543 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
1545 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
=0;
1546 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, &s
->s3
->send_alert
[0], 2, 0);
1549 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
=1;
1553 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1554 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1555 * we will not worry too much. */
1556 if (s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
)
1557 (void)BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
1559 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1560 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, s
->s3
->send_alert
, 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1562 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1563 cb
=s
->info_callback
;
1564 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1565 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1569 j
=(s
->s3
->send_alert
[0]<<8)|s
->s3
->send_alert
[1];
1570 cb(s
,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT
,j
);