2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
122 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
);
123 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL
*s
);
125 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, int n
, int max
, int extend
)
127 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
128 * packet by another n bytes.
129 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
130 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
131 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
132 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
139 if (n
<= 0) return n
;
143 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
147 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
148 align
= (long)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
149 align
= (-align
)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
-1);
154 /* start with empty packet ... */
157 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)
159 /* check if next packet length is large
160 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
161 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
162 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
163 && (pkt
[3]<<8|pkt
[4]) >= 128)
165 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
166 * and its length field is insane, we can
167 * only be led to wrong decision about
168 * whether memmove will occur or not.
169 * Header values has no effect on memmove
170 * arguments and therefore no buffer
171 * overrun can be triggered. */
172 memmove (rb
->buf
+align
,pkt
,left
);
176 s
->packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
177 s
->packet_length
= 0;
178 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
181 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
182 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
183 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
184 if (SSL_version(s
) == DTLS1_VERSION
|| SSL_version(s
) == DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
186 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
190 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
199 /* else we need to read more data */
201 len
= s
->packet_length
;
203 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
204 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
205 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
206 if (s
->packet
!= pkt
) /* len > 0 */
208 memmove(pkt
, s
->packet
, len
+left
);
210 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
213 if (n
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)) /* does not happen */
215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
220 /* ignore max parameter */
226 if (max
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
))
227 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
232 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
233 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
234 * len+max if possible) */
239 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
240 i
=BIO_read(s
->rbio
,pkt
+len
+left
, max
-left
);
244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
251 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
252 SSL_version(s
) != DTLS1_VERSION
&& SSL_version(s
) != DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
254 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
258 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
259 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
260 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
261 if (SSL_version(s
) == DTLS1_VERSION
|| SSL_version(s
) == DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
264 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
268 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
271 s
->packet_length
+= n
;
272 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
276 /* Call this to get a new input record.
277 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
278 * or non-blocking IO.
279 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
280 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
281 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
282 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
284 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
285 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL
*s
)
287 int ssl_major
,ssl_minor
,al
;
288 int enc_err
,n
,i
,ret
= -1;
292 unsigned char md
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
294 unsigned mac_size
, orig_len
;
300 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
)
301 extra
=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA
;
304 if (extra
&& !s
->s3
->init_extra
)
306 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
307 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
313 /* check if we have the header */
314 if ( (s
->rstate
!= SSL_ST_READ_BODY
) ||
315 (s
->packet_length
< SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
))
317 n
=ssl3_read_n(s
, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
, 0);
318 if (n
<= 0) return(n
); /* error or non-blocking */
319 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_BODY
;
323 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
327 version
=(ssl_major
<<8)|ssl_minor
;
330 fprintf(stderr
, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr
->type
, rr
->length
);
333 /* Lets check version */
334 if (!s
->first_packet
)
336 if (version
!= s
->version
)
338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
339 if ((s
->version
& 0xFF00) == (version
& 0xFF00) && !s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
)
340 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
341 s
->version
= (unsigned short)version
;
342 al
=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
347 if ((version
>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
)
349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
353 if (rr
->length
> s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
- SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)
355 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
360 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
363 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
365 if (rr
->length
> s
->packet_length
-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)
367 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
369 n
=ssl3_read_n(s
,i
,i
,1);
370 if (n
<= 0) return(n
); /* error or non-blocking io */
371 /* now n == rr->length,
372 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
375 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
; /* set state for later operations */
377 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
378 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
380 rr
->input
= &(s
->packet
[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
]);
382 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
383 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
384 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
385 * the decryption or by the decompression
386 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
387 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
389 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
390 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
392 /* check is not needed I believe */
393 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
+extra
)
395 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
400 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
403 enc_err
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
,0);
405 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
406 * 1: if the padding is valid
407 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
410 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED
;
411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG
);
416 printf("dec %d\n",rr
->length
);
417 { unsigned int z
; for (z
=0; z
<rr
->length
; z
++) printf("%02X%c",rr
->data
[z
],((z
+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
421 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
422 if ((sess
!= NULL
) &&
423 (s
->enc_read_ctx
!= NULL
) &&
424 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->read_hash
) != NULL
))
426 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
427 unsigned char *mac
= NULL
;
428 unsigned char mac_tmp
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
429 mac_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->read_hash
);
430 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
432 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
433 orig_len
= rr
->length
+((unsigned int)rr
->type
>>8);
435 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
436 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
437 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
438 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
440 if (orig_len
< mac_size
||
441 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
442 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_read_ctx
) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
&&
443 orig_len
< mac_size
+1))
445 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
450 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_read_ctx
) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
)
452 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
453 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
454 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
455 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
458 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp
, rr
, mac_size
, orig_len
);
459 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
463 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
464 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
465 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
466 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
467 mac
= &rr
->data
[rr
->length
];
470 i
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
,md
,0 /* not send */);
471 if (i
< 0 || mac
== NULL
|| CRYPTO_memcmp(md
, mac
, (size_t)mac_size
) != 0)
473 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+extra
+mac_size
)
479 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
480 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
481 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
482 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
483 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
484 al
=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC
;
485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC
);
489 /* r->length is now just compressed */
490 if (s
->expand
!= NULL
)
492 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+extra
)
494 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
498 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s
))
500 al
=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE
;
501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION
);
506 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+extra
)
508 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
514 /* So at this point the following is true
515 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
516 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
517 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
518 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
522 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
525 /* just read a 0 length packet */
526 if (rr
->length
== 0) goto again
;
529 fprintf(stderr
, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr
->type
, rr
->length
);
535 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
540 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL
*ssl
)
542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
546 rr
= &(ssl
->s3
->rrec
);
547 i
=COMP_expand_block(ssl
->expand
,rr
->comp
,
548 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,rr
->data
,(int)rr
->length
);
558 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL
*ssl
)
560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
564 wr
= &(ssl
->s3
->wrec
);
565 i
=COMP_compress_block(ssl
->compress
,wr
->data
,
566 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
,
567 wr
->input
,(int)wr
->length
);
578 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
579 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
581 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, int len
)
583 const unsigned char *buf
=buf_
;
587 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
588 OPENSSL_assert(s
->s3
->wnum
<= INT_MAX
);
592 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !s
->in_handshake
)
594 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
595 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
603 /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write
604 * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete
605 * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding
606 * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
607 * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
608 * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
609 * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
622 if (n
> s
->max_send_fragment
)
623 nw
=s
->max_send_fragment
;
627 i
=do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), nw
, 0);
635 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
636 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
)))
638 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
639 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
640 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
650 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
651 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
)
653 unsigned char *p
,*plen
;
654 int i
,mac_size
,clear
=0;
659 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
=&(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
663 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
664 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
666 return(ssl3_write_pending(s
,type
,buf
,len
));
668 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
669 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
)
671 i
=s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
674 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
678 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
))
681 if (len
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
687 if ( (sess
== NULL
) ||
688 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) ||
689 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
))
692 clear
=s
->enc_write_ctx
?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
700 mac_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
705 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
706 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
)
708 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
709 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
711 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
713 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
714 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
715 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
716 * together with the actual payload) */
717 prefix_len
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, 0, 1);
722 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
))
724 /* insufficient space */
725 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
730 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
733 if (create_empty_fragment
)
735 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
736 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
737 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
738 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
739 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
740 align
= (long)wb
->buf
+ 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
741 align
= (-align
)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
-1);
748 p
= wb
->buf
+ wb
->offset
+ prefix_len
;
752 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
753 align
= (long)wb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
754 align
= (-align
)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
-1);
760 /* write the header */
765 *(p
++)=(s
->version
>>8);
766 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
767 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
769 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
771 && TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
)
774 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
776 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
779 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
780 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_1_VERSION
)
782 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
783 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
)
785 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
789 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
790 else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
)
791 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
798 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
801 wr
->input
=(unsigned char *)buf
;
803 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
806 /* first we compress */
807 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
)
809 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
))
811 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
817 memcpy(wr
->data
,wr
->input
,wr
->length
);
821 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
822 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
823 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
827 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
,&(p
[wr
->length
+ eivlen
]),1) < 0)
829 wr
->length
+=mac_size
;
837 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
839 wr
->length
+= eivlen
;
842 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
843 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
,1);
845 /* record length after mac and block padding */
846 s2n(wr
->length
,plen
);
848 /* we should now have
849 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
851 wr
->type
=type
; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
852 wr
->length
+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
854 if (create_empty_fragment
)
856 /* we are in a recursive call;
857 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
862 /* now let's set up wb */
863 wb
->left
= prefix_len
+ wr
->length
;
865 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
866 s
->s3
->wpend_tot
=len
;
867 s
->s3
->wpend_buf
=buf
;
868 s
->s3
->wpend_type
=type
;
869 s
->s3
->wpend_ret
=len
;
871 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
872 return ssl3_write_pending(s
,type
,buf
,len
);
877 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
878 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
882 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
=&(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
885 if ((s
->s3
->wpend_tot
> (int)len
)
886 || ((s
->s3
->wpend_buf
!= buf
) &&
887 !(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
))
888 || (s
->s3
->wpend_type
!= type
))
890 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
899 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
901 (char *)&(wb
->buf
[wb
->offset
]),
902 (unsigned int)wb
->left
);
906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
913 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
914 SSL_version(s
) != DTLS1_VERSION
&& SSL_version(s
) != DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
915 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
916 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
917 return(s
->s3
->wpend_ret
);
920 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
||
921 s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
922 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
923 point in using a datagram service */
933 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
934 * 'type' is one of the following:
936 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
937 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
938 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
940 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
941 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
943 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
944 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
945 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
946 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
947 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
948 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
949 * Change cipher spec protocol
950 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
952 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
954 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
955 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
956 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
957 * Application data protocol
958 * none of our business
960 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, unsigned char *buf
, int len
, int peek
)
965 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type2
,int val
)=NULL
;
967 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.buf
== NULL
) /* Not initialized yet */
968 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
971 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && type
) ||
972 (peek
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)))
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
978 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
979 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
981 unsigned char *src
= s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
982 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
987 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
990 len
--; s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
--;
993 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
994 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
995 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
999 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
1001 if (!s
->in_handshake
&& SSL_in_init(s
))
1003 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1004 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
1005 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1013 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1015 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1016 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1017 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1018 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
1019 rr
= &(s
->s3
->rrec
);
1021 /* get new packet if necessary */
1022 if ((rr
->length
== 0) || (s
->rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
))
1024 ret
=ssl3_get_record(s
);
1025 if (ret
<= 0) return(ret
);
1028 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1030 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1031 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1032 && (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
))
1034 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1039 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1040 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1041 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
)
1044 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1049 if (type
== rr
->type
) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1051 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1052 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1053 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1054 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
))
1056 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1061 if (len
<= 0) return(len
);
1063 if ((unsigned int)len
> rr
->length
)
1066 n
= (unsigned int)len
;
1068 memcpy(buf
,&(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]),n
);
1073 if (rr
->length
== 0)
1075 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1077 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0)
1078 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1085 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1086 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1088 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1089 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1092 unsigned int dest_maxlen
= 0;
1093 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
1094 unsigned int *dest_len
= NULL
;
1096 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
1098 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
1099 dest
= s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
1100 dest_len
= &s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
;
1102 else if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
)
1104 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->s3
->alert_fragment
;
1105 dest
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
;
1106 dest_len
= &s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
;
1108 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1109 else if (rr
->type
== TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
)
1111 tls1_process_heartbeat(s
);
1113 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1115 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
1116 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1117 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1122 if (dest_maxlen
> 0)
1124 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1126 n
= rr
->length
; /* available bytes */
1128 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1131 dest
[(*dest_len
)++] = rr
->data
[rr
->off
++];
1135 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1136 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1140 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1141 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1142 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1144 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1146 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1147 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) &&
1148 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
))
1150 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
1152 if ((s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[1] != 0) ||
1153 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[2] != 0) ||
1154 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[3] != 0))
1156 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST
);
1161 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1162 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
, 4, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1164 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1165 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
) &&
1166 !s
->s3
->renegotiate
)
1168 ssl3_renegotiate(s
);
1169 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
))
1171 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
1172 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1179 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
))
1181 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1184 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1185 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1186 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1187 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1188 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
1189 bio
=SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1190 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1191 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1197 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1198 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1201 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1202 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1203 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1206 SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1207 !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
1208 (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) &&
1209 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1210 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) &&
1211 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) &&
1212 !(s
->ctx
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
))
1215 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1217 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1220 if (s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
>= 2)
1222 int alert_level
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
[0];
1223 int alert_descr
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
[1];
1225 s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
1227 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1228 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, s
->s3
->alert_fragment
, 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1230 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1231 cb
=s
->info_callback
;
1232 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1233 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1237 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1238 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1241 if (alert_level
== 1) /* warning */
1243 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1244 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
)
1246 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1249 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1250 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1251 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1252 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1253 * expects it to succeed.
1255 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1256 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1258 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)
1260 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1264 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1265 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
)
1269 else if (alert_level
== 2) /* fatal */
1273 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1274 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1276 BIO_snprintf(tmp
,sizeof tmp
,"%d",alert_descr
);
1277 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp
);
1278 s
->shutdown
|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1279 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
,s
->session
);
1284 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1292 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1294 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1299 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
)
1301 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1302 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1303 if ( (rr
->length
!= 1) || (rr
->off
!= 0) ||
1304 (rr
->data
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
))
1306 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1311 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1312 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
1314 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1319 if (!(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
))
1321 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1326 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
1330 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1331 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, rr
->data
, 1, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1333 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
=1;
1334 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
))
1340 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1341 if ((s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) && !s
->in_handshake
)
1343 if (((s
->state
&SSL_ST_MASK
) == SSL_ST_OK
) &&
1344 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
))
1346 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1347 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1348 * protocol violations): */
1349 s
->state
=SSL_ST_BEFORE
|(s
->server
)
1353 s
->state
= s
->server
? SSL_ST_ACCEPT
: SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
1358 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
1359 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1366 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
))
1368 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1371 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1372 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1373 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1374 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1375 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
1376 bio
=SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1377 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1378 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1389 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1390 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1392 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->version
<= TLS1_1_VERSION
)
1398 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1401 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1403 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1404 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1405 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1406 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1407 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1410 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1411 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1412 * but have application data. If the library was
1413 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1414 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1415 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1416 * we will indulge it.
1418 if (s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
&&
1419 (s
->s3
->total_renegotiations
!= 0) &&
1421 (s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
) &&
1422 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) &&
1423 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1425 (s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
) &&
1426 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
) &&
1427 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
1431 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
=2;
1436 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1444 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1449 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
)
1455 if (s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
)
1456 i
=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
;
1458 i
=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
;
1460 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.key_block
== NULL
)
1462 if (s
->session
== NULL
|| s
->session
->master_key_length
== 0)
1464 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1469 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
1470 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) return(0);
1473 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,i
))
1476 /* we have to record the message digest at
1477 * this point so we can get it before we read
1478 * the finished message */
1479 if (s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
)
1481 sender
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
1482 slen
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
1486 sender
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
1487 slen
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
1490 i
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
1491 sender
,slen
,s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
1494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1497 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= i
;
1502 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL
*s
, int level
, int desc
)
1504 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1505 desc
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->alert_value(desc
);
1506 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
&& desc
== SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
)
1507 desc
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1508 if (desc
< 0) return -1;
1509 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1510 if ((level
== 2) && (s
->session
!= NULL
))
1511 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
,s
->session
);
1513 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
=1;
1514 s
->s3
->send_alert
[0]=level
;
1515 s
->s3
->send_alert
[1]=desc
;
1516 if (s
->s3
->wbuf
.left
== 0) /* data still being written out? */
1517 return s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
1518 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1519 * some time in the future */
1523 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL
*s
)
1526 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
1528 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
=0;
1529 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, &s
->s3
->send_alert
[0], 2, 0);
1532 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
=1;
1536 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1537 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1538 * we will not worry too much. */
1539 if (s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
)
1540 (void)BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
1542 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1543 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, s
->s3
->send_alert
, 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1545 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1546 cb
=s
->info_callback
;
1547 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1548 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1552 j
=(s
->s3
->send_alert
[0]<<8)|s
->s3
->send_alert
[1];
1553 cb(s
,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT
,j
);