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OpenSSL update to 1.0.1c: (clean source)
[tomato.git] / release / src / router / openssl / ssl / s3_srvr.c
blob118939fabb1ae4307432fb363a0fbdb2b0bb301b
1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #endif
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169 #endif
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
171
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
173
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
175 {
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
178 else
179 return(NULL);
180 }
181
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
184 {
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
186
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
188
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
191 {
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
193 {
194 /* There isn't any srp login extension !!! */
195 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
196 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
197 }
198 else
199 {
200 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
201 }
202 }
203 return ret;
204 }
205 #endif
206
207 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
208 ssl3_accept,
209 ssl_undefined_function,
210 ssl3_get_server_method)
211
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
213 {
214 BUF_MEM *buf;
215 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
217 int ret= -1;
218 int new_state,state,skip=0;
219
220 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
221 ERR_clear_error();
222 clear_sys_error();
223
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb=s->info_callback;
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
228
229 /* init things to blank */
230 s->in_handshake++;
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
232
233 if (s->cert == NULL)
234 {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
236 return(-1);
237 }
238
239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
241 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
242 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
243 */
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
245 {
246 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
247 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
248 }
249 #endif
250
251 for (;;)
252 {
253 state=s->state;
254
255 switch (s->state)
256 {
257 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
258 s->renegotiate=1;
259 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260
261 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
262 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
263 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
264 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265
266 s->server=1;
267 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
268
269 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
270 {
271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
272 return -1;
273 }
274 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
275
276 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
277 {
278 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
279 {
280 ret= -1;
281 goto end;
282 }
283 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
284 {
285 ret= -1;
286 goto end;
287 }
288 s->init_buf=buf;
289 }
290
291 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
292 {
293 ret= -1;
294 goto end;
295 }
296
297 s->init_num=0;
298 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
299
300 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
301 {
302 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
303 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
304 */
305 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
306
307 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
308 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
309 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
310 }
311 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
312 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
313 {
314 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
315 * client that doesn't support secure
316 * renegotiation.
317 */
318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
319 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
320 ret = -1;
321 goto end;
322 }
323 else
324 {
325 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
326 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
327 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
328 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
329 }
330 break;
331
332 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
333 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
334
335 s->shutdown=0;
336 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
337 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
338 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
339 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
340 s->init_num=0;
341
342 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
343 break;
344
345 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
346 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
347 break;
348
349 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
350 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
352
353 s->shutdown=0;
354 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
355 {
356 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
357 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
358 }
359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
360 {
361 int al;
362 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
363 {
364 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
365 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
366 goto end;
367 }
368 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
369 {
370 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
371 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
372 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
373 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
375 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
376 ret= -1;
377 goto end;
378 }
379 }
380 #endif
381 s->renegotiate = 2;
382 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
383 s->init_num=0;
384 break;
385
386 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
387 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
388 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
389 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
391 if (s->hit)
392 {
393 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
394 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
395 else
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
397 }
398 #else
399 if (s->hit)
400 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
401 #endif
402 else
403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
404 s->init_num=0;
405 break;
406
407 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
408 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
409 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
410 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
411 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
412 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
413 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
414 {
415 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
416 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
418 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
419 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
420 else
421 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
422 }
423 else
424 {
425 skip = 1;
426 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
427 }
428 #else
429 }
430 else
431 skip=1;
432
433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
434 #endif
435 s->init_num=0;
436 break;
437
438 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
439 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
440 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
441
442 /* clear this, it may get reset by
443 * send_server_key_exchange */
444 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
446 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
447 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
448 )
449 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
450 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
451 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
452 * be able to handle this) */
453 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
454 else
455 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
456
457
458 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
459 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
460 *
461 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
462 *
463 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
464 * message only if the cipher suite is either
465 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
466 * server certificate contains the server's
467 * public key for key exchange.
468 */
469 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
470 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
471 * hint if provided */
472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
473 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
474 #endif
475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
476 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
477 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
478 #endif
479 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
480 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
481 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
482 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
483 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
484 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
485 )
486 )
487 )
488 )
489 {
490 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
491 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
492 }
493 else
494 skip=1;
495
496 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
497 s->init_num=0;
498 break;
499
500 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
502 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
503 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
504 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
505 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
506 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
507 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
508 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
509 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
510 * and in RFC 2246): */
511 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
512 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
513 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
514 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
515 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
516 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
517 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
518 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
519 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
520 {
521 /* no cert request */
522 skip=1;
523 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
524 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
525 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
526 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
527 return -1;
528 }
529 else
530 {
531 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
532 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
533 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
534 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
535 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
536 #else
537 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
538 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
539 #endif
540 s->init_num=0;
541 }
542 break;
543
544 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
545 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
546 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
547 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
548 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
549 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
550 s->init_num=0;
551 break;
552
553 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
554
555 /* This code originally checked to see if
556 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
557 * and then flushed. This caused problems
558 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
559 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
560 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
561 * still exist. So instead we just flush
562 * unconditionally.
563 */
564
565 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
566 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
567 {
568 ret= -1;
569 goto end;
570 }
571 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
572
573 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
574 break;
575
576 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
577 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
578 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
579 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
580 if (ret <= 0)
581 goto end;
582 if (ret == 2)
583 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
584 else {
585 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
586 {
587 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
588 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
589 }
590 s->init_num=0;
591 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
592 }
593 break;
594
595 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
596 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
597 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
598 if (ret <= 0)
599 goto end;
600 if (ret == 2)
601 {
602 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
603 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
604 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
605 * message is not sent.
606 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
607 * the client uses its key from the certificate
608 * for key exchange.
609 */
610 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
611 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
612 #else
613 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
614 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
615 else
616 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
617 #endif
618 s->init_num = 0;
619 }
620 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
621 {
622 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
623 s->init_num=0;
624 if (!s->session->peer)
625 break;
626 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
627 * at this point and digest cached records.
628 */
629 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
630 {
631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
632 return -1;
633 }
634 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
635 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
636 return -1;
637 }
638 else
639 {
640 int offset=0;
641 int dgst_num;
642
643 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
644 s->init_num=0;
645
646 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
647 * a client cert, it can be verified
648 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
649 * should be generalized. But it is next step
650 */
651 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
652 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
653 return -1;
654 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
655 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
656 {
657 int dgst_size;
658
659 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
660 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
661 if (dgst_size < 0)
662 {
663 ret = -1;
664 goto end;
665 }
666 offset+=dgst_size;
667 }
668 }
669 break;
670
671 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
672 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
673
674 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
675 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
676 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
677
678 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
679 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
680 #else
681 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
682 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
683 else
684 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
685 #endif
686 s->init_num=0;
687 break;
688
689 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
690 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
691 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
692 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
693 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
694 s->init_num = 0;
695 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
696 break;
697 #endif
698
699 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
700 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
701 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
702 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
703 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
704 if (s->hit)
705 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
707 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
708 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
709 #endif
710 else
711 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
712 s->init_num=0;
713 break;
714
715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
716 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
717 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
718 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
719 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
720 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
721 s->init_num=0;
722 break;
723
724 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
725 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
726 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
727 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
728 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
729 s->init_num=0;
730 break;
731
732 #endif
733
734 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
735 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
736
737 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
738 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
739 { ret= -1; goto end; }
740
741 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
742 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
743
744 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
745 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
746 s->init_num=0;
747
748 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
749 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
750 {
751 ret= -1;
752 goto end;
753 }
754
755 break;
756
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
759 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
760 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
761 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
762 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
763 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
764 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
765 if (s->hit)
766 {
767 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
768 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
769 #else
770 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
771 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
772 else
773 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
774 #endif
775 }
776 else
777 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
778 s->init_num=0;
779 break;
780
781 case SSL_ST_OK:
782 /* clean a few things up */
783 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
784
785 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
786 s->init_buf=NULL;
787
788 /* remove buffering on output */
789 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
790
791 s->init_num=0;
792
793 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
794 {
795 s->renegotiate=0;
796 s->new_session=0;
797
798 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
799
800 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
801 /* s->server=1; */
802 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
803
804 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
805 }
806
807 ret = 1;
808 goto end;
809 /* break; */
810
811 default:
812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
813 ret= -1;
814 goto end;
815 /* break; */
816 }
817
818 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
819 {
820 if (s->debug)
821 {
822 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
823 goto end;
824 }
825
826
827 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
828 {
829 new_state=s->state;
830 s->state=state;
831 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
832 s->state=new_state;
833 }
834 }
835 skip=0;
836 }
837 end:
838 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
839
840 s->in_handshake--;
841 if (cb != NULL)
842 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
843 return(ret);
844 }
845
846 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
847 {
848 unsigned char *p;
849
850 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
851 {
852 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
853 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
854 *(p++)=0;
855 *(p++)=0;
856 *(p++)=0;
857
858 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
859 /* number of bytes to write */
860 s->init_num=4;
861 s->init_off=0;
862 }
863
864 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
865 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
866 }
867
868 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
869 {
870 int ok;
871 long n;
872
873 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
874 * so permit appropriate message length */
875 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
876 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
877 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
878 -1,
879 s->max_cert_list,
880 &ok);
881 if (!ok) return((int)n);
882 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
883 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
884 {
885 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
886 * negotiation. */
887 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
888 {
889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
890 return -1;
891 }
892 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
893 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
895 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
896 {
897 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
898 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
899 }
900 #endif
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
902 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
903 {
904 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
905 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
906 }
907 #endif
908 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
909 return 2;
910 }
911 return 1;
912 }
913
914 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
915 {
916 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
917 unsigned int cookie_len;
918 long n;
919 unsigned long id;
920 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
921 SSL_CIPHER *c;
922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
923 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
924 #endif
925 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
926
927 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
928 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
929 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
930 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
931 * TLSv1.
932 */
933 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
934 )
935 {
936 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
937 }
938 s->first_packet=1;
939 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
940 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
941 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
942 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
943 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
944 &ok);
945
946 if (!ok) return((int)n);
947 s->first_packet=0;
948 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
949
950 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
951 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
952 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
953 p+=2;
954
955 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
956 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
957 {
958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
959 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
960 {
961 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
962 s->version = s->client_version;
963 }
964 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
965 goto f_err;
966 }
967
968 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
969 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
970 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
971 */
972 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
973 {
974 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
975
976 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
977 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
978
979 if (cookie_length == 0)
980 return 1;
981 }
982
983 /* load the client random */
984 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
985 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
986
987 /* get the session-id */
988 j= *(p++);
989
990 s->hit=0;
991 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
992 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
993 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
994 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
995 * won't even compile against older library versions).
996 *
997 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
998 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
999 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1000 * setting will be ignored.
1001 */
1002 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1003 {
1004 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1005 goto err;
1006 }
1007 else
1008 {
1009 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1010 if (i == 1)
1011 { /* previous session */
1012 s->hit=1;
1013 }
1014 else if (i == -1)
1015 goto err;
1016 else /* i == 0 */
1017 {
1018 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1019 goto err;
1020 }
1021 }
1022
1023 p+=j;
1024
1025 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1026 {
1027 /* cookie stuff */
1028 cookie_len = *(p++);
1029
1030 /*
1031 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1032 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1033 * does not cause an overflow.
1034 */
1035 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1036 {
1037 /* too much data */
1038 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1040 goto f_err;
1041 }
1042
1043 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1044 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1045 cookie_len > 0)
1046 {
1047 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1048
1049 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1050 {
1051 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1052 cookie_len) == 0)
1053 {
1054 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1056 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1057 goto f_err;
1058 }
1059 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1060 }
1061 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1062 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1063 {
1064 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1066 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1067 goto f_err;
1068 }
1069
1070 ret = 2;
1071 }
1072
1073 p += cookie_len;
1074 }
1075
1076 n2s(p,i);
1077 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1078 {
1079 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1080 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1082 goto f_err;
1083 }
1084 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
1085 {
1086 /* not enough data */
1087 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1089 goto f_err;
1090 }
1091 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1092 == NULL))
1093 {
1094 goto err;
1095 }
1096 p+=i;
1097
1098 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1099 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1100 {
1101 j=0;
1102 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1103
1104 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1105 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1106 #endif
1107 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1108 {
1109 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1110 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1111 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1112 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1113 #endif
1114 if (c->id == id)
1115 {
1116 j=1;
1117 break;
1118 }
1119 }
1120 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1121 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1122 */
1123 #if 0
1124 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1125 {
1126 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1127 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1128 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1129 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1130 * enabled, though. */
1131 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1132 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1133 {
1134 s->session->cipher = c;
1135 j = 1;
1136 }
1137 }
1138 #endif
1139 if (j == 0)
1140 {
1141 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1142 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1143 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1145 goto f_err;
1146 }
1147 }
1148
1149 /* compression */
1150 i= *(p++);
1151 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1152 {
1153 /* not enough data */
1154 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1156 goto f_err;
1157 }
1158 q=p;
1159 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1160 {
1161 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1162 }
1163
1164 p+=i;
1165 if (j >= i)
1166 {
1167 /* no compress */
1168 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1170 goto f_err;
1171 }
1172
1173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1174 /* TLS extensions*/
1175 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1176 {
1177 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1178 {
1179 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1181 goto f_err;
1182 }
1183 }
1184 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1186 goto err;
1187 }
1188
1189 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1190 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1191 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1192 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1193 {
1194 unsigned long Time;
1195 unsigned char *pos;
1196 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1197 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1198 l2n(Time,pos);
1199 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1200 {
1201 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1202 goto f_err;
1203 }
1204 }
1205
1206 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1207 {
1208 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1209
1210 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1211 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1212 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1213 {
1214 s->hit=1;
1215 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1216 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1217
1218 ciphers=NULL;
1219
1220 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1221 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1222 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1223 {
1224 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1226 goto f_err;
1227 }
1228
1229 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1230
1231 if (s->cipher_list)
1232 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1233
1234 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1235 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1236
1237 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1238 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1239 }
1240 }
1241 #endif
1242
1243 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1244 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1245 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1246 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1248 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1249 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1250 {
1251 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1252 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1253 /* Can't disable compression */
1254 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1255 {
1256 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1258 goto f_err;
1259 }
1260 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1261 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1262 {
1263 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1264 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1265 {
1266 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1267 break;
1268 }
1269 }
1270 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1271 {
1272 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1274 goto f_err;
1275 }
1276 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1277 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1278 {
1279 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1280 break;
1281 }
1282 if (m >= i)
1283 {
1284 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1286 goto f_err;
1287 }
1288 }
1289 else if (s->hit)
1290 comp = NULL;
1291 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1292 { /* See if we have a match */
1293 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1294
1295 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1296 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1297 {
1298 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1299 v=comp->id;
1300 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1301 {
1302 if (v == q[o])
1303 {
1304 done=1;
1305 break;
1306 }
1307 }
1308 if (done) break;
1309 }
1310 if (done)
1311 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1312 else
1313 comp=NULL;
1314 }
1315 #else
1316 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1317 * using compression.
1318 */
1319 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1320 {
1321 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1323 goto f_err;
1324 }
1325 #endif
1326
1327 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1328 * pick a cipher */
1329
1330 if (!s->hit)
1331 {
1332 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1333 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1334 #else
1335 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1336 #endif
1337 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1338 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1339 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1340 if (ciphers == NULL)
1341 {
1342 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1344 goto f_err;
1345 }
1346 ciphers=NULL;
1347 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1348 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1349
1350 if (c == NULL)
1351 {
1352 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1354 goto f_err;
1355 }
1356 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1357 }
1358 else
1359 {
1360 /* Session-id reuse */
1361 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1362 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1363 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1364 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1365
1366 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1367 {
1368 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1369 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1370 {
1371 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1372 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1373 nc=c;
1374 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1375 ec=c;
1376 }
1377 if (nc != NULL)
1378 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1379 else if (ec != NULL)
1380 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1381 else
1382 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1383 }
1384 else
1385 #endif
1386 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1387 }
1388
1389 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1390 {
1391 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1392 goto f_err;
1393 }
1394
1395 /* we now have the following setup.
1396 * client_random
1397 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1398 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1399 * compression - basically ignored right now
1400 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1401 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1402 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1403 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1404 */
1405
1406 if (ret < 0) ret=1;
1407 if (0)
1408 {
1409 f_err:
1410 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1411 }
1412 err:
1413 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1414 return(ret);
1415 }
1416
1417 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1418 {
1419 unsigned char *buf;
1420 unsigned char *p,*d;
1421 int i,sl;
1422 unsigned long l;
1423 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1424 unsigned long Time;
1425 #endif
1426
1427 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1428 {
1429 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1430 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1431 p=s->s3->server_random;
1432 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1433 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1434 l2n(Time,p);
1435 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1436 return -1;
1437 #endif
1438 /* Do the message type and length last */
1439 d=p= &(buf[4]);
1440
1441 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1442 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1443
1444 /* Random stuff */
1445 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1446 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1447
1448 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1449 * back in the server hello:
1450 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1451 * we send back the old session ID.
1452 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1453 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1454 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1455 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1456 * session ID.
1457 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1458 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1459 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1460 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1461 * to send back.
1462 */
1463 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1464 && !s->hit)
1465 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1466
1467 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1468 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1469 {
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1471 return -1;
1472 }
1473 *(p++)=sl;
1474 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1475 p+=sl;
1476
1477 /* put the cipher */
1478 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1479 p+=i;
1480
1481 /* put the compression method */
1482 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1483 *(p++)=0;
1484 #else
1485 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1486 *(p++)=0;
1487 else
1488 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1489 #endif
1490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1491 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1492 {
1493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1494 return -1;
1495 }
1496 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1497 {
1498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1499 return -1;
1500 }
1501 #endif
1502 /* do the header */
1503 l=(p-d);
1504 d=buf;
1505 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1506 l2n3(l,d);
1507
1508 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1509 /* number of bytes to write */
1510 s->init_num=p-buf;
1511 s->init_off=0;
1512 }
1513
1514 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1515 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1516 }
1517
1518 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1519 {
1520 unsigned char *p;
1521
1522 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1523 {
1524 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1525
1526 /* do the header */
1527 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1528 *(p++)=0;
1529 *(p++)=0;
1530 *(p++)=0;
1531
1532 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1533 /* number of bytes to write */
1534 s->init_num=4;
1535 s->init_off=0;
1536 }
1537
1538 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1539 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1540 }
1541
1542 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1543 {
1544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1545 unsigned char *q;
1546 int j,num;
1547 RSA *rsa;
1548 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1549 unsigned int u;
1550 #endif
1551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1552 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1553 #endif
1554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1555 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1556 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1557 int encodedlen = 0;
1558 int curve_id = 0;
1559 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1560 #endif
1561 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1562 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1563 unsigned char *p,*d;
1564 int al,i;
1565 unsigned long type;
1566 int n;
1567 CERT *cert;
1568 BIGNUM *r[4];
1569 int nr[4],kn;
1570 BUF_MEM *buf;
1571 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1572
1573 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1574 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1575 {
1576 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1577 cert=s->cert;
1578
1579 buf=s->init_buf;
1580
1581 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1582 n=0;
1583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1584 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1585 {
1586 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1587 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1588 {
1589 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1590 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1591 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1592 if(rsa == NULL)
1593 {
1594 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1596 goto f_err;
1597 }
1598 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1599 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1600 }
1601 if (rsa == NULL)
1602 {
1603 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1605 goto f_err;
1606 }
1607 r[0]=rsa->n;
1608 r[1]=rsa->e;
1609 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1610 }
1611 else
1612 #endif
1613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1614 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1615 {
1616 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1617 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1618 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1619 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1620 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1621 if (dhp == NULL)
1622 {
1623 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1625 goto f_err;
1626 }
1627
1628 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1629 {
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1631 goto err;
1632 }
1633
1634 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1635 {
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1637 goto err;
1638 }
1639
1640 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1641 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1642 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1643 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1644 {
1645 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1646 {
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1648 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1649 goto err;
1650 }
1651 }
1652 else
1653 {
1654 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1655 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1656 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1657 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1658 {
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1660 goto err;
1661 }
1662 }
1663 r[0]=dh->p;
1664 r[1]=dh->g;
1665 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1666 }
1667 else
1668 #endif
1669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1670 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1671 {
1672 const EC_GROUP *group;
1673
1674 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1675 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1676 {
1677 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1678 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1679 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1680 }
1681 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1682 {
1683 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1685 goto f_err;
1686 }
1687
1688 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1689 {
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1691 goto err;
1692 }
1693
1694 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1695 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1696 {
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1698 goto err;
1699 }
1700 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1701 {
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1703 goto err;
1704 }
1705
1706 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1707 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1708 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1709 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1710 {
1711 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1712 {
1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1714 goto err;
1715 }
1716 }
1717
1718 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1719 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1720 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1721 {
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1723 goto err;
1724 }
1725
1726 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1727 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1728 {
1729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1730 goto err;
1731 }
1732
1733 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1734 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1735 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1736 */
1737 if ((curve_id =
1738 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1739 == 0)
1740 {
1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1742 goto err;
1743 }
1744
1745 /* Encode the public key.
1746 * First check the size of encoding and
1747 * allocate memory accordingly.
1748 */
1749 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1750 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1751 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1752 NULL, 0, NULL);
1753
1754 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1755 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1756 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1757 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1758 {
1759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1760 goto err;
1761 }
1762
1763
1764 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1765 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1766 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1767 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1768
1769 if (encodedlen == 0)
1770 {
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1772 goto err;
1773 }
1774
1775 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1776
1777 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1778 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1779 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1780 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1781 * structure.
1782 */
1783 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1784
1785 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1786 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1787 */
1788 r[0]=NULL;
1789 r[1]=NULL;
1790 r[2]=NULL;
1791 r[3]=NULL;
1792 }
1793 else
1794 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1795 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1796 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1797 {
1798 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1799 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1800 }
1801 else
1802 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1804 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1805 {
1806 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1807 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1808 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1809 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1810 {
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1812 goto err;
1813 }
1814 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
1815 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
1816 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
1817 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
1818 }
1819 else
1820 #endif
1821 {
1822 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1824 goto f_err;
1825 }
1826 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1827 {
1828 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1830 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1831 n+=1+nr[i];
1832 else
1833 #endif
1834 n+=2+nr[i];
1835 }
1836
1837 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1838 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1839 {
1840 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1841 == NULL)
1842 {
1843 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1844 goto f_err;
1845 }
1846 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1847 }
1848 else
1849 {
1850 pkey=NULL;
1851 kn=0;
1852 }
1853
1854 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1855 {
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1857 goto err;
1858 }
1859 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1860 p= &(d[4]);
1861
1862 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1863 {
1864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1865 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1866 {
1867 *p = nr[i];
1868 p++;
1869 }
1870 else
1871 #endif
1872 s2n(nr[i],p);
1873 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1874 p+=nr[i];
1875 }
1876
1877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1878 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1879 {
1880 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1881 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1882 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1883 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1884 * the actual encoded point itself
1885 */
1886 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1887 p += 1;
1888 *p = 0;
1889 p += 1;
1890 *p = curve_id;
1891 p += 1;
1892 *p = encodedlen;
1893 p += 1;
1894 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1895 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1896 encodedlen);
1897 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1898 encodedPoint = NULL;
1899 p += encodedlen;
1900 }
1901 #endif
1902
1903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1904 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1905 {
1906 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1907 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1908 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1909 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1910 }
1911 #endif
1912
1913 /* not anonymous */
1914 if (pkey != NULL)
1915 {
1916 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1917 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1919 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1920 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1921 {
1922 q=md_buf;
1923 j=0;
1924 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1925 {
1926 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1927 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1928 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1929 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1930 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1931 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1932 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1933 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1934 (unsigned int *)&i);
1935 q+=i;
1936 j+=i;
1937 }
1938 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1939 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1940 {
1941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1942 goto err;
1943 }
1944 s2n(u,p);
1945 n+=u+2;
1946 }
1947 else
1948 #endif
1949 if (md)
1950 {
1951 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1952 * algorithm */
1953 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1954 {
1955 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1956 {
1957 /* Should never happen */
1958 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1960 goto f_err;
1961 }
1962 p+=2;
1963 }
1964 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
1965 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
1966 EVP_MD_name(md));
1967 #endif
1968 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1969 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1970 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1971 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1972 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1973 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1974 {
1975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
1976 goto err;
1977 }
1978 s2n(i,p);
1979 n+=i+2;
1980 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1981 n+= 2;
1982 }
1983 else
1984 {
1985 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1986 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1988 goto f_err;
1989 }
1990 }
1991
1992 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1993 l2n3(n,d);
1994
1995 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1996 * it off */
1997 s->init_num=n+4;
1998 s->init_off=0;
1999 }
2000
2001 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2002 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2003 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2004 f_err:
2005 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2006 err:
2007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2008 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2009 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2010 #endif
2011 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2012 return(-1);
2013 }
2014
2015 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2016 {
2017 unsigned char *p,*d;
2018 int i,j,nl,off,n;
2019 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2020 X509_NAME *name;
2021 BUF_MEM *buf;
2022
2023 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2024 {
2025 buf=s->init_buf;
2026
2027 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2028
2029 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2030 p++;
2031 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2032 d[0]=n;
2033 p+=n;
2034 n++;
2035
2036 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2037 {
2038 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2039 s2n(nl, p);
2040 p += nl + 2;
2041 n += nl + 2;
2042 }
2043
2044 off=n;
2045 p+=2;
2046 n+=2;
2047
2048 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2049 nl=0;
2050 if (sk != NULL)
2051 {
2052 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2053 {
2054 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2055 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2056 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2057 {
2058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2059 goto err;
2060 }
2061 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2062 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2063 {
2064 s2n(j,p);
2065 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2066 n+=2+j;
2067 nl+=2+j;
2068 }
2069 else
2070 {
2071 d=p;
2072 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2073 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2074 n+=j;
2075 nl+=j;
2076 }
2077 }
2078 }
2079 /* else no CA names */
2080 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2081 s2n(nl,p);
2082
2083 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2084 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2085 l2n3(n,d);
2086
2087 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2088 * it off */
2089
2090 s->init_num=n+4;
2091 s->init_off=0;
2092 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2093 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2094
2095 /* do the header */
2096 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2097 *(p++)=0;
2098 *(p++)=0;
2099 *(p++)=0;
2100 s->init_num += 4;
2101 #endif
2102
2103 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2104 }
2105
2106 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2107 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2108 err:
2109 return(-1);
2110 }
2111
2112 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2113 {
2114 int i,al,ok;
2115 long n;
2116 unsigned long alg_k;
2117 unsigned char *p;
2118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2119 RSA *rsa=NULL;
2120 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2121 #endif
2122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2123 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
2124 DH *dh_srvr;
2125 #endif
2126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2127 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2128 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2129
2130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2131 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2132 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2133 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2134 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2135 #endif
2136
2137 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2138 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2139 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2140 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2141 2048, /* ??? */
2142 &ok);
2143
2144 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2145 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2146
2147 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2148
2149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2150 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2151 {
2152 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2153 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2154 {
2155 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2156 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2157 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2158 * be sent already */
2159 if (rsa == NULL)
2160 {
2161 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2163 goto f_err;
2164
2165 }
2166 }
2167 else
2168 {
2169 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2170 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2171 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2172 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2173 {
2174 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2176 goto f_err;
2177 }
2178 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
2179 }
2180
2181 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2182 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2183 {
2184 n2s(p,i);
2185 if (n != i+2)
2186 {
2187 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2188 {
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2190 goto err;
2191 }
2192 else
2193 p-=2;
2194 }
2195 else
2196 n=i;
2197 }
2198
2199 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2200
2201 al = -1;
2202
2203 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2204 {
2205 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2206 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2207 }
2208
2209 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2210 {
2211 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2212 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2213 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2214 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2215 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2216 * protocol version.
2217 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2218 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2219 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2220 {
2221 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2222 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2223
2224 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2225 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2226 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2227 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2228 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2229 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2230 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2231 }
2232 }
2233
2234 if (al != -1)
2235 {
2236 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2237 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2238 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2239 ERR_clear_error();
2240 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2241 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2242 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2243 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2244 goto err;
2245 }
2246
2247 s->session->master_key_length=
2248 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2249 s->session->master_key,
2250 p,i);
2251 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2252 }
2253 else
2254 #endif
2255 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2256 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2257 {
2258 n2s(p,i);
2259 if (n != i+2)
2260 {
2261 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2262 {
2263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2264 goto err;
2265 }
2266 else
2267 {
2268 p-=2;
2269 i=(int)n;
2270 }
2271 }
2272
2273 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2274 {
2275 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2277 goto f_err;
2278 }
2279 else
2280 {
2281 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2282 {
2283 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2285 goto f_err;
2286 }
2287 else
2288 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2289 }
2290
2291 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2292 if (pub == NULL)
2293 {
2294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2295 goto err;
2296 }
2297
2298 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2299
2300 if (i <= 0)
2301 {
2302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2303 BN_clear_free(pub);
2304 goto err;
2305 }
2306
2307 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2308 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2309
2310 BN_clear_free(pub);
2311 pub=NULL;
2312 s->session->master_key_length=
2313 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2314 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2315 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2316 }
2317 else
2318 #endif
2319 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2320 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2321 {
2322 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2323 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2324 krb5_data authenticator;
2325 krb5_data enc_pms;
2326 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2327 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2328 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2329 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2330 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2331 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2332 int padl, outl;
2333 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2334 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2335
2336 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2337
2338 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2339
2340 n2s(p,i);
2341 enc_ticket.length = i;
2342
2343 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2344 {
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2346 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2347 goto err;
2348 }
2349
2350 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2351 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2352
2353 n2s(p,i);
2354 authenticator.length = i;
2355
2356 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2357 {
2358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2359 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2360 goto err;
2361 }
2362
2363 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2364 p+=authenticator.length;
2365
2366 n2s(p,i);
2367 enc_pms.length = i;
2368 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2369 p+=enc_pms.length;
2370
2371 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2372 ** after decryption
2373 */
2374 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2375 {
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2377 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2378 goto err;
2379 }
2380
2381 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2382 enc_pms.length + 6))
2383 {
2384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2385 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2386 goto err;
2387 }
2388
2389 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2390 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2391 {
2392 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2393 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2394 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2395 if (kssl_err.text)
2396 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2397 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2399 kssl_err.reason);
2400 goto err;
2401 }
2402
2403 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2404 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2405 */
2406 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2407 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2408 {
2409 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2410 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2411 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2412 if (kssl_err.text)
2413 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2414 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2416 kssl_err.reason);
2417 goto err;
2418 }
2419
2420 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2421 {
2422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2423 goto err;
2424 }
2425
2426 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2427 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2428 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2429
2430 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2431 if (enc == NULL)
2432 goto err;
2433
2434 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2435
2436 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2437 {
2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2439 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2440 goto err;
2441 }
2442 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2443 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2444 {
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2446 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2447 goto err;
2448 }
2449 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2450 {
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2452 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2453 goto err;
2454 }
2455 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2456 {
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2458 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2459 goto err;
2460 }
2461 outl += padl;
2462 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2463 {
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2465 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2466 goto err;
2467 }
2468 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2469 {
2470 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2471 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2472 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2473 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2474 * the protocol version.
2475 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2476 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2477 */
2478 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2479 {
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2481 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2482 goto err;
2483 }
2484 }
2485
2486 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2487
2488 s->session->master_key_length=
2489 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2490 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2491
2492 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2493 {
2494 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2495 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2496 {
2497 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2498 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2499 }
2500 }
2501
2502
2503 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2504 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2505 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2506 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2507 */
2508 }
2509 else
2510 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2511
2512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2513 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2514 {
2515 int ret = 1;
2516 int field_size = 0;
2517 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2518 const EC_GROUP *group;
2519 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2520
2521 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2522 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2523 {
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2525 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2526 goto err;
2527 }
2528
2529 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2530 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2531 {
2532 /* use the certificate */
2533 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2534 }
2535 else
2536 {
2537 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2538 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2539 */
2540 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2541 }
2542
2543 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2544 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2545
2546 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2547 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2548 {
2549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2550 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2551 goto err;
2552 }
2553
2554 /* Let's get client's public key */
2555 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2556 {
2557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2558 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2559 goto err;
2560 }
2561
2562 if (n == 0L)
2563 {
2564 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2565
2566 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2567 {
2568 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2570 goto f_err;
2571 }
2572 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2573 == NULL) ||
2574 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2575 {
2576 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2577 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2578 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2579 * never executed. When that support is
2580 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2581 * received in the certificate is
2582 * authorized for key agreement.
2583 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2584 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2585 * group.
2586 */
2587 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2589 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2590 goto f_err;
2591 }
2592
2593 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2594 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2595 {
2596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2597 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2598 goto err;
2599 }
2600 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2601 }
2602 else
2603 {
2604 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2605 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2606 */
2607 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2608 {
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2610 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2611 goto err;
2612 }
2613
2614 /* Get encoded point length */
2615 i = *p;
2616 p += 1;
2617 if (n != 1 + i)
2618 {
2619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2620 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2621 goto err;
2622 }
2623 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2624 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2625 {
2626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2627 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2628 goto err;
2629 }
2630 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2631 * currently, so set it to the start
2632 */
2633 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2634 }
2635
2636 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2637 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2638 if (field_size <= 0)
2639 {
2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2641 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2642 goto err;
2643 }
2644 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2645 if (i <= 0)
2646 {
2647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2648 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2649 goto err;
2650 }
2651
2652 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2653 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2654 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2655 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2656 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2657 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2658
2659 /* Compute the master secret */
2660 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2661 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2662
2663 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2664 return (ret);
2665 }
2666 else
2667 #endif
2668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2669 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2670 {
2671 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2672 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2673 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2674 int psk_err = 1;
2675 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2676
2677 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2678
2679 n2s(p,i);
2680 if (n != i+2)
2681 {
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2683 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2684 goto psk_err;
2685 }
2686 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2687 {
2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2689 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2690 goto psk_err;
2691 }
2692 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2693 {
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2695 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2696 goto psk_err;
2697 }
2698
2699 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2700 * string for the callback */
2701 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2702 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2703 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2704 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2705 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2706
2707 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2708 {
2709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2710 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2711 goto psk_err;
2712 }
2713 else if (psk_len == 0)
2714 {
2715 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2717 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2718 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2719 goto psk_err;
2720 }
2721
2722 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2723 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2724 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2725 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2726 s2n(psk_len, t);
2727 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2728 t+=psk_len;
2729 s2n(psk_len, t);
2730
2731 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2732 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2733 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2734 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2735 {
2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2737 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2738 goto psk_err;
2739 }
2740
2741 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2742 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2743 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2744 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2745 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2746 {
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2748 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2749 goto psk_err;
2750 }
2751
2752 s->session->master_key_length=
2753 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2754 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2755 psk_err = 0;
2756 psk_err:
2757 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2758 if (psk_err != 0)
2759 goto f_err;
2760 }
2761 else
2762 #endif
2763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2764 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2765 {
2766 int param_len;
2767
2768 n2s(p,i);
2769 param_len=i+2;
2770 if (param_len > n)
2771 {
2772 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2774 goto f_err;
2775 }
2776 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2777 {
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2779 goto err;
2780 }
2781 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2782 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2783 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2784 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2785 {
2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2787 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2788 goto err;
2789 }
2790
2791 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2792 {
2793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2794 goto err;
2795 }
2796
2797 p+=i;
2798 }
2799 else
2800 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2801 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2802 {
2803 int ret = 0;
2804 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2805 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2806 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2807 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2808 unsigned long alg_a;
2809
2810 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2811 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2812 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2813 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2814 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2815 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2816
2817 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2818 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2819 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2820 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2821 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2822 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2823 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2824 if (client_pub_pkey)
2825 {
2826 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2827 ERR_clear_error();
2828 }
2829 /* Decrypt session key */
2830 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2831 {
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2833 goto gerr;
2834 }
2835 if (p[1] == 0x81)
2836 {
2837 start = p+3;
2838 inlen = p[2];
2839 }
2840 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2841 {
2842 start = p+2;
2843 inlen = p[1];
2844 }
2845 else
2846 {
2847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2848 goto gerr;
2849 }
2850 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2851
2852 {
2853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2854 goto gerr;
2855 }
2856 /* Generate master secret */
2857 s->session->master_key_length=
2858 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2859 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2860 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2861 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2862 ret = 2;
2863 else
2864 ret = 1;
2865 gerr:
2866 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2867 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2868 if (ret)
2869 return ret;
2870 else
2871 goto err;
2872 }
2873 else
2874 {
2875 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2877 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2878 goto f_err;
2879 }
2880
2881 return(1);
2882 f_err:
2883 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2884 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2885 err:
2886 #endif
2887 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2888 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2889 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2890 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2891 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2892 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2893 #endif
2894 return(-1);
2895 }
2896
2897 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2898 {
2899 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2900 unsigned char *p;
2901 int al,ok,ret=0;
2902 long n;
2903 int type=0,i,j;
2904 X509 *peer;
2905 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2906 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
2907 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2908
2909 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2910 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2911 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2912 -1,
2913 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
2914 &ok);
2915
2916 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2917
2918 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2919 {
2920 peer=s->session->peer;
2921 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2922 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2923 }
2924 else
2925 {
2926 peer=NULL;
2927 pkey=NULL;
2928 }
2929
2930 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2931 {
2932 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2933 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2934 {
2935 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2937 goto f_err;
2938 }
2939 ret=1;
2940 goto end;
2941 }
2942
2943 if (peer == NULL)
2944 {
2945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2946 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2947 goto f_err;
2948 }
2949
2950 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2951 {
2952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2953 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2954 goto f_err;
2955 }
2956
2957 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2958 {
2959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2960 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2961 goto f_err;
2962 }
2963
2964 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2965 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2966 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2967 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2968 * signature without length field */
2969 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2970 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2971 {
2972 i=64;
2973 }
2974 else
2975 {
2976 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2977 {
2978 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
2979 /* Should never happen */
2980 if (sigalg == -1)
2981 {
2982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2983 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2984 goto f_err;
2985 }
2986 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
2987 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
2988 {
2989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2990 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2991 goto f_err;
2992 }
2993 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
2994 if (md == NULL)
2995 {
2996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
2997 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2998 goto f_err;
2999 }
3000 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3001 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3002 #endif
3003 p += 2;
3004 n -= 2;
3005 }
3006 n2s(p,i);
3007 n-=2;
3008 if (i > n)
3009 {
3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3011 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3012 goto f_err;
3013 }
3014 }
3015 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3016 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3017 {
3018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3019 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3020 goto f_err;
3021 }
3022
3023 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3024 {
3025 long hdatalen = 0;
3026 void *hdata;
3027 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3028 if (hdatalen <= 0)
3029 {
3030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3031 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3032 goto f_err;
3033 }
3034 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3035 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3036 EVP_MD_name(md));
3037 #endif
3038 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3039 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3040 {
3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3042 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3043 goto f_err;
3044 }
3045
3046 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3047 {
3048 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3050 goto f_err;
3051 }
3052 }
3053 else
3054 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3055 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3056 {
3057 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3058 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3059 pkey->pkey.rsa);
3060 if (i < 0)
3061 {
3062 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3064 goto f_err;
3065 }
3066 if (i == 0)
3067 {
3068 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3070 goto f_err;
3071 }
3072 }
3073 else
3074 #endif
3075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3076 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3077 {
3078 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3079 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3080 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3081 if (j <= 0)
3082 {
3083 /* bad signature */
3084 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3086 goto f_err;
3087 }
3088 }
3089 else
3090 #endif
3091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3092 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3093 {
3094 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3095 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3096 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3097 if (j <= 0)
3098 {
3099 /* bad signature */
3100 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3102 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3103 goto f_err;
3104 }
3105 }
3106 else
3107 #endif
3108 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3109 { unsigned char signature[64];
3110 int idx;
3111 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3112 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3113 if (i!=64) {
3114 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3115 }
3116 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3117 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3118 }
3119 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3120 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3121 if (j<=0)
3122 {
3123 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3125 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3126 goto f_err;
3127 }
3128 }
3129 else
3130 {
3131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3132 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3133 goto f_err;
3134 }
3135
3136
3137 ret=1;
3138 if (0)
3139 {
3140 f_err:
3141 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3142 }
3143 end:
3144 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3145 {
3146 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3147 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3148 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3149 }
3150 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3151 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3152 return(ret);
3153 }
3154
3155 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3156 {
3157 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3158 X509 *x=NULL;
3159 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3160 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3161 unsigned char *d;
3162 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3163
3164 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3165 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3166 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3167 -1,
3168 s->max_cert_list,
3169 &ok);
3170
3171 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3172
3173 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3174 {
3175 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3176 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3177 {
3178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3179 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3180 goto f_err;
3181 }
3182 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3183 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3184 {
3185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3186 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3187 goto f_err;
3188 }
3189 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3190 return(1);
3191 }
3192
3193 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3194 {
3195 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3197 goto f_err;
3198 }
3199 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3200
3201 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3202 {
3203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3204 goto err;
3205 }
3206
3207 n2l3(p,llen);
3208 if (llen+3 != n)
3209 {
3210 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3212 goto f_err;
3213 }
3214 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3215 {
3216 n2l3(p,l);
3217 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3218 {
3219 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3221 goto f_err;
3222 }
3223
3224 q=p;
3225 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3226 if (x == NULL)
3227 {
3228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3229 goto err;
3230 }
3231 if (p != (q+l))
3232 {
3233 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3235 goto f_err;
3236 }
3237 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3238 {
3239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3240 goto err;
3241 }
3242 x=NULL;
3243 nc+=l+3;
3244 }
3245
3246 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3247 {
3248 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3249 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3250 {
3251 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3253 goto f_err;
3254 }
3255 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3256 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3257 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3258 {
3259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3260 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3261 goto f_err;
3262 }
3263 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3264 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3265 {
3266 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3267 goto f_err;
3268 }
3269 }
3270 else
3271 {
3272 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3273 if (i <= 0)
3274 {
3275 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3277 goto f_err;
3278 }
3279 }
3280
3281 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3282 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3283 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3284 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3285
3286 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3287 * when we arrive here. */
3288 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3289 {
3290 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3291 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3292 {
3293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3294 goto err;
3295 }
3296 }
3297 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3298 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3299 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3300 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3301 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3302
3303 sk=NULL;
3304
3305 ret=1;
3306 if (0)
3307 {
3308 f_err:
3309 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3310 }
3311 err:
3312 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3313 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3314 return(ret);
3315 }
3316
3317 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3318 {
3319 unsigned long l;
3320 X509 *x;
3321
3322 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3323 {
3324 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3325 if (x == NULL)
3326 {
3327 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3328 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3329 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3330 {
3331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3332 return(0);
3333 }
3334 }
3335
3336 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3337 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3338 s->init_num=(int)l;
3339 s->init_off=0;
3340 }
3341
3342 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3343 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3344 }
3345
3346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3347 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3348 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3349 {
3350 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3351 {
3352 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3353 const unsigned char *const_p;
3354 int len, slen_full, slen;
3355 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3356 unsigned int hlen;
3357 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3358 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3359 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3360 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3361 unsigned char key_name[16];
3362
3363 /* get session encoding length */
3364 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3365 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3366 * too long
3367 */
3368 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3369 return -1;
3370 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3371 if (!senc)
3372 return -1;
3373 p = senc;
3374 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3375
3376 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3377 const_p = senc;
3378 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3379 if (sess == NULL)
3380 {
3381 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3382 return -1;
3383 }
3384 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3385
3386 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3387 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3388 {
3389 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3390 return -1;
3391 }
3392 p = senc;
3393 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3394 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3395
3396 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3397 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3398 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3399 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3400 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3401 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3402 */
3403 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3404 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3405 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3406 return -1;
3407
3408 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3409 /* do the header */
3410 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3411 /* Skip message length for now */
3412 p += 3;
3413 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3414 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3415 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3416 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3417 * from parent ctx.
3418 */
3419 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3420 {
3421 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3422 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3423 {
3424 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3425 return -1;
3426 }
3427 }
3428 else
3429 {
3430 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3431 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3432 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3433 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3434 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3435 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3436 }
3437
3438 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3439 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3440 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3441 * as their sessions. */
3442 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3443
3444 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3445 p += 2;
3446 /* Output key name */
3447 macstart = p;
3448 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3449 p += 16;
3450 /* output IV */
3451 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3452 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3453 /* Encrypt session data */
3454 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3455 p += len;
3456 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3457 p += len;
3458 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3459
3460 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3461 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3462 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3463
3464 p += hlen;
3465 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3466 /* Total length */
3467 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3468 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3469 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3470 p += 4;
3471 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3472
3473 /* number of bytes to write */
3474 s->init_num= len;
3475 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3476 s->init_off=0;
3477 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3478 }
3479
3480 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3481 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3482 }
3483
3484 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3485 {
3486 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3487 {
3488 unsigned char *p;
3489 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3490 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3491 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3492 * + (ocsp response)
3493 */
3494 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3495 return -1;
3496
3497 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3498
3499 /* do the header */
3500 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3501 /* message length */
3502 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3503 /* status type */
3504 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3505 /* length of OCSP response */
3506 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3507 /* actual response */
3508 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3509 /* number of bytes to write */
3510 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3511 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3512 s->init_off = 0;
3513 }
3514
3515 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3516 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3517 }
3518
3519 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3520 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3521 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3522 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3523 {
3524 int ok;
3525 int proto_len, padding_len;
3526 long n;
3527 const unsigned char *p;
3528
3529 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3530 * extension in their ClientHello */
3531 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3532 {
3533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3534 return -1;
3535 }
3536
3537 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3538 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3539 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3540 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
3541 514, /* See the payload format below */
3542 &ok);
3543
3544 if (!ok)
3545 return((int)n);
3546
3547 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3548 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3549 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3550 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3551 {
3552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3553 return -1;
3554 }
3555
3556 if (n < 2)
3557 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3558
3559 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3560
3561 /* The payload looks like:
3562 * uint8 proto_len;
3563 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3564 * uint8 padding_len;
3565 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3566 */
3567 proto_len = p[0];
3568 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3569 return 0;
3570 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3571 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3572 return 0;
3573
3574 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3575 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3576 {
3577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3578 return 0;
3579 }
3580 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3581 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3582
3583 return 1;
3584 }
3585 # endif
3586 #endif
Tomato firmware and modifications.