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OpenSSL 1.0.1i
[tomato.git] / release / src / router / openssl / ssl / t1_lib.c
blob022a4fb289e36f8a5b941110a534b9ac73c13534
1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
119
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 #endif
127
128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
129 tls1_enc,
130 tls1_mac,
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
139 tls1_alert_code,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
141 };
142
143 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
144 {
145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
147 return(60*60*2);
148 }
149
150 int tls1_new(SSL *s)
151 {
152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
153 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
154 return(1);
155 }
156
157 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
158 {
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
161 {
162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
163 }
164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
165 ssl3_free(s);
166 }
167
168 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
169 {
170 ssl3_clear(s);
171 s->version = s->method->version;
172 }
173
174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
175
176 static int nid_list[] =
177 {
178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
203 };
204
205 static int pref_list[] =
206 {
207 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
208 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
209 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
210 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
211 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
212 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
213 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
214 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
215 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
216 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
217 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
221 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
222 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
223 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
224 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
225 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
230 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
231 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
232 };
233
234 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
235 {
236 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
237 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
238 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
239 return 0;
240 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
241 }
242
243 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
244 {
245 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
246 switch (nid)
247 {
248 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
249 return 1;
250 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
251 return 2;
252 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
253 return 3;
254 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
255 return 4;
256 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
257 return 5;
258 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
259 return 6;
260 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
261 return 7;
262 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
263 return 8;
264 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
265 return 9;
266 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
267 return 10;
268 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
269 return 11;
270 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
271 return 12;
272 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
273 return 13;
274 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 return 14;
276 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
277 return 15;
278 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
279 return 16;
280 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
281 return 17;
282 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
283 return 18;
284 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 return 19;
286 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
287 return 20;
288 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
289 return 21;
290 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
291 return 22;
292 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
293 return 23;
294 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
295 return 24;
296 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
297 return 25;
298 default:
299 return 0;
300 }
301 }
302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
303
304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
305
306 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
307 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
308 */
309
310 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
311 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
312 #else
313 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
314 #endif
315
316 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
317 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
318 #else
319 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
320 #endif
321
322 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
323 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
324 #else
325 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
326 #endif
327
328 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
329 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
330 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
331 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
332
333 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
335 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
336 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
337 #endif
338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
340 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
341 #endif
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
343 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
344 #endif
345 };
346
347 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
348 {
349 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
350 if (p)
351 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
352 return (int)slen;
353 }
354
355 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
356 {
357 int extdatalen=0;
358 unsigned char *orig = buf;
359 unsigned char *ret = buf;
360
361 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
362 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
363 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
364 return orig;
365
366 ret+=2;
367
368 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
369
370 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
371 {
372 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
373 unsigned long size_str;
374 long lenmax;
375
376 /* check for enough space.
377 4 for the servername type and entension length
378 2 for servernamelist length
379 1 for the hostname type
380 2 for hostname length
381 + hostname length
382 */
383
384 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
385 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
386 return NULL;
387
388 /* extension type and length */
389 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
390 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
391
392 /* length of servername list */
393 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
394
395 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
396 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
397 s2n(size_str,ret);
398 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
399 ret+=size_str;
400 }
401
402 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
403 if (s->renegotiate)
404 {
405 int el;
406
407 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
408 {
409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
410 return NULL;
411 }
412
413 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
414
415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
416 s2n(el,ret);
417
418 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
419 {
420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
421 return NULL;
422 }
423
424 ret += el;
425 }
426
427 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
428 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
429 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
430 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
431
432 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
433 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
434 {
435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
436 return NULL;
437 }
438
439 /* check for enough space.
440 4 for the srp type type and entension length
441 1 for the srp user identity
442 + srp user identity length
443 */
444 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
445
446 /* fill in the extension */
447 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
448 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
449 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
450 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
451 ret+=login_len;
452 }
453 #endif
454
455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
456 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
457 {
458 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
459 long lenmax;
460
461 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
462 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
463 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
464 {
465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
466 return NULL;
467 }
468
469 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
470 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
471 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
472 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
473 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
474 }
475 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
476 {
477 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
478 long lenmax;
479
480 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
481 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
482 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
483 {
484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
485 return NULL;
486 }
487
488 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
489 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
490
491 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
492 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
493 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
494 * resolves this to two bytes.
495 */
496 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
497 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
498 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
499 }
500 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
501
502 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
503 {
504 int ticklen;
505 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
506 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
507 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
508 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
509 {
510 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
511 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
512 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
513 return NULL;
514 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
515 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
516 ticklen);
517 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
518 }
519 else
520 ticklen = 0;
521 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
522 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
523 goto skip_ext;
524 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
525 * rest for ticket
526 */
527 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
528 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
529 s2n(ticklen,ret);
530 if (ticklen)
531 {
532 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
533 ret += ticklen;
534 }
535 }
536 skip_ext:
537
538 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
539 {
540 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
541 return NULL;
542 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
543 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
544 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
545 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
546 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
547 }
548
549 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
550 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
551 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
552 {
553 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
554
555 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
556 return NULL;
557 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
558 return NULL;
559
560 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
561 s2n(col + 2, ret);
562 s2n(col, ret);
563 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
564 ret += col;
565 }
566 #endif
567
568 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
569 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
570 {
571 int i;
572 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
573 OCSP_RESPID *id;
574
575 idlen = 0;
576 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
577 {
578 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
579 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
580 if (itmp <= 0)
581 return NULL;
582 idlen += itmp + 2;
583 }
584
585 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
586 {
587 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
588 if (extlen < 0)
589 return NULL;
590 }
591 else
592 extlen = 0;
593
594 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
595 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
596 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
597 return NULL;
598 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
599 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
600 s2n(idlen, ret);
601 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
602 {
603 /* save position of id len */
604 unsigned char *q = ret;
605 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
606 /* skip over id len */
607 ret += 2;
608 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
609 /* write id len */
610 s2n(itmp, q);
611 }
612 s2n(extlen, ret);
613 if (extlen > 0)
614 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
615 }
616
617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
618 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
619 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
620 return NULL;
621 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
622 s2n(1,ret);
623 /* Set mode:
624 * 1: peer may send requests
625 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
626 */
627 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
628 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
629 else
630 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
631 #endif
632
633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
634 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
635 {
636 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
637 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
638 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
639 return NULL;
640 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
641 s2n(0,ret);
642 }
643 #endif
644
645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
646 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
647 {
648 int el;
649
650 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
651
652 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
653
654 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
655 s2n(el,ret);
656
657 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
658 {
659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
660 return NULL;
661 }
662 ret += el;
663 }
664 #endif
665 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
666 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
667 *
668 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
669 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
670 */
671 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
672 {
673 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
674 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
675 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
676 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
677 */
678 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
679 hlen -= 5;
680 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
681 {
682 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
683 if (hlen >= 4)
684 hlen -= 4;
685 else
686 hlen = 0;
687
688 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
689 s2n(hlen, ret);
690 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
691 ret += hlen;
692 }
693 }
694
695 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
696 return orig;
697
698 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
699 return ret;
700 }
701
702 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
703 {
704 int extdatalen=0;
705 unsigned char *orig = buf;
706 unsigned char *ret = buf;
707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
708 int next_proto_neg_seen;
709 #endif
710
711 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
712 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
713 return orig;
714
715 ret+=2;
716 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
717
718 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
719 {
720 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
721
722 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
723 s2n(0,ret);
724 }
725
726 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
727 {
728 int el;
729
730 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
731 {
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
733 return NULL;
734 }
735
736 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
737
738 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
739 s2n(el,ret);
740
741 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
742 {
743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
744 return NULL;
745 }
746
747 ret += el;
748 }
749
750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
751 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
752 {
753 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
754 long lenmax;
755
756 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
757 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
758 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
759 {
760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
761 return NULL;
762 }
763
764 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
765 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
766 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
767 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
768 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
769
770 }
771 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
772 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
773
774 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
775 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
776 {
777 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
778 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
779 s2n(0,ret);
780 }
781
782 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
783 {
784 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
785 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
786 s2n(0,ret);
787 }
788
789 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
790 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
791 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
792 {
793 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
794
795 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
796 return NULL;
797 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
798 return NULL;
799
800 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
801 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
802 s2n(sol, ret);
803 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
804 ret += sol;
805 }
806 #endif
807
808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
809 if(s->srtp_profile)
810 {
811 int el;
812
813 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
814
815 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
816
817 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
818 s2n(el,ret);
819
820 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
821 {
822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
823 return NULL;
824 }
825 ret+=el;
826 }
827 #endif
828
829 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
830 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
831 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
832 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
833 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
834 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
835 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
836 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
837 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
838 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
839 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
840 ret+=36;
841
842 }
843
844 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
845 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
846 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
847 {
848 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
849 return NULL;
850 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
851 s2n(1,ret);
852 /* Set mode:
853 * 1: peer may send requests
854 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
855 */
856 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
857 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
858 else
859 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
860
861 }
862 #endif
863
864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
865 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
866 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
867 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
868 {
869 const unsigned char *npa;
870 unsigned int npalen;
871 int r;
872
873 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
874 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
875 {
876 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
877 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
878 s2n(npalen,ret);
879 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
880 ret += npalen;
881 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
882 }
883 }
884 #endif
885
886 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
887 return orig;
888
889 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
890 return ret;
891 }
892
893 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
894 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
895 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
896 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
897 * SNI,
898 * elliptic_curves
899 * ec_point_formats
900 *
901 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
902 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
903 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
904 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
905 */
906 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
907 unsigned short type, size;
908 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
909 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
910 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
911 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
912 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
913 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
914 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
915
916 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
917 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
918 0x01, /* 1 point format */
919 0x00, /* uncompressed */
920 };
921
922 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
923 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
924 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
925 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
926 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
927 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
928 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
929 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
930 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
931 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
932 };
933
934 if (data >= (d+n-2))
935 return;
936 data += 2;
937
938 if (data > (d+n-4))
939 return;
940 n2s(data,type);
941 n2s(data,size);
942
943 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
944 return;
945
946 if (data+size > d+n)
947 return;
948 data += size;
949
950 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
951 {
952 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
953 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
954
955 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
956 return;
957 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
958 return;
959 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
960 return;
961 }
962 else
963 {
964 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
965
966 if (data + len != d+n)
967 return;
968 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
969 return;
970 }
971
972 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
973 }
974 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
975
976 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
977 {
978 unsigned short type;
979 unsigned short size;
980 unsigned short len;
981 unsigned char *data = *p;
982 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
983 int sigalg_seen = 0;
984
985 s->servername_done = 0;
986 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
988 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
989 #endif
990
991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
992 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
993 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
994 #endif
995
996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
997 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
998 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
999 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1000
1001 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1002 goto ri_check;
1003 n2s(data,len);
1004
1005 if (data > (d+n-len))
1006 goto ri_check;
1007
1008 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1009 {
1010 n2s(data,type);
1011 n2s(data,size);
1012
1013 if (data+size > (d+n))
1014 goto ri_check;
1015 #if 0
1016 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1017 #endif
1018 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1019 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1020 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1021 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1022
1023 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1024 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1025 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1026 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1027 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1028 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1029 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1030 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1031 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1032 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1033 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1034 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1035 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1036 the value of the Host: field.
1037 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1038 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1039 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1040 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1041
1042 */
1043
1044 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1045 {
1046 unsigned char *sdata;
1047 int servname_type;
1048 int dsize;
1049
1050 if (size < 2)
1051 {
1052 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1053 return 0;
1054 }
1055 n2s(data,dsize);
1056 size -= 2;
1057 if (dsize > size )
1058 {
1059 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1060 return 0;
1061 }
1062
1063 sdata = data;
1064 while (dsize > 3)
1065 {
1066 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1067 n2s(sdata,len);
1068 dsize -= 3;
1069
1070 if (len > dsize)
1071 {
1072 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1073 return 0;
1074 }
1075 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1076 switch (servname_type)
1077 {
1078 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1079 if (!s->hit)
1080 {
1081 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1082 {
1083 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1084 return 0;
1085 }
1086 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1087 {
1088 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1089 return 0;
1090 }
1091 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1092 {
1093 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1094 return 0;
1095 }
1096 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1097 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1098 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1099 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1100 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1101 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1102 return 0;
1103 }
1104 s->servername_done = 1;
1105
1106 }
1107 else
1108 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1109 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1110 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1111
1112 break;
1113
1114 default:
1115 break;
1116 }
1117
1118 dsize -= len;
1119 }
1120 if (dsize != 0)
1121 {
1122 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1123 return 0;
1124 }
1125
1126 }
1127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1128 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1129 {
1130 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1131 {
1132 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1133 return 0;
1134 }
1135 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1136 {
1137 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1138 return 0;
1139 }
1140 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1141 return -1;
1142 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1143 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1144
1145 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1146 {
1147 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1148 return 0;
1149 }
1150 }
1151 #endif
1152
1153 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1154 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1155 {
1156 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1157 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1158
1159 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1160 {
1161 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1162 return 0;
1163 }
1164 if (!s->hit)
1165 {
1166 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1167 {
1168 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1169 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1170 }
1171 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1172 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1173 {
1174 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1175 return 0;
1176 }
1177 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1178 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1179 }
1180 #if 0
1181 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1182 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1183 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1184 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1185 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1186 #endif
1187 }
1188 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
1189 {
1190 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1191 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1192 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1193
1194 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1195 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1196 {
1197 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1198 return 0;
1199 }
1200 if (!s->hit)
1201 {
1202 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1203 {
1204 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1205 return 0;
1206 }
1207 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1208 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1209 {
1210 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1211 return 0;
1212 }
1213 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1214 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1215 }
1216 #if 0
1217 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1218 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1219 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1220 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1221 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1222 #endif
1223 }
1224 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1225 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1226 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1227 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1228 {
1229 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1230
1231 if (size < 2)
1232 {
1233 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1234 return 0;
1235 }
1236 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1237 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1238 {
1239 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1240 return 0;
1241 }
1242
1243 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1244 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1245 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1246 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1247 else
1248 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1249 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1250 {
1251 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1252 return 0;
1253 }
1254 }
1255 #endif
1256 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1257 {
1258 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1259 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1260 {
1261 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1262 return 0;
1263 }
1264 }
1265 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1266 {
1267 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1268 return 0;
1269 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1270 }
1271 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1272 {
1273 int dsize;
1274 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1275 {
1276 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1277 return 0;
1278 }
1279 sigalg_seen = 1;
1280 n2s(data,dsize);
1281 size -= 2;
1282 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1283 {
1284 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1285 return 0;
1286 }
1287 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1288 {
1289 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1290 return 0;
1291 }
1292 }
1293 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1294 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1295 {
1296
1297 if (size < 5)
1298 {
1299 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1300 return 0;
1301 }
1302
1303 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1304 size--;
1305 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1306 {
1307 const unsigned char *sdata;
1308 int dsize;
1309 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1310 n2s(data,dsize);
1311 size -= 2;
1312 if (dsize > size )
1313 {
1314 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1315 return 0;
1316 }
1317 while (dsize > 0)
1318 {
1319 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1320 int idsize;
1321 if (dsize < 4)
1322 {
1323 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1324 return 0;
1325 }
1326 n2s(data, idsize);
1327 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1328 size -= 2 + idsize;
1329 if (dsize < 0)
1330 {
1331 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1332 return 0;
1333 }
1334 sdata = data;
1335 data += idsize;
1336 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1337 &sdata, idsize);
1338 if (!id)
1339 {
1340 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1341 return 0;
1342 }
1343 if (data != sdata)
1344 {
1345 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1346 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1347 return 0;
1348 }
1349 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1350 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1351 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1352 {
1353 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1354 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1355 return 0;
1356 }
1357 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1358 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1359 {
1360 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1361 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1362 return 0;
1363 }
1364 }
1365
1366 /* Read in request_extensions */
1367 if (size < 2)
1368 {
1369 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1370 return 0;
1371 }
1372 n2s(data,dsize);
1373 size -= 2;
1374 if (dsize != size)
1375 {
1376 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1377 return 0;
1378 }
1379 sdata = data;
1380 if (dsize > 0)
1381 {
1382 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1383 {
1384 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1385 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1386 }
1387
1388 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1389 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1390 &sdata, dsize);
1391 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1392 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1393 {
1394 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1395 return 0;
1396 }
1397 }
1398 }
1399 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1400 * so ignore it.
1401 */
1402 else
1403 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1404 }
1405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1406 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1407 {
1408 switch(data[0])
1409 {
1410 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1411 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1412 break;
1413 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1414 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1415 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1416 break;
1417 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1418 return 0;
1419 }
1420 }
1421 #endif
1422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1423 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1424 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1425 {
1426 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1427 * renegotiation.
1428 *
1429 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1430 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1431 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1432 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1433 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1434 * anything like that, but this might change).
1435
1436 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1437 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1438 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1439 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1440 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1441 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1442 }
1443 #endif
1444
1445 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1447 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1448 {
1449 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1450 al))
1451 return 0;
1452 }
1453 #endif
1454
1455 data+=size;
1456 }
1457
1458 *p = data;
1459
1460 ri_check:
1461
1462 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1463
1464 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1465 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1466 {
1467 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1469 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1470 return 0;
1471 }
1472
1473 return 1;
1474 }
1475
1476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1477 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1478 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1479 * the length of the block. */
1480 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1481 {
1482 unsigned int off = 0;
1483
1484 while (off < len)
1485 {
1486 if (d[off] == 0)
1487 return 0;
1488 off += d[off];
1489 off++;
1490 }
1491
1492 return off == len;
1493 }
1494 #endif
1495
1496 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1497 {
1498 unsigned short length;
1499 unsigned short type;
1500 unsigned short size;
1501 unsigned char *data = *p;
1502 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1503 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1504
1505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1506 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1507 #endif
1508
1509 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1510 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1511 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1512 #endif
1513
1514 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1515 goto ri_check;
1516
1517 n2s(data,length);
1518 if (data+length != d+n)
1519 {
1520 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1521 return 0;
1522 }
1523
1524 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1525 {
1526 n2s(data,type);
1527 n2s(data,size);
1528
1529 if (data+size > (d+n))
1530 goto ri_check;
1531
1532 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1533 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1534 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1535
1536 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1537 {
1538 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1539 {
1540 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1541 return 0;
1542 }
1543 tlsext_servername = 1;
1544 }
1545
1546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1547 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1548 {
1549 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1550 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1551
1552 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1553 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1554 {
1555 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1556 return 0;
1557 }
1558 if (!s->hit)
1559 {
1560 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1561 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1562 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1563 {
1564 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1565 return 0;
1566 }
1567 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1568 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1569 }
1570 #if 0
1571 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1572 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1573 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1574 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1575 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1576 #endif
1577 }
1578 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1579
1580 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1581 {
1582 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1583 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1584 {
1585 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1586 return 0;
1587 }
1588 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1589 || (size > 0))
1590 {
1591 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1592 return 0;
1593 }
1594 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1595 }
1596 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1597 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1598 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1599 {
1600 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1601
1602 if (size < 2)
1603 {
1604 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1605 return 0;
1606 }
1607 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1608 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1609 {
1610 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1611 return 0;
1612 }
1613
1614 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1615 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1616 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1617 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1618 else
1619 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1620
1621 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1622 {
1623 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1624 return 0;
1625 }
1626 }
1627 #endif
1628 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1629 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1630 {
1631 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1632 * a status request message.
1633 */
1634 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1635 {
1636 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1637 return 0;
1638 }
1639 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1640 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1641 }
1642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1643 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1644 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1645 {
1646 unsigned char *selected;
1647 unsigned char selected_len;
1648
1649 /* We must have requested it. */
1650 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
1651 {
1652 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1653 return 0;
1654 }
1655 /* The data must be valid */
1656 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1657 {
1658 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1659 return 0;
1660 }
1661 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1662 {
1663 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1664 return 0;
1665 }
1666 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1667 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1668 {
1669 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1670 return 0;
1671 }
1672 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1673 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1674 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1675 }
1676 #endif
1677 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1678 {
1679 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1680 return 0;
1681 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1682 }
1683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1684 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1685 {
1686 switch(data[0])
1687 {
1688 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1689 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1690 break;
1691 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1692 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1693 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1694 break;
1695 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1696 return 0;
1697 }
1698 }
1699 #endif
1700 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1701 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1702 {
1703 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1704 al))
1705 return 0;
1706 }
1707 #endif
1708
1709 data+=size;
1710 }
1711
1712 if (data != d+n)
1713 {
1714 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1715 return 0;
1716 }
1717
1718 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1719 {
1720 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1721 {
1722 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1723 {
1724 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1725 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1726 {
1727 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1728 return 0;
1729 }
1730 }
1731 else
1732 {
1733 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1734 return 0;
1735 }
1736 }
1737 }
1738
1739 *p = data;
1740
1741 ri_check:
1742
1743 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1744 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1745 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1746 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1747 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1748 * absence on initial connect only.
1749 */
1750 if (!renegotiate_seen
1751 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1752 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1753 {
1754 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1756 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1757 return 0;
1758 }
1759
1760 return 1;
1761 }
1762
1763
1764 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1765 {
1766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1767 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1768 * and elliptic curves we support.
1769 */
1770 int using_ecc = 0;
1771 int i;
1772 unsigned char *j;
1773 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1774 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1775
1776 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1777 {
1778 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1779
1780 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1781 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1782 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1783 {
1784 using_ecc = 1;
1785 break;
1786 }
1787 }
1788 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1789 if (using_ecc)
1790 {
1791 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1792 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1793 {
1794 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1795 return -1;
1796 }
1797 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1798 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1799 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1800 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1801
1802 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1803 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1804 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
1805 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1806 {
1807 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1809 return -1;
1810 }
1811 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
1812 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
1813 {
1814 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1815 s2n(id,j);
1816 }
1817 }
1818 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1819
1820 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1821 {
1822 int r = 1;
1823
1824 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1825 {
1826 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1827 if (!r)
1828 return -1;
1829 }
1830
1831 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1832 {
1833 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1834 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1835
1836 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1837 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1838 else
1839 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1840 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1841 {
1842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1843 return -1;
1844 }
1845 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1846 }
1847
1848 if (r == 2)
1849 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1850 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1851 }
1852 #endif
1853
1854 return 1;
1855 }
1856
1857 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1858 {
1859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1860 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1861 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1862 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1863 */
1864
1865 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1866 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1867 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1868 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1869
1870 if (using_ecc)
1871 {
1872 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1873 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1874 {
1875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1876 return -1;
1877 }
1878 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1879 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1880 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1881 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1882 }
1883 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1884
1885 return 1;
1886 }
1887
1888 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
1889 {
1890 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1891 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1892
1893 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1894 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1895 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1896 */
1897 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1898 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1899 */
1900 #endif
1901
1902 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1903 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1904 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1905 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1906
1907 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1908 {
1909 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1910 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1911 * so this has to happen here in
1912 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
1913
1914 int r = 1;
1915
1916 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1917 {
1918 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1919 if (!r)
1920 {
1921 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1922 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1923 goto err;
1924 }
1925 }
1926
1927 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1928 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1929 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1930
1931 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1932 {
1933 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1934 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1935 {
1936 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1937 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1938
1939 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1940 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1941 else
1942 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1943 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1944 {
1945 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1946 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1947 goto err;
1948 }
1949 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1950 }
1951 }
1952
1953 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1954 {
1955 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1956 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1957 * abort the handshake.
1958 */
1959 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1960 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1961 }
1962 }
1963
1964 err:
1965 #endif
1966 switch (ret)
1967 {
1968 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1969 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1970 return -1;
1971
1972 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1973 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1974 return 1;
1975
1976 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1977 s->servername_done=0;
1978 default:
1979 return 1;
1980 }
1981 }
1982
1983 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
1984 {
1985 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1986 int al;
1987
1988 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1989 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1990 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
1991 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
1992 */
1993 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1994 {
1995 int r;
1996 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
1997 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
1998 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1999 if (certpkey == NULL)
2000 {
2001 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2002 return 1;
2003 }
2004 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2005 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2006 */
2007 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2008 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2009 switch (r)
2010 {
2011 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2012 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2013 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2014 break;
2015 /* status request response should be sent */
2016 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2017 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2018 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2019 else
2020 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2021 break;
2022 /* something bad happened */
2023 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2024 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2025 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2026 goto err;
2027 }
2028 }
2029 else
2030 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2031
2032 err:
2033 switch (ret)
2034 {
2035 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2036 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2037 return -1;
2038
2039 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2040 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2041 return 1;
2042
2043 default:
2044 return 1;
2045 }
2046 }
2047
2048 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2049 {
2050 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2051 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2052
2053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2054 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2055 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2056 * it must contain uncompressed.
2057 */
2058 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2059 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2060 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2061 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2062 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2063 {
2064 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2065 size_t i;
2066 unsigned char *list;
2067 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2068 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2069 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2070 {
2071 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2072 {
2073 found_uncompressed = 1;
2074 break;
2075 }
2076 }
2077 if (!found_uncompressed)
2078 {
2079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2080 return -1;
2081 }
2082 }
2083 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2084 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2085
2086 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2087 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2088 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2089 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2090
2091 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2092 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2093 {
2094 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2095 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2096
2097 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2098 {
2099 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2100 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2101 }
2102
2103 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2104 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2105 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2106 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2107 {
2108 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2109 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2110 }
2111 }
2112 #endif
2113
2114 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2115 * tell the callback
2116 */
2117 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2118 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2119 {
2120 int r;
2121 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2122 * there is no response.
2123 */
2124 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2125 {
2126 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2127 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2128 }
2129 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2130 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2131 if (r == 0)
2132 {
2133 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2134 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2135 }
2136 if (r < 0)
2137 {
2138 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2139 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2140 }
2141 }
2142
2143 switch (ret)
2144 {
2145 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2146 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2147 return -1;
2148
2149 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2150 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2151 return 1;
2152
2153 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2154 s->servername_done=0;
2155 default:
2156 return 1;
2157 }
2158 }
2159
2160 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2161 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2162 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2163 *
2164 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2165 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2166 * extension, if any.
2167 * len: the length of the session ID.
2168 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2169 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2170 * point to the resulting session.
2171 *
2172 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2173 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2174 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2175 *
2176 * Returns:
2177 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2178 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2179 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2180 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2181 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2182 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2183 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2184 *
2185 * Side effects:
2186 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2187 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2188 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2189 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2190 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2191 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2192 */
2193 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2194 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2195 {
2196 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2197 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2198 unsigned short i;
2199
2200 *ret = NULL;
2201 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2202
2203 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2204 * to permit stateful resumption.
2205 */
2206 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2207 return 0;
2208 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2209 return 0;
2210 if (p >= limit)
2211 return -1;
2212 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2213 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2214 {
2215 i = *(p++);
2216 p+= i;
2217 if (p >= limit)
2218 return -1;
2219 }
2220 /* Skip past cipher list */
2221 n2s(p, i);
2222 p+= i;
2223 if (p >= limit)
2224 return -1;
2225 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2226 i = *(p++);
2227 p += i;
2228 if (p > limit)
2229 return -1;
2230 /* Now at start of extensions */
2231 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2232 return 0;
2233 n2s(p, i);
2234 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2235 {
2236 unsigned short type, size;
2237 n2s(p, type);
2238 n2s(p, size);
2239 if (p + size > limit)
2240 return 0;
2241 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2242 {
2243 int r;
2244 if (size == 0)
2245 {
2246 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2247 * currently have one. */
2248 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2249 return 1;
2250 }
2251 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2252 {
2253 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2254 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2255 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2256 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2257 * calculate the master secret later. */
2258 return 2;
2259 }
2260 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2261 switch (r)
2262 {
2263 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2264 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2265 return 2;
2266 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2267 return r;
2268 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2269 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2270 return 3;
2271 default: /* fatal error */
2272 return -1;
2273 }
2274 }
2275 p += size;
2276 }
2277 return 0;
2278 }
2279
2280 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2281 *
2282 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2283 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2284 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2285 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2286 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2287 * point to the resulting session.
2288 *
2289 * Returns:
2290 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2291 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2292 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2293 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2294 */
2295 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2296 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2297 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2298 {
2299 SSL_SESSION *sess;
2300 unsigned char *sdec;
2301 const unsigned char *p;
2302 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2303 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2304 HMAC_CTX hctx;
2305 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
2306 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2307 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2308 if (eticklen < 48)
2309 return 2;
2310 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2311 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2312 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2313 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2314 {
2315 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2316 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2317 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
2318 if (rv < 0)
2319 return -1;
2320 if (rv == 0)
2321 return 2;
2322 if (rv == 2)
2323 renew_ticket = 1;
2324 }
2325 else
2326 {
2327 /* Check key name matches */
2328 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2329 return 2;
2330 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2331 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2332 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2333 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2334 }
2335 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2336 * integrity checks on ticket.
2337 */
2338 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2339 if (mlen < 0)
2340 {
2341 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2342 return -1;
2343 }
2344 eticklen -= mlen;
2345 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2346 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2347 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2348 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2349 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2350 return 2;
2351 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2352 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2353 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2354 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2355 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2356 if (!sdec)
2357 {
2358 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2359 return -1;
2360 }
2361 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2362 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2363 {
2364 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2365 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
2366 return 2;
2367 }
2368 slen += mlen;
2369 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2370 p = sdec;
2371
2372 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2373 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
2374 if (sess)
2375 {
2376 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2377 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2378 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2379 * as required by standard.
2380 */
2381 if (sesslen)
2382 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2383 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2384 *psess = sess;
2385 if (renew_ticket)
2386 return 4;
2387 else
2388 return 3;
2389 }
2390 ERR_clear_error();
2391 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2392 * ticket. */
2393 return 2;
2394 }
2395
2396 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2397
2398 typedef struct
2399 {
2400 int nid;
2401 int id;
2402 } tls12_lookup;
2403
2404 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2406 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2407 #endif
2408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2409 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2410 #endif
2411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2412 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2413 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2414 #endif
2415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2416 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2417 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2418 #endif
2419 };
2420
2421 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2423 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2424 #endif
2425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2426 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2427 #endif
2428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2429 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2430 #endif
2431 };
2432
2433 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2434 {
2435 size_t i;
2436 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2437 {
2438 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2439 return table[i].id;
2440 }
2441 return -1;
2442 }
2443 #if 0
2444 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2445 {
2446 size_t i;
2447 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2448 {
2449 if (table[i].id == id)
2450 return table[i].nid;
2451 }
2452 return -1;
2453 }
2454 #endif
2455
2456 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2457 {
2458 int sig_id, md_id;
2459 if (!md)
2460 return 0;
2461 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2462 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2463 if (md_id == -1)
2464 return 0;
2465 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2466 if (sig_id == -1)
2467 return 0;
2468 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2469 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2470 return 1;
2471 }
2472
2473 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2474 {
2475 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2476 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2477 }
2478
2479 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2480 {
2481 switch(hash_alg)
2482 {
2483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2484 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2485 return EVP_sha1();
2486 #endif
2487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2488 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2489 return EVP_sha224();
2490
2491 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2492 return EVP_sha256();
2493 #endif
2494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2495 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2496 return EVP_sha384();
2497
2498 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2499 return EVP_sha512();
2500 #endif
2501 default:
2502 return NULL;
2503
2504 }
2505 }
2506
2507 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2508
2509 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2510 {
2511 int i, idx;
2512 const EVP_MD *md;
2513 CERT *c = s->cert;
2514 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2515 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2516 return 1;
2517 /* Should never happen */
2518 if (!c)
2519 return 0;
2520
2521 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2522 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2523 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2524 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2525
2526 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2527 {
2528 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2529
2530 switch(sig_alg)
2531 {
2532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2533 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2534 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2535 break;
2536 #endif
2537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2538 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2539 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2540 break;
2541 #endif
2542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2543 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2544 idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
2545 break;
2546 #endif
2547 default:
2548 continue;
2549 }
2550
2551 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2552 {
2553 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2554 if (md)
2555 {
2556 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2557 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2558 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2559 }
2560 }
2561
2562 }
2563
2564
2565 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2566 * supported it stays as NULL.
2567 */
2568 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2569 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2570 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2571 #endif
2572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2573 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2574 {
2575 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2576 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2577 }
2578 #endif
2579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2580 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2581 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2582 #endif
2583 return 1;
2584 }
2585
2586 #endif
2587
2588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2589 int
2590 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2591 {
2592 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2593 unsigned short hbtype;
2594 unsigned int payload;
2595 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2596
2597 if (s->msg_callback)
2598 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2599 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2600 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2601
2602 /* Read type and payload length first */
2603 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2604 return 0; /* silently discard */
2605 hbtype = *p++;
2606 n2s(p, payload);
2607 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2608 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
2609 pl = p;
2610
2611 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
2612 {
2613 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2614 int r;
2615
2616 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
2617 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
2618 * payload, plus padding
2619 */
2620 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2621 bp = buffer;
2622
2623 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2624 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2625 s2n(payload, bp);
2626 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2627 bp += payload;
2628 /* Random padding */
2629 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
2630
2631 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
2632
2633 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2634 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2635 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2636 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2637
2638 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2639
2640 if (r < 0)
2641 return r;
2642 }
2643 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
2644 {
2645 unsigned int seq;
2646
2647 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
2648 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
2649 * sequence number */
2650 n2s(pl, seq);
2651
2652 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
2653 {
2654 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
2655 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2656 }
2657 }
2658
2659 return 0;
2660 }
2661
2662 int
2663 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2664 {
2665 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2666 int ret;
2667 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2668 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2669
2670 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2671 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2672 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
2673 {
2674 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2675 return -1;
2676 }
2677
2678 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2679 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
2680 {
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2682 return -1;
2683 }
2684
2685 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2686 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
2687 {
2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2689 return -1;
2690 }
2691
2692 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
2693 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2694 */
2695 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2696
2697 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2698 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2699 * some random stuff.
2700 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2701 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2702 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2703 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2704 * - Padding
2705 */
2706 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2707 p = buf;
2708 /* Message Type */
2709 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2710 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2711 s2n(payload, p);
2712 /* Sequence number */
2713 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2714 /* 16 random bytes */
2715 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2716 p += 16;
2717 /* Random padding */
2718 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
2719
2720 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2721 if (ret >= 0)
2722 {
2723 if (s->msg_callback)
2724 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2725 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2726 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2727
2728 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
2729 }
2730
2731 OPENSSL_free(buf);
2732
2733 return ret;
2734 }
2735 #endif
Tomato firmware and modifications.