1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
174 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
176 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
185 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
187 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
189 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
190 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
))
192 if(s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
201 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
,al
);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
210 ssl_undefined_function
,
211 ssl3_get_server_method
)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
216 unsigned long alg_k
,Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
);
217 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
219 int new_state
,state
,skip
=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time
,sizeof(Time
),0);
225 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
227 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
228 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) SSL_clear(s
);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
)
247 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
265 case SSL_ST_OK
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
268 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
270 if ((s
->version
>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
275 s
->type
=SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
277 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
)
279 if ((buf
=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
)
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
))
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
299 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
301 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
)
303 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
304 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
306 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
,1)) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
308 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
309 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
310 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
312 else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
313 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
))
315 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
316 * client that doesn't support secure
319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
320 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
326 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
327 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
328 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
329 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
333 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
337 ret
=ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
338 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
339 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
340 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
343 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
350 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
355 if (s
->rwstate
!= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
)
357 ret
=ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
358 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
363 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
,&al
)) < 0)
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s
->rwstate
=SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
369 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
)
371 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
376 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
384 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
390 ret
=ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
391 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
395 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
396 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
398 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
402 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
405 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
409 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
410 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
411 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
412 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
413 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
414 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)
415 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
417 ret
=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
418 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
420 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
421 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
423 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
428 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
435 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
440 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
441 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
442 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
444 /* clear this, it may get reset by
445 * send_server_key_exchange */
446 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
)
447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
448 && !(alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
449 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
451 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
452 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
453 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
454 * be able to handle this) */
455 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
457 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=0;
460 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
461 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
463 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
465 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
466 * message only if the cipher suite is either
467 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
468 * server certificate contains the server's
469 * public key for key exchange.
471 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
472 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
473 * hint if provided */
474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
475 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
478 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
479 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
481 || (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
|SSL_kEDH
))
482 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
483 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
484 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
485 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
486 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
492 ret
=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
493 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
498 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
504 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
505 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
506 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
507 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
508 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
509 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
510 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
511 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
512 * and in RFC 2246): */
513 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
514 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
515 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
516 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
517 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
518 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
)
519 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
520 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
521 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
523 /* no cert request */
525 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=0;
526 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
527 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
528 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
533 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=1;
534 ret
=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
535 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
536 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
537 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
539 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
540 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
546 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
547 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
548 ret
=ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
549 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
550 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
551 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
555 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
557 /* This code originally checked to see if
558 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
559 * and then flushed. This caused problems
560 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
561 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
562 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
563 * still exist. So instead we just flush
567 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
568 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0)
573 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
575 s
->state
=s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
578 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
579 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
580 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
581 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
585 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
587 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
589 ret
=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
590 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
593 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
597 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
598 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
599 ret
=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
604 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
605 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
606 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
607 * message is not sent.
608 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
609 * the client uses its key from the certificate
612 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
613 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
615 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
616 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
618 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
622 else if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
624 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
626 if (!s
->session
->peer
)
628 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
629 * at this point and digest cached records.
631 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
636 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
637 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
645 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
648 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
649 * a client cert, it can be verified
650 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
651 * should be generalized. But it is next step
653 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
654 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
656 for (dgst_num
=0; dgst_num
<SSL_MAX_DIGEST
;dgst_num
++)
657 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
])
661 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]),&(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[offset
]));
662 dgst_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
673 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
674 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
676 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
677 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
678 ret
=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
679 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
681 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
682 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
684 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
685 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
687 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
692 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
695 ret
=ssl3_get_next_proto(s
);
696 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
698 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
703 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
704 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
705 ret
=ssl3_get_finished(s
,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
706 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
707 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
711 else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
712 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
715 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
720 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
721 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
722 ret
=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
723 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
724 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
728 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
729 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
730 ret
=ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
731 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
732 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
738 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
739 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
741 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
742 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
743 { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
745 ret
=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
746 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
748 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
749 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
752 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
753 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
761 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
762 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
763 ret
=ssl3_send_finished(s
,
764 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
765 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
766 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
767 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
768 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
771 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
772 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
774 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
776 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
777 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
780 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
784 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL_ST_OK
;
789 /* clean a few things up */
790 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
792 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
795 /* remove buffering on output */
796 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
800 if (s
->renegotiate
== 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
805 ssl_update_cache(s
,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
807 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
809 s
->handshake_func
=ssl3_accept
;
811 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
,1);
819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
825 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
)
829 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
834 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
))
838 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
,1);
845 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
849 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
,ret
);
853 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
857 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
)
859 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
860 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
865 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
866 /* number of bytes to write */
871 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
872 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
875 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
880 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
881 * so permit appropriate message length */
882 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
888 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
889 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
890 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
)
892 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
894 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
)
896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS
);
899 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
900 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
902 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
904 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
905 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
909 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
911 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
912 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
915 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
921 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
923 int i
,j
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
924 unsigned int cookie_len
;
927 unsigned char *p
,*d
,*q
;
929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
932 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
=NULL
;
934 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
935 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
936 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
937 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
940 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
943 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
946 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
947 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
948 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
949 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
950 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
953 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
955 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
957 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
958 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
959 s
->client_version
=(((int)p
[0])<<8)|(int)p
[1];
962 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
> s
->version
) ||
963 (s
->version
!= DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
< s
->version
))
965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
966 if ((s
->client_version
>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
&&
967 !s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
)
969 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
970 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
972 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
976 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
977 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
978 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
980 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)
982 unsigned int session_length
, cookie_length
;
984 session_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
985 cookie_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1);
987 if (cookie_length
== 0)
991 /* load the client random */
992 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
,p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
995 /* get the session-id */
999 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1000 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1001 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1002 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1003 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1005 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1006 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1007 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1008 * setting will be ignored.
1010 if ((s
->new_session
&& (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
)))
1012 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
1017 i
=ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
1019 { /* previous session */
1026 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
1033 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1036 cookie_len
= *(p
++);
1039 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1040 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1041 * does not cause an overflow.
1043 if ( cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
))
1046 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1051 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1052 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) &&
1055 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
1057 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
)
1059 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
1062 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1064 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1067 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1069 else if ( memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1070 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) /* default verification */
1072 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1074 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1085 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0))
1087 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1088 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
1094 /* not enough data */
1095 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1099 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
,p
,i
,&(ciphers
))
1106 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1107 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0))
1110 id
=s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1113 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers
));
1115 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++)
1117 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,i
);
1119 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1120 i
,sk_num(ciphers
),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1128 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1129 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1132 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1))
1134 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1135 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1136 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1137 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1138 * enabled, though. */
1139 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
1140 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0)
1142 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
1149 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1150 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1151 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1161 /* not enough data */
1162 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1169 if (p
[j
] == 0) break;
1176 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1183 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
)
1185 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
,&p
,d
,n
, &al
))
1187 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1192 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s
) <= 0) {
1193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1197 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1198 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1199 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1200 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1203 pos
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1204 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0)
1206 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1211 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
)
1213 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
=NULL
;
1215 s
->session
->master_key_length
=sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1216 if(s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1217 ciphers
, &pref_cipher
, s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
))
1220 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1221 s
->session
->verify_result
=X509_V_OK
;
1225 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1226 pref_cipher
=pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1227 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1229 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1234 s
->session
->cipher
=pref_cipher
;
1237 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1239 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1240 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1242 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1243 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1248 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1249 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1250 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1251 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=NULL
;
1252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1253 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1254 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1256 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1257 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1258 /* Can't disable compression */
1259 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1261 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1265 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1266 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++)
1268 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1269 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
)
1271 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1275 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1277 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1281 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1282 for (m
= 0; m
< i
; m
++)
1284 if (q
[m
] == comp_id
)
1289 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1296 else if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
1297 { /* See if we have a match */
1298 int m
,nn
,o
,v
,done
=0;
1300 nn
=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1301 for (m
=0; m
<nn
; m
++)
1303 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1316 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1321 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1322 * using compression.
1324 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1326 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1332 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1337 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1338 s
->session
->compress_meth
=0;
1340 s
->session
->compress_meth
=(comp
== NULL
)?0:comp
->id
;
1342 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1343 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1344 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1345 if (ciphers
== NULL
)
1347 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
1352 c
=ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,s
->session
->ciphers
,
1353 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1357 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1361 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=c
;
1365 /* Session-id reuse */
1366 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1367 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1368 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
=NULL
;
1369 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
=NULL
;
1371 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1373 sk
=s
->session
->ciphers
;
1374 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++)
1376 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
,i
);
1377 if (c
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_eNULL
)
1379 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1383 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=nc
;
1384 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1385 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=ec
;
1387 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1391 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1394 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) < TLS1_2_VERSION
|| !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
))
1396 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1398 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1403 /* we now have the following setup.
1405 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1406 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1407 * compression - basically ignored right now
1408 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1409 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1410 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1411 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1414 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1415 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
)
1417 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s
) <= 0)
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1428 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1431 if (ciphers
!= NULL
) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1435 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1438 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1442 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1444 buf
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1445 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1446 p
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1447 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0)
1450 /* Do the message type and length last */
1453 *(p
++)=s
->version
>>8;
1454 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1457 memcpy(p
,s
->s3
->server_random
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1458 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1460 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1461 * back in the server hello:
1462 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1463 * we send back the old session ID.
1464 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1465 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1466 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1467 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1469 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1470 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1471 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1472 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1475 if (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1477 s
->session
->session_id_length
=0;
1479 sl
=s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1480 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
))
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1486 memcpy(p
,s
->session
->session_id
,sl
);
1489 /* put the cipher */
1490 i
=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,p
);
1493 /* put the compression method */
1494 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1497 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1500 *(p
++)=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1503 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0)
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1508 if ((p
= ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) == NULL
)
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1517 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1520 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1521 /* number of bytes to write */
1526 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1527 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1530 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1534 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
)
1536 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1539 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1544 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1545 /* number of bytes to write */
1550 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1551 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1554 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1560 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1567 EC_KEY
*ecdh
=NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1568 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1571 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1574 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1575 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1585 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1586 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
)
1588 type
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1593 r
[0]=r
[1]=r
[2]=r
[3]=NULL
;
1595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1596 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
)
1599 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1601 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1602 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1603 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1606 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1615 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1621 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
1625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1626 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
)
1629 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1630 dhp
=s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1631 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1632 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1635 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1640 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1646 if ((dh
=DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
)
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1653 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1654 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1655 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
)))
1657 if(!DH_generate_key(dh
))
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1666 dh
->pub_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1667 dh
->priv_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1668 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1669 (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1681 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1682 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1684 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1686 ecdhp
=cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1687 if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1689 ecdhp
=s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1690 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1691 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1695 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1700 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1706 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1712 if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp
)) == NULL
)
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1718 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
=ecdh
;
1719 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1720 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1721 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
))
1723 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
))
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1730 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1731 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1732 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
))
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1738 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1739 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163))
1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1745 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1746 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1747 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1750 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1757 /* Encode the public key.
1758 * First check the size of encoding and
1759 * allocate memory accordingly.
1761 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1762 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1763 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1766 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1767 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
*sizeof(unsigned char));
1768 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1769 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
))
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1776 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1777 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1778 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1779 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1781 if (encodedlen
== 0)
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1787 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
); bn_ctx
=NULL
;
1789 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1790 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1791 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1792 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1797 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1798 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1806 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1808 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1810 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1811 n
+=2+strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1814 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1816 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
)
1818 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1819 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1820 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) ||
1821 (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
))
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1834 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1838 for (i
=0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1840 nr
[i
]=BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1842 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1849 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
1850 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
1852 if ((pkey
=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
,s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,&md
))
1855 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1858 kn
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1866 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,n
+4+kn
))
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1871 d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1874 for (i
=0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1877 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1890 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1892 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1893 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1894 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1895 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1896 * the actual encoded point itself
1898 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1906 memcpy((unsigned char*)p
,
1907 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
,
1909 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1910 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1916 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1918 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1919 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1920 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
, strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
1921 p
+=strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1928 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1929 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1931 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
1932 && TLS1_get_version(s
) < TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1936 for (num
=2; num
> 0; num
--)
1938 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
,
1939 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1940 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,(num
== 2)
1941 ?s
->ctx
->md5
:s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1942 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1943 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1944 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1945 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
,q
,
1946 (unsigned int *)&i
);
1950 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
1951 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0)
1953 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_RSA
);
1963 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1965 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1967 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
))
1969 /* Should never happen */
1970 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1977 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n",
1980 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
1981 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1982 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1983 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1984 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1985 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_EVP
);
1992 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1997 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1998 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
2004 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
2007 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2013 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
2014 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2015 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2017 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2020 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2021 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2023 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2027 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2029 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
2031 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
=NULL
;
2035 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
)
2039 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4]);
2041 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2043 n
=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
,p
);
2048 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2050 nl
= tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s
, p
+ 2);
2060 sk
=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2064 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++)
2066 name
=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
,i
);
2067 j
=i2d_X509_NAME(name
,NULL
);
2068 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,4+n
+j
+2))
2070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
2073 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+n
]);
2074 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
2077 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2084 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2085 j
-=2; s2n(j
,d
); j
+=2;
2091 /* else no CA names */
2092 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+off
]);
2095 d
=(unsigned char *)buf
->data
;
2096 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
2099 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2104 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2105 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, s
->init_num
+ 4))
2107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
2110 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
2113 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
2120 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
2123 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2124 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2129 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2133 unsigned long alg_k
;
2135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2137 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2145 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2148 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
2149 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2150 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2151 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2154 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2155 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
2156 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
2157 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2161 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2162 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2164 alg_k
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2167 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
2169 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2170 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
)
2172 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
2173 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
2174 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2175 * be sent already */
2178 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
2186 pkey
=s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
2187 if ( (pkey
== NULL
) ||
2188 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) ||
2189 (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
))
2191 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2198 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2199 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
2204 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
))
2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2216 i
=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
,p
,p
,rsa
,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2220 if (i
!= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2222 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2223 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2226 if ((al
== -1) && !((p
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2228 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2229 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2230 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2231 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2232 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2234 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2235 if (!((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) &&
2236 (p
[0] == (s
->version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->version
& 0xff))))
2238 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2239 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2241 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2242 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2243 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2244 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2245 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2246 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2247 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2253 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2254 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2255 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2257 i
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2258 p
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2259 p
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2260 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
+2, i
-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2264 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2265 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2266 s
->session
->master_key
,
2268 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2273 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEDH
|SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
))
2278 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
))
2280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2290 if (n
== 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2292 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS
);
2298 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
)
2300 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2305 dh_srvr
=s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2308 pub
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
);
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2315 i
=DH_compute_key(p
,pub
,dh_srvr
);
2319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2324 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2329 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2330 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2331 s
->session
->master_key
,p
,i
);
2332 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2337 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
2339 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2340 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2341 krb5_data authenticator
;
2343 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2344 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2345 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2346 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2347 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2348 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2350 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2351 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2353 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2355 if (!kssl_ctx
) kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2358 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2360 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ 6))
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2363 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2367 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2368 p
+=enc_ticket
.length
;
2371 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2373 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6))
2375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2376 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2380 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2381 p
+=authenticator
.length
;
2385 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2388 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2391 if(enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
)
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2394 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2398 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2399 enc_pms
.length
+ 6))
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2402 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2406 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2410 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2411 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2413 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2414 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2420 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2421 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2423 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2424 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0)
2427 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2428 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2430 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2431 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2437 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0)
2439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2444 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2445 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2447 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2451 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2453 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
,enc
,NULL
,kssl_ctx
->key
,iv
))
2455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2456 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2459 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
,&outl
,
2460 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2463 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2466 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2469 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2472 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
,&(pms
[outl
]),&padl
))
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2475 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2479 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2482 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2485 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2487 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2488 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2489 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2490 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2491 * the protocol version.
2492 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2493 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2495 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
))
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2498 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2503 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2505 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2506 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2507 s
->session
->master_key
, pms
, outl
);
2509 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
)
2511 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2512 if ( len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
)
2514 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2515 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
,kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,len
);
2520 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2521 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2522 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2523 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2527 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2530 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEECDH
|SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2535 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2536 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2538 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2539 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
)
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2542 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2546 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2547 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2549 /* use the certificate */
2550 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2554 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2555 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2557 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2560 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2561 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2563 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2564 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
))
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2571 /* Let's get client's public key */
2572 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
)
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2575 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2581 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2583 if (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
2585 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2589 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2591 (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
))
2593 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2594 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2595 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2596 * never executed. When that support is
2597 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2598 * received in the certificate is
2599 * authorized for key agreement.
2600 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2601 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2604 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2606 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2610 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2611 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) == 0)
2613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2617 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2621 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2622 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2624 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
2626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2627 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2631 /* Get encoded point length */
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2640 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
,
2641 clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0)
2643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2647 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2648 * currently, so set it to the start
2650 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2653 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2654 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2655 if (field_size
<= 0)
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2661 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, NULL
);
2664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2669 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2670 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2671 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2672 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2673 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2674 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2676 /* Compute the master secret */
2677 s
->session
->master_key_length
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
-> \
2678 generate_master_secret(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, p
, i
);
2680 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2686 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)
2688 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2689 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
*2+4];
2690 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2692 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1];
2694 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2700 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2703 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
)
2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2706 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2709 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
)
2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2712 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2716 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2717 * string for the callback */
2718 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2719 memset(tmp_id
+i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1-i
);
2720 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2721 psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2722 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1);
2724 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
)
2726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2727 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2730 else if (psk_len
== 0)
2732 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2734 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2735 al
=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2739 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2740 pre_ms_len
=2+psk_len
+2+psk_len
;
2742 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+psk_len
+4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2744 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2748 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2749 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2750 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup((char *)p
);
2751 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
)
2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2754 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2758 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2759 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2760 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2761 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2762 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2765 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2769 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2770 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2771 s
->session
->master_key
, psk_or_pre_ms
, pre_ms_len
);
2774 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2780 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2781 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
2789 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2793 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.A
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
)))
2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2798 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0
2799 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
))
2801 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
2805 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2806 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2807 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2808 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
)
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2811 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2815 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
= SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s
,s
->session
->master_key
))<0)
2817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2824 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2825 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
)
2828 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2829 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2830 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2831 size_t outlen
=32, inlen
;
2832 unsigned long alg_a
;
2836 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2837 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2838 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST94
)
2839 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST94
].privatekey
;
2840 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
)
2841 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2843 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
,NULL
);
2844 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2845 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2846 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2847 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2848 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2849 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2850 if (client_pub_pkey
)
2852 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2855 /* Decrypt session key */
2856 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
, &Tclass
, n
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
||
2857 Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
||
2858 Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
)
2860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2865 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
,premaster_secret
,&outlen
,start
,inlen
) <=0)
2868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2871 /* Generate master secret */
2872 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2873 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2874 s
->session
->master_key
,premaster_secret
,32);
2875 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2876 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2881 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
2882 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2890 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2892 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2898 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2899 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2903 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2904 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2905 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2906 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2907 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2912 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2914 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2920 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2922 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
2924 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2925 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2926 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2928 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
2931 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2933 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
2935 peer
=s
->session
->peer
;
2936 pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2937 type
=X509_certificate_type(peer
,pkey
);
2945 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
)
2947 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2948 if ((peer
!= NULL
) && (type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2950 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
2960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
2961 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2965 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2968 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2972 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
2974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
2975 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2979 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2980 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2981 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2982 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2983 * signature without length field */
2984 if (n
==64 && (pkey
->type
==NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
2985 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) )
2991 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2993 int sigalg
= tls12_get_sigid(pkey
);
2994 /* Should never happen */
2997 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2998 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3001 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3002 if (sigalg
!= (int)p
[1])
3004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
3005 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3008 md
= tls12_get_hash(p
[0]);
3011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
3012 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3016 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
3025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3026 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3030 j
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
3031 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0))
3033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
3034 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3038 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3042 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3046 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3050 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3053 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3054 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
))
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3057 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3061 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx
, p
, i
, pkey
) <= 0)
3063 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
3069 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3070 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3072 i
=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3073 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
3077 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
3083 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
3090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3091 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
3093 j
=DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3094 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3095 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
3099 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
3106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3107 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
3109 j
=ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3110 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3111 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
3115 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3117 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3123 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
|| pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)
3124 { unsigned char signature
[64];
3126 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
,NULL
);
3127 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
);
3129 fprintf(stderr
,"GOST signature length is %d",i
);
3131 for (idx
=0;idx
<64;idx
++) {
3132 signature
[63-idx
]=p
[idx
];
3134 j
=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
,signature
,64,s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,32);
3135 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3138 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3140 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3147 al
=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
3156 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3159 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
3161 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3162 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3163 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3165 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3166 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3170 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3172 int i
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
3174 unsigned long l
,nc
,llen
,n
;
3175 const unsigned char *p
,*q
;
3177 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
=NULL
;
3179 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3186 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
3188 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
)
3190 if ( (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3191 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3194 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3197 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3198 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
3200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
3201 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3204 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
3208 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
)
3210 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
3214 p
=d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3216 if ((sk
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
)
3218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3225 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3229 for (nc
=0; nc
<llen
; )
3232 if ((l
+nc
+3) > llen
)
3234 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3240 x
=d2i_X509(NULL
,&p
,l
);
3243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3248 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3252 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
,x
))
3254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3261 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0)
3263 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3264 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
3266 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3270 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3271 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3272 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3275 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3278 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3279 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
3281 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3287 i
=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
,sk
);
3290 al
=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED
);
3296 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
3297 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3298 s
->session
->peer
=sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3299 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3301 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3302 * when we arrive here. */
3303 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3305 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
3306 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3312 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
3313 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
3314 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
=sk
;
3315 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3316 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3324 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3327 if (x
!= NULL
) X509_free(x
);
3328 if (sk
!= NULL
) sk_X509_pop_free(sk
,X509_free
);
3332 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3337 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
)
3339 x
=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s
);
3342 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3343 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
3344 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
))
3346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3351 l
=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,x
);
3352 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
3357 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3358 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3362 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3363 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3365 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
)
3367 unsigned char *p
, *senc
, *macstart
;
3368 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3369 int len
, slen_full
, slen
;
3374 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3375 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3376 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3378 /* get session encoding length */
3379 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3380 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3383 if (slen_full
> 0xFF00)
3385 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3389 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
);
3391 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3393 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3399 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3401 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3402 if (slen
> slen_full
) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3408 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
);
3409 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3411 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3412 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3413 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3414 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3415 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3416 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3418 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3419 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+
3420 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3423 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3425 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
3426 /* Skip message length for now */
3428 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3429 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3430 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3431 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3434 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
)
3436 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3445 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv
, 16);
3446 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3447 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
);
3448 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3449 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
);
3450 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3453 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3454 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3455 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3456 * as their sessions. */
3457 l2n(s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
, p
);
3459 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3461 /* Output key name */
3463 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3466 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3467 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3468 /* Encrypt session data */
3469 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
);
3471 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
);
3473 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3475 HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
);
3476 HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
);
3477 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3480 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3482 len
= p
- (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3483 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ 1;
3484 l2n3(len
- 4, p
); /* Message length */
3486 s2n(len
- 10, p
); /* Ticket length */
3488 /* number of bytes to write */
3490 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3495 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3496 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3499 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3501 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
)
3504 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3505 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3506 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3509 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
))
3512 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3515 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3516 /* message length */
3517 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3519 *(p
++)= s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3520 /* length of OCSP response */
3521 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3522 /* actual response */
3523 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3524 /* number of bytes to write */
3525 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3526 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3530 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3531 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3534 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3535 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3536 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3537 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3540 int proto_len
, padding_len
;
3542 const unsigned char *p
;
3544 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3545 * extension in their ClientHello */
3546 if (!s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
3548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION
);
3552 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3553 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
,
3554 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
,
3556 514, /* See the payload format below */
3562 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3563 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3564 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3565 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
3567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
3572 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3574 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3576 /* The payload looks like:
3578 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3579 * uint8 padding_len;
3580 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3583 if (proto_len
+ 2 > s
->init_num
)
3585 padding_len
= p
[proto_len
+ 1];
3586 if (proto_len
+ padding_len
+ 2 != s
->init_num
)
3589 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len
);
3590 if (!s
->next_proto_negotiated
)
3592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3595 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, p
+ 1, proto_len
);
3596 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= proto_len
;