Reorder configuration file reading.

[shishi.git] / doc / specifications / draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-31.txt

NETWORK WORKING GROUP                                             L. Zhu
Internet-Draft                                     Microsoft Corporation
Expires: June 24, 2006                                           B. Tung
                                      USC Information Sciences Institute
                                                       December 21, 2005


     Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos
                   draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-31

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 24, 2006.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

Abstract

   This document describes protocol extensions (hereafter called PKINIT)
   to the Kerberos protocol specification.  These extensions provide a
   method for integrating public key cryptography into the initial
   authentication exchange, by using asymmetric-key signature and/or
   encryption algorithms in pre-authentication data fields.





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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Conventions Used in This Document  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  Definitions, Requirements, and Constants . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.1.1.  Required Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.1.2.  Defined Message and Encryption Types . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.1.3.  Algorithm Identifiers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.2.  PKINIT Pre-authentication Syntax and Use . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.2.1.  Generation of Client Request . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.2.2.  Receipt of Client Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       3.2.3.  Generation of KDC Reply  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       3.2.4.  Receipt of KDC Reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     3.3.  Interoperability Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     3.4.  KDC Indication of PKINIT Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   4.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   5.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
   Appendix A.  PKINIT ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
   Appendix B.  Test Vectors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
   Appendix C.  Miscellaneous Information about Microsoft Windows
                PKINIT Implementations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 41























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1.  Introduction

   The Kerberos V5 protocol [RFC4120] involves use of a trusted third
   party known as the Key Distribution Center (KDC) to negotiate shared
   session keys between clients and services and provide mutual
   authentication between them.

   The corner-stone of Kerberos V5 is the Ticket and the Authenticator.
   A Ticket encapsulates a symmetric key (the ticket session key) in an
   envelope (a public message) intended for a specific service.  The
   contents of the Ticket are encrypted with a symmetric key shared
   between the service principal and the issuing KDC.  The encrypted
   part of the Ticket contains the client principal name, amongst other
   items.  An Authenticator is a record that can be shown to have been
   recently generated using the ticket session key in the associated
   Ticket.  The ticket session key is known by the client who requested
   the ticket.  The contents of the Authenticator are encrypted with the
   associated ticket session key.  The encrypted part of an
   Authenticator contains a timestamp and the client principal name,
   amongst other items.

   As shown in Figure 1 below, the Kerberos V5 protocol consists of the
   following message exchanges between the client and the KDC, and the
   client and the application service:

    - The Authentication Service (AS) Exchange

      The client obtains an "initial" ticket from the Kerberos
      authentication server (AS), typically a Ticket Granting Ticket
      (TGT).  The AS-REQ message and the AS-REP message are the request
      and the reply message respectively between the client and the AS.

    - The Ticket Granting Service (TGS) Exchange

      The client subsequently uses the TGT to authenticate and request a
      service ticket for a particular service, from the Kerberos ticket-
      granting server (TGS).  The TGS-REQ message and the TGS-REP
      message are the request and the reply message respectively between
      the client and the TGS.

    - The Client/Server Authentication Protocol (AP) Exchange

      The client then makes a request with an AP-REQ message, consisting
      of a service ticket and an authenticator that certifies the
      client's possession of the ticket session key.  The server may
      optionally reply with an AP-REP message.  AP exchanges typically
      negotiate session specific symmetric keys.




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   Usually, the AS and TGS are integrated in a single device also known
   as the KDC.

      Figure 1:  The Message Exchanges in the Kerberos V5 Protocol

                          +--------------+
               +--------->|  KDC         |
       AS-REQ /   +-------|              |
             /   /        +--------------+
            /   /          ^           |
           /    |AS-REP   /            |
          |     |        / TGS-REQ     + TGS-REP
          |     |       /             /
          |     |      /             /
          |     |     /   +---------+
          |     |    /   /
          |     |   /   /
          |     |  /   /
          |     v /   v
         ++-------+------+             +-----------------+
         |  Client       +------------>|  Application    |
         |               |    AP-REQ   |  Server         |
         |               |<------------|                 |
         +---------------+    AP-REP   +-----------------+

   In the AS exchange, the KDC reply contains the ticket session key,
   amongst other items, that is encrypted using a key (the AS reply key)
   shared between the client and the KDC.  The AS reply key is typically
   derived from the client's password for human users.  Therefore for
   human users the attack resistance strength of the Kerberos protocol
   is no stronger than the strength of their passwords.

   The use of asymmetric cryptography in the form of X.509 certificates
   [RFC3280] is popular for facilitating non-repudiation and perfect
   secrecy.  An established Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) provides key
   management and key distribution mechanisms that can be used to
   establish authentication and secure communication.  Adding public-key
   cryptography to Kerberos provides a nice congruence to public-key
   protocols, obviates the human users' burden to manage strong
   passwords, and allows Kerberized applications to take advantage of
   existing key services and identity management.

   The advantage afforded by the Kerberos TGT is that the client exposes
   his long-term secrets only once.  The TGT and its associated session
   key can then be used for any subsequent service ticket requests.  One
   result of this is that all further authentication is independent of
   the method by which the initial authentication was performed.
   Consequently, initial authentication provides a convenient place to



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   integrate public-key cryptography into Kerberos authentication.  In
   addition, the use of symmetric cryptography after the initial
   exchange is preferred for performance.

   This document describes the methods and data formats using which the
   client and the KDC can use public and private key pairs to mutually
   authenticate in the AS exchange and negotiate the AS reply key, known
   only by the client and the KDC, to encrypt the AS-REP sent by the
   KDC.


2.  Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   In this protocol, both the client and the KDC have a public-private
   key pair in order to prove their identities to each other over the
   open network.  The term "signature key" is used to refer to the
   private key of the key pair being used.

   The encryption key used to encrypt the enc-part field of the KDC-REP
   in the AS-REP [RFC4120] is referred to as the AS reply key.

   An empty sequence in an optional field can be either included or
   omitted: both encodings are permitted and considered equivalent.

   The term "Modular Exponential Diffie-Hellman" is used to refer to the
   Diffie-Hellman key exchange as described in [RFC2631], in order to
   differentiate it from other equivalent representations of the same
   key agreement algorithm.


3.  Extensions

   This section describes extensions to [RFC4120] for supporting the use
   of public-key cryptography in the initial request for a ticket.

   Briefly, this document defines the following extensions to [RFC4120]:

   1. The client indicates the use of public-key authentication by
      including a special preauthenticator in the initial request.  This
      preauthenticator contains the client's public-key data and a
      signature.






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   2. The KDC tests the client's request against its authentication
      policy and trusted Certification Authorities (CAs).

   3. If the request passes the verification tests, the KDC replies as
      usual, but the reply is encrypted using either:

      a. a key generated through a Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange
         [RFC2631] [IEEE1363] with the client, signed using the KDC's
         signature key; or

      b. a symmetric encryption key, signed using the KDC's signature
         key and encrypted using the client's public key.

      Any keying material required by the client to obtain the
      encryption key for decrypting the KDC reply is returned in a pre-
      authentication field accompanying the usual reply.

   4. The client validates the KDC's signature, obtains the encryption
      key, decrypts the reply, and then proceeds as usual.

   Section 3.1 of this document enumerates the required algorithms and
   necessary extension message types.  Section 3.2 describes the
   extension messages in greater detail.

3.1.  Definitions, Requirements, and Constants

3.1.1.  Required Algorithms

   All PKINIT implementations MUST support the following algorithms:

   o  AS reply key enctype: aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 and aes256-cts-hmac-
      sha1-96 [RFC3962].

   o  Signature algorithm: sha-1WithRSAEncryption [RFC3279].

   o  AS reply key delivery method: Diffie-Hellman key exchange
      [RFC2631].

   In addition, implementations of this specification MUST be capable of
   processing the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension and the id-pkinit-
   san (as defined in Section 3.2.2) otherName of the Subject
   Alternative Name (SAN) extension in X.509 certificates [RFC3280], if
   present.

3.1.2.  Defined Message and Encryption Types

   PKINIT makes use of the following new pre-authentication types:




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       PA_PK_AS_REQ                                 16
       PA_PK_AS_REP                                 17

   PKINIT also makes use of the following new authorization data type:

       AD_INITIAL_VERIFIED_CAS                       9

   PKINIT introduces the following new error codes:

       KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED                   62
       KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG                          64
       KDC_ERR_DH_KEY_PARAMETERS_NOT_ACCEPTED       65
       KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE              70
       KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE                  71
       KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE                  72
       KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN            73
       KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH                 75
       KDC_ERR_INCONSISTENT_KEY_PURPOSE             77
       KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_CERT_NOT_ACCEPTED          78
       KDC_ERR_HASH_IN_KDF_NOT_ACCEPTED             79
       KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_SIGNED_DATA_NOT_ACCEPTED   80

   PKINIT uses the following typed data types for errors:

       TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS                       104
       TD_INVALID_CERTIFICATES                     105
       TD_DH_PARAMETERS                            109

   The ASN.1 module for all structures defined in this document (plus
   IMPORT statements for all imported structures) is given in
   Appendix A.

   All structures defined in or imported into this document MUST be
   encoded using Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X680] [X690]
   (unless otherwise noted).  All data structures carried in OCTET
   STRINGs must be encoded according to the rules specified in
   corresponding specifications.

   Interoperability note: Some implementations may not be able to decode
   wrapped CMS objects encoded with BER; specifically, they may not be
   able to decode indefinite length encodings.  To maximize
   interoperability, implementers SHOULD encode CMS objects used in
   PKINIT with DER.

3.1.3.  Algorithm Identifiers

   PKINIT does not define, but does make use of, the following algorithm
   identifiers.



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   PKINIT uses the following algorithm identifier(s) for Modular
   Exponential Diffie-Hellman key agreement [RFC2631] [RFC3279]:

       dhpublicnumber (as described in [RFC3279])

   PKINIT uses the following signature algorithm identifiers as defined
   in [RFC3279]:

       sha-1WithRSAEncryption (RSA with SHA1)
       md5WithRSAEncryption   (RSA with MD5)
       id-dsa-with-sha1       (DSA with SHA1)

   PKINIT uses the following encryption algorithm identifiers as defined
   in [RFC3447] for encrypting the temporary key with a public key:

       rsaEncryption
       id-RSAES-OAEP

   PKINIT uses the following algorithm identifiers [RFC3370] [RFC3565]
   for encrypting the AS reply key with the temporary key:

       des-ede3-cbc (three-key 3DES, CBC mode, as defined in [RFC3370])
       rc2-cbc       (RC2, CBC mode, as defined in [RFC3370])
       id-aes256-CBC (AES-256, CBC mode, as defined in [RFC3565])

   PKINIT defines the following encryption types, for use in the etype
   field of the AS-REQ [RFC4120] message to indicate acceptance of the
   corresponding algorithms that can used by Cryptographic Message
   Syntax (CMS) [RFC3852] messages in the reply:

       id-dsa-with-sha1-CmsOID                       9
          -- Indicates that the client supports id-dsa-with-sha1.
       md5WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID                  10
          -- Indicates that the client supports md5WithRSAEncryption.
       sha-1WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID                11
          -- Indicates that the client supports sha-1WithRSAEncryption.
       rc2-cbc-EnvOID                               12
          -- Indicates that the client supports rc2-cbc.
       rsaEncryption-EnvOID                         13
          -- Indicates that the client supports rsaEncryption.
       id-RSAES-OAEP-EnvOID                         14
          -- Indicates that the client supports id-RSAES-OAEP.
       des-ede3-cbc-EnvOID                          15
          -- Indicates that the client supports des-ede3-cbc.







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3.2.  PKINIT Pre-authentication Syntax and Use

   This section defines the syntax and use of the various pre-
   authentication fields employed by PKINIT.

3.2.1.  Generation of Client Request

   The initial authentication request (AS-REQ) is sent as per [RFC4120];
   in addition, a pre-authentication data element, whose padata-type is
   PA_PK_AS_REQ and whose padata-value contains the DER encoding of the
   type PA-PK-AS-REQ, is included.

       PA-PK-AS-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {
          signedAuthPack          [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING,
                   -- Contains a CMS type ContentInfo encoded
                   -- according to [RFC3852].
                   -- The contentType field of the type ContentInfo
                   -- is id-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2),
                   -- and the content field is a SignedData.
                   -- The eContentType field for the type SignedData is
                   -- id-pkinit-authData (1.3.6.1.5.2.3.1), and the
                   -- eContent field contains the DER encoding of the
                   -- type AuthPack.
                   -- AuthPack is defined below.
          trustedCertifiers       [1] SEQUENCE OF
                      ExternalPrincipalIdentifier OPTIONAL,
                   -- Contains a list of CAs, trusted by the client,
                   -- that can be used to certify the KDC.
                   -- Each ExternalPrincipalIdentifier identifies a CA
                   -- or a CA certificate (thereby its public key).
                   -- The information contained in the
                   -- trustedCertifiers SHOULD be used by the KDC as
                   -- hints to guide its selection of an appropriate
                   -- certificate chain to return to the client.
          kdcPkId                 [2] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING
                                      OPTIONAL,
                   -- Contains a CMS type SignerIdentifier encoded
                   -- according to [RFC3852].
                   -- Identifies, if present, a particular KDC
                   -- public key that the client already has.
          ...
       }

       DHNonce ::= OCTET STRING

       ExternalPrincipalIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
          subjectName            [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
                   -- Contains a PKIX type Name encoded according to



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                   -- [RFC3280].
                   -- Identifies the certificate subject by the
                   -- distinguished subject name.
                   -- REQUIRED when there is a distinguished subject
                   -- name present in the certificate.
         issuerAndSerialNumber   [1] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
                   -- Contains a CMS type IssuerAndSerialNumber encoded
                   -- according to [RFC3852].
                   -- Identifies a certificate of the subject.
                   -- REQUIRED for TD-INVALID-CERTIFICATES and
                   -- TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS.
         subjectKeyIdentifier    [2] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
                   -- Identifies the subject's public key by a key
                   -- identifier.  When an X.509 certificate is
                   -- referenced, this key identifier matches the X.509
                   -- subjectKeyIdentifier extension value.  When other
                   -- certificate formats are referenced, the documents
                   -- that specify the certificate format and their use
                   -- with the CMS must include details on matching the
                   -- key identifier to the appropriate certificate
                   -- field.
                   -- RECOMMENDED for TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS.
          ...
       }

       AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {
          pkAuthenticator         [0] PKAuthenticator,
          clientPublicValue       [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
                   -- Type SubjectPublicKeyInfo is defined in
                   -- [RFC3280].
                   -- Specifies Diffie-Hellman domain parameters
                   -- and the client's public key value [IEEE1363].
                   -- The DH public key value is encoded as a BIT
                   -- STRING according to [RFC3279].
                   -- This field is present only if the client wishes
                   -- to use the Diffie-Hellman key agreement method.
          supportedCMSTypes       [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
                                      OPTIONAL,
                   -- Type AlgorithmIdentifier is defined in
                   -- [RFC3280].
                   -- List of CMS encryption types supported by the
                   -- client in order of (decreasing) preference.
          clientDHNonce           [3] DHNonce OPTIONAL,
                   -- Present only if the client indicates that it
                   -- wishes to reuse DH keys or to allow the KDC to
                   -- do so (see Section 3.2.3.1).
          ...
       }



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       PKAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE {
          cusec                   [0] INTEGER (0..999999),
          ctime                   [1] KerberosTime,
                   -- cusec and ctime are used as in [RFC4120], for
                   -- replay prevention.
          nonce                   [2] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
                   -- Chosen randomly;  This nonce does not need to
                   -- match with the nonce in the KDC-REQ-BODY.
          paChecksum              [3] OCTET STRING,
                   -- Contains the SHA1 checksum, performed over
                   -- KDC-REQ-BODY.
          ...
       }

   The ContentInfo [RFC3852] structure contained in the signedAuthPack
   field of the type PA-PK-AS-REQ is encoded according to [RFC3852] and
   is filled out as follows:

   1.  The contentType field of the type ContentInfo is id-signedData
       (as defined in [RFC3852]), and the content field is a SignedData
       (as defined in [RFC3852]).

   2.  The eContentType field for the type SignedData is id-pkinit-
       authData: { iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) authData(1) }.  Notes to CMS
       implementers: the signed attribute content-type MUST be present
       in this SignedData instance and its value is id-pkinit-authData
       according to [RFC3852].

   3.  The eContent field for the type SignedData contains the DER
       encoding of the type AuthPack.

   4.  The signerInfos field of the type SignedData contains a single
       signerInfo, which contains the signature over the type AuthPack.

   5.  The AuthPack structure contains a PKAuthenticator, the client
       public key information, the CMS encryption types supported by the
       client and a DHNonce.  The pkAuthenticator field certifies to the
       KDC that the client has recent knowledge of the signing key that
       authenticates the client.  The clientPublicValue field specifies
       Diffie-Hellman domain parameters and the client's public key
       value.  The DH public key value is encoded as a BIT STRING
       according to [RFC3279].  The clientPublicValue field is present
       only if the client wishes to use the Diffie-Hellman key agreement
       method.  The supportedCMSTypes field specifies the list of CMS
       encryption types supported by the client in order of (decreasing)
       preference.  The clientDHNonce field is described later in this
       section.



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   6.  The ctime field in the PKAuthenticator structure contains the
       current time on the client's host, and the cusec field contains
       the microsecond part of the client's timestamp.  The ctime and
       cusec fields are used together to specify a reasonably accurate
       timestamp [RFC4120].  The nonce field is chosen randomly.  The
       paChecksum field contains a SHA1 checksum that is performed over
       the KDC-REQ-BODY [RFC4120].

   7.  The certificates field of the type SignedData contains
       certificates intended to facilitate certification path
       construction, so that the KDC can verify the signature over the
       type AuthPack.  For path validation, these certificates SHOULD be
       sufficient to construct at least one certification path from the
       client certificate to one trust anchor acceptable by the KDC
       [RFC4158].  The client MUST be capable of including such a set of
       certificates if configured to do so.  The certificates field MUST
       NOT contain "root" CA certificates.

   8.  The client's Diffie-Hellman public value (clientPublicValue) is
       included if and only if the client wishes to use the Diffie-
       Hellman key agreement method.  The Diffie-Hellman domain
       parameters [IEEE1363] for the client's public key are specified
       in the algorithm field of the type SubjectPublicKeyInfo [RFC3279]
       and the client's Diffie-Hellman public key value is mapped to a
       subjectPublicKey (a BIT STRING) according to [RFC3279].  When
       using the Diffie-Hellman key agreement method, implementations
       MUST support Oakley 1024-bit Modular Exponential (MODP) well-
       known group 2 [RFC2412] and Oakley 2048-bit MODP well-known group
       14 [RFC3526], and SHOULD support Oakley 4096-bit MODP well-known
       group 16 [RFC3526].

       The Diffie-Hellman field size should be chosen so as to provide
       sufficient cryptographic security [RFC3766].

       When MODP Diffie-Hellman is used, the exponents should have at
       least twice as many bits as the symmetric keys that will be
       derived from them [ODL99].

   9.  The client may wish to reuse DH keys or to allow the KDC to do so
       (see Section 3.2.3.1).  If so, then the client includes the
       clientDHNonce field.  This nonce string MUST be as long as the
       longest key length of the symmetric key types that the client
       supports.  This nonce MUST be chosen randomly.

   The ExternalPrincipalIdentifier structure is used in this document to
   identify the subject's public key thereby the subject principal.
   This structure is filled out as follows:




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   1.  The subjectName field contains a PKIX type Name encoded according
       to [RFC3280].  This field identifies the certificate subject by
       the distinguished subject name.  This field is REQUIRED when
       there is a distinguished subject name present in the certificate
       being used.

   2.  The issuerAndSerialNumber field contains a CMS type
       IssuerAndSerialNumber encoded according to [RFC3852].  This field
       identifies a certificate of the subject.  This field is REQUIRED
       for TD-INVALID-CERTIFICATES and TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS (both
       structures are defined in Section 3.2.2).

   3.  The subjectKeyIdentifier [RFC3852] field identifies the subject's
       public key by a key identifier.  When an X.509 certificate is
       referenced, this key identifier matches the X.509
       subjectKeyIdentifier extension value.  When other certificate
       formats are referenced, the documents that specify the
       certificate format and their use with the CMS must include
       details on matching the key identifier to the appropriate
       certificate field.  This field is RECOMMENDED for TD-TRUSTED-
       CERTIFIERS (as defined in Section 3.2.2).

   The trustedCertifiers field of the type PA-PK-AS-REQ contains a list
   of CAs, trusted by the client, that can be used to certify the KDC.
   Each ExternalPrincipalIdentifier identifies a CA or a CA certificate
   (thereby its public key).

   The kdcPkId field of the type PA-PK-AS-REQ contains a CMS type
   SignerIdentifier encoded according to [RFC3852].  This field
   identifies, if present, a particular KDC public key that the client
   already has.

3.2.2.  Receipt of Client Request

   Upon receiving the client's request, the KDC validates it.  This
   section describes the steps that the KDC MUST (unless otherwise
   noted) take in validating the request.

   The KDC verifies the client's signature in the signedAuthPack field
   according to [RFC3852].

   If, while validating the client's X.509 certificate [RFC3280], the
   KDC cannot build a certification path to validate the client's
   certificate, it sends back a KRB-ERROR [RFC4120] message with the
   code KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE.  The accompanying e-data for
   this error message is a TYPED-DATA (as defined in [RFC4120]) that
   contains an element whose data-type is TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS, and
   whose data-value contains the DER encoding of the type TD-TRUSTED-



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   CERTIFIERS:

       TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS ::= SEQUENCE OF
                      ExternalPrincipalIdentifier
                   -- Identifies a list of CAs trusted by the KDC.
                   -- Each ExternalPrincipalIdentifier identifies a CA
                   -- or a CA certificate (thereby its public key).

   Each ExternalPrincipalIdentifier (as defined in Section 3.2.1) in the
   TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS structure identifies a CA or a CA certificate
   (thereby its public key) trusted by the KDC.

   Upon receiving this error message, the client SHOULD retry only if it
   has a different set of certificates (from those of the previous
   requests) that form a certification path (or a partial path) from one
   of the trust anchors acceptable by the KDC to its own certificate.

   If, while processing the certification path, the KDC determines that
   the signature on one of the certificates in the signedAuthPack field
   is invalid, it returns a KRB-ERROR [RFC4120] message with the code
   KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE.  The accompanying e-data for this error
   message is a TYPED-DATA that contains an element whose data-type is
   TD_INVALID_CERTIFICATES, and whose data-value contains the DER
   encoding of the type TD-INVALID-CERTIFICATES:

       TD-INVALID-CERTIFICATES ::= SEQUENCE OF
                      ExternalPrincipalIdentifier
                   -- Each ExternalPrincipalIdentifier identifies a
                   -- certificate (sent by the client) with an invalid
                   -- signature.

   Each ExternalPrincipalIdentifier (as defined in Section 3.2.1) in the
   TD-INVALID-CERTIFICATES structure identifies a certificate (that was
   sent by the client) with an invalid signature.

   If more than one X.509 certificate signature is invalid, the KDC MAY
   include one IssuerAndSerialNumber per invalid signature within the
   TD-INVALID-CERTIFICATES.

   The client's X.509 certificate is validated according to [RFC3280].

   Based on local policy, the KDC may also check whether any X.509
   certificates in the certification path validating the client's
   certificate have been revoked.  If any of them have been revoked, the
   KDC MUST return an error message with the code
   KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE; if the KDC attempts to determine the
   revocation status but is unable to do so, it SHOULD return an error
   message with the code KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN.  The



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   certificate or certificates affected are identified exactly as for
   the error code KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE (see above).

   Note that the TD_INVALID_CERTIFICATES error data is only used to
   identify invalid certificates sent by the client in the request.

   The client's public key is then used to verify the signature.  If the
   signature fails to verify, the KDC MUST return an error message with
   the code KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG.  There is no accompanying e-data for
   this error message.

   In addition to validating the client's signature, the KDC MUST also
   check that the client's public key used to verify the client's
   signature is bound to the client's principal name as specified in the
   AS-REQ as follows:

   1. If the KDC has its own binding between either the client's
      signature-verification public key or the client's certificate and
      the client's Kerberos principal name, it uses that binding.

   2. Otherwise, if the client's X.509 certificate contains a Subject
      Alternative Name (SAN) extension carrying a KRB5PrincipalName
      (defined below) in the otherName field of the type GeneralName
      [RFC3280], it binds the client's X.509 certificate to that name.

      The type of the otherName field is AnotherName.  The type-id field
      of the type AnotherName is id-pkinit-san:

       id-pkinit-san OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
         { iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2)
           x509SanAN (2) }

      And the value field of the type AnotherName is a
      KRB5PrincipalName.

       KRB5PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE {
           realm                   [0] Realm,
           principalName           [1] PrincipalName
       }

   If the KDC does not have its own binding and there is no
   KRB5PrincipalName name present in the client's X.509 certificate, or
   if the Kerberos name in the request does not match the
   KRB5PrincipalName in the client's X.509 certificate (including the
   realm name), the KDC MUST return an error message with the code
   KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH.  There is no accompanying e-data for
   this error message.




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   Even if the certification path is validated and the certificate is
   mapped to the client's principal name, the KDC may decide not to
   accept the client's certificate, depending on local policy.

   The KDC MAY require the presence of an Extended Key Usage (EKU)
   KeyPurposeId [RFC3280] id-pkinit-KPClientAuth in the extensions field
   of the client's X.509 certificate:

       id-pkinit-KPClientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
         { iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2)
           pkinit(3) keyPurposeClientAuth(4) }
              -- PKINIT client authentication.
              -- Key usage bits that MUST be consistent:
              -- digitalSignature.

   The digitalSignature key usage bit [RFC3280] MUST be asserted when
   the intended purpose of the client's X.509 certificate is restricted
   with the id-pkinit-KPClientAuth EKU.

   If this EKU KeyPurposeId is required but it is not present or if the
   client certificate is restricted not to be used for PKINIT client
   authentication per Section 4.2.1.13 of [RFC3280], the KDC MUST return
   an error message of the code KDC_ERR_INCONSISTENT_KEY_PURPOSE.  There
   is no accompanying e-data for this error message.  KDCs implementing
   this requirement SHOULD also accept the EKU KeyPurposeId id-ms-kp-sc-
   logon (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2) as meeting the requirement, as there
   are a large number of X.509 client certificates deployed for use with
   PKINIT which have this EKU.

   As a matter of local policy, the KDC MAY decide to reject requests on
   the basis of the absence or presence of other specific EKU OID's.

   If the digest algorithm used in generating the CA signature for the
   public key in any certificate of the request is not acceptable by the
   KDC, the KDC MUST return a KRB-ERROR [RFC4120] message with the code
   KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_CERT_NOT_ACCEPTED.  The accompanying e-data MUST be
   encoded in TYPED-DATA although none is defined at this point.

   If the client's public key is not accepted with reasons other than
   what were specified above, the KDC returns a KRB-ERROR [RFC4120]
   message with the code KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED.  There is no
   accompanying e-data currently defined for this error message.

   The KDC MUST check the timestamp to ensure that the request is not a
   replay, and that the time skew falls within acceptable limits.  The
   recommendations for clock skew times in [RFC4120] apply here.  If the
   check fails, the KDC MUST return error code KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT or
   KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW, respectively.



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   If the clientPublicValue is filled in, indicating that the client
   wishes to use the Diffie-Hellman key agreement method, the KDC SHOULD
   check to see if the key parameters satisfy its policy.  If they do
   not, it MUST return an error message with the code
   KDC_ERR_DH_KEY_PARAMETERS_NOT_ACCEPTED.  The accompanying e-data is a
   TYPED-DATA that contains an element whose data-type is
   TD_DH_PARAMETERS, and whose data-value contains the DER encoding of
   the type TD-DH-PARAMETERS:

       TD-DH-PARAMETERS ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
                   -- Each AlgorithmIdentifier specifies a set of
                   -- Diffie-Hellman domain parameters [IEEE1363].
                   -- This list is in decreasing preference order.

   TD-DH-PARAMETERS contains a list of Diffie-Hellman domain parameters
   that the KDC supports in decreasing preference order, from which the
   client SHOULD pick one to retry the request.

   The AlgorithmIdentifier structure is defined in [RFC3280] and is
   filled in according to [RFC3279].  More specifically Section 2.3.3 of
   [RFC3279] describes how to fill in the AlgorithmIdentifier structure
   in the case where MODP Diffie-Hellman key exchange is used.

   If the client included a kdcPkId field in the PA-PK-AS-REQ and the
   KDC does not possess the corresponding key, the KDC MUST ignore the
   kdcPkId field as if the client did not include one.

   If the digest algorithm used by the id-pkinit-authData is not
   acceptable by the KDC, the KDC MUST return a KRB-ERROR [RFC4120]
   message with the code KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_SIGNED_DATA_NOT_ACCEPTED.
   The accompanying e-data MUST be encoded in TYPED-DATA although none
   is defined at this point.

3.2.3.  Generation of KDC Reply

   Assuming that the client's request has been properly validated, the
   KDC proceeds as per [RFC4120], except as follows.

   The KDC MUST set the initial flag and include an authorization data
   element of ad-type [RFC4120] AD_INITIAL_VERIFIED_CAS in the issued
   ticket.  The ad-data [RFC4120] field contains the DER encoding of the
   type AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS:

       AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS ::= SEQUENCE OF
                      ExternalPrincipalIdentifier
                   -- Identifies the certification path based on which
                   -- the client certificate was validated.
                   -- Each ExternalPrincipalIdentifier identifies a CA



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                   -- or a CA certificate (thereby its public key).

   The AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS structure identifies the certification
   path based on which the client certificate was validated.  Each
   ExternalPrincipalIdentifier (as defined in Section 3.2.1) in the AD-
   INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS structure identifies a CA or a CA certificate
   (thereby its public key).

   The AS wraps any AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS data in AD-IF-RELEVANT
   containers if the list of CAs satisfies the AS' realm's local policy
   (this corresponds to the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED ticket flag
   [RFC4120]).  Furthermore, any TGS MUST copy such authorization data
   from tickets used within a PA-TGS-REQ of the TGS-REQ into the
   resulting ticket.  If the list of CAs satisfies the local KDC's
   realm's policy, the TGS MAY wrap the data into the AD-IF-RELEVANT
   container, otherwise it MAY unwrap the authorization data out of the
   AD-IF-RELEVANT container.

   Application servers that understand this authorization data type
   SHOULD apply local policy to determine whether a given ticket bearing
   such a type *not* contained within an AD-IF-RELEVANT container is
   acceptable.  (This corresponds to the AP server checking the
   transited field when the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag has not been
   set [RFC4120].)  If such a data type is contained within an AD-IF-
   RELEVANT container, AP servers MAY apply local policy to determine
   whether the authorization data is acceptable.

   A pre-authentication data element, whose padata-type is PA_PK_AS_REP
   and whose padata-value contains the DER encoding of the type PA-PK-
   AS-REP (defined below), is included in the AS-REP [RFC4120].

       PA-PK-AS-REP ::= CHOICE {
          dhInfo                  [0] DHRepInfo,
                   -- Selected when Diffie-Hellman key exchange is
                   -- used.
          encKeyPack              [1] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING,
                   -- Selected when public key encryption is used.
                   -- Contains a CMS type ContentInfo encoded
                   -- according to [RFC3852].
                   -- The contentType field of the type ContentInfo is
                   -- id-envelopedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.3).
                   -- The content field is an EnvelopedData.
                   -- The contentType field for the type EnvelopedData
                   -- is id-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2).
                   -- The eContentType field for the inner type
                   -- SignedData (when unencrypted) is
                   -- id-pkinit-rkeyData (1.3.6.1.5.2.3.3) and the
                   -- eContent field contains the DER encoding of the



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                   -- type ReplyKeyPack.
                   -- ReplyKeyPack is defined in Section 3.2.3.2.
          ...
       }

       DHRepInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
          dhSignedData            [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING,
                   -- Contains a CMS type ContentInfo encoded according
                   -- to [RFC3852].
                   -- The contentType field of the type ContentInfo is
                   -- id-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2), and the
                   -- content field is a SignedData.
                   -- The eContentType field for the type SignedData is
                   -- id-pkinit-DHKeyData (1.3.6.1.5.2.3.2), and the
                   -- eContent field contains the DER encoding of the
                   -- type KDCDHKeyInfo.
                   -- KDCDHKeyInfo is defined below.
          serverDHNonce           [1] DHNonce OPTIONAL,
                   -- Present if and only if dhKeyExpiration is
                   -- present in the KDCDHKeyInfo.
          ...
       }

       KDCDHKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
          subjectPublicKey        [0] BIT STRING,
                   -- The KDC's DH public key.
                   -- The DH public key value is encoded as a BIT
                   -- STRING according to [RFC3279].
          nonce                   [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
                   -- Contains the nonce in the pkAuthenticator field
                   -- in the request if the DH keys are NOT reused,
                   -- 0 otherwise.
          dhKeyExpiration         [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
                   -- Expiration time for KDC's key pair,
                   -- present if and only if the DH keys are reused.
                   -- If present, the KDC's DH public key MUST not be
                   -- used past the point of this expiration time.
                   -- If this field is omitted then the serverDHNonce
                   -- field MUST also be omitted.
          ...
       }

   The content of the AS-REP is otherwise unchanged from [RFC4120].  The
   KDC encrypts the reply as usual, but not with the client's long-term
   key.  Instead, it encrypts it with either a shared key derived from a
   Diffie-Hellman exchange, or a generated encryption key.  The contents
   of the PA-PK-AS-REP indicate which key delivery method is used.




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   In addition, the lifetime of the ticket returned by the KDC MUST NOT
   exceed that of the client's public-private key pair.  The ticket
   lifetime, however, can be shorter than that of the client's public-
   private key pair.  For the implementations of this specification, the
   lifetime of the client's public-private key pair is the validity
   period in X.509 certificates [RFC3280], unless configured otherwise.

3.2.3.1.  Using Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

   In this case, the PA-PK-AS-REP contains a DHRepInfo structure.

   The ContentInfo [RFC3852] structure for the dhSignedData field is
   filled in as follows:

   1.  The contentType field of the type ContentInfo is id-signedData
       (as defined in [RFC3852]), and the content field is a SignedData
       (as defined in [RFC3852]).

   2.  The eContentType field for the type SignedData is the OID value
       for id-pkinit-DHKeyData: { iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1)
       security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) DHKeyData(2) }.  Notes to CMS
       implementers: the signed attribute content-type MUST be present
       in this SignedData instance and its value is id-pkinit-DHKeyData
       according to [RFC3852].

   3.  The eContent field for the type SignedData contains the DER
       encoding of the type KDCDHKeyInfo.

   4.  The KDCDHKeyInfo structure contains the KDC's public key, a nonce
       and optionally the expiration time of the KDC's DH key being
       reused.  The subjectPublicKey field of the type KDCDHKeyInfo
       field identifies KDC's DH public key.  This DH public key value
       is encoded as a BIT STRING according to [RFC3279].  The nonce
       field contains the nonce in the pkAuthenticator field in the
       request if the DH keys are NOT reused.  The value of this nonce
       field is 0 if the DH keys are reused.  The dhKeyExpiration field
       is present if and only if the DH keys are reused.  If the
       dhKeyExpiration field is present, the KDC's public key in this
       KDCDHKeyInfo structure MUST NOT be used past the point of this
       expiration time.  If this field is omitted then the serverDHNonce
       field MUST also be omitted.

   5.  The signerInfos field of the type SignedData contains a single
       signerInfo, which contains the signature over the type
       KDCDHKeyInfo.






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   6.  The certificates field of the type SignedData contains
       certificates intended to facilitate certification path
       construction, so that the client can verify the KDC's signature
       over the type KDCDHKeyInfo.  The information contained in the
       trustedCertifiers in the request SHOULD be used by the KDC as
       hints to guide its selection of an appropriate certificate chain
       to return to the client.  This field may be left empty if the KDC
       public key specified by the kdcPkId field in the PA-PK-AS-REQ was
       used for signing.  Otherwise, for path validation, these
       certificates SHOULD be sufficient to construct at least one
       certification path from the KDC certificate to one trust anchor
       acceptable by the client [RFC4158].  The KDC MUST be capable of
       including such a set of certificates if configured to do so.  The
       certificates field MUST NOT contain "root" CA certificates.

   7.  If the client included the clientDHNonce field, then the KDC may
       choose to reuse its DH keys.  If the server reuses DH keys then
       it MUST include an expiration time in the dhKeyExpiration field.
       Past the point of the expiration time, the signature over the
       type DHRepInfo is considered expired/invalid.  When the server
       reuses DH keys then it MUST include a serverDHNonce at least as
       long as the length of keys for the symmetric encryption system
       used to encrypt the AS reply.  Note that including the
       serverDHNonce changes how the client and server calculate the key
       to use to encrypt the reply; see below for details.  The KDC
       SHOULD NOT reuse DH keys unless the clientDHNonce field is
       present in the request.

   The AS reply key is derived as follows:

   1. Both the KDC and the client calculate the shared secret value as
      follows:

      a) When MODP Diffie-Hellman is used, let DHSharedSecret be the
         shared secret value.  DHSharedSecret is the value ZZ as
         described in Section 2.1.1 of [RFC2631].

      DHSharedSecret is first padded with leading zeros such that the
      size of DHSharedSecret in octets is the same as that of the
      modulus, then represented as a string of octets in big-endian
      order.

      Implementation note: Both the client and the KDC can cache the
      triple (ya, yb, DHSharedSecret), where ya is the client's public
      key and yb is the KDC's public key.  If both ya and yb are the
      same in a later exchange, the cached DHSharedSecret can be used.





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   2. Let K be the key-generation seed length [RFC3961] of the AS reply
      key whose enctype is selected according to [RFC4120].

   3. Define the function octetstring2key() as follows:

           octetstring2key(x) == random-to-key(K-truncate(
                                    SHA1(0x00 | x) |
                                    SHA1(0x01 | x) |
                                    SHA1(0x02 | x) |
                                    ...
                                    ))

      where x is an octet string; | is the concatenation operator; 0x00,
      0x01, 0x02, etc., are each represented as a single octet; random-
      to-key() is an operation that generates a protocol key from a
      bitstring of length K; and K-truncate truncates its input to the
      first K bits.  Both K and random-to-key() are as defined in the
      kcrypto profile [RFC3961] for the enctype of the AS reply key.

   4. When DH keys are reused, let n_c be the clientDHNonce, and n_k be
      the serverDHNonce; otherwise, let both n_c and n_k be empty octet
      strings.

   5. The AS reply key k is:

           k = octetstring2key(DHSharedSecret | n_c | n_k)

   If the hash algorithm used in the key derivation function (currently
   only octetstring2key() is defined) is not acceptable by the KDC, the
   KDC MUST return a KRB-ERROR [RFC4120] message with the code
   KDC_ERR_HASH_IN_KDF_NOT_ACCEPTED.  The accompanying e-data MUST be
   encoded in TYPED-DATA although none is defined at this point.

3.2.3.2.  Using Public Key Encryption

   In this case, the PA-PK-AS-REP contains the encKeyPack field where
   the AS reply key is encrypted.

   The ContentInfo [RFC3852] structure for the encKeyPack field is
   filled in as follows:

   1.  The contentType field of the type ContentInfo is id-envelopedData
       (as defined in [RFC3852]), and the content field is an
       EnvelopedData (as defined in [RFC3852]).

   2.  The contentType field for the type EnvelopedData is id-
       signedData: { iso (1) member-body (2) us (840) rsadsi (113549)
       pkcs (1) pkcs7 (7) signedData (2) }.



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   3.  The eContentType field for the inner type SignedData (when
       decrypted from the encryptedContent field for the type
       EnvelopedData) is id-pkinit-rkeyData: { iso(1) org(3) dod(6)
       internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) rkeyData(3) }.
       Notes to CMS implementers: the signed attribute content-type MUST
       be present in this SignedData instance and its value is id-
       pkinit-rkeyData according to [RFC3852].

   4.  The eContent field for the inner type SignedData contains the DER
       encoding of the type ReplyKeyPack (as described below).

   5.  The signerInfos field of the inner type SignedData contains a
       single signerInfo, which contains the signature for the type
       ReplyKeyPack.

   6.  The certificates field of the inner type SignedData contains
       certificates intended to facilitate certification path
       construction, so that the client can verify the KDC's signature
       for the type ReplyKeyPack.  The information contained in the
       trustedCertifiers in the request SHOULD be used by the KDC as
       hints to guide its selection of an appropriate certificate chain
       to return to the client.  This field may be left empty if the KDC
       public key specified by the kdcPkId field in the PA-PK-AS-REQ was
       used for signing.  Otherwise, for path validation, these
       certificates SHOULD be sufficient to construct at least one
       certification path from the KDC certificate to one trust anchor
       acceptable by the client [RFC4158].  The KDC MUST be capable of
       including such a set of certificates if configured to do so.  The
       certificates field MUST NOT contain "root" CA certificates.

   7.  The recipientInfos field of the type EnvelopedData is a SET which
       MUST contain exactly one member of type KeyTransRecipientInfo.
       The encryptedKey of this member contains the temporary key which
       is encrypted using the client's public key.

   8.  The unprotectedAttrs or originatorInfo fields of the type
       EnvelopedData MAY be present.

   If there is a supportedCMSTypes field in the AuthPack, the KDC must
   check to see if it supports any of the listed types.  If it supports
   more than one of the types, the KDC SHOULD use the one listed first.
   If it does not support any of them, it MUST return an error message
   with the code KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP [RFC4120].

   Furthermore the KDC computes the checksum of the AS-REQ in the client
   request.  This checksum is performed over the type AS-REQ and the
   protocol key [RFC3961] of the checksum operation is the replyKey and
   the key usage number is 6.  If the replyKey's enctype is "newer"



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   [RFC4120] [RFC4121], the checksum operation is the required checksum
   operation [RFC3961] of that enctype.

       ReplyKeyPack ::= SEQUENCE {
          replyKey                [0] EncryptionKey,
                   -- Contains the session key used to encrypt the
                   -- enc-part field in the AS-REP, i.e. the
                   -- AS reply key.
          asChecksum              [1] Checksum,
                  -- Contains the checksum of the AS-REQ
                  -- corresponding to the containing AS-REP.
                  -- The checksum is performed over the type AS-REQ.
                  -- The protocol key [RFC3961] of the checksum is the
                  -- replyKey and the key usage number is 6.
                  -- If the replyKey's enctype is "newer" [RFC4120]
                  -- [RFC4121], the checksum is the required
                  -- checksum operation [RFC3961] for that enctype.
                  -- The client MUST verify this checksum upon receipt
                  -- of the AS-REP.
          ...
       }

   Implementations of this RSA encryption key delivery method are
   RECOMMENDED to support RSA keys at least 2048 bits in size.

3.2.4.  Receipt of KDC Reply

   Upon receipt of the KDC's reply, the client proceeds as follows.  If
   the PA-PK-AS-REP contains the dhSignedData field, the client derives
   the AS reply key using the same procedure used by the KDC as defined
   in Section 3.2.3.1.  Otherwise, the message contains the encKeyPack
   field, and the client decrypts and extracts the temporary key in the
   encryptedKey field of the member KeyTransRecipientInfo, and then uses
   that as the AS reply key.

   If the public key encryption method is used, the client MUST verify
   the asChecksum contained in the ReplyKeyPack.

   In either case, the client MUST verify the signature in the
   SignedData according to [RFC3852].  The KDC's X.509 certificate MUST
   be validated according to [RFC3280].  In addition, unless the client
   can otherwise verify that the public key used to verify the KDC's
   signature is bound to the KDC of the target realm, the KDC's X.509
   certificate MUST contain a Subject Alternative Name extension
   [RFC3280] carrying an AnotherName whose type-id is id-pkinit-san (as
   defined in Section 3.2.2) and whose value is a KRB5PrincipalName that
   matches the name of the TGS of the target realm (as defined in
   Section 7.3 of [RFC4120]).



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   Unless the client knows by some other means that the KDC certificate
   is intended for a Kerberos KDC, the client MUST require that the KDC
   certificate contains the EKU KeyPurposeId [RFC3280] id-pkinit-KPKdc:

       id-pkinit-KPKdc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
         { iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2)
           pkinit(3) keyPurposeKdc(5) }
              -- Signing KDC responses.
              -- Key usage bits that MUST be consistent:
              -- digitalSignature.

   The digitalSignature key usage bit [RFC3280] MUST be asserted when
   the intended purpose of the KDC's X.509 certificate is restricted
   with the id-pkinit-KPKdc EKU.

   If the KDC certificate contains the Kerberos TGS name encoded as an
   id-pkinit-san SAN, this certificate is certified by the issuing CA as
   a KDC certificate, therefore the id-pkinit-KPKdc EKU is not required.

   If all applicable checks are satisfied, the client then decrypts the
   enc-part field of the KDC-REP in the AS-REP using the AS reply key,
   and then proceeds as described in [RFC4120].

   Implementation note: CAs issuing KDC certificates SHOULD place all
   "short" and "fully-qualified" Kerberos realm names of the KDC (one
   per GeneralName [RFC3280]) into the KDC certificate to allow maximum
   flexibility.

3.3.  Interoperability Requirements

   The client MUST be capable of sending a set of certificates
   sufficient to allow the KDC to construct a certification path for the
   client's certificate, if the correct set of certificates is provided
   through configuration or policy.

   If the client sends all the X.509 certificates on a certification
   path to a trust anchor acceptable by the KDC, and the KDC can not
   verify the client's public key otherwise, the KDC MUST be able to
   process path validation for the client's certificate based on the
   certificates in the request.

   The KDC MUST be capable of sending a set of certificates sufficient
   to allow the client to construct a certification path for the KDC's
   certificate, if the correct set of certificates is provided through
   configuration or policy.

   If the KDC sends all the X.509 certificates on a certification path
   to a trust anchor acceptable by the client, and the client can not



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   verify the KDC's public key otherwise, the client MUST be able to
   process path validation for the KDC's certificate based on the
   certificates in the reply.

3.4.  KDC Indication of PKINIT Support

   If pre-authentication is required, but was not present in the
   request, per [RFC4120] an error message with the code
   KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED is returned and a METHOD-DATA object will be
   stored in the e-data field of the KRB-ERROR message to specify which
   pre-authentication mechanisms are acceptable.  The KDC can then
   indicate the support of PKINIT by including an empty element whose
   padata-type is PA_PK_AS_REQ in that METHOD-DATA object.

   Otherwise if it is required by the KDC's local policy that the client
   must be pre-authenticated using the pre-authentication mechanism
   specified in this document, but no PKINIT pre-authentication was
   present in the request, an error message with the code
   KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED SHOULD be returned.

   KDCs MUST leave the padata-value field of the PA_PK_AS_REQ element in
   the KRB-ERROR's METHOD-DATA empty (i.e., send a zero-length OCTET
   STRING), and clients MUST ignore this and any other value.  Future
   extensions to this protocol may specify other data to send instead of
   an empty OCTET STRING.


4.  Security Considerations

   Kerberos error messages are not integrity protected, as a result, the
   domain parameters sent by the KDC as TD-DH-PARAMETERS can be tampered
   with by an attacker so that the set of domain parameters selected
   could be either weaker or not mutually preferred.  Local policy can
   configure sets of domain parameters acceptable locally, or disallow
   the negotiation of DH domain parameters.

   The symmetric reply key size and Diffie-Hellman field size or RSA
   modulus size should be chosen so as to provide sufficient
   cryptographic security [RFC3766].

   When MODP Diffie-Hellman is used, the exponents should have at least
   twice as many bits as the symmetric keys that will be derived from
   them [ODL99].

   PKINIT raises certain security considerations beyond those that can
   be regulated strictly in protocol definitions.  We will address them
   in this section.




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   PKINIT extends the cross-realm model to the public-key
   infrastructure.  Users of PKINIT must understand security policies
   and procedures appropriate to the use of Public Key Infrastructures
   [RFC3280].

   In order to trust a KDC certificate that is certified by a CA as a
   KDC certificate for a target realm (for example, by asserting the TGS
   name of that Kerberos realm as an id-pkinit-san SAN and/or
   restricting the certificate usage by using the id-pkinit-KPKdc EKU,
   as described in Section 3.2.4), the client MUST verify that the KDC
   certificate's issuing CA is authorized to issue KDC certificates for
   that target realm.  Otherwise, the binding between the KDC
   certificate and the KDC of the target realm is not established.

   How to validate this authorization is a matter of local policy.  A
   way to achieve this is the configuration of specific sets of
   intermediary CAs and trust anchors, one of which must be on the KDC
   certificate's certification path [RFC3280]; and for each CA or trust
   anchor the realms for which it is allowed to issue certificates.

   In addition, if any CA is trusted to issue KDC certificates can also
   issue other kinds of certificates, then local policy must be able to
   distinguish between them: for example, it could require that KDC
   certificates contain the id-pkinit-KPKdc EKU or that the realm be
   specified with the id-pkinit-san SAN.

   It is the responsibility of the PKI administrators for an
   organization to ensure that KDC certificates are only issued to KDCs,
   and that clients can ascertain this using their local policy.

   Standard Kerberos allows the possibility of interactions between
   cryptosystems of varying strengths; this document adds interactions
   with public-key cryptosystems to Kerberos.  Some administrative
   policies may allow the use of relatively weak public keys.  Using
   such keys to wrap data encrypted under stronger conventional
   cryptosystems may be inappropriate.

   PKINIT requires keys for symmetric cryptosystems to be generated.
   Some such systems contain "weak" keys.  For recommendations regarding
   these weak keys, see [RFC4120].

   PKINIT allows the use of the same RSA key pair for encryption and
   signing when doing RSA encryption based key delivery.  This is not
   recommended usage of RSA keys [RFC3447], by using DH based key
   delivery this is avoided.

   Care should be taken in how certificates are chosen for the purposes
   of authentication using PKINIT.  Some local policies may require that



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   key escrow be used for certain certificate types.  Deployers of
   PKINIT should be aware of the implications of using certificates that
   have escrowed keys for the purposes of authentication.  Because
   signing only certificates are normally not escrowed, by using DH
   based key delivery this is avoided.

   PKINIT does not provide for a "return routability" test to prevent
   attackers from mounting a denial-of-service attack on the KDC by
   causing it to perform unnecessary and expensive public-key
   operations.  Strictly speaking, this is also true of standard
   Kerberos, although the potential cost is not as great, because
   standard Kerberos does not make use of public-key cryptography.  By
   using DH based key delivery and reusing DH keys, the necessary crypto
   processing cost per request can be minimized.

   The syntax for the AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS authorization data does
   permit empty SEQUENCEs to be encoded.  Such empty sequences may only
   be used if the KDC itself vouches for the user's certificate.

   When the Diffie-Hellman key exchange method is used, additional pre-
   authentication data [RFC4120] (in addition to the PA_PK_AS_REQ as
   defined in this specification) is not bound to the AS_REQ by the
   mechanisms discussed in this specification (meaning it may be dropped
   or added by attackers without being detected by either the client or
   the KDC).  Designers of additional pre-authentication data should
   take that into consideration if such additional pre-authentication
   data can be used in conjunction with the PA_PK_AS_REQ.  The future
   work of the Kerberos working group is expected to update the hash
   algorithms specified in this document and provide a generic mechanism
   to bind additional pre-authentication data with the accompanying
   AS_REQ.


5.  Acknowledgements

   The following people have made significant contributions to this
   draft: Paul Leach, Stefan Santesson, Sam Hartman, Love Hornquist
   Astrand, Ken Raeburn, Nicolas Williams, John Wray, Tom Yu, Jeffrey
   Hutzelman, David Cross, Dan Simon, Karthik Jaganathan, Chaskiel M
   Grundman and Jeffrey Altman.

   Andre Scedrov, Aaron D. Jaggard, Iliano Cervesato, Joe-Kai Tsay and
   Chris Walstad discovered a binding issue between the AS-REQ and AS-
   REP in draft -26, the asChecksum field was added as the result.

   Special thanks to Clifford Neuman, Matthew Hur, Sasha Medvinsky and
   Jonathan Trostle who wrote earlier versions of this document.




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   The authors are indebted to the Kerberos working group chair Jeffrey
   Hutzelman who kept track of various issues and was enormously helpful
   during the creation of this document.

   Some of the ideas on which this document is based arose during
   discussions over several years between members of the SAAG, the IETF
   CAT working group, and the PSRG, regarding integration of Kerberos
   and SPX.  Some ideas have also been drawn from the DASS system.
   These changes are by no means endorsed by these groups.  This is an
   attempt to revive some of the goals of those groups, and this
   document approaches those goals primarily from the Kerberos
   perspective.

   Lastly, comments from groups working on similar ideas in DCE have
   been invaluable.


6.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.


7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [IEEE1363]
              IEEE, "Standard Specifications for Public Key 
              Cryptography", IEEE 1363, 2000.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2412]  Orman, H., "The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol",
              RFC 2412, November 1998.

   [RFC2631]  Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
              RFC 2631, June 1999.

   [RFC3279]  Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
              Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.

   [RFC3280]  Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
              X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
              Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
              April 2002.



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   [RFC3370]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
              Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.

   [RFC3447]  Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
              Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
              Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.

   [RFC3526]  Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponential (MODP)
              Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
              RFC 3526, May 2003.

   [RFC3565]  Schaad, J., "Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
              Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax
              (CMS)", RFC 3565, July 2003.

   [RFC3766]  Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For
              Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", BCP 86,
              RFC 3766, April 2004.

   [RFC3852]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
              RFC 3852, July 2004.

   [RFC3961]  Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
              Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, February 2005.

   [RFC3962]  Raeburn, K., "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
              Encryption for Kerberos 5", RFC 3962, February 2005.

   [RFC4120]  Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
              Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
              July 2005.

   [RFC4121]  Zhu, L., Jaganathan, K., and S. Hartman, "The Kerberos
              Version 5 Generic Security Service Application Program
              Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism: Version 2", RFC 4121,
              July 2005.

   [X680]     ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002, 
              Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One 
              (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation.

   [X690]     ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002, 
              Information technology - ASN.1 encoding Rules: Specification 
              of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules 
              (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER).






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7.2.  Informative References

   [LENSTRA]  Lenstra, A. and E. Verheul, "Selecting Cryptographic Key 
              Sizes", Journal of Cryptology 14 (2001) 255-293.
   
   [ODL99]    Odlyzko, A., "Discrete logarithms: The past and the
              future, Designs, Codes, and Cryptography (1999)".
              
   [RFC4158]  Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R.
              Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
              Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, September 2005.


Appendix A.  PKINIT ASN.1 Module

       KerberosV5-PK-INIT-SPEC {
               iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
               security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) pkinit(5)
       } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN

       IMPORTS
           SubjectPublicKeyInfo, AlgorithmIdentifier
               FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso (1)
                 identified-organization (3) dod (6) internet (1)
                 security (5) mechanisms (5) pkix (7) id-mod (0)
                 id-pkix1-explicit (18) }
                 -- As defined in RFC 3280.

           KerberosTime, PrincipalName, Realm, EncryptionKey
               FROM KerberosV5Spec2 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
                 dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosV5(2)
                 modules(4) krb5spec2(2) } ;

       id-pkinit OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
         { iso (1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1) security (5)
           kerberosv5 (2) pkinit (3) }

       id-pkinit-authData      OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= { id-pkinit 1 }
       id-pkinit-DHKeyData     OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= { id-pkinit 2 }
       id-pkinit-rkeyData      OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= { id-pkinit 3 }
       id-pkinit-KPClientAuth  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= { id-pkinit 4 }
       id-pkinit-KPKdc         OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= { id-pkinit 5 }

       id-pkinit-san OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
         { iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2)
           x509SanAN (2) }



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       pa-pk-as-req INTEGER ::=                  16
       pa-pk-as-rep INTEGER ::=                  17

       ad-initial-verified-cas INTEGER ::=        9

       td-trusted-certifiers INTEGER ::=        104
       td-invalid-certificates INTEGER ::=      105
       td-dh-parameters INTEGER ::=             109

       PA-PK-AS-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {
          signedAuthPack          [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING,
                   -- Contains a CMS type ContentInfo encoded
                   -- according to [RFC3852].
                   -- The contentType field of the type ContentInfo
                   -- is id-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2),
                   -- and the content field is a SignedData.
                   -- The eContentType field for the type SignedData is
                   -- id-pkinit-authData (1.3.6.1.5.2.3.1), and the
                   -- eContent field contains the DER encoding of the
                   -- type AuthPack.
                   -- AuthPack is defined below.
          trustedCertifiers       [1] SEQUENCE OF
                      ExternalPrincipalIdentifier OPTIONAL,
                   -- Contains a list of CAs, trusted by the client,
                   -- that can be used to certify the KDC.
                   -- Each ExternalPrincipalIdentifier identifies a CA
                   -- or a CA certificate (thereby its public key).
                   -- The information contained in the
                   -- trustedCertifiers SHOULD be used by the KDC as
                   -- hints to guide its selection of an appropriate
                   -- certificate chain to return to the client.
          kdcPkId                 [2] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING
                                      OPTIONAL,
                   -- Contains a CMS type SignerIdentifier encoded
                   -- according to [RFC3852].
                   -- Identifies, if present, a particular KDC
                   -- public key that the client already has.
          ...
       }

       DHNonce ::= OCTET STRING

       ExternalPrincipalIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
          subjectName            [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
                   -- Contains a PKIX type Name encoded according to
                   -- [RFC3280].
                   -- Identifies the certificate subject by the
                   -- distinguished subject name.



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                   -- REQUIRED when there is a distinguished subject
                   -- name present in the certificate.
         issuerAndSerialNumber   [1] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
                   -- Contains a CMS type IssuerAndSerialNumber encoded
                   -- according to [RFC3852].
                   -- Identifies a certificate of the subject.
                   -- REQUIRED for TD-INVALID-CERTIFICATES and
                   -- TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS.
         subjectKeyIdentifier    [2] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
                   -- Identifies the subject's public key by a key
                   -- identifier.  When an X.509 certificate is
                   -- referenced, this key identifier matches the X.509
                   -- subjectKeyIdentifier extension value.  When other
                   -- certificate formats are referenced, the documents
                   -- that specify the certificate format and their use
                   -- with the CMS must include details on matching the
                   -- key identifier to the appropriate certificate
                   -- field.
                   -- RECOMMENDED for TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS.
          ...
       }

       AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {
          pkAuthenticator         [0] PKAuthenticator,
          clientPublicValue       [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
                   -- Type SubjectPublicKeyInfo is defined in
                   -- [RFC3280].
                   -- Specifies Diffie-Hellman domain parameters
                   -- and the client's public key value [IEEE1363].
                   -- The DH public key value is encoded as a BIT
                   -- STRING according to [RFC3279].
                   -- This field is present only if the client wishes
                   -- to use the Diffie-Hellman key agreement method.
          supportedCMSTypes       [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
                                      OPTIONAL,
                   -- Type AlgorithmIdentifier is defined in
                   -- [RFC3280].
                   -- List of CMS encryption types supported by the
                   -- client in order of (decreasing) preference.
          clientDHNonce           [3] DHNonce OPTIONAL,
                   -- Present only if the client indicates that it
                   -- wishes to reuse DH keys or to allow the KDC to
                   -- do so.
          ...
       }

       PKAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE {
          cusec                   [0] INTEGER (0..999999),



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          ctime                   [1] KerberosTime,
                   -- cusec and ctime are used as in [RFC4120], for
                   -- replay prevention.
          nonce                   [2] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
                   -- Chosen randomly;  This nonce does not need to
                   -- match with the nonce in the KDC-REQ-BODY.
          paChecksum              [3] OCTET STRING,
                   -- Contains the SHA1 checksum, performed over
                   -- KDC-REQ-BODY.
          ...
       }

       TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS ::= SEQUENCE OF
                      ExternalPrincipalIdentifier
                   -- Identifies a list of CAs trusted by the KDC.
                   -- Each ExternalPrincipalIdentifier identifies a CA
                   -- or a CA certificate (thereby its public key).

       TD-INVALID-CERTIFICATES ::= SEQUENCE OF
                      ExternalPrincipalIdentifier
                   -- Each ExternalPrincipalIdentifier identifies a
                   -- certificate (sent by the client) with an invalid
                   -- signature.

       KRB5PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE {
           realm                   [0] Realm,
           principalName           [1] PrincipalName
       }

       AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS ::= SEQUENCE OF
                      ExternalPrincipalIdentifier
                   -- Identifies the certification path based on which
                   -- the client certificate was validated.
                   -- Each ExternalPrincipalIdentifier identifies a CA
                   -- or a CA certificate (thereby its public key).

       PA-PK-AS-REP ::= CHOICE {
          dhInfo                  [0] DHRepInfo,
                   -- Selected when Diffie-Hellman key exchange is
                   -- used.
          encKeyPack              [1] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING,
                   -- Selected when public key encryption is used.
                   -- Contains a CMS type ContentInfo encoded
                   -- according to [RFC3852].
                   -- The contentType field of the type ContentInfo is
                   -- id-envelopedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.3).
                   -- The content field is an EnvelopedData.
                   -- The contentType field for the type EnvelopedData



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                   -- is id-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2).
                   -- The eContentType field for the inner type
                   -- SignedData (when unencrypted) is
                   -- id-pkinit-rkeyData (1.3.6.1.5.2.3.3) and the
                   -- eContent field contains the DER encoding of the
                   -- type ReplyKeyPack.
                   -- ReplyKeyPack is defined below.
          ...
       }

       DHRepInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
          dhSignedData            [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING,
                   -- Contains a CMS type ContentInfo encoded according
                   -- to [RFC3852].
                   -- The contentType field of the type ContentInfo is
                   -- id-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2), and the
                   -- content field is a SignedData.
                   -- The eContentType field for the type SignedData is
                   -- id-pkinit-DHKeyData (1.3.6.1.5.2.3.2), and the
                   -- eContent field contains the DER encoding of the
                   -- type KDCDHKeyInfo.
                   -- KDCDHKeyInfo is defined below.
          serverDHNonce           [1] DHNonce OPTIONAL,
                   -- Present if and only if dhKeyExpiration is
                   -- present.
          ...
       }

       KDCDHKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
          subjectPublicKey        [0] BIT STRING,
                   -- The KDC's DH public key.
                   -- The DH public key value is encoded as a BIT
                   -- STRING according to [RFC3279].
          nonce                   [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
                   -- Contains the nonce in the pkAuthenticator field
                   -- in the request if the DH keys are NOT reused,
                   -- 0 otherwise.
          dhKeyExpiration         [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
                   -- Expiration time for KDC's key pair,
                   -- present if and only if the DH keys are reused.
                   -- If present, the KDC's DH public key MUST not be
                   -- used past the point of this expiration time.
                   -- If this field is omitted then the serverDHNonce
                   -- field MUST also be omitted.
          ...
       }

       ReplyKeyPack ::= SEQUENCE {



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          replyKey                [0] EncryptionKey,
                   -- Contains the session key used to encrypt the
                   -- enc-part field in the AS-REP, i.e. the
                   -- AS reply key.
          asChecksum              [1] Checksum,
                  -- Contains the checksum of the AS-REQ
                  -- corresponding to the containing AS-REP.
                  -- The checksum is performed over the type AS-REQ.
                  -- The protocol key [RFC3961] of the checksum is the
                  -- replyKey and the key usage number is 6.
                  -- If the replyKey's enctype is "newer" [RFC4120]
                  -- [RFC4121], the checksum is the required
                  -- checksum operation [RFC3961] for that enctype.
                  -- The client MUST verify this checksum upon receipt
                  -- of the AS-REP.
          ...
       }

       TD-DH-PARAMETERS ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
                   -- Each AlgorithmIdentifier specifies a set of
                   -- Diffie-Hellman domain parameters [IEEE1363].
                   -- This list is in decreasing preference order.
       END


Appendix B.  Test Vectors

   Function octetstring2key() is defined in Section 3.2.3.1.  This
   section describes a few sets of test vectors that would be useful for
   implementers of octetstring2key().


   Set 1
   =====
   Input octet string x is:

     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00



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     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

   Output of K-truncate() when the key size is 32 octets:

     5e e5 0d 67 5c 80 9f e5 9e 4a 77 62 c5 4b 65 83
     75 47 ea fb 15 9b d8 cd c7 5f fc a5 91 1e 4c 41


   Set 2:
   =====
   Input octet string x is:

     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

   Output of K-truncate() when the key size is 32 octets:

     ac f7 70 7c 08 97 3d df db 27 cd 36 14 42 cc fb
     a3 55 c8 88 4c b4 72 f3 7d a6 36 d0 7d 56 78 7e


   Set 3:
   ======
   Input octet string x is:

     00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
     10 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e
     0f 10 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d
     0e 0f 10 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c
     0d 0e 0f 10 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b
     0c 0d 0e 0f 10 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a
     0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
     0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08

   Output of K-truncate() when the key size is 32 octets:

     c4 42 da 58 5f cb 80 e4 3b 47 94 6f 25 40 93 e3
     73 29 d9 90 01 38 0d b7 83 71 db 3a cf 5c 79 7e




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   Set 4:
   =====
   Input octet string x is:

     00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
     10 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e
     0f 10 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d
     0e 0f 10 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c
     0d 0e 0f 10 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08

   Output of K-truncate() when the key size is 32 octets:

     00 53 95 3b 84 c8 96 f4 eb 38 5c 3f 2e 75 1c 4a
     59 0e d6 ff ad ca 6f f6 4f 47 eb eb 8d 78 0f fc


Appendix C.  Miscellaneous Information about Microsoft Windows PKINIT
             Implementations

   Earlier revisions of the PKINIT I-D were implemented in various
   releases of Microsoft Windows and deployed in fairly large numbers.
   To enable the community to better interoperate with systems running
   those releases, the following information may be useful.

   KDC certificates issued by Windows 2000 Enterprise CAs contain a
   dNSName SAN with the DNS name of the host running the KDC, and the
   id-kp-serverAuth EKU [RFC3280].

   KDC certificates issued by Windows 2003 Enterprise CAs contain a
   dNSName SAN with the DNS name of the host running the KDC, the id-kp-
   serverAuth EKU and the id-ms-kp-sc-logon EKU.

   It is anticipated that the next release of Windows is already too far
   along to allow it to support the issuing KDC certificates with id-
   pkinit-san SAN as specified in this RFC.  Instead, they will have a
   dNSName SAN containing the domain name of the KDC and the intended
   purpose of these KDC certificates be restricted by the presence of
   the id-pkinit-KPKdc EKU and id-kp-serverAuth EKU.

   In addition to checking that the above are present in a KDC
   certificate, Windows clients verify that the issuer of the KDC
   certificate is one of a set of allowed issuers of such certificates,
   so those wishing to issue KDC certificates need to configure their
   Windows clients appropriately.

   Client certificates accepted by Windows 2000 and Windows 2003 Server
   KDCs must contain an id-ms-san-sc-logon-upn (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.3)
   SAN and the id-ms-kp-sc-logon EKU.  The id-ms-san-sc-logon-upn SAN



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   contains a UTF8 encoded string whose value is that of the Directory
   Service attribute UserPrincipalName of the client account object, and
   the purpose of including the id-ms-san-sc-logon-upn SAN in the client
   certificate is to validate the client mapping (in other words, the
   client's public key is bound to the account that has this
   UserPrincipalName value).

   It should be noted that all Microsoft Kerberos realm names are domain
   style realm names and strictly in upper case.  In addition, the
   UserPrincipalName attribute is globally unique in Windows 2000 and
   Windows 2003.








































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Authors' Addresses

   Larry Zhu
   Microsoft Corporation
   One Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA  98052
   US

   Email: lzhu@microsoft.com


   Brian Tung
   USC Information Sciences Institute
   4676 Admiralty Way Suite 1001
   Marina del Rey, CA  90292
   US

   Email: brian@isi.edu

































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