8 QEMU may be running with various helper processes involved:
9 - vhost-user* processes (gpu, virtfs, input, etc...)
10 - TPM emulation (or other devices)
11 - user networking (slirp)
12 - network services (DHCP/DNS, samba/ftp etc)
13 - background tasks (compression, streaming etc)
17 Having several processes allows stricter security rules, as well as
20 While QEMU itself uses QMP as primary IPC (and Spice/VNC for remote
21 display), D-Bus is the de facto IPC of choice on Unix systems. The
22 wire format is machine friendly, good bindings exist for various
23 languages, and there are various tools available.
25 Using a bus, helper processes can discover and communicate with each
26 other easily, without going through QEMU. The bus topology is also
27 easier to apprehend and debug than a mesh. However, it is wise to
28 consider the security aspects of it.
33 A QEMU D-Bus bus should be private to a single VM. Thus, only
34 cooperative tasks are running on the same bus to serve the VM.
36 D-Bus, the protocol and standard, doesn't have mechanisms to enforce
37 security between peers once the connection is established. Peers may
38 have additional mechanisms to enforce security rules, based for
39 example on UNIX credentials.
41 The daemon can control which peers can send/recv messages using
42 various metadata attributes, however, this is alone is not generally
43 sufficient to make the deployment secure. The semantics of the actual
44 methods implemented using D-Bus are just as critical. Peers need to
45 carefully validate any information they received from a peer with a
46 different trust level.
51 dbus-daemon can enforce various policies based on the UID/GID of the
52 processes that are connected to it. It is thus a good idea to run
53 helpers as different UID from QEMU and set appropriate policies.
55 Depending on the use case, you may choose different scenarios:
57 - Everything the same UID
59 - Convenient for developers
60 - Improved reliability - crash of one part doens't take
62 - No security benefit over traditional QEMU, unless additional
63 unless additional controls such as SELinux or AppArmor are
66 - Two UIDs, one for QEMU, one for dbus & helpers
68 - Moderately improved user based security isolation
70 - Many UIDs, one for QEMU one for dbus and one for each helpers
72 - Best user based security isolation
73 - Complex to manager distinct UIDs needed for each VM
75 For example, to allow only ``qemu`` user to talk to ``qemu-helper``
76 ``org.qemu.Helper1`` service, a dbus-daemon policy may contain:
81 <allow send_destination="org.qemu.Helper1"/>
82 <allow receive_sender="org.qemu.Helper1"/>
85 <policy user="qemu-helper">
86 <allow own="org.qemu.Helper1"/>
90 dbus-daemon can also perfom SELinux checks based on the security
91 context of the source and the target. For example, ``virtiofs_t``
92 could be allowed to send a message to ``svirt_t``, but ``virtiofs_t``
93 wouldn't be allowed to send a message to ``virtiofs_t``.
95 See dbus-daemon man page for details.
100 When implementing new D-Bus interfaces, it is recommended to follow
101 the "D-Bus API Design Guidelines":
102 https://dbus.freedesktop.org/doc/dbus-api-design.html
104 The "org.qemu.*" prefix is reserved for services implemented &
105 distributed by the QEMU project.