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1 \chapter{Restricted Execution \label{restricted}}
3 \begin{notice}[warning]
4 In Python 2.3 these modules have been disabled due to various known
5 and not readily fixable security holes. The modules are still
6 documented here to help in reading old code that uses the
7 \module{rexec} and \module{Bastion} modules.
8 \end{notice}
10 \emph{Restricted execution} is the basic framework in Python that allows
11 for the segregation of trusted and untrusted code. The framework is based on the
12 notion that trusted Python code (a \emph{supervisor}) can create a
13 ``padded cell' (or environment) with limited permissions, and run the
14 untrusted code within this cell. The untrusted code cannot break out
15 of its cell, and can only interact with sensitive system resources
16 through interfaces defined and managed by the trusted code. The term
17 ``restricted execution'' is favored over ``safe-Python''
18 since true safety is hard to define, and is determined by the way the
19 restricted environment is created. Note that the restricted
20 environments can be nested, with inner cells creating subcells of
21 lesser, but never greater, privilege.
23 An interesting aspect of Python's restricted execution model is that
24 the interfaces presented to untrusted code usually have the same names
25 as those presented to trusted code. Therefore no special interfaces
26 need to be learned to write code designed to run in a restricted
27 environment. And because the exact nature of the padded cell is
28 determined by the supervisor, different restrictions can be imposed,
29 depending on the application. For example, it might be deemed
30 ``safe'' for untrusted code to read any file within a specified
31 directory, but never to write a file. In this case, the supervisor
32 may redefine the built-in \function{open()} function so that it raises
33 an exception whenever the \var{mode} parameter is \code{'w'}. It
34 might also perform a \cfunction{chroot()}-like operation on the
35 \var{filename} parameter, such that root is always relative to some
36 safe ``sandbox'' area of the filesystem. In this case, the untrusted
37 code would still see an built-in \function{open()} function in its
38 environment, with the same calling interface. The semantics would be
39 identical too, with \exception{IOError}s being raised when the
40 supervisor determined that an unallowable parameter is being used.
42 The Python run-time determines whether a particular code block is
43 executing in restricted execution mode based on the identity of the
44 \code{__builtins__} object in its global variables: if this is (the
45 dictionary of) the standard \refmodule[builtin]{__builtin__} module,
46 the code is deemed to be unrestricted, else it is deemed to be
47 restricted.
49 Python code executing in restricted mode faces a number of limitations
50 that are designed to prevent it from escaping from the padded cell.
51 For instance, the function object attribute \member{func_globals} and
52 the class and instance object attribute \member{__dict__} are
53 unavailable.
55 Two modules provide the framework for setting up restricted execution
56 environments:
58 \localmoduletable
60 \begin{seealso}
61 \seetitle[http://grail.sourceforge.net/]{Grail Home Page}
62 {Grail, an Internet browser written in Python, uses these
63 modules to support Python applets. More
64 information on the use of Python's restricted execution
65 mode in Grail is available on the Web site.}
66 \end{seealso}