match_asm_constraints: Use copy_rtx where needed (PR88001)
[official-gcc.git] / libsanitizer / tsan / tsan_platform_linux.cc
blob9b4dea206594c4b50df23936b9ba37021c8a8b77
1 //===-- tsan_platform_linux.cc --------------------------------------------===//
2 //
3 // This file is distributed under the University of Illinois Open Source
4 // License. See LICENSE.TXT for details.
5 //
6 //===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
7 //
8 // This file is a part of ThreadSanitizer (TSan), a race detector.
9 //
10 // Linux- and FreeBSD-specific code.
11 //===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
14 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_platform.h"
15 #if SANITIZER_LINUX || SANITIZER_FREEBSD || SANITIZER_NETBSD
17 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common.h"
18 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_libc.h"
19 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux.h"
20 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_platform_limits_netbsd.h"
21 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_platform_limits_posix.h"
22 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_posix.h"
23 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_procmaps.h"
24 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_stoptheworld.h"
25 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_stackdepot.h"
26 #include "tsan_platform.h"
27 #include "tsan_rtl.h"
28 #include "tsan_flags.h"
30 #include <fcntl.h>
31 #include <pthread.h>
32 #include <signal.h>
33 #include <stdio.h>
34 #include <stdlib.h>
35 #include <string.h>
36 #include <stdarg.h>
37 #include <sys/mman.h>
38 #if SANITIZER_LINUX
39 #include <sys/personality.h>
40 #include <setjmp.h>
41 #endif
42 #include <sys/syscall.h>
43 #include <sys/socket.h>
44 #include <sys/time.h>
45 #include <sys/types.h>
46 #include <sys/resource.h>
47 #include <sys/stat.h>
48 #include <unistd.h>
49 #include <sched.h>
50 #include <dlfcn.h>
51 #if SANITIZER_LINUX
52 #define __need_res_state
53 #include <resolv.h>
54 #endif
56 #ifdef sa_handler
57 # undef sa_handler
58 #endif
60 #ifdef sa_sigaction
61 # undef sa_sigaction
62 #endif
64 #if SANITIZER_FREEBSD
65 extern "C" void *__libc_stack_end;
66 void *__libc_stack_end = 0;
67 #endif
69 #if SANITIZER_LINUX && defined(__aarch64__)
70 void InitializeGuardPtr() __attribute__((visibility("hidden")));
71 #endif
73 namespace __tsan {
75 #ifdef TSAN_RUNTIME_VMA
76 // Runtime detected VMA size.
77 uptr vmaSize;
78 #endif
80 enum {
81 MemTotal = 0,
82 MemShadow = 1,
83 MemMeta = 2,
84 MemFile = 3,
85 MemMmap = 4,
86 MemTrace = 5,
87 MemHeap = 6,
88 MemOther = 7,
89 MemCount = 8,
92 void FillProfileCallback(uptr p, uptr rss, bool file,
93 uptr *mem, uptr stats_size) {
94 mem[MemTotal] += rss;
95 if (p >= ShadowBeg() && p < ShadowEnd())
96 mem[MemShadow] += rss;
97 else if (p >= MetaShadowBeg() && p < MetaShadowEnd())
98 mem[MemMeta] += rss;
99 #if !SANITIZER_GO
100 else if (p >= HeapMemBeg() && p < HeapMemEnd())
101 mem[MemHeap] += rss;
102 else if (p >= LoAppMemBeg() && p < LoAppMemEnd())
103 mem[file ? MemFile : MemMmap] += rss;
104 else if (p >= HiAppMemBeg() && p < HiAppMemEnd())
105 mem[file ? MemFile : MemMmap] += rss;
106 #else
107 else if (p >= AppMemBeg() && p < AppMemEnd())
108 mem[file ? MemFile : MemMmap] += rss;
109 #endif
110 else if (p >= TraceMemBeg() && p < TraceMemEnd())
111 mem[MemTrace] += rss;
112 else
113 mem[MemOther] += rss;
116 void WriteMemoryProfile(char *buf, uptr buf_size, uptr nthread, uptr nlive) {
117 uptr mem[MemCount];
118 internal_memset(mem, 0, sizeof(mem[0]) * MemCount);
119 __sanitizer::GetMemoryProfile(FillProfileCallback, mem, 7);
120 StackDepotStats *stacks = StackDepotGetStats();
121 internal_snprintf(buf, buf_size,
122 "RSS %zd MB: shadow:%zd meta:%zd file:%zd mmap:%zd"
123 " trace:%zd heap:%zd other:%zd stacks=%zd[%zd] nthr=%zd/%zd\n",
124 mem[MemTotal] >> 20, mem[MemShadow] >> 20, mem[MemMeta] >> 20,
125 mem[MemFile] >> 20, mem[MemMmap] >> 20, mem[MemTrace] >> 20,
126 mem[MemHeap] >> 20, mem[MemOther] >> 20,
127 stacks->allocated >> 20, stacks->n_uniq_ids,
128 nlive, nthread);
131 #if SANITIZER_LINUX
132 void FlushShadowMemoryCallback(
133 const SuspendedThreadsList &suspended_threads_list,
134 void *argument) {
135 ReleaseMemoryPagesToOS(ShadowBeg(), ShadowEnd());
137 #endif
139 void FlushShadowMemory() {
140 #if SANITIZER_LINUX
141 StopTheWorld(FlushShadowMemoryCallback, 0);
142 #endif
145 #if !SANITIZER_GO
146 // Mark shadow for .rodata sections with the special kShadowRodata marker.
147 // Accesses to .rodata can't race, so this saves time, memory and trace space.
148 static void MapRodata() {
149 // First create temp file.
150 const char *tmpdir = GetEnv("TMPDIR");
151 if (tmpdir == 0)
152 tmpdir = GetEnv("TEST_TMPDIR");
153 #ifdef P_tmpdir
154 if (tmpdir == 0)
155 tmpdir = P_tmpdir;
156 #endif
157 if (tmpdir == 0)
158 return;
159 char name[256];
160 internal_snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s/tsan.rodata.%d",
161 tmpdir, (int)internal_getpid());
162 uptr openrv = internal_open(name, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600);
163 if (internal_iserror(openrv))
164 return;
165 internal_unlink(name); // Unlink it now, so that we can reuse the buffer.
166 fd_t fd = openrv;
167 // Fill the file with kShadowRodata.
168 const uptr kMarkerSize = 512 * 1024 / sizeof(u64);
169 InternalMmapVector<u64> marker(kMarkerSize);
170 // volatile to prevent insertion of memset
171 for (volatile u64 *p = marker.data(); p < marker.data() + kMarkerSize; p++)
172 *p = kShadowRodata;
173 internal_write(fd, marker.data(), marker.size() * sizeof(u64));
174 // Map the file into memory.
175 uptr page = internal_mmap(0, GetPageSizeCached(), PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
176 MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, fd, 0);
177 if (internal_iserror(page)) {
178 internal_close(fd);
179 return;
181 // Map the file into shadow of .rodata sections.
182 MemoryMappingLayout proc_maps(/*cache_enabled*/true);
183 // Reusing the buffer 'name'.
184 MemoryMappedSegment segment(name, ARRAY_SIZE(name));
185 while (proc_maps.Next(&segment)) {
186 if (segment.filename[0] != 0 && segment.filename[0] != '[' &&
187 segment.IsReadable() && segment.IsExecutable() &&
188 !segment.IsWritable() && IsAppMem(segment.start)) {
189 // Assume it's .rodata
190 char *shadow_start = (char *)MemToShadow(segment.start);
191 char *shadow_end = (char *)MemToShadow(segment.end);
192 for (char *p = shadow_start; p < shadow_end;
193 p += marker.size() * sizeof(u64)) {
194 internal_mmap(p, Min<uptr>(marker.size() * sizeof(u64), shadow_end - p),
195 PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, fd, 0);
199 internal_close(fd);
202 void InitializeShadowMemoryPlatform() {
203 MapRodata();
206 #endif // #if !SANITIZER_GO
208 void InitializePlatformEarly() {
209 #ifdef TSAN_RUNTIME_VMA
210 vmaSize =
211 (MostSignificantSetBitIndex(GET_CURRENT_FRAME()) + 1);
212 #if defined(__aarch64__)
213 # if !SANITIZER_GO
214 if (vmaSize != 39 && vmaSize != 42 && vmaSize != 48) {
215 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
216 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 39, 42 and 48\n", vmaSize);
217 Die();
219 #else
220 if (vmaSize != 48) {
221 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
222 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 48\n", vmaSize);
223 Die();
225 #endif
226 #elif defined(__powerpc64__)
227 # if !SANITIZER_GO
228 if (vmaSize != 44 && vmaSize != 46 && vmaSize != 47) {
229 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
230 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 44, 46, and 47\n", vmaSize);
231 Die();
233 # else
234 if (vmaSize != 46 && vmaSize != 47) {
235 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
236 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 46, and 47\n", vmaSize);
237 Die();
239 # endif
240 #endif
241 #endif
244 void InitializePlatform() {
245 DisableCoreDumperIfNecessary();
247 // Go maps shadow memory lazily and works fine with limited address space.
248 // Unlimited stack is not a problem as well, because the executable
249 // is not compiled with -pie.
250 if (!SANITIZER_GO) {
251 bool reexec = false;
252 // TSan doesn't play well with unlimited stack size (as stack
253 // overlaps with shadow memory). If we detect unlimited stack size,
254 // we re-exec the program with limited stack size as a best effort.
255 if (StackSizeIsUnlimited()) {
256 const uptr kMaxStackSize = 32 * 1024 * 1024;
257 VReport(1, "Program is run with unlimited stack size, which wouldn't "
258 "work with ThreadSanitizer.\n"
259 "Re-execing with stack size limited to %zd bytes.\n",
260 kMaxStackSize);
261 SetStackSizeLimitInBytes(kMaxStackSize);
262 reexec = true;
265 if (!AddressSpaceIsUnlimited()) {
266 Report("WARNING: Program is run with limited virtual address space,"
267 " which wouldn't work with ThreadSanitizer.\n");
268 Report("Re-execing with unlimited virtual address space.\n");
269 SetAddressSpaceUnlimited();
270 reexec = true;
272 #if SANITIZER_LINUX && defined(__aarch64__)
273 // After patch "arm64: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS." is introduced in
274 // linux kernel, the random gap between stack and mapped area is increased
275 // from 128M to 36G on 39-bit aarch64. As it is almost impossible to cover
276 // this big range, we should disable randomized virtual space on aarch64.
277 int old_personality = personality(0xffffffff);
278 if (old_personality != -1 && (old_personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) == 0) {
279 VReport(1, "WARNING: Program is run with randomized virtual address "
280 "space, which wouldn't work with ThreadSanitizer.\n"
281 "Re-execing with fixed virtual address space.\n");
282 CHECK_NE(personality(old_personality | ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE), -1);
283 reexec = true;
285 // Initialize the guard pointer used in {sig}{set,long}jump.
286 InitializeGuardPtr();
287 #endif
288 if (reexec)
289 ReExec();
292 #if !SANITIZER_GO
293 CheckAndProtect();
294 InitTlsSize();
295 #endif
298 #if !SANITIZER_GO
299 // Extract file descriptors passed to glibc internal __res_iclose function.
300 // This is required to properly "close" the fds, because we do not see internal
301 // closes within glibc. The code is a pure hack.
302 int ExtractResolvFDs(void *state, int *fds, int nfd) {
303 #if SANITIZER_LINUX && !SANITIZER_ANDROID
304 int cnt = 0;
305 struct __res_state *statp = (struct __res_state*)state;
306 for (int i = 0; i < MAXNS && cnt < nfd; i++) {
307 if (statp->_u._ext.nsaddrs[i] && statp->_u._ext.nssocks[i] != -1)
308 fds[cnt++] = statp->_u._ext.nssocks[i];
310 return cnt;
311 #else
312 return 0;
313 #endif
316 // Extract file descriptors passed via UNIX domain sockets.
317 // This is requried to properly handle "open" of these fds.
318 // see 'man recvmsg' and 'man 3 cmsg'.
319 int ExtractRecvmsgFDs(void *msgp, int *fds, int nfd) {
320 int res = 0;
321 msghdr *msg = (msghdr*)msgp;
322 struct cmsghdr *cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(msg);
323 for (; cmsg; cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(msg, cmsg)) {
324 if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_SOCKET || cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS)
325 continue;
326 int n = (cmsg->cmsg_len - CMSG_LEN(0)) / sizeof(fds[0]);
327 for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
328 fds[res++] = ((int*)CMSG_DATA(cmsg))[i];
329 if (res == nfd)
330 return res;
333 return res;
336 void ImitateTlsWrite(ThreadState *thr, uptr tls_addr, uptr tls_size) {
337 // Check that the thr object is in tls;
338 const uptr thr_beg = (uptr)thr;
339 const uptr thr_end = (uptr)thr + sizeof(*thr);
340 CHECK_GE(thr_beg, tls_addr);
341 CHECK_LE(thr_beg, tls_addr + tls_size);
342 CHECK_GE(thr_end, tls_addr);
343 CHECK_LE(thr_end, tls_addr + tls_size);
344 // Since the thr object is huge, skip it.
345 MemoryRangeImitateWrite(thr, /*pc=*/2, tls_addr, thr_beg - tls_addr);
346 MemoryRangeImitateWrite(thr, /*pc=*/2, thr_end,
347 tls_addr + tls_size - thr_end);
350 // Note: this function runs with async signals enabled,
351 // so it must not touch any tsan state.
352 int call_pthread_cancel_with_cleanup(int(*fn)(void *c, void *m,
353 void *abstime), void *c, void *m, void *abstime,
354 void(*cleanup)(void *arg), void *arg) {
355 // pthread_cleanup_push/pop are hardcore macros mess.
356 // We can't intercept nor call them w/o including pthread.h.
357 int res;
358 pthread_cleanup_push(cleanup, arg);
359 res = fn(c, m, abstime);
360 pthread_cleanup_pop(0);
361 return res;
363 #endif
365 #if !SANITIZER_GO
366 void ReplaceSystemMalloc() { }
367 #endif
369 #if !SANITIZER_GO
370 #if SANITIZER_ANDROID
371 // On Android, one thread can call intercepted functions after
372 // DestroyThreadState(), so add a fake thread state for "dead" threads.
373 static ThreadState *dead_thread_state = nullptr;
375 ThreadState *cur_thread() {
376 ThreadState* thr = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(*get_android_tls_ptr());
377 if (thr == nullptr) {
378 __sanitizer_sigset_t emptyset;
379 internal_sigfillset(&emptyset);
380 __sanitizer_sigset_t oldset;
381 CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &emptyset, &oldset));
382 thr = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(*get_android_tls_ptr());
383 if (thr == nullptr) {
384 thr = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(MmapOrDie(sizeof(ThreadState),
385 "ThreadState"));
386 *get_android_tls_ptr() = reinterpret_cast<uptr>(thr);
387 if (dead_thread_state == nullptr) {
388 dead_thread_state = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(
389 MmapOrDie(sizeof(ThreadState), "ThreadState"));
390 dead_thread_state->fast_state.SetIgnoreBit();
391 dead_thread_state->ignore_interceptors = 1;
392 dead_thread_state->is_dead = true;
393 *const_cast<int*>(&dead_thread_state->tid) = -1;
394 CHECK_EQ(0, internal_mprotect(dead_thread_state, sizeof(ThreadState),
395 PROT_READ));
398 CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldset, nullptr));
400 return thr;
403 void cur_thread_finalize() {
404 __sanitizer_sigset_t emptyset;
405 internal_sigfillset(&emptyset);
406 __sanitizer_sigset_t oldset;
407 CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &emptyset, &oldset));
408 ThreadState* thr = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(*get_android_tls_ptr());
409 if (thr != dead_thread_state) {
410 *get_android_tls_ptr() = reinterpret_cast<uptr>(dead_thread_state);
411 UnmapOrDie(thr, sizeof(ThreadState));
413 CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldset, nullptr));
415 #endif // SANITIZER_ANDROID
416 #endif // if !SANITIZER_GO
418 } // namespace __tsan
420 #endif // SANITIZER_LINUX || SANITIZER_FREEBSD || SANITIZER_NETBSD