PR27116, Spelling errors found by Debian style checker
[official-gcc.git] / libsanitizer / tsan / tsan_platform_linux.cpp
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1 //===-- tsan_platform_linux.cpp -------------------------------------------===//
2 //
3 // Part of the LLVM Project, under the Apache License v2.0 with LLVM Exceptions.
4 // See https://llvm.org/LICENSE.txt for license information.
5 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception
6 //
7 //===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
8 //
9 // This file is a part of ThreadSanitizer (TSan), a race detector.
11 // Linux- and BSD-specific code.
12 //===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
14 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_platform.h"
15 #if SANITIZER_LINUX || SANITIZER_FREEBSD || SANITIZER_NETBSD
17 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common.h"
18 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_libc.h"
19 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux.h"
20 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_platform_limits_netbsd.h"
21 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_platform_limits_posix.h"
22 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_posix.h"
23 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_procmaps.h"
24 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_stackdepot.h"
25 #include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_stoptheworld.h"
26 #include "tsan_flags.h"
27 #include "tsan_platform.h"
28 #include "tsan_rtl.h"
30 #include <fcntl.h>
31 #include <pthread.h>
32 #include <signal.h>
33 #include <stdio.h>
34 #include <stdlib.h>
35 #include <string.h>
36 #include <stdarg.h>
37 #include <sys/mman.h>
38 #if SANITIZER_LINUX
39 #include <sys/personality.h>
40 #include <setjmp.h>
41 #endif
42 #include <sys/syscall.h>
43 #include <sys/socket.h>
44 #include <sys/time.h>
45 #include <sys/types.h>
46 #include <sys/resource.h>
47 #include <sys/stat.h>
48 #include <unistd.h>
49 #include <sched.h>
50 #include <dlfcn.h>
51 #if SANITIZER_LINUX
52 #define __need_res_state
53 #include <resolv.h>
54 #endif
56 #ifdef sa_handler
57 # undef sa_handler
58 #endif
60 #ifdef sa_sigaction
61 # undef sa_sigaction
62 #endif
64 #if SANITIZER_FREEBSD
65 extern "C" void *__libc_stack_end;
66 void *__libc_stack_end = 0;
67 #endif
69 #if SANITIZER_LINUX && (defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__loongarch_lp64)) && \
70 !SANITIZER_GO
71 # define INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY 1
72 #else
73 # define INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY 0
74 #endif
76 #if INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY
77 #include "interception/interception.h"
78 // Must be declared outside of other namespaces.
79 DECLARE_REAL(int, _setjmp, void *env)
80 #endif
82 namespace __tsan {
84 #if INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY
85 static void InitializeLongjmpXorKey();
86 static uptr longjmp_xor_key;
87 #endif
89 // Runtime detected VMA size.
90 uptr vmaSize;
92 enum {
93 MemTotal,
94 MemShadow,
95 MemMeta,
96 MemFile,
97 MemMmap,
98 MemHeap,
99 MemOther,
100 MemCount,
103 void FillProfileCallback(uptr p, uptr rss, bool file, uptr *mem) {
104 mem[MemTotal] += rss;
105 if (p >= ShadowBeg() && p < ShadowEnd())
106 mem[MemShadow] += rss;
107 else if (p >= MetaShadowBeg() && p < MetaShadowEnd())
108 mem[MemMeta] += rss;
109 else if ((p >= LoAppMemBeg() && p < LoAppMemEnd()) ||
110 (p >= MidAppMemBeg() && p < MidAppMemEnd()) ||
111 (p >= HiAppMemBeg() && p < HiAppMemEnd()))
112 mem[file ? MemFile : MemMmap] += rss;
113 else if (p >= HeapMemBeg() && p < HeapMemEnd())
114 mem[MemHeap] += rss;
115 else
116 mem[MemOther] += rss;
119 void WriteMemoryProfile(char *buf, uptr buf_size, u64 uptime_ns) {
120 uptr mem[MemCount];
121 internal_memset(mem, 0, sizeof(mem));
122 GetMemoryProfile(FillProfileCallback, mem);
123 auto meta = ctx->metamap.GetMemoryStats();
124 StackDepotStats stacks = StackDepotGetStats();
125 uptr nthread, nlive;
126 ctx->thread_registry.GetNumberOfThreads(&nthread, &nlive);
127 uptr trace_mem;
129 Lock l(&ctx->slot_mtx);
130 trace_mem = ctx->trace_part_total_allocated * sizeof(TracePart);
132 uptr internal_stats[AllocatorStatCount];
133 internal_allocator()->GetStats(internal_stats);
134 // All these are allocated from the common mmap region.
135 mem[MemMmap] -= meta.mem_block + meta.sync_obj + trace_mem +
136 stacks.allocated + internal_stats[AllocatorStatMapped];
137 if (s64(mem[MemMmap]) < 0)
138 mem[MemMmap] = 0;
139 internal_snprintf(
140 buf, buf_size,
141 "==%zu== %llus [%zu]: RSS %zd MB: shadow:%zd meta:%zd file:%zd"
142 " mmap:%zd heap:%zd other:%zd intalloc:%zd memblocks:%zd syncobj:%zu"
143 " trace:%zu stacks=%zd threads=%zu/%zu\n",
144 internal_getpid(), uptime_ns / (1000 * 1000 * 1000), ctx->global_epoch,
145 mem[MemTotal] >> 20, mem[MemShadow] >> 20, mem[MemMeta] >> 20,
146 mem[MemFile] >> 20, mem[MemMmap] >> 20, mem[MemHeap] >> 20,
147 mem[MemOther] >> 20, internal_stats[AllocatorStatMapped] >> 20,
148 meta.mem_block >> 20, meta.sync_obj >> 20, trace_mem >> 20,
149 stacks.allocated >> 20, nlive, nthread);
152 #if !SANITIZER_GO
153 // Mark shadow for .rodata sections with the special Shadow::kRodata marker.
154 // Accesses to .rodata can't race, so this saves time, memory and trace space.
155 static void MapRodata() {
156 // First create temp file.
157 const char *tmpdir = GetEnv("TMPDIR");
158 if (tmpdir == 0)
159 tmpdir = GetEnv("TEST_TMPDIR");
160 #ifdef P_tmpdir
161 if (tmpdir == 0)
162 tmpdir = P_tmpdir;
163 #endif
164 if (tmpdir == 0)
165 return;
166 char name[256];
167 internal_snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s/tsan.rodata.%d",
168 tmpdir, (int)internal_getpid());
169 uptr openrv = internal_open(name, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600);
170 if (internal_iserror(openrv))
171 return;
172 internal_unlink(name); // Unlink it now, so that we can reuse the buffer.
173 fd_t fd = openrv;
174 // Fill the file with Shadow::kRodata.
175 const uptr kMarkerSize = 512 * 1024 / sizeof(RawShadow);
176 InternalMmapVector<RawShadow> marker(kMarkerSize);
177 // volatile to prevent insertion of memset
178 for (volatile RawShadow *p = marker.data(); p < marker.data() + kMarkerSize;
179 p++)
180 *p = Shadow::kRodata;
181 internal_write(fd, marker.data(), marker.size() * sizeof(RawShadow));
182 // Map the file into memory.
183 uptr page = internal_mmap(0, GetPageSizeCached(), PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
184 MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, fd, 0);
185 if (internal_iserror(page)) {
186 internal_close(fd);
187 return;
189 // Map the file into shadow of .rodata sections.
190 MemoryMappingLayout proc_maps(/*cache_enabled*/true);
191 // Reusing the buffer 'name'.
192 MemoryMappedSegment segment(name, ARRAY_SIZE(name));
193 while (proc_maps.Next(&segment)) {
194 if (segment.filename[0] != 0 && segment.filename[0] != '[' &&
195 segment.IsReadable() && segment.IsExecutable() &&
196 !segment.IsWritable() && IsAppMem(segment.start)) {
197 // Assume it's .rodata
198 char *shadow_start = (char *)MemToShadow(segment.start);
199 char *shadow_end = (char *)MemToShadow(segment.end);
200 for (char *p = shadow_start; p < shadow_end;
201 p += marker.size() * sizeof(RawShadow)) {
202 internal_mmap(
203 p, Min<uptr>(marker.size() * sizeof(RawShadow), shadow_end - p),
204 PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, fd, 0);
208 internal_close(fd);
211 void InitializeShadowMemoryPlatform() {
212 MapRodata();
215 #endif // #if !SANITIZER_GO
217 void InitializePlatformEarly() {
218 vmaSize =
219 (MostSignificantSetBitIndex(GET_CURRENT_FRAME()) + 1);
220 #if defined(__aarch64__)
221 # if !SANITIZER_GO
222 if (vmaSize != 39 && vmaSize != 42 && vmaSize != 48) {
223 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
224 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 39, 42 and 48\n", vmaSize);
225 Die();
227 #else
228 if (vmaSize != 48) {
229 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
230 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 48\n", vmaSize);
231 Die();
233 #endif
234 #elif SANITIZER_LOONGARCH64
235 # if !SANITIZER_GO
236 if (vmaSize != 47) {
237 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
238 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 47\n", vmaSize);
239 Die();
241 # endif
242 #elif defined(__powerpc64__)
243 # if !SANITIZER_GO
244 if (vmaSize != 44 && vmaSize != 46 && vmaSize != 47) {
245 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
246 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 44, 46, and 47\n", vmaSize);
247 Die();
249 # else
250 if (vmaSize != 46 && vmaSize != 47) {
251 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
252 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 46, and 47\n", vmaSize);
253 Die();
255 # endif
256 #elif defined(__mips64)
257 # if !SANITIZER_GO
258 if (vmaSize != 40) {
259 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
260 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 40\n", vmaSize);
261 Die();
263 # else
264 if (vmaSize != 47) {
265 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
266 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 47\n", vmaSize);
267 Die();
269 # endif
270 #endif
273 void InitializePlatform() {
274 DisableCoreDumperIfNecessary();
276 // Go maps shadow memory lazily and works fine with limited address space.
277 // Unlimited stack is not a problem as well, because the executable
278 // is not compiled with -pie.
279 #if !SANITIZER_GO
281 bool reexec = false;
282 // TSan doesn't play well with unlimited stack size (as stack
283 // overlaps with shadow memory). If we detect unlimited stack size,
284 // we re-exec the program with limited stack size as a best effort.
285 if (StackSizeIsUnlimited()) {
286 const uptr kMaxStackSize = 32 * 1024 * 1024;
287 VReport(1, "Program is run with unlimited stack size, which wouldn't "
288 "work with ThreadSanitizer.\n"
289 "Re-execing with stack size limited to %zd bytes.\n",
290 kMaxStackSize);
291 SetStackSizeLimitInBytes(kMaxStackSize);
292 reexec = true;
295 if (!AddressSpaceIsUnlimited()) {
296 Report("WARNING: Program is run with limited virtual address space,"
297 " which wouldn't work with ThreadSanitizer.\n");
298 Report("Re-execing with unlimited virtual address space.\n");
299 SetAddressSpaceUnlimited();
300 reexec = true;
302 #if SANITIZER_ANDROID && (defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__x86_64__))
303 // After patch "arm64: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS." is introduced in
304 // linux kernel, the random gap between stack and mapped area is increased
305 // from 128M to 36G on 39-bit aarch64. As it is almost impossible to cover
306 // this big range, we should disable randomized virtual space on aarch64.
307 // ASLR personality check.
308 int old_personality = personality(0xffffffff);
309 if (old_personality != -1 && (old_personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) == 0) {
310 VReport(1, "WARNING: Program is run with randomized virtual address "
311 "space, which wouldn't work with ThreadSanitizer.\n"
312 "Re-execing with fixed virtual address space.\n");
313 CHECK_NE(personality(old_personality | ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE), -1);
314 reexec = true;
317 #endif
318 #if SANITIZER_LINUX && (defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__loongarch_lp64))
319 // Initialize the xor key used in {sig}{set,long}jump.
320 InitializeLongjmpXorKey();
321 #endif
322 if (reexec)
323 ReExec();
326 CheckAndProtect();
327 InitTlsSize();
328 #endif // !SANITIZER_GO
331 #if !SANITIZER_GO
332 // Extract file descriptors passed to glibc internal __res_iclose function.
333 // This is required to properly "close" the fds, because we do not see internal
334 // closes within glibc. The code is a pure hack.
335 int ExtractResolvFDs(void *state, int *fds, int nfd) {
336 #if SANITIZER_LINUX && !SANITIZER_ANDROID
337 int cnt = 0;
338 struct __res_state *statp = (struct __res_state*)state;
339 for (int i = 0; i < MAXNS && cnt < nfd; i++) {
340 if (statp->_u._ext.nsaddrs[i] && statp->_u._ext.nssocks[i] != -1)
341 fds[cnt++] = statp->_u._ext.nssocks[i];
343 return cnt;
344 #else
345 return 0;
346 #endif
349 // Extract file descriptors passed via UNIX domain sockets.
350 // This is required to properly handle "open" of these fds.
351 // see 'man recvmsg' and 'man 3 cmsg'.
352 int ExtractRecvmsgFDs(void *msgp, int *fds, int nfd) {
353 int res = 0;
354 msghdr *msg = (msghdr*)msgp;
355 struct cmsghdr *cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(msg);
356 for (; cmsg; cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(msg, cmsg)) {
357 if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_SOCKET || cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS)
358 continue;
359 int n = (cmsg->cmsg_len - CMSG_LEN(0)) / sizeof(fds[0]);
360 for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
361 fds[res++] = ((int*)CMSG_DATA(cmsg))[i];
362 if (res == nfd)
363 return res;
366 return res;
369 // Reverse operation of libc stack pointer mangling
370 static uptr UnmangleLongJmpSp(uptr mangled_sp) {
371 #if defined(__x86_64__)
372 # if SANITIZER_LINUX
373 // Reverse of:
374 // xor %fs:0x30, %rsi
375 // rol $0x11, %rsi
376 uptr sp;
377 asm("ror $0x11, %0 \n"
378 "xor %%fs:0x30, %0 \n"
379 : "=r" (sp)
380 : "0" (mangled_sp));
381 return sp;
382 # else
383 return mangled_sp;
384 # endif
385 #elif defined(__aarch64__)
386 # if SANITIZER_LINUX
387 return mangled_sp ^ longjmp_xor_key;
388 # else
389 return mangled_sp;
390 # endif
391 #elif defined(__loongarch_lp64)
392 return mangled_sp ^ longjmp_xor_key;
393 #elif defined(__powerpc64__)
394 // Reverse of:
395 // ld r4, -28696(r13)
396 // xor r4, r3, r4
397 uptr xor_key;
398 asm("ld %0, -28696(%%r13)" : "=r" (xor_key));
399 return mangled_sp ^ xor_key;
400 #elif defined(__mips__)
401 return mangled_sp;
402 #elif defined(__s390x__)
403 // tcbhead_t.stack_guard
404 uptr xor_key = ((uptr *)__builtin_thread_pointer())[5];
405 return mangled_sp ^ xor_key;
406 #else
407 #error "Unknown platform"
408 #endif
411 #if SANITIZER_NETBSD
412 # ifdef __x86_64__
413 # define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 6
414 # else
415 # error unsupported
416 # endif
417 #elif defined(__powerpc__)
418 # define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 0
419 #elif SANITIZER_FREEBSD
420 # ifdef __aarch64__
421 # define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 1
422 # else
423 # define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 2
424 # endif
425 #elif SANITIZER_LINUX
426 # ifdef __aarch64__
427 # define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 13
428 # elif defined(__loongarch__)
429 # define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 1
430 # elif defined(__mips64)
431 # define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 1
432 # elif defined(__s390x__)
433 # define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 9
434 # else
435 # define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 6
436 # endif
437 #endif
439 uptr ExtractLongJmpSp(uptr *env) {
440 uptr mangled_sp = env[LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT];
441 return UnmangleLongJmpSp(mangled_sp);
444 #if INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY
445 // GLIBC mangles the function pointers in jmp_buf (used in {set,long}*jmp
446 // functions) by XORing them with a random key. For AArch64 it is a global
447 // variable rather than a TCB one (as for x86_64/powerpc). We obtain the key by
448 // issuing a setjmp and XORing the SP pointer values to derive the key.
449 static void InitializeLongjmpXorKey() {
450 // 1. Call REAL(setjmp), which stores the mangled SP in env.
451 jmp_buf env;
452 REAL(_setjmp)(env);
454 // 2. Retrieve vanilla/mangled SP.
455 uptr sp;
456 #ifdef __loongarch__
457 asm("move %0, $sp" : "=r" (sp));
458 #else
459 asm("mov %0, sp" : "=r" (sp));
460 #endif
461 uptr mangled_sp = ((uptr *)&env)[LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT];
463 // 3. xor SPs to obtain key.
464 longjmp_xor_key = mangled_sp ^ sp;
466 #endif
468 extern "C" void __tsan_tls_initialization() {}
470 void ImitateTlsWrite(ThreadState *thr, uptr tls_addr, uptr tls_size) {
471 // Check that the thr object is in tls;
472 const uptr thr_beg = (uptr)thr;
473 const uptr thr_end = (uptr)thr + sizeof(*thr);
474 CHECK_GE(thr_beg, tls_addr);
475 CHECK_LE(thr_beg, tls_addr + tls_size);
476 CHECK_GE(thr_end, tls_addr);
477 CHECK_LE(thr_end, tls_addr + tls_size);
478 // Since the thr object is huge, skip it.
479 const uptr pc = StackTrace::GetNextInstructionPc(
480 reinterpret_cast<uptr>(__tsan_tls_initialization));
481 MemoryRangeImitateWrite(thr, pc, tls_addr, thr_beg - tls_addr);
482 MemoryRangeImitateWrite(thr, pc, thr_end, tls_addr + tls_size - thr_end);
485 // Note: this function runs with async signals enabled,
486 // so it must not touch any tsan state.
487 int call_pthread_cancel_with_cleanup(int (*fn)(void *arg),
488 void (*cleanup)(void *arg), void *arg) {
489 // pthread_cleanup_push/pop are hardcore macros mess.
490 // We can't intercept nor call them w/o including pthread.h.
491 int res;
492 pthread_cleanup_push(cleanup, arg);
493 res = fn(arg);
494 pthread_cleanup_pop(0);
495 return res;
497 #endif // !SANITIZER_GO
499 #if !SANITIZER_GO
500 void ReplaceSystemMalloc() { }
501 #endif
503 #if !SANITIZER_GO
504 #if SANITIZER_ANDROID
505 // On Android, one thread can call intercepted functions after
506 // DestroyThreadState(), so add a fake thread state for "dead" threads.
507 static ThreadState *dead_thread_state = nullptr;
509 ThreadState *cur_thread() {
510 ThreadState* thr = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(*get_android_tls_ptr());
511 if (thr == nullptr) {
512 __sanitizer_sigset_t emptyset;
513 internal_sigfillset(&emptyset);
514 __sanitizer_sigset_t oldset;
515 CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &emptyset, &oldset));
516 thr = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(*get_android_tls_ptr());
517 if (thr == nullptr) {
518 thr = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(MmapOrDie(sizeof(ThreadState),
519 "ThreadState"));
520 *get_android_tls_ptr() = reinterpret_cast<uptr>(thr);
521 if (dead_thread_state == nullptr) {
522 dead_thread_state = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(
523 MmapOrDie(sizeof(ThreadState), "ThreadState"));
524 dead_thread_state->fast_state.SetIgnoreBit();
525 dead_thread_state->ignore_interceptors = 1;
526 dead_thread_state->is_dead = true;
527 *const_cast<u32*>(&dead_thread_state->tid) = -1;
528 CHECK_EQ(0, internal_mprotect(dead_thread_state, sizeof(ThreadState),
529 PROT_READ));
532 CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldset, nullptr));
534 return thr;
537 void set_cur_thread(ThreadState *thr) {
538 *get_android_tls_ptr() = reinterpret_cast<uptr>(thr);
541 void cur_thread_finalize() {
542 __sanitizer_sigset_t emptyset;
543 internal_sigfillset(&emptyset);
544 __sanitizer_sigset_t oldset;
545 CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &emptyset, &oldset));
546 ThreadState* thr = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(*get_android_tls_ptr());
547 if (thr != dead_thread_state) {
548 *get_android_tls_ptr() = reinterpret_cast<uptr>(dead_thread_state);
549 UnmapOrDie(thr, sizeof(ThreadState));
551 CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldset, nullptr));
553 #endif // SANITIZER_ANDROID
554 #endif // if !SANITIZER_GO
556 } // namespace __tsan
558 #endif // SANITIZER_LINUX || SANITIZER_FREEBSD || SANITIZER_NETBSD