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[ALSA] pcsp: remove downsampling
[linux-2.6/zen-sources.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c
blob308e2cf17d75ef363907243359fcf1c64a9d0800
1 /*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
16 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
18 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
19 *
20 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
21 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
22 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
23 */
24
25 #include <linux/init.h>
26 #include <linux/kernel.h>
27 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
28 #include <linux/errno.h>
29 #include <linux/sched.h>
30 #include <linux/security.h>
31 #include <linux/xattr.h>
32 #include <linux/capability.h>
33 #include <linux/unistd.h>
34 #include <linux/mm.h>
35 #include <linux/mman.h>
36 #include <linux/slab.h>
37 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
38 #include <linux/swap.h>
39 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
40 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
41 #include <linux/file.h>
42 #include <linux/namei.h>
43 #include <linux/mount.h>
44 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
45 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
46 #include <linux/kd.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
50 #include <net/icmp.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
70 #include <net/ipv6.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78
79 #include "avc.h"
80 #include "objsec.h"
81 #include "netif.h"
82 #include "netnode.h"
83 #include "netport.h"
84 #include "xfrm.h"
85 #include "netlabel.h"
86 #include "audit.h"
87
88 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
89 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
90
91 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
92
93 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
94 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
95 extern int selinux_compat_net;
96 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
97
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
103
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
105 {
106 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
107 return 1;
108 }
109 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
110 #endif
111
112 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
113 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
114
115 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
116 {
117 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
118 return 1;
119 }
120 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
121 #else
122 int selinux_enabled = 1;
123 #endif
124
125 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
126 static struct security_operations *original_ops;
127
128 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
129 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
130 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
131 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
132 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
133
134 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
135 before the policy was loaded. */
136 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
137 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
138
139 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
140
141 /**
142 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
143 *
144 * Description:
145 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
146 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
147 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
148 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
149 *
150 */
151 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
152 {
153 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
154 }
155
156 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
157
158 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
159 {
160 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
161
162 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
163 if (!tsec)
164 return -ENOMEM;
165
166 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
167 task->security = tsec;
168
169 return 0;
170 }
171
172 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
173 {
174 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
175 task->security = NULL;
176 kfree(tsec);
177 }
178
179 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
180 {
181 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
182 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
183
184 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
185 if (!isec)
186 return -ENOMEM;
187
188 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
189 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
190 isec->inode = inode;
191 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
192 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
193 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
194 inode->i_security = isec;
195
196 return 0;
197 }
198
199 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
200 {
201 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
202 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
203
204 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
205 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
206 list_del_init(&isec->list);
207 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
208
209 inode->i_security = NULL;
210 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
211 }
212
213 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
214 {
215 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
216 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
217
218 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
219 if (!fsec)
220 return -ENOMEM;
221
222 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
223 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
224 file->f_security = fsec;
225
226 return 0;
227 }
228
229 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
230 {
231 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
232 file->f_security = NULL;
233 kfree(fsec);
234 }
235
236 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
237 {
238 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
239
240 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
241 if (!sbsec)
242 return -ENOMEM;
243
244 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
245 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
246 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
247 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
248 sbsec->sb = sb;
249 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
250 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
251 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
252 sb->s_security = sbsec;
253
254 return 0;
255 }
256
257 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
258 {
259 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
260
261 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
262 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
263 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
264 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
265
266 sb->s_security = NULL;
267 kfree(sbsec);
268 }
269
270 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
271 {
272 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
273
274 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
275 if (!ssec)
276 return -ENOMEM;
277
278 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
279 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
280 sk->sk_security = ssec;
281
282 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
283
284 return 0;
285 }
286
287 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
288 {
289 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
290
291 sk->sk_security = NULL;
292 kfree(ssec);
293 }
294
295 /* The security server must be initialized before
296 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
297 extern int ss_initialized;
298
299 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
300
301 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
302 "uses xattr",
303 "uses transition SIDs",
304 "uses task SIDs",
305 "uses genfs_contexts",
306 "not configured for labeling",
307 "uses mountpoint labeling",
308 };
309
310 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
311
312 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
313 {
314 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
315 }
316
317 enum {
318 Opt_error = -1,
319 Opt_context = 1,
320 Opt_fscontext = 2,
321 Opt_defcontext = 3,
322 Opt_rootcontext = 4,
323 };
324
325 static match_table_t tokens = {
326 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
327 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
328 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
329 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
330 {Opt_error, NULL},
331 };
332
333 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
334
335 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
336 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
337 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
338 {
339 int rc;
340
341 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
342 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
343 if (rc)
344 return rc;
345
346 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
347 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
348 return rc;
349 }
350
351 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
352 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
353 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
354 {
355 int rc;
356 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
357 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
358 if (rc)
359 return rc;
360
361 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
362 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
363 return rc;
364 }
365
366 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
367 {
368 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
369 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
370 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
371 int rc = 0;
372
373 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
374 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
375 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
376 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
377 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
378 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
379 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
380 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
381 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
382 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
383 goto out;
384 }
385 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
386 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
387 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
388 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
389 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
390 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
391 else
392 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
393 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
394 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
395 goto out;
396 }
397 }
398
399 sbsec->initialized = 1;
400
401 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
402 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
403 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
404 else
405 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
406 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
407 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
408
409 /* Initialize the root inode. */
410 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
411
412 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
413 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
414 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
415 populates itself. */
416 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
417 next_inode:
418 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
419 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
420 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
421 struct inode_security_struct, list);
422 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
423 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
424 inode = igrab(inode);
425 if (inode) {
426 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
427 inode_doinit(inode);
428 iput(inode);
429 }
430 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
431 list_del_init(&isec->list);
432 goto next_inode;
433 }
434 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
435 out:
436 return rc;
437 }
438
439 /*
440 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
441 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
442 * mount options, or whatever.
443 */
444 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
445 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
446 {
447 int rc = 0, i;
448 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
449 char *context = NULL;
450 u32 len;
451 char tmp;
452
453 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
454
455 if (!sbsec->initialized)
456 return -EINVAL;
457
458 if (!ss_initialized)
459 return -EINVAL;
460
461 /*
462 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
463 * settings this is going to need a mask
464 */
465 tmp = sbsec->flags;
466 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
467 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
468 if (tmp & 0x01)
469 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
470 tmp >>= 1;
471 }
472
473 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
474 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
475 rc = -ENOMEM;
476 goto out_free;
477 }
478
479 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
480 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
481 rc = -ENOMEM;
482 goto out_free;
483 }
484
485 i = 0;
486 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
487 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
488 if (rc)
489 goto out_free;
490 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
491 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
492 }
493 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
494 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
495 if (rc)
496 goto out_free;
497 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
498 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
499 }
500 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
501 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
502 if (rc)
503 goto out_free;
504 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
505 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
506 }
507 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
508 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
509 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
510
511 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
512 if (rc)
513 goto out_free;
514 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
515 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
516 }
517
518 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
519
520 return 0;
521
522 out_free:
523 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
524 return rc;
525 }
526
527 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
528 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
529 {
530 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
531 if (sbsec->initialized)
532 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
533 (old_sid != new_sid))
534 return 1;
535
536 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
537 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
538 */
539 if (!sbsec->initialized)
540 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
541 return 1;
542 return 0;
543 }
544
545 /*
546 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
547 * labeling information.
548 */
549 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
550 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
551 {
552 int rc = 0, i;
553 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
554 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
555 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
556 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
557 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
558 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
559 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
560 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
561 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
562 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
563
564 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
565
566 if (!ss_initialized) {
567 if (!num_opts) {
568 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
569 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
570 server is ready to handle calls. */
571 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
572 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
573 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
574 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
575 goto out;
576 }
577 rc = -EINVAL;
578 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
579 "before the security server is initialized\n");
580 goto out;
581 }
582
583 /*
584 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
585 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
586 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
587 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
588 *
589 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
590 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
591 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
592 * will be used for both mounts)
593 */
594 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
595 && (num_opts == 0))
596 goto out;
597
598 /*
599 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
600 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
601 * than once with different security options.
602 */
603 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
604 u32 sid;
605 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
606 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
607 if (rc) {
608 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
609 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
610 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
611 goto out;
612 }
613 switch (flags[i]) {
614 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
615 fscontext_sid = sid;
616
617 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
618 fscontext_sid))
619 goto out_double_mount;
620
621 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
622 break;
623 case CONTEXT_MNT:
624 context_sid = sid;
625
626 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
627 context_sid))
628 goto out_double_mount;
629
630 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
631 break;
632 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
633 rootcontext_sid = sid;
634
635 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
636 rootcontext_sid))
637 goto out_double_mount;
638
639 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
640
641 break;
642 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
643 defcontext_sid = sid;
644
645 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
646 defcontext_sid))
647 goto out_double_mount;
648
649 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
650
651 break;
652 default:
653 rc = -EINVAL;
654 goto out;
655 }
656 }
657
658 if (sbsec->initialized) {
659 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
660 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
661 goto out_double_mount;
662 rc = 0;
663 goto out;
664 }
665
666 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
667 sbsec->proc = 1;
668
669 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
670 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
671 if (rc) {
672 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
673 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
674 goto out;
675 }
676
677 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
678 if (fscontext_sid) {
679
680 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
681 if (rc)
682 goto out;
683
684 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
685 }
686
687 /*
688 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
689 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
690 * the superblock context if not already set.
691 */
692 if (context_sid) {
693 if (!fscontext_sid) {
694 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
695 if (rc)
696 goto out;
697 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
698 } else {
699 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
700 if (rc)
701 goto out;
702 }
703 if (!rootcontext_sid)
704 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
705
706 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
707 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
708 }
709
710 if (rootcontext_sid) {
711 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
712 if (rc)
713 goto out;
714
715 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
716 root_isec->initialized = 1;
717 }
718
719 if (defcontext_sid) {
720 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
721 rc = -EINVAL;
722 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
723 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
724 goto out;
725 }
726
727 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
728 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
729 sbsec, tsec);
730 if (rc)
731 goto out;
732 }
733
734 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
735 }
736
737 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
738 out:
739 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
740 return rc;
741 out_double_mount:
742 rc = -EINVAL;
743 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
744 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
745 goto out;
746 }
747
748 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
749 struct super_block *newsb)
750 {
751 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
752 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
753
754 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
755 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
756 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
757
758 /*
759 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
760 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
761 * with it later
762 */
763 if (!ss_initialized) {
764 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
765 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
766 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
767 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
768 return;
769 }
770
771 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
772 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
773
774 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
775 if (newsbsec->initialized)
776 return;
777
778 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
779
780 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
781
782 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
783 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
784 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
785
786 if (set_context) {
787 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
788
789 if (!set_fscontext)
790 newsbsec->sid = sid;
791 if (!set_rootcontext) {
792 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
793 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
794 newisec->sid = sid;
795 }
796 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
797 }
798 if (set_rootcontext) {
799 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
800 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
801 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
802 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
803
804 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
805 }
806
807 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
808 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
809 }
810
811 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
812 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
813 {
814 char *p;
815 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
816 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
817 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
818
819 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
820
821 /* Standard string-based options. */
822 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
823 int token;
824 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
825
826 if (!*p)
827 continue;
828
829 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
830
831 switch (token) {
832 case Opt_context:
833 if (context || defcontext) {
834 rc = -EINVAL;
835 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
836 goto out_err;
837 }
838 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
839 if (!context) {
840 rc = -ENOMEM;
841 goto out_err;
842 }
843 break;
844
845 case Opt_fscontext:
846 if (fscontext) {
847 rc = -EINVAL;
848 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
849 goto out_err;
850 }
851 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
852 if (!fscontext) {
853 rc = -ENOMEM;
854 goto out_err;
855 }
856 break;
857
858 case Opt_rootcontext:
859 if (rootcontext) {
860 rc = -EINVAL;
861 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
862 goto out_err;
863 }
864 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
865 if (!rootcontext) {
866 rc = -ENOMEM;
867 goto out_err;
868 }
869 break;
870
871 case Opt_defcontext:
872 if (context || defcontext) {
873 rc = -EINVAL;
874 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
875 goto out_err;
876 }
877 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
878 if (!defcontext) {
879 rc = -ENOMEM;
880 goto out_err;
881 }
882 break;
883
884 default:
885 rc = -EINVAL;
886 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
887 goto out_err;
888
889 }
890 }
891
892 rc = -ENOMEM;
893 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
894 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
895 goto out_err;
896
897 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
898 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
899 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
900 goto out_err;
901 }
902
903 if (fscontext) {
904 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
905 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
906 }
907 if (context) {
908 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
909 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
910 }
911 if (rootcontext) {
912 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
913 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
914 }
915 if (defcontext) {
916 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
917 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
918 }
919
920 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
921 return 0;
922
923 out_err:
924 kfree(context);
925 kfree(defcontext);
926 kfree(fscontext);
927 kfree(rootcontext);
928 return rc;
929 }
930 /*
931 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
932 */
933 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
934 {
935 int rc = 0;
936 char *options = data;
937 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
938
939 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
940
941 if (!data)
942 goto out;
943
944 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
945
946 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
947 if (rc)
948 goto out_err;
949
950 out:
951 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
952
953 out_err:
954 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
955 return rc;
956 }
957
958 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
959 {
960 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
961 case S_IFSOCK:
962 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
963 case S_IFLNK:
964 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
965 case S_IFREG:
966 return SECCLASS_FILE;
967 case S_IFBLK:
968 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
969 case S_IFDIR:
970 return SECCLASS_DIR;
971 case S_IFCHR:
972 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
973 case S_IFIFO:
974 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
975
976 }
977
978 return SECCLASS_FILE;
979 }
980
981 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
982 {
983 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
984 }
985
986 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
987 {
988 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
989 }
990
991 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
992 {
993 switch (family) {
994 case PF_UNIX:
995 switch (type) {
996 case SOCK_STREAM:
997 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
998 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
999 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1000 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1001 }
1002 break;
1003 case PF_INET:
1004 case PF_INET6:
1005 switch (type) {
1006 case SOCK_STREAM:
1007 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1008 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1009 else
1010 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1011 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1012 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1013 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1014 else
1015 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1016 case SOCK_DCCP:
1017 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1018 default:
1019 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1020 }
1021 break;
1022 case PF_NETLINK:
1023 switch (protocol) {
1024 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1025 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1026 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1027 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1028 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1029 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1030 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1031 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1032 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1033 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1034 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1035 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1036 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1037 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1038 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1039 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1040 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1041 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1042 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1043 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1044 default:
1045 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1046 }
1047 case PF_PACKET:
1048 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1049 case PF_KEY:
1050 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1051 case PF_APPLETALK:
1052 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1053 }
1054
1055 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1056 }
1057
1058 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1059 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1060 u16 tclass,
1061 u32 *sid)
1062 {
1063 int buflen, rc;
1064 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1065
1066 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1067 if (!buffer)
1068 return -ENOMEM;
1069
1070 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1071 end = buffer+buflen;
1072 *--end = '\0';
1073 buflen--;
1074 path = end-1;
1075 *path = '/';
1076 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1077 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1078 if (buflen < 0)
1079 break;
1080 end -= de->namelen;
1081 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1082 *--end = '/';
1083 path = end;
1084 de = de->parent;
1085 }
1086 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1087 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1088 return rc;
1089 }
1090 #else
1091 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1092 u16 tclass,
1093 u32 *sid)
1094 {
1095 return -EINVAL;
1096 }
1097 #endif
1098
1099 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1100 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1101 {
1102 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1103 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1104 u32 sid;
1105 struct dentry *dentry;
1106 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1107 char *context = NULL;
1108 unsigned len = 0;
1109 int rc = 0;
1110
1111 if (isec->initialized)
1112 goto out;
1113
1114 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1115 if (isec->initialized)
1116 goto out_unlock;
1117
1118 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1119 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1120 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1121 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1122 server is ready to handle calls. */
1123 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1124 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1125 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1126 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1127 goto out_unlock;
1128 }
1129
1130 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1131 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1132 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1133 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1134 break;
1135 }
1136
1137 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1138 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1139 if (opt_dentry) {
1140 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1141 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1142 } else {
1143 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1144 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1145 }
1146 if (!dentry) {
1147 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1148 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1149 inode->i_ino);
1150 goto out_unlock;
1151 }
1152
1153 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1154 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1155 if (!context) {
1156 rc = -ENOMEM;
1157 dput(dentry);
1158 goto out_unlock;
1159 }
1160 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1161 context, len);
1162 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1163 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1164 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1165 NULL, 0);
1166 if (rc < 0) {
1167 dput(dentry);
1168 goto out_unlock;
1169 }
1170 kfree(context);
1171 len = rc;
1172 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1173 if (!context) {
1174 rc = -ENOMEM;
1175 dput(dentry);
1176 goto out_unlock;
1177 }
1178 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1179 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1180 context, len);
1181 }
1182 dput(dentry);
1183 if (rc < 0) {
1184 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1185 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1186 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1187 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1188 kfree(context);
1189 goto out_unlock;
1190 }
1191 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1192 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1193 rc = 0;
1194 } else {
1195 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1196 sbsec->def_sid,
1197 GFP_NOFS);
1198 if (rc) {
1199 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1200 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1201 __func__, context, -rc,
1202 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1203 kfree(context);
1204 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1205 rc = 0;
1206 break;
1207 }
1208 }
1209 kfree(context);
1210 isec->sid = sid;
1211 break;
1212 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1213 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1214 break;
1215 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1216 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1217 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1218
1219 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1220 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1221 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1222 sbsec->sid,
1223 isec->sclass,
1224 &sid);
1225 if (rc)
1226 goto out_unlock;
1227 isec->sid = sid;
1228 break;
1229 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1230 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1231 break;
1232 default:
1233 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1234 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1235
1236 if (sbsec->proc) {
1237 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1238 if (proci->pde) {
1239 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1240 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1241 isec->sclass,
1242 &sid);
1243 if (rc)
1244 goto out_unlock;
1245 isec->sid = sid;
1246 }
1247 }
1248 break;
1249 }
1250
1251 isec->initialized = 1;
1252
1253 out_unlock:
1254 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1255 out:
1256 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1257 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1258 return rc;
1259 }
1260
1261 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1262 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1263 {
1264 u32 perm = 0;
1265
1266 switch (sig) {
1267 case SIGCHLD:
1268 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1269 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1270 break;
1271 case SIGKILL:
1272 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1273 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1274 break;
1275 case SIGSTOP:
1276 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1277 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1278 break;
1279 default:
1280 /* All other signals. */
1281 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1282 break;
1283 }
1284
1285 return perm;
1286 }
1287
1288 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1289 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1290 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1291 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1292 u32 perms)
1293 {
1294 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1295
1296 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1297 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1298 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1299 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1300 }
1301
1302 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1303 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1304 #endif
1305
1306 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1307 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1308 int cap)
1309 {
1310 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1311 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1312 u16 sclass;
1313 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1314
1315 tsec = tsk->security;
1316
1317 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1318 ad.tsk = tsk;
1319 ad.u.cap = cap;
1320
1321 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1322 case 0:
1323 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1324 break;
1325 case 1:
1326 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1327 break;
1328 default:
1329 printk(KERN_ERR
1330 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1331 BUG();
1332 }
1333 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
1334 }
1335
1336 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1337 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1338 u32 perms)
1339 {
1340 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1341
1342 tsec = tsk->security;
1343
1344 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1345 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1346 }
1347
1348 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1349 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1350 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1351 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1352 struct inode *inode,
1353 u32 perms,
1354 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1355 {
1356 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1357 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1358 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1359
1360 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1361 return 0;
1362
1363 tsec = tsk->security;
1364 isec = inode->i_security;
1365
1366 if (!adp) {
1367 adp = &ad;
1368 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1369 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1370 }
1371
1372 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1373 }
1374
1375 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1376 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1377 pathname if needed. */
1378 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1379 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1380 struct dentry *dentry,
1381 u32 av)
1382 {
1383 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1384 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1385 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1386 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1387 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1388 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1389 }
1390
1391 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1392 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1393 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1394 check a particular permission to the file.
1395 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1396 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1397 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1398 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1399 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1400 struct file *file,
1401 u32 av)
1402 {
1403 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1404 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1405 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1406 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1407 int rc;
1408
1409 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1410 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1411
1412 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1413 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1414 SECCLASS_FD,
1415 FD__USE,
1416 &ad);
1417 if (rc)
1418 return rc;
1419 }
1420
1421 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1422 if (av)
1423 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1424
1425 return 0;
1426 }
1427
1428 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1429 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1430 struct dentry *dentry,
1431 u16 tclass)
1432 {
1433 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1434 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1435 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1436 u32 newsid;
1437 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1438 int rc;
1439
1440 tsec = current->security;
1441 dsec = dir->i_security;
1442 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1443
1444 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1445 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1446
1447 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1448 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1449 &ad);
1450 if (rc)
1451 return rc;
1452
1453 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1454 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1455 } else {
1456 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1457 &newsid);
1458 if (rc)
1459 return rc;
1460 }
1461
1462 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1463 if (rc)
1464 return rc;
1465
1466 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1467 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1468 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1469 }
1470
1471 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1472 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1473 struct task_struct *ctx)
1474 {
1475 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1476
1477 tsec = ctx->security;
1478
1479 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1480 }
1481
1482 #define MAY_LINK 0
1483 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1484 #define MAY_RMDIR 2
1485
1486 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1487 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1488 struct dentry *dentry,
1489 int kind)
1490
1491 {
1492 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1493 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1494 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1495 u32 av;
1496 int rc;
1497
1498 tsec = current->security;
1499 dsec = dir->i_security;
1500 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1501
1502 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1503 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1504
1505 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1506 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1507 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1508 if (rc)
1509 return rc;
1510
1511 switch (kind) {
1512 case MAY_LINK:
1513 av = FILE__LINK;
1514 break;
1515 case MAY_UNLINK:
1516 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1517 break;
1518 case MAY_RMDIR:
1519 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1520 break;
1521 default:
1522 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1523 __func__, kind);
1524 return 0;
1525 }
1526
1527 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1528 return rc;
1529 }
1530
1531 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1532 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1533 struct inode *new_dir,
1534 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1535 {
1536 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1537 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1538 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1539 u32 av;
1540 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1541 int rc;
1542
1543 tsec = current->security;
1544 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1545 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1546 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1547 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1548
1549 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1550
1551 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1552 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1553 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1554 if (rc)
1555 return rc;
1556 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1557 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1558 if (rc)
1559 return rc;
1560 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1561 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1562 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1563 if (rc)
1564 return rc;
1565 }
1566
1567 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1568 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1569 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1570 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1571 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1572 if (rc)
1573 return rc;
1574 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1575 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1576 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1577 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1578 new_isec->sclass,
1579 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1580 if (rc)
1581 return rc;
1582 }
1583
1584 return 0;
1585 }
1586
1587 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1588 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1589 struct super_block *sb,
1590 u32 perms,
1591 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1592 {
1593 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1594 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1595
1596 tsec = tsk->security;
1597 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1598 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1599 perms, ad);
1600 }
1601
1602 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1603 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1604 {
1605 u32 av = 0;
1606
1607 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1608 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1609 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1610 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1611 av |= FILE__READ;
1612
1613 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1614 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1615 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1616 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1617
1618 } else {
1619 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1620 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1621 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1622 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1623 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1624 av |= DIR__READ;
1625 }
1626
1627 return av;
1628 }
1629
1630 /*
1631 * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
1632 * open permission.
1633 */
1634 static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1635 {
1636 u32 av = file_mask_to_av(mode, mask);
1637
1638 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1639 /*
1640 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1641 */
1642 if (S_ISREG(mode))
1643 av |= FILE__OPEN;
1644 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1645 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1646 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1647 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1648 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1649 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1650 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1651 av |= DIR__OPEN;
1652 else
1653 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1654 "unknown mode:%x\n", __func__, mode);
1655 }
1656 return av;
1657 }
1658
1659 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1660 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1661 {
1662 u32 av = 0;
1663
1664 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1665 av |= FILE__READ;
1666 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1667 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1668 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1669 else
1670 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1671 }
1672 if (!av) {
1673 /*
1674 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1675 */
1676 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1677 }
1678
1679 return av;
1680 }
1681
1682 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1683
1684 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1685 {
1686 int rc;
1687
1688 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent, child);
1689 if (rc)
1690 return rc;
1691
1692 return task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1693 }
1694
1695 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1696 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1697 {
1698 int error;
1699
1700 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1701 if (error)
1702 return error;
1703
1704 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1705 }
1706
1707 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1708 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1709 {
1710 int error;
1711
1712 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1713 if (error)
1714 return error;
1715
1716 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1717 }
1718
1719 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1720 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1721 {
1722 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1723 }
1724
1725 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1726 {
1727 int rc;
1728
1729 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1730 if (rc)
1731 return rc;
1732
1733 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
1734 }
1735
1736 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1737 {
1738 int buflen, rc;
1739 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1740
1741 rc = -ENOMEM;
1742 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1743 if (!buffer)
1744 goto out;
1745
1746 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1747 end = buffer+buflen;
1748 *--end = '\0';
1749 buflen--;
1750 path = end-1;
1751 *path = '/';
1752 while (table) {
1753 const char *name = table->procname;
1754 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1755 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1756 if (buflen < 0)
1757 goto out_free;
1758 end -= namelen;
1759 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1760 *--end = '/';
1761 path = end;
1762 table = table->parent;
1763 }
1764 buflen -= 4;
1765 if (buflen < 0)
1766 goto out_free;
1767 end -= 4;
1768 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1769 path = end;
1770 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1771 out_free:
1772 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1773 out:
1774 return rc;
1775 }
1776
1777 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1778 {
1779 int error = 0;
1780 u32 av;
1781 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1782 u32 tsid;
1783 int rc;
1784
1785 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1786 if (rc)
1787 return rc;
1788
1789 tsec = current->security;
1790
1791 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1792 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1793 if (rc) {
1794 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1795 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1796 }
1797
1798 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1799 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1800 if (op == 001) {
1801 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1802 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1803 } else {
1804 av = 0;
1805 if (op & 004)
1806 av |= FILE__READ;
1807 if (op & 002)
1808 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1809 if (av)
1810 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1811 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1812 }
1813
1814 return error;
1815 }
1816
1817 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1818 {
1819 int rc = 0;
1820
1821 if (!sb)
1822 return 0;
1823
1824 switch (cmds) {
1825 case Q_SYNC:
1826 case Q_QUOTAON:
1827 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1828 case Q_SETINFO:
1829 case Q_SETQUOTA:
1830 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1831 NULL);
1832 break;
1833 case Q_GETFMT:
1834 case Q_GETINFO:
1835 case Q_GETQUOTA:
1836 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1837 NULL);
1838 break;
1839 default:
1840 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1841 break;
1842 }
1843 return rc;
1844 }
1845
1846 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1847 {
1848 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1849 }
1850
1851 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1852 {
1853 int rc;
1854
1855 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1856 if (rc)
1857 return rc;
1858
1859 switch (type) {
1860 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1861 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1862 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1863 break;
1864 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1865 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1866 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1867 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1868 break;
1869 case 0: /* Close log */
1870 case 1: /* Open log */
1871 case 2: /* Read from log */
1872 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1873 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1874 default:
1875 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1876 break;
1877 }
1878 return rc;
1879 }
1880
1881 /*
1882 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1883 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1884 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1885 *
1886 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1887 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1888 * the capability is granted.
1889 *
1890 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1891 * processes that allocate mappings.
1892 */
1893 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1894 {
1895 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1896 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1897
1898 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1899 if (rc == 0)
1900 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1901 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1902 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1903 0,
1904 NULL);
1905
1906 if (rc == 0)
1907 cap_sys_admin = 1;
1908
1909 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1910 }
1911
1912 /**
1913 * task_tracer_task - return the task that is tracing the given task
1914 * @task: task to consider
1915 *
1916 * Returns NULL if noone is tracing @task, or the &struct task_struct
1917 * pointer to its tracer.
1918 *
1919 * Must be called under rcu_read_lock().
1920 */
1921 static struct task_struct *task_tracer_task(struct task_struct *task)
1922 {
1923 if (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
1924 return rcu_dereference(task->parent);
1925 return NULL;
1926 }
1927
1928 /* binprm security operations */
1929
1930 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1931 {
1932 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1933
1934 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1935 if (!bsec)
1936 return -ENOMEM;
1937
1938 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1939 bsec->set = 0;
1940
1941 bprm->security = bsec;
1942 return 0;
1943 }
1944
1945 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1946 {
1947 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1948 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1949 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1950 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1951 u32 newsid;
1952 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1953 int rc;
1954
1955 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1956 if (rc)
1957 return rc;
1958
1959 bsec = bprm->security;
1960
1961 if (bsec->set)
1962 return 0;
1963
1964 tsec = current->security;
1965 isec = inode->i_security;
1966
1967 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1968 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1969
1970 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1971 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1972 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1973 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1974
1975 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1976 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1977 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1978 tsec->exec_sid = 0;
1979 } else {
1980 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1981 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1982 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1983 if (rc)
1984 return rc;
1985 }
1986
1987 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1988 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
1989
1990 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1991 newsid = tsec->sid;
1992
1993 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1994 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1995 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1996 if (rc)
1997 return rc;
1998 } else {
1999 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2000 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2001 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2002 if (rc)
2003 return rc;
2004
2005 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2006 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2007 if (rc)
2008 return rc;
2009
2010 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2011 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2012
2013 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2014 bsec->sid = newsid;
2015 }
2016
2017 bsec->set = 1;
2018 return 0;
2019 }
2020
2021 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2022 {
2023 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2024 }
2025
2026
2027 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2028 {
2029 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2030 int atsecure = 0;
2031
2032 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2033 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2034 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2035 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2036 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2037 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2038 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2039 }
2040
2041 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2042 }
2043
2044 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2045 {
2046 kfree(bprm->security);
2047 bprm->security = NULL;
2048 }
2049
2050 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2051 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2052
2053 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2054 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2055 {
2056 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2057 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2058 struct tty_struct *tty;
2059 struct fdtable *fdt;
2060 long j = -1;
2061 int drop_tty = 0;
2062
2063 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
2064 tty = get_current_tty();
2065 if (tty) {
2066 file_list_lock();
2067 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
2068 if (file) {
2069 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2070 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2071 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2072 file may belong to another process and we are only
2073 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2074 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2075 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2076 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2077 drop_tty = 1;
2078 }
2079 }
2080 file_list_unlock();
2081 }
2082 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
2083 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2084 if (drop_tty)
2085 no_tty();
2086
2087 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2088
2089 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2090
2091 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2092 for (;;) {
2093 unsigned long set, i;
2094 int fd;
2095
2096 j++;
2097 i = j * __NFDBITS;
2098 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2099 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2100 break;
2101 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2102 if (!set)
2103 continue;
2104 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2105 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2106 if (set & 1) {
2107 file = fget(i);
2108 if (!file)
2109 continue;
2110 if (file_has_perm(current,
2111 file,
2112 file_to_av(file))) {
2113 sys_close(i);
2114 fd = get_unused_fd();
2115 if (fd != i) {
2116 if (fd >= 0)
2117 put_unused_fd(fd);
2118 fput(file);
2119 continue;
2120 }
2121 if (devnull) {
2122 get_file(devnull);
2123 } else {
2124 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2125 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2126 devnull = NULL;
2127 put_unused_fd(fd);
2128 fput(file);
2129 continue;
2130 }
2131 }
2132 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2133 }
2134 fput(file);
2135 }
2136 }
2137 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2138
2139 }
2140 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2141 }
2142
2143 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2144 {
2145 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2146 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2147 u32 sid;
2148 int rc;
2149
2150 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2151
2152 tsec = current->security;
2153
2154 bsec = bprm->security;
2155 sid = bsec->sid;
2156
2157 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2158 bsec->unsafe = 0;
2159 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2160 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2161 unchanged and kill. */
2162 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2163 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2164 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2165 if (rc) {
2166 bsec->unsafe = 1;
2167 return;
2168 }
2169 }
2170
2171 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2172 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2173 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2174 struct task_struct *tracer;
2175 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2176 u32 ptsid = 0;
2177
2178 rcu_read_lock();
2179 tracer = task_tracer_task(current);
2180 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2181 sec = tracer->security;
2182 ptsid = sec->sid;
2183 }
2184 rcu_read_unlock();
2185
2186 if (ptsid != 0) {
2187 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2188 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2189 if (rc) {
2190 bsec->unsafe = 1;
2191 return;
2192 }
2193 }
2194 }
2195 tsec->sid = sid;
2196 }
2197 }
2198
2199 /*
2200 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2201 */
2202 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2203 {
2204 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2205 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2206 struct itimerval itimer;
2207 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2208 int rc, i;
2209
2210 tsec = current->security;
2211 bsec = bprm->security;
2212
2213 if (bsec->unsafe) {
2214 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2215 return;
2216 }
2217 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2218 return;
2219
2220 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2221 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2222
2223 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2224 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2225 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2226 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2227 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2228 will be checked against the new SID. */
2229 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2230 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2231 if (rc) {
2232 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2233 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2234 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2235 flush_signals(current);
2236 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2237 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2238 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2239 recalc_sigpending();
2240 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2241 }
2242
2243 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2244 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2245
2246 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2247 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2248 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2249 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2250 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2251 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2252 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2253 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2254 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2255 RLIMIT_STACK.*/
2256 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2257 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2258 if (rc) {
2259 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2260 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2261 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2262 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2263 }
2264 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
2265 /*
2266 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
2267 * to be refigured.
2268 */
2269 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
2270 }
2271 }
2272
2273 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2274 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2275 wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2276 }
2277
2278 /* superblock security operations */
2279
2280 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2281 {
2282 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2283 }
2284
2285 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2286 {
2287 superblock_free_security(sb);
2288 }
2289
2290 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2291 {
2292 if (plen > olen)
2293 return 0;
2294
2295 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2296 }
2297
2298 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2299 {
2300 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2301 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2302 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2303 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2304 }
2305
2306 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2307 {
2308 if (!*first) {
2309 **to = ',';
2310 *to += 1;
2311 } else
2312 *first = 0;
2313 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2314 *to += len;
2315 }
2316
2317 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2318 int len)
2319 {
2320 int current_size = 0;
2321
2322 if (!*first) {
2323 **to = '|';
2324 *to += 1;
2325 } else
2326 *first = 0;
2327
2328 while (current_size < len) {
2329 if (*from != '"') {
2330 **to = *from;
2331 *to += 1;
2332 }
2333 from += 1;
2334 current_size += 1;
2335 }
2336 }
2337
2338 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2339 {
2340 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2341 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2342 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2343 int open_quote = 0;
2344
2345 in_curr = orig;
2346 sec_curr = copy;
2347
2348 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2349 if (!nosec) {
2350 rc = -ENOMEM;
2351 goto out;
2352 }
2353
2354 nosec_save = nosec;
2355 fnosec = fsec = 1;
2356 in_save = in_end = orig;
2357
2358 do {
2359 if (*in_end == '"')
2360 open_quote = !open_quote;
2361 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2362 *in_end == '\0') {
2363 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2364
2365 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2366 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2367 else
2368 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2369
2370 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2371 }
2372 } while (*in_end++);
2373
2374 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2375 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2376 out:
2377 return rc;
2378 }
2379
2380 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2381 {
2382 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2383 int rc;
2384
2385 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2386 if (rc)
2387 return rc;
2388
2389 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2390 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2391 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2392 }
2393
2394 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2395 {
2396 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2397
2398 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2399 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2400 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2401 }
2402
2403 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2404 struct path *path,
2405 char *type,
2406 unsigned long flags,
2407 void *data)
2408 {
2409 int rc;
2410
2411 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2412 if (rc)
2413 return rc;
2414
2415 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2416 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2417 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2418 else
2419 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2420 FILE__MOUNTON);
2421 }
2422
2423 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2424 {
2425 int rc;
2426
2427 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2428 if (rc)
2429 return rc;
2430
2431 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2432 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2433 }
2434
2435 /* inode security operations */
2436
2437 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2438 {
2439 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2440 }
2441
2442 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2443 {
2444 inode_free_security(inode);
2445 }
2446
2447 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2448 char **name, void **value,
2449 size_t *len)
2450 {
2451 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2452 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2453 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2454 u32 newsid, clen;
2455 int rc;
2456 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2457
2458 tsec = current->security;
2459 dsec = dir->i_security;
2460 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2461
2462 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2463 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2464 } else {
2465 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2466 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2467 &newsid);
2468 if (rc) {
2469 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2470 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2471 "ino=%ld)\n",
2472 __func__,
2473 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2474 return rc;
2475 }
2476 }
2477
2478 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2479 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2480 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2481 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2482 isec->sid = newsid;
2483 isec->initialized = 1;
2484 }
2485
2486 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2487 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2488
2489 if (name) {
2490 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2491 if (!namep)
2492 return -ENOMEM;
2493 *name = namep;
2494 }
2495
2496 if (value && len) {
2497 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
2498 if (rc) {
2499 kfree(namep);
2500 return rc;
2501 }
2502 *value = context;
2503 *len = clen;
2504 }
2505
2506 return 0;
2507 }
2508
2509 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2510 {
2511 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2512 }
2513
2514 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2515 {
2516 int rc;
2517
2518 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2519 if (rc)
2520 return rc;
2521 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2522 }
2523
2524 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2525 {
2526 int rc;
2527
2528 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2529 if (rc)
2530 return rc;
2531 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2532 }
2533
2534 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2535 {
2536 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2537 }
2538
2539 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2540 {
2541 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2542 }
2543
2544 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2545 {
2546 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2547 }
2548
2549 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2550 {
2551 int rc;
2552
2553 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2554 if (rc)
2555 return rc;
2556
2557 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2558 }
2559
2560 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2561 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2562 {
2563 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2564 }
2565
2566 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2567 {
2568 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2569 }
2570
2571 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2572 {
2573 int rc;
2574
2575 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2576 if (rc)
2577 return rc;
2578 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2579 }
2580
2581 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2582 struct nameidata *nd)
2583 {
2584 int rc;
2585
2586 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2587 if (rc)
2588 return rc;
2589
2590 if (!mask) {
2591 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2592 return 0;
2593 }
2594
2595 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2596 open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2597 }
2598
2599 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2600 {
2601 int rc;
2602
2603 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2604 if (rc)
2605 return rc;
2606
2607 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2608 return 0;
2609
2610 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2611 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2612 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2613
2614 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2615 }
2616
2617 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2618 {
2619 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2620 }
2621
2622 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2623 {
2624 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2625 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2626 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2627 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2628 return -EPERM;
2629 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2630 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2631 Restrict to administrator. */
2632 return -EPERM;
2633 }
2634 }
2635
2636 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2637 ordinary setattr permission. */
2638 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2639 }
2640
2641 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2642 {
2643 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2644 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2645 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2646 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2647 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2648 u32 newsid;
2649 int rc = 0;
2650
2651 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2652 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2653
2654 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2655 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2656 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2657
2658 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2659 return -EPERM;
2660
2661 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2662 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2663
2664 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2665 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2666 if (rc)
2667 return rc;
2668
2669 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2670 if (rc)
2671 return rc;
2672
2673 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2674 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2675 if (rc)
2676 return rc;
2677
2678 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2679 isec->sclass);
2680 if (rc)
2681 return rc;
2682
2683 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2684 sbsec->sid,
2685 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2686 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2687 &ad);
2688 }
2689
2690 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2691 void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2692 {
2693 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2694 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2695 u32 newsid;
2696 int rc;
2697
2698 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2699 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2700 return;
2701 }
2702
2703 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2704 if (rc) {
2705 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
2706 "%s, rc=%d\n", __func__, (char *)value, -rc);
2707 return;
2708 }
2709
2710 isec->sid = newsid;
2711 return;
2712 }
2713
2714 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2715 {
2716 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2717 }
2718
2719 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2720 {
2721 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2722 }
2723
2724 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2725 {
2726 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2727 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2728
2729 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2730 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2731 return -EACCES;
2732 }
2733
2734 /*
2735 * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
2736 * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2737 * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2738 *
2739 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2740 */
2741 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2742 {
2743 u32 size;
2744 int error;
2745 char *context = NULL;
2746 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2747
2748 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2749 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2750
2751 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2752 if (error)
2753 return error;
2754 error = size;
2755 if (alloc) {
2756 *buffer = context;
2757 goto out_nofree;
2758 }
2759 kfree(context);
2760 out_nofree:
2761 return error;
2762 }
2763
2764 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2765 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2766 {
2767 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2768 u32 newsid;
2769 int rc;
2770
2771 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2772 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2773
2774 if (!value || !size)
2775 return -EACCES;
2776
2777 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2778 if (rc)
2779 return rc;
2780
2781 isec->sid = newsid;
2782 return 0;
2783 }
2784
2785 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2786 {
2787 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2788 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2789 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2790 return len;
2791 }
2792
2793 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2794 {
2795 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2796 }
2797
2798 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2799 {
2800 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2801 }
2802
2803 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2804 {
2805 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2806 *secid = isec->sid;
2807 }
2808
2809 /* file security operations */
2810
2811 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2812 {
2813 int rc;
2814 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2815
2816 if (!mask) {
2817 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2818 return 0;
2819 }
2820
2821 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2822 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2823 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2824
2825 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2826 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2827 if (rc)
2828 return rc;
2829
2830 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2831 }
2832
2833 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2834 {
2835 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2836 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2837 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2838 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2839
2840 if (!mask) {
2841 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2842 return 0;
2843 }
2844
2845 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2846 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2847 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2848
2849 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2850 }
2851
2852 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2853 {
2854 return file_alloc_security(file);
2855 }
2856
2857 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2858 {
2859 file_free_security(file);
2860 }
2861
2862 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2863 unsigned long arg)
2864 {
2865 int error = 0;
2866
2867 switch (cmd) {
2868 case FIONREAD:
2869 /* fall through */
2870 case FIBMAP:
2871 /* fall through */
2872 case FIGETBSZ:
2873 /* fall through */
2874 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2875 /* fall through */
2876 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2877 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2878 break;
2879
2880 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2881 /* fall through */
2882 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2883 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2884 break;
2885
2886 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2887 case FIONBIO:
2888 /* fall through */
2889 case FIOASYNC:
2890 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2891 break;
2892
2893 case KDSKBENT:
2894 case KDSKBSENT:
2895 error = task_has_capability(current, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2896 break;
2897
2898 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2899 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2900 */
2901 default:
2902 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2903 }
2904 return error;
2905 }
2906
2907 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2908 {
2909 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2910 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2911 /*
2912 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2913 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2914 * This has an additional check.
2915 */
2916 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2917 if (rc)
2918 return rc;
2919 }
2920 #endif
2921
2922 if (file) {
2923 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2924 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2925
2926 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2927 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2928 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2929
2930 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2931 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2932
2933 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2934 }
2935 return 0;
2936 }
2937
2938 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2939 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2940 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2941 {
2942 int rc = 0;
2943 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
2944
2945 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
2946 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
2947 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
2948 if (rc || addr_only)
2949 return rc;
2950
2951 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2952 prot = reqprot;
2953
2954 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2955 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2956 }
2957
2958 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2959 unsigned long reqprot,
2960 unsigned long prot)
2961 {
2962 int rc;
2963
2964 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2965 if (rc)
2966 return rc;
2967
2968 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2969 prot = reqprot;
2970
2971 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2972 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2973 rc = 0;
2974 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2975 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2976 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2977 PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
2978 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2979 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2980 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2981 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2982 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2983 /*
2984 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2985 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2986 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2987 * modified content. This typically should only
2988 * occur for text relocations.
2989 */
2990 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
2991 FILE__EXECMOD);
2992 }
2993 if (rc)
2994 return rc;
2995 }
2996 #endif
2997
2998 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2999 }
3000
3001 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3002 {
3003 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3004 }
3005
3006 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3007 unsigned long arg)
3008 {
3009 int err = 0;
3010
3011 switch (cmd) {
3012 case F_SETFL:
3013 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3014 err = -EINVAL;
3015 break;
3016 }
3017
3018 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3019 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3020 break;
3021 }
3022 /* fall through */
3023 case F_SETOWN:
3024 case F_SETSIG:
3025 case F_GETFL:
3026 case F_GETOWN:
3027 case F_GETSIG:
3028 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3029 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3030 break;
3031 case F_GETLK:
3032 case F_SETLK:
3033 case F_SETLKW:
3034 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3035 case F_GETLK64:
3036 case F_SETLK64:
3037 case F_SETLKW64:
3038 #endif
3039 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3040 err = -EINVAL;
3041 break;
3042 }
3043 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3044 break;
3045 }
3046
3047 return err;
3048 }
3049
3050 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3051 {
3052 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3053 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3054
3055 tsec = current->security;
3056 fsec = file->f_security;
3057 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
3058
3059 return 0;
3060 }
3061
3062 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3063 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3064 {
3065 struct file *file;
3066 u32 perm;
3067 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3068 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3069
3070 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3071 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3072
3073 tsec = tsk->security;
3074 fsec = file->f_security;
3075
3076 if (!signum)
3077 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3078 else
3079 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3080
3081 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
3082 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3083 }
3084
3085 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3086 {
3087 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3088 }
3089
3090 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3091 {
3092 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3093 struct inode *inode;
3094 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3095 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3096 fsec = file->f_security;
3097 isec = inode->i_security;
3098 /*
3099 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3100 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3101 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3102 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3103 * struct as its SID.
3104 */
3105 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3106 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3107 /*
3108 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3109 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3110 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3111 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3112 * new inode label or new policy.
3113 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3114 */
3115 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
3116 }
3117
3118 /* task security operations */
3119
3120 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3121 {
3122 int rc;
3123
3124 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3125 if (rc)
3126 return rc;
3127
3128 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3129 }
3130
3131 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3132 {
3133 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3134 int rc;
3135
3136 tsec1 = current->security;
3137
3138 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
3139 if (rc)
3140 return rc;
3141 tsec2 = tsk->security;
3142
3143 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3144 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3145
3146 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3147 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3148 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3149 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3150 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3151
3152 return 0;
3153 }
3154
3155 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3156 {
3157 task_free_security(tsk);
3158 }
3159
3160 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3161 {
3162 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3163 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3164 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3165 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3166 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3167 capable hook. */
3168 return 0;
3169 }
3170
3171 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3172 {
3173 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3174 }
3175
3176 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3177 {
3178 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3179 return 0;
3180 }
3181
3182 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3183 {
3184 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3185 }
3186
3187 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3188 {
3189 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3190 }
3191
3192 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3193 {
3194 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3195 }
3196
3197 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3198 {
3199 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3200 *secid = tsec->sid;
3201 }
3202
3203 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3204 {
3205 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3206 return 0;
3207 }
3208
3209 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3210 {
3211 int rc;
3212
3213 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3214 if (rc)
3215 return rc;
3216
3217 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3218 }
3219
3220 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3221 {
3222 int rc;
3223
3224 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3225 if (rc)
3226 return rc;
3227
3228 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3229 }
3230
3231 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3232 {
3233 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3234 }
3235
3236 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3237 {
3238 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3239 int rc;
3240
3241 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3242 if (rc)
3243 return rc;
3244
3245 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3246 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3247 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3248 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3249 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3250 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3251
3252 return 0;
3253 }
3254
3255 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3256 {
3257 int rc;
3258
3259 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3260 if (rc)
3261 return rc;
3262
3263 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3264 }
3265
3266 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3267 {
3268 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3269 }
3270
3271 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3272 {
3273 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3274 }
3275
3276 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3277 int sig, u32 secid)
3278 {
3279 u32 perm;
3280 int rc;
3281 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3282
3283 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3284 if (rc)
3285 return rc;
3286
3287 if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
3288 return 0;
3289
3290 if (!sig)
3291 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3292 else
3293 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3294 tsec = p->security;
3295 if (secid)
3296 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3297 else
3298 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3299 return rc;
3300 }
3301
3302 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3303 unsigned long arg2,
3304 unsigned long arg3,
3305 unsigned long arg4,
3306 unsigned long arg5)
3307 {
3308 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3309 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3310 the state of the current process. */
3311 return 0;
3312 }
3313
3314 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3315 {
3316 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3317 }
3318
3319 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3320 {
3321 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3322
3323 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3324
3325 tsec = p->security;
3326 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3327 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3328 return;
3329 }
3330
3331 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3332 struct inode *inode)
3333 {
3334 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3335 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3336
3337 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3338 isec->initialized = 1;
3339 return;
3340 }
3341
3342 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3343 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3344 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3345 {
3346 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3347 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3348
3349 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3350 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3351 if (ih == NULL)
3352 goto out;
3353
3354 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3355 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3356 goto out;
3357
3358 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3359 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3360 ret = 0;
3361
3362 if (proto)
3363 *proto = ih->protocol;
3364
3365 switch (ih->protocol) {
3366 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3367 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3368
3369 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3370 break;
3371
3372 offset += ihlen;
3373 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3374 if (th == NULL)
3375 break;
3376
3377 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3378 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3379 break;
3380 }
3381
3382 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3383 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3384
3385 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3386 break;
3387
3388 offset += ihlen;
3389 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3390 if (uh == NULL)
3391 break;
3392
3393 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3394 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3395 break;
3396 }
3397
3398 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3399 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3400
3401 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3402 break;
3403
3404 offset += ihlen;
3405 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3406 if (dh == NULL)
3407 break;
3408
3409 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3410 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3411 break;
3412 }
3413
3414 default:
3415 break;
3416 }
3417 out:
3418 return ret;
3419 }
3420
3421 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3422
3423 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3424 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3425 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3426 {
3427 u8 nexthdr;
3428 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3429 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3430
3431 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3432 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3433 if (ip6 == NULL)
3434 goto out;
3435
3436 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3437 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3438 ret = 0;
3439
3440 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3441 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3442 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3443 if (offset < 0)
3444 goto out;
3445
3446 if (proto)
3447 *proto = nexthdr;
3448
3449 switch (nexthdr) {
3450 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3451 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3452
3453 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3454 if (th == NULL)
3455 break;
3456
3457 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3458 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3459 break;
3460 }
3461
3462 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3463 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3464
3465 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3466 if (uh == NULL)
3467 break;
3468
3469 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3470 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3471 break;
3472 }
3473
3474 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3475 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3476
3477 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3478 if (dh == NULL)
3479 break;
3480
3481 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3482 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3483 break;
3484 }
3485
3486 /* includes fragments */
3487 default:
3488 break;
3489 }
3490 out:
3491 return ret;
3492 }
3493
3494 #endif /* IPV6 */
3495
3496 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3497 char **addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3498 {
3499 int ret = 0;
3500
3501 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3502 case PF_INET:
3503 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3504 if (ret || !addrp)
3505 break;
3506 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3507 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3508 break;
3509
3510 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3511 case PF_INET6:
3512 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3513 if (ret || !addrp)
3514 break;
3515 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3516 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3517 break;
3518 #endif /* IPV6 */
3519 default:
3520 break;
3521 }
3522
3523 if (unlikely(ret))
3524 printk(KERN_WARNING
3525 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3526 " unable to parse packet\n");
3527
3528 return ret;
3529 }
3530
3531 /**
3532 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3533 * @skb: the packet
3534 * @family: protocol family
3535 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3536 *
3537 * Description:
3538 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3539 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3540 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3541 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3542 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3543 * peer labels.
3544 *
3545 */
3546 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3547 {
3548 int err;
3549 u32 xfrm_sid;
3550 u32 nlbl_sid;
3551 u32 nlbl_type;
3552
3553 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3554 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3555
3556 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3557 if (unlikely(err)) {
3558 printk(KERN_WARNING
3559 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3560 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3561 return -EACCES;
3562 }
3563
3564 return 0;
3565 }
3566
3567 /* socket security operations */
3568 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3569 u32 perms)
3570 {
3571 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3572 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3573 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3574 int err = 0;
3575
3576 tsec = task->security;
3577 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3578
3579 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3580 goto out;
3581
3582 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3583 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3584 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3585
3586 out:
3587 return err;
3588 }
3589
3590 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3591 int protocol, int kern)
3592 {
3593 int err = 0;
3594 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3595 u32 newsid;
3596
3597 if (kern)
3598 goto out;
3599
3600 tsec = current->security;
3601 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3602 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3603 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3604 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3605
3606 out:
3607 return err;
3608 }
3609
3610 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3611 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3612 {
3613 int err = 0;
3614 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3615 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3616 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3617 u32 newsid;
3618
3619 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3620
3621 tsec = current->security;
3622 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3623 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3624 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3625 isec->initialized = 1;
3626
3627 if (sock->sk) {
3628 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3629 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3630 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3631 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3632 }
3633
3634 return err;
3635 }
3636
3637 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3638 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3639 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3640
3641 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3642 {
3643 u16 family;
3644 int err;
3645
3646 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3647 if (err)
3648 goto out;
3649
3650 /*
3651 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3652 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3653 * check the first address now.
3654 */
3655 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3656 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3657 char *addrp;
3658 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3659 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3660 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3661 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3662 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3663 unsigned short snum;
3664 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3665 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3666
3667 tsec = current->security;
3668 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3669
3670 if (family == PF_INET) {
3671 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3672 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3673 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3674 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3675 } else {
3676 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3677 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3678 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3679 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3680 }
3681
3682 if (snum) {
3683 int low, high;
3684
3685 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3686
3687 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3688 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3689 snum, &sid);
3690 if (err)
3691 goto out;
3692 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3693 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3694 ad.u.net.family = family;
3695 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3696 isec->sclass,
3697 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3698 if (err)
3699 goto out;
3700 }
3701 }
3702
3703 switch (isec->sclass) {
3704 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3705 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3706 break;
3707
3708 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3709 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3710 break;
3711
3712 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3713 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3714 break;
3715
3716 default:
3717 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3718 break;
3719 }
3720
3721 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3722 if (err)
3723 goto out;
3724
3725 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3726 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3727 ad.u.net.family = family;
3728
3729 if (family == PF_INET)
3730 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3731 else
3732 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3733
3734 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3735 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3736 if (err)
3737 goto out;
3738 }
3739 out:
3740 return err;
3741 }
3742
3743 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3744 {
3745 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3746 int err;
3747
3748 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3749 if (err)
3750 return err;
3751
3752 /*
3753 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3754 */
3755 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3756 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3757 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3758 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3759 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3760 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3761 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3762 unsigned short snum;
3763 u32 sid, perm;
3764
3765 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3766 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3767 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3768 return -EINVAL;
3769 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3770 } else {
3771 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3772 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3773 return -EINVAL;
3774 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3775 }
3776
3777 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3778 if (err)
3779 goto out;
3780
3781 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3782 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3783
3784 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3785 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3786 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3787 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3788 if (err)
3789 goto out;
3790 }
3791
3792 out:
3793 return err;
3794 }
3795
3796 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3797 {
3798 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3799 }
3800
3801 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3802 {
3803 int err;
3804 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3805 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3806
3807 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3808 if (err)
3809 return err;
3810
3811 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3812
3813 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3814 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3815 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3816 newisec->initialized = 1;
3817
3818 return 0;
3819 }
3820
3821 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3822 int size)
3823 {
3824 int rc;
3825
3826 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3827 if (rc)
3828 return rc;
3829
3830 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3831 }
3832
3833 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3834 int size, int flags)
3835 {
3836 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3837 }
3838
3839 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3840 {
3841 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3842 }
3843
3844 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3845 {
3846 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3847 }
3848
3849 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3850 {
3851 int err;
3852
3853 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3854 if (err)
3855 return err;
3856
3857 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3858 }
3859
3860 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3861 int optname)
3862 {
3863 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3864 }
3865
3866 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3867 {
3868 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3869 }
3870
3871 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3872 struct socket *other,
3873 struct sock *newsk)
3874 {
3875 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3876 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3877 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3878 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3879 int err;
3880
3881 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3882 if (err)
3883 return err;
3884
3885 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3886 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3887
3888 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3889 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3890
3891 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3892 isec->sclass,
3893 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3894 if (err)
3895 return err;
3896
3897 /* connecting socket */
3898 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3899 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3900
3901 /* server child socket */
3902 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3903 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3904 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3905
3906 return err;
3907 }
3908
3909 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3910 struct socket *other)
3911 {
3912 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3913 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3914 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3915 int err;
3916
3917 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3918 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3919
3920 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3921 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3922
3923 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3924 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3925 if (err)
3926 return err;
3927
3928 return 0;
3929 }
3930
3931 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3932 u32 peer_sid,
3933 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
3934 {
3935 int err;
3936 u32 if_sid;
3937 u32 node_sid;
3938
3939 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
3940 if (err)
3941 return err;
3942 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
3943 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
3944 if (err)
3945 return err;
3946
3947 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
3948 if (err)
3949 return err;
3950 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
3951 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
3952 }
3953
3954 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
3955 struct sk_buff *skb,
3956 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3957 u16 family,
3958 char *addrp)
3959 {
3960 int err;
3961 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3962 u16 sk_class;
3963 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
3964 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
3965
3966 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
3967 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
3968
3969 switch (sk_class) {
3970 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3971 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3972 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3973 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3974 break;
3975 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3976 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3977 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3978 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3979 break;
3980 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3981 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
3982 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
3983 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3984 break;
3985 default:
3986 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3987 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3988 recv_perm = 0;
3989 break;
3990 }
3991
3992 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
3993 if (err)
3994 return err;
3995 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3996 if (err)
3997 return err;
3998
3999 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4000 if (err)
4001 return err;
4002 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4003 if (err)
4004 return err;
4005
4006 if (!recv_perm)
4007 return 0;
4008 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4009 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4010 if (unlikely(err)) {
4011 printk(KERN_WARNING
4012 "SELinux: failure in"
4013 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4014 " network port label not found\n");
4015 return err;
4016 }
4017 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4018 }
4019
4020 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4021 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4022 u16 family, char *addrp)
4023 {
4024 int err;
4025 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4026 u32 peer_sid;
4027 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4028
4029 if (selinux_compat_net)
4030 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, ad,
4031 family, addrp);
4032 else
4033 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4034 PACKET__RECV, ad);
4035 if (err)
4036 return err;
4037
4038 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4039 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4040 if (err)
4041 return err;
4042 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4043 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad);
4044 } else {
4045 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad);
4046 if (err)
4047 return err;
4048 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, ad);
4049 }
4050
4051 return err;
4052 }
4053
4054 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4055 {
4056 int err;
4057 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4058 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4059 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4060 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4061 char *addrp;
4062
4063 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4064 return 0;
4065
4066 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4067 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4068 family = PF_INET;
4069
4070 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4071 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4072 ad.u.net.family = family;
4073 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4074 if (err)
4075 return err;
4076
4077 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4078 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4079 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4080 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4081 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4082 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4083 family, addrp);
4084
4085 if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
4086 u32 peer_sid;
4087
4088 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4089 if (err)
4090 return err;
4091 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4092 peer_sid, &ad);
4093 if (err)
4094 return err;
4095 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4096 PEER__RECV, &ad);
4097 }
4098
4099 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4100 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4101 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4102 if (err)
4103 return err;
4104 }
4105
4106 return err;
4107 }
4108
4109 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4110 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4111 {
4112 int err = 0;
4113 char *scontext;
4114 u32 scontext_len;
4115 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4116 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4117 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4118
4119 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4120
4121 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4122 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4123 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4124 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4125 }
4126 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4127 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
4128 goto out;
4129 }
4130
4131 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4132
4133 if (err)
4134 goto out;
4135
4136 if (scontext_len > len) {
4137 err = -ERANGE;
4138 goto out_len;
4139 }
4140
4141 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4142 err = -EFAULT;
4143
4144 out_len:
4145 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4146 err = -EFAULT;
4147
4148 kfree(scontext);
4149 out:
4150 return err;
4151 }
4152
4153 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4154 {
4155 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4156 u16 family;
4157
4158 if (sock)
4159 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4160 else if (skb && skb->sk)
4161 family = skb->sk->sk_family;
4162 else
4163 goto out;
4164
4165 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4166 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4167 else if (skb)
4168 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4169
4170 out:
4171 *secid = peer_secid;
4172 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4173 return -EINVAL;
4174 return 0;
4175 }
4176
4177 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4178 {
4179 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4180 }
4181
4182 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4183 {
4184 sk_free_security(sk);
4185 }
4186
4187 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4188 {
4189 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4190 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4191
4192 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4193 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4194 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4195
4196 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4197 }
4198
4199 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4200 {
4201 if (!sk)
4202 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4203 else {
4204 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4205
4206 *secid = sksec->sid;
4207 }
4208 }
4209
4210 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4211 {
4212 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4213 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4214
4215 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4216 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4217 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4218 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4219
4220 selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
4221 }
4222
4223 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4224 struct request_sock *req)
4225 {
4226 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4227 int err;
4228 u32 newsid;
4229 u32 peersid;
4230
4231 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid);
4232 if (err)
4233 return err;
4234 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4235 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4236 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4237 return 0;
4238 }
4239
4240 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4241 if (err)
4242 return err;
4243
4244 req->secid = newsid;
4245 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4246 return 0;
4247 }
4248
4249 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4250 const struct request_sock *req)
4251 {
4252 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4253
4254 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4255 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4256 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4257 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4258 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4259 time it will have been created and available. */
4260
4261 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4262 * thread with access to newsksec */
4263 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4264 }
4265
4266 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
4267 struct sk_buff *skb)
4268 {
4269 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4270
4271 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4272 }
4273
4274 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4275 struct flowi *fl)
4276 {
4277 fl->secid = req->secid;
4278 }
4279
4280 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4281 {
4282 int err = 0;
4283 u32 perm;
4284 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4285 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4286 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4287
4288 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4289 err = -EINVAL;
4290 goto out;
4291 }
4292 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4293
4294 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4295 if (err) {
4296 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4297 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4298 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4299 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4300 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4301 if (!selinux_enforcing)
4302 err = 0;
4303 }
4304
4305 /* Ignore */
4306 if (err == -ENOENT)
4307 err = 0;
4308 goto out;
4309 }
4310
4311 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4312 out:
4313 return err;
4314 }
4315
4316 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4317
4318 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4319 u16 family)
4320 {
4321 char *addrp;
4322 u32 peer_sid;
4323 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4324 u8 secmark_active;
4325 u8 peerlbl_active;
4326
4327 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4328 return NF_ACCEPT;
4329
4330 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4331 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4332 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4333 return NF_ACCEPT;
4334
4335 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4336 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4337 ad.u.net.family = family;
4338 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4339 return NF_DROP;
4340
4341 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4342 return NF_DROP;
4343
4344 if (peerlbl_active)
4345 if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4346 peer_sid, &ad) != 0)
4347 return NF_DROP;
4348
4349 if (secmark_active)
4350 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4351 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4352 return NF_DROP;
4353
4354 return NF_ACCEPT;
4355 }
4356
4357 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4358 struct sk_buff *skb,
4359 const struct net_device *in,
4360 const struct net_device *out,
4361 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4362 {
4363 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4364 }
4365
4366 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4367 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4368 struct sk_buff *skb,
4369 const struct net_device *in,
4370 const struct net_device *out,
4371 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4372 {
4373 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4374 }
4375 #endif /* IPV6 */
4376
4377 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4378 int ifindex,
4379 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4380 u16 family, char *addrp)
4381 {
4382 int err;
4383 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4384 u16 sk_class;
4385 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4386 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4387
4388 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4389 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4390
4391 switch (sk_class) {
4392 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4393 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4394 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4395 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4396 break;
4397 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4398 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4399 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4400 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4401 break;
4402 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4403 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4404 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4405 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4406 break;
4407 default:
4408 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4409 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4410 send_perm = 0;
4411 break;
4412 }
4413
4414 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4415 if (err)
4416 return err;
4417 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4418 return err;
4419
4420 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4421 if (err)
4422 return err;
4423 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4424 if (err)
4425 return err;
4426
4427 if (send_perm != 0)
4428 return 0;
4429
4430 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4431 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4432 if (unlikely(err)) {
4433 printk(KERN_WARNING
4434 "SELinux: failure in"
4435 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4436 " network port label not found\n");
4437 return err;
4438 }
4439 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4440 }
4441
4442 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4443 int ifindex,
4444 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4445 u16 family,
4446 char *addrp,
4447 u8 proto)
4448 {
4449 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4450 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4451
4452 if (sk == NULL)
4453 return NF_ACCEPT;
4454 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4455
4456 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4457 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4458 ad, family, addrp))
4459 return NF_DROP;
4460 } else {
4461 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4462 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, ad))
4463 return NF_DROP;
4464 }
4465
4466 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4467 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, ad, proto))
4468 return NF_DROP;
4469
4470 return NF_ACCEPT;
4471 }
4472
4473 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4474 u16 family)
4475 {
4476 u32 secmark_perm;
4477 u32 peer_sid;
4478 struct sock *sk;
4479 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4480 char *addrp;
4481 u8 proto;
4482 u8 secmark_active;
4483 u8 peerlbl_active;
4484
4485 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4486 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4487 ad.u.net.family = family;
4488 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4489 return NF_DROP;
4490
4491 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4492 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4493 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4494 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4495 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4496 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, &ad,
4497 family, addrp, proto);
4498
4499 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4500 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4501 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4502 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4503 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4504 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4505 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4506 return NF_ACCEPT;
4507
4508 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4509 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4510 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4511 return NF_ACCEPT;
4512
4513 /* if the packet is locally generated (skb->sk != NULL) then use the
4514 * socket's label as the peer label, otherwise the packet is being
4515 * forwarded through this system and we need to fetch the peer label
4516 * directly from the packet */
4517 sk = skb->sk;
4518 if (sk) {
4519 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4520 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4521 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4522 } else {
4523 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4524 return NF_DROP;
4525 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4526 }
4527
4528 if (secmark_active)
4529 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4530 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4531 return NF_DROP;
4532
4533 if (peerlbl_active) {
4534 u32 if_sid;
4535 u32 node_sid;
4536
4537 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4538 return NF_DROP;
4539 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4540 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4541 return NF_DROP;
4542
4543 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4544 return NF_DROP;
4545 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4546 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4547 return NF_DROP;
4548 }
4549
4550 return NF_ACCEPT;
4551 }
4552
4553 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4554 struct sk_buff *skb,
4555 const struct net_device *in,
4556 const struct net_device *out,
4557 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4558 {
4559 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4560 }
4561
4562 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4563 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4564 struct sk_buff *skb,
4565 const struct net_device *in,
4566 const struct net_device *out,
4567 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4568 {
4569 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4570 }
4571 #endif /* IPV6 */
4572
4573 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4574
4575 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4576 {
4577 int err;
4578
4579 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4580 if (err)
4581 return err;
4582
4583 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4584 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4585
4586 return err;
4587 }
4588
4589 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4590 {
4591 int err;
4592 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4593
4594 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4595 if (err)
4596 return err;
4597
4598 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4599 ad.u.cap = capability;
4600
4601 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4602 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4603 }
4604
4605 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4606 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4607 u16 sclass)
4608 {
4609 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4610 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4611
4612 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4613 if (!isec)
4614 return -ENOMEM;
4615
4616 isec->sclass = sclass;
4617 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4618 perm->security = isec;
4619
4620 return 0;
4621 }
4622
4623 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4624 {
4625 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4626 perm->security = NULL;
4627 kfree(isec);
4628 }
4629
4630 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4631 {
4632 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4633
4634 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4635 if (!msec)
4636 return -ENOMEM;
4637
4638 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4639 msg->security = msec;
4640
4641 return 0;
4642 }
4643
4644 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4645 {
4646 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4647
4648 msg->security = NULL;
4649 kfree(msec);
4650 }
4651
4652 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4653 u32 perms)
4654 {
4655 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4656 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4657 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4658
4659 tsec = current->security;
4660 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4661
4662 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4663 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4664
4665 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4666 }
4667
4668 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4669 {
4670 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4671 }
4672
4673 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4674 {
4675 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4676 }
4677
4678 /* message queue security operations */
4679 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4680 {
4681 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4682 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4683 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4684 int rc;
4685
4686 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4687 if (rc)
4688 return rc;
4689
4690 tsec = current->security;
4691 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4692
4693 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4694 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4695
4696 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4697 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
4698 if (rc) {
4699 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4700 return rc;
4701 }
4702 return 0;
4703 }
4704
4705 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4706 {
4707 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4708 }
4709
4710 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4711 {
4712 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4713 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4714 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4715
4716 tsec = current->security;
4717 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4718
4719 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4720 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4721
4722 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4723 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4724 }
4725
4726 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4727 {
4728 int err;
4729 int perms;
4730
4731 switch (cmd) {
4732 case IPC_INFO:
4733 case MSG_INFO:
4734 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4735 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4736 case IPC_STAT:
4737 case MSG_STAT:
4738 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4739 break;
4740 case IPC_SET:
4741 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4742 break;
4743 case IPC_RMID:
4744 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4745 break;
4746 default:
4747 return 0;
4748 }
4749
4750 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4751 return err;
4752 }
4753
4754 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4755 {
4756 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4757 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4758 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4759 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4760 int rc;
4761
4762 tsec = current->security;
4763 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4764 msec = msg->security;
4765
4766 /*
4767 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4768 */
4769 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4770 /*
4771 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4772 * message queue this message will be stored in
4773 */
4774 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4775 isec->sid,
4776 SECCLASS_MSG,
4777 &msec->sid);
4778 if (rc)
4779 return rc;
4780 }
4781
4782 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4783 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4784
4785 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4786 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4787 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
4788 if (!rc)
4789 /* Can this process send the message */
4790 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4791 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4792 if (!rc)
4793 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4794 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4795 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4796
4797 return rc;
4798 }
4799
4800 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4801 struct task_struct *target,
4802 long type, int mode)
4803 {
4804 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4805 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4806 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4807 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4808 int rc;
4809
4810 tsec = target->security;
4811 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4812 msec = msg->security;
4813
4814 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4815 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4816
4817 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4818 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4819 if (!rc)
4820 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4821 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4822 return rc;
4823 }
4824
4825 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4826 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4827 {
4828 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4829 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4830 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4831 int rc;
4832
4833 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4834 if (rc)
4835 return rc;
4836
4837 tsec = current->security;
4838 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4839
4840 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4841 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4842
4843 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4844 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
4845 if (rc) {
4846 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4847 return rc;
4848 }
4849 return 0;
4850 }
4851
4852 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4853 {
4854 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4855 }
4856
4857 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4858 {
4859 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4860 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4861 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4862
4863 tsec = current->security;
4864 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4865
4866 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4867 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4868
4869 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4870 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4871 }
4872
4873 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4874 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4875 {
4876 int perms;
4877 int err;
4878
4879 switch (cmd) {
4880 case IPC_INFO:
4881 case SHM_INFO:
4882 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4883 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4884 case IPC_STAT:
4885 case SHM_STAT:
4886 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4887 break;
4888 case IPC_SET:
4889 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4890 break;
4891 case SHM_LOCK:
4892 case SHM_UNLOCK:
4893 perms = SHM__LOCK;
4894 break;
4895 case IPC_RMID:
4896 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4897 break;
4898 default:
4899 return 0;
4900 }
4901
4902 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4903 return err;
4904 }
4905
4906 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4907 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4908 {
4909 u32 perms;
4910 int rc;
4911
4912 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4913 if (rc)
4914 return rc;
4915
4916 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4917 perms = SHM__READ;
4918 else
4919 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4920
4921 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4922 }
4923
4924 /* Semaphore security operations */
4925 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4926 {
4927 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4928 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4929 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4930 int rc;
4931
4932 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4933 if (rc)
4934 return rc;
4935
4936 tsec = current->security;
4937 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4938
4939 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4940 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4941
4942 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4943 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
4944 if (rc) {
4945 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4946 return rc;
4947 }
4948 return 0;
4949 }
4950
4951 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4952 {
4953 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4954 }
4955
4956 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4957 {
4958 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4959 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4960 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4961
4962 tsec = current->security;
4963 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4964
4965 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4966 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4967
4968 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4969 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4970 }
4971
4972 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4973 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4974 {
4975 int err;
4976 u32 perms;
4977
4978 switch (cmd) {
4979 case IPC_INFO:
4980 case SEM_INFO:
4981 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4982 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4983 case GETPID:
4984 case GETNCNT:
4985 case GETZCNT:
4986 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4987 break;
4988 case GETVAL:
4989 case GETALL:
4990 perms = SEM__READ;
4991 break;
4992 case SETVAL:
4993 case SETALL:
4994 perms = SEM__WRITE;
4995 break;
4996 case IPC_RMID:
4997 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
4998 break;
4999 case IPC_SET:
5000 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5001 break;
5002 case IPC_STAT:
5003 case SEM_STAT:
5004 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5005 break;
5006 default:
5007 return 0;
5008 }
5009
5010 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5011 return err;
5012 }
5013
5014 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5015 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5016 {
5017 u32 perms;
5018
5019 if (alter)
5020 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5021 else
5022 perms = SEM__READ;
5023
5024 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5025 }
5026
5027 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5028 {
5029 u32 av = 0;
5030
5031 av = 0;
5032 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5033 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5034 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5035 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5036
5037 if (av == 0)
5038 return 0;
5039
5040 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5041 }
5042
5043 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5044 {
5045 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5046 *secid = isec->sid;
5047 }
5048
5049 /* module stacking operations */
5050 static int selinux_register_security(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
5051 {
5052 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
5053 printk(KERN_ERR "%s: There is already a secondary security "
5054 "module registered.\n", __func__);
5055 return -EINVAL;
5056 }
5057
5058 secondary_ops = ops;
5059
5060 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
5061 __func__,
5062 name);
5063
5064 return 0;
5065 }
5066
5067 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5068 {
5069 if (inode)
5070 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5071 }
5072
5073 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5074 char *name, char **value)
5075 {
5076 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5077 u32 sid;
5078 int error;
5079 unsigned len;
5080
5081 if (current != p) {
5082 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5083 if (error)
5084 return error;
5085 }
5086
5087 tsec = p->security;
5088
5089 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5090 sid = tsec->sid;
5091 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5092 sid = tsec->osid;
5093 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5094 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
5095 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5096 sid = tsec->create_sid;
5097 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5098 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5099 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5100 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5101 else
5102 return -EINVAL;
5103
5104 if (!sid)
5105 return 0;
5106
5107 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5108 if (error)
5109 return error;
5110 return len;
5111 }
5112
5113 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5114 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5115 {
5116 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5117 struct task_struct *tracer;
5118 u32 sid = 0;
5119 int error;
5120 char *str = value;
5121
5122 if (current != p) {
5123 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5124 security attributes. */
5125 return -EACCES;
5126 }
5127
5128 /*
5129 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5130 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5131 * above restriction is ever removed.
5132 */
5133 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5134 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5135 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5136 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5137 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5138 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5139 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5140 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5141 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5142 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5143 else
5144 error = -EINVAL;
5145 if (error)
5146 return error;
5147
5148 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5149 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5150 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5151 str[size-1] = 0;
5152 size--;
5153 }
5154 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5155 if (error)
5156 return error;
5157 }
5158
5159 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5160 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5161 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5162 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5163 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5164 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5165 tsec = p->security;
5166 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5167 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5168 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5169 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5170 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5171 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5172 if (error)
5173 return error;
5174 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5175 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5176 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5177 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5178 struct av_decision avd;
5179
5180 if (sid == 0)
5181 return -EINVAL;
5182
5183 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5184 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5185 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5186 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5187 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5188 do_each_thread(g, t)
5189 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5190 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5191 return -EPERM;
5192 }
5193 while_each_thread(g, t);
5194 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5195 }
5196
5197 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5198 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5199 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5200 if (error)
5201 return error;
5202
5203 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5204 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5205 task_lock(p);
5206 rcu_read_lock();
5207 tracer = task_tracer_task(p);
5208 if (tracer != NULL) {
5209 struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
5210 u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
5211 rcu_read_unlock();
5212 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5213 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5214 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5215 if (!error)
5216 tsec->sid = sid;
5217 task_unlock(p);
5218 avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5219 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5220 if (error)
5221 return error;
5222 } else {
5223 rcu_read_unlock();
5224 tsec->sid = sid;
5225 task_unlock(p);
5226 }
5227 } else
5228 return -EINVAL;
5229
5230 return size;
5231 }
5232
5233 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5234 {
5235 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5236 }
5237
5238 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5239 {
5240 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5241 }
5242
5243 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5244 {
5245 kfree(secdata);
5246 }
5247
5248 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5249
5250 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5251 unsigned long flags)
5252 {
5253 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
5254 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5255
5256 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5257 if (!ksec)
5258 return -ENOMEM;
5259
5260 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5261 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5262 else
5263 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5264 k->security = ksec;
5265
5266 return 0;
5267 }
5268
5269 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5270 {
5271 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5272
5273 k->security = NULL;
5274 kfree(ksec);
5275 }
5276
5277 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5278 struct task_struct *ctx,
5279 key_perm_t perm)
5280 {
5281 struct key *key;
5282 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5283 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5284
5285 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5286
5287 tsec = ctx->security;
5288 ksec = key->security;
5289
5290 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5291 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5292 appear to be created. */
5293 if (perm == 0)
5294 return 0;
5295
5296 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5297 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5298 }
5299
5300 #endif
5301
5302 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5303 .name = "selinux",
5304
5305 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
5306 .capget = selinux_capget,
5307 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5308 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5309 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5310 .capable = selinux_capable,
5311 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5312 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5313 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5314 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5315
5316 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5317 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5318
5319 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5320 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5321 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5322 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5323 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5324 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5325 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5326
5327 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5328 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5329 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5330 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5331 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5332 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5333 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5334 .sb_get_mnt_opts = selinux_get_mnt_opts,
5335 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5336 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5337 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5338
5339
5340 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5341 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5342 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5343 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5344 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5345 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5346 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5347 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5348 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5349 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5350 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5351 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5352 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5353 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5354 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5355 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5356 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5357 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5358 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5359 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5360 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5361 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5362 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5363 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5364 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5365 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5366 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5367
5368 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5369 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5370 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5371 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5372 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5373 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5374 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5375 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5376 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5377 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5378 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5379
5380 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5381
5382 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5383 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
5384 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
5385 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5386 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5387 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5388 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5389 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5390 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5391 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5392 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5393 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5394 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5395 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5396 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5397 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5398 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5399 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5400 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5401 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5402 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5403 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5404 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5405
5406 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5407 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5408
5409 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5410 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5411
5412 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5413 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5414 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5415 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5416 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5417 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5418
5419 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5420 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5421 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5422 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5423 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5424
5425 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5426 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5427 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5428 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5429 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5430
5431 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
5432
5433 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5434
5435 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5436 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5437
5438 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5439 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5440 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5441
5442 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5443 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5444
5445 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5446 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5447 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5448 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5449 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5450 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5451 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5452 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5453 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5454 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5455 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5456 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5457 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5458 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5459 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5460 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5461 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5462 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5463 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5464 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5465 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5466 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5467 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5468 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5469 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5470
5471 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5472 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5473 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5474 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5475 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5476 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5477 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5478 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5479 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5480 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5481 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5482 #endif
5483
5484 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5485 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5486 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5487 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5488 #endif
5489
5490 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
5491 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5492 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5493 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5494 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5495 #endif
5496 };
5497
5498 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5499 {
5500 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5501
5502 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5503 selinux_enabled = 0;
5504 return 0;
5505 }
5506
5507 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5508 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5509 return 0;
5510 }
5511
5512 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5513
5514 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5515 if (task_alloc_security(current))
5516 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5517 tsec = current->security;
5518 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5519
5520 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5521 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5522 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5523 avc_init();
5524
5525 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
5526 if (!secondary_ops)
5527 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5528 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5529 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5530
5531 if (selinux_enforcing)
5532 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5533 else
5534 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5535
5536 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5537 /* Add security information to initial keyrings */
5538 selinux_key_alloc(&root_user_keyring, current,
5539 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
5540 selinux_key_alloc(&root_session_keyring, current,
5541 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
5542 #endif
5543
5544 return 0;
5545 }
5546
5547 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5548 {
5549 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5550
5551 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5552 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5553 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5554 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5555 next_sb:
5556 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5557 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5558 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5559 struct superblock_security_struct,
5560 list);
5561 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5562 sb->s_count++;
5563 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5564 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5565 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5566 if (sb->s_root)
5567 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5568 drop_super(sb);
5569 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5570 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5571 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5572 goto next_sb;
5573 }
5574 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5575 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5576 }
5577
5578 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5579 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5580 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5581
5582 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5583
5584 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5585 {
5586 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5587 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5588 .pf = PF_INET,
5589 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5590 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5591 },
5592 {
5593 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5594 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5595 .pf = PF_INET,
5596 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5597 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5598 }
5599 };
5600
5601 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5602
5603 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5604 {
5605 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5606 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5607 .pf = PF_INET6,
5608 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5609 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5610 },
5611 {
5612 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5613 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5614 .pf = PF_INET6,
5615 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5616 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5617 }
5618 };
5619
5620 #endif /* IPV6 */
5621
5622 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5623 {
5624 int err = 0;
5625 u32 iter;
5626
5627 if (!selinux_enabled)
5628 goto out;
5629
5630 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5631
5632 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops); iter++) {
5633 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_ops[iter]);
5634 if (err)
5635 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n",
5636 err);
5637 }
5638
5639 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5640 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops); iter++) {
5641 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_ops[iter]);
5642 if (err)
5643 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n",
5644 err);
5645 }
5646 #endif /* IPV6 */
5647
5648 out:
5649 return err;
5650 }
5651
5652 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5653
5654 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5655 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5656 {
5657 u32 iter;
5658
5659 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5660
5661 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops); iter++)
5662 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_ops[iter]);
5663 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5664 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops); iter++)
5665 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_ops[iter]);
5666 #endif /* IPV6 */
5667 }
5668 #endif
5669
5670 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5671
5672 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5673 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5674 #endif
5675
5676 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5677
5678 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5679 static int selinux_disabled;
5680
5681 int selinux_disable(void)
5682 {
5683 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5684
5685 if (ss_initialized) {
5686 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5687 return -EINVAL;
5688 }
5689
5690 if (selinux_disabled) {
5691 /* Only do this once. */
5692 return -EINVAL;
5693 }
5694
5695 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5696
5697 selinux_disabled = 1;
5698 selinux_enabled = 0;
5699
5700 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5701 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5702
5703 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5704 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5705
5706 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
5707 exit_sel_fs();
5708
5709 return 0;
5710 }
5711 #endif
Stable & featurefull patchset based on Linus's git branch