?  search:
summary | log | graphiclog1 | graphiclog2 | commit | commitdiff | tree | refs | edit | fork
blame | history | raw | HEAD
cfq-iosched: get rid of ->dispatch_slice
[linux-2.6/zen-sources.git] / kernel / auditsc.c
blob628c7ac590a0c1465943b08119d601a15f1cb91c
1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
7 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
40 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
43 */
44
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <asm/atomic.h>
48 #include <asm/types.h>
49 #include <linux/fs.h>
50 #include <linux/namei.h>
51 #include <linux/mm.h>
52 #include <linux/module.h>
53 #include <linux/mount.h>
54 #include <linux/socket.h>
55 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
56 #include <linux/audit.h>
57 #include <linux/personality.h>
58 #include <linux/time.h>
59 #include <linux/netlink.h>
60 #include <linux/compiler.h>
61 #include <asm/unistd.h>
62 #include <linux/security.h>
63 #include <linux/list.h>
64 #include <linux/tty.h>
65 #include <linux/selinux.h>
66 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
67 #include <linux/highmem.h>
68 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
69
70 #include "audit.h"
71
72 extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
73
74 /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
75 extern int audit_enabled;
76
77 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
78 * for saving names from getname(). */
79 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
80
81 /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
82 * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
83 * path_lookup. */
84 #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
85
86 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
87 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
88
89 /* number of audit rules */
90 int audit_n_rules;
91
92 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
93 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
94 * pointers at syscall exit time).
95 *
96 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
97 struct audit_names {
98 const char *name;
99 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
100 unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
101 unsigned long ino;
102 dev_t dev;
103 umode_t mode;
104 uid_t uid;
105 gid_t gid;
106 dev_t rdev;
107 u32 osid;
108 };
109
110 struct audit_aux_data {
111 struct audit_aux_data *next;
112 int type;
113 };
114
115 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
116
117 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open {
118 struct audit_aux_data d;
119 int oflag;
120 mode_t mode;
121 struct mq_attr attr;
122 };
123
124 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv {
125 struct audit_aux_data d;
126 mqd_t mqdes;
127 size_t msg_len;
128 unsigned int msg_prio;
129 struct timespec abs_timeout;
130 };
131
132 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify {
133 struct audit_aux_data d;
134 mqd_t mqdes;
135 struct sigevent notification;
136 };
137
138 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr {
139 struct audit_aux_data d;
140 mqd_t mqdes;
141 struct mq_attr mqstat;
142 };
143
144 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
145 struct audit_aux_data d;
146 struct ipc_perm p;
147 unsigned long qbytes;
148 uid_t uid;
149 gid_t gid;
150 mode_t mode;
151 u32 osid;
152 };
153
154 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
155 struct audit_aux_data d;
156 int argc;
157 int envc;
158 char mem[0];
159 };
160
161 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
162 struct audit_aux_data d;
163 int nargs;
164 unsigned long args[0];
165 };
166
167 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
168 struct audit_aux_data d;
169 int len;
170 char a[0];
171 };
172
173 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair {
174 struct audit_aux_data d;
175 int fd[2];
176 };
177
178 struct audit_aux_data_path {
179 struct audit_aux_data d;
180 struct dentry *dentry;
181 struct vfsmount *mnt;
182 };
183
184 /* The per-task audit context. */
185 struct audit_context {
186 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
187 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
188 enum audit_state state;
189 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
190 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
191 uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */
192 int major; /* syscall number */
193 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
194 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
195 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
196 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
197 int name_count;
198 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
199 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
200 struct dentry * pwd;
201 struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
202 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
203 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
204
205 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
206 pid_t pid, ppid;
207 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
208 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
209 unsigned long personality;
210 int arch;
211
212 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
213 int put_count;
214 int ino_count;
215 #endif
216 };
217
218 #define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
219 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
220 {
221 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
222 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
223 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
224 return n & mask;
225 }
226
227 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
228 {
229 unsigned n = ctx->major;
230 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
231 case 0: /* native */
232 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
233 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
234 return 1;
235 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
236 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
237 return 1;
238 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
239 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
240 return 1;
241 return 0;
242 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
243 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
244 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
245 return 1;
246 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
247 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
248 return 1;
249 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
250 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
251 return 1;
252 return 0;
253 case 2: /* open */
254 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
255 case 3: /* openat */
256 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
257 case 4: /* socketcall */
258 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
259 case 5: /* execve */
260 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
261 default:
262 return 0;
263 }
264 }
265
266 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
267 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
268 * otherwise. */
269 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
270 struct audit_krule *rule,
271 struct audit_context *ctx,
272 struct audit_names *name,
273 enum audit_state *state)
274 {
275 int i, j, need_sid = 1;
276 u32 sid;
277
278 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
279 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
280 int result = 0;
281
282 switch (f->type) {
283 case AUDIT_PID:
284 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
285 break;
286 case AUDIT_PPID:
287 if (ctx) {
288 if (!ctx->ppid)
289 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
290 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
291 }
292 break;
293 case AUDIT_UID:
294 result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
295 break;
296 case AUDIT_EUID:
297 result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
298 break;
299 case AUDIT_SUID:
300 result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
301 break;
302 case AUDIT_FSUID:
303 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
304 break;
305 case AUDIT_GID:
306 result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
307 break;
308 case AUDIT_EGID:
309 result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
310 break;
311 case AUDIT_SGID:
312 result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
313 break;
314 case AUDIT_FSGID:
315 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
316 break;
317 case AUDIT_PERS:
318 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
319 break;
320 case AUDIT_ARCH:
321 if (ctx)
322 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
323 break;
324
325 case AUDIT_EXIT:
326 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
327 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
328 break;
329 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
330 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
331 if (f->val)
332 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
333 else
334 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
335 }
336 break;
337 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
338 if (name)
339 result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
340 f->op, f->val);
341 else if (ctx) {
342 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
343 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
344 ++result;
345 break;
346 }
347 }
348 }
349 break;
350 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
351 if (name)
352 result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
353 f->op, f->val);
354 else if (ctx) {
355 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
356 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
357 ++result;
358 break;
359 }
360 }
361 }
362 break;
363 case AUDIT_INODE:
364 if (name)
365 result = (name->ino == f->val);
366 else if (ctx) {
367 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
368 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
369 ++result;
370 break;
371 }
372 }
373 }
374 break;
375 case AUDIT_WATCH:
376 if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1)
377 result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
378 name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
379 break;
380 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
381 result = 0;
382 if (ctx)
383 result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
384 break;
385 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
386 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
387 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
388 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
389 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
390 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
391 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
392 match for now to avoid losing information that
393 may be wanted. An error message will also be
394 logged upon error */
395 if (f->se_rule) {
396 if (need_sid) {
397 selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &sid);
398 need_sid = 0;
399 }
400 result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
401 f->op,
402 f->se_rule,
403 ctx);
404 }
405 break;
406 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
407 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
408 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
409 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
410 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
411 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
412 also applies here */
413 if (f->se_rule) {
414 /* Find files that match */
415 if (name) {
416 result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
417 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
418 f->se_rule, ctx);
419 } else if (ctx) {
420 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
421 if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
422 ctx->names[j].osid,
423 f->type, f->op,
424 f->se_rule, ctx)) {
425 ++result;
426 break;
427 }
428 }
429 }
430 /* Find ipc objects that match */
431 if (ctx) {
432 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
433 for (aux = ctx->aux; aux;
434 aux = aux->next) {
435 if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
436 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
437 if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
438 ++result;
439 break;
440 }
441 }
442 }
443 }
444 }
445 break;
446 case AUDIT_ARG0:
447 case AUDIT_ARG1:
448 case AUDIT_ARG2:
449 case AUDIT_ARG3:
450 if (ctx)
451 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
452 break;
453 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
454 /* ignore this field for filtering */
455 result = 1;
456 break;
457 case AUDIT_PERM:
458 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
459 break;
460 }
461
462 if (!result)
463 return 0;
464 }
465 if (rule->filterkey)
466 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
467 switch (rule->action) {
468 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
469 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
470 }
471 return 1;
472 }
473
474 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
475 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
476 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
477 */
478 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
479 {
480 struct audit_entry *e;
481 enum audit_state state;
482
483 rcu_read_lock();
484 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
485 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
486 rcu_read_unlock();
487 return state;
488 }
489 }
490 rcu_read_unlock();
491 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
492 }
493
494 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
495 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
496 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
497 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
498 */
499 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
500 struct audit_context *ctx,
501 struct list_head *list)
502 {
503 struct audit_entry *e;
504 enum audit_state state;
505
506 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
507 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
508
509 rcu_read_lock();
510 if (!list_empty(list)) {
511 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
512 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
513
514 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
515 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
516 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
517 &state)) {
518 rcu_read_unlock();
519 return state;
520 }
521 }
522 }
523 rcu_read_unlock();
524 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
525 }
526
527 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
528 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
529 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
530 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
531 */
532 enum audit_state audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
533 struct audit_context *ctx)
534 {
535 int i;
536 struct audit_entry *e;
537 enum audit_state state;
538
539 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
540 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
541
542 rcu_read_lock();
543 for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
544 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
545 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
546 struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
547 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
548 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
549
550 if (list_empty(list))
551 continue;
552
553 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
554 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
555 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
556 rcu_read_unlock();
557 return state;
558 }
559 }
560 }
561 rcu_read_unlock();
562 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
563 }
564
565 void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
566 {
567 ctx->auditable = 1;
568 }
569
570 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
571 int return_valid,
572 int return_code)
573 {
574 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
575
576 if (likely(!context))
577 return NULL;
578 context->return_valid = return_valid;
579 context->return_code = return_code;
580
581 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy && !context->auditable) {
582 enum audit_state state;
583
584 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
585 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
586 context->auditable = 1;
587 goto get_context;
588 }
589
590 state = audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
591 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
592 context->auditable = 1;
593
594 }
595
596 get_context:
597
598 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
599 return context;
600 }
601
602 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
603 {
604 int i;
605
606 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
607 if (context->auditable
608 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
609 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
610 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
611 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
612 __FILE__, __LINE__,
613 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
614 context->name_count, context->put_count,
615 context->ino_count);
616 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
617 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
618 context->names[i].name,
619 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
620 }
621 dump_stack();
622 return;
623 }
624 #endif
625 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
626 context->put_count = 0;
627 context->ino_count = 0;
628 #endif
629
630 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
631 if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
632 __putname(context->names[i].name);
633 }
634 context->name_count = 0;
635 if (context->pwd)
636 dput(context->pwd);
637 if (context->pwdmnt)
638 mntput(context->pwdmnt);
639 context->pwd = NULL;
640 context->pwdmnt = NULL;
641 }
642
643 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
644 {
645 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
646
647 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
648 if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
649 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
650 dput(axi->dentry);
651 mntput(axi->mnt);
652 }
653
654 context->aux = aux->next;
655 kfree(aux);
656 }
657 }
658
659 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
660 enum audit_state state)
661 {
662 uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
663
664 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
665 context->state = state;
666 context->loginuid = loginuid;
667 }
668
669 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
670 {
671 struct audit_context *context;
672
673 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
674 return NULL;
675 audit_zero_context(context, state);
676 return context;
677 }
678
679 /**
680 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
681 * @tsk: task
682 *
683 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
684 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
685 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
686 * needed.
687 */
688 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
689 {
690 struct audit_context *context;
691 enum audit_state state;
692
693 if (likely(!audit_enabled))
694 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
695
696 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
697 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
698 return 0;
699
700 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
701 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
702 return -ENOMEM;
703 }
704
705 /* Preserve login uid */
706 context->loginuid = -1;
707 if (current->audit_context)
708 context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
709
710 tsk->audit_context = context;
711 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
712 return 0;
713 }
714
715 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
716 {
717 struct audit_context *previous;
718 int count = 0;
719
720 do {
721 previous = context->previous;
722 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
723 ++count;
724 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
725 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
726 context->serial, context->major,
727 context->name_count, count);
728 }
729 audit_free_names(context);
730 audit_free_aux(context);
731 kfree(context->filterkey);
732 kfree(context);
733 context = previous;
734 } while (context);
735 if (count >= 10)
736 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
737 }
738
739 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
740 {
741 char *ctx = NULL;
742 unsigned len;
743 int error;
744 u32 sid;
745
746 selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
747 if (!sid)
748 return;
749
750 error = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
751 if (error) {
752 if (error != -EINVAL)
753 goto error_path;
754 return;
755 }
756
757 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
758 kfree(ctx);
759 return;
760
761 error_path:
762 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
763 return;
764 }
765
766 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
767
768 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
769 {
770 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
771 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
772 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
773
774 /* tsk == current */
775
776 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
777 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
778 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
779
780 if (mm) {
781 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
782 vma = mm->mmap;
783 while (vma) {
784 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
785 vma->vm_file) {
786 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
787 vma->vm_file->f_path.dentry,
788 vma->vm_file->f_path.mnt);
789 break;
790 }
791 vma = vma->vm_next;
792 }
793 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
794 }
795 audit_log_task_context(ab);
796 }
797
798 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
799 {
800 int i, call_panic = 0;
801 struct audit_buffer *ab;
802 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
803 const char *tty;
804
805 /* tsk == current */
806 context->pid = tsk->pid;
807 if (!context->ppid)
808 context->ppid = sys_getppid();
809 context->uid = tsk->uid;
810 context->gid = tsk->gid;
811 context->euid = tsk->euid;
812 context->suid = tsk->suid;
813 context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
814 context->egid = tsk->egid;
815 context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
816 context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
817 context->personality = tsk->personality;
818
819 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
820 if (!ab)
821 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
822 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
823 context->arch, context->major);
824 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
825 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
826 if (context->return_valid)
827 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
828 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
829 context->return_code);
830
831 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
832 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
833 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
834 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
835 else
836 tty = "(none)";
837 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
838 audit_log_format(ab,
839 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
840 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
841 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
842 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
843 context->argv[0],
844 context->argv[1],
845 context->argv[2],
846 context->argv[3],
847 context->name_count,
848 context->ppid,
849 context->pid,
850 context->loginuid,
851 context->uid,
852 context->gid,
853 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
854 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
855
856 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
857
858 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
859 if (context->filterkey) {
860 audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
861 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
862 } else
863 audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
864 audit_log_end(ab);
865
866 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
867
868 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
869 if (!ab)
870 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
871
872 switch (aux->type) {
873 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
874 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *axi = (void *)aux;
875 audit_log_format(ab,
876 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
877 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
878 axi->oflag, axi->mode, axi->attr.mq_flags,
879 axi->attr.mq_maxmsg, axi->attr.mq_msgsize,
880 axi->attr.mq_curmsgs);
881 break; }
882
883 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
884 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *axi = (void *)aux;
885 audit_log_format(ab,
886 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
887 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
888 axi->mqdes, axi->msg_len, axi->msg_prio,
889 axi->abs_timeout.tv_sec, axi->abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
890 break; }
891
892 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
893 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *axi = (void *)aux;
894 audit_log_format(ab,
895 "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
896 axi->mqdes,
897 axi->notification.sigev_signo);
898 break; }
899
900 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
901 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *axi = (void *)aux;
902 audit_log_format(ab,
903 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
904 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
905 axi->mqdes,
906 axi->mqstat.mq_flags, axi->mqstat.mq_maxmsg,
907 axi->mqstat.mq_msgsize, axi->mqstat.mq_curmsgs);
908 break; }
909
910 case AUDIT_IPC: {
911 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
912 audit_log_format(ab,
913 "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
914 axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
915 if (axi->osid != 0) {
916 char *ctx = NULL;
917 u32 len;
918 if (selinux_sid_to_string(
919 axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
920 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
921 axi->osid);
922 call_panic = 1;
923 } else
924 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
925 kfree(ctx);
926 }
927 break; }
928
929 case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
930 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
931 audit_log_format(ab,
932 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
933 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
934 break; }
935
936 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
937 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
938 int i;
939 const char *p;
940 for (i = 0, p = axi->mem; i < axi->argc; i++) {
941 audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i);
942 p = audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
943 audit_log_format(ab, "\n");
944 }
945 break; }
946
947 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
948 int i;
949 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
950 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
951 for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
952 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
953 break; }
954
955 case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
956 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
957
958 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
959 audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
960 break; }
961
962 case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
963 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
964 audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
965 break; }
966
967 case AUDIT_FD_PAIR: {
968 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *axs = (void *)aux;
969 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", axs->fd[0], axs->fd[1]);
970 break; }
971
972 }
973 audit_log_end(ab);
974 }
975
976 if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
977 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
978 if (ab) {
979 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
980 audit_log_end(ab);
981 }
982 }
983 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
984 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
985
986 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
987 if (!ab)
988 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
989
990 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
991
992 if (n->name) {
993 switch(n->name_len) {
994 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
995 /* log the full path */
996 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
997 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
998 break;
999 case 0:
1000 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1001 * directory component is the cwd */
1002 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", context->pwd,
1003 context->pwdmnt);
1004 break;
1005 default:
1006 /* log the name's directory component */
1007 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1008 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name_len,
1009 n->name);
1010 }
1011 } else
1012 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1013
1014 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1015 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1016 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1017 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1018 n->ino,
1019 MAJOR(n->dev),
1020 MINOR(n->dev),
1021 n->mode,
1022 n->uid,
1023 n->gid,
1024 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1025 MINOR(n->rdev));
1026 }
1027 if (n->osid != 0) {
1028 char *ctx = NULL;
1029 u32 len;
1030 if (selinux_sid_to_string(
1031 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1032 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1033 call_panic = 2;
1034 } else
1035 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1036 kfree(ctx);
1037 }
1038
1039 audit_log_end(ab);
1040 }
1041 if (call_panic)
1042 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1043 }
1044
1045 /**
1046 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1047 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1048 *
1049 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1050 */
1051 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1052 {
1053 struct audit_context *context;
1054
1055 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1056 if (likely(!context))
1057 return;
1058
1059 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1060 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1061 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1062 * in the context of the idle thread */
1063 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1064 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1065 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1066
1067 audit_free_context(context);
1068 }
1069
1070 /**
1071 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1072 * @tsk: task being audited
1073 * @arch: architecture type
1074 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1075 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1076 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1077 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1078 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1079 *
1080 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1081 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1082 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1083 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1084 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1085 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1086 * be written).
1087 */
1088 void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1089 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1090 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1091 {
1092 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1093 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1094 enum audit_state state;
1095
1096 BUG_ON(!context);
1097
1098 /*
1099 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1100 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1101 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1102 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1103 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1104 *
1105 * i386 no
1106 * x86_64 no
1107 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1108 *
1109 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1110 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1111 */
1112 if (context->in_syscall) {
1113 struct audit_context *newctx;
1114
1115 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1116 printk(KERN_ERR
1117 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1118 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1119 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1120 #endif
1121 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1122 if (newctx) {
1123 newctx->previous = context;
1124 context = newctx;
1125 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1126 } else {
1127 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1128 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1129 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1130 * to abandon auditing. */
1131 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1132 }
1133 }
1134 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1135
1136 if (!audit_enabled)
1137 return;
1138
1139 context->arch = arch;
1140 context->major = major;
1141 context->argv[0] = a1;
1142 context->argv[1] = a2;
1143 context->argv[2] = a3;
1144 context->argv[3] = a4;
1145
1146 state = context->state;
1147 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1148 if (!context->dummy && (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT))
1149 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1150 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
1151 return;
1152
1153 context->serial = 0;
1154 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1155 context->in_syscall = 1;
1156 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
1157 context->ppid = 0;
1158 }
1159
1160 /**
1161 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1162 * @tsk: task being audited
1163 * @valid: success/failure flag
1164 * @return_code: syscall return value
1165 *
1166 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1167 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1168 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1169 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1170 * free the names stored from getname().
1171 */
1172 void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
1173 {
1174 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1175 struct audit_context *context;
1176
1177 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
1178
1179 if (likely(!context))
1180 return;
1181
1182 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1183 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1184
1185 context->in_syscall = 0;
1186 context->auditable = 0;
1187
1188 if (context->previous) {
1189 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1190 context->previous = NULL;
1191 audit_free_context(context);
1192 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1193 } else {
1194 audit_free_names(context);
1195 audit_free_aux(context);
1196 kfree(context->filterkey);
1197 context->filterkey = NULL;
1198 tsk->audit_context = context;
1199 }
1200 }
1201
1202 /**
1203 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1204 * @name: name to add
1205 *
1206 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1207 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1208 */
1209 void __audit_getname(const char *name)
1210 {
1211 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1212
1213 if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
1214 return;
1215
1216 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1217 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1218 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1219 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1220 dump_stack();
1221 #endif
1222 return;
1223 }
1224 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1225 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
1226 context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1227 context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
1228 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1229 ++context->name_count;
1230 if (!context->pwd) {
1231 read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
1232 context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd);
1233 context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt);
1234 read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
1235 }
1236
1237 }
1238
1239 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1240 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1241 *
1242 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1243 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1244 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1245 */
1246 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1247 {
1248 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1249
1250 BUG_ON(!context);
1251 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1252 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1253 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1254 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1255 if (context->name_count) {
1256 int i;
1257 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1258 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1259 context->names[i].name,
1260 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
1261 }
1262 #endif
1263 __putname(name);
1264 }
1265 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1266 else {
1267 ++context->put_count;
1268 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1269 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1270 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1271 " put_count=%d\n",
1272 __FILE__, __LINE__,
1273 context->serial, context->major,
1274 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1275 context->put_count);
1276 dump_stack();
1277 }
1278 }
1279 #endif
1280 }
1281
1282 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1283 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode)
1284 {
1285 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1286 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1287 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1288 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1289 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1290 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1291 selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &name->osid);
1292 }
1293
1294 /**
1295 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1296 * @name: name being audited
1297 * @inode: inode being audited
1298 *
1299 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1300 */
1301 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
1302 {
1303 int idx;
1304 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1305
1306 if (!context->in_syscall)
1307 return;
1308 if (context->name_count
1309 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1310 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1311 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1312 else if (context->name_count > 1
1313 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1314 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1315 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1316 else {
1317 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1318 * associated name? */
1319 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
1320 return;
1321 idx = context->name_count++;
1322 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1323 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1324 ++context->ino_count;
1325 #endif
1326 }
1327 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1328 }
1329
1330 /**
1331 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1332 * @dname: inode's dentry name
1333 * @inode: inode being audited
1334 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1335 *
1336 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1337 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1338 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1339 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1340 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1341 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1342 * unsuccessful attempts.
1343 */
1344 void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
1345 const struct inode *parent)
1346 {
1347 int idx;
1348 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1349 const char *found_name = NULL;
1350 int dirlen = 0;
1351
1352 if (!context->in_syscall)
1353 return;
1354
1355 /* determine matching parent */
1356 if (!dname)
1357 goto update_context;
1358 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
1359 if (context->names[idx].ino == parent->i_ino) {
1360 const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
1361
1362 if (!name)
1363 continue;
1364
1365 if (audit_compare_dname_path(dname, name, &dirlen) == 0) {
1366 context->names[idx].name_len = dirlen;
1367 found_name = name;
1368 break;
1369 }
1370 }
1371
1372 update_context:
1373 idx = context->name_count;
1374 if (context->name_count == AUDIT_NAMES) {
1375 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed and losing %s\n",
1376 found_name ?: "(null)");
1377 return;
1378 }
1379 context->name_count++;
1380 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1381 context->ino_count++;
1382 #endif
1383 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent directory.
1384 * All names for this context are relinquished in audit_free_names() */
1385 context->names[idx].name = found_name;
1386 context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1387 context->names[idx].name_put = 0; /* don't call __putname() */
1388
1389 if (!inode)
1390 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1391 else
1392 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1393
1394 /* A parent was not found in audit_names, so copy the inode data for the
1395 * provided parent. */
1396 if (!found_name) {
1397 idx = context->name_count;
1398 if (context->name_count == AUDIT_NAMES) {
1399 printk(KERN_DEBUG
1400 "name_count maxed and losing parent inode data: dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu",
1401 MAJOR(parent->i_sb->s_dev),
1402 MINOR(parent->i_sb->s_dev),
1403 parent->i_ino);
1404 return;
1405 }
1406 context->name_count++;
1407 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1408 context->ino_count++;
1409 #endif
1410 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], parent);
1411 }
1412 }
1413
1414 /**
1415 * audit_inode_update - update inode info for last collected name
1416 * @inode: inode being audited
1417 *
1418 * When open() is called on an existing object with the O_CREAT flag, the inode
1419 * data audit initially collects is incorrect. This additional hook ensures
1420 * audit has the inode data for the actual object to be opened.
1421 */
1422 void __audit_inode_update(const struct inode *inode)
1423 {
1424 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1425 int idx;
1426
1427 if (!context->in_syscall || !inode)
1428 return;
1429
1430 if (context->name_count == 0) {
1431 context->name_count++;
1432 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1433 context->ino_count++;
1434 #endif
1435 }
1436 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1437
1438 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1439 }
1440
1441 /**
1442 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1443 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1444 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1445 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1446 *
1447 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1448 */
1449 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1450 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1451 {
1452 if (!ctx->serial)
1453 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
1454 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1455 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1456 *serial = ctx->serial;
1457 ctx->auditable = 1;
1458 }
1459
1460 /**
1461 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
1462 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
1463 * @loginuid: loginuid value
1464 *
1465 * Returns 0.
1466 *
1467 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
1468 */
1469 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
1470 {
1471 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
1472
1473 if (context) {
1474 /* Only log if audit is enabled */
1475 if (context->in_syscall) {
1476 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1477
1478 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1479 if (ab) {
1480 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1481 "old auid=%u new auid=%u",
1482 task->pid, task->uid,
1483 context->loginuid, loginuid);
1484 audit_log_end(ab);
1485 }
1486 }
1487 context->loginuid = loginuid;
1488 }
1489 return 0;
1490 }
1491
1492 /**
1493 * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
1494 * @ctx: the audit_context
1495 *
1496 * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
1497 */
1498 uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
1499 {
1500 return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
1501 }
1502
1503 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_get_loginuid);
1504
1505 /**
1506 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
1507 * @oflag: open flag
1508 * @mode: mode bits
1509 * @u_attr: queue attributes
1510 *
1511 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1512 */
1513 int __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr __user *u_attr)
1514 {
1515 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *ax;
1516 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1517
1518 if (!audit_enabled)
1519 return 0;
1520
1521 if (likely(!context))
1522 return 0;
1523
1524 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1525 if (!ax)
1526 return -ENOMEM;
1527
1528 if (u_attr != NULL) {
1529 if (copy_from_user(&ax->attr, u_attr, sizeof(ax->attr))) {
1530 kfree(ax);
1531 return -EFAULT;
1532 }
1533 } else
1534 memset(&ax->attr, 0, sizeof(ax->attr));
1535
1536 ax->oflag = oflag;
1537 ax->mode = mode;
1538
1539 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
1540 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1541 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1542 return 0;
1543 }
1544
1545 /**
1546 * __audit_mq_timedsend - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send
1547 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1548 * @msg_len: Message length
1549 * @msg_prio: Message priority
1550 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
1551 *
1552 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1553 */
1554 int __audit_mq_timedsend(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
1555 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
1556 {
1557 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
1558 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1559
1560 if (!audit_enabled)
1561 return 0;
1562
1563 if (likely(!context))
1564 return 0;
1565
1566 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1567 if (!ax)
1568 return -ENOMEM;
1569
1570 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
1571 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
1572 kfree(ax);
1573 return -EFAULT;
1574 }
1575 } else
1576 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
1577
1578 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
1579 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
1580 ax->msg_prio = msg_prio;
1581
1582 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
1583 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1584 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1585 return 0;
1586 }
1587
1588 /**
1589 * __audit_mq_timedreceive - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed receive
1590 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1591 * @msg_len: Message length
1592 * @u_msg_prio: Message priority
1593 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
1594 *
1595 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1596 */
1597 int __audit_mq_timedreceive(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len,
1598 unsigned int __user *u_msg_prio,
1599 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
1600 {
1601 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
1602 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1603
1604 if (!audit_enabled)
1605 return 0;
1606
1607 if (likely(!context))
1608 return 0;
1609
1610 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1611 if (!ax)
1612 return -ENOMEM;
1613
1614 if (u_msg_prio != NULL) {
1615 if (get_user(ax->msg_prio, u_msg_prio)) {
1616 kfree(ax);
1617 return -EFAULT;
1618 }
1619 } else
1620 ax->msg_prio = 0;
1621
1622 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
1623 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
1624 kfree(ax);
1625 return -EFAULT;
1626 }
1627 } else
1628 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
1629
1630 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
1631 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
1632
1633 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
1634 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1635 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1636 return 0;
1637 }
1638
1639 /**
1640 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
1641 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1642 * @u_notification: Notification event
1643 *
1644 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1645 */
1646
1647 int __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent __user *u_notification)
1648 {
1649 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *ax;
1650 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1651
1652 if (!audit_enabled)
1653 return 0;
1654
1655 if (likely(!context))
1656 return 0;
1657
1658 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1659 if (!ax)
1660 return -ENOMEM;
1661
1662 if (u_notification != NULL) {
1663 if (copy_from_user(&ax->notification, u_notification, sizeof(ax->notification))) {
1664 kfree(ax);
1665 return -EFAULT;
1666 }
1667 } else
1668 memset(&ax->notification, 0, sizeof(ax->notification));
1669
1670 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
1671
1672 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
1673 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1674 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1675 return 0;
1676 }
1677
1678 /**
1679 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
1680 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1681 * @mqstat: MQ flags
1682 *
1683 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1684 */
1685 int __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
1686 {
1687 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *ax;
1688 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1689
1690 if (!audit_enabled)
1691 return 0;
1692
1693 if (likely(!context))
1694 return 0;
1695
1696 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1697 if (!ax)
1698 return -ENOMEM;
1699
1700 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
1701 ax->mqstat = *mqstat;
1702
1703 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
1704 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1705 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1706 return 0;
1707 }
1708
1709 /**
1710 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
1711 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
1712 *
1713 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1714 */
1715 int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
1716 {
1717 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1718 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1719
1720 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1721 if (!ax)
1722 return -ENOMEM;
1723
1724 ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
1725 ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
1726 ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
1727 selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
1728
1729 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
1730 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1731 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1732 return 0;
1733 }
1734
1735 /**
1736 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
1737 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
1738 * @uid: msgq user id
1739 * @gid: msgq group id
1740 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
1741 *
1742 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1743 */
1744 int __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
1745 {
1746 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1747 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1748
1749 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1750 if (!ax)
1751 return -ENOMEM;
1752
1753 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
1754 ax->uid = uid;
1755 ax->gid = gid;
1756 ax->mode = mode;
1757
1758 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM;
1759 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1760 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1761 return 0;
1762 }
1763
1764 int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1765 {
1766 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
1767 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1768 unsigned long p, next;
1769 void *to;
1770
1771 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
1772 return 0;
1773
1774 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - bprm->p,
1775 GFP_KERNEL);
1776 if (!ax)
1777 return -ENOMEM;
1778
1779 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
1780 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
1781 for (p = bprm->p, to = ax->mem; p < MAX_ARG_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE; p = next) {
1782 struct page *page = bprm->page[p / PAGE_SIZE];
1783 void *kaddr = kmap(page);
1784 next = (p + PAGE_SIZE) & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);
1785 memcpy(to, kaddr + (p & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)), next - p);
1786 to += next - p;
1787 kunmap(page);
1788 }
1789
1790 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
1791 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1792 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1793 return 0;
1794 }
1795
1796
1797 /**
1798 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
1799 * @nargs: number of args
1800 * @args: args array
1801 *
1802 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1803 */
1804 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
1805 {
1806 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
1807 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1808
1809 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
1810 return 0;
1811
1812 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
1813 if (!ax)
1814 return -ENOMEM;
1815
1816 ax->nargs = nargs;
1817 memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
1818
1819 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
1820 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1821 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1822 return 0;
1823 }
1824
1825 /**
1826 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
1827 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
1828 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
1829 *
1830 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1831 */
1832 int __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
1833 {
1834 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1835 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *ax;
1836
1837 if (likely(!context)) {
1838 return 0;
1839 }
1840
1841 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
1842 if (!ax) {
1843 return -ENOMEM;
1844 }
1845
1846 ax->fd[0] = fd1;
1847 ax->fd[1] = fd2;
1848
1849 ax->d.type = AUDIT_FD_PAIR;
1850 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1851 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1852 return 0;
1853 }
1854
1855 /**
1856 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
1857 * @len: data length in user space
1858 * @a: data address in kernel space
1859 *
1860 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1861 */
1862 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
1863 {
1864 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
1865 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1866
1867 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
1868 return 0;
1869
1870 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
1871 if (!ax)
1872 return -ENOMEM;
1873
1874 ax->len = len;
1875 memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
1876
1877 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
1878 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1879 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1880 return 0;
1881 }
1882
1883 /**
1884 * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
1885 * @dentry: dentry to record
1886 * @mnt: mnt to record
1887 *
1888 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1889 *
1890 * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
1891 */
1892 int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
1893 {
1894 struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
1895 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1896
1897 if (likely(!context))
1898 return 0;
1899
1900 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1901 if (!ax)
1902 return -ENOMEM;
1903
1904 ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
1905 ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
1906
1907 ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
1908 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1909 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1910 return 0;
1911 }
1912
1913 /**
1914 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
1915 * @sig: signal value
1916 * @t: task being signaled
1917 *
1918 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
1919 * and uid that is doing that.
1920 */
1921 void __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
1922 {
1923 extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
1924 extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
1925 extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
1926
1927 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1) {
1928 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1929 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
1930 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
1931 if (ctx)
1932 audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
1933 else
1934 audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
1935 selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
1936 }
1937 }
Stable & featurefull patchset based on Linus's git branch