security/commoncap.c

   1 /* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o and root_plug.o
   2  *
   3  *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   4  *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
   5  *      the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
   6  *      (at your option) any later version.
   7  *
   8  */
   9
  10 #include <linux/capability.h>
  11 #include <linux/module.h>
  12 #include <linux/init.h>
  13 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  14 #include <linux/security.h>
  15 #include <linux/file.h>
  16 #include <linux/mm.h>
  17 #include <linux/mman.h>
  18 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
  19 #include <linux/swap.h>
  20 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
  21 #include <linux/netlink.h>
  22 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
  23 #include <linux/xattr.h>
  24 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
  25 #include <linux/mount.h>
  26 #include <linux/sched.h>
  27 #include <linux/prctl.h>
  28 #include <linux/securebits.h>
  29
  30 int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
  31 {
  32         NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective;
  33         return 0;
  34 }
  35
  36 int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
  37 {
  38         if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, cap))
  39                 return -EPERM;
  40         return 0;
  41 }
  42
  43 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
  44
  45 /*
  46  * NOTE WELL: cap_capable() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
  47  * function.  That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable()
  48  * returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable()
  49  * returns 1 for this case.
  50  */
  51 int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
  52 {
  53         /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
  54         if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap))
  55                 return 0;
  56         return -EPERM;
  57 }
  58
  59 int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
  60 {
  61         if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME))
  62                 return -EPERM;
  63         return 0;
  64 }
  65
  66 int cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
  67 {
  68         /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
  69         if (!cap_issubset(child->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted) &&
  70             !__capable(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
  71                 return -EPERM;
  72         return 0;
  73 }
  74
  75 int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
  76                 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
  77 {
  78         /* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */
  79         *effective = target->cap_effective;
  80         *inheritable = target->cap_inheritable;
  81         *permitted = target->cap_permitted;
  82         return 0;
  83 }
  84
  85 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
  86
  87 static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *target)
  88 {
  89         /*
  90          * No support for remote process capability manipulation with
  91          * filesystem capability support.
  92          */
  93         return (target != current);
  94 }
  95
  96 static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
  97 {
  98         /*
  99          * Return 1 if changes to the inheritable set are limited
 100          * to the old permitted set. That is, if the current task
 101          * does *not* possess the CAP_SETPCAP capability.
 102          */
 103         return (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0);
 104 }
 105
 106 #else /* ie., ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
 107
 108 static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *t) { return 0; }
 109 static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) { return 1; }
 110
 111 #endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
 112
 113 int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 114                       kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 115 {
 116         if (cap_block_setpcap(target)) {
 117                 return -EPERM;
 118         }
 119         if (cap_inh_is_capped()
 120             && !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
 121                              cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
 122                                          current->cap_permitted))) {
 123                 /* incapable of using this inheritable set */
 124                 return -EPERM;
 125         }
 126         if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
 127                            cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
 128                                        current->cap_bset))) {
 129                 /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
 130                 return -EPERM;
 131         }
 132
 133         /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
 134         if (!cap_issubset (*permitted,
 135                            cap_combine (target->cap_permitted,
 136                                         current->cap_permitted))) {
 137                 return -EPERM;
 138         }
 139
 140         /* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */
 141         if (!cap_issubset (*effective, *permitted)) {
 142                 return -EPERM;
 143         }
 144
 145         return 0;
 146 }
 147
 148 void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 149                      kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 150 {
 151         target->cap_effective = *effective;
 152         target->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
 153         target->cap_permitted = *permitted;
 154 }
 155
 156 static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 157 {
 158         cap_clear(bprm->cap_inheritable);
 159         cap_clear(bprm->cap_permitted);
 160         bprm->cap_effective = false;
 161 }
 162
 163 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 164
 165 int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 166 {
 167         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 168         int error;
 169
 170         if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
 171                return 0;
 172
 173         error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0);
 174         if (error <= 0)
 175                 return 0;
 176         return 1;
 177 }
 178
 179 int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 180 {
 181         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 182
 183         if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->removexattr)
 184                return 0;
 185
 186         return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
 187 }
 188
 189 static inline int cap_from_disk(struct vfs_cap_data *caps,
 190                                 struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned size)
 191 {
 192         __u32 magic_etc;
 193         unsigned tocopy, i;
 194
 195         if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
 196                 return -EINVAL;
 197
 198         magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc);
 199
 200         switch ((magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)) {
 201         case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
 202                 if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1)
 203                         return -EINVAL;
 204                 tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_1;
 205                 break;
 206         case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2:
 207                 if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
 208                         return -EINVAL;
 209                 tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2;
 210                 break;
 211         default:
 212                 return -EINVAL;
 213         }
 214
 215         if (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) {
 216                 bprm->cap_effective = true;
 217         } else {
 218                 bprm->cap_effective = false;
 219         }
 220
 221         for (i = 0; i < tocopy; ++i) {
 222                 bprm->cap_permitted.cap[i] =
 223                         le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].permitted);
 224                 bprm->cap_inheritable.cap[i] =
 225                         le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].inheritable);
 226         }
 227         while (i < VFS_CAP_U32) {
 228                 bprm->cap_permitted.cap[i] = 0;
 229                 bprm->cap_inheritable.cap[i] = 0;
 230                 i++;
 231         }
 232
 233         return 0;
 234 }
 235
 236 /* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
 237 static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 238 {
 239         struct dentry *dentry;
 240         int rc = 0;
 241         struct vfs_cap_data vcaps;
 242         struct inode *inode;
 243
 244         if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) {
 245                 bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
 246                 return 0;
 247         }
 248
 249         dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
 250         inode = dentry->d_inode;
 251         if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
 252                 goto out;
 253
 254         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &vcaps,
 255                                    XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
 256         if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
 257                 /* no data, that's ok */
 258                 rc = 0;
 259                 goto out;
 260         }
 261         if (rc < 0)
 262                 goto out;
 263
 264         rc = cap_from_disk(&vcaps, bprm, rc);
 265         if (rc)
 266                 printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
 267                         __func__, rc, bprm->filename);
 268
 269 out:
 270         dput(dentry);
 271         if (rc)
 272                 bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
 273
 274         return rc;
 275 }
 276
 277 #else
 278 int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 279 {
 280         return 0;
 281 }
 282
 283 int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 284 {
 285         return 0;
 286 }
 287
 288 static inline int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 289 {
 290         bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
 291         return 0;
 292 }
 293 #endif
 294
 295 int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 296 {
 297         int ret;
 298
 299         ret = get_file_caps(bprm);
 300         if (ret)
 301                 printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_file_caps returned %d for %s\n",
 302                         __func__, ret, bprm->filename);
 303
 304         /*  To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
 305          *  executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
 306          *  capability sets for the file.
 307          *
 308          *  If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable
 309          *  and permitted sets of the executable file.
 310          */
 311
 312         if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) {
 313                 if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
 314                         cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
 315                         cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
 316                 }
 317                 if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
 318                         bprm->cap_effective = true;
 319         }
 320
 321         return ret;
 322 }
 323
 324 void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
 325 {
 326         /* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */
 327         kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working;
 328
 329         new_permitted = cap_intersect(bprm->cap_permitted,
 330                                  current->cap_bset);
 331         working = cap_intersect(bprm->cap_inheritable,
 332                                  current->cap_inheritable);
 333         new_permitted = cap_combine(new_permitted, working);
 334
 335         if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid ||
 336             !cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) {
 337                 set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
 338                 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
 339
 340                 if (unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
 341                         if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
 342                                 bprm->e_uid = current->uid;
 343                                 bprm->e_gid = current->gid;
 344                         }
 345                         if (!capable (CAP_SETPCAP)) {
 346                                 new_permitted = cap_intersect (new_permitted,
 347                                                         current->cap_permitted);
 348                         }
 349                 }
 350         }
 351
 352         current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
 353         current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
 354
 355         /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set
 356          * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual
 357          * capability rules */
 358         if (!is_global_init(current)) {
 359                 current->cap_permitted = new_permitted;
 360                 if (bprm->cap_effective)
 361                         current->cap_effective = new_permitted;
 362                 else
 363                         cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
 364         }
 365
 366         /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
 367
 368         current->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
 369 }
 370
 371 int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 372 {
 373         if (current->uid != 0) {
 374                 if (bprm->cap_effective)
 375                         return 1;
 376                 if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_permitted))
 377                         return 1;
 378                 if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_inheritable))
 379                         return 1;
 380         }
 381
 382         return (current->euid != current->uid ||
 383                 current->egid != current->gid);
 384 }
 385
 386 int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value,
 387                        size_t size, int flags)
 388 {
 389         if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
 390                 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
 391                         return -EPERM;
 392                 return 0;
 393         } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
 394                      sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)  &&
 395             !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 396                 return -EPERM;
 397         return 0;
 398 }
 399
 400 int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
 401 {
 402         if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
 403                 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
 404                         return -EPERM;
 405                 return 0;
 406         } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
 407                      sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)  &&
 408             !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 409                 return -EPERM;
 410         return 0;
 411 }
 412
 413 /* moved from kernel/sys.c. */
 414 /*
 415  * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of
 416  * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid.
 417  *
 418  *  1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of
 419  *  {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are
 420  *  cleared.
 421  *
 422  *  2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective
 423  *  capabilities of the process are cleared.
 424  *
 425  *  3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective
 426  *  capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities.
 427  *
 428  *  fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should
 429  *  never happen.
 430  *
 431  *  -astor
 432  *
 433  * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99
 434  * A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it
 435  * calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and
 436  * effective sets will be retained.
 437  * Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some
 438  * of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges!
 439  * Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital
 440  * files..
 441  * Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this.
 442  */
 443 static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid (int old_ruid, int old_euid,
 444                                         int old_suid)
 445 {
 446         if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) &&
 447             (current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0 && current->suid != 0) &&
 448             !issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) {
 449                 cap_clear (current->cap_permitted);
 450                 cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
 451         }
 452         if (old_euid == 0 && current->euid != 0) {
 453                 cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
 454         }
 455         if (old_euid != 0 && current->euid == 0) {
 456                 current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted;
 457         }
 458 }
 459
 460 int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
 461                           int flags)
 462 {
 463         switch (flags) {
 464         case LSM_SETID_RE:
 465         case LSM_SETID_ID:
 466         case LSM_SETID_RES:
 467                 /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setreuid/setuid/setresuid. */
 468                 if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
 469                         cap_emulate_setxuid (old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid);
 470                 }
 471                 break;
 472         case LSM_SETID_FS:
 473                 {
 474                         uid_t old_fsuid = old_ruid;
 475
 476                         /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setfsuid. */
 477
 478                         /*
 479                          * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
 480                          *          if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
 481                          */
 482
 483                         if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
 484                                 if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) {
 485                                         current->cap_effective =
 486                                                 cap_drop_fs_set(
 487                                                     current->cap_effective);
 488                                 }
 489                                 if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) {
 490                                         current->cap_effective =
 491                                                 cap_raise_fs_set(
 492                                                     current->cap_effective,
 493                                                     current->cap_permitted);
 494                                 }
 495                         }
 496                         break;
 497                 }
 498         default:
 499                 return -EINVAL;
 500         }
 501
 502         return 0;
 503 }
 504
 505 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 506 /*
 507  * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and
 508  * task_setnice, assumes that
 509  *   . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed
 510  *   . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes,
 511  *      then those actions should be allowed
 512  * This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but
 513  * yet with increased caps.
 514  * So we check for increased caps on the target process.
 515  */
 516 static inline int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
 517 {
 518         if (!cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
 519             !__capable(current, CAP_SYS_NICE))
 520                 return -EPERM;
 521         return 0;
 522 }
 523
 524 int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
 525                            struct sched_param *lp)
 526 {
 527         return cap_safe_nice(p);
 528 }
 529
 530 int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 531 {
 532         return cap_safe_nice(p);
 533 }
 534
 535 int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 536 {
 537         return cap_safe_nice(p);
 538 }
 539
 540 /*
 541  * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
 542  * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
 543  * no new races - i.e. only another task doing capget() on
 544  * this task could get inconsistent info.  There can be no
 545  * racing writer bc a task can only change its own caps.
 546  */
 547 static long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
 548 {
 549         if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
 550                 return -EPERM;
 551         if (!cap_valid(cap))
 552                 return -EINVAL;
 553         cap_lower(current->cap_bset, cap);
 554         return 0;
 555 }
 556
 557 #else
 558 int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
 559                            struct sched_param *lp)
 560 {
 561         return 0;
 562 }
 563 int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 564 {
 565         return 0;
 566 }
 567 int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 568 {
 569         return 0;
 570 }
 571 #endif
 572
 573 int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 574                    unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
 575 {
 576         long error = 0;
 577
 578         switch (option) {
 579         case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
 580                 if (!cap_valid(arg2))
 581                         error = -EINVAL;
 582                 else
 583                         error = !!cap_raised(current->cap_bset, arg2);
 584                 break;
 585 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 586         case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
 587                 error = cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
 588                 break;
 589
 590         /*
 591          * The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a
 592          * system from legacy UID=0 based privilege (when filesystem
 593          * capabilities are not in use) to a system using filesystem
 594          * capabilities only - as the POSIX.1e draft intended.
 595          *
 596          * Note:
 597          *
 598          *  PR_SET_SECUREBITS =
 599          *      issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)
 600          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)
 601          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)
 602          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)
 603          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)
 604          *
 605          * will ensure that the current process and all of its
 606          * children will be locked into a pure
 607          * capability-based-privilege environment.
 608          */
 609         case PR_SET_SECUREBITS:
 610                 if ((((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
 611                      & (current->securebits ^ arg2))                  /*[1]*/
 612                     || ((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS
 613                          & ~arg2))                                    /*[2]*/
 614                     || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
 615                     || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0)) {    /*[4]*/
 616                         /*
 617                          * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
 618                          * [2] no unlocking of locks
 619                          * [3] no setting of unsupported bits
 620                          * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about
 621                          *     the "sendmail capabilities bug")
 622                          */
 623                         error = -EPERM;  /* cannot change a locked bit */
 624                 } else {
 625                         current->securebits = arg2;
 626                 }
 627                 break;
 628         case PR_GET_SECUREBITS:
 629                 error = current->securebits;
 630                 break;
 631
 632 #endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
 633
 634         case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
 635                 if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
 636                         error = 1;
 637                 break;
 638         case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
 639                 if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */
 640                         error = -EINVAL;
 641                 else if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
 642                         error = -EPERM;
 643                 else if (arg2)
 644                         current->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
 645                 else
 646                         current->securebits &=
 647                                 ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
 648                 break;
 649
 650         default:
 651                 /* No functionality available - continue with default */
 652                 return 0;
 653         }
 654
 655         /* Functionality provided */
 656         *rc_p = error;
 657         return 1;
 658 }
 659
 660 void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
 661 {
 662         cap_set_init_eff(p->cap_effective);
 663         cap_clear(p->cap_inheritable);
 664         cap_set_full(p->cap_permitted);
 665         p->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT;
 666         return;
 667 }
 668
 669 int cap_syslog (int type)
 670 {
 671         if ((type != 3 && type != 10) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 672                 return -EPERM;
 673         return 0;
 674 }
 675
 676 int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 677 {
 678         int cap_sys_admin = 0;
 679
 680         if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0)
 681                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
 682         return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
 683 }
 684