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[PATCH] reduce sizeof(struct file)
[linux-2.6/sactl.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c
blobbb62838be49655954016345dd26e174126543b95
1 /*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
15 *
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
19 */
20
21 #include <linux/config.h>
22 #include <linux/module.h>
23 #include <linux/init.h>
24 #include <linux/kernel.h>
25 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
26 #include <linux/errno.h>
27 #include <linux/sched.h>
28 #include <linux/security.h>
29 #include <linux/xattr.h>
30 #include <linux/capability.h>
31 #include <linux/unistd.h>
32 #include <linux/mm.h>
33 #include <linux/mman.h>
34 #include <linux/slab.h>
35 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
36 #include <linux/swap.h>
37 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
38 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
39 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
40 #include <linux/file.h>
41 #include <linux/namei.h>
42 #include <linux/mount.h>
43 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
44 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
45 #include <linux/kd.h>
46 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
48 #include <linux/tty.h>
49 #include <net/icmp.h>
50 #include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
51 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
52 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
53 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
54 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
55 #include <linux/bitops.h>
56 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
57 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/tcp.h>
60 #include <linux/udp.h>
61 #include <linux/quota.h>
62 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
63 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
64 #include <linux/parser.h>
65 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
66 #include <net/ipv6.h>
67 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
68 #include <linux/personality.h>
69 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
70 #include <linux/audit.h>
71 #include <linux/string.h>
72
73 #include "avc.h"
74 #include "objsec.h"
75 #include "netif.h"
76
77 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
78 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
79
80 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
81 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
82
83 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
84 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
85
86 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
87 {
88 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
89 return 1;
90 }
91 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
92 #endif
93
94 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
95 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
96
97 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
98 {
99 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
100 return 1;
101 }
102 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
103 #endif
104
105 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
106 static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
107
108 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
109 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
110 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
111 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
112 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
113
114 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
115 before the policy was loaded. */
116 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
117 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
118
119 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
120
121 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
122 {
123 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
124
125 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
126 if (!tsec)
127 return -ENOMEM;
128
129 tsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
130 tsec->task = task;
131 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
132 task->security = tsec;
133
134 return 0;
135 }
136
137 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
138 {
139 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
140
141 if (!tsec || tsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
142 return;
143
144 task->security = NULL;
145 kfree(tsec);
146 }
147
148 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
149 {
150 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
151 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
152
153 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
154 if (!isec)
155 return -ENOMEM;
156
157 init_MUTEX(&isec->sem);
158 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
159 isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
160 isec->inode = inode;
161 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
162 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
163 if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC)
164 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
165 else
166 isec->task_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
167 inode->i_security = isec;
168
169 return 0;
170 }
171
172 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
173 {
174 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
175 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
176
177 if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
178 return;
179
180 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
181 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
182 list_del_init(&isec->list);
183 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
184
185 inode->i_security = NULL;
186 kfree(isec);
187 }
188
189 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
190 {
191 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
192 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
193
194 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_ATOMIC);
195 if (!fsec)
196 return -ENOMEM;
197
198 fsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
199 fsec->file = file;
200 if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC) {
201 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
202 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
203 } else {
204 fsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
205 fsec->fown_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
206 }
207 file->f_security = fsec;
208
209 return 0;
210 }
211
212 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
213 {
214 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
215
216 if (!fsec || fsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
217 return;
218
219 file->f_security = NULL;
220 kfree(fsec);
221 }
222
223 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
224 {
225 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
226
227 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
228 if (!sbsec)
229 return -ENOMEM;
230
231 init_MUTEX(&sbsec->sem);
232 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
233 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
234 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
235 sbsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
236 sbsec->sb = sb;
237 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
238 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
239 sb->s_security = sbsec;
240
241 return 0;
242 }
243
244 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
245 {
246 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
247
248 if (!sbsec || sbsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
249 return;
250
251 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
252 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
253 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
254 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
255
256 sb->s_security = NULL;
257 kfree(sbsec);
258 }
259
260 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
261 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
262 {
263 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
264
265 if (family != PF_UNIX)
266 return 0;
267
268 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
269 if (!ssec)
270 return -ENOMEM;
271
272 ssec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
273 ssec->sk = sk;
274 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
275 sk->sk_security = ssec;
276
277 return 0;
278 }
279
280 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
281 {
282 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
283
284 if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX || ssec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
285 return;
286
287 sk->sk_security = NULL;
288 kfree(ssec);
289 }
290 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
291
292 /* The security server must be initialized before
293 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
294 extern int ss_initialized;
295
296 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
297
298 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
299 "uses xattr",
300 "uses transition SIDs",
301 "uses task SIDs",
302 "uses genfs_contexts",
303 "not configured for labeling",
304 "uses mountpoint labeling",
305 };
306
307 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
308
309 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
310 {
311 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
312 }
313
314 enum {
315 Opt_context = 1,
316 Opt_fscontext = 2,
317 Opt_defcontext = 4,
318 };
319
320 static match_table_t tokens = {
321 {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
322 {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
323 {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
324 };
325
326 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
327
328 static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
329 {
330 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
331 const char *name;
332 u32 sid;
333 int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
334 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
335 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
336
337 if (!data)
338 goto out;
339
340 name = sb->s_type->name;
341
342 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
343
344 /* NFS we understand. */
345 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
346 struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
347
348 if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
349 goto out;
350
351 if (d->context[0]) {
352 context = d->context;
353 seen |= Opt_context;
354 }
355 } else
356 goto out;
357
358 } else {
359 /* Standard string-based options. */
360 char *p, *options = data;
361
362 while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
363 int token;
364 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
365
366 if (!*p)
367 continue;
368
369 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
370
371 switch (token) {
372 case Opt_context:
373 if (seen) {
374 rc = -EINVAL;
375 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
376 goto out_free;
377 }
378 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
379 if (!context) {
380 rc = -ENOMEM;
381 goto out_free;
382 }
383 if (!alloc)
384 alloc = 1;
385 seen |= Opt_context;
386 break;
387
388 case Opt_fscontext:
389 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_fscontext)) {
390 rc = -EINVAL;
391 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
392 goto out_free;
393 }
394 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
395 if (!context) {
396 rc = -ENOMEM;
397 goto out_free;
398 }
399 if (!alloc)
400 alloc = 1;
401 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
402 break;
403
404 case Opt_defcontext:
405 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
406 rc = -EINVAL;
407 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: "
408 "defcontext option is invalid "
409 "for this filesystem type\n");
410 goto out_free;
411 }
412 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
413 rc = -EINVAL;
414 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
415 goto out_free;
416 }
417 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
418 if (!defcontext) {
419 rc = -ENOMEM;
420 goto out_free;
421 }
422 if (!alloc)
423 alloc = 1;
424 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
425 break;
426
427 default:
428 rc = -EINVAL;
429 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount "
430 "option\n");
431 goto out_free;
432
433 }
434 }
435 }
436
437 if (!seen)
438 goto out;
439
440 if (context) {
441 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
442 if (rc) {
443 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
444 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
445 context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
446 goto out_free;
447 }
448
449 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
450 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
451 if (rc)
452 goto out_free;
453
454 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
455 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
456 if (rc)
457 goto out_free;
458
459 sbsec->sid = sid;
460
461 if (seen & Opt_context)
462 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
463 }
464
465 if (defcontext) {
466 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
467 if (rc) {
468 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
469 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
470 defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
471 goto out_free;
472 }
473
474 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
475 goto out_free;
476
477 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
478 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
479 if (rc)
480 goto out_free;
481
482 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
483 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
484 if (rc)
485 goto out_free;
486
487 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
488 }
489
490 out_free:
491 if (alloc) {
492 kfree(context);
493 kfree(defcontext);
494 }
495 out:
496 return rc;
497 }
498
499 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
500 {
501 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
502 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
503 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
504 int rc = 0;
505
506 down(&sbsec->sem);
507 if (sbsec->initialized)
508 goto out;
509
510 if (!ss_initialized) {
511 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
512 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
513 server is ready to handle calls. */
514 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
515 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
516 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
517 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
518 goto out;
519 }
520
521 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
522 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
523 if (rc) {
524 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
525 __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
526 goto out;
527 }
528
529 rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
530 if (rc)
531 goto out;
532
533 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
534 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
535 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
536 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
537 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
538 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
539 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
540 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
541 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
542 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
543 goto out;
544 }
545 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
546 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
547 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
548 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
549 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
550 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
551 else
552 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
553 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
554 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
555 goto out;
556 }
557 }
558
559 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
560 sbsec->proc = 1;
561
562 sbsec->initialized = 1;
563
564 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
565 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
566 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
567 }
568 else {
569 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
570 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
571 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
572 }
573
574 /* Initialize the root inode. */
575 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
576
577 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
578 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
579 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
580 populates itself. */
581 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
582 next_inode:
583 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
584 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
585 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
586 struct inode_security_struct, list);
587 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
588 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
589 inode = igrab(inode);
590 if (inode) {
591 if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
592 inode_doinit(inode);
593 iput(inode);
594 }
595 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
596 list_del_init(&isec->list);
597 goto next_inode;
598 }
599 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
600 out:
601 up(&sbsec->sem);
602 return rc;
603 }
604
605 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
606 {
607 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
608 case S_IFSOCK:
609 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
610 case S_IFLNK:
611 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
612 case S_IFREG:
613 return SECCLASS_FILE;
614 case S_IFBLK:
615 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
616 case S_IFDIR:
617 return SECCLASS_DIR;
618 case S_IFCHR:
619 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
620 case S_IFIFO:
621 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
622
623 }
624
625 return SECCLASS_FILE;
626 }
627
628 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
629 {
630 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
631 }
632
633 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
634 {
635 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
636 }
637
638 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
639 {
640 switch (family) {
641 case PF_UNIX:
642 switch (type) {
643 case SOCK_STREAM:
644 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
645 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
646 case SOCK_DGRAM:
647 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
648 }
649 break;
650 case PF_INET:
651 case PF_INET6:
652 switch (type) {
653 case SOCK_STREAM:
654 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
655 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
656 else
657 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
658 case SOCK_DGRAM:
659 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
660 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
661 else
662 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
663 default:
664 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
665 }
666 break;
667 case PF_NETLINK:
668 switch (protocol) {
669 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
670 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
671 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
672 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
673 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
674 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
675 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
676 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
677 case NETLINK_XFRM:
678 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
679 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
680 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
681 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
682 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
683 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
684 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
685 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
686 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
687 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
688 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
689 default:
690 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
691 }
692 case PF_PACKET:
693 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
694 case PF_KEY:
695 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
696 }
697
698 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
699 }
700
701 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
702 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
703 u16 tclass,
704 u32 *sid)
705 {
706 int buflen, rc;
707 char *buffer, *path, *end;
708
709 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
710 if (!buffer)
711 return -ENOMEM;
712
713 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
714 end = buffer+buflen;
715 *--end = '\0';
716 buflen--;
717 path = end-1;
718 *path = '/';
719 while (de && de != de->parent) {
720 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
721 if (buflen < 0)
722 break;
723 end -= de->namelen;
724 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
725 *--end = '/';
726 path = end;
727 de = de->parent;
728 }
729 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
730 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
731 return rc;
732 }
733 #else
734 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
735 u16 tclass,
736 u32 *sid)
737 {
738 return -EINVAL;
739 }
740 #endif
741
742 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
743 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
744 {
745 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
746 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
747 u32 sid;
748 struct dentry *dentry;
749 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
750 char *context = NULL;
751 unsigned len = 0;
752 int rc = 0;
753 int hold_sem = 0;
754
755 if (isec->initialized)
756 goto out;
757
758 down(&isec->sem);
759 hold_sem = 1;
760 if (isec->initialized)
761 goto out;
762
763 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
764 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
765 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
766 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
767 server is ready to handle calls. */
768 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
769 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
770 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
771 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
772 goto out;
773 }
774
775 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
776 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
777 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
778 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
779 break;
780 }
781
782 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
783 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
784 if (opt_dentry) {
785 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
786 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
787 } else {
788 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
789 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
790 }
791 if (!dentry) {
792 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s "
793 "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
794 inode->i_ino);
795 goto out;
796 }
797
798 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
799 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
800 if (!context) {
801 rc = -ENOMEM;
802 dput(dentry);
803 goto out;
804 }
805 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
806 context, len);
807 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
808 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
809 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
810 NULL, 0);
811 if (rc < 0) {
812 dput(dentry);
813 goto out;
814 }
815 kfree(context);
816 len = rc;
817 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
818 if (!context) {
819 rc = -ENOMEM;
820 dput(dentry);
821 goto out;
822 }
823 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
824 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
825 context, len);
826 }
827 dput(dentry);
828 if (rc < 0) {
829 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
830 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned "
831 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
832 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
833 kfree(context);
834 goto out;
835 }
836 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
837 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
838 rc = 0;
839 } else {
840 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
841 sbsec->def_sid);
842 if (rc) {
843 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) "
844 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
845 __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
846 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
847 kfree(context);
848 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
849 rc = 0;
850 break;
851 }
852 }
853 kfree(context);
854 isec->sid = sid;
855 break;
856 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
857 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
858 break;
859 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
860 /* Default to the fs SID. */
861 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
862
863 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
864 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
865 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
866 sbsec->sid,
867 isec->sclass,
868 &sid);
869 if (rc)
870 goto out;
871 isec->sid = sid;
872 break;
873 default:
874 /* Default to the fs SID. */
875 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
876
877 if (sbsec->proc) {
878 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
879 if (proci->pde) {
880 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
881 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
882 isec->sclass,
883 &sid);
884 if (rc)
885 goto out;
886 isec->sid = sid;
887 }
888 }
889 break;
890 }
891
892 isec->initialized = 1;
893
894 out:
895 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
896 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
897
898 if (hold_sem)
899 up(&isec->sem);
900 return rc;
901 }
902
903 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
904 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
905 {
906 u32 perm = 0;
907
908 switch (sig) {
909 case SIGCHLD:
910 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
911 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
912 break;
913 case SIGKILL:
914 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
915 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
916 break;
917 case SIGSTOP:
918 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
919 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
920 break;
921 default:
922 /* All other signals. */
923 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
924 break;
925 }
926
927 return perm;
928 }
929
930 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
931 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
932 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
933 struct task_struct *tsk2,
934 u32 perms)
935 {
936 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
937
938 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
939 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
940 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
941 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
942 }
943
944 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
945 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
946 int cap)
947 {
948 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
949 struct avc_audit_data ad;
950
951 tsec = tsk->security;
952
953 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
954 ad.tsk = tsk;
955 ad.u.cap = cap;
956
957 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
958 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
959 }
960
961 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
962 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
963 u32 perms)
964 {
965 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
966
967 tsec = tsk->security;
968
969 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
970 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
971 }
972
973 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
974 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
975 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
976 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
977 struct inode *inode,
978 u32 perms,
979 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
980 {
981 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
982 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
983 struct avc_audit_data ad;
984
985 tsec = tsk->security;
986 isec = inode->i_security;
987
988 if (!adp) {
989 adp = &ad;
990 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
991 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
992 }
993
994 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
995 }
996
997 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
998 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
999 pathname if needed. */
1000 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1001 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1002 struct dentry *dentry,
1003 u32 av)
1004 {
1005 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1006 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1007 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1008 ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1009 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1010 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1011 }
1012
1013 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1014 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1015 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1016 check a particular permission to the file.
1017 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1018 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1019 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1020 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1021 static inline int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1022 struct file *file,
1023 u32 av)
1024 {
1025 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1026 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1027 struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
1028 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
1029 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1030 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1031 int rc;
1032
1033 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1034 ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1035 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1036
1037 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1038 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1039 SECCLASS_FD,
1040 FD__USE,
1041 &ad);
1042 if (rc)
1043 return rc;
1044 }
1045
1046 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1047 if (av)
1048 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1049
1050 return 0;
1051 }
1052
1053 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1054 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1055 struct dentry *dentry,
1056 u16 tclass)
1057 {
1058 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1059 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1060 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1061 u32 newsid;
1062 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1063 int rc;
1064
1065 tsec = current->security;
1066 dsec = dir->i_security;
1067 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1068
1069 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1070 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1071
1072 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1073 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1074 &ad);
1075 if (rc)
1076 return rc;
1077
1078 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1079 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1080 } else {
1081 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1082 &newsid);
1083 if (rc)
1084 return rc;
1085 }
1086
1087 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1088 if (rc)
1089 return rc;
1090
1091 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1092 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1093 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1094 }
1095
1096 #define MAY_LINK 0
1097 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1098 #define MAY_RMDIR 2
1099
1100 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1101 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1102 struct dentry *dentry,
1103 int kind)
1104
1105 {
1106 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1107 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1108 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1109 u32 av;
1110 int rc;
1111
1112 tsec = current->security;
1113 dsec = dir->i_security;
1114 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1115
1116 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1117 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1118
1119 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1120 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1121 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1122 if (rc)
1123 return rc;
1124
1125 switch (kind) {
1126 case MAY_LINK:
1127 av = FILE__LINK;
1128 break;
1129 case MAY_UNLINK:
1130 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1131 break;
1132 case MAY_RMDIR:
1133 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1134 break;
1135 default:
1136 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1137 return 0;
1138 }
1139
1140 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1141 return rc;
1142 }
1143
1144 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1145 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1146 struct inode *new_dir,
1147 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1148 {
1149 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1150 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1151 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1152 u32 av;
1153 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1154 int rc;
1155
1156 tsec = current->security;
1157 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1158 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1159 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1160 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1161
1162 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1163
1164 ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1165 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1166 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1167 if (rc)
1168 return rc;
1169 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1170 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1171 if (rc)
1172 return rc;
1173 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1174 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1175 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1176 if (rc)
1177 return rc;
1178 }
1179
1180 ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1181 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1182 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1183 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1184 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1185 if (rc)
1186 return rc;
1187 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1188 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1189 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1190 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1191 new_isec->sclass,
1192 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1193 if (rc)
1194 return rc;
1195 }
1196
1197 return 0;
1198 }
1199
1200 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1201 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1202 struct super_block *sb,
1203 u32 perms,
1204 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1205 {
1206 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1207 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1208
1209 tsec = tsk->security;
1210 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1211 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1212 perms, ad);
1213 }
1214
1215 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1216 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1217 {
1218 u32 av = 0;
1219
1220 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1221 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1222 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1223 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1224 av |= FILE__READ;
1225
1226 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1227 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1228 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1229 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1230
1231 } else {
1232 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1233 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1234 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1235 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1236 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1237 av |= DIR__READ;
1238 }
1239
1240 return av;
1241 }
1242
1243 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1244 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1245 {
1246 u32 av = 0;
1247
1248 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1249 av |= FILE__READ;
1250 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1251 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1252 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1253 else
1254 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1255 }
1256
1257 return av;
1258 }
1259
1260 /* Set an inode's SID to a specified value. */
1261 static int inode_security_set_sid(struct inode *inode, u32 sid)
1262 {
1263 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1264 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1265
1266 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1267 /* Defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
1268 return 0;
1269 }
1270
1271 down(&isec->sem);
1272 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1273 isec->sid = sid;
1274 isec->initialized = 1;
1275 up(&isec->sem);
1276 return 0;
1277 }
1278
1279 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1280
1281 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1282 {
1283 struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1284 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1285 int rc;
1286
1287 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1288 if (rc)
1289 return rc;
1290
1291 rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1292 /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1293 if (!rc)
1294 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1295 return rc;
1296 }
1297
1298 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1299 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1300 {
1301 int error;
1302
1303 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1304 if (error)
1305 return error;
1306
1307 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1308 }
1309
1310 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1311 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1312 {
1313 int error;
1314
1315 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1316 if (error)
1317 return error;
1318
1319 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1320 }
1321
1322 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1323 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1324 {
1325 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1326 }
1327
1328 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1329 {
1330 int rc;
1331
1332 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1333 if (rc)
1334 return rc;
1335
1336 return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1337 }
1338
1339 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1340 {
1341 int error = 0;
1342 u32 av;
1343 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1344 u32 tsid;
1345 int rc;
1346
1347 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1348 if (rc)
1349 return rc;
1350
1351 tsec = current->security;
1352
1353 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
1354 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1355 if (rc) {
1356 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1357 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1358 }
1359
1360 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1361 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1362 if(op == 001) {
1363 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1364 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1365 } else {
1366 av = 0;
1367 if (op & 004)
1368 av |= FILE__READ;
1369 if (op & 002)
1370 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1371 if (av)
1372 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1373 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1374 }
1375
1376 return error;
1377 }
1378
1379 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1380 {
1381 int rc = 0;
1382
1383 if (!sb)
1384 return 0;
1385
1386 switch (cmds) {
1387 case Q_SYNC:
1388 case Q_QUOTAON:
1389 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1390 case Q_SETINFO:
1391 case Q_SETQUOTA:
1392 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1393 sb,
1394 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1395 break;
1396 case Q_GETFMT:
1397 case Q_GETINFO:
1398 case Q_GETQUOTA:
1399 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1400 sb,
1401 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1402 break;
1403 default:
1404 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1405 break;
1406 }
1407 return rc;
1408 }
1409
1410 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1411 {
1412 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1413 }
1414
1415 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1416 {
1417 int rc;
1418
1419 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1420 if (rc)
1421 return rc;
1422
1423 switch (type) {
1424 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1425 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1426 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1427 break;
1428 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1429 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1430 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1431 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1432 break;
1433 case 0: /* Close log */
1434 case 1: /* Open log */
1435 case 2: /* Read from log */
1436 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1437 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1438 default:
1439 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1440 break;
1441 }
1442 return rc;
1443 }
1444
1445 /*
1446 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1447 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1448 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1449 *
1450 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1451 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1452 * the capability is granted.
1453 *
1454 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1455 * processes that allocate mappings.
1456 */
1457 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
1458 {
1459 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1460 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1461
1462 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1463 if (rc == 0)
1464 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1465 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1466 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1467 NULL);
1468
1469 if (rc == 0)
1470 cap_sys_admin = 1;
1471
1472 return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
1473 }
1474
1475 /* binprm security operations */
1476
1477 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1478 {
1479 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1480
1481 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1482 if (!bsec)
1483 return -ENOMEM;
1484
1485 bsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
1486 bsec->bprm = bprm;
1487 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1488 bsec->set = 0;
1489
1490 bprm->security = bsec;
1491 return 0;
1492 }
1493
1494 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1495 {
1496 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1497 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1498 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1499 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1500 u32 newsid;
1501 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1502 int rc;
1503
1504 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1505 if (rc)
1506 return rc;
1507
1508 bsec = bprm->security;
1509
1510 if (bsec->set)
1511 return 0;
1512
1513 tsec = current->security;
1514 isec = inode->i_security;
1515
1516 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1517 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1518
1519 /* Reset create SID on execve. */
1520 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1521
1522 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1523 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1524 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1525 tsec->exec_sid = 0;
1526 } else {
1527 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1528 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1529 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1530 if (rc)
1531 return rc;
1532 }
1533
1534 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1535 ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt;
1536 ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
1537
1538 if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1539 newsid = tsec->sid;
1540
1541 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1542 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1543 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1544 if (rc)
1545 return rc;
1546 } else {
1547 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1548 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1549 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1550 if (rc)
1551 return rc;
1552
1553 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1554 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1555 if (rc)
1556 return rc;
1557
1558 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1559 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1560
1561 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1562 bsec->sid = newsid;
1563 }
1564
1565 bsec->set = 1;
1566 return 0;
1567 }
1568
1569 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1570 {
1571 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1572 }
1573
1574
1575 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1576 {
1577 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1578 int atsecure = 0;
1579
1580 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1581 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1582 the noatsecure permission is granted between
1583 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1584 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1585 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1586 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1587 }
1588
1589 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1590 }
1591
1592 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1593 {
1594 kfree(bprm->security);
1595 bprm->security = NULL;
1596 }
1597
1598 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1599 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1600
1601 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1602 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1603 {
1604 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1605 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1606 struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty;
1607 struct fdtable *fdt;
1608 long j = -1;
1609
1610 if (tty) {
1611 file_list_lock();
1612 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
1613 if (file) {
1614 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1615 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1616 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1617 file may belong to another process and we are only
1618 interested in the inode-based check here. */
1619 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1620 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1621 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1622 /* Reset controlling tty. */
1623 current->signal->tty = NULL;
1624 current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
1625 }
1626 }
1627 file_list_unlock();
1628 }
1629
1630 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1631
1632 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1633
1634 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1635 for (;;) {
1636 unsigned long set, i;
1637 int fd;
1638
1639 j++;
1640 i = j * __NFDBITS;
1641 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
1642 if (i >= fdt->max_fds || i >= fdt->max_fdset)
1643 break;
1644 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1645 if (!set)
1646 continue;
1647 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1648 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1649 if (set & 1) {
1650 file = fget(i);
1651 if (!file)
1652 continue;
1653 if (file_has_perm(current,
1654 file,
1655 file_to_av(file))) {
1656 sys_close(i);
1657 fd = get_unused_fd();
1658 if (fd != i) {
1659 if (fd >= 0)
1660 put_unused_fd(fd);
1661 fput(file);
1662 continue;
1663 }
1664 if (devnull) {
1665 rcuref_inc(&devnull->f_count);
1666 } else {
1667 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
1668 if (!devnull) {
1669 put_unused_fd(fd);
1670 fput(file);
1671 continue;
1672 }
1673 }
1674 fd_install(fd, devnull);
1675 }
1676 fput(file);
1677 }
1678 }
1679 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1680
1681 }
1682 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1683 }
1684
1685 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1686 {
1687 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1688 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1689 u32 sid;
1690 int rc;
1691
1692 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1693
1694 tsec = current->security;
1695
1696 bsec = bprm->security;
1697 sid = bsec->sid;
1698
1699 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1700 bsec->unsafe = 0;
1701 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1702 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
1703 unchanged and kill. */
1704 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1705 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1706 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1707 if (rc) {
1708 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1709 return;
1710 }
1711 }
1712
1713 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1714 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1715 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1716 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1717 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1718 NULL);
1719 if (rc) {
1720 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1721 return;
1722 }
1723 }
1724 tsec->sid = sid;
1725 }
1726 }
1727
1728 /*
1729 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1730 */
1731 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1732 {
1733 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1734 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1735 struct itimerval itimer;
1736 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1737 int rc, i;
1738
1739 tsec = current->security;
1740 bsec = bprm->security;
1741
1742 if (bsec->unsafe) {
1743 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1744 return;
1745 }
1746 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1747 return;
1748
1749 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1750 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1751
1752 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1753 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
1754 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1755 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1756 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1757 will be checked against the new SID. */
1758 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1759 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1760 if (rc) {
1761 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1762 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1763 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1764 flush_signals(current);
1765 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1766 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1767 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
1768 recalc_sigpending();
1769 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1770 }
1771
1772 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1773 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
1774 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1775 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
1776 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1777 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1778 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1779 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1780 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1781 RLIMIT_STACK.*/
1782 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1783 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1784 if (rc) {
1785 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1786 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1787 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1788 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1789 }
1790 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1791 /*
1792 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1793 * to be refigured.
1794 */
1795 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1796 }
1797 }
1798
1799 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1800 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1801 wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1802 }
1803
1804 /* superblock security operations */
1805
1806 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1807 {
1808 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1809 }
1810
1811 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1812 {
1813 superblock_free_security(sb);
1814 }
1815
1816 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1817 {
1818 if (plen > olen)
1819 return 0;
1820
1821 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1822 }
1823
1824 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1825 {
1826 return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1827 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1828 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len));
1829 }
1830
1831 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1832 {
1833 if (!*first) {
1834 **to = ',';
1835 *to += 1;
1836 }
1837 else
1838 *first = 0;
1839 memcpy(*to, from, len);
1840 *to += len;
1841 }
1842
1843 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
1844 {
1845 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
1846 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
1847 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
1848
1849 in_curr = orig;
1850 sec_curr = copy;
1851
1852 /* Binary mount data: just copy */
1853 if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
1854 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
1855 goto out;
1856 }
1857
1858 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1859 if (!nosec) {
1860 rc = -ENOMEM;
1861 goto out;
1862 }
1863
1864 nosec_save = nosec;
1865 fnosec = fsec = 1;
1866 in_save = in_end = orig;
1867
1868 do {
1869 if (*in_end == ',' || *in_end == '\0') {
1870 int len = in_end - in_curr;
1871
1872 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
1873 take_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
1874 else
1875 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
1876
1877 in_curr = in_end + 1;
1878 }
1879 } while (*in_end++);
1880
1881 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
1882 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
1883 out:
1884 return rc;
1885 }
1886
1887 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1888 {
1889 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1890 int rc;
1891
1892 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
1893 if (rc)
1894 return rc;
1895
1896 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1897 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
1898 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
1899 }
1900
1901 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct super_block *sb)
1902 {
1903 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1904
1905 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1906 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
1907 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
1908 }
1909
1910 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
1911 struct nameidata *nd,
1912 char * type,
1913 unsigned long flags,
1914 void * data)
1915 {
1916 int rc;
1917
1918 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
1919 if (rc)
1920 return rc;
1921
1922 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
1923 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
1924 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
1925 else
1926 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
1927 FILE__MOUNTON);
1928 }
1929
1930 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
1931 {
1932 int rc;
1933
1934 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
1935 if (rc)
1936 return rc;
1937
1938 return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
1939 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
1940 }
1941
1942 /* inode security operations */
1943
1944 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
1945 {
1946 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
1947 }
1948
1949 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
1950 {
1951 inode_free_security(inode);
1952 }
1953
1954 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
1955 char **name, void **value,
1956 size_t *len)
1957 {
1958 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1959 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1960 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1961 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1962 u32 newsid, clen;
1963 int rc;
1964 char *namep = NULL, *context;
1965
1966 tsec = current->security;
1967 dsec = dir->i_security;
1968 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1969 isec = inode->i_security;
1970
1971 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1972 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1973 } else {
1974 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
1975 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
1976 &newsid);
1977 if (rc) {
1978 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
1979 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
1980 "ino=%ld)\n",
1981 __FUNCTION__,
1982 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1983 return rc;
1984 }
1985 }
1986
1987 inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid);
1988
1989 if (name) {
1990 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
1991 if (!namep)
1992 return -ENOMEM;
1993 *name = namep;
1994 }
1995
1996 if (value && len) {
1997 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
1998 if (rc) {
1999 kfree(namep);
2000 return rc;
2001 }
2002 *value = context;
2003 *len = clen;
2004 }
2005
2006 return 0;
2007 }
2008
2009 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2010 {
2011 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2012 }
2013
2014 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2015 {
2016 int rc;
2017
2018 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2019 if (rc)
2020 return rc;
2021 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2022 }
2023
2024 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2025 {
2026 int rc;
2027
2028 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2029 if (rc)
2030 return rc;
2031 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2032 }
2033
2034 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2035 {
2036 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2037 }
2038
2039 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2040 {
2041 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2042 }
2043
2044 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2045 {
2046 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2047 }
2048
2049 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2050 {
2051 int rc;
2052
2053 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2054 if (rc)
2055 return rc;
2056
2057 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2058 }
2059
2060 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2061 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2062 {
2063 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2064 }
2065
2066 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2067 {
2068 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2069 }
2070
2071 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2072 {
2073 int rc;
2074
2075 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2076 if (rc)
2077 return rc;
2078 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2079 }
2080
2081 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2082 struct nameidata *nd)
2083 {
2084 int rc;
2085
2086 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2087 if (rc)
2088 return rc;
2089
2090 if (!mask) {
2091 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2092 return 0;
2093 }
2094
2095 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2096 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2097 }
2098
2099 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2100 {
2101 int rc;
2102
2103 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2104 if (rc)
2105 return rc;
2106
2107 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2108 return 0;
2109
2110 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2111 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2112 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2113
2114 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2115 }
2116
2117 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2118 {
2119 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2120 }
2121
2122 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2123 {
2124 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2125 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2126 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2127 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2128 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2129 u32 newsid;
2130 int rc = 0;
2131
2132 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2133 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2134 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2135 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2136 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2137 Restrict to administrator. */
2138 return -EPERM;
2139 }
2140
2141 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2142 ordinary setattr permission. */
2143 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2144 }
2145
2146 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2147 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2148 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2149
2150 if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
2151 return -EPERM;
2152
2153 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2154 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2155
2156 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2157 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2158 if (rc)
2159 return rc;
2160
2161 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2162 if (rc)
2163 return rc;
2164
2165 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2166 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2167 if (rc)
2168 return rc;
2169
2170 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2171 isec->sclass);
2172 if (rc)
2173 return rc;
2174
2175 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2176 sbsec->sid,
2177 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2178 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2179 &ad);
2180 }
2181
2182 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2183 void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2184 {
2185 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2186 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2187 u32 newsid;
2188 int rc;
2189
2190 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2191 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2192 return;
2193 }
2194
2195 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2196 if (rc) {
2197 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
2198 "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2199 return;
2200 }
2201
2202 isec->sid = newsid;
2203 return;
2204 }
2205
2206 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2207 {
2208 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2209 }
2210
2211 static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2212 {
2213 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2214 }
2215
2216 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2217 {
2218 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2219 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2220 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2221 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2222 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2223 Restrict to administrator. */
2224 return -EPERM;
2225 }
2226
2227 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2228 ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
2229 permission for removexattr. */
2230 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2231 }
2232
2233 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2234 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2235 return -EACCES;
2236 }
2237
2238 /*
2239 * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
2240 * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2241 * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2242 *
2243 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2244 */
2245 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
2246 {
2247 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2248 char *context;
2249 unsigned len;
2250 int rc;
2251
2252 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) {
2253 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
2254 goto out;
2255 }
2256
2257 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
2258 if (rc)
2259 goto out;
2260
2261 /* Probe for required buffer size */
2262 if (!buffer || !size) {
2263 rc = len;
2264 goto out_free;
2265 }
2266
2267 if (size < len) {
2268 rc = -ERANGE;
2269 goto out_free;
2270 }
2271
2272 if (err > 0) {
2273 if ((len == err) && !(memcmp(context, buffer, len))) {
2274 /* Don't need to canonicalize value */
2275 rc = err;
2276 goto out_free;
2277 }
2278 memset(buffer, 0, size);
2279 }
2280 memcpy(buffer, context, len);
2281 rc = len;
2282 out_free:
2283 kfree(context);
2284 out:
2285 return rc;
2286 }
2287
2288 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2289 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2290 {
2291 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2292 u32 newsid;
2293 int rc;
2294
2295 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2296 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2297
2298 if (!value || !size)
2299 return -EACCES;
2300
2301 rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2302 if (rc)
2303 return rc;
2304
2305 isec->sid = newsid;
2306 return 0;
2307 }
2308
2309 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2310 {
2311 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2312 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2313 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2314 return len;
2315 }
2316
2317 /* file security operations */
2318
2319 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2320 {
2321 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
2322
2323 if (!mask) {
2324 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2325 return 0;
2326 }
2327
2328 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2329 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2330 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2331
2332 return file_has_perm(current, file,
2333 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2334 }
2335
2336 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2337 {
2338 return file_alloc_security(file);
2339 }
2340
2341 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2342 {
2343 file_free_security(file);
2344 }
2345
2346 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2347 unsigned long arg)
2348 {
2349 int error = 0;
2350
2351 switch (cmd) {
2352 case FIONREAD:
2353 /* fall through */
2354 case FIBMAP:
2355 /* fall through */
2356 case FIGETBSZ:
2357 /* fall through */
2358 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2359 /* fall through */
2360 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2361 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2362 break;
2363
2364 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2365 /* fall through */
2366 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2367 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2368 break;
2369
2370 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2371 case FIONBIO:
2372 /* fall through */
2373 case FIOASYNC:
2374 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2375 break;
2376
2377 case KDSKBENT:
2378 case KDSKBSENT:
2379 error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2380 break;
2381
2382 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2383 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2384 */
2385 default:
2386 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2387
2388 }
2389 return error;
2390 }
2391
2392 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2393 {
2394 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2395 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2396 /*
2397 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2398 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2399 * This has an additional check.
2400 */
2401 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2402 if (rc)
2403 return rc;
2404 }
2405 #endif
2406
2407 if (file) {
2408 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2409 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2410
2411 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2412 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2413 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2414
2415 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2416 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2417
2418 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2419 }
2420 return 0;
2421 }
2422
2423 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2424 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
2425 {
2426 int rc;
2427
2428 rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
2429 if (rc)
2430 return rc;
2431
2432 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2433 prot = reqprot;
2434
2435 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2436 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2437 }
2438
2439 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2440 unsigned long reqprot,
2441 unsigned long prot)
2442 {
2443 int rc;
2444
2445 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2446 if (rc)
2447 return rc;
2448
2449 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2450 prot = reqprot;
2451
2452 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2453 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
2454 (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2455 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk)) {
2456 /*
2457 * We are making an executable mapping in the brk region.
2458 * This has an additional execheap check.
2459 */
2460 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
2461 if (rc)
2462 return rc;
2463 }
2464 if (vma->vm_file != NULL && vma->anon_vma != NULL && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
2465 /*
2466 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2467 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been written,
2468 * check ability to execute the possibly modified content.
2469 * This typically should only occur for text relocations.
2470 */
2471 int rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
2472 if (rc)
2473 return rc;
2474 }
2475 if (!vma->vm_file && (prot & PROT_EXEC) &&
2476 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2477 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2478 /* Attempt to make the process stack executable.
2479 * This has an additional execstack check.
2480 */
2481 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2482 if (rc)
2483 return rc;
2484 }
2485 #endif
2486
2487 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2488 }
2489
2490 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
2491 {
2492 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2493 }
2494
2495 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2496 unsigned long arg)
2497 {
2498 int err = 0;
2499
2500 switch (cmd) {
2501 case F_SETFL:
2502 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2503 err = -EINVAL;
2504 break;
2505 }
2506
2507 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
2508 err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
2509 break;
2510 }
2511 /* fall through */
2512 case F_SETOWN:
2513 case F_SETSIG:
2514 case F_GETFL:
2515 case F_GETOWN:
2516 case F_GETSIG:
2517 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
2518 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2519 break;
2520 case F_GETLK:
2521 case F_SETLK:
2522 case F_SETLKW:
2523 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
2524 case F_GETLK64:
2525 case F_SETLK64:
2526 case F_SETLKW64:
2527 #endif
2528 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2529 err = -EINVAL;
2530 break;
2531 }
2532 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2533 break;
2534 }
2535
2536 return err;
2537 }
2538
2539 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
2540 {
2541 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2542 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2543
2544 tsec = current->security;
2545 fsec = file->f_security;
2546 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
2547
2548 return 0;
2549 }
2550
2551 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
2552 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
2553 {
2554 struct file *file;
2555 u32 perm;
2556 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2557 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2558
2559 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
2560 file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner));
2561
2562 tsec = tsk->security;
2563 fsec = file->f_security;
2564
2565 if (!signum)
2566 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
2567 else
2568 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
2569
2570 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
2571 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2572 }
2573
2574 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
2575 {
2576 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
2577 }
2578
2579 /* task security operations */
2580
2581 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
2582 {
2583 int rc;
2584
2585 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
2586 if (rc)
2587 return rc;
2588
2589 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
2590 }
2591
2592 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2593 {
2594 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
2595 int rc;
2596
2597 tsec1 = current->security;
2598
2599 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
2600 if (rc)
2601 return rc;
2602 tsec2 = tsk->security;
2603
2604 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
2605 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
2606
2607 /* Retain the exec and create SIDs across fork */
2608 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
2609 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
2610
2611 /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
2612 This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
2613 subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
2614 tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
2615
2616 return 0;
2617 }
2618
2619 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2620 {
2621 task_free_security(tsk);
2622 }
2623
2624 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2625 {
2626 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
2627 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
2628 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
2629 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
2630 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
2631 capable hook. */
2632 return 0;
2633 }
2634
2635 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2636 {
2637 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
2638 }
2639
2640 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
2641 {
2642 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2643 return 0;
2644 }
2645
2646 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2647 {
2648 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
2649 }
2650
2651 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2652 {
2653 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
2654 }
2655
2656 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2657 {
2658 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
2659 }
2660
2661 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
2662 {
2663 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2664 return 0;
2665 }
2666
2667 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2668 {
2669 int rc;
2670
2671 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
2672 if (rc)
2673 return rc;
2674
2675 return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2676 }
2677
2678 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
2679 {
2680 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
2681 int rc;
2682
2683 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
2684 if (rc)
2685 return rc;
2686
2687 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
2688 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
2689 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
2690 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
2691 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
2692 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
2693
2694 return 0;
2695 }
2696
2697 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
2698 {
2699 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2700 }
2701
2702 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2703 {
2704 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2705 }
2706
2707 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig)
2708 {
2709 u32 perm;
2710 int rc;
2711
2712 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig);
2713 if (rc)
2714 return rc;
2715
2716 if (info && ((unsigned long)info == 1 ||
2717 (unsigned long)info == 2 || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
2718 return 0;
2719
2720 if (!sig)
2721 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
2722 else
2723 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
2724
2725 return task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
2726 }
2727
2728 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
2729 unsigned long arg2,
2730 unsigned long arg3,
2731 unsigned long arg4,
2732 unsigned long arg5)
2733 {
2734 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
2735 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
2736 the state of the current process. */
2737 return 0;
2738 }
2739
2740 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2741 {
2742 u32 perm;
2743
2744 perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
2745
2746 return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
2747 }
2748
2749 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
2750 {
2751 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2752
2753 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
2754
2755 tsec = p->security;
2756 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2757 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
2758 return;
2759 }
2760
2761 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
2762 struct inode *inode)
2763 {
2764 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
2765 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2766
2767 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
2768 isec->initialized = 1;
2769 return;
2770 }
2771
2772 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
2773
2774 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2775 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2776 {
2777 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
2778 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
2779
2780 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2781 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
2782 if (ih == NULL)
2783 goto out;
2784
2785 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
2786 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
2787 goto out;
2788
2789 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
2790 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
2791 ret = 0;
2792
2793 switch (ih->protocol) {
2794 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
2795 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2796
2797 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2798 break;
2799
2800 offset += ihlen;
2801 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2802 if (th == NULL)
2803 break;
2804
2805 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2806 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2807 break;
2808 }
2809
2810 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
2811 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2812
2813 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2814 break;
2815
2816 offset += ihlen;
2817 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2818 if (uh == NULL)
2819 break;
2820
2821 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2822 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2823 break;
2824 }
2825
2826 default:
2827 break;
2828 }
2829 out:
2830 return ret;
2831 }
2832
2833 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2834
2835 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2836 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2837 {
2838 u8 nexthdr;
2839 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
2840 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
2841
2842 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2843 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
2844 if (ip6 == NULL)
2845 goto out;
2846
2847 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
2848 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
2849 ret = 0;
2850
2851 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
2852 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
2853 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
2854 if (offset < 0)
2855 goto out;
2856
2857 switch (nexthdr) {
2858 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
2859 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2860
2861 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2862 if (th == NULL)
2863 break;
2864
2865 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2866 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2867 break;
2868 }
2869
2870 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
2871 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2872
2873 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2874 if (uh == NULL)
2875 break;
2876
2877 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2878 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2879 break;
2880 }
2881
2882 /* includes fragments */
2883 default:
2884 break;
2885 }
2886 out:
2887 return ret;
2888 }
2889
2890 #endif /* IPV6 */
2891
2892 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
2893 char **addrp, int *len, int src)
2894 {
2895 int ret = 0;
2896
2897 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
2898 case PF_INET:
2899 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad);
2900 if (ret || !addrp)
2901 break;
2902 *len = 4;
2903 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
2904 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
2905 break;
2906
2907 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2908 case PF_INET6:
2909 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad);
2910 if (ret || !addrp)
2911 break;
2912 *len = 16;
2913 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
2914 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
2915 break;
2916 #endif /* IPV6 */
2917 default:
2918 break;
2919 }
2920
2921 return ret;
2922 }
2923
2924 /* socket security operations */
2925 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
2926 u32 perms)
2927 {
2928 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2929 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2930 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2931 int err = 0;
2932
2933 tsec = task->security;
2934 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2935
2936 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
2937 goto out;
2938
2939 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
2940 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
2941 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
2942
2943 out:
2944 return err;
2945 }
2946
2947 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
2948 int protocol, int kern)
2949 {
2950 int err = 0;
2951 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2952
2953 if (kern)
2954 goto out;
2955
2956 tsec = current->security;
2957 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2958 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
2959 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
2960
2961 out:
2962 return err;
2963 }
2964
2965 static void selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2966 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2967 {
2968 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2969 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2970
2971 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2972
2973 tsec = current->security;
2974 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
2975 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : tsec->sid;
2976 isec->initialized = 1;
2977
2978 return;
2979 }
2980
2981 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
2982 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
2983 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
2984 #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0]
2985 #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1]
2986
2987 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
2988 {
2989 u16 family;
2990 int err;
2991
2992 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
2993 if (err)
2994 goto out;
2995
2996 /*
2997 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
2998 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
2999 * check the first address now.
3000 */
3001 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3002 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3003 char *addrp;
3004 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3005 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3006 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3007 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3008 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3009 unsigned short snum;
3010 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3011 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3012
3013 tsec = current->security;
3014 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3015
3016 if (family == PF_INET) {
3017 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3018 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3019 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3020 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3021 } else {
3022 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3023 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3024 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3025 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3026 }
3027
3028 if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) ||
3029 snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) {
3030 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3031 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3032 if (err)
3033 goto out;
3034 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3035 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3036 ad.u.net.family = family;
3037 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3038 isec->sclass,
3039 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3040 if (err)
3041 goto out;
3042 }
3043
3044 switch(isec->sclass) {
3045 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3046 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3047 break;
3048
3049 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3050 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3051 break;
3052
3053 default:
3054 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3055 break;
3056 }
3057
3058 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
3059 if (err)
3060 goto out;
3061
3062 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3063 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3064 ad.u.net.family = family;
3065
3066 if (family == PF_INET)
3067 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3068 else
3069 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3070
3071 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3072 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3073 if (err)
3074 goto out;
3075 }
3076 out:
3077 return err;
3078 }
3079
3080 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3081 {
3082 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3083 int err;
3084
3085 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3086 if (err)
3087 return err;
3088
3089 /*
3090 * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3091 */
3092 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3093 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3094 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3095 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3096 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3097 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3098 unsigned short snum;
3099 u32 sid;
3100
3101 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3102 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3103 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3104 return -EINVAL;
3105 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3106 } else {
3107 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3108 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3109 return -EINVAL;
3110 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3111 }
3112
3113 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3114 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3115 if (err)
3116 goto out;
3117
3118 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3119 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3120 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3121 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass,
3122 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad);
3123 if (err)
3124 goto out;
3125 }
3126
3127 out:
3128 return err;
3129 }
3130
3131 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3132 {
3133 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3134 }
3135
3136 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3137 {
3138 int err;
3139 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3140 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3141
3142 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3143 if (err)
3144 return err;
3145
3146 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3147
3148 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3149 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3150 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3151 newisec->initialized = 1;
3152
3153 return 0;
3154 }
3155
3156 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3157 int size)
3158 {
3159 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3160 }
3161
3162 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3163 int size, int flags)
3164 {
3165 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3166 }
3167
3168 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3169 {
3170 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3171 }
3172
3173 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3174 {
3175 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3176 }
3177
3178 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
3179 {
3180 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3181 }
3182
3183 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3184 int optname)
3185 {
3186 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3187 }
3188
3189 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3190 {
3191 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3192 }
3193
3194 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3195 struct socket *other,
3196 struct sock *newsk)
3197 {
3198 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3199 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3200 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3201 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3202 int err;
3203
3204 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3205 if (err)
3206 return err;
3207
3208 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3209 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3210
3211 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3212 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3213
3214 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3215 isec->sclass,
3216 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3217 if (err)
3218 return err;
3219
3220 /* connecting socket */
3221 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3222 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3223
3224 /* server child socket */
3225 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3226 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3227
3228 return 0;
3229 }
3230
3231 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3232 struct socket *other)
3233 {
3234 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3235 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3236 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3237 int err;
3238
3239 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3240 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3241
3242 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3243 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3244
3245 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3246 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3247 if (err)
3248 return err;
3249
3250 return 0;
3251 }
3252
3253 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3254 {
3255 u16 family;
3256 char *addrp;
3257 int len, err = 0;
3258 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
3259 u32 sock_sid = 0;
3260 u16 sock_class = 0;
3261 struct socket *sock;
3262 struct net_device *dev;
3263 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3264
3265 family = sk->sk_family;
3266 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
3267 goto out;
3268
3269 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3270 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
3271 family = PF_INET;
3272
3273 read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3274 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3275 if (sock) {
3276 struct inode *inode;
3277 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3278 if (inode) {
3279 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3280 isec = inode->i_security;
3281 sock_sid = isec->sid;
3282 sock_class = isec->sclass;
3283 }
3284 }
3285 read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3286 if (!sock_sid)
3287 goto out;
3288
3289 dev = skb->dev;
3290 if (!dev)
3291 goto out;
3292
3293 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3294 if (err)
3295 goto out;
3296
3297 switch (sock_class) {
3298 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3299 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3300 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3301 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3302 break;
3303
3304 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3305 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3306 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3307 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3308 break;
3309
3310 default:
3311 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3312 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3313 break;
3314 }
3315
3316 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3317 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3318 ad.u.net.family = family;
3319
3320 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
3321 if (err)
3322 goto out;
3323
3324 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, &ad);
3325 if (err)
3326 goto out;
3327
3328 /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
3329 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3330 if (err)
3331 goto out;
3332
3333 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, &ad);
3334 if (err)
3335 goto out;
3336
3337 if (recv_perm) {
3338 u32 port_sid;
3339
3340 /* Fixme: make this more efficient */
3341 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3342 sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad.u.net.sport),
3343 &port_sid);
3344 if (err)
3345 goto out;
3346
3347 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
3348 sock_class, recv_perm, &ad);
3349 }
3350 out:
3351 return err;
3352 }
3353
3354 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
3355 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3356 {
3357 int err = 0;
3358 char *scontext;
3359 u32 scontext_len;
3360 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3361 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3362
3363 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3364 if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
3365 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
3366 goto out;
3367 }
3368
3369 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3370
3371 err = security_sid_to_context(ssec->peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
3372 if (err)
3373 goto out;
3374
3375 if (scontext_len > len) {
3376 err = -ERANGE;
3377 goto out_len;
3378 }
3379
3380 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
3381 err = -EFAULT;
3382
3383 out_len:
3384 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
3385 err = -EFAULT;
3386
3387 kfree(scontext);
3388 out:
3389 return err;
3390 }
3391
3392 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
3393 {
3394 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
3395 }
3396
3397 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
3398 {
3399 sk_free_security(sk);
3400 }
3401
3402 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3403 {
3404 int err = 0;
3405 u32 perm;
3406 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
3407 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
3408 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3409
3410 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
3411 err = -EINVAL;
3412 goto out;
3413 }
3414 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
3415
3416 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
3417 if (err) {
3418 if (err == -EINVAL) {
3419 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3420 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
3421 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
3422 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
3423 if (!selinux_enforcing)
3424 err = 0;
3425 }
3426
3427 /* Ignore */
3428 if (err == -ENOENT)
3429 err = 0;
3430 goto out;
3431 }
3432
3433 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
3434 out:
3435 return err;
3436 }
3437
3438 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
3439
3440 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3441 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3442 const struct net_device *in,
3443 const struct net_device *out,
3444 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
3445 u16 family)
3446 {
3447 char *addrp;
3448 int len, err = NF_ACCEPT;
3449 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
3450 struct sock *sk;
3451 struct socket *sock;
3452 struct inode *inode;
3453 struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
3454 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3455 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3456 struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
3457
3458 sk = skb->sk;
3459 if (!sk)
3460 goto out;
3461
3462 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3463 if (!sock)
3464 goto out;
3465
3466 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3467 if (!inode)
3468 goto out;
3469
3470 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3471 if (err)
3472 goto out;
3473
3474 isec = inode->i_security;
3475
3476 switch (isec->sclass) {
3477 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3478 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
3479 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
3480 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3481 break;
3482
3483 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3484 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
3485 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
3486 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3487 break;
3488
3489 default:
3490 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
3491 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
3492 break;
3493 }
3494
3495
3496 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3497 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3498 ad.u.net.family = family;
3499
3500 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp,
3501 &len, 0) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3502 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3503 goto out;
3504
3505 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF,
3506 netif_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3507 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3508 goto out;
3509
3510 /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
3511 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len,
3512 &node_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3513 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3514 goto out;
3515
3516 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE,
3517 node_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3518 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3519 goto out;
3520
3521 if (send_perm) {
3522 u32 port_sid;
3523
3524 /* Fixme: make this more efficient */
3525 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3526 sk->sk_type,
3527 sk->sk_protocol,
3528 ntohs(ad.u.net.dport),
3529 &port_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3530 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3531 goto out;
3532
3533 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
3534 send_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3535 }
3536
3537 out:
3538 return err;
3539 }
3540
3541 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3542 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3543 const struct net_device *in,
3544 const struct net_device *out,
3545 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3546 {
3547 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
3548 }
3549
3550 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3551
3552 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3553 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3554 const struct net_device *in,
3555 const struct net_device *out,
3556 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3557 {
3558 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
3559 }
3560
3561 #endif /* IPV6 */
3562
3563 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
3564
3565 #else
3566
3567 static inline int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3568 {
3569 return 0;
3570 }
3571
3572 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
3573
3574 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3575 {
3576 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3577 struct av_decision avd;
3578 int err;
3579
3580 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
3581 if (err)
3582 return err;
3583
3584 tsec = current->security;
3585
3586 avd.allowed = 0;
3587 avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
3588 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, ~0, &avd);
3589 cap_mask(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, avd.allowed);
3590
3591 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
3592 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
3593
3594 return err;
3595 }
3596
3597 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
3598 {
3599 if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
3600 return -EPERM;
3601 return 0;
3602 }
3603
3604 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
3605 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
3606 u16 sclass)
3607 {
3608 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
3609 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3610
3611 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3612 if (!isec)
3613 return -ENOMEM;
3614
3615 isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
3616 isec->sclass = sclass;
3617 isec->ipc_perm = perm;
3618 if (tsec) {
3619 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3620 } else {
3621 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3622 }
3623 perm->security = isec;
3624
3625 return 0;
3626 }
3627
3628 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
3629 {
3630 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
3631 if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
3632 return;
3633
3634 perm->security = NULL;
3635 kfree(isec);
3636 }
3637
3638 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3639 {
3640 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3641
3642 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3643 if (!msec)
3644 return -ENOMEM;
3645
3646 msec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
3647 msec->msg = msg;
3648 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3649 msg->security = msec;
3650
3651 return 0;
3652 }
3653
3654 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3655 {
3656 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
3657 if (!msec || msec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
3658 return;
3659
3660 msg->security = NULL;
3661 kfree(msec);
3662 }
3663
3664 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
3665 u32 perms)
3666 {
3667 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3668 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3669 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3670
3671 tsec = current->security;
3672 isec = ipc_perms->security;
3673
3674 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3675 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
3676
3677 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3678 }
3679
3680 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3681 {
3682 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
3683 }
3684
3685 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3686 {
3687 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
3688 }
3689
3690 /* message queue security operations */
3691 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3692 {
3693 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3694 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3695 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3696 int rc;
3697
3698 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
3699 if (rc)
3700 return rc;
3701
3702 tsec = current->security;
3703 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3704
3705 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3706 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3707
3708 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3709 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
3710 if (rc) {
3711 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3712 return rc;
3713 }
3714 return 0;
3715 }
3716
3717 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3718 {
3719 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3720 }
3721
3722 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
3723 {
3724 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3725 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3726 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3727
3728 tsec = current->security;
3729 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3730
3731 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3732 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3733
3734 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3735 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3736 }
3737
3738 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
3739 {
3740 int err;
3741 int perms;
3742
3743 switch(cmd) {
3744 case IPC_INFO:
3745 case MSG_INFO:
3746 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3747 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3748 case IPC_STAT:
3749 case MSG_STAT:
3750 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
3751 break;
3752 case IPC_SET:
3753 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
3754 break;
3755 case IPC_RMID:
3756 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
3757 break;
3758 default:
3759 return 0;
3760 }
3761
3762 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
3763 return err;
3764 }
3765
3766 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
3767 {
3768 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3769 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3770 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3771 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3772 int rc;
3773
3774 tsec = current->security;
3775 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3776 msec = msg->security;
3777
3778 /*
3779 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
3780 */
3781 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
3782 /*
3783 * Compute new sid based on current process and
3784 * message queue this message will be stored in
3785 */
3786 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
3787 isec->sid,
3788 SECCLASS_MSG,
3789 &msec->sid);
3790 if (rc)
3791 return rc;
3792 }
3793
3794 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3795 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3796
3797 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
3798 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3799 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
3800 if (!rc)
3801 /* Can this process send the message */
3802 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
3803 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
3804 if (!rc)
3805 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
3806 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
3807 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
3808
3809 return rc;
3810 }
3811
3812 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3813 struct task_struct *target,
3814 long type, int mode)
3815 {
3816 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3817 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3818 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3819 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3820 int rc;
3821
3822 tsec = target->security;
3823 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3824 msec = msg->security;
3825
3826 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3827 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3828
3829 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
3830 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
3831 if (!rc)
3832 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
3833 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
3834 return rc;
3835 }
3836
3837 /* Shared Memory security operations */
3838 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
3839 {
3840 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3841 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3842 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3843 int rc;
3844
3845 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
3846 if (rc)
3847 return rc;
3848
3849 tsec = current->security;
3850 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
3851
3852 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3853 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
3854
3855 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
3856 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
3857 if (rc) {
3858 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
3859 return rc;
3860 }
3861 return 0;
3862 }
3863
3864 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
3865 {
3866 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
3867 }
3868
3869 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
3870 {
3871 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3872 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3873 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3874
3875 tsec = current->security;
3876 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
3877
3878 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3879 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
3880
3881 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
3882 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3883 }
3884
3885 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
3886 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
3887 {
3888 int perms;
3889 int err;
3890
3891 switch(cmd) {
3892 case IPC_INFO:
3893 case SHM_INFO:
3894 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3895 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3896 case IPC_STAT:
3897 case SHM_STAT:
3898 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
3899 break;
3900 case IPC_SET:
3901 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
3902 break;
3903 case SHM_LOCK:
3904 case SHM_UNLOCK:
3905 perms = SHM__LOCK;
3906 break;
3907 case IPC_RMID:
3908 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
3909 break;
3910 default:
3911 return 0;
3912 }
3913
3914 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
3915 return err;
3916 }
3917
3918 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
3919 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
3920 {
3921 u32 perms;
3922 int rc;
3923
3924 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
3925 if (rc)
3926 return rc;
3927
3928 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
3929 perms = SHM__READ;
3930 else
3931 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
3932
3933 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
3934 }
3935
3936 /* Semaphore security operations */
3937 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3938 {
3939 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3940 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3941 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3942 int rc;
3943
3944 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
3945 if (rc)
3946 return rc;
3947
3948 tsec = current->security;
3949 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
3950
3951 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3952 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
3953
3954 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
3955 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
3956 if (rc) {
3957 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
3958 return rc;
3959 }
3960 return 0;
3961 }
3962
3963 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3964 {
3965 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
3966 }
3967
3968 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
3969 {
3970 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3971 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3972 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3973
3974 tsec = current->security;
3975 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
3976
3977 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3978 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
3979
3980 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
3981 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3982 }
3983
3984 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
3985 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
3986 {
3987 int err;
3988 u32 perms;
3989
3990 switch(cmd) {
3991 case IPC_INFO:
3992 case SEM_INFO:
3993 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3994 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3995 case GETPID:
3996 case GETNCNT:
3997 case GETZCNT:
3998 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
3999 break;
4000 case GETVAL:
4001 case GETALL:
4002 perms = SEM__READ;
4003 break;
4004 case SETVAL:
4005 case SETALL:
4006 perms = SEM__WRITE;
4007 break;
4008 case IPC_RMID:
4009 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
4010 break;
4011 case IPC_SET:
4012 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
4013 break;
4014 case IPC_STAT:
4015 case SEM_STAT:
4016 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
4017 break;
4018 default:
4019 return 0;
4020 }
4021
4022 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4023 return err;
4024 }
4025
4026 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
4027 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
4028 {
4029 u32 perms;
4030
4031 if (alter)
4032 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
4033 else
4034 perms = SEM__READ;
4035
4036 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4037 }
4038
4039 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
4040 {
4041 u32 av = 0;
4042
4043 av = 0;
4044 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
4045 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
4046 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
4047 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
4048
4049 if (av == 0)
4050 return 0;
4051
4052 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
4053 }
4054
4055 /* module stacking operations */
4056 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4057 {
4058 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
4059 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: There is already a secondary security "
4060 "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4061 return -EINVAL;
4062 }
4063
4064 secondary_ops = ops;
4065
4066 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
4067 __FUNCTION__,
4068 name);
4069
4070 return 0;
4071 }
4072
4073 static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4074 {
4075 if (ops != secondary_ops) {
4076 printk (KERN_INFO "%s: trying to unregister a security module "
4077 "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4078 return -EINVAL;
4079 }
4080
4081 secondary_ops = original_ops;
4082
4083 return 0;
4084 }
4085
4086 static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
4087 {
4088 if (inode)
4089 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
4090 }
4091
4092 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4093 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4094 {
4095 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4096 u32 sid, len;
4097 char *context;
4098 int error;
4099
4100 if (current != p) {
4101 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
4102 if (error)
4103 return error;
4104 }
4105
4106 if (!size)
4107 return -ERANGE;
4108
4109 tsec = p->security;
4110
4111 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4112 sid = tsec->sid;
4113 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
4114 sid = tsec->osid;
4115 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4116 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
4117 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4118 sid = tsec->create_sid;
4119 else
4120 return -EINVAL;
4121
4122 if (!sid)
4123 return 0;
4124
4125 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
4126 if (error)
4127 return error;
4128 if (len > size) {
4129 kfree(context);
4130 return -ERANGE;
4131 }
4132 memcpy(value, context, len);
4133 kfree(context);
4134 return len;
4135 }
4136
4137 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4138 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4139 {
4140 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4141 u32 sid = 0;
4142 int error;
4143 char *str = value;
4144
4145 if (current != p) {
4146 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
4147 security attributes. */
4148 return -EACCES;
4149 }
4150
4151 /*
4152 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
4153 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
4154 * above restriction is ever removed.
4155 */
4156 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4157 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
4158 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4159 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
4160 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4161 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
4162 else
4163 error = -EINVAL;
4164 if (error)
4165 return error;
4166
4167 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
4168 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
4169 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
4170 str[size-1] = 0;
4171 size--;
4172 }
4173 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
4174 if (error)
4175 return error;
4176 }
4177
4178 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
4179 performed during the actual operation (execve,
4180 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
4181 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
4182 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
4183 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
4184 tsec = p->security;
4185 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4186 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
4187 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4188 tsec->create_sid = sid;
4189 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
4190 struct av_decision avd;
4191
4192 if (sid == 0)
4193 return -EINVAL;
4194
4195 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
4196 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
4197 struct task_struct *g, *t;
4198 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
4199 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4200 do_each_thread(g, t)
4201 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
4202 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4203 return -EPERM;
4204 }
4205 while_each_thread(g, t);
4206 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4207 }
4208
4209 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
4210 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4211 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
4212 if (error)
4213 return error;
4214
4215 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
4216 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
4217 task_lock(p);
4218 if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
4219 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
4220 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4221 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
4222 if (!error)
4223 tsec->sid = sid;
4224 task_unlock(p);
4225 avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4226 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
4227 if (error)
4228 return error;
4229 } else {
4230 tsec->sid = sid;
4231 task_unlock(p);
4232 }
4233 }
4234 else
4235 return -EINVAL;
4236
4237 return size;
4238 }
4239
4240 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
4241 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
4242 .capget = selinux_capget,
4243 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
4244 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
4245 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
4246 .capable = selinux_capable,
4247 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
4248 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
4249 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
4250 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
4251
4252 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
4253 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
4254
4255 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
4256 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
4257 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
4258 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
4259 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
4260 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
4261 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
4262
4263 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
4264 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
4265 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
4266 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
4267 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
4268 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
4269 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
4270
4271 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
4272 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
4273 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
4274 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
4275 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
4276 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
4277 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
4278 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
4279 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
4280 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
4281 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
4282 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
4283 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
4284 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
4285 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
4286 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
4287 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
4288 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
4289 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
4290 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
4291 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
4292 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
4293 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
4294 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
4295
4296 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
4297 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
4298 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
4299 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
4300 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
4301 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
4302 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
4303 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
4304 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
4305 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
4306 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
4307
4308 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
4309 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
4310 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
4311 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
4312 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
4313 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
4314 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
4315 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
4316 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
4317 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
4318 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
4319 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
4320 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
4321 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
4322 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
4323 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
4324 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
4325 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
4326 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
4327
4328 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
4329
4330 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
4331 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
4332
4333 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
4334 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
4335 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
4336 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
4337 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
4338 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
4339
4340 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
4341 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
4342 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
4343 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
4344 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
4345
4346 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
4347 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
4348 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
4349 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
4350 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
4351
4352 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
4353 .unregister_security = selinux_unregister_security,
4354
4355 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
4356
4357 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
4358 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
4359
4360 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
4361 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
4362 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
4363
4364 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
4365 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
4366 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
4367 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
4368 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
4369 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
4370 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
4371 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
4372 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
4373 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
4374 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
4375 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
4376 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
4377 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
4378 .socket_getpeersec = selinux_socket_getpeersec,
4379 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
4380 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
4381 #endif
4382 };
4383
4384 static __init int selinux_init(void)
4385 {
4386 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4387
4388 if (!selinux_enabled) {
4389 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
4390 return 0;
4391 }
4392
4393 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
4394
4395 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
4396 if (task_alloc_security(current))
4397 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
4398 tsec = current->security;
4399 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4400
4401 avc_init();
4402
4403 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
4404 if (!secondary_ops)
4405 panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
4406 if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
4407 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
4408
4409 if (selinux_enforcing) {
4410 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
4411 } else {
4412 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
4413 }
4414 return 0;
4415 }
4416
4417 void selinux_complete_init(void)
4418 {
4419 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
4420
4421 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
4422 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
4423 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4424 next_sb:
4425 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
4426 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
4427 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
4428 struct superblock_security_struct,
4429 list);
4430 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
4431 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4432 sb->s_count++;
4433 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4434 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4435 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
4436 if (sb->s_root)
4437 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
4438 drop_super(sb);
4439 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4440 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
4441 goto next_sb;
4442 }
4443 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4444 }
4445
4446 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
4447 all processes and objects when they are created. */
4448 security_initcall(selinux_init);
4449
4450 #if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
4451
4452 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
4453 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
4454 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4455 .pf = PF_INET,
4456 .hooknum = NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
4457 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4458 };
4459
4460 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4461
4462 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
4463 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
4464 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4465 .pf = PF_INET6,
4466 .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
4467 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4468 };
4469
4470 #endif /* IPV6 */
4471
4472 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
4473 {
4474 int err = 0;
4475
4476 if (!selinux_enabled)
4477 goto out;
4478
4479 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
4480
4481 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4482 if (err)
4483 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
4484
4485 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4486
4487 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4488 if (err)
4489 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
4490
4491 #endif /* IPV6 */
4492 out:
4493 return err;
4494 }
4495
4496 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
4497
4498 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4499 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
4500 {
4501 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
4502
4503 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4504 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4505 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4506 #endif /* IPV6 */
4507 }
4508 #endif
4509
4510 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4511
4512 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4513 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
4514 #endif
4515
4516 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4517
4518 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4519 int selinux_disable(void)
4520 {
4521 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
4522 static int selinux_disabled = 0;
4523
4524 if (ss_initialized) {
4525 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
4526 return -EINVAL;
4527 }
4528
4529 if (selinux_disabled) {
4530 /* Only do this once. */
4531 return -EINVAL;
4532 }
4533
4534 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
4535
4536 selinux_disabled = 1;
4537
4538 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
4539 security_ops = secondary_ops;
4540
4541 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
4542 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
4543
4544 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
4545 exit_sel_fs();
4546
4547 return 0;
4548 }
4549 #endif
4550
4551
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