security/commoncap.c

   1 /* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o and root_plug.o
   2  *
   3  *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   4  *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
   5  *      the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
   6  *      (at your option) any later version.
   7  *
   8  */
   9
  10 #include <linux/capability.h>
  11 #include <linux/module.h>
  12 #include <linux/init.h>
  13 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  14 #include <linux/security.h>
  15 #include <linux/file.h>
  16 #include <linux/mm.h>
  17 #include <linux/mman.h>
  18 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
  19 #include <linux/swap.h>
  20 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
  21 #include <linux/netlink.h>
  22 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
  23 #include <linux/xattr.h>
  24 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
  25 #include <linux/mount.h>
  26 #include <linux/sched.h>
  27 #include <linux/prctl.h>
  28 #include <linux/securebits.h>
  29
  30 int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
  31 {
  32         NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective;
  33         return 0;
  34 }
  35
  36 int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
  37 {
  38         if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, cap))
  39                 return -EPERM;
  40         return 0;
  41 }
  42
  43 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
  44
  45 /*
  46  * NOTE WELL: cap_capable() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
  47  * function.  That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable()
  48  * returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable()
  49  * returns 1 for this case.
  50  */
  51 int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
  52 {
  53         /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
  54         if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap))
  55                 return 0;
  56         return -EPERM;
  57 }
  58
  59 int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
  60 {
  61         if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME))
  62                 return -EPERM;
  63         return 0;
  64 }
  65
  66 int cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child,
  67                 unsigned int mode)
  68 {
  69         /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
  70         if (!cap_issubset(child->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted) &&
  71             !__capable(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
  72                 return -EPERM;
  73         return 0;
  74 }
  75
  76 int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
  77                 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
  78 {
  79         /* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */
  80         *effective = target->cap_effective;
  81         *inheritable = target->cap_inheritable;
  82         *permitted = target->cap_permitted;
  83         return 0;
  84 }
  85
  86 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
  87
  88 static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *target)
  89 {
  90         /*
  91          * No support for remote process capability manipulation with
  92          * filesystem capability support.
  93          */
  94         return (target != current);
  95 }
  96
  97 static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
  98 {
  99         /*
 100          * Return 1 if changes to the inheritable set are limited
 101          * to the old permitted set. That is, if the current task
 102          * does *not* possess the CAP_SETPCAP capability.
 103          */
 104         return (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0);
 105 }
 106
 107 static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void) { return 1; }
 108
 109 #else /* ie., ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
 110
 111 static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *t) { return 0; }
 112 static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) { return 1; }
 113 static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void)
 114 {
 115         return !capable(CAP_SETPCAP);
 116 }
 117
 118 #endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
 119
 120 int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 121                       kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 122 {
 123         if (cap_block_setpcap(target)) {
 124                 return -EPERM;
 125         }
 126         if (cap_inh_is_capped()
 127             && !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
 128                              cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
 129                                          current->cap_permitted))) {
 130                 /* incapable of using this inheritable set */
 131                 return -EPERM;
 132         }
 133         if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
 134                            cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
 135                                        current->cap_bset))) {
 136                 /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
 137                 return -EPERM;
 138         }
 139
 140         /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
 141         if (!cap_issubset (*permitted,
 142                            cap_combine (target->cap_permitted,
 143                                         current->cap_permitted))) {
 144                 return -EPERM;
 145         }
 146
 147         /* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */
 148         if (!cap_issubset (*effective, *permitted)) {
 149                 return -EPERM;
 150         }
 151
 152         return 0;
 153 }
 154
 155 void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 156                      kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 157 {
 158         target->cap_effective = *effective;
 159         target->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
 160         target->cap_permitted = *permitted;
 161 }
 162
 163 static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 164 {
 165         cap_clear(bprm->cap_inheritable);
 166         cap_clear(bprm->cap_permitted);
 167         bprm->cap_effective = false;
 168 }
 169
 170 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 171
 172 int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 173 {
 174         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 175         int error;
 176
 177         if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
 178                return 0;
 179
 180         error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0);
 181         if (error <= 0)
 182                 return 0;
 183         return 1;
 184 }
 185
 186 int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 187 {
 188         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 189
 190         if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->removexattr)
 191                return 0;
 192
 193         return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
 194 }
 195
 196 static inline int cap_from_disk(struct vfs_cap_data *caps,
 197                                 struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned size)
 198 {
 199         __u32 magic_etc;
 200         unsigned tocopy, i;
 201
 202         if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
 203                 return -EINVAL;
 204
 205         magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc);
 206
 207         switch ((magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)) {
 208         case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
 209                 if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1)
 210                         return -EINVAL;
 211                 tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_1;
 212                 break;
 213         case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2:
 214                 if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
 215                         return -EINVAL;
 216                 tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2;
 217                 break;
 218         default:
 219                 return -EINVAL;
 220         }
 221
 222         if (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) {
 223                 bprm->cap_effective = true;
 224         } else {
 225                 bprm->cap_effective = false;
 226         }
 227
 228         for (i = 0; i < tocopy; ++i) {
 229                 bprm->cap_permitted.cap[i] =
 230                         le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].permitted);
 231                 bprm->cap_inheritable.cap[i] =
 232                         le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].inheritable);
 233         }
 234         while (i < VFS_CAP_U32) {
 235                 bprm->cap_permitted.cap[i] = 0;
 236                 bprm->cap_inheritable.cap[i] = 0;
 237                 i++;
 238         }
 239
 240         return 0;
 241 }
 242
 243 /* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
 244 static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 245 {
 246         struct dentry *dentry;
 247         int rc = 0;
 248         struct vfs_cap_data vcaps;
 249         struct inode *inode;
 250
 251         if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) {
 252                 bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
 253                 return 0;
 254         }
 255
 256         dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
 257         inode = dentry->d_inode;
 258         if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
 259                 goto out;
 260
 261         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &vcaps,
 262                                    XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
 263         if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
 264                 /* no data, that's ok */
 265                 rc = 0;
 266                 goto out;
 267         }
 268         if (rc < 0)
 269                 goto out;
 270
 271         rc = cap_from_disk(&vcaps, bprm, rc);
 272         if (rc)
 273                 printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
 274                         __func__, rc, bprm->filename);
 275
 276 out:
 277         dput(dentry);
 278         if (rc)
 279                 bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
 280
 281         return rc;
 282 }
 283
 284 #else
 285 int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 286 {
 287         return 0;
 288 }
 289
 290 int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 291 {
 292         return 0;
 293 }
 294
 295 static inline int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 296 {
 297         bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
 298         return 0;
 299 }
 300 #endif
 301
 302 int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 303 {
 304         int ret;
 305
 306         ret = get_file_caps(bprm);
 307         if (ret)
 308                 printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_file_caps returned %d for %s\n",
 309                         __func__, ret, bprm->filename);
 310
 311         /*  To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
 312          *  executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
 313          *  capability sets for the file.
 314          *
 315          *  If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable
 316          *  and permitted sets of the executable file.
 317          */
 318
 319         if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) {
 320                 if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
 321                         cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
 322                         cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
 323                 }
 324                 if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
 325                         bprm->cap_effective = true;
 326         }
 327
 328         return ret;
 329 }
 330
 331 void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
 332 {
 333         /* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */
 334         kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working;
 335
 336         new_permitted = cap_intersect(bprm->cap_permitted,
 337                                  current->cap_bset);
 338         working = cap_intersect(bprm->cap_inheritable,
 339                                  current->cap_inheritable);
 340         new_permitted = cap_combine(new_permitted, working);
 341
 342         if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid ||
 343             !cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) {
 344                 set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
 345                 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
 346
 347                 if (unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
 348                         if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
 349                                 bprm->e_uid = current->uid;
 350                                 bprm->e_gid = current->gid;
 351                         }
 352                         if (cap_limit_ptraced_target()) {
 353                                 new_permitted =
 354                                         cap_intersect(new_permitted,
 355                                                       current->cap_permitted);
 356                         }
 357                 }
 358         }
 359
 360         current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
 361         current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
 362
 363         /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set
 364          * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual
 365          * capability rules */
 366         if (!is_global_init(current)) {
 367                 current->cap_permitted = new_permitted;
 368                 if (bprm->cap_effective)
 369                         current->cap_effective = new_permitted;
 370                 else
 371                         cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
 372         }
 373
 374         /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
 375
 376         current->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
 377 }
 378
 379 int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 380 {
 381         if (current->uid != 0) {
 382                 if (bprm->cap_effective)
 383                         return 1;
 384                 if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_permitted))
 385                         return 1;
 386                 if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_inheritable))
 387                         return 1;
 388         }
 389
 390         return (current->euid != current->uid ||
 391                 current->egid != current->gid);
 392 }
 393
 394 int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 395                        const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 396 {
 397         if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
 398                 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
 399                         return -EPERM;
 400                 return 0;
 401         } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
 402                      sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)  &&
 403             !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 404                 return -EPERM;
 405         return 0;
 406 }
 407
 408 int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 409 {
 410         if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
 411                 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
 412                         return -EPERM;
 413                 return 0;
 414         } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
 415                      sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)  &&
 416             !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 417                 return -EPERM;
 418         return 0;
 419 }
 420
 421 /* moved from kernel/sys.c. */
 422 /*
 423  * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of
 424  * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid.
 425  *
 426  *  1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of
 427  *  {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are
 428  *  cleared.
 429  *
 430  *  2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective
 431  *  capabilities of the process are cleared.
 432  *
 433  *  3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective
 434  *  capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities.
 435  *
 436  *  fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should
 437  *  never happen.
 438  *
 439  *  -astor
 440  *
 441  * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99
 442  * A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it
 443  * calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and
 444  * effective sets will be retained.
 445  * Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some
 446  * of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges!
 447  * Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital
 448  * files..
 449  * Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this.
 450  */
 451 static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid (int old_ruid, int old_euid,
 452                                         int old_suid)
 453 {
 454         if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) &&
 455             (current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0 && current->suid != 0) &&
 456             !issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) {
 457                 cap_clear (current->cap_permitted);
 458                 cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
 459         }
 460         if (old_euid == 0 && current->euid != 0) {
 461                 cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
 462         }
 463         if (old_euid != 0 && current->euid == 0) {
 464                 current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted;
 465         }
 466 }
 467
 468 int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
 469                           int flags)
 470 {
 471         switch (flags) {
 472         case LSM_SETID_RE:
 473         case LSM_SETID_ID:
 474         case LSM_SETID_RES:
 475                 /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setreuid/setuid/setresuid. */
 476                 if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
 477                         cap_emulate_setxuid (old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid);
 478                 }
 479                 break;
 480         case LSM_SETID_FS:
 481                 {
 482                         uid_t old_fsuid = old_ruid;
 483
 484                         /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setfsuid. */
 485
 486                         /*
 487                          * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
 488                          *          if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
 489                          */
 490
 491                         if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
 492                                 if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) {
 493                                         current->cap_effective =
 494                                                 cap_drop_fs_set(
 495                                                     current->cap_effective);
 496                                 }
 497                                 if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) {
 498                                         current->cap_effective =
 499                                                 cap_raise_fs_set(
 500                                                     current->cap_effective,
 501                                                     current->cap_permitted);
 502                                 }
 503                         }
 504                         break;
 505                 }
 506         default:
 507                 return -EINVAL;
 508         }
 509
 510         return 0;
 511 }
 512
 513 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 514 /*
 515  * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and
 516  * task_setnice, assumes that
 517  *   . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed
 518  *   . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes,
 519  *      then those actions should be allowed
 520  * This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but
 521  * yet with increased caps.
 522  * So we check for increased caps on the target process.
 523  */
 524 static inline int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
 525 {
 526         if (!cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
 527             !__capable(current, CAP_SYS_NICE))
 528                 return -EPERM;
 529         return 0;
 530 }
 531
 532 int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
 533                            struct sched_param *lp)
 534 {
 535         return cap_safe_nice(p);
 536 }
 537
 538 int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 539 {
 540         return cap_safe_nice(p);
 541 }
 542
 543 int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 544 {
 545         return cap_safe_nice(p);
 546 }
 547
 548 /*
 549  * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
 550  * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
 551  * no new races - i.e. only another task doing capget() on
 552  * this task could get inconsistent info.  There can be no
 553  * racing writer bc a task can only change its own caps.
 554  */
 555 static long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
 556 {
 557         if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
 558                 return -EPERM;
 559         if (!cap_valid(cap))
 560                 return -EINVAL;
 561         cap_lower(current->cap_bset, cap);
 562         return 0;
 563 }
 564
 565 #else
 566 int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
 567                            struct sched_param *lp)
 568 {
 569         return 0;
 570 }
 571 int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 572 {
 573         return 0;
 574 }
 575 int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 576 {
 577         return 0;
 578 }
 579 #endif
 580
 581 int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 582                    unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
 583 {
 584         long error = 0;
 585
 586         switch (option) {
 587         case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
 588                 if (!cap_valid(arg2))
 589                         error = -EINVAL;
 590                 else
 591                         error = !!cap_raised(current->cap_bset, arg2);
 592                 break;
 593 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 594         case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
 595                 error = cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
 596                 break;
 597
 598         /*
 599          * The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a
 600          * system from legacy UID=0 based privilege (when filesystem
 601          * capabilities are not in use) to a system using filesystem
 602          * capabilities only - as the POSIX.1e draft intended.
 603          *
 604          * Note:
 605          *
 606          *  PR_SET_SECUREBITS =
 607          *      issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)
 608          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)
 609          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)
 610          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)
 611          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)
 612          *
 613          * will ensure that the current process and all of its
 614          * children will be locked into a pure
 615          * capability-based-privilege environment.
 616          */
 617         case PR_SET_SECUREBITS:
 618                 if ((((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
 619                      & (current->securebits ^ arg2))                  /*[1]*/
 620                     || ((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS
 621                          & ~arg2))                                    /*[2]*/
 622                     || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
 623                     || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0)) {    /*[4]*/
 624                         /*
 625                          * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
 626                          * [2] no unlocking of locks
 627                          * [3] no setting of unsupported bits
 628                          * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about
 629                          *     the "sendmail capabilities bug")
 630                          */
 631                         error = -EPERM;  /* cannot change a locked bit */
 632                 } else {
 633                         current->securebits = arg2;
 634                 }
 635                 break;
 636         case PR_GET_SECUREBITS:
 637                 error = current->securebits;
 638                 break;
 639
 640 #endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
 641
 642         case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
 643                 if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
 644                         error = 1;
 645                 break;
 646         case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
 647                 if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */
 648                         error = -EINVAL;
 649                 else if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
 650                         error = -EPERM;
 651                 else if (arg2)
 652                         current->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
 653                 else
 654                         current->securebits &=
 655                                 ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
 656                 break;
 657
 658         default:
 659                 /* No functionality available - continue with default */
 660                 return 0;
 661         }
 662
 663         /* Functionality provided */
 664         *rc_p = error;
 665         return 1;
 666 }
 667
 668 void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
 669 {
 670         cap_set_init_eff(p->cap_effective);
 671         cap_clear(p->cap_inheritable);
 672         cap_set_full(p->cap_permitted);
 673         p->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT;
 674         return;
 675 }
 676
 677 int cap_syslog (int type)
 678 {
 679         if ((type != 3 && type != 10) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 680                 return -EPERM;
 681         return 0;
 682 }
 683
 684 int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 685 {
 686         int cap_sys_admin = 0;
 687
 688         if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0)
 689                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
 690         return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
 691 }
 692