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SELinux: NULL terminate al contexts from disk
[linux-2.6/mini2440.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c
blob309648c573d8471e416229b434aed22e5004f18f
1 /*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 *
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
24 */
25
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
35 #include <linux/mm.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
50 #include <net/icmp.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
70 #include <net/ipv6.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
79
80 #include "avc.h"
81 #include "objsec.h"
82 #include "netif.h"
83 #include "netnode.h"
84 #include "netport.h"
85 #include "xfrm.h"
86 #include "netlabel.h"
87 #include "audit.h"
88
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
91
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
93
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
98
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
104
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
106 {
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
110 return 1;
111 }
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
113 #endif
114
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
117
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
119 {
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
123 return 1;
124 }
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
126 #else
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
128 #endif
129
130
131 /*
132 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
133 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
134 */
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
136
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
141
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
143
144 /**
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
146 *
147 * Description:
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
152 *
153 */
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
155 {
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
157 }
158
159 /*
160 * initialise the security for the init task
161 */
162 static void cred_init_security(void)
163 {
164 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
165 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
166
167 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
168 if (!tsec)
169 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
170
171 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
172 cred->security = tsec;
173 }
174
175 /*
176 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
177 */
178 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
179 {
180 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
181
182 tsec = cred->security;
183 return tsec->sid;
184 }
185
186 /*
187 * get the objective security ID of a task
188 */
189 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
190 {
191 u32 sid;
192
193 rcu_read_lock();
194 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
195 rcu_read_unlock();
196 return sid;
197 }
198
199 /*
200 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
201 */
202 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
203 {
204 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
205
206 return tsec->sid;
207 }
208
209 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
210
211 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
212 {
213 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
214 u32 sid = current_sid();
215
216 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
217 if (!isec)
218 return -ENOMEM;
219
220 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
221 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
222 isec->inode = inode;
223 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
224 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
225 isec->task_sid = sid;
226 inode->i_security = isec;
227
228 return 0;
229 }
230
231 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
232 {
233 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
234 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
235
236 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
237 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
238 list_del_init(&isec->list);
239 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
240
241 inode->i_security = NULL;
242 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
243 }
244
245 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
246 {
247 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
248 u32 sid = current_sid();
249
250 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
251 if (!fsec)
252 return -ENOMEM;
253
254 fsec->sid = sid;
255 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
256 file->f_security = fsec;
257
258 return 0;
259 }
260
261 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
262 {
263 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
264 file->f_security = NULL;
265 kfree(fsec);
266 }
267
268 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
269 {
270 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
271
272 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
273 if (!sbsec)
274 return -ENOMEM;
275
276 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
278 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
279 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
280 sbsec->sb = sb;
281 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
283 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
284 sb->s_security = sbsec;
285
286 return 0;
287 }
288
289 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
290 {
291 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
292
293 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
294 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
295 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
296 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
297
298 sb->s_security = NULL;
299 kfree(sbsec);
300 }
301
302 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
303 {
304 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
305
306 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
307 if (!ssec)
308 return -ENOMEM;
309
310 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
312 sk->sk_security = ssec;
313
314 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
315
316 return 0;
317 }
318
319 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
320 {
321 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
322
323 sk->sk_security = NULL;
324 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
325 kfree(ssec);
326 }
327
328 /* The security server must be initialized before
329 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
330 extern int ss_initialized;
331
332 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
333
334 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
335 "uses xattr",
336 "uses transition SIDs",
337 "uses task SIDs",
338 "uses genfs_contexts",
339 "not configured for labeling",
340 "uses mountpoint labeling",
341 };
342
343 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
344
345 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
346 {
347 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
348 }
349
350 enum {
351 Opt_error = -1,
352 Opt_context = 1,
353 Opt_fscontext = 2,
354 Opt_defcontext = 3,
355 Opt_rootcontext = 4,
356 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
357 };
358
359 static const match_table_t tokens = {
360 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
363 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
364 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
365 {Opt_error, NULL},
366 };
367
368 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
369
370 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
372 const struct cred *cred)
373 {
374 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
375 int rc;
376
377 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
378 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
379 if (rc)
380 return rc;
381
382 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
383 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
384 return rc;
385 }
386
387 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
388 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
389 const struct cred *cred)
390 {
391 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
392 int rc;
393 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
394 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
395 if (rc)
396 return rc;
397
398 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
399 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
400 return rc;
401 }
402
403 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
404 {
405 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
406 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
407 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
408 int rc = 0;
409
410 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
411 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
412 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
413 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
414 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
415 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
416 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
417 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
418 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
419 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
420 goto out;
421 }
422 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
423 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
424 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
425 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
426 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
427 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
428 else
429 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
430 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
431 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
432 goto out;
433 }
434 }
435
436 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
437
438 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
439 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
440 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
441 else
442 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
443 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
444 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
445
446 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
447 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
448 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
449 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
450 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
451
452 /* Initialize the root inode. */
453 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
454
455 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
456 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
457 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
458 populates itself. */
459 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
460 next_inode:
461 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
462 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
463 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
464 struct inode_security_struct, list);
465 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
466 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
467 inode = igrab(inode);
468 if (inode) {
469 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
470 inode_doinit(inode);
471 iput(inode);
472 }
473 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
474 list_del_init(&isec->list);
475 goto next_inode;
476 }
477 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
478 out:
479 return rc;
480 }
481
482 /*
483 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
484 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
485 * mount options, or whatever.
486 */
487 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
488 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
489 {
490 int rc = 0, i;
491 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
492 char *context = NULL;
493 u32 len;
494 char tmp;
495
496 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
497
498 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
499 return -EINVAL;
500
501 if (!ss_initialized)
502 return -EINVAL;
503
504 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
505 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
506 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
507 if (tmp & 0x01)
508 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
509 tmp >>= 1;
510 }
511 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
512 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
513 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
514
515 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
516 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
517 rc = -ENOMEM;
518 goto out_free;
519 }
520
521 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
522 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
523 rc = -ENOMEM;
524 goto out_free;
525 }
526
527 i = 0;
528 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
529 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
530 if (rc)
531 goto out_free;
532 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
533 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
534 }
535 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
536 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
537 if (rc)
538 goto out_free;
539 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
540 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
541 }
542 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
543 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
544 if (rc)
545 goto out_free;
546 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
547 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
548 }
549 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
550 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
551 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
552
553 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
554 if (rc)
555 goto out_free;
556 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
557 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
558 }
559 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
560 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
561 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
562 }
563
564 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
565
566 return 0;
567
568 out_free:
569 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
570 return rc;
571 }
572
573 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
574 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
575 {
576 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
577
578 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
579 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
580 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
581 (old_sid != new_sid))
582 return 1;
583
584 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
585 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
586 */
587 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
588 if (mnt_flags & flag)
589 return 1;
590 return 0;
591 }
592
593 /*
594 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
595 * labeling information.
596 */
597 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
598 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
599 {
600 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
601 int rc = 0, i;
602 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
603 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
604 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
605 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
606 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
607 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
608 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
609 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
610 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
611
612 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
613
614 if (!ss_initialized) {
615 if (!num_opts) {
616 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
617 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
618 server is ready to handle calls. */
619 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
620 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
621 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
622 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
623 goto out;
624 }
625 rc = -EINVAL;
626 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
627 "before the security server is initialized\n");
628 goto out;
629 }
630
631 /*
632 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
633 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
634 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
635 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
636 *
637 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
638 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
639 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
640 * will be used for both mounts)
641 */
642 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
643 && (num_opts == 0))
644 goto out;
645
646 /*
647 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
648 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
649 * than once with different security options.
650 */
651 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
652 u32 sid;
653
654 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
655 continue;
656 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
657 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
658 if (rc) {
659 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
660 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
661 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
662 goto out;
663 }
664 switch (flags[i]) {
665 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
666 fscontext_sid = sid;
667
668 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
669 fscontext_sid))
670 goto out_double_mount;
671
672 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
673 break;
674 case CONTEXT_MNT:
675 context_sid = sid;
676
677 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
678 context_sid))
679 goto out_double_mount;
680
681 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
682 break;
683 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
684 rootcontext_sid = sid;
685
686 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
687 rootcontext_sid))
688 goto out_double_mount;
689
690 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
691
692 break;
693 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
694 defcontext_sid = sid;
695
696 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
697 defcontext_sid))
698 goto out_double_mount;
699
700 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
701
702 break;
703 default:
704 rc = -EINVAL;
705 goto out;
706 }
707 }
708
709 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
710 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
711 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
712 goto out_double_mount;
713 rc = 0;
714 goto out;
715 }
716
717 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
718 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
719
720 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
721 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
722 if (rc) {
723 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
724 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
725 goto out;
726 }
727
728 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
729 if (fscontext_sid) {
730 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
731 if (rc)
732 goto out;
733
734 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
735 }
736
737 /*
738 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
739 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
740 * the superblock context if not already set.
741 */
742 if (context_sid) {
743 if (!fscontext_sid) {
744 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
745 cred);
746 if (rc)
747 goto out;
748 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
749 } else {
750 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
751 cred);
752 if (rc)
753 goto out;
754 }
755 if (!rootcontext_sid)
756 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
757
758 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
759 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
760 }
761
762 if (rootcontext_sid) {
763 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
764 cred);
765 if (rc)
766 goto out;
767
768 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
769 root_isec->initialized = 1;
770 }
771
772 if (defcontext_sid) {
773 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
774 rc = -EINVAL;
775 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
776 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
777 goto out;
778 }
779
780 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
781 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
782 sbsec, cred);
783 if (rc)
784 goto out;
785 }
786
787 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
788 }
789
790 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
791 out:
792 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
793 return rc;
794 out_double_mount:
795 rc = -EINVAL;
796 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
797 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
798 goto out;
799 }
800
801 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
802 struct super_block *newsb)
803 {
804 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
805 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
806
807 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
808 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
809 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
810
811 /*
812 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
813 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
814 * with it later
815 */
816 if (!ss_initialized) {
817 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
818 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
819 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
820 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
821 return;
822 }
823
824 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
825 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
826
827 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
828 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
829 return;
830
831 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
832
833 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
834
835 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
836 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
837 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
838
839 if (set_context) {
840 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
841
842 if (!set_fscontext)
843 newsbsec->sid = sid;
844 if (!set_rootcontext) {
845 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
846 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
847 newisec->sid = sid;
848 }
849 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
850 }
851 if (set_rootcontext) {
852 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
853 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
854 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
855 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
856
857 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
858 }
859
860 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
861 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
862 }
863
864 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
865 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
866 {
867 char *p;
868 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
869 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
870 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
871
872 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
873
874 /* Standard string-based options. */
875 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
876 int token;
877 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
878
879 if (!*p)
880 continue;
881
882 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
883
884 switch (token) {
885 case Opt_context:
886 if (context || defcontext) {
887 rc = -EINVAL;
888 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
889 goto out_err;
890 }
891 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
892 if (!context) {
893 rc = -ENOMEM;
894 goto out_err;
895 }
896 break;
897
898 case Opt_fscontext:
899 if (fscontext) {
900 rc = -EINVAL;
901 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
902 goto out_err;
903 }
904 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
905 if (!fscontext) {
906 rc = -ENOMEM;
907 goto out_err;
908 }
909 break;
910
911 case Opt_rootcontext:
912 if (rootcontext) {
913 rc = -EINVAL;
914 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
915 goto out_err;
916 }
917 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
918 if (!rootcontext) {
919 rc = -ENOMEM;
920 goto out_err;
921 }
922 break;
923
924 case Opt_defcontext:
925 if (context || defcontext) {
926 rc = -EINVAL;
927 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
928 goto out_err;
929 }
930 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
931 if (!defcontext) {
932 rc = -ENOMEM;
933 goto out_err;
934 }
935 break;
936 case Opt_labelsupport:
937 break;
938 default:
939 rc = -EINVAL;
940 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
941 goto out_err;
942
943 }
944 }
945
946 rc = -ENOMEM;
947 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
948 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
949 goto out_err;
950
951 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
952 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
953 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
954 goto out_err;
955 }
956
957 if (fscontext) {
958 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
959 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
960 }
961 if (context) {
962 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
963 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
964 }
965 if (rootcontext) {
966 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
967 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
968 }
969 if (defcontext) {
970 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
971 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
972 }
973
974 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
975 return 0;
976
977 out_err:
978 kfree(context);
979 kfree(defcontext);
980 kfree(fscontext);
981 kfree(rootcontext);
982 return rc;
983 }
984 /*
985 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
986 */
987 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
988 {
989 int rc = 0;
990 char *options = data;
991 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
992
993 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
994
995 if (!data)
996 goto out;
997
998 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
999
1000 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1001 if (rc)
1002 goto out_err;
1003
1004 out:
1005 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1006
1007 out_err:
1008 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1009 return rc;
1010 }
1011
1012 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1013 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1014 {
1015 int i;
1016 char *prefix;
1017
1018 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1019 char *has_comma;
1020
1021 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1022 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1023 else
1024 has_comma = NULL;
1025
1026 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1027 case CONTEXT_MNT:
1028 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1029 break;
1030 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
1031 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1032 break;
1033 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1034 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1035 break;
1036 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1037 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1038 break;
1039 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1040 seq_putc(m, ',');
1041 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1042 continue;
1043 default:
1044 BUG();
1045 };
1046 /* we need a comma before each option */
1047 seq_putc(m, ',');
1048 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1049 if (has_comma)
1050 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1051 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1052 if (has_comma)
1053 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1054 }
1055 }
1056
1057 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1058 {
1059 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1060 int rc;
1061
1062 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1063 if (rc) {
1064 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1065 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1066 rc = 0;
1067 return rc;
1068 }
1069
1070 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1071
1072 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1073
1074 return rc;
1075 }
1076
1077 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1078 {
1079 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1080 case S_IFSOCK:
1081 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1082 case S_IFLNK:
1083 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1084 case S_IFREG:
1085 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1086 case S_IFBLK:
1087 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1088 case S_IFDIR:
1089 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1090 case S_IFCHR:
1091 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1092 case S_IFIFO:
1093 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1094
1095 }
1096
1097 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1098 }
1099
1100 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1101 {
1102 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1103 }
1104
1105 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1106 {
1107 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1108 }
1109
1110 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1111 {
1112 switch (family) {
1113 case PF_UNIX:
1114 switch (type) {
1115 case SOCK_STREAM:
1116 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1117 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1118 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1119 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1120 }
1121 break;
1122 case PF_INET:
1123 case PF_INET6:
1124 switch (type) {
1125 case SOCK_STREAM:
1126 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1127 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1128 else
1129 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1130 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1131 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1132 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1133 else
1134 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1135 case SOCK_DCCP:
1136 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1137 default:
1138 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1139 }
1140 break;
1141 case PF_NETLINK:
1142 switch (protocol) {
1143 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1144 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1145 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1146 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1147 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1148 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1149 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1150 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1151 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1152 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1153 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1154 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1155 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1156 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1157 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1158 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1159 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1160 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1161 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1162 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1163 default:
1164 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1165 }
1166 case PF_PACKET:
1167 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1168 case PF_KEY:
1169 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1170 case PF_APPLETALK:
1171 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1172 }
1173
1174 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1175 }
1176
1177 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1178 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1179 u16 tclass,
1180 u32 *sid)
1181 {
1182 int buflen, rc;
1183 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1184
1185 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1186 if (!buffer)
1187 return -ENOMEM;
1188
1189 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1190 end = buffer+buflen;
1191 *--end = '\0';
1192 buflen--;
1193 path = end-1;
1194 *path = '/';
1195 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1196 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1197 if (buflen < 0)
1198 break;
1199 end -= de->namelen;
1200 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1201 *--end = '/';
1202 path = end;
1203 de = de->parent;
1204 }
1205 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1206 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1207 return rc;
1208 }
1209 #else
1210 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1211 u16 tclass,
1212 u32 *sid)
1213 {
1214 return -EINVAL;
1215 }
1216 #endif
1217
1218 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1219 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1220 {
1221 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1223 u32 sid;
1224 struct dentry *dentry;
1225 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1226 char *context = NULL;
1227 unsigned len = 0;
1228 int rc = 0;
1229
1230 if (isec->initialized)
1231 goto out;
1232
1233 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1234 if (isec->initialized)
1235 goto out_unlock;
1236
1237 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1238 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1239 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1240 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1241 server is ready to handle calls. */
1242 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1243 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1244 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1245 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1246 goto out_unlock;
1247 }
1248
1249 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1250 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1251 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1252 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1253 break;
1254 }
1255
1256 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1257 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1258 if (opt_dentry) {
1259 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1260 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1261 } else {
1262 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1263 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1264 }
1265 if (!dentry) {
1266 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1267 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1268 inode->i_ino);
1269 goto out_unlock;
1270 }
1271
1272 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1273 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1274 if (!context) {
1275 rc = -ENOMEM;
1276 dput(dentry);
1277 goto out_unlock;
1278 }
1279 context[len] = '\0';
1280 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1281 context, len);
1282 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1283 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1284 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1285 NULL, 0);
1286 if (rc < 0) {
1287 dput(dentry);
1288 goto out_unlock;
1289 }
1290 kfree(context);
1291 len = rc;
1292 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1293 if (!context) {
1294 rc = -ENOMEM;
1295 dput(dentry);
1296 goto out_unlock;
1297 }
1298 context[len] = '\0';
1299 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1300 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1301 context, len);
1302 }
1303 dput(dentry);
1304 if (rc < 0) {
1305 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1306 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1307 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1308 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1309 kfree(context);
1310 goto out_unlock;
1311 }
1312 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1313 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1314 rc = 0;
1315 } else {
1316 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1317 sbsec->def_sid,
1318 GFP_NOFS);
1319 if (rc) {
1320 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1321 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1322
1323 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1324 if (printk_ratelimit())
1325 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1326 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1327 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1328 } else {
1329 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1330 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1331 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1332 }
1333 kfree(context);
1334 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1335 rc = 0;
1336 break;
1337 }
1338 }
1339 kfree(context);
1340 isec->sid = sid;
1341 break;
1342 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1343 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1344 break;
1345 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1346 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1347 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1348
1349 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1350 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1351 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1352 sbsec->sid,
1353 isec->sclass,
1354 &sid);
1355 if (rc)
1356 goto out_unlock;
1357 isec->sid = sid;
1358 break;
1359 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1360 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1361 break;
1362 default:
1363 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1364 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1365
1366 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1367 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1368 if (proci->pde) {
1369 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1370 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1371 isec->sclass,
1372 &sid);
1373 if (rc)
1374 goto out_unlock;
1375 isec->sid = sid;
1376 }
1377 }
1378 break;
1379 }
1380
1381 isec->initialized = 1;
1382
1383 out_unlock:
1384 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1385 out:
1386 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1387 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1388 return rc;
1389 }
1390
1391 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1392 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1393 {
1394 u32 perm = 0;
1395
1396 switch (sig) {
1397 case SIGCHLD:
1398 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1399 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1400 break;
1401 case SIGKILL:
1402 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1403 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1404 break;
1405 case SIGSTOP:
1406 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1407 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1408 break;
1409 default:
1410 /* All other signals. */
1411 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1412 break;
1413 }
1414
1415 return perm;
1416 }
1417
1418 /*
1419 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1420 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1421 */
1422 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1423 const struct cred *target,
1424 u32 perms)
1425 {
1426 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1427
1428 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1429 }
1430
1431 /*
1432 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1433 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1434 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1435 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1436 */
1437 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1438 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1439 u32 perms)
1440 {
1441 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1442 u32 sid1, sid2;
1443
1444 rcu_read_lock();
1445 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1446 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1447 rcu_read_unlock();
1448 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1449 }
1450
1451 /*
1452 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1453 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1454 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1455 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1456 */
1457 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1458 u32 perms)
1459 {
1460 u32 sid, tsid;
1461
1462 sid = current_sid();
1463 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1464 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1465 }
1466
1467 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1468 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1469 #endif
1470
1471 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1472 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1473 const struct cred *cred,
1474 int cap, int audit)
1475 {
1476 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1477 struct av_decision avd;
1478 u16 sclass;
1479 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1480 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1481 int rc;
1482
1483 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1484 ad.tsk = tsk;
1485 ad.u.cap = cap;
1486
1487 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1488 case 0:
1489 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1490 break;
1491 case 1:
1492 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1493 break;
1494 default:
1495 printk(KERN_ERR
1496 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1497 BUG();
1498 }
1499
1500 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1501 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1502 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1503 return rc;
1504 }
1505
1506 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1507 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1508 u32 perms)
1509 {
1510 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1511
1512 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1513 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1514 }
1515
1516 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1517 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1518 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1519 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1520 struct inode *inode,
1521 u32 perms,
1522 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1523 {
1524 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1525 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1526 u32 sid;
1527
1528 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1529 return 0;
1530
1531 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1532 isec = inode->i_security;
1533
1534 if (!adp) {
1535 adp = &ad;
1536 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1537 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1538 }
1539
1540 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1541 }
1542
1543 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1544 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1545 pathname if needed. */
1546 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1547 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1548 struct dentry *dentry,
1549 u32 av)
1550 {
1551 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1552 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1553
1554 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1555 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1556 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1557 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1558 }
1559
1560 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1561 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1562 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1563 check a particular permission to the file.
1564 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1565 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1566 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1567 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1568 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1569 struct file *file,
1570 u32 av)
1571 {
1572 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1573 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1574 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1575 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1576 int rc;
1577
1578 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1579 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1580
1581 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1582 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1583 SECCLASS_FD,
1584 FD__USE,
1585 &ad);
1586 if (rc)
1587 goto out;
1588 }
1589
1590 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1591 rc = 0;
1592 if (av)
1593 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1594
1595 out:
1596 return rc;
1597 }
1598
1599 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1600 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1601 struct dentry *dentry,
1602 u16 tclass)
1603 {
1604 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1605 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1606 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1607 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1608 u32 sid, newsid;
1609 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1610 int rc;
1611
1612 dsec = dir->i_security;
1613 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1614
1615 sid = tsec->sid;
1616 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1617
1618 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1619 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1620
1621 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1622 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1623 &ad);
1624 if (rc)
1625 return rc;
1626
1627 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1628 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1629 if (rc)
1630 return rc;
1631 }
1632
1633 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1634 if (rc)
1635 return rc;
1636
1637 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1638 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1639 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1640 }
1641
1642 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1643 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1644 struct task_struct *ctx)
1645 {
1646 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1647
1648 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1649 }
1650
1651 #define MAY_LINK 0
1652 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1653 #define MAY_RMDIR 2
1654
1655 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1656 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1657 struct dentry *dentry,
1658 int kind)
1659
1660 {
1661 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1662 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1663 u32 sid = current_sid();
1664 u32 av;
1665 int rc;
1666
1667 dsec = dir->i_security;
1668 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1669
1670 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1671 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1672
1673 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1674 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1675 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1676 if (rc)
1677 return rc;
1678
1679 switch (kind) {
1680 case MAY_LINK:
1681 av = FILE__LINK;
1682 break;
1683 case MAY_UNLINK:
1684 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1685 break;
1686 case MAY_RMDIR:
1687 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1688 break;
1689 default:
1690 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1691 __func__, kind);
1692 return 0;
1693 }
1694
1695 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1696 return rc;
1697 }
1698
1699 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1700 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1701 struct inode *new_dir,
1702 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1703 {
1704 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1705 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1706 u32 sid = current_sid();
1707 u32 av;
1708 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1709 int rc;
1710
1711 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1712 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1713 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1714 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1715
1716 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1717
1718 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1719 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1720 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1721 if (rc)
1722 return rc;
1723 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1724 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1725 if (rc)
1726 return rc;
1727 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1728 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1729 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1730 if (rc)
1731 return rc;
1732 }
1733
1734 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1735 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1736 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1737 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1738 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1739 if (rc)
1740 return rc;
1741 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1742 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1743 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1744 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1745 new_isec->sclass,
1746 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1747 if (rc)
1748 return rc;
1749 }
1750
1751 return 0;
1752 }
1753
1754 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1755 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1756 struct super_block *sb,
1757 u32 perms,
1758 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1759 {
1760 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1761 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1762
1763 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1764 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1765 }
1766
1767 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1768 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1769 {
1770 u32 av = 0;
1771
1772 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1773 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1774 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1775 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1776 av |= FILE__READ;
1777
1778 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1779 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1780 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1781 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1782
1783 } else {
1784 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1785 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1786 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1787 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1788 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1789 av |= DIR__READ;
1790 }
1791
1792 return av;
1793 }
1794
1795 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1796 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1797 {
1798 u32 av = 0;
1799
1800 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1801 av |= FILE__READ;
1802 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1803 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1804 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1805 else
1806 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1807 }
1808 if (!av) {
1809 /*
1810 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1811 */
1812 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1813 }
1814
1815 return av;
1816 }
1817
1818 /*
1819 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1820 * open permission.
1821 */
1822 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1823 {
1824 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1825
1826 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1827 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1828 /*
1829 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1830 */
1831 if (S_ISREG(mode))
1832 av |= FILE__OPEN;
1833 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1834 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1835 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1836 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1837 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1838 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1839 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1840 av |= DIR__OPEN;
1841 else
1842 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1843 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1844 }
1845 return av;
1846 }
1847
1848 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1849
1850 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1851 unsigned int mode)
1852 {
1853 int rc;
1854
1855 rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1856 if (rc)
1857 return rc;
1858
1859 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1860 u32 sid = current_sid();
1861 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1862 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1863 }
1864
1865 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1866 }
1867
1868 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1869 {
1870 int rc;
1871
1872 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1873 if (rc)
1874 return rc;
1875
1876 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1877 }
1878
1879 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1880 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1881 {
1882 int error;
1883
1884 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1885 if (error)
1886 return error;
1887
1888 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1889 }
1890
1891 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1892 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1893 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1894 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1895 {
1896 int error;
1897
1898 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1899 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1900 if (error)
1901 return error;
1902
1903 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1904 }
1905
1906 /*
1907 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1908 * which was removed).
1909 *
1910 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1911 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1912 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1913 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1914 */
1915
1916 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1917 int cap, int audit)
1918 {
1919 int rc;
1920
1921 rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1922 if (rc)
1923 return rc;
1924
1925 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1926 }
1927
1928 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1929 {
1930 int buflen, rc;
1931 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1932
1933 rc = -ENOMEM;
1934 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1935 if (!buffer)
1936 goto out;
1937
1938 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1939 end = buffer+buflen;
1940 *--end = '\0';
1941 buflen--;
1942 path = end-1;
1943 *path = '/';
1944 while (table) {
1945 const char *name = table->procname;
1946 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1947 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1948 if (buflen < 0)
1949 goto out_free;
1950 end -= namelen;
1951 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1952 *--end = '/';
1953 path = end;
1954 table = table->parent;
1955 }
1956 buflen -= 4;
1957 if (buflen < 0)
1958 goto out_free;
1959 end -= 4;
1960 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1961 path = end;
1962 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1963 out_free:
1964 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1965 out:
1966 return rc;
1967 }
1968
1969 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1970 {
1971 int error = 0;
1972 u32 av;
1973 u32 tsid, sid;
1974 int rc;
1975
1976 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1977 if (rc)
1978 return rc;
1979
1980 sid = current_sid();
1981
1982 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1983 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1984 if (rc) {
1985 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1986 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1987 }
1988
1989 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1990 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1991 if (op == 001) {
1992 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1993 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1994 } else {
1995 av = 0;
1996 if (op & 004)
1997 av |= FILE__READ;
1998 if (op & 002)
1999 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2000 if (av)
2001 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
2002 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
2003 }
2004
2005 return error;
2006 }
2007
2008 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2009 {
2010 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2011 int rc = 0;
2012
2013 if (!sb)
2014 return 0;
2015
2016 switch (cmds) {
2017 case Q_SYNC:
2018 case Q_QUOTAON:
2019 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2020 case Q_SETINFO:
2021 case Q_SETQUOTA:
2022 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2023 break;
2024 case Q_GETFMT:
2025 case Q_GETINFO:
2026 case Q_GETQUOTA:
2027 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2028 break;
2029 default:
2030 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2031 break;
2032 }
2033 return rc;
2034 }
2035
2036 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2037 {
2038 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2039
2040 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2041 }
2042
2043 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2044 {
2045 int rc;
2046
2047 rc = cap_syslog(type);
2048 if (rc)
2049 return rc;
2050
2051 switch (type) {
2052 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
2053 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2054 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2055 break;
2056 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
2057 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
2058 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2059 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2060 break;
2061 case 0: /* Close log */
2062 case 1: /* Open log */
2063 case 2: /* Read from log */
2064 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2065 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2066 default:
2067 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2068 break;
2069 }
2070 return rc;
2071 }
2072
2073 /*
2074 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2075 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2076 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2077 *
2078 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2079 * processes that allocate mappings.
2080 */
2081 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2082 {
2083 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2084
2085 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2086 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2087 if (rc == 0)
2088 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2089
2090 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2091 }
2092
2093 /* binprm security operations */
2094
2095 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2096 {
2097 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2098 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2099 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2100 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2101 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2102 int rc;
2103
2104 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2105 if (rc)
2106 return rc;
2107
2108 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2109 * the script interpreter */
2110 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2111 return 0;
2112
2113 old_tsec = current_security();
2114 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2115 isec = inode->i_security;
2116
2117 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2118 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2119 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2120
2121 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2122 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2123 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2124 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2125
2126 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2127 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2128 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2129 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2130 } else {
2131 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2132 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2133 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2134 if (rc)
2135 return rc;
2136 }
2137
2138 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2139 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2140
2141 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2142 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2143
2144 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2145 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2146 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2147 if (rc)
2148 return rc;
2149 } else {
2150 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2151 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2152 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2153 if (rc)
2154 return rc;
2155
2156 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2157 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2158 if (rc)
2159 return rc;
2160
2161 /* Check for shared state */
2162 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2163 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2164 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2165 NULL);
2166 if (rc)
2167 return -EPERM;
2168 }
2169
2170 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2171 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2172 if (bprm->unsafe &
2173 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2174 struct task_struct *tracer;
2175 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2176 u32 ptsid = 0;
2177
2178 rcu_read_lock();
2179 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2180 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2181 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2182 ptsid = sec->sid;
2183 }
2184 rcu_read_unlock();
2185
2186 if (ptsid != 0) {
2187 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2188 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2189 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2190 if (rc)
2191 return -EPERM;
2192 }
2193 }
2194
2195 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2196 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2197 }
2198
2199 return 0;
2200 }
2201
2202 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2203 {
2204 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2205 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2206 u32 sid, osid;
2207 int atsecure = 0;
2208
2209 sid = tsec->sid;
2210 osid = tsec->osid;
2211
2212 if (osid != sid) {
2213 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2214 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2215 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2216 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2217 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2218 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2219 }
2220
2221 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2222 }
2223
2224 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2225 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2226
2227 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2228 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2229 struct files_struct *files)
2230 {
2231 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2232 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2233 struct tty_struct *tty;
2234 struct fdtable *fdt;
2235 long j = -1;
2236 int drop_tty = 0;
2237
2238 tty = get_current_tty();
2239 if (tty) {
2240 file_list_lock();
2241 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2242 struct inode *inode;
2243
2244 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2245 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2246 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2247 file may belong to another process and we are only
2248 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2249 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2250 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2251 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2252 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2253 drop_tty = 1;
2254 }
2255 }
2256 file_list_unlock();
2257 tty_kref_put(tty);
2258 }
2259 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2260 if (drop_tty)
2261 no_tty();
2262
2263 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2264
2265 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2266
2267 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2268 for (;;) {
2269 unsigned long set, i;
2270 int fd;
2271
2272 j++;
2273 i = j * __NFDBITS;
2274 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2275 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2276 break;
2277 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2278 if (!set)
2279 continue;
2280 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2281 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2282 if (set & 1) {
2283 file = fget(i);
2284 if (!file)
2285 continue;
2286 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2287 file,
2288 file_to_av(file))) {
2289 sys_close(i);
2290 fd = get_unused_fd();
2291 if (fd != i) {
2292 if (fd >= 0)
2293 put_unused_fd(fd);
2294 fput(file);
2295 continue;
2296 }
2297 if (devnull) {
2298 get_file(devnull);
2299 } else {
2300 devnull = dentry_open(
2301 dget(selinux_null),
2302 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2303 O_RDWR, cred);
2304 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2305 devnull = NULL;
2306 put_unused_fd(fd);
2307 fput(file);
2308 continue;
2309 }
2310 }
2311 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2312 }
2313 fput(file);
2314 }
2315 }
2316 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2317
2318 }
2319 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2320 }
2321
2322 /*
2323 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2324 */
2325 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2326 {
2327 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2328 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2329 int rc, i;
2330
2331 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2332 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2333 return;
2334
2335 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2336 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2337
2338 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2339 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2340
2341 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2342 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2343 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2344 *
2345 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2346 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2347 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2348 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2349 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2350 */
2351 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2352 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2353 if (rc) {
2354 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2355 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2356 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2357 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2358 }
2359 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2360 }
2361 }
2362
2363 /*
2364 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2365 * due to exec
2366 */
2367 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2368 {
2369 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2370 struct itimerval itimer;
2371 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2372 u32 osid, sid;
2373 int rc, i;
2374 unsigned long flags;
2375
2376 osid = tsec->osid;
2377 sid = tsec->sid;
2378
2379 if (sid == osid)
2380 return;
2381
2382 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2383 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2384 * flush and unblock signals.
2385 *
2386 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2387 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2388 */
2389 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2390 if (rc) {
2391 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2392 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2393 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2394 flush_signals(current);
2395 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2396 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2397 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2398 recalc_sigpending();
2399 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2400 }
2401
2402 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2403 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2404 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2405 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2406 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2407 wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2408 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2409 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2410 }
2411
2412 /* superblock security operations */
2413
2414 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2415 {
2416 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2417 }
2418
2419 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2420 {
2421 superblock_free_security(sb);
2422 }
2423
2424 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2425 {
2426 if (plen > olen)
2427 return 0;
2428
2429 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2430 }
2431
2432 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2433 {
2434 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2435 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2436 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2437 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2438 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2439 }
2440
2441 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2442 {
2443 if (!*first) {
2444 **to = ',';
2445 *to += 1;
2446 } else
2447 *first = 0;
2448 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2449 *to += len;
2450 }
2451
2452 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2453 int len)
2454 {
2455 int current_size = 0;
2456
2457 if (!*first) {
2458 **to = '|';
2459 *to += 1;
2460 } else
2461 *first = 0;
2462
2463 while (current_size < len) {
2464 if (*from != '"') {
2465 **to = *from;
2466 *to += 1;
2467 }
2468 from += 1;
2469 current_size += 1;
2470 }
2471 }
2472
2473 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2474 {
2475 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2476 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2477 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2478 int open_quote = 0;
2479
2480 in_curr = orig;
2481 sec_curr = copy;
2482
2483 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2484 if (!nosec) {
2485 rc = -ENOMEM;
2486 goto out;
2487 }
2488
2489 nosec_save = nosec;
2490 fnosec = fsec = 1;
2491 in_save = in_end = orig;
2492
2493 do {
2494 if (*in_end == '"')
2495 open_quote = !open_quote;
2496 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2497 *in_end == '\0') {
2498 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2499
2500 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2501 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2502 else
2503 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2504
2505 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2506 }
2507 } while (*in_end++);
2508
2509 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2510 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2511 out:
2512 return rc;
2513 }
2514
2515 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2516 {
2517 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2518 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2519 int rc;
2520
2521 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2522 if (rc)
2523 return rc;
2524
2525 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2526 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2527 return 0;
2528
2529 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2530 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2531 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2532 }
2533
2534 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2535 {
2536 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2537 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2538
2539 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2540 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2541 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2542 }
2543
2544 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2545 struct path *path,
2546 char *type,
2547 unsigned long flags,
2548 void *data)
2549 {
2550 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2551
2552 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2553 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2554 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2555 else
2556 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2557 FILE__MOUNTON);
2558 }
2559
2560 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2561 {
2562 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2563
2564 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2565 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2566 }
2567
2568 /* inode security operations */
2569
2570 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2571 {
2572 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2573 }
2574
2575 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2576 {
2577 inode_free_security(inode);
2578 }
2579
2580 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2581 char **name, void **value,
2582 size_t *len)
2583 {
2584 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2585 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2586 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2587 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2588 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2589 int rc;
2590 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2591
2592 dsec = dir->i_security;
2593 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2594
2595 sid = tsec->sid;
2596 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2597
2598 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2599 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2600 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2601 &newsid);
2602 if (rc) {
2603 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2604 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2605 "ino=%ld)\n",
2606 __func__,
2607 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2608 return rc;
2609 }
2610 }
2611
2612 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2613 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2614 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2615 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2616 isec->sid = newsid;
2617 isec->initialized = 1;
2618 }
2619
2620 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2621 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2622
2623 if (name) {
2624 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2625 if (!namep)
2626 return -ENOMEM;
2627 *name = namep;
2628 }
2629
2630 if (value && len) {
2631 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2632 if (rc) {
2633 kfree(namep);
2634 return rc;
2635 }
2636 *value = context;
2637 *len = clen;
2638 }
2639
2640 return 0;
2641 }
2642
2643 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2644 {
2645 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2646 }
2647
2648 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2649 {
2650 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2651 }
2652
2653 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2654 {
2655 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2656 }
2657
2658 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2659 {
2660 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2661 }
2662
2663 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2664 {
2665 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2666 }
2667
2668 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2669 {
2670 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2671 }
2672
2673 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2674 {
2675 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2676 }
2677
2678 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2679 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2680 {
2681 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2682 }
2683
2684 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2685 {
2686 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2687
2688 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2689 }
2690
2691 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2692 {
2693 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2694
2695 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2696 }
2697
2698 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2699 {
2700 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2701
2702 if (!mask) {
2703 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2704 return 0;
2705 }
2706
2707 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2708 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2709 }
2710
2711 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2712 {
2713 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2714
2715 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2716 return 0;
2717
2718 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2719 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2720 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2721
2722 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2723 }
2724
2725 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2726 {
2727 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2728
2729 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2730 }
2731
2732 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2733 {
2734 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2735
2736 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2737 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2738 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2739 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2740 return -EPERM;
2741 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2742 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2743 Restrict to administrator. */
2744 return -EPERM;
2745 }
2746 }
2747
2748 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2749 ordinary setattr permission. */
2750 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2751 }
2752
2753 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2754 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2755 {
2756 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2757 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2758 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2759 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2760 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2761 int rc = 0;
2762
2763 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2764 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2765
2766 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2767 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2768 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2769
2770 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2771 return -EPERM;
2772
2773 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2774 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2775
2776 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2777 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2778 if (rc)
2779 return rc;
2780
2781 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2782 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2783 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2784 return rc;
2785 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2786 }
2787 if (rc)
2788 return rc;
2789
2790 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2791 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2792 if (rc)
2793 return rc;
2794
2795 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2796 isec->sclass);
2797 if (rc)
2798 return rc;
2799
2800 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2801 sbsec->sid,
2802 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2803 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2804 &ad);
2805 }
2806
2807 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2808 const void *value, size_t size,
2809 int flags)
2810 {
2811 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2812 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2813 u32 newsid;
2814 int rc;
2815
2816 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2817 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2818 return;
2819 }
2820
2821 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2822 if (rc) {
2823 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2824 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2825 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2826 return;
2827 }
2828
2829 isec->sid = newsid;
2830 return;
2831 }
2832
2833 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2834 {
2835 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2836
2837 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2838 }
2839
2840 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2841 {
2842 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2843
2844 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2845 }
2846
2847 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2848 {
2849 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2850 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2851
2852 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2853 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2854 return -EACCES;
2855 }
2856
2857 /*
2858 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2859 *
2860 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2861 */
2862 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2863 {
2864 u32 size;
2865 int error;
2866 char *context = NULL;
2867 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2868
2869 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2870 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2871
2872 /*
2873 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2874 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2875 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2876 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2877 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2878 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2879 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2880 */
2881 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2882 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2883 if (!error)
2884 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2885 &size);
2886 else
2887 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2888 if (error)
2889 return error;
2890 error = size;
2891 if (alloc) {
2892 *buffer = context;
2893 goto out_nofree;
2894 }
2895 kfree(context);
2896 out_nofree:
2897 return error;
2898 }
2899
2900 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2901 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2902 {
2903 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2904 u32 newsid;
2905 int rc;
2906
2907 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2908 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2909
2910 if (!value || !size)
2911 return -EACCES;
2912
2913 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2914 if (rc)
2915 return rc;
2916
2917 isec->sid = newsid;
2918 return 0;
2919 }
2920
2921 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2922 {
2923 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2924 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2925 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2926 return len;
2927 }
2928
2929 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2930 {
2931 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2932 *secid = isec->sid;
2933 }
2934
2935 /* file security operations */
2936
2937 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2938 {
2939 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2940 int rc;
2941 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2942
2943 if (!mask) {
2944 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2945 return 0;
2946 }
2947
2948 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2949 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2950 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2951
2952 rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
2953 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2954 if (rc)
2955 return rc;
2956
2957 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2958 }
2959
2960 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2961 {
2962 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2963 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2964 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2965 u32 sid = current_sid();
2966
2967 if (!mask) {
2968 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2969 return 0;
2970 }
2971
2972 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2973 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2974 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2975
2976 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2977 }
2978
2979 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2980 {
2981 return file_alloc_security(file);
2982 }
2983
2984 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2985 {
2986 file_free_security(file);
2987 }
2988
2989 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2990 unsigned long arg)
2991 {
2992 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2993 u32 av = 0;
2994
2995 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2996 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2997 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2998 av |= FILE__READ;
2999 if (!av)
3000 av = FILE__IOCTL;
3001
3002 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3003 }
3004
3005 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3006 {
3007 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3008 int rc = 0;
3009
3010 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3011 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3012 /*
3013 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3014 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3015 * This has an additional check.
3016 */
3017 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3018 if (rc)
3019 goto error;
3020 }
3021 #endif
3022
3023 if (file) {
3024 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3025 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3026
3027 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3028 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3029 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3030
3031 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3032 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3033
3034 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3035 }
3036
3037 error:
3038 return rc;
3039 }
3040
3041 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3042 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3043 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3044 {
3045 int rc = 0;
3046 u32 sid = current_sid();
3047
3048 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3049 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3050 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3051 if (rc || addr_only)
3052 return rc;
3053
3054 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3055 prot = reqprot;
3056
3057 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3058 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3059 }
3060
3061 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3062 unsigned long reqprot,
3063 unsigned long prot)
3064 {
3065 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3066
3067 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3068 prot = reqprot;
3069
3070 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3071 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3072 int rc = 0;
3073 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3074 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3075 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3076 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3077 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3078 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3079 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3080 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3081 /*
3082 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3083 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3084 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3085 * modified content. This typically should only
3086 * occur for text relocations.
3087 */
3088 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3089 }
3090 if (rc)
3091 return rc;
3092 }
3093 #endif
3094
3095 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3096 }
3097
3098 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3099 {
3100 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3101
3102 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3103 }
3104
3105 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3106 unsigned long arg)
3107 {
3108 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3109 int err = 0;
3110
3111 switch (cmd) {
3112 case F_SETFL:
3113 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3114 err = -EINVAL;
3115 break;
3116 }
3117
3118 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3119 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3120 break;
3121 }
3122 /* fall through */
3123 case F_SETOWN:
3124 case F_SETSIG:
3125 case F_GETFL:
3126 case F_GETOWN:
3127 case F_GETSIG:
3128 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3129 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3130 break;
3131 case F_GETLK:
3132 case F_SETLK:
3133 case F_SETLKW:
3134 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3135 case F_GETLK64:
3136 case F_SETLK64:
3137 case F_SETLKW64:
3138 #endif
3139 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3140 err = -EINVAL;
3141 break;
3142 }
3143 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3144 break;
3145 }
3146
3147 return err;
3148 }
3149
3150 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3151 {
3152 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3153
3154 fsec = file->f_security;
3155 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3156
3157 return 0;
3158 }
3159
3160 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3161 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3162 {
3163 struct file *file;
3164 u32 sid = current_sid();
3165 u32 perm;
3166 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3167
3168 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3169 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3170
3171 fsec = file->f_security;
3172
3173 if (!signum)
3174 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3175 else
3176 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3177
3178 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3179 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3180 }
3181
3182 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3183 {
3184 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3185
3186 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3187 }
3188
3189 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3190 {
3191 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3192 struct inode *inode;
3193 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3194
3195 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3196 fsec = file->f_security;
3197 isec = inode->i_security;
3198 /*
3199 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3200 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3201 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3202 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3203 * struct as its SID.
3204 */
3205 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3206 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3207 /*
3208 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3209 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3210 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3211 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3212 * new inode label or new policy.
3213 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3214 */
3215 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3216 }
3217
3218 /* task security operations */
3219
3220 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3221 {
3222 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3223 }
3224
3225 /*
3226 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3227 */
3228 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3229 {
3230 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3231 cred->security = NULL;
3232 kfree(tsec);
3233 }
3234
3235 /*
3236 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3237 */
3238 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3239 gfp_t gfp)
3240 {
3241 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3242 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3243
3244 old_tsec = old->security;
3245
3246 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3247 if (!tsec)
3248 return -ENOMEM;
3249
3250 new->security = tsec;
3251 return 0;
3252 }
3253
3254 /*
3255 * set the security data for a kernel service
3256 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3257 */
3258 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3259 {
3260 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3261 u32 sid = current_sid();
3262 int ret;
3263
3264 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3265 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3266 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3267 NULL);
3268 if (ret == 0) {
3269 tsec->sid = secid;
3270 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3271 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3272 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3273 }
3274 return ret;
3275 }
3276
3277 /*
3278 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3279 * objective context of the specified inode
3280 */
3281 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3282 {
3283 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3284 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3285 u32 sid = current_sid();
3286 int ret;
3287
3288 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3289 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3290 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3291 NULL);
3292
3293 if (ret == 0)
3294 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3295 return 0;
3296 }
3297
3298 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3299 {
3300 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3301 }
3302
3303 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3304 {
3305 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3306 }
3307
3308 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3309 {
3310 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3311 }
3312
3313 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3314 {
3315 *secid = task_sid(p);
3316 }
3317
3318 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3319 {
3320 int rc;
3321
3322 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3323 if (rc)
3324 return rc;
3325
3326 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3327 }
3328
3329 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3330 {
3331 int rc;
3332
3333 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3334 if (rc)
3335 return rc;
3336
3337 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3338 }
3339
3340 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3341 {
3342 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3343 }
3344
3345 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3346 {
3347 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3348
3349 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3350 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3351 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3352 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3353 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3354 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3355
3356 return 0;
3357 }
3358
3359 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3360 {
3361 int rc;
3362
3363 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3364 if (rc)
3365 return rc;
3366
3367 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3368 }
3369
3370 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3371 {
3372 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3373 }
3374
3375 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3376 {
3377 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3378 }
3379
3380 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3381 int sig, u32 secid)
3382 {
3383 u32 perm;
3384 int rc;
3385
3386 if (!sig)
3387 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3388 else
3389 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3390 if (secid)
3391 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3392 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3393 else
3394 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3395 return rc;
3396 }
3397
3398 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3399 {
3400 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3401 }
3402
3403 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3404 struct inode *inode)
3405 {
3406 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3407 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3408
3409 isec->sid = sid;
3410 isec->initialized = 1;
3411 }
3412
3413 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3414 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3415 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3416 {
3417 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3418 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3419
3420 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3421 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3422 if (ih == NULL)
3423 goto out;
3424
3425 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3426 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3427 goto out;
3428
3429 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3430 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3431 ret = 0;
3432
3433 if (proto)
3434 *proto = ih->protocol;
3435
3436 switch (ih->protocol) {
3437 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3438 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3439
3440 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3441 break;
3442
3443 offset += ihlen;
3444 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3445 if (th == NULL)
3446 break;
3447
3448 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3449 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3450 break;
3451 }
3452
3453 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3454 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3455
3456 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3457 break;
3458
3459 offset += ihlen;
3460 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3461 if (uh == NULL)
3462 break;
3463
3464 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3465 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3466 break;
3467 }
3468
3469 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3470 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3471
3472 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3473 break;
3474
3475 offset += ihlen;
3476 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3477 if (dh == NULL)
3478 break;
3479
3480 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3481 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3482 break;
3483 }
3484
3485 default:
3486 break;
3487 }
3488 out:
3489 return ret;
3490 }
3491
3492 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3493
3494 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3495 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3496 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3497 {
3498 u8 nexthdr;
3499 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3500 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3501
3502 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3503 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3504 if (ip6 == NULL)
3505 goto out;
3506
3507 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3508 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3509 ret = 0;
3510
3511 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3512 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3513 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3514 if (offset < 0)
3515 goto out;
3516
3517 if (proto)
3518 *proto = nexthdr;
3519
3520 switch (nexthdr) {
3521 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3522 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3523
3524 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3525 if (th == NULL)
3526 break;
3527
3528 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3529 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3530 break;
3531 }
3532
3533 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3534 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3535
3536 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3537 if (uh == NULL)
3538 break;
3539
3540 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3541 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3542 break;
3543 }
3544
3545 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3546 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3547
3548 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3549 if (dh == NULL)
3550 break;
3551
3552 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3553 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3554 break;
3555 }
3556
3557 /* includes fragments */
3558 default:
3559 break;
3560 }
3561 out:
3562 return ret;
3563 }
3564
3565 #endif /* IPV6 */
3566
3567 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3568 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3569 {
3570 char *addrp;
3571 int ret;
3572
3573 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3574 case PF_INET:
3575 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3576 if (ret)
3577 goto parse_error;
3578 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3579 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3580 goto okay;
3581
3582 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3583 case PF_INET6:
3584 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3585 if (ret)
3586 goto parse_error;
3587 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3588 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3589 goto okay;
3590 #endif /* IPV6 */
3591 default:
3592 addrp = NULL;
3593 goto okay;
3594 }
3595
3596 parse_error:
3597 printk(KERN_WARNING
3598 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3599 " unable to parse packet\n");
3600 return ret;
3601
3602 okay:
3603 if (_addrp)
3604 *_addrp = addrp;
3605 return 0;
3606 }
3607
3608 /**
3609 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3610 * @skb: the packet
3611 * @family: protocol family
3612 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3613 *
3614 * Description:
3615 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3616 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3617 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3618 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3619 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3620 * peer labels.
3621 *
3622 */
3623 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3624 {
3625 int err;
3626 u32 xfrm_sid;
3627 u32 nlbl_sid;
3628 u32 nlbl_type;
3629
3630 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3631 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3632
3633 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3634 if (unlikely(err)) {
3635 printk(KERN_WARNING
3636 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3637 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3638 return -EACCES;
3639 }
3640
3641 return 0;
3642 }
3643
3644 /* socket security operations */
3645 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3646 u32 perms)
3647 {
3648 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3649 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3650 u32 sid;
3651 int err = 0;
3652
3653 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3654
3655 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3656 goto out;
3657 sid = task_sid(task);
3658
3659 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3660 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3661 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3662
3663 out:
3664 return err;
3665 }
3666
3667 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3668 int protocol, int kern)
3669 {
3670 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3671 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3672 u32 sid, newsid;
3673 u16 secclass;
3674 int err = 0;
3675
3676 if (kern)
3677 goto out;
3678
3679 sid = tsec->sid;
3680 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3681
3682 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3683 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3684
3685 out:
3686 return err;
3687 }
3688
3689 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3690 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3691 {
3692 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3693 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3694 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3695 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3696 u32 sid, newsid;
3697 int err = 0;
3698
3699 sid = tsec->sid;
3700 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3701
3702 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3703
3704 if (kern)
3705 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3706 else if (newsid)
3707 isec->sid = newsid;
3708 else
3709 isec->sid = sid;
3710
3711 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3712 isec->initialized = 1;
3713
3714 if (sock->sk) {
3715 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3716 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3717 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3718 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3719 }
3720
3721 return err;
3722 }
3723
3724 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3725 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3726 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3727
3728 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3729 {
3730 u16 family;
3731 int err;
3732
3733 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3734 if (err)
3735 goto out;
3736
3737 /*
3738 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3739 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3740 * check the first address now.
3741 */
3742 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3743 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3744 char *addrp;
3745 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3746 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3747 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3748 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3749 unsigned short snum;
3750 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3751 u32 sid, node_perm;
3752
3753 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3754
3755 if (family == PF_INET) {
3756 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3757 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3758 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3759 } else {
3760 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3761 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3762 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3763 }
3764
3765 if (snum) {
3766 int low, high;
3767
3768 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3769
3770 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3771 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3772 snum, &sid);
3773 if (err)
3774 goto out;
3775 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3776 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3777 ad.u.net.family = family;
3778 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3779 isec->sclass,
3780 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3781 if (err)
3782 goto out;
3783 }
3784 }
3785
3786 switch (isec->sclass) {
3787 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3788 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3789 break;
3790
3791 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3792 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3793 break;
3794
3795 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3796 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3797 break;
3798
3799 default:
3800 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3801 break;
3802 }
3803
3804 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3805 if (err)
3806 goto out;
3807
3808 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3809 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3810 ad.u.net.family = family;
3811
3812 if (family == PF_INET)
3813 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3814 else
3815 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3816
3817 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3818 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3819 if (err)
3820 goto out;
3821 }
3822 out:
3823 return err;
3824 }
3825
3826 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3827 {
3828 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3829 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3830 int err;
3831
3832 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3833 if (err)
3834 return err;
3835
3836 /*
3837 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3838 */
3839 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3840 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3841 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3842 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3843 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3844 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3845 unsigned short snum;
3846 u32 sid, perm;
3847
3848 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3849 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3850 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3851 return -EINVAL;
3852 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3853 } else {
3854 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3855 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3856 return -EINVAL;
3857 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3858 }
3859
3860 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3861 if (err)
3862 goto out;
3863
3864 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3865 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3866
3867 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3868 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3869 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3870 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3871 if (err)
3872 goto out;
3873 }
3874
3875 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3876
3877 out:
3878 return err;
3879 }
3880
3881 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3882 {
3883 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3884 }
3885
3886 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3887 {
3888 int err;
3889 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3890 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3891
3892 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3893 if (err)
3894 return err;
3895
3896 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3897
3898 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3899 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3900 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3901 newisec->initialized = 1;
3902
3903 return 0;
3904 }
3905
3906 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3907 int size)
3908 {
3909 int rc;
3910
3911 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3912 if (rc)
3913 return rc;
3914
3915 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3916 }
3917
3918 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3919 int size, int flags)
3920 {
3921 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3922 }
3923
3924 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3925 {
3926 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3927 }
3928
3929 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3930 {
3931 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3932 }
3933
3934 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3935 {
3936 int err;
3937
3938 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3939 if (err)
3940 return err;
3941
3942 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3943 }
3944
3945 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3946 int optname)
3947 {
3948 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3949 }
3950
3951 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3952 {
3953 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3954 }
3955
3956 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3957 struct socket *other,
3958 struct sock *newsk)
3959 {
3960 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3961 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3962 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3963 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3964 int err;
3965
3966 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3967 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3968
3969 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3970 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3971
3972 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3973 isec->sclass,
3974 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3975 if (err)
3976 return err;
3977
3978 /* connecting socket */
3979 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3980 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3981
3982 /* server child socket */
3983 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3984 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3985 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3986
3987 return err;
3988 }
3989
3990 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3991 struct socket *other)
3992 {
3993 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3994 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3995 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3996 int err;
3997
3998 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3999 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4000
4001 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4002 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4003
4004 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4005 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4006 if (err)
4007 return err;
4008
4009 return 0;
4010 }
4011
4012 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4013 u32 peer_sid,
4014 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4015 {
4016 int err;
4017 u32 if_sid;
4018 u32 node_sid;
4019
4020 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4021 if (err)
4022 return err;
4023 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4024 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4025 if (err)
4026 return err;
4027
4028 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4029 if (err)
4030 return err;
4031 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4032 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4033 }
4034
4035 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4036 struct sk_buff *skb,
4037 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4038 u16 family,
4039 char *addrp)
4040 {
4041 int err;
4042 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4043 u16 sk_class;
4044 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4045 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4046
4047 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4048 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4049
4050 switch (sk_class) {
4051 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4052 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4053 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4054 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4055 break;
4056 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4057 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4058 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4059 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4060 break;
4061 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4062 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4063 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4064 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4065 break;
4066 default:
4067 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4068 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4069 recv_perm = 0;
4070 break;
4071 }
4072
4073 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4074 if (err)
4075 return err;
4076 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4077 if (err)
4078 return err;
4079
4080 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4081 if (err)
4082 return err;
4083 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4084 if (err)
4085 return err;
4086
4087 if (!recv_perm)
4088 return 0;
4089 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4090 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4091 if (unlikely(err)) {
4092 printk(KERN_WARNING
4093 "SELinux: failure in"
4094 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4095 " network port label not found\n");
4096 return err;
4097 }
4098 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4099 }
4100
4101 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4102 u16 family)
4103 {
4104 int err = 0;
4105 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4106 u32 peer_sid;
4107 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4108 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4109 char *addrp;
4110
4111 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4112 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4113 ad.u.net.family = family;
4114 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4115 if (err)
4116 return err;
4117
4118 if (selinux_compat_net)
4119 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4120 family, addrp);
4121 else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4122 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4123 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4124 if (err)
4125 return err;
4126
4127 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4128 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4129 if (err)
4130 return err;
4131 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4132 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4133 if (err)
4134 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4135 } else {
4136 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4137 if (err)
4138 return err;
4139 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4140 }
4141
4142 return err;
4143 }
4144
4145 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4146 {
4147 int err;
4148 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4149 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4150 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4151 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4152 char *addrp;
4153 u8 secmark_active;
4154 u8 peerlbl_active;
4155
4156 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4157 return 0;
4158
4159 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4160 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4161 family = PF_INET;
4162
4163 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4164 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4165 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4166 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4167 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4168 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4169
4170 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4171 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4172 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4173 return 0;
4174
4175 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4176 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4177 ad.u.net.family = family;
4178 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4179 if (err)
4180 return err;
4181
4182 if (peerlbl_active) {
4183 u32 peer_sid;
4184
4185 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4186 if (err)
4187 return err;
4188 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4189 peer_sid, &ad);
4190 if (err) {
4191 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4192 return err;
4193 }
4194 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4195 PEER__RECV, &ad);
4196 if (err)
4197 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4198 }
4199
4200 if (secmark_active) {
4201 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4202 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4203 if (err)
4204 return err;
4205 }
4206
4207 return err;
4208 }
4209
4210 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4211 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4212 {
4213 int err = 0;
4214 char *scontext;
4215 u32 scontext_len;
4216 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4217 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4218 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4219
4220 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4221
4222 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4223 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4224 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4225 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4226 }
4227 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4228 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
4229 goto out;
4230 }
4231
4232 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4233
4234 if (err)
4235 goto out;
4236
4237 if (scontext_len > len) {
4238 err = -ERANGE;
4239 goto out_len;
4240 }
4241
4242 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4243 err = -EFAULT;
4244
4245 out_len:
4246 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4247 err = -EFAULT;
4248
4249 kfree(scontext);
4250 out:
4251 return err;
4252 }
4253
4254 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4255 {
4256 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4257 u16 family;
4258
4259 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4260 family = PF_INET;
4261 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4262 family = PF_INET6;
4263 else if (sock)
4264 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4265 else
4266 goto out;
4267
4268 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4269 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4270 else if (skb)
4271 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4272
4273 out:
4274 *secid = peer_secid;
4275 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4276 return -EINVAL;
4277 return 0;
4278 }
4279
4280 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4281 {
4282 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4283 }
4284
4285 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4286 {
4287 sk_free_security(sk);
4288 }
4289
4290 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4291 {
4292 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4293 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4294
4295 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4296 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4297 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4298
4299 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4300 }
4301
4302 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4303 {
4304 if (!sk)
4305 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4306 else {
4307 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4308
4309 *secid = sksec->sid;
4310 }
4311 }
4312
4313 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4314 {
4315 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4316 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4317
4318 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4319 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4320 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4321 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4322 }
4323
4324 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4325 struct request_sock *req)
4326 {
4327 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4328 int err;
4329 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4330 u32 newsid;
4331 u32 peersid;
4332
4333 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4334 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4335 family = PF_INET;
4336
4337 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4338 if (err)
4339 return err;
4340 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4341 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4342 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4343 return 0;
4344 }
4345
4346 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4347 if (err)
4348 return err;
4349
4350 req->secid = newsid;
4351 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4352 return 0;
4353 }
4354
4355 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4356 const struct request_sock *req)
4357 {
4358 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4359
4360 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4361 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4362 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4363 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4364 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4365 time it will have been created and available. */
4366
4367 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4368 * thread with access to newsksec */
4369 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4370 }
4371
4372 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4373 {
4374 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4375 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4376
4377 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4378 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4379 family = PF_INET;
4380
4381 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4382
4383 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4384 }
4385
4386 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4387 struct flowi *fl)
4388 {
4389 fl->secid = req->secid;
4390 }
4391
4392 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4393 {
4394 int err = 0;
4395 u32 perm;
4396 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4397 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4398 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4399
4400 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4401 err = -EINVAL;
4402 goto out;
4403 }
4404 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4405
4406 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4407 if (err) {
4408 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4409 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4410 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4411 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4412 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4413 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4414 err = 0;
4415 }
4416
4417 /* Ignore */
4418 if (err == -ENOENT)
4419 err = 0;
4420 goto out;
4421 }
4422
4423 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4424 out:
4425 return err;
4426 }
4427
4428 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4429
4430 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4431 u16 family)
4432 {
4433 int err;
4434 char *addrp;
4435 u32 peer_sid;
4436 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4437 u8 secmark_active;
4438 u8 netlbl_active;
4439 u8 peerlbl_active;
4440
4441 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4442 return NF_ACCEPT;
4443
4444 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4445 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4446 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4447 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4448 return NF_ACCEPT;
4449
4450 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4451 return NF_DROP;
4452
4453 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4454 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4455 ad.u.net.family = family;
4456 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4457 return NF_DROP;
4458
4459 if (peerlbl_active) {
4460 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4461 peer_sid, &ad);
4462 if (err) {
4463 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4464 return NF_DROP;
4465 }
4466 }
4467
4468 if (secmark_active)
4469 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4470 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4471 return NF_DROP;
4472
4473 if (netlbl_active)
4474 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4475 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4476 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4477 * protection */
4478 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4479 return NF_DROP;
4480
4481 return NF_ACCEPT;
4482 }
4483
4484 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4485 struct sk_buff *skb,
4486 const struct net_device *in,
4487 const struct net_device *out,
4488 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4489 {
4490 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4491 }
4492
4493 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4494 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4495 struct sk_buff *skb,
4496 const struct net_device *in,
4497 const struct net_device *out,
4498 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4499 {
4500 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4501 }
4502 #endif /* IPV6 */
4503
4504 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4505 u16 family)
4506 {
4507 u32 sid;
4508
4509 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4510 return NF_ACCEPT;
4511
4512 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4513 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4514 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4515 if (skb->sk) {
4516 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4517 sid = sksec->sid;
4518 } else
4519 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4520 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4521 return NF_DROP;
4522
4523 return NF_ACCEPT;
4524 }
4525
4526 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4527 struct sk_buff *skb,
4528 const struct net_device *in,
4529 const struct net_device *out,
4530 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4531 {
4532 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4533 }
4534
4535 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4536 int ifindex,
4537 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4538 u16 family, char *addrp)
4539 {
4540 int err;
4541 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4542 u16 sk_class;
4543 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4544 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4545
4546 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4547 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4548
4549 switch (sk_class) {
4550 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4551 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4552 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4553 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4554 break;
4555 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4556 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4557 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4558 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4559 break;
4560 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4561 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4562 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4563 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4564 break;
4565 default:
4566 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4567 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4568 send_perm = 0;
4569 break;
4570 }
4571
4572 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4573 if (err)
4574 return err;
4575 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4576 return err;
4577
4578 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4579 if (err)
4580 return err;
4581 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4582 if (err)
4583 return err;
4584
4585 if (send_perm != 0)
4586 return 0;
4587
4588 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4589 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4590 if (unlikely(err)) {
4591 printk(KERN_WARNING
4592 "SELinux: failure in"
4593 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4594 " network port label not found\n");
4595 return err;
4596 }
4597 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4598 }
4599
4600 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4601 int ifindex,
4602 u16 family)
4603 {
4604 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4605 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4606 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4607 char *addrp;
4608 u8 proto;
4609
4610 if (sk == NULL)
4611 return NF_ACCEPT;
4612 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4613
4614 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4615 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4616 ad.u.net.family = family;
4617 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4618 return NF_DROP;
4619
4620 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4621 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4622 &ad, family, addrp))
4623 return NF_DROP;
4624 } else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4625 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4626 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4627 return NF_DROP;
4628 }
4629
4630 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4631 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4632 return NF_DROP;
4633
4634 return NF_ACCEPT;
4635 }
4636
4637 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4638 u16 family)
4639 {
4640 u32 secmark_perm;
4641 u32 peer_sid;
4642 struct sock *sk;
4643 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4644 char *addrp;
4645 u8 secmark_active;
4646 u8 peerlbl_active;
4647
4648 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4649 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4650 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4651 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4652 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4653 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4654 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
4655 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4656 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4657 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4658 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4659 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4660 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4661 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4662 return NF_ACCEPT;
4663 #endif
4664 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4665 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4666 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4667 return NF_ACCEPT;
4668
4669 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4670 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4671 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4672 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4673 sk = skb->sk;
4674 if (sk == NULL) {
4675 switch (family) {
4676 case PF_INET:
4677 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4678 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4679 else
4680 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4681 break;
4682 case PF_INET6:
4683 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4684 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4685 else
4686 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4687 break;
4688 default:
4689 return NF_DROP;
4690 }
4691 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4692 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4693 return NF_DROP;
4694 } else
4695 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4696 } else {
4697 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4698 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4699 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4700 }
4701
4702 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4703 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4704 ad.u.net.family = family;
4705 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4706 return NF_DROP;
4707
4708 if (secmark_active)
4709 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4710 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4711 return NF_DROP;
4712
4713 if (peerlbl_active) {
4714 u32 if_sid;
4715 u32 node_sid;
4716
4717 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4718 return NF_DROP;
4719 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4720 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4721 return NF_DROP;
4722
4723 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4724 return NF_DROP;
4725 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4726 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4727 return NF_DROP;
4728 }
4729
4730 return NF_ACCEPT;
4731 }
4732
4733 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4734 struct sk_buff *skb,
4735 const struct net_device *in,
4736 const struct net_device *out,
4737 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4738 {
4739 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4740 }
4741
4742 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4743 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4744 struct sk_buff *skb,
4745 const struct net_device *in,
4746 const struct net_device *out,
4747 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4748 {
4749 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4750 }
4751 #endif /* IPV6 */
4752
4753 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4754
4755 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4756 {
4757 int err;
4758
4759 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4760 if (err)
4761 return err;
4762
4763 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4764 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4765
4766 return err;
4767 }
4768
4769 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4770 {
4771 int err;
4772 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4773
4774 err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4775 if (err)
4776 return err;
4777
4778 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4779 ad.u.cap = capability;
4780
4781 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4782 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4783 }
4784
4785 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4786 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4787 u16 sclass)
4788 {
4789 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4790 u32 sid;
4791
4792 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4793 if (!isec)
4794 return -ENOMEM;
4795
4796 sid = task_sid(task);
4797 isec->sclass = sclass;
4798 isec->sid = sid;
4799 perm->security = isec;
4800
4801 return 0;
4802 }
4803
4804 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4805 {
4806 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4807 perm->security = NULL;
4808 kfree(isec);
4809 }
4810
4811 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4812 {
4813 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4814
4815 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4816 if (!msec)
4817 return -ENOMEM;
4818
4819 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4820 msg->security = msec;
4821
4822 return 0;
4823 }
4824
4825 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4826 {
4827 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4828
4829 msg->security = NULL;
4830 kfree(msec);
4831 }
4832
4833 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4834 u32 perms)
4835 {
4836 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4837 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4838 u32 sid = current_sid();
4839
4840 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4841
4842 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4843 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4844
4845 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4846 }
4847
4848 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4849 {
4850 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4851 }
4852
4853 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4854 {
4855 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4856 }
4857
4858 /* message queue security operations */
4859 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4860 {
4861 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4862 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4863 u32 sid = current_sid();
4864 int rc;
4865
4866 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4867 if (rc)
4868 return rc;
4869
4870 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4871
4872 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4873 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4874
4875 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4876 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
4877 if (rc) {
4878 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4879 return rc;
4880 }
4881 return 0;
4882 }
4883
4884 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4885 {
4886 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4887 }
4888
4889 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4890 {
4891 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4892 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4893 u32 sid = current_sid();
4894
4895 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4896
4897 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4898 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4899
4900 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4901 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4902 }
4903
4904 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4905 {
4906 int err;
4907 int perms;
4908
4909 switch (cmd) {
4910 case IPC_INFO:
4911 case MSG_INFO:
4912 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4913 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4914 case IPC_STAT:
4915 case MSG_STAT:
4916 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4917 break;
4918 case IPC_SET:
4919 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4920 break;
4921 case IPC_RMID:
4922 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4923 break;
4924 default:
4925 return 0;
4926 }
4927
4928 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4929 return err;
4930 }
4931
4932 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4933 {
4934 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4935 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4936 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4937 u32 sid = current_sid();
4938 int rc;
4939
4940 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4941 msec = msg->security;
4942
4943 /*
4944 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4945 */
4946 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4947 /*
4948 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4949 * message queue this message will be stored in
4950 */
4951 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4952 &msec->sid);
4953 if (rc)
4954 return rc;
4955 }
4956
4957 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4958 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4959
4960 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4961 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4962 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
4963 if (!rc)
4964 /* Can this process send the message */
4965 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4966 MSG__SEND, &ad);
4967 if (!rc)
4968 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4969 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4970 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4971
4972 return rc;
4973 }
4974
4975 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4976 struct task_struct *target,
4977 long type, int mode)
4978 {
4979 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4980 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4981 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4982 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4983 int rc;
4984
4985 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4986 msec = msg->security;
4987
4988 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4989 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4990
4991 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4992 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4993 if (!rc)
4994 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4995 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4996 return rc;
4997 }
4998
4999 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5000 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5001 {
5002 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5003 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5004 u32 sid = current_sid();
5005 int rc;
5006
5007 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5008 if (rc)
5009 return rc;
5010
5011 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5012
5013 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5014 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5015
5016 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5017 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
5018 if (rc) {
5019 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5020 return rc;
5021 }
5022 return 0;
5023 }
5024
5025 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5026 {
5027 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5028 }
5029
5030 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5031 {
5032 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5033 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5034 u32 sid = current_sid();
5035
5036 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5037
5038 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5039 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5040
5041 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5042 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5043 }
5044
5045 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5046 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5047 {
5048 int perms;
5049 int err;
5050
5051 switch (cmd) {
5052 case IPC_INFO:
5053 case SHM_INFO:
5054 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5055 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5056 case IPC_STAT:
5057 case SHM_STAT:
5058 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5059 break;
5060 case IPC_SET:
5061 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5062 break;
5063 case SHM_LOCK:
5064 case SHM_UNLOCK:
5065 perms = SHM__LOCK;
5066 break;
5067 case IPC_RMID:
5068 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5069 break;
5070 default:
5071 return 0;
5072 }
5073
5074 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5075 return err;
5076 }
5077
5078 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5079 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5080 {
5081 u32 perms;
5082
5083 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5084 perms = SHM__READ;
5085 else
5086 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5087
5088 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5089 }
5090
5091 /* Semaphore security operations */
5092 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5093 {
5094 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5095 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5096 u32 sid = current_sid();
5097 int rc;
5098
5099 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5100 if (rc)
5101 return rc;
5102
5103 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5104
5105 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5106 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5107
5108 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5109 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
5110 if (rc) {
5111 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5112 return rc;
5113 }
5114 return 0;
5115 }
5116
5117 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5118 {
5119 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5120 }
5121
5122 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5123 {
5124 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5125 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5126 u32 sid = current_sid();
5127
5128 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5129
5130 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5131 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5132
5133 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5134 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5135 }
5136
5137 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5138 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5139 {
5140 int err;
5141 u32 perms;
5142
5143 switch (cmd) {
5144 case IPC_INFO:
5145 case SEM_INFO:
5146 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5147 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5148 case GETPID:
5149 case GETNCNT:
5150 case GETZCNT:
5151 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5152 break;
5153 case GETVAL:
5154 case GETALL:
5155 perms = SEM__READ;
5156 break;
5157 case SETVAL:
5158 case SETALL:
5159 perms = SEM__WRITE;
5160 break;
5161 case IPC_RMID:
5162 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5163 break;
5164 case IPC_SET:
5165 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5166 break;
5167 case IPC_STAT:
5168 case SEM_STAT:
5169 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5170 break;
5171 default:
5172 return 0;
5173 }
5174
5175 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5176 return err;
5177 }
5178
5179 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5180 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5181 {
5182 u32 perms;
5183
5184 if (alter)
5185 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5186 else
5187 perms = SEM__READ;
5188
5189 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5190 }
5191
5192 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5193 {
5194 u32 av = 0;
5195
5196 av = 0;
5197 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5198 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5199 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5200 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5201
5202 if (av == 0)
5203 return 0;
5204
5205 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5206 }
5207
5208 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5209 {
5210 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5211 *secid = isec->sid;
5212 }
5213
5214 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5215 {
5216 if (inode)
5217 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5218 }
5219
5220 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5221 char *name, char **value)
5222 {
5223 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5224 u32 sid;
5225 int error;
5226 unsigned len;
5227
5228 if (current != p) {
5229 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5230 if (error)
5231 return error;
5232 }
5233
5234 rcu_read_lock();
5235 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5236
5237 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5238 sid = __tsec->sid;
5239 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5240 sid = __tsec->osid;
5241 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5242 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5243 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5244 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5245 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5246 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5247 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5248 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5249 else
5250 goto invalid;
5251 rcu_read_unlock();
5252
5253 if (!sid)
5254 return 0;
5255
5256 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5257 if (error)
5258 return error;
5259 return len;
5260
5261 invalid:
5262 rcu_read_unlock();
5263 return -EINVAL;
5264 }
5265
5266 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5267 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5268 {
5269 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5270 struct task_struct *tracer;
5271 struct cred *new;
5272 u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
5273 int error;
5274 char *str = value;
5275
5276 if (current != p) {
5277 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5278 security attributes. */
5279 return -EACCES;
5280 }
5281
5282 /*
5283 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5284 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5285 * above restriction is ever removed.
5286 */
5287 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5288 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5289 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5290 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5291 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5292 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5293 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5294 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5295 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5296 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5297 else
5298 error = -EINVAL;
5299 if (error)
5300 return error;
5301
5302 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5303 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5304 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5305 str[size-1] = 0;
5306 size--;
5307 }
5308 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5309 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5310 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5311 return error;
5312 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5313 &sid);
5314 }
5315 if (error)
5316 return error;
5317 }
5318
5319 new = prepare_creds();
5320 if (!new)
5321 return -ENOMEM;
5322
5323 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5324 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5325 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5326 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5327 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5328 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5329 tsec = new->security;
5330 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5331 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5332 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5333 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5334 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5335 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5336 if (error)
5337 goto abort_change;
5338 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5339 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5340 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5341 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5342 error = -EINVAL;
5343 if (sid == 0)
5344 goto abort_change;
5345
5346 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5347 error = -EPERM;
5348 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5349 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5350 if (error)
5351 goto abort_change;
5352 }
5353
5354 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5355 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5356 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5357 if (error)
5358 goto abort_change;
5359
5360 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5361 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5362 ptsid = 0;
5363 task_lock(p);
5364 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5365 if (tracer)
5366 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5367 task_unlock(p);
5368
5369 if (tracer) {
5370 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5371 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5372 if (error)
5373 goto abort_change;
5374 }
5375
5376 tsec->sid = sid;
5377 } else {
5378 error = -EINVAL;
5379 goto abort_change;
5380 }
5381
5382 commit_creds(new);
5383 return size;
5384
5385 abort_change:
5386 abort_creds(new);
5387 return error;
5388 }
5389
5390 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5391 {
5392 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5393 }
5394
5395 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5396 {
5397 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5398 }
5399
5400 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5401 {
5402 kfree(secdata);
5403 }
5404
5405 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5406
5407 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5408 unsigned long flags)
5409 {
5410 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5411 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5412
5413 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5414 if (!ksec)
5415 return -ENOMEM;
5416
5417 tsec = cred->security;
5418 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5419 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5420 else
5421 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5422
5423 k->security = ksec;
5424 return 0;
5425 }
5426
5427 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5428 {
5429 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5430
5431 k->security = NULL;
5432 kfree(ksec);
5433 }
5434
5435 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5436 const struct cred *cred,
5437 key_perm_t perm)
5438 {
5439 struct key *key;
5440 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5441 u32 sid;
5442
5443 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5444 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5445 appear to be created. */
5446 if (perm == 0)
5447 return 0;
5448
5449 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5450
5451 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5452 ksec = key->security;
5453
5454 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5455 }
5456
5457 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5458 {
5459 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5460 char *context = NULL;
5461 unsigned len;
5462 int rc;
5463
5464 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5465 if (!rc)
5466 rc = len;
5467 *_buffer = context;
5468 return rc;
5469 }
5470
5471 #endif
5472
5473 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5474 .name = "selinux",
5475
5476 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5477 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5478 .capget = selinux_capget,
5479 .capset = selinux_capset,
5480 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5481 .capable = selinux_capable,
5482 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5483 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5484 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5485 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5486
5487 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5488 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5489
5490 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5491 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5492 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5493 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5494
5495 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5496 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5497 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5498 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5499 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5500 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5501 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5502 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5503 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5504 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5505 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5506
5507
5508 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5509 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5510 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5511 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5512 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5513 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5514 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5515 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5516 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5517 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5518 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5519 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5520 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5521 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5522 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5523 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5524 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5525 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5526 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5527 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5528 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5529 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5530 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5531 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5532 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5533
5534 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5535 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5536 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5537 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5538 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5539 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5540 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5541 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5542 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5543 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5544 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5545
5546 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5547
5548 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5549 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5550 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5551 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5552 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5553 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5554 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5555 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5556 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5557 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5558 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5559 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5560 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5561 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5562 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5563 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5564 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5565 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5566 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5567
5568 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5569 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5570
5571 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5572 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5573
5574 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5575 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5576 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5577 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5578 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5579 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5580
5581 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5582 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5583 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5584 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5585 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5586
5587 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5588 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5589 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5590 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5591 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5592
5593 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5594
5595 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5596 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5597
5598 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5599 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5600 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5601
5602 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5603 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5604
5605 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5606 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5607 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5608 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5609 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5610 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5611 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5612 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5613 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5614 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5615 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5616 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5617 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5618 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5619 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5620 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5621 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5622 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5623 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5624 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5625 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5626 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5627 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5628 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5629 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5630
5631 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5632 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5633 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5634 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5635 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5636 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5637 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5638 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5639 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5640 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5641 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5642 #endif
5643
5644 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5645 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5646 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5647 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5648 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5649 #endif
5650
5651 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
5652 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5653 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5654 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5655 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5656 #endif
5657 };
5658
5659 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5660 {
5661 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5662 selinux_enabled = 0;
5663 return 0;
5664 }
5665
5666 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5667 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5668 return 0;
5669 }
5670
5671 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5672
5673 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5674 cred_init_security();
5675
5676 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5677 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5678 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5679 avc_init();
5680
5681 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5682 if (!secondary_ops)
5683 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5684 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5685 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5686
5687 if (selinux_enforcing)
5688 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5689 else
5690 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5691
5692 return 0;
5693 }
5694
5695 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5696 {
5697 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5698
5699 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5700 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5701 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5702 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5703 next_sb:
5704 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5705 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5706 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5707 struct superblock_security_struct,
5708 list);
5709 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5710 sb->s_count++;
5711 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5712 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5713 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5714 if (sb->s_root)
5715 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5716 drop_super(sb);
5717 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5718 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5719 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5720 goto next_sb;
5721 }
5722 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5723 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5724 }
5725
5726 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5727 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5728 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5729
5730 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5731
5732 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5733 {
5734 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5735 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5736 .pf = PF_INET,
5737 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5738 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5739 },
5740 {
5741 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5742 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5743 .pf = PF_INET,
5744 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5745 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5746 },
5747 {
5748 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5749 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5750 .pf = PF_INET,
5751 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5752 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5753 }
5754 };
5755
5756 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5757
5758 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5759 {
5760 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5761 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5762 .pf = PF_INET6,
5763 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5764 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5765 },
5766 {
5767 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5768 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5769 .pf = PF_INET6,
5770 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5771 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5772 }
5773 };
5774
5775 #endif /* IPV6 */
5776
5777 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5778 {
5779 int err = 0;
5780
5781 if (!selinux_enabled)
5782 goto out;
5783
5784 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5785
5786 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5787 if (err)
5788 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5789
5790 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5791 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5792 if (err)
5793 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5794 #endif /* IPV6 */
5795
5796 out:
5797 return err;
5798 }
5799
5800 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5801
5802 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5803 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5804 {
5805 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5806
5807 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5808 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5809 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5810 #endif /* IPV6 */
5811 }
5812 #endif
5813
5814 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5815
5816 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5817 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5818 #endif
5819
5820 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5821
5822 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5823 static int selinux_disabled;
5824
5825 int selinux_disable(void)
5826 {
5827 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5828
5829 if (ss_initialized) {
5830 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5831 return -EINVAL;
5832 }
5833
5834 if (selinux_disabled) {
5835 /* Only do this once. */
5836 return -EINVAL;
5837 }
5838
5839 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5840
5841 selinux_disabled = 1;
5842 selinux_enabled = 0;
5843
5844 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5845 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5846
5847 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5848 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5849
5850 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
5851 exit_sel_fs();
5852
5853 return 0;
5854 }
5855 #endif
Support for the Chinese Samsung S3C2440 based development boards