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ext4: Replace hackish ext4_mb_poll_new_transaction with commit callback
[linux-2.6/mini2440.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c
blob576e511990794eacfad7ad525722c4fa077ae852
1 /*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 *
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
24 */
25
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
35 #include <linux/mm.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
50 #include <net/icmp.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
70 #include <net/ipv6.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78
79 #include "avc.h"
80 #include "objsec.h"
81 #include "netif.h"
82 #include "netnode.h"
83 #include "netport.h"
84 #include "xfrm.h"
85 #include "netlabel.h"
86 #include "audit.h"
87
88 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
89 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
90
91 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
92
93 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
94 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
95 extern int selinux_compat_net;
96 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
97
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
103
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
105 {
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
109 return 1;
110 }
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
112 #endif
113
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
116
117 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
118 {
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
122 return 1;
123 }
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
125 #else
126 int selinux_enabled = 1;
127 #endif
128
129
130 /*
131 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
133 */
134 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
135
136 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
137 before the policy was loaded. */
138 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
139 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
140
141 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
142
143 /**
144 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
145 *
146 * Description:
147 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
148 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
149 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
150 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
151 *
152 */
153 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
154 {
155 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
156 }
157
158 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
159
160 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
161 {
162 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
163
164 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
165 if (!tsec)
166 return -ENOMEM;
167
168 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
169 task->security = tsec;
170
171 return 0;
172 }
173
174 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
175 {
176 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
177 task->security = NULL;
178 kfree(tsec);
179 }
180
181 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
182 {
183 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
184 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
185
186 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
187 if (!isec)
188 return -ENOMEM;
189
190 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
191 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
192 isec->inode = inode;
193 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
194 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
195 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
196 inode->i_security = isec;
197
198 return 0;
199 }
200
201 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
202 {
203 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
204 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
205
206 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
207 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
208 list_del_init(&isec->list);
209 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
210
211 inode->i_security = NULL;
212 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
213 }
214
215 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
216 {
217 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
218 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
219
220 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
221 if (!fsec)
222 return -ENOMEM;
223
224 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
225 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
226 file->f_security = fsec;
227
228 return 0;
229 }
230
231 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
232 {
233 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
234 file->f_security = NULL;
235 kfree(fsec);
236 }
237
238 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
239 {
240 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
241
242 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
243 if (!sbsec)
244 return -ENOMEM;
245
246 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
247 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
248 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
249 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
250 sbsec->sb = sb;
251 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
252 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
253 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
254 sb->s_security = sbsec;
255
256 return 0;
257 }
258
259 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
260 {
261 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
262
263 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
264 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
265 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
266 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
267
268 sb->s_security = NULL;
269 kfree(sbsec);
270 }
271
272 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
273 {
274 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
275
276 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
277 if (!ssec)
278 return -ENOMEM;
279
280 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
281 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sk->sk_security = ssec;
283
284 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
285
286 return 0;
287 }
288
289 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
290 {
291 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
292
293 sk->sk_security = NULL;
294 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
295 kfree(ssec);
296 }
297
298 /* The security server must be initialized before
299 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
300 extern int ss_initialized;
301
302 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
303
304 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
305 "uses xattr",
306 "uses transition SIDs",
307 "uses task SIDs",
308 "uses genfs_contexts",
309 "not configured for labeling",
310 "uses mountpoint labeling",
311 };
312
313 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
314
315 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
316 {
317 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
318 }
319
320 enum {
321 Opt_error = -1,
322 Opt_context = 1,
323 Opt_fscontext = 2,
324 Opt_defcontext = 3,
325 Opt_rootcontext = 4,
326 };
327
328 static const match_table_t tokens = {
329 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
330 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
331 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
332 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
333 {Opt_error, NULL},
334 };
335
336 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
337
338 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
339 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
340 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
341 {
342 int rc;
343
344 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
345 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
346 if (rc)
347 return rc;
348
349 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
350 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
351 return rc;
352 }
353
354 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
355 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
356 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
357 {
358 int rc;
359 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
360 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
361 if (rc)
362 return rc;
363
364 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
365 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
366 return rc;
367 }
368
369 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
370 {
371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
372 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
373 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
374 int rc = 0;
375
376 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
377 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
378 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
379 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
380 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
381 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
382 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
383 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
384 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
385 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
386 goto out;
387 }
388 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
389 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
390 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
391 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
392 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
393 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
394 else
395 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
396 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
397 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
398 goto out;
399 }
400 }
401
402 sbsec->initialized = 1;
403
404 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
405 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
406 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
407 else
408 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
409 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
410 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
411
412 /* Initialize the root inode. */
413 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
414
415 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
416 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
417 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
418 populates itself. */
419 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
420 next_inode:
421 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
422 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
423 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
424 struct inode_security_struct, list);
425 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
426 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
427 inode = igrab(inode);
428 if (inode) {
429 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
430 inode_doinit(inode);
431 iput(inode);
432 }
433 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
434 list_del_init(&isec->list);
435 goto next_inode;
436 }
437 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
438 out:
439 return rc;
440 }
441
442 /*
443 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
444 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
445 * mount options, or whatever.
446 */
447 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
448 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
449 {
450 int rc = 0, i;
451 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
452 char *context = NULL;
453 u32 len;
454 char tmp;
455
456 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
457
458 if (!sbsec->initialized)
459 return -EINVAL;
460
461 if (!ss_initialized)
462 return -EINVAL;
463
464 /*
465 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
466 * settings this is going to need a mask
467 */
468 tmp = sbsec->flags;
469 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
470 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
471 if (tmp & 0x01)
472 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
473 tmp >>= 1;
474 }
475
476 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
477 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
478 rc = -ENOMEM;
479 goto out_free;
480 }
481
482 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
483 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
484 rc = -ENOMEM;
485 goto out_free;
486 }
487
488 i = 0;
489 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
490 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
491 if (rc)
492 goto out_free;
493 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
494 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
495 }
496 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
497 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
498 if (rc)
499 goto out_free;
500 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
501 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
502 }
503 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
504 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
505 if (rc)
506 goto out_free;
507 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
508 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
509 }
510 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
511 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
512 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
513
514 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
515 if (rc)
516 goto out_free;
517 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
518 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
519 }
520
521 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
522
523 return 0;
524
525 out_free:
526 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
527 return rc;
528 }
529
530 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
531 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
532 {
533 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
534 if (sbsec->initialized)
535 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
536 (old_sid != new_sid))
537 return 1;
538
539 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
540 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
541 */
542 if (!sbsec->initialized)
543 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
544 return 1;
545 return 0;
546 }
547
548 /*
549 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
550 * labeling information.
551 */
552 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
553 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
554 {
555 int rc = 0, i;
556 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
557 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
558 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
559 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
560 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
561 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
562 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
563 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
564 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
565 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
566
567 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
568
569 if (!ss_initialized) {
570 if (!num_opts) {
571 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
572 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
573 server is ready to handle calls. */
574 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
575 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
576 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
577 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
578 goto out;
579 }
580 rc = -EINVAL;
581 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
582 "before the security server is initialized\n");
583 goto out;
584 }
585
586 /*
587 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
588 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
589 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
590 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
591 *
592 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
593 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
594 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
595 * will be used for both mounts)
596 */
597 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
598 && (num_opts == 0))
599 goto out;
600
601 /*
602 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
603 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
604 * than once with different security options.
605 */
606 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
607 u32 sid;
608 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
609 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
610 if (rc) {
611 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
612 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
613 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
614 goto out;
615 }
616 switch (flags[i]) {
617 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
618 fscontext_sid = sid;
619
620 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
621 fscontext_sid))
622 goto out_double_mount;
623
624 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
625 break;
626 case CONTEXT_MNT:
627 context_sid = sid;
628
629 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
630 context_sid))
631 goto out_double_mount;
632
633 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
634 break;
635 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
636 rootcontext_sid = sid;
637
638 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
639 rootcontext_sid))
640 goto out_double_mount;
641
642 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
643
644 break;
645 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
646 defcontext_sid = sid;
647
648 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
649 defcontext_sid))
650 goto out_double_mount;
651
652 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
653
654 break;
655 default:
656 rc = -EINVAL;
657 goto out;
658 }
659 }
660
661 if (sbsec->initialized) {
662 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
663 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
664 goto out_double_mount;
665 rc = 0;
666 goto out;
667 }
668
669 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
670 sbsec->proc = 1;
671
672 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
673 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
674 if (rc) {
675 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
676 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
677 goto out;
678 }
679
680 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
681 if (fscontext_sid) {
682
683 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
684 if (rc)
685 goto out;
686
687 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
688 }
689
690 /*
691 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
692 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
693 * the superblock context if not already set.
694 */
695 if (context_sid) {
696 if (!fscontext_sid) {
697 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
698 if (rc)
699 goto out;
700 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
701 } else {
702 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
703 if (rc)
704 goto out;
705 }
706 if (!rootcontext_sid)
707 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
708
709 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
711 }
712
713 if (rootcontext_sid) {
714 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
715 if (rc)
716 goto out;
717
718 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
719 root_isec->initialized = 1;
720 }
721
722 if (defcontext_sid) {
723 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
724 rc = -EINVAL;
725 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
726 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
727 goto out;
728 }
729
730 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
731 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
732 sbsec, tsec);
733 if (rc)
734 goto out;
735 }
736
737 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
738 }
739
740 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
741 out:
742 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
743 return rc;
744 out_double_mount:
745 rc = -EINVAL;
746 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
747 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
748 goto out;
749 }
750
751 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
752 struct super_block *newsb)
753 {
754 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
755 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
756
757 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
758 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
759 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
760
761 /*
762 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
763 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
764 * with it later
765 */
766 if (!ss_initialized) {
767 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
768 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
769 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
770 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
771 return;
772 }
773
774 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
775 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
776
777 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
778 if (newsbsec->initialized)
779 return;
780
781 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
782
783 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
784
785 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
786 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
787 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
788
789 if (set_context) {
790 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
791
792 if (!set_fscontext)
793 newsbsec->sid = sid;
794 if (!set_rootcontext) {
795 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
796 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
797 newisec->sid = sid;
798 }
799 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
800 }
801 if (set_rootcontext) {
802 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
803 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
804 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
805 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
806
807 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
808 }
809
810 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
811 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
812 }
813
814 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
815 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
816 {
817 char *p;
818 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
819 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
820 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
821
822 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
823
824 /* Standard string-based options. */
825 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
826 int token;
827 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
828
829 if (!*p)
830 continue;
831
832 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
833
834 switch (token) {
835 case Opt_context:
836 if (context || defcontext) {
837 rc = -EINVAL;
838 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
839 goto out_err;
840 }
841 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
842 if (!context) {
843 rc = -ENOMEM;
844 goto out_err;
845 }
846 break;
847
848 case Opt_fscontext:
849 if (fscontext) {
850 rc = -EINVAL;
851 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
852 goto out_err;
853 }
854 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
855 if (!fscontext) {
856 rc = -ENOMEM;
857 goto out_err;
858 }
859 break;
860
861 case Opt_rootcontext:
862 if (rootcontext) {
863 rc = -EINVAL;
864 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
865 goto out_err;
866 }
867 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
868 if (!rootcontext) {
869 rc = -ENOMEM;
870 goto out_err;
871 }
872 break;
873
874 case Opt_defcontext:
875 if (context || defcontext) {
876 rc = -EINVAL;
877 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
878 goto out_err;
879 }
880 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
881 if (!defcontext) {
882 rc = -ENOMEM;
883 goto out_err;
884 }
885 break;
886
887 default:
888 rc = -EINVAL;
889 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
890 goto out_err;
891
892 }
893 }
894
895 rc = -ENOMEM;
896 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
897 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
898 goto out_err;
899
900 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
901 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
902 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
903 goto out_err;
904 }
905
906 if (fscontext) {
907 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
908 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
909 }
910 if (context) {
911 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
912 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
913 }
914 if (rootcontext) {
915 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
916 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
917 }
918 if (defcontext) {
919 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
920 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
921 }
922
923 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
924 return 0;
925
926 out_err:
927 kfree(context);
928 kfree(defcontext);
929 kfree(fscontext);
930 kfree(rootcontext);
931 return rc;
932 }
933 /*
934 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
935 */
936 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
937 {
938 int rc = 0;
939 char *options = data;
940 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
941
942 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
943
944 if (!data)
945 goto out;
946
947 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
948
949 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
950 if (rc)
951 goto out_err;
952
953 out:
954 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
955
956 out_err:
957 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
958 return rc;
959 }
960
961 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
962 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
963 {
964 int i;
965 char *prefix;
966
967 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
968 char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
969
970 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
971 case CONTEXT_MNT:
972 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
973 break;
974 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
975 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
976 break;
977 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
978 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
979 break;
980 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
981 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
982 break;
983 default:
984 BUG();
985 };
986 /* we need a comma before each option */
987 seq_putc(m, ',');
988 seq_puts(m, prefix);
989 if (has_comma)
990 seq_putc(m, '\"');
991 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
992 if (has_comma)
993 seq_putc(m, '\"');
994 }
995 }
996
997 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
998 {
999 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1000 int rc;
1001
1002 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1003 if (rc) {
1004 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1005 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1006 rc = 0;
1007 return rc;
1008 }
1009
1010 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1011
1012 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1013
1014 return rc;
1015 }
1016
1017 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1018 {
1019 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1020 case S_IFSOCK:
1021 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1022 case S_IFLNK:
1023 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1024 case S_IFREG:
1025 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1026 case S_IFBLK:
1027 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1028 case S_IFDIR:
1029 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1030 case S_IFCHR:
1031 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1032 case S_IFIFO:
1033 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1034
1035 }
1036
1037 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1038 }
1039
1040 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1041 {
1042 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1043 }
1044
1045 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1046 {
1047 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1048 }
1049
1050 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1051 {
1052 switch (family) {
1053 case PF_UNIX:
1054 switch (type) {
1055 case SOCK_STREAM:
1056 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1057 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1058 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1059 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1060 }
1061 break;
1062 case PF_INET:
1063 case PF_INET6:
1064 switch (type) {
1065 case SOCK_STREAM:
1066 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1067 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1068 else
1069 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1070 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1071 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1072 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1073 else
1074 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1075 case SOCK_DCCP:
1076 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1077 default:
1078 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1079 }
1080 break;
1081 case PF_NETLINK:
1082 switch (protocol) {
1083 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1084 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1085 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1086 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1087 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1088 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1089 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1090 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1091 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1092 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1093 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1094 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1095 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1096 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1097 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1098 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1099 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1100 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1101 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1102 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1103 default:
1104 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1105 }
1106 case PF_PACKET:
1107 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1108 case PF_KEY:
1109 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1110 case PF_APPLETALK:
1111 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1112 }
1113
1114 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1115 }
1116
1117 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1118 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1119 u16 tclass,
1120 u32 *sid)
1121 {
1122 int buflen, rc;
1123 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1124
1125 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1126 if (!buffer)
1127 return -ENOMEM;
1128
1129 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1130 end = buffer+buflen;
1131 *--end = '\0';
1132 buflen--;
1133 path = end-1;
1134 *path = '/';
1135 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1136 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1137 if (buflen < 0)
1138 break;
1139 end -= de->namelen;
1140 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1141 *--end = '/';
1142 path = end;
1143 de = de->parent;
1144 }
1145 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1146 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1147 return rc;
1148 }
1149 #else
1150 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1151 u16 tclass,
1152 u32 *sid)
1153 {
1154 return -EINVAL;
1155 }
1156 #endif
1157
1158 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1159 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1160 {
1161 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1162 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1163 u32 sid;
1164 struct dentry *dentry;
1165 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1166 char *context = NULL;
1167 unsigned len = 0;
1168 int rc = 0;
1169
1170 if (isec->initialized)
1171 goto out;
1172
1173 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1174 if (isec->initialized)
1175 goto out_unlock;
1176
1177 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1178 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1179 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1180 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1181 server is ready to handle calls. */
1182 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1183 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1184 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1185 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1186 goto out_unlock;
1187 }
1188
1189 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1190 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1191 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1192 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1193 break;
1194 }
1195
1196 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1197 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1198 if (opt_dentry) {
1199 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1200 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1201 } else {
1202 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1203 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1204 }
1205 if (!dentry) {
1206 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1207 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1208 inode->i_ino);
1209 goto out_unlock;
1210 }
1211
1212 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1213 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1214 if (!context) {
1215 rc = -ENOMEM;
1216 dput(dentry);
1217 goto out_unlock;
1218 }
1219 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1220 context, len);
1221 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1222 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1223 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1224 NULL, 0);
1225 if (rc < 0) {
1226 dput(dentry);
1227 goto out_unlock;
1228 }
1229 kfree(context);
1230 len = rc;
1231 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1232 if (!context) {
1233 rc = -ENOMEM;
1234 dput(dentry);
1235 goto out_unlock;
1236 }
1237 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1238 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1239 context, len);
1240 }
1241 dput(dentry);
1242 if (rc < 0) {
1243 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1244 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1245 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1246 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1247 kfree(context);
1248 goto out_unlock;
1249 }
1250 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1251 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1252 rc = 0;
1253 } else {
1254 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1255 sbsec->def_sid,
1256 GFP_NOFS);
1257 if (rc) {
1258 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1259 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1260 __func__, context, -rc,
1261 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1262 kfree(context);
1263 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1264 rc = 0;
1265 break;
1266 }
1267 }
1268 kfree(context);
1269 isec->sid = sid;
1270 break;
1271 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1272 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1273 break;
1274 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1275 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1276 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1277
1278 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1279 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1280 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1281 sbsec->sid,
1282 isec->sclass,
1283 &sid);
1284 if (rc)
1285 goto out_unlock;
1286 isec->sid = sid;
1287 break;
1288 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1289 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1290 break;
1291 default:
1292 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1293 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1294
1295 if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1296 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1297 if (proci->pde) {
1298 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1299 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1300 isec->sclass,
1301 &sid);
1302 if (rc)
1303 goto out_unlock;
1304 isec->sid = sid;
1305 }
1306 }
1307 break;
1308 }
1309
1310 isec->initialized = 1;
1311
1312 out_unlock:
1313 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1314 out:
1315 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1316 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1317 return rc;
1318 }
1319
1320 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1321 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1322 {
1323 u32 perm = 0;
1324
1325 switch (sig) {
1326 case SIGCHLD:
1327 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1328 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1329 break;
1330 case SIGKILL:
1331 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1332 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1333 break;
1334 case SIGSTOP:
1335 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1336 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1337 break;
1338 default:
1339 /* All other signals. */
1340 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1341 break;
1342 }
1343
1344 return perm;
1345 }
1346
1347 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1348 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1349 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1350 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1351 u32 perms)
1352 {
1353 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1354
1355 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1356 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1357 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1358 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1359 }
1360
1361 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1362 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1363 #endif
1364
1365 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1366 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1367 int cap)
1368 {
1369 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1370 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1371 u16 sclass;
1372 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1373
1374 tsec = tsk->security;
1375
1376 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1377 ad.tsk = tsk;
1378 ad.u.cap = cap;
1379
1380 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1381 case 0:
1382 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1383 break;
1384 case 1:
1385 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1386 break;
1387 default:
1388 printk(KERN_ERR
1389 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1390 BUG();
1391 }
1392 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
1393 }
1394
1395 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1396 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1397 u32 perms)
1398 {
1399 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1400
1401 tsec = tsk->security;
1402
1403 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1404 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1405 }
1406
1407 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1408 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1409 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1410 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1411 struct inode *inode,
1412 u32 perms,
1413 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1414 {
1415 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1416 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1417 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1418
1419 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1420 return 0;
1421
1422 tsec = tsk->security;
1423 isec = inode->i_security;
1424
1425 if (!adp) {
1426 adp = &ad;
1427 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1428 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1429 }
1430
1431 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1432 }
1433
1434 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1435 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1436 pathname if needed. */
1437 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1438 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1439 struct dentry *dentry,
1440 u32 av)
1441 {
1442 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1443 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1444 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1445 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1446 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1447 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1448 }
1449
1450 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1451 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1452 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1453 check a particular permission to the file.
1454 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1455 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1456 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1457 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1458 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1459 struct file *file,
1460 u32 av)
1461 {
1462 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1463 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1464 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1465 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1466 int rc;
1467
1468 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1469 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1470
1471 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1472 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1473 SECCLASS_FD,
1474 FD__USE,
1475 &ad);
1476 if (rc)
1477 return rc;
1478 }
1479
1480 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1481 if (av)
1482 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1483
1484 return 0;
1485 }
1486
1487 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1488 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1489 struct dentry *dentry,
1490 u16 tclass)
1491 {
1492 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1493 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1494 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1495 u32 newsid;
1496 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1497 int rc;
1498
1499 tsec = current->security;
1500 dsec = dir->i_security;
1501 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1502
1503 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1504 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1505
1506 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1507 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1508 &ad);
1509 if (rc)
1510 return rc;
1511
1512 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1513 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1514 } else {
1515 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1516 &newsid);
1517 if (rc)
1518 return rc;
1519 }
1520
1521 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1522 if (rc)
1523 return rc;
1524
1525 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1526 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1527 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1528 }
1529
1530 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1531 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1532 struct task_struct *ctx)
1533 {
1534 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1535
1536 tsec = ctx->security;
1537
1538 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1539 }
1540
1541 #define MAY_LINK 0
1542 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1543 #define MAY_RMDIR 2
1544
1545 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1546 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1547 struct dentry *dentry,
1548 int kind)
1549
1550 {
1551 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1552 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1553 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1554 u32 av;
1555 int rc;
1556
1557 tsec = current->security;
1558 dsec = dir->i_security;
1559 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1560
1561 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1562 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1563
1564 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1565 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1566 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1567 if (rc)
1568 return rc;
1569
1570 switch (kind) {
1571 case MAY_LINK:
1572 av = FILE__LINK;
1573 break;
1574 case MAY_UNLINK:
1575 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1576 break;
1577 case MAY_RMDIR:
1578 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1579 break;
1580 default:
1581 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1582 __func__, kind);
1583 return 0;
1584 }
1585
1586 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1587 return rc;
1588 }
1589
1590 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1591 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1592 struct inode *new_dir,
1593 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1594 {
1595 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1596 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1597 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1598 u32 av;
1599 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1600 int rc;
1601
1602 tsec = current->security;
1603 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1604 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1605 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1606 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1607
1608 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1609
1610 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1611 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1612 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1613 if (rc)
1614 return rc;
1615 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1616 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1617 if (rc)
1618 return rc;
1619 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1620 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1621 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1622 if (rc)
1623 return rc;
1624 }
1625
1626 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1627 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1628 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1629 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1630 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1631 if (rc)
1632 return rc;
1633 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1634 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1635 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1636 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1637 new_isec->sclass,
1638 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1639 if (rc)
1640 return rc;
1641 }
1642
1643 return 0;
1644 }
1645
1646 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1647 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1648 struct super_block *sb,
1649 u32 perms,
1650 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1651 {
1652 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1653 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1654
1655 tsec = tsk->security;
1656 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1657 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1658 perms, ad);
1659 }
1660
1661 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1662 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1663 {
1664 u32 av = 0;
1665
1666 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1667 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1668 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1669 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1670 av |= FILE__READ;
1671
1672 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1673 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1674 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1675 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1676
1677 } else {
1678 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1679 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1680 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1681 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1682 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1683 av |= DIR__READ;
1684 }
1685
1686 return av;
1687 }
1688
1689 /*
1690 * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
1691 * open permission.
1692 */
1693 static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1694 {
1695 u32 av = file_mask_to_av(mode, mask);
1696
1697 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1698 /*
1699 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1700 */
1701 if (S_ISREG(mode))
1702 av |= FILE__OPEN;
1703 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1704 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1705 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1706 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1707 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1708 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1709 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1710 av |= DIR__OPEN;
1711 else
1712 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1713 "unknown mode:%x\n", __func__, mode);
1714 }
1715 return av;
1716 }
1717
1718 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1719 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1720 {
1721 u32 av = 0;
1722
1723 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1724 av |= FILE__READ;
1725 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1726 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1727 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1728 else
1729 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1730 }
1731 if (!av) {
1732 /*
1733 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1734 */
1735 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1736 }
1737
1738 return av;
1739 }
1740
1741 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1742
1743 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1744 unsigned int mode)
1745 {
1746 int rc;
1747
1748 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1749 if (rc)
1750 return rc;
1751
1752 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1753 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1754 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1755 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
1756 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1757 }
1758
1759 return task_has_perm(current, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1760 }
1761
1762 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1763 {
1764 int rc;
1765
1766 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1767 if (rc)
1768 return rc;
1769
1770 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1771 }
1772
1773 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1774 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1775 {
1776 int error;
1777
1778 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1779 if (error)
1780 return error;
1781
1782 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1783 }
1784
1785 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1786 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1787 {
1788 int error;
1789
1790 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1791 if (error)
1792 return error;
1793
1794 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1795 }
1796
1797 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1798 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1799 {
1800 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1801 }
1802
1803 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1804 {
1805 int rc;
1806
1807 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1808 if (rc)
1809 return rc;
1810
1811 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
1812 }
1813
1814 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1815 {
1816 int buflen, rc;
1817 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1818
1819 rc = -ENOMEM;
1820 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1821 if (!buffer)
1822 goto out;
1823
1824 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1825 end = buffer+buflen;
1826 *--end = '\0';
1827 buflen--;
1828 path = end-1;
1829 *path = '/';
1830 while (table) {
1831 const char *name = table->procname;
1832 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1833 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1834 if (buflen < 0)
1835 goto out_free;
1836 end -= namelen;
1837 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1838 *--end = '/';
1839 path = end;
1840 table = table->parent;
1841 }
1842 buflen -= 4;
1843 if (buflen < 0)
1844 goto out_free;
1845 end -= 4;
1846 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1847 path = end;
1848 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1849 out_free:
1850 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1851 out:
1852 return rc;
1853 }
1854
1855 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1856 {
1857 int error = 0;
1858 u32 av;
1859 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1860 u32 tsid;
1861 int rc;
1862
1863 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1864 if (rc)
1865 return rc;
1866
1867 tsec = current->security;
1868
1869 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1870 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1871 if (rc) {
1872 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1873 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1874 }
1875
1876 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1877 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1878 if (op == 001) {
1879 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1880 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1881 } else {
1882 av = 0;
1883 if (op & 004)
1884 av |= FILE__READ;
1885 if (op & 002)
1886 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1887 if (av)
1888 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1889 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1890 }
1891
1892 return error;
1893 }
1894
1895 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1896 {
1897 int rc = 0;
1898
1899 if (!sb)
1900 return 0;
1901
1902 switch (cmds) {
1903 case Q_SYNC:
1904 case Q_QUOTAON:
1905 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1906 case Q_SETINFO:
1907 case Q_SETQUOTA:
1908 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1909 NULL);
1910 break;
1911 case Q_GETFMT:
1912 case Q_GETINFO:
1913 case Q_GETQUOTA:
1914 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1915 NULL);
1916 break;
1917 default:
1918 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1919 break;
1920 }
1921 return rc;
1922 }
1923
1924 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1925 {
1926 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1927 }
1928
1929 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1930 {
1931 int rc;
1932
1933 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1934 if (rc)
1935 return rc;
1936
1937 switch (type) {
1938 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1939 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1940 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1941 break;
1942 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1943 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1944 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1945 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1946 break;
1947 case 0: /* Close log */
1948 case 1: /* Open log */
1949 case 2: /* Read from log */
1950 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1951 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1952 default:
1953 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1954 break;
1955 }
1956 return rc;
1957 }
1958
1959 /*
1960 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1961 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1962 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1963 *
1964 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1965 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1966 * the capability is granted.
1967 *
1968 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1969 * processes that allocate mappings.
1970 */
1971 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1972 {
1973 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1974 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1975
1976 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1977 if (rc == 0)
1978 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1979 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1980 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1981 0,
1982 NULL);
1983
1984 if (rc == 0)
1985 cap_sys_admin = 1;
1986
1987 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1988 }
1989
1990 /* binprm security operations */
1991
1992 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1993 {
1994 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1995
1996 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1997 if (!bsec)
1998 return -ENOMEM;
1999
2000 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2001 bsec->set = 0;
2002
2003 bprm->security = bsec;
2004 return 0;
2005 }
2006
2007 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2008 {
2009 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2010 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2011 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2012 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2013 u32 newsid;
2014 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2015 int rc;
2016
2017 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
2018 if (rc)
2019 return rc;
2020
2021 bsec = bprm->security;
2022
2023 if (bsec->set)
2024 return 0;
2025
2026 tsec = current->security;
2027 isec = inode->i_security;
2028
2029 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2030 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
2031
2032 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2033 tsec->create_sid = 0;
2034 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2035 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2036
2037 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
2038 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
2039 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2040 tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2041 } else {
2042 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2043 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2044 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
2045 if (rc)
2046 return rc;
2047 }
2048
2049 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2050 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2051
2052 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2053 newsid = tsec->sid;
2054
2055 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
2056 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2057 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2058 if (rc)
2059 return rc;
2060 } else {
2061 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2062 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2063 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2064 if (rc)
2065 return rc;
2066
2067 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2068 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2069 if (rc)
2070 return rc;
2071
2072 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2073 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2074
2075 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2076 bsec->sid = newsid;
2077 }
2078
2079 bsec->set = 1;
2080 return 0;
2081 }
2082
2083 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2084 {
2085 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2086 }
2087
2088
2089 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2090 {
2091 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2092 int atsecure = 0;
2093
2094 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2095 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2096 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2097 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2098 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2099 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2100 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2101 }
2102
2103 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2104 }
2105
2106 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2107 {
2108 kfree(bprm->security);
2109 bprm->security = NULL;
2110 }
2111
2112 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2113 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2114
2115 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2116 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2117 {
2118 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2119 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2120 struct tty_struct *tty;
2121 struct fdtable *fdt;
2122 long j = -1;
2123 int drop_tty = 0;
2124
2125 tty = get_current_tty();
2126 if (tty) {
2127 file_list_lock();
2128 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
2129 if (file) {
2130 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2131 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2132 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2133 file may belong to another process and we are only
2134 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2135 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2136 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2137 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2138 drop_tty = 1;
2139 }
2140 }
2141 file_list_unlock();
2142 tty_kref_put(tty);
2143 }
2144 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2145 if (drop_tty)
2146 no_tty();
2147
2148 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2149
2150 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2151
2152 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2153 for (;;) {
2154 unsigned long set, i;
2155 int fd;
2156
2157 j++;
2158 i = j * __NFDBITS;
2159 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2160 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2161 break;
2162 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2163 if (!set)
2164 continue;
2165 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2166 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2167 if (set & 1) {
2168 file = fget(i);
2169 if (!file)
2170 continue;
2171 if (file_has_perm(current,
2172 file,
2173 file_to_av(file))) {
2174 sys_close(i);
2175 fd = get_unused_fd();
2176 if (fd != i) {
2177 if (fd >= 0)
2178 put_unused_fd(fd);
2179 fput(file);
2180 continue;
2181 }
2182 if (devnull) {
2183 get_file(devnull);
2184 } else {
2185 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2186 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2187 devnull = NULL;
2188 put_unused_fd(fd);
2189 fput(file);
2190 continue;
2191 }
2192 }
2193 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2194 }
2195 fput(file);
2196 }
2197 }
2198 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2199
2200 }
2201 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2202 }
2203
2204 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2205 {
2206 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2207 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2208 u32 sid;
2209 int rc;
2210
2211 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2212
2213 tsec = current->security;
2214
2215 bsec = bprm->security;
2216 sid = bsec->sid;
2217
2218 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2219 bsec->unsafe = 0;
2220 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2221 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2222 unchanged and kill. */
2223 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2224 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2225 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2226 if (rc) {
2227 bsec->unsafe = 1;
2228 return;
2229 }
2230 }
2231
2232 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2233 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2234 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2235 struct task_struct *tracer;
2236 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2237 u32 ptsid = 0;
2238
2239 rcu_read_lock();
2240 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2241 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2242 sec = tracer->security;
2243 ptsid = sec->sid;
2244 }
2245 rcu_read_unlock();
2246
2247 if (ptsid != 0) {
2248 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2249 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2250 if (rc) {
2251 bsec->unsafe = 1;
2252 return;
2253 }
2254 }
2255 }
2256 tsec->sid = sid;
2257 }
2258 }
2259
2260 /*
2261 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2262 */
2263 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2264 {
2265 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2266 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2267 struct itimerval itimer;
2268 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2269 int rc, i;
2270
2271 tsec = current->security;
2272 bsec = bprm->security;
2273
2274 if (bsec->unsafe) {
2275 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2276 return;
2277 }
2278 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2279 return;
2280
2281 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2282 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2283
2284 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2285 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2286 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2287 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2288 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2289 will be checked against the new SID. */
2290 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2291 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2292 if (rc) {
2293 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2294 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2295 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2296 flush_signals(current);
2297 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2298 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2299 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2300 recalc_sigpending();
2301 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2302 }
2303
2304 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2305 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2306
2307 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2308 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2309 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2310 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2311 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2312 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2313 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2314 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2315 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2316 RLIMIT_STACK.*/
2317 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2318 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2319 if (rc) {
2320 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2321 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2322 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2323 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2324 }
2325 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
2326 /*
2327 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
2328 * to be refigured.
2329 */
2330 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
2331 }
2332 }
2333
2334 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2335 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2336 wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2337 }
2338
2339 /* superblock security operations */
2340
2341 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2342 {
2343 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2344 }
2345
2346 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2347 {
2348 superblock_free_security(sb);
2349 }
2350
2351 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2352 {
2353 if (plen > olen)
2354 return 0;
2355
2356 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2357 }
2358
2359 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2360 {
2361 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2362 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2363 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2364 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2365 }
2366
2367 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2368 {
2369 if (!*first) {
2370 **to = ',';
2371 *to += 1;
2372 } else
2373 *first = 0;
2374 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2375 *to += len;
2376 }
2377
2378 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2379 int len)
2380 {
2381 int current_size = 0;
2382
2383 if (!*first) {
2384 **to = '|';
2385 *to += 1;
2386 } else
2387 *first = 0;
2388
2389 while (current_size < len) {
2390 if (*from != '"') {
2391 **to = *from;
2392 *to += 1;
2393 }
2394 from += 1;
2395 current_size += 1;
2396 }
2397 }
2398
2399 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2400 {
2401 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2402 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2403 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2404 int open_quote = 0;
2405
2406 in_curr = orig;
2407 sec_curr = copy;
2408
2409 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2410 if (!nosec) {
2411 rc = -ENOMEM;
2412 goto out;
2413 }
2414
2415 nosec_save = nosec;
2416 fnosec = fsec = 1;
2417 in_save = in_end = orig;
2418
2419 do {
2420 if (*in_end == '"')
2421 open_quote = !open_quote;
2422 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2423 *in_end == '\0') {
2424 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2425
2426 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2427 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2428 else
2429 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2430
2431 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2432 }
2433 } while (*in_end++);
2434
2435 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2436 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2437 out:
2438 return rc;
2439 }
2440
2441 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2442 {
2443 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2444 int rc;
2445
2446 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2447 if (rc)
2448 return rc;
2449
2450 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2451 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2452 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2453 }
2454
2455 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2456 {
2457 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2458
2459 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2460 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2461 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2462 }
2463
2464 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2465 struct path *path,
2466 char *type,
2467 unsigned long flags,
2468 void *data)
2469 {
2470 int rc;
2471
2472 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2473 if (rc)
2474 return rc;
2475
2476 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2477 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2478 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2479 else
2480 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2481 FILE__MOUNTON);
2482 }
2483
2484 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2485 {
2486 int rc;
2487
2488 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2489 if (rc)
2490 return rc;
2491
2492 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2493 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2494 }
2495
2496 /* inode security operations */
2497
2498 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2499 {
2500 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2501 }
2502
2503 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2504 {
2505 inode_free_security(inode);
2506 }
2507
2508 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2509 char **name, void **value,
2510 size_t *len)
2511 {
2512 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2513 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2514 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2515 u32 newsid, clen;
2516 int rc;
2517 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2518
2519 tsec = current->security;
2520 dsec = dir->i_security;
2521 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2522
2523 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2524 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2525 } else {
2526 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2527 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2528 &newsid);
2529 if (rc) {
2530 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2531 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2532 "ino=%ld)\n",
2533 __func__,
2534 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2535 return rc;
2536 }
2537 }
2538
2539 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2540 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2541 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2542 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2543 isec->sid = newsid;
2544 isec->initialized = 1;
2545 }
2546
2547 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2548 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2549
2550 if (name) {
2551 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2552 if (!namep)
2553 return -ENOMEM;
2554 *name = namep;
2555 }
2556
2557 if (value && len) {
2558 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2559 if (rc) {
2560 kfree(namep);
2561 return rc;
2562 }
2563 *value = context;
2564 *len = clen;
2565 }
2566
2567 return 0;
2568 }
2569
2570 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2571 {
2572 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2573 }
2574
2575 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2576 {
2577 int rc;
2578
2579 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2580 if (rc)
2581 return rc;
2582 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2583 }
2584
2585 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2586 {
2587 int rc;
2588
2589 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2590 if (rc)
2591 return rc;
2592 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2593 }
2594
2595 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2596 {
2597 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2598 }
2599
2600 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2601 {
2602 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2603 }
2604
2605 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2606 {
2607 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2608 }
2609
2610 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2611 {
2612 int rc;
2613
2614 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2615 if (rc)
2616 return rc;
2617
2618 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2619 }
2620
2621 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2622 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2623 {
2624 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2625 }
2626
2627 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2628 {
2629 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2630 }
2631
2632 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2633 {
2634 int rc;
2635
2636 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2637 if (rc)
2638 return rc;
2639 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2640 }
2641
2642 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2643 {
2644 int rc;
2645
2646 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2647 if (rc)
2648 return rc;
2649
2650 if (!mask) {
2651 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2652 return 0;
2653 }
2654
2655 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2656 open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2657 }
2658
2659 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2660 {
2661 int rc;
2662
2663 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2664 if (rc)
2665 return rc;
2666
2667 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2668 return 0;
2669
2670 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2671 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2672 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2673
2674 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2675 }
2676
2677 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2678 {
2679 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2680 }
2681
2682 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2683 {
2684 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2685 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2686 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2687 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2688 return -EPERM;
2689 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2690 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2691 Restrict to administrator. */
2692 return -EPERM;
2693 }
2694 }
2695
2696 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2697 ordinary setattr permission. */
2698 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2699 }
2700
2701 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2702 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2703 {
2704 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2705 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2706 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2707 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2708 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2709 u32 newsid;
2710 int rc = 0;
2711
2712 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2713 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2714
2715 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2716 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2717 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2718
2719 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2720 return -EPERM;
2721
2722 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2723 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2724
2725 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2726 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2727 if (rc)
2728 return rc;
2729
2730 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2731 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2732 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2733 return rc;
2734 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2735 }
2736 if (rc)
2737 return rc;
2738
2739 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2740 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2741 if (rc)
2742 return rc;
2743
2744 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2745 isec->sclass);
2746 if (rc)
2747 return rc;
2748
2749 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2750 sbsec->sid,
2751 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2752 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2753 &ad);
2754 }
2755
2756 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2757 const void *value, size_t size,
2758 int flags)
2759 {
2760 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2761 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2762 u32 newsid;
2763 int rc;
2764
2765 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2766 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2767 return;
2768 }
2769
2770 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2771 if (rc) {
2772 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2773 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2774 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2775 return;
2776 }
2777
2778 isec->sid = newsid;
2779 return;
2780 }
2781
2782 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2783 {
2784 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2785 }
2786
2787 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2788 {
2789 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2790 }
2791
2792 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2793 {
2794 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2795 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2796
2797 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2798 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2799 return -EACCES;
2800 }
2801
2802 /*
2803 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2804 *
2805 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2806 */
2807 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2808 {
2809 u32 size;
2810 int error;
2811 char *context = NULL;
2812 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2813 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2814
2815 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2816 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2817
2818 /*
2819 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2820 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2821 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2822 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2823 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2824 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2825 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2826 */
2827 error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN);
2828 if (!error)
2829 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2830 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
2831 CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
2832 0,
2833 NULL);
2834 if (!error)
2835 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2836 &size);
2837 else
2838 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2839 if (error)
2840 return error;
2841 error = size;
2842 if (alloc) {
2843 *buffer = context;
2844 goto out_nofree;
2845 }
2846 kfree(context);
2847 out_nofree:
2848 return error;
2849 }
2850
2851 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2852 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2853 {
2854 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2855 u32 newsid;
2856 int rc;
2857
2858 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2859 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2860
2861 if (!value || !size)
2862 return -EACCES;
2863
2864 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2865 if (rc)
2866 return rc;
2867
2868 isec->sid = newsid;
2869 return 0;
2870 }
2871
2872 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2873 {
2874 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2875 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2876 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2877 return len;
2878 }
2879
2880 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2881 {
2882 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2883 }
2884
2885 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2886 {
2887 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2888 }
2889
2890 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2891 {
2892 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2893 *secid = isec->sid;
2894 }
2895
2896 /* file security operations */
2897
2898 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2899 {
2900 int rc;
2901 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2902
2903 if (!mask) {
2904 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2905 return 0;
2906 }
2907
2908 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2909 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2910 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2911
2912 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2913 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2914 if (rc)
2915 return rc;
2916
2917 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2918 }
2919
2920 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2921 {
2922 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2923 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2924 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2925 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2926
2927 if (!mask) {
2928 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2929 return 0;
2930 }
2931
2932 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2933 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2934 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2935
2936 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2937 }
2938
2939 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2940 {
2941 return file_alloc_security(file);
2942 }
2943
2944 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2945 {
2946 file_free_security(file);
2947 }
2948
2949 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2950 unsigned long arg)
2951 {
2952 u32 av = 0;
2953
2954 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2955 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2956 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2957 av |= FILE__READ;
2958 if (!av)
2959 av = FILE__IOCTL;
2960
2961 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2962 }
2963
2964 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2965 {
2966 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2967 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2968 /*
2969 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2970 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2971 * This has an additional check.
2972 */
2973 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2974 if (rc)
2975 return rc;
2976 }
2977 #endif
2978
2979 if (file) {
2980 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2981 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2982
2983 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2984 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2985 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2986
2987 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2988 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2989
2990 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2991 }
2992 return 0;
2993 }
2994
2995 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2996 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2997 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2998 {
2999 int rc = 0;
3000 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
3001
3002 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3003 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3004 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3005 if (rc || addr_only)
3006 return rc;
3007
3008 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3009 prot = reqprot;
3010
3011 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3012 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3013 }
3014
3015 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3016 unsigned long reqprot,
3017 unsigned long prot)
3018 {
3019 int rc;
3020
3021 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3022 if (rc)
3023 return rc;
3024
3025 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3026 prot = reqprot;
3027
3028 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3029 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3030 rc = 0;
3031 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3032 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3033 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
3034 PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3035 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3036 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3037 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3038 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3039 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3040 /*
3041 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3042 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3043 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3044 * modified content. This typically should only
3045 * occur for text relocations.
3046 */
3047 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
3048 FILE__EXECMOD);
3049 }
3050 if (rc)
3051 return rc;
3052 }
3053 #endif
3054
3055 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3056 }
3057
3058 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3059 {
3060 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3061 }
3062
3063 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3064 unsigned long arg)
3065 {
3066 int err = 0;
3067
3068 switch (cmd) {
3069 case F_SETFL:
3070 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3071 err = -EINVAL;
3072 break;
3073 }
3074
3075 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3076 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3077 break;
3078 }
3079 /* fall through */
3080 case F_SETOWN:
3081 case F_SETSIG:
3082 case F_GETFL:
3083 case F_GETOWN:
3084 case F_GETSIG:
3085 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3086 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3087 break;
3088 case F_GETLK:
3089 case F_SETLK:
3090 case F_SETLKW:
3091 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3092 case F_GETLK64:
3093 case F_SETLK64:
3094 case F_SETLKW64:
3095 #endif
3096 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3097 err = -EINVAL;
3098 break;
3099 }
3100 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3101 break;
3102 }
3103
3104 return err;
3105 }
3106
3107 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3108 {
3109 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3110 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3111
3112 tsec = current->security;
3113 fsec = file->f_security;
3114 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
3115
3116 return 0;
3117 }
3118
3119 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3120 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3121 {
3122 struct file *file;
3123 u32 perm;
3124 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3125 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3126
3127 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3128 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3129
3130 tsec = tsk->security;
3131 fsec = file->f_security;
3132
3133 if (!signum)
3134 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3135 else
3136 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3137
3138 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
3139 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3140 }
3141
3142 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3143 {
3144 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3145 }
3146
3147 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3148 {
3149 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3150 struct inode *inode;
3151 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3152 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3153 fsec = file->f_security;
3154 isec = inode->i_security;
3155 /*
3156 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3157 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3158 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3159 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3160 * struct as its SID.
3161 */
3162 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3163 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3164 /*
3165 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3166 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3167 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3168 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3169 * new inode label or new policy.
3170 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3171 */
3172 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
3173 }
3174
3175 /* task security operations */
3176
3177 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3178 {
3179 int rc;
3180
3181 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3182 if (rc)
3183 return rc;
3184
3185 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3186 }
3187
3188 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3189 {
3190 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3191 int rc;
3192
3193 tsec1 = current->security;
3194
3195 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
3196 if (rc)
3197 return rc;
3198 tsec2 = tsk->security;
3199
3200 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3201 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3202
3203 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3204 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3205 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3206 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3207 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3208
3209 return 0;
3210 }
3211
3212 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3213 {
3214 task_free_security(tsk);
3215 }
3216
3217 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3218 {
3219 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3220 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3221 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3222 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3223 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3224 capable hook. */
3225 return 0;
3226 }
3227
3228 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3229 {
3230 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3231 }
3232
3233 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3234 {
3235 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3236 return 0;
3237 }
3238
3239 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3240 {
3241 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3242 }
3243
3244 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3245 {
3246 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3247 }
3248
3249 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3250 {
3251 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3252 }
3253
3254 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3255 {
3256 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3257 *secid = tsec->sid;
3258 }
3259
3260 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3261 {
3262 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3263 return 0;
3264 }
3265
3266 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3267 {
3268 int rc;
3269
3270 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3271 if (rc)
3272 return rc;
3273
3274 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3275 }
3276
3277 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3278 {
3279 int rc;
3280
3281 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3282 if (rc)
3283 return rc;
3284
3285 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3286 }
3287
3288 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3289 {
3290 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3291 }
3292
3293 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3294 {
3295 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3296 int rc;
3297
3298 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3299 if (rc)
3300 return rc;
3301
3302 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3303 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3304 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3305 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3306 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3307 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3308
3309 return 0;
3310 }
3311
3312 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3313 {
3314 int rc;
3315
3316 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3317 if (rc)
3318 return rc;
3319
3320 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3321 }
3322
3323 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3324 {
3325 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3326 }
3327
3328 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3329 {
3330 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3331 }
3332
3333 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3334 int sig, u32 secid)
3335 {
3336 u32 perm;
3337 int rc;
3338 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3339
3340 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3341 if (rc)
3342 return rc;
3343
3344 if (!sig)
3345 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3346 else
3347 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3348 tsec = p->security;
3349 if (secid)
3350 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3351 else
3352 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3353 return rc;
3354 }
3355
3356 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3357 unsigned long arg2,
3358 unsigned long arg3,
3359 unsigned long arg4,
3360 unsigned long arg5,
3361 long *rc_p)
3362 {
3363 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3364 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3365 the state of the current process. */
3366 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
3367 }
3368
3369 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3370 {
3371 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3372 }
3373
3374 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3375 {
3376 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3377
3378 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3379
3380 tsec = p->security;
3381 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3382 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3383 return;
3384 }
3385
3386 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3387 struct inode *inode)
3388 {
3389 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3390 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3391
3392 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3393 isec->initialized = 1;
3394 return;
3395 }
3396
3397 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3398 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3399 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3400 {
3401 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3402 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3403
3404 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3405 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3406 if (ih == NULL)
3407 goto out;
3408
3409 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3410 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3411 goto out;
3412
3413 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3414 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3415 ret = 0;
3416
3417 if (proto)
3418 *proto = ih->protocol;
3419
3420 switch (ih->protocol) {
3421 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3422 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3423
3424 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3425 break;
3426
3427 offset += ihlen;
3428 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3429 if (th == NULL)
3430 break;
3431
3432 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3433 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3434 break;
3435 }
3436
3437 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3438 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3439
3440 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3441 break;
3442
3443 offset += ihlen;
3444 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3445 if (uh == NULL)
3446 break;
3447
3448 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3449 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3450 break;
3451 }
3452
3453 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3454 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3455
3456 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3457 break;
3458
3459 offset += ihlen;
3460 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3461 if (dh == NULL)
3462 break;
3463
3464 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3465 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3466 break;
3467 }
3468
3469 default:
3470 break;
3471 }
3472 out:
3473 return ret;
3474 }
3475
3476 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3477
3478 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3479 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3480 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3481 {
3482 u8 nexthdr;
3483 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3484 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3485
3486 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3487 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3488 if (ip6 == NULL)
3489 goto out;
3490
3491 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3492 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3493 ret = 0;
3494
3495 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3496 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3497 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3498 if (offset < 0)
3499 goto out;
3500
3501 if (proto)
3502 *proto = nexthdr;
3503
3504 switch (nexthdr) {
3505 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3506 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3507
3508 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3509 if (th == NULL)
3510 break;
3511
3512 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3513 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3514 break;
3515 }
3516
3517 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3518 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3519
3520 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3521 if (uh == NULL)
3522 break;
3523
3524 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3525 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3526 break;
3527 }
3528
3529 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3530 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3531
3532 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3533 if (dh == NULL)
3534 break;
3535
3536 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3537 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3538 break;
3539 }
3540
3541 /* includes fragments */
3542 default:
3543 break;
3544 }
3545 out:
3546 return ret;
3547 }
3548
3549 #endif /* IPV6 */
3550
3551 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3552 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3553 {
3554 char *addrp;
3555 int ret;
3556
3557 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3558 case PF_INET:
3559 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3560 if (ret)
3561 goto parse_error;
3562 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3563 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3564 goto okay;
3565
3566 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3567 case PF_INET6:
3568 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3569 if (ret)
3570 goto parse_error;
3571 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3572 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3573 goto okay;
3574 #endif /* IPV6 */
3575 default:
3576 addrp = NULL;
3577 goto okay;
3578 }
3579
3580 parse_error:
3581 printk(KERN_WARNING
3582 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3583 " unable to parse packet\n");
3584 return ret;
3585
3586 okay:
3587 if (_addrp)
3588 *_addrp = addrp;
3589 return 0;
3590 }
3591
3592 /**
3593 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3594 * @skb: the packet
3595 * @family: protocol family
3596 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3597 *
3598 * Description:
3599 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3600 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3601 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3602 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3603 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3604 * peer labels.
3605 *
3606 */
3607 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3608 {
3609 int err;
3610 u32 xfrm_sid;
3611 u32 nlbl_sid;
3612 u32 nlbl_type;
3613
3614 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3615 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3616
3617 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3618 if (unlikely(err)) {
3619 printk(KERN_WARNING
3620 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3621 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3622 return -EACCES;
3623 }
3624
3625 return 0;
3626 }
3627
3628 /* socket security operations */
3629 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3630 u32 perms)
3631 {
3632 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3633 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3634 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3635 int err = 0;
3636
3637 tsec = task->security;
3638 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3639
3640 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3641 goto out;
3642
3643 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3644 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3645 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3646
3647 out:
3648 return err;
3649 }
3650
3651 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3652 int protocol, int kern)
3653 {
3654 int err = 0;
3655 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3656 u32 newsid;
3657
3658 if (kern)
3659 goto out;
3660
3661 tsec = current->security;
3662 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3663 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3664 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3665 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3666
3667 out:
3668 return err;
3669 }
3670
3671 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3672 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3673 {
3674 int err = 0;
3675 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3676 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3677 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3678 u32 newsid;
3679
3680 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3681
3682 tsec = current->security;
3683 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3684 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3685 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3686 isec->initialized = 1;
3687
3688 if (sock->sk) {
3689 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3690 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3691 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3692 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3693 }
3694
3695 return err;
3696 }
3697
3698 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3699 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3700 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3701
3702 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3703 {
3704 u16 family;
3705 int err;
3706
3707 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3708 if (err)
3709 goto out;
3710
3711 /*
3712 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3713 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3714 * check the first address now.
3715 */
3716 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3717 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3718 char *addrp;
3719 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3720 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3721 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3722 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3723 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3724 unsigned short snum;
3725 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3726 u32 sid, node_perm;
3727
3728 tsec = current->security;
3729 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3730
3731 if (family == PF_INET) {
3732 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3733 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3734 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3735 } else {
3736 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3737 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3738 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3739 }
3740
3741 if (snum) {
3742 int low, high;
3743
3744 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3745
3746 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3747 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3748 snum, &sid);
3749 if (err)
3750 goto out;
3751 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3752 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3753 ad.u.net.family = family;
3754 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3755 isec->sclass,
3756 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3757 if (err)
3758 goto out;
3759 }
3760 }
3761
3762 switch (isec->sclass) {
3763 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3764 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3765 break;
3766
3767 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3768 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3769 break;
3770
3771 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3772 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3773 break;
3774
3775 default:
3776 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3777 break;
3778 }
3779
3780 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3781 if (err)
3782 goto out;
3783
3784 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3785 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3786 ad.u.net.family = family;
3787
3788 if (family == PF_INET)
3789 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3790 else
3791 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3792
3793 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3794 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3795 if (err)
3796 goto out;
3797 }
3798 out:
3799 return err;
3800 }
3801
3802 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3803 {
3804 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3805 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3806 int err;
3807
3808 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3809 if (err)
3810 return err;
3811
3812 /*
3813 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3814 */
3815 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3816 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3817 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3818 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3819 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3820 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3821 unsigned short snum;
3822 u32 sid, perm;
3823
3824 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3825 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3826 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3827 return -EINVAL;
3828 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3829 } else {
3830 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3831 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3832 return -EINVAL;
3833 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3834 }
3835
3836 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3837 if (err)
3838 goto out;
3839
3840 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3841 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3842
3843 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3844 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3845 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3846 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3847 if (err)
3848 goto out;
3849 }
3850
3851 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3852
3853 out:
3854 return err;
3855 }
3856
3857 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3858 {
3859 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3860 }
3861
3862 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3863 {
3864 int err;
3865 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3866 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3867
3868 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3869 if (err)
3870 return err;
3871
3872 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3873
3874 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3875 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3876 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3877 newisec->initialized = 1;
3878
3879 return 0;
3880 }
3881
3882 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3883 int size)
3884 {
3885 int rc;
3886
3887 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3888 if (rc)
3889 return rc;
3890
3891 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3892 }
3893
3894 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3895 int size, int flags)
3896 {
3897 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3898 }
3899
3900 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3901 {
3902 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3903 }
3904
3905 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3906 {
3907 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3908 }
3909
3910 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3911 {
3912 int err;
3913
3914 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3915 if (err)
3916 return err;
3917
3918 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3919 }
3920
3921 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3922 int optname)
3923 {
3924 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3925 }
3926
3927 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3928 {
3929 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3930 }
3931
3932 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3933 struct socket *other,
3934 struct sock *newsk)
3935 {
3936 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3937 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3938 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3939 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3940 int err;
3941
3942 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3943 if (err)
3944 return err;
3945
3946 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3947 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3948
3949 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3950 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3951
3952 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3953 isec->sclass,
3954 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3955 if (err)
3956 return err;
3957
3958 /* connecting socket */
3959 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3960 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3961
3962 /* server child socket */
3963 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3964 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3965 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3966
3967 return err;
3968 }
3969
3970 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3971 struct socket *other)
3972 {
3973 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3974 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3975 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3976 int err;
3977
3978 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3979 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3980
3981 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3982 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3983
3984 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3985 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3986 if (err)
3987 return err;
3988
3989 return 0;
3990 }
3991
3992 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3993 u32 peer_sid,
3994 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
3995 {
3996 int err;
3997 u32 if_sid;
3998 u32 node_sid;
3999
4000 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4001 if (err)
4002 return err;
4003 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4004 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4005 if (err)
4006 return err;
4007
4008 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4009 if (err)
4010 return err;
4011 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4012 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4013 }
4014
4015 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4016 struct sk_buff *skb,
4017 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4018 u16 family,
4019 char *addrp)
4020 {
4021 int err;
4022 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4023 u16 sk_class;
4024 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4025 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4026
4027 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4028 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4029
4030 switch (sk_class) {
4031 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4032 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4033 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4034 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4035 break;
4036 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4037 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4038 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4039 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4040 break;
4041 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4042 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4043 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4044 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4045 break;
4046 default:
4047 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4048 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4049 recv_perm = 0;
4050 break;
4051 }
4052
4053 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4054 if (err)
4055 return err;
4056 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4057 if (err)
4058 return err;
4059
4060 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4061 if (err)
4062 return err;
4063 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4064 if (err)
4065 return err;
4066
4067 if (!recv_perm)
4068 return 0;
4069 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4070 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4071 if (unlikely(err)) {
4072 printk(KERN_WARNING
4073 "SELinux: failure in"
4074 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4075 " network port label not found\n");
4076 return err;
4077 }
4078 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4079 }
4080
4081 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4082 u16 family)
4083 {
4084 int err;
4085 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4086 u32 peer_sid;
4087 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4088 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4089 char *addrp;
4090
4091 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4092 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4093 ad.u.net.family = family;
4094 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4095 if (err)
4096 return err;
4097
4098 if (selinux_compat_net)
4099 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4100 family, addrp);
4101 else
4102 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4103 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4104 if (err)
4105 return err;
4106
4107 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4108 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4109 if (err)
4110 return err;
4111 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4112 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4113 if (err)
4114 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4115 } else {
4116 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4117 if (err)
4118 return err;
4119 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4120 }
4121
4122 return err;
4123 }
4124
4125 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4126 {
4127 int err;
4128 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4129 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4130 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4131 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4132 char *addrp;
4133 u8 secmark_active;
4134 u8 peerlbl_active;
4135
4136 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4137 return 0;
4138
4139 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4140 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4141 family = PF_INET;
4142
4143 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4144 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4145 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4146 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4147 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4148 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4149
4150 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4151 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4152 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4153 return 0;
4154
4155 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4156 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4157 ad.u.net.family = family;
4158 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4159 if (err)
4160 return err;
4161
4162 if (peerlbl_active) {
4163 u32 peer_sid;
4164
4165 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4166 if (err)
4167 return err;
4168 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4169 peer_sid, &ad);
4170 if (err) {
4171 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4172 return err;
4173 }
4174 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4175 PEER__RECV, &ad);
4176 if (err)
4177 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4178 }
4179
4180 if (secmark_active) {
4181 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4182 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4183 if (err)
4184 return err;
4185 }
4186
4187 return err;
4188 }
4189
4190 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4191 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4192 {
4193 int err = 0;
4194 char *scontext;
4195 u32 scontext_len;
4196 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4197 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4198 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4199
4200 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4201
4202 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4203 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4204 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4205 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4206 }
4207 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4208 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
4209 goto out;
4210 }
4211
4212 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4213
4214 if (err)
4215 goto out;
4216
4217 if (scontext_len > len) {
4218 err = -ERANGE;
4219 goto out_len;
4220 }
4221
4222 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4223 err = -EFAULT;
4224
4225 out_len:
4226 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4227 err = -EFAULT;
4228
4229 kfree(scontext);
4230 out:
4231 return err;
4232 }
4233
4234 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4235 {
4236 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4237 u16 family;
4238
4239 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4240 family = PF_INET;
4241 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4242 family = PF_INET6;
4243 else if (sock)
4244 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4245 else
4246 goto out;
4247
4248 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4249 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4250 else if (skb)
4251 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4252
4253 out:
4254 *secid = peer_secid;
4255 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4256 return -EINVAL;
4257 return 0;
4258 }
4259
4260 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4261 {
4262 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4263 }
4264
4265 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4266 {
4267 sk_free_security(sk);
4268 }
4269
4270 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4271 {
4272 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4273 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4274
4275 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4276 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4277 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4278
4279 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4280 }
4281
4282 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4283 {
4284 if (!sk)
4285 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4286 else {
4287 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4288
4289 *secid = sksec->sid;
4290 }
4291 }
4292
4293 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4294 {
4295 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4296 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4297
4298 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4299 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4300 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4301 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4302 }
4303
4304 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4305 struct request_sock *req)
4306 {
4307 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4308 int err;
4309 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4310 u32 newsid;
4311 u32 peersid;
4312
4313 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4314 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4315 family = PF_INET;
4316
4317 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4318 if (err)
4319 return err;
4320 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4321 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4322 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4323 return 0;
4324 }
4325
4326 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4327 if (err)
4328 return err;
4329
4330 req->secid = newsid;
4331 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4332 return 0;
4333 }
4334
4335 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4336 const struct request_sock *req)
4337 {
4338 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4339
4340 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4341 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4342 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4343 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4344 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4345 time it will have been created and available. */
4346
4347 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4348 * thread with access to newsksec */
4349 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4350 }
4351
4352 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4353 {
4354 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4355 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4356
4357 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4358 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4359 family = PF_INET;
4360
4361 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4362
4363 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4364 }
4365
4366 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4367 struct flowi *fl)
4368 {
4369 fl->secid = req->secid;
4370 }
4371
4372 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4373 {
4374 int err = 0;
4375 u32 perm;
4376 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4377 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4378 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4379
4380 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4381 err = -EINVAL;
4382 goto out;
4383 }
4384 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4385
4386 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4387 if (err) {
4388 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4389 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4390 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4391 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4392 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4393 if (!selinux_enforcing)
4394 err = 0;
4395 }
4396
4397 /* Ignore */
4398 if (err == -ENOENT)
4399 err = 0;
4400 goto out;
4401 }
4402
4403 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4404 out:
4405 return err;
4406 }
4407
4408 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4409
4410 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4411 u16 family)
4412 {
4413 int err;
4414 char *addrp;
4415 u32 peer_sid;
4416 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4417 u8 secmark_active;
4418 u8 netlbl_active;
4419 u8 peerlbl_active;
4420
4421 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4422 return NF_ACCEPT;
4423
4424 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4425 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4426 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4427 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4428 return NF_ACCEPT;
4429
4430 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4431 return NF_DROP;
4432
4433 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4434 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4435 ad.u.net.family = family;
4436 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4437 return NF_DROP;
4438
4439 if (peerlbl_active) {
4440 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4441 peer_sid, &ad);
4442 if (err) {
4443 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4444 return NF_DROP;
4445 }
4446 }
4447
4448 if (secmark_active)
4449 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4450 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4451 return NF_DROP;
4452
4453 if (netlbl_active)
4454 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4455 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4456 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4457 * protection */
4458 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4459 return NF_DROP;
4460
4461 return NF_ACCEPT;
4462 }
4463
4464 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4465 struct sk_buff *skb,
4466 const struct net_device *in,
4467 const struct net_device *out,
4468 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4469 {
4470 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4471 }
4472
4473 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4474 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4475 struct sk_buff *skb,
4476 const struct net_device *in,
4477 const struct net_device *out,
4478 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4479 {
4480 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4481 }
4482 #endif /* IPV6 */
4483
4484 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4485 u16 family)
4486 {
4487 u32 sid;
4488
4489 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4490 return NF_ACCEPT;
4491
4492 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4493 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4494 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4495 if (skb->sk) {
4496 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4497 sid = sksec->sid;
4498 } else
4499 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4500 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4501 return NF_DROP;
4502
4503 return NF_ACCEPT;
4504 }
4505
4506 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4507 struct sk_buff *skb,
4508 const struct net_device *in,
4509 const struct net_device *out,
4510 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4511 {
4512 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4513 }
4514
4515 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4516 int ifindex,
4517 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4518 u16 family, char *addrp)
4519 {
4520 int err;
4521 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4522 u16 sk_class;
4523 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4524 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4525
4526 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4527 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4528
4529 switch (sk_class) {
4530 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4531 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4532 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4533 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4534 break;
4535 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4536 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4537 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4538 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4539 break;
4540 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4541 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4542 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4543 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4544 break;
4545 default:
4546 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4547 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4548 send_perm = 0;
4549 break;
4550 }
4551
4552 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4553 if (err)
4554 return err;
4555 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4556 return err;
4557
4558 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4559 if (err)
4560 return err;
4561 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4562 if (err)
4563 return err;
4564
4565 if (send_perm != 0)
4566 return 0;
4567
4568 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4569 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4570 if (unlikely(err)) {
4571 printk(KERN_WARNING
4572 "SELinux: failure in"
4573 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4574 " network port label not found\n");
4575 return err;
4576 }
4577 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4578 }
4579
4580 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4581 int ifindex,
4582 u16 family)
4583 {
4584 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4585 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4586 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4587 char *addrp;
4588 u8 proto;
4589
4590 if (sk == NULL)
4591 return NF_ACCEPT;
4592 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4593
4594 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4595 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4596 ad.u.net.family = family;
4597 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4598 return NF_DROP;
4599
4600 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4601 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4602 &ad, family, addrp))
4603 return NF_DROP;
4604 } else {
4605 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4606 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4607 return NF_DROP;
4608 }
4609
4610 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4611 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4612 return NF_DROP;
4613
4614 return NF_ACCEPT;
4615 }
4616
4617 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4618 u16 family)
4619 {
4620 u32 secmark_perm;
4621 u32 peer_sid;
4622 struct sock *sk;
4623 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4624 char *addrp;
4625 u8 secmark_active;
4626 u8 peerlbl_active;
4627
4628 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4629 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4630 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4631 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4632 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4633 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4634
4635 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4636 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4637 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4638 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4639 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4640 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4641 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4642 return NF_ACCEPT;
4643
4644 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4645 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4646 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4647 return NF_ACCEPT;
4648
4649 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4650 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4651 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4652 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4653 sk = skb->sk;
4654 if (sk == NULL) {
4655 switch (family) {
4656 case PF_INET:
4657 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4658 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4659 else
4660 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4661 break;
4662 case PF_INET6:
4663 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4664 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4665 else
4666 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4667 break;
4668 default:
4669 return NF_DROP;
4670 }
4671 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4672 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4673 return NF_DROP;
4674 } else
4675 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4676 } else {
4677 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4678 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4679 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4680 }
4681
4682 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4683 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4684 ad.u.net.family = family;
4685 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4686 return NF_DROP;
4687
4688 if (secmark_active)
4689 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4690 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4691 return NF_DROP;
4692
4693 if (peerlbl_active) {
4694 u32 if_sid;
4695 u32 node_sid;
4696
4697 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4698 return NF_DROP;
4699 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4700 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4701 return NF_DROP;
4702
4703 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4704 return NF_DROP;
4705 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4706 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4707 return NF_DROP;
4708 }
4709
4710 return NF_ACCEPT;
4711 }
4712
4713 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4714 struct sk_buff *skb,
4715 const struct net_device *in,
4716 const struct net_device *out,
4717 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4718 {
4719 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4720 }
4721
4722 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4723 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4724 struct sk_buff *skb,
4725 const struct net_device *in,
4726 const struct net_device *out,
4727 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4728 {
4729 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4730 }
4731 #endif /* IPV6 */
4732
4733 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4734
4735 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4736 {
4737 int err;
4738
4739 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4740 if (err)
4741 return err;
4742
4743 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4744 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4745
4746 return err;
4747 }
4748
4749 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4750 {
4751 int err;
4752 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4753
4754 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4755 if (err)
4756 return err;
4757
4758 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4759 ad.u.cap = capability;
4760
4761 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4762 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4763 }
4764
4765 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4766 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4767 u16 sclass)
4768 {
4769 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4770 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4771
4772 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4773 if (!isec)
4774 return -ENOMEM;
4775
4776 isec->sclass = sclass;
4777 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4778 perm->security = isec;
4779
4780 return 0;
4781 }
4782
4783 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4784 {
4785 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4786 perm->security = NULL;
4787 kfree(isec);
4788 }
4789
4790 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4791 {
4792 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4793
4794 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4795 if (!msec)
4796 return -ENOMEM;
4797
4798 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4799 msg->security = msec;
4800
4801 return 0;
4802 }
4803
4804 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4805 {
4806 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4807
4808 msg->security = NULL;
4809 kfree(msec);
4810 }
4811
4812 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4813 u32 perms)
4814 {
4815 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4816 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4817 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4818
4819 tsec = current->security;
4820 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4821
4822 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4823 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4824
4825 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4826 }
4827
4828 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4829 {
4830 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4831 }
4832
4833 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4834 {
4835 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4836 }
4837
4838 /* message queue security operations */
4839 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4840 {
4841 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4842 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4843 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4844 int rc;
4845
4846 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4847 if (rc)
4848 return rc;
4849
4850 tsec = current->security;
4851 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4852
4853 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4854 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4855
4856 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4857 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
4858 if (rc) {
4859 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4860 return rc;
4861 }
4862 return 0;
4863 }
4864
4865 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4866 {
4867 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4868 }
4869
4870 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4871 {
4872 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4873 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4874 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4875
4876 tsec = current->security;
4877 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4878
4879 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4880 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4881
4882 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4883 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4884 }
4885
4886 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4887 {
4888 int err;
4889 int perms;
4890
4891 switch (cmd) {
4892 case IPC_INFO:
4893 case MSG_INFO:
4894 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4895 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4896 case IPC_STAT:
4897 case MSG_STAT:
4898 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4899 break;
4900 case IPC_SET:
4901 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4902 break;
4903 case IPC_RMID:
4904 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4905 break;
4906 default:
4907 return 0;
4908 }
4909
4910 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4911 return err;
4912 }
4913
4914 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4915 {
4916 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4917 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4918 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4919 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4920 int rc;
4921
4922 tsec = current->security;
4923 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4924 msec = msg->security;
4925
4926 /*
4927 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4928 */
4929 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4930 /*
4931 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4932 * message queue this message will be stored in
4933 */
4934 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4935 isec->sid,
4936 SECCLASS_MSG,
4937 &msec->sid);
4938 if (rc)
4939 return rc;
4940 }
4941
4942 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4943 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4944
4945 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4946 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4947 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
4948 if (!rc)
4949 /* Can this process send the message */
4950 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4951 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4952 if (!rc)
4953 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4954 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4955 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4956
4957 return rc;
4958 }
4959
4960 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4961 struct task_struct *target,
4962 long type, int mode)
4963 {
4964 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4965 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4966 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4967 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4968 int rc;
4969
4970 tsec = target->security;
4971 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4972 msec = msg->security;
4973
4974 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4975 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4976
4977 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4978 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4979 if (!rc)
4980 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4981 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4982 return rc;
4983 }
4984
4985 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4986 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4987 {
4988 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4989 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4990 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4991 int rc;
4992
4993 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4994 if (rc)
4995 return rc;
4996
4997 tsec = current->security;
4998 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4999
5000 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5001 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5002
5003 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5004 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
5005 if (rc) {
5006 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5007 return rc;
5008 }
5009 return 0;
5010 }
5011
5012 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5013 {
5014 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5015 }
5016
5017 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5018 {
5019 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5020 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5021 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5022
5023 tsec = current->security;
5024 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5025
5026 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5027 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5028
5029 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5030 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5031 }
5032
5033 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5034 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5035 {
5036 int perms;
5037 int err;
5038
5039 switch (cmd) {
5040 case IPC_INFO:
5041 case SHM_INFO:
5042 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5043 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5044 case IPC_STAT:
5045 case SHM_STAT:
5046 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5047 break;
5048 case IPC_SET:
5049 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5050 break;
5051 case SHM_LOCK:
5052 case SHM_UNLOCK:
5053 perms = SHM__LOCK;
5054 break;
5055 case IPC_RMID:
5056 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5057 break;
5058 default:
5059 return 0;
5060 }
5061
5062 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5063 return err;
5064 }
5065
5066 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5067 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5068 {
5069 u32 perms;
5070 int rc;
5071
5072 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5073 if (rc)
5074 return rc;
5075
5076 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5077 perms = SHM__READ;
5078 else
5079 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5080
5081 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5082 }
5083
5084 /* Semaphore security operations */
5085 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5086 {
5087 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5088 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5089 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5090 int rc;
5091
5092 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5093 if (rc)
5094 return rc;
5095
5096 tsec = current->security;
5097 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5098
5099 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5100 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5101
5102 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5103 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
5104 if (rc) {
5105 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5106 return rc;
5107 }
5108 return 0;
5109 }
5110
5111 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5112 {
5113 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5114 }
5115
5116 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5117 {
5118 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5119 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5120 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5121
5122 tsec = current->security;
5123 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5124
5125 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5126 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5127
5128 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5129 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5130 }
5131
5132 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5133 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5134 {
5135 int err;
5136 u32 perms;
5137
5138 switch (cmd) {
5139 case IPC_INFO:
5140 case SEM_INFO:
5141 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5142 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5143 case GETPID:
5144 case GETNCNT:
5145 case GETZCNT:
5146 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5147 break;
5148 case GETVAL:
5149 case GETALL:
5150 perms = SEM__READ;
5151 break;
5152 case SETVAL:
5153 case SETALL:
5154 perms = SEM__WRITE;
5155 break;
5156 case IPC_RMID:
5157 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5158 break;
5159 case IPC_SET:
5160 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5161 break;
5162 case IPC_STAT:
5163 case SEM_STAT:
5164 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5165 break;
5166 default:
5167 return 0;
5168 }
5169
5170 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5171 return err;
5172 }
5173
5174 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5175 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5176 {
5177 u32 perms;
5178
5179 if (alter)
5180 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5181 else
5182 perms = SEM__READ;
5183
5184 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5185 }
5186
5187 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5188 {
5189 u32 av = 0;
5190
5191 av = 0;
5192 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5193 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5194 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5195 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5196
5197 if (av == 0)
5198 return 0;
5199
5200 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5201 }
5202
5203 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5204 {
5205 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5206 *secid = isec->sid;
5207 }
5208
5209 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5210 {
5211 if (inode)
5212 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5213 }
5214
5215 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5216 char *name, char **value)
5217 {
5218 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5219 u32 sid;
5220 int error;
5221 unsigned len;
5222
5223 if (current != p) {
5224 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5225 if (error)
5226 return error;
5227 }
5228
5229 tsec = p->security;
5230
5231 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5232 sid = tsec->sid;
5233 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5234 sid = tsec->osid;
5235 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5236 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
5237 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5238 sid = tsec->create_sid;
5239 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5240 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5241 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5242 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5243 else
5244 return -EINVAL;
5245
5246 if (!sid)
5247 return 0;
5248
5249 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5250 if (error)
5251 return error;
5252 return len;
5253 }
5254
5255 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5256 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5257 {
5258 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5259 struct task_struct *tracer;
5260 u32 sid = 0;
5261 int error;
5262 char *str = value;
5263
5264 if (current != p) {
5265 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5266 security attributes. */
5267 return -EACCES;
5268 }
5269
5270 /*
5271 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5272 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5273 * above restriction is ever removed.
5274 */
5275 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5276 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5277 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5278 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5279 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5280 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5281 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5282 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5283 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5284 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5285 else
5286 error = -EINVAL;
5287 if (error)
5288 return error;
5289
5290 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5291 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5292 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5293 str[size-1] = 0;
5294 size--;
5295 }
5296 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5297 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5298 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5299 return error;
5300 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5301 &sid);
5302 }
5303 if (error)
5304 return error;
5305 }
5306
5307 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5308 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5309 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5310 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5311 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5312 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5313 tsec = p->security;
5314 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5315 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5316 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5317 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5318 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5319 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5320 if (error)
5321 return error;
5322 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5323 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5324 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5325 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5326 struct av_decision avd;
5327
5328 if (sid == 0)
5329 return -EINVAL;
5330 /*
5331 * SELinux allows to change context in the following case only.
5332 * - Single threaded processes.
5333 * - Multi threaded processes intend to change its context into
5334 * more restricted domain (defined by TYPEBOUNDS statement).
5335 */
5336 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5337 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5338 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5339 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5340 do_each_thread(g, t) {
5341 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5342 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5343 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5344 if (!error)
5345 goto boundary_ok;
5346
5347 return error;
5348 }
5349 } while_each_thread(g, t);
5350 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5351 }
5352 boundary_ok:
5353
5354 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5355 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5356 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5357 if (error)
5358 return error;
5359
5360 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5361 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5362 task_lock(p);
5363 rcu_read_lock();
5364 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5365 if (tracer != NULL) {
5366 struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
5367 u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
5368 rcu_read_unlock();
5369 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5370 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5371 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5372 if (!error)
5373 tsec->sid = sid;
5374 task_unlock(p);
5375 avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5376 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5377 if (error)
5378 return error;
5379 } else {
5380 rcu_read_unlock();
5381 tsec->sid = sid;
5382 task_unlock(p);
5383 }
5384 } else
5385 return -EINVAL;
5386
5387 return size;
5388 }
5389
5390 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5391 {
5392 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5393 }
5394
5395 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5396 {
5397 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5398 }
5399
5400 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5401 {
5402 kfree(secdata);
5403 }
5404
5405 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5406
5407 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5408 unsigned long flags)
5409 {
5410 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
5411 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5412
5413 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5414 if (!ksec)
5415 return -ENOMEM;
5416
5417 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5418 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5419 else
5420 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5421 k->security = ksec;
5422
5423 return 0;
5424 }
5425
5426 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5427 {
5428 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5429
5430 k->security = NULL;
5431 kfree(ksec);
5432 }
5433
5434 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5435 struct task_struct *ctx,
5436 key_perm_t perm)
5437 {
5438 struct key *key;
5439 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5440 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5441
5442 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5443
5444 tsec = ctx->security;
5445 ksec = key->security;
5446
5447 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5448 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5449 appear to be created. */
5450 if (perm == 0)
5451 return 0;
5452
5453 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5454 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5455 }
5456
5457 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5458 {
5459 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5460 char *context = NULL;
5461 unsigned len;
5462 int rc;
5463
5464 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5465 if (!rc)
5466 rc = len;
5467 *_buffer = context;
5468 return rc;
5469 }
5470
5471 #endif
5472
5473 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5474 .name = "selinux",
5475
5476 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5477 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5478 .capget = selinux_capget,
5479 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5480 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5481 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5482 .capable = selinux_capable,
5483 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5484 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5485 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5486 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5487
5488 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5489 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5490
5491 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5492 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5493 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5494 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5495 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5496 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5497 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5498
5499 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5500 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5501 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5502 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5503 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5504 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5505 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5506 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5507 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5508 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5509 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5510
5511
5512 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5513 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5514 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5515 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5516 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5517 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5518 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5519 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5520 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5521 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5522 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5523 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5524 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5525 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5526 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5527 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5528 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5529 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5530 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5531 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5532 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5533 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5534 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5535 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5536 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5537 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5538 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5539
5540 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5541 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5542 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5543 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5544 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5545 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5546 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5547 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5548 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5549 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5550 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5551
5552 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5553
5554 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5555 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
5556 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
5557 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5558 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5559 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5560 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5561 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5562 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5563 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5564 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5565 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5566 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5567 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5568 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5569 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5570 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5571 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5572 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5573 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5574 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5575 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5576 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5577
5578 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5579 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5580
5581 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5582 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5583
5584 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5585 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5586 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5587 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5588 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5589 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5590
5591 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5592 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5593 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5594 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5595 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5596
5597 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5598 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5599 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5600 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5601 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5602
5603 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5604
5605 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5606 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5607
5608 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5609 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5610 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5611
5612 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5613 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5614
5615 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5616 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5617 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5618 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5619 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5620 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5621 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5622 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5623 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5624 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5625 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5626 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5627 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5628 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5629 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5630 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5631 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5632 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5633 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5634 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5635 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5636 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5637 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5638 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5639 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5640
5641 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5642 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5643 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5644 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5645 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5646 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5647 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5648 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5649 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5650 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5651 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5652 #endif
5653
5654 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5655 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5656 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5657 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5658 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5659 #endif
5660
5661 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
5662 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5663 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5664 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5665 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5666 #endif
5667 };
5668
5669 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5670 {
5671 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5672
5673 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5674 selinux_enabled = 0;
5675 return 0;
5676 }
5677
5678 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5679 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5680 return 0;
5681 }
5682
5683 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5684
5685 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5686 if (task_alloc_security(current))
5687 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5688 tsec = current->security;
5689 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5690
5691 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5692 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5693 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5694 avc_init();
5695
5696 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5697 if (!secondary_ops)
5698 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5699 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5700 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5701
5702 if (selinux_enforcing)
5703 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5704 else
5705 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5706
5707 return 0;
5708 }
5709
5710 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5711 {
5712 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5713
5714 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5715 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5716 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5717 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5718 next_sb:
5719 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5720 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5721 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5722 struct superblock_security_struct,
5723 list);
5724 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5725 sb->s_count++;
5726 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5727 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5728 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5729 if (sb->s_root)
5730 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5731 drop_super(sb);
5732 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5733 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5734 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5735 goto next_sb;
5736 }
5737 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5738 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5739 }
5740
5741 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5742 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5743 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5744
5745 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5746
5747 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5748 {
5749 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5750 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5751 .pf = PF_INET,
5752 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5753 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5754 },
5755 {
5756 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5757 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5758 .pf = PF_INET,
5759 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5760 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5761 },
5762 {
5763 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5764 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5765 .pf = PF_INET,
5766 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5767 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5768 }
5769 };
5770
5771 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5772
5773 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5774 {
5775 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5776 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5777 .pf = PF_INET6,
5778 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5779 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5780 },
5781 {
5782 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5783 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5784 .pf = PF_INET6,
5785 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5786 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5787 }
5788 };
5789
5790 #endif /* IPV6 */
5791
5792 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5793 {
5794 int err = 0;
5795
5796 if (!selinux_enabled)
5797 goto out;
5798
5799 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5800
5801 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5802 if (err)
5803 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5804
5805 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5806 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5807 if (err)
5808 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5809 #endif /* IPV6 */
5810
5811 out:
5812 return err;
5813 }
5814
5815 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5816
5817 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5818 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5819 {
5820 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5821
5822 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5823 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5824 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5825 #endif /* IPV6 */
5826 }
5827 #endif
5828
5829 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5830
5831 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5832 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5833 #endif
5834
5835 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5836
5837 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5838 static int selinux_disabled;
5839
5840 int selinux_disable(void)
5841 {
5842 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5843
5844 if (ss_initialized) {
5845 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5846 return -EINVAL;
5847 }
5848
5849 if (selinux_disabled) {
5850 /* Only do this once. */
5851 return -EINVAL;
5852 }
5853
5854 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5855
5856 selinux_disabled = 1;
5857 selinux_enabled = 0;
5858
5859 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5860 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5861
5862 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5863 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5864
5865 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
5866 exit_sel_fs();
5867
5868 return 0;
5869 }
5870 #endif
Support for the Chinese Samsung S3C2440 based development boards