Another current->mm -> current->active_mm change.

[linux-2.6/linux-mips.git] / kernel / sys.c

/*
 *  linux/kernel/sys.c
 *
 *  Copyright (C) 1991, 1992  Linus Torvalds
 */

#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
#include <linux/notifier.h>
#include <linux/reboot.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/highuid.h>

#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/io.h>

/*
 * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for
 * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past
 */

int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID;
int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID;

/*
 * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit
 * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures
 */

int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID;
int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID;

/*
 * this indicates whether you can reboot with ctrl-alt-del: the default is yes
 */

int C_A_D = 1;


/*
 *      Notifier list for kernel code which wants to be called
 *      at shutdown. This is used to stop any idling DMA operations
 *      and the like. 
 */

static struct notifier_block *reboot_notifier_list = NULL;
rwlock_t notifier_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED;

/**
 *      notifier_chain_register - Add notifier to a notifier chain
 *      @list: Pointer to root list pointer
 *      @n: New entry in notifier chain
 *
 *      Adds a notifier to a notifier chain.
 *
 *      Currently always returns zero.
 */
 
int notifier_chain_register(struct notifier_block **list, struct notifier_block *n)
{
        write_lock(&notifier_lock);
        while(*list)
        {
                if(n->priority > (*list)->priority)
                        break;
                list= &((*list)->next);
        }
        n->next = *list;
        *list=n;
        write_unlock(&notifier_lock);
        return 0;
}

/**
 *      notifier_chain_unregister - Remove notifier from a notifier chain
 *      @nl: Pointer to root list pointer
 *      @n: New entry in notifier chain
 *
 *      Removes a notifier from a notifier chain.
 *
 *      Returns zero on success, or %-ENOENT on failure.
 */
 
int notifier_chain_unregister(struct notifier_block **nl, struct notifier_block *n)
{
        write_lock(&notifier_lock);
        while((*nl)!=NULL)
        {
                if((*nl)==n)
                {
                        *nl=n->next;
                        write_unlock(&notifier_lock);
                        return 0;
                }
                nl=&((*nl)->next);
        }
        write_unlock(&notifier_lock);
        return -ENOENT;
}

/**
 *      notifier_call_chain - Call functions in a notifier chain
 *      @n: Pointer to root pointer of notifier chain
 *      @val: Value passed unmodified to notifier function
 *      @v: Pointer passed unmodified to notifier function
 *
 *      Calls each function in a notifier chain in turn.
 *
 *      If the return value of the notifier can be and'd
 *      with %NOTIFY_STOP_MASK, then notifier_call_chain
 *      will return immediately, with the return value of
 *      the notifier function which halted execution.
 *      Otherwise, the return value is the return value
 *      of the last notifier function called.
 */
 
int notifier_call_chain(struct notifier_block **n, unsigned long val, void *v)
{
        int ret=NOTIFY_DONE;
        struct notifier_block *nb = *n;

        read_lock(&notifier_lock);
        while(nb)
        {
                ret=nb->notifier_call(nb,val,v);
                if(ret&NOTIFY_STOP_MASK)
                {
                        read_unlock(&notifier_lock);
                        return ret;
                }
                nb=nb->next;
        }
        read_unlock(&notifier_lock);
        return ret;
}

/**
 *      register_reboot_notifier - Register function to be called at reboot time
 *      @nb: Info about notifier function to be called
 *
 *      Registers a function with the list of functions
 *      to be called at reboot time.
 *
 *      Currently always returns zero, as notifier_chain_register
 *      always returns zero.
 */
 
int register_reboot_notifier(struct notifier_block * nb)
{
        return notifier_chain_register(&reboot_notifier_list, nb);
}

/**
 *      unregister_reboot_notifier - Unregister previously registered reboot notifier
 *      @nb: Hook to be unregistered
 *
 *      Unregisters a previously registered reboot
 *      notifier function.
 *
 *      Returns zero on success, or %-ENOENT on failure.
 */
 
int unregister_reboot_notifier(struct notifier_block * nb)
{
        return notifier_chain_unregister(&reboot_notifier_list, nb);
}

asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall(void)
{
        return -ENOSYS;
}

static int proc_sel(struct task_struct *p, int which, int who)
{
        if(p->pid)
        {
                switch (which) {
                        case PRIO_PROCESS:
                                if (!who && p == current)
                                        return 1;
                                return(p->pid == who);
                        case PRIO_PGRP:
                                if (!who)
                                        who = current->pgrp;
                                return(p->pgrp == who);
                        case PRIO_USER:
                                if (!who)
                                        who = current->uid;
                                return(p->uid == who);
                }
        }
        return 0;
}

asmlinkage long sys_setpriority(int which, int who, int niceval)
{
        struct task_struct *p;
        int error;

        if (which > 2 || which < 0)
                return -EINVAL;

        /* normalize: avoid signed division (rounding problems) */
        error = -ESRCH;
        if (niceval < -20)
                niceval = -20;
        if (niceval > 19)
                niceval = 19;

        read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
        for_each_task(p) {
                if (!proc_sel(p, which, who))
                        continue;
                if (p->uid != current->euid &&
                        p->uid != current->uid && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
                        error = -EPERM;
                        continue;
                }
                if (error == -ESRCH)
                        error = 0;
                if (niceval < p->nice && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
                        error = -EACCES;
                else
                        p->nice = niceval;
        }
        read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);

        return error;
}

/*
 * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will
 * not return the normal nice-value, but a value that has been
 * offset by 20 (ie it returns 0..39 instead of -20..19)
 */
asmlinkage long sys_getpriority(int which, int who)
{
        struct task_struct *p;
        long retval = -ESRCH;

        if (which > 2 || which < 0)
                return -EINVAL;

        read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
        for_each_task (p) {
                unsigned niceval;
                if (!proc_sel(p, which, who))
                        continue;
                niceval = 20 - p->nice;
                if (niceval < (unsigned)retval)
                        retval = niceval;
        }
        read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);

        return retval;
}


/*
 * Reboot system call: for obvious reasons only root may call it,
 * and even root needs to set up some magic numbers in the registers
 * so that some mistake won't make this reboot the whole machine.
 * You can also set the meaning of the ctrl-alt-del-key here.
 *
 * reboot doesn't sync: do that yourself before calling this.
 */
asmlinkage long sys_reboot(int magic1, int magic2, unsigned int cmd, void * arg)
{
        char buffer[256];

        /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
        if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT))
                return -EPERM;

        /* For safety, we require "magic" arguments. */
        if (magic1 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC1 ||
            (magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2 && magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2A &&
                        magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2B))
                return -EINVAL;

        lock_kernel();
        switch (cmd) {
        case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART:
                notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_RESTART, NULL);
                printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system.\n");
                machine_restart(NULL);
                break;

        case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_ON:
                C_A_D = 1;
                break;

        case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_OFF:
                C_A_D = 0;
                break;

        case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT:
                notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_HALT, NULL);
                printk(KERN_EMERG "System halted.\n");
                machine_halt();
                do_exit(0);
                break;

        case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF:
                notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_POWER_OFF, NULL);
                printk(KERN_EMERG "Power down.\n");
                machine_power_off();
                do_exit(0);
                break;

        case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART2:
                if (strncpy_from_user(&buffer[0], (char *)arg, sizeof(buffer) - 1) < 0) {
                        unlock_kernel();
                        return -EFAULT;
                }
                buffer[sizeof(buffer) - 1] = '\0';

                notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_RESTART, buffer);
                printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system with command '%s'.\n", buffer);
                machine_restart(buffer);
                break;

        default:
                unlock_kernel();
                return -EINVAL;
        }
        unlock_kernel();
        return 0;
}

/*
 * This function gets called by ctrl-alt-del - ie the keyboard interrupt.
 * As it's called within an interrupt, it may NOT sync: the only choice
 * is whether to reboot at once, or just ignore the ctrl-alt-del.
 */
void ctrl_alt_del(void)
{
        if (C_A_D) {
                notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_RESTART, NULL);
                machine_restart(NULL);
        } else
                kill_proc(1, SIGINT, 1);
}
        

/*
 * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid
 * or vice versa.  (BSD-style)
 *
 * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not
 * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid.
 *
 * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its
 * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
 * a security audit over a program.
 *
 * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be
 * 100% compatible with BSD.  A program which uses just setgid() will be
 * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. 
 *
 * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem
 *      operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned).
 */
asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid)
{
        int old_rgid = current->gid;
        int old_egid = current->egid;

        if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
                if ((old_rgid == rgid) ||
                    (current->egid==rgid) ||
                    capable(CAP_SETGID))
                        current->gid = rgid;
                else
                        return -EPERM;
        }
        if (egid != (gid_t) -1) {
                if ((old_rgid == egid) ||
                    (current->egid == egid) ||
                    (current->sgid == egid) ||
                    capable(CAP_SETGID))
                        current->fsgid = current->egid = egid;
                else {
                        current->gid = old_rgid;
                        return -EPERM;
                }
        }
        if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
            (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old_rgid))
                current->sgid = current->egid;
        current->fsgid = current->egid;
        if (current->egid != old_egid)
                current->dumpable = 0;
        return 0;
}

/*
 * setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS 
 *
 * SMP: Same implicit races as above.
 */
asmlinkage long sys_setgid(gid_t gid)
{
        int old_egid = current->egid;

        if (capable(CAP_SETGID))
                current->gid = current->egid = current->sgid = current->fsgid = gid;
        else if ((gid == current->gid) || (gid == current->sgid))
                current->egid = current->fsgid = gid;
        else
                return -EPERM;

        if (current->egid != old_egid)
                current->dumpable = 0;
        return 0;
}
  
/* 
 * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of
 * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid.
 *
 *  1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of
 *  {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are
 *  cleared.
 *
 *  2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective
 *  capabilities of the process are cleared.
 *
 *  3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective
 *  capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities.
 *
 *  fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should 
 *  never happen.
 *
 *  -astor 
 *
 * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99
 * A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it
 * calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and
 * effective sets will be retained.
 * Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some
 * of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges!
 * Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital
 * files..
 * Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this.
 */
extern inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(int old_ruid, int old_euid, 
                                       int old_suid)
{
        if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) &&
            (current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0 && current->suid != 0) &&
            !current->keep_capabilities) {
                cap_clear(current->cap_permitted);
                cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
        }
        if (old_euid == 0 && current->euid != 0) {
                cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
        }
        if (old_euid != 0 && current->euid == 0) {
                current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted;
        }
}

/*
 * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid
 * or vice versa.  (BSD-style)
 *
 * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not
 * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid.
 *
 * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its
 * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
 * a security audit over a program.
 *
 * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be
 * 100% compatible with BSD.  A program which uses just setuid() will be
 * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. 
 */
asmlinkage long sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
{
        int old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, new_ruid;

        new_ruid = old_ruid = current->uid;
        old_euid = current->euid;
        old_suid = current->suid;
        if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
                if ((old_ruid == ruid) || 
                    (current->euid==ruid) ||
                    capable(CAP_SETUID))
                        new_ruid = ruid;
                else
                        return -EPERM;
        }
        if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
                if ((old_ruid == euid) ||
                    (current->euid == euid) ||
                    (current->suid == euid) ||
                    capable(CAP_SETUID))
                        current->fsuid = current->euid = euid;
                else
                        return -EPERM;
        }
        if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 ||
            (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old_ruid))
                current->suid = current->euid;
        current->fsuid = current->euid;
        if (current->euid != old_euid)
                current->dumpable = 0;

        if(new_ruid != old_ruid) {
                /* What if a process setreuid()'s and this brings the
                 * new uid over his NPROC rlimit?  We can check this now
                 * cheaply with the new uid cache, so if it matters
                 * we should be checking for it.  -DaveM
                 */
                free_uid(current);
                current->uid = new_ruid;
                alloc_uid(current);
        }
        
        if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
                cap_emulate_setxuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid);
        }

        return 0;
}


                
/*
 * setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS 
 * 
 * Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program
 * like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal 
 * user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets
 * the saved uid too.  If you don't like this, blame the bright people
 * in the POSIX committee and/or USG.  Note that the BSD-style setreuid()
 * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to
 * regain them by swapping the real and effective uid.  
 */
asmlinkage long sys_setuid(uid_t uid)
{
        int old_euid = current->euid;
        int old_ruid, old_suid, new_ruid;

        old_ruid = new_ruid = current->uid;
        old_suid = current->suid;
        if (capable(CAP_SETUID))
                new_ruid = current->euid = current->suid = current->fsuid = uid;
        else if ((uid == current->uid) || (uid == current->suid))
                current->fsuid = current->euid = uid;
        else
                return -EPERM;

        if (current->euid != old_euid)
                current->dumpable = 0;

       if (new_ruid != old_ruid) {
                /* See comment above about NPROC rlimit issues... */
                free_uid(current);
                current->uid = new_ruid;
                alloc_uid(current);
        }

        if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
                cap_emulate_setxuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid);
        }

        return 0;
}


/*
 * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid,
 * and suid.  This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid().
 */
asmlinkage long sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
{
        int old_ruid = current->uid;
        int old_euid = current->euid;
        int old_suid = current->suid;

        if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
                if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && (ruid != current->uid) &&
                    (ruid != current->euid) && (ruid != current->suid))
                        return -EPERM;
                if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && (euid != current->uid) &&
                    (euid != current->euid) && (euid != current->suid))
                        return -EPERM;
                if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && (suid != current->uid) &&
                    (suid != current->euid) && (suid != current->suid))
                        return -EPERM;
        }
        if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
                /* See above commentary about NPROC rlimit issues here. */
                free_uid(current);
                current->uid = ruid;
                alloc_uid(current);
        }
        if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
                if (euid != current->euid)
                        current->dumpable = 0;
                current->euid = euid;
                current->fsuid = euid;
        }
        if (suid != (uid_t) -1)
                current->suid = suid;

        if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
                cap_emulate_setxuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid);
        }

        return 0;
}

asmlinkage long sys_getresuid(uid_t *ruid, uid_t *euid, uid_t *suid)
{
        int retval;

        if (!(retval = put_user(current->uid, ruid)) &&
            !(retval = put_user(current->euid, euid)))
                retval = put_user(current->suid, suid);

        return retval;
}

/*
 * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid.
 */
asmlinkage long sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
{
       if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
                if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && (rgid != current->gid) &&
                    (rgid != current->egid) && (rgid != current->sgid))
                        return -EPERM;
                if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && (egid != current->gid) &&
                    (egid != current->egid) && (egid != current->sgid))
                        return -EPERM;
                if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && (sgid != current->gid) &&
                    (sgid != current->egid) && (sgid != current->sgid))
                        return -EPERM;
        }
        if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
                current->gid = rgid;
        if (egid != (gid_t) -1) {
                if (egid != current->egid)
                        current->dumpable = 0;
                current->egid = egid;
                current->fsgid = egid;
        }
        if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
                current->sgid = sgid;
        return 0;
}

asmlinkage long sys_getresgid(gid_t *rgid, gid_t *egid, gid_t *sgid)
{
        int retval;

        if (!(retval = put_user(current->gid, rgid)) &&
            !(retval = put_user(current->egid, egid)))
                retval = put_user(current->sgid, sgid);

        return retval;
}


/*
 * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This
 * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at
 * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when
 * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access..
 */
asmlinkage long sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid)
{
        int old_fsuid;

        old_fsuid = current->fsuid;
        if (uid == current->uid || uid == current->euid ||
            uid == current->suid || uid == current->fsuid || 
            capable(CAP_SETUID))
                current->fsuid = uid;
        if (current->fsuid != old_fsuid)
                current->dumpable = 0;

        /* We emulate fsuid by essentially doing a scaled-down version
         * of what we did in setresuid and friends. However, we only
         * operate on the fs-specific bits of the process' effective
         * capabilities 
         *
         * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
         *          if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
         */
        
        if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
                if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) {
                        cap_t(current->cap_effective) &= ~CAP_FS_MASK;
                }
                if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) {
                        cap_t(current->cap_effective) |=
                                (cap_t(current->cap_permitted) & CAP_FS_MASK);
                }
        }

        return old_fsuid;
}

/*
 * Samma på svenska..
 */
asmlinkage long sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid)
{
        int old_fsgid;

        old_fsgid = current->fsgid;
        if (gid == current->gid || gid == current->egid ||
            gid == current->sgid || gid == current->fsgid || 
            capable(CAP_SETGID))
                current->fsgid = gid;
        if (current->fsgid != old_fsgid)
                current->dumpable = 0;

        return old_fsgid;
}

asmlinkage long sys_times(struct tms * tbuf)
{
        struct tms temp;

        /*
         *      In the SMP world we might just be unlucky and have one of
         *      the times increment as we use it. Since the value is an
         *      atomically safe type this is just fine. Conceptually its
         *      as if the syscall took an instant longer to occur.
         */
        if (tbuf) {
                temp.tms_utime = hz_to_std(current->times.tms_utime);
                temp.tms_stime = hz_to_std(current->times.tms_stime);
                temp.tms_cutime = hz_to_std(current->times.tms_cutime);
                temp.tms_cstime = hz_to_std(current->times.tms_cstime);
                if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &temp, sizeof(struct tms)))
                        return -EFAULT;
        }
        return hz_to_std(jiffies);
}

/*
 * This needs some heavy checking ...
 * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully
 * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it.
 *
 * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really
 * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user
 * can't send a signal to a process owned by another.  -TYT, 12/12/91
 *
 * Auch. Had to add the 'did_exec' flag to conform completely to POSIX.
 * LBT 04.03.94
 */

asmlinkage long sys_setpgid(pid_t pid, pid_t pgid)
{
        struct task_struct * p;
        int err = -EINVAL;

        if (!pid)
                pid = current->pid;
        if (!pgid)
                pgid = pid;
        if (pgid < 0)
                return -EINVAL;

        /* From this point forward we keep holding onto the tasklist lock
         * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM
         */
        read_lock(&tasklist_lock);

        err = -ESRCH;
        p = find_task_by_pid(pid);
        if (!p)
                goto out;

        if (p->p_pptr == current || p->p_opptr == current) {
                err = -EPERM;
                if (p->session != current->session)
                        goto out;
                err = -EACCES;
                if (p->did_exec)
                        goto out;
        } else if (p != current)
                goto out;
        err = -EPERM;
        if (p->leader)
                goto out;
        if (pgid != pid) {
                struct task_struct * tmp;
                for_each_task (tmp) {
                        if (tmp->pgrp == pgid &&
                            tmp->session == current->session)
                                goto ok_pgid;
                }
                goto out;
        }

ok_pgid:
        p->pgrp = pgid;
        err = 0;
out:
        /* All paths lead to here, thus we are safe. -DaveM */
        read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
        return err;
}

asmlinkage long sys_getpgid(pid_t pid)
{
        if (!pid) {
                return current->pgrp;
        } else {
                int retval;
                struct task_struct *p;

                read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
                p = find_task_by_pid(pid);

                retval = -ESRCH;
                if (p)
                        retval = p->pgrp;
                read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
                return retval;
        }
}

asmlinkage long sys_getpgrp(void)
{
        /* SMP - assuming writes are word atomic this is fine */
        return current->pgrp;
}

asmlinkage long sys_getsid(pid_t pid)
{
        if (!pid) {
                return current->session;
        } else {
                int retval;
                struct task_struct *p;

                read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
                p = find_task_by_pid(pid);

                retval = -ESRCH;
                if(p)
                        retval = p->session;
                read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
                return retval;
        }
}

asmlinkage long sys_setsid(void)
{
        struct task_struct * p;
        int err = -EPERM;

        read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
        for_each_task(p) {
                if (p->pgrp == current->pid)
                        goto out;
        }

        current->leader = 1;
        current->session = current->pgrp = current->pid;
        current->tty = NULL;
        current->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
        err = current->pgrp;
out:
        read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
        return err;
}

/*
 * Supplementary group IDs
 */
asmlinkage long sys_getgroups(int gidsetsize, gid_t *grouplist)
{
        int i;
        
        /*
         *      SMP: Nobody else can change our grouplist. Thus we are
         *      safe.
         */

        if (gidsetsize < 0)
                return -EINVAL;
        i = current->ngroups;
        if (gidsetsize) {
                if (i > gidsetsize)
                        return -EINVAL;
                if (copy_to_user(grouplist, current->groups, sizeof(gid_t)*i))
                        return -EFAULT;
        }
        return i;
}

/*
 *      SMP: Our groups are not shared. We can copy to/from them safely
 *      without another task interfering.
 */
 
asmlinkage long sys_setgroups(int gidsetsize, gid_t *grouplist)
{
        if (!capable(CAP_SETGID))
                return -EPERM;
        if ((unsigned) gidsetsize > NGROUPS)
                return -EINVAL;
        if(copy_from_user(current->groups, grouplist, gidsetsize * sizeof(gid_t)))
                return -EFAULT;
        current->ngroups = gidsetsize;
        return 0;
}

static int supplemental_group_member(gid_t grp)
{
        int i = current->ngroups;

        if (i) {
                gid_t *groups = current->groups;
                do {
                        if (*groups == grp)
                                return 1;
                        groups++;
                        i--;
                } while (i);
        }
        return 0;
}

/*
 * Check whether we're fsgid/egid or in the supplemental group..
 */
int in_group_p(gid_t grp)
{
        int retval = 1;
        if (grp != current->fsgid)
                retval = supplemental_group_member(grp);
        return retval;
}

int in_egroup_p(gid_t grp)
{
        int retval = 1;
        if (grp != current->egid)
                retval = supplemental_group_member(grp);
        return retval;
}

DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem);

asmlinkage long sys_newuname(struct new_utsname * name)
{
        int errno = 0;

        down_read(&uts_sem);
        if (copy_to_user(name,&system_utsname,sizeof *name))
                errno = -EFAULT;
        up_read(&uts_sem);
        return errno;
}

asmlinkage long sys_sethostname(char *name, int len)
{
        int errno;

        if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                return -EPERM;
        if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
                return -EINVAL;
        down_write(&uts_sem);
        errno = -EFAULT;
        if (!copy_from_user(system_utsname.nodename, name, len)) {
                system_utsname.nodename[len] = 0;
                errno = 0;
        }
        up_write(&uts_sem);
        return errno;
}

asmlinkage long sys_gethostname(char *name, int len)
{
        int i, errno;

        if (len < 0)
                return -EINVAL;
        down_read(&uts_sem);
        i = 1 + strlen(system_utsname.nodename);
        if (i > len)
                i = len;
        errno = 0;
        if (copy_to_user(name, system_utsname.nodename, i))
                errno = -EFAULT;
        up_read(&uts_sem);
        return errno;
}

/*
 * Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling
 * uname()
 */
asmlinkage long sys_setdomainname(char *name, int len)
{
        int errno;

        if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                return -EPERM;
        if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
                return -EINVAL;

        down_write(&uts_sem);
        errno = -EFAULT;
        if (!copy_from_user(system_utsname.domainname, name, len)) {
                errno = 0;
                system_utsname.domainname[len] = 0;
        }
        up_write(&uts_sem);
        return errno;
}

asmlinkage long sys_getrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *rlim)
{
        if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
                return -EINVAL;
        else
                return copy_to_user(rlim, current->rlim + resource, sizeof(*rlim))
                        ? -EFAULT : 0;
}

#if !defined(__ia64__) && !defined(__s390__)

/*
 *      Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps.
 */
 
asmlinkage long sys_old_getrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *rlim)
{
        struct rlimit x;
        if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
                return -EINVAL;

        memcpy(&x, current->rlim + resource, sizeof(*rlim));
        if(x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF)
                x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF;
        if(x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF)
                x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF;
        return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x))?-EFAULT:0;
}

#endif

asmlinkage long sys_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *rlim)
{
        struct rlimit new_rlim, *old_rlim;

        if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
                return -EINVAL;
        if(copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim)))
                return -EFAULT;
        if (new_rlim.rlim_cur < 0 || new_rlim.rlim_max < 0)
                return -EINVAL;
        old_rlim = current->rlim + resource;
        if (((new_rlim.rlim_cur > old_rlim->rlim_max) ||
             (new_rlim.rlim_max > old_rlim->rlim_max)) &&
            !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
                return -EPERM;
        if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE) {
                if (new_rlim.rlim_cur > NR_OPEN || new_rlim.rlim_max > NR_OPEN)
                        return -EPERM;
        }
        *old_rlim = new_rlim;
        return 0;
}

/*
 * It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct,
 * except that would make the task_struct be *really big*.  After
 * task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would
 * make sense to do this.  It will make moving the rest of the information
 * a lot simpler!  (Which we're not doing right now because we're not
 * measuring them yet).
 *
 * This is SMP safe.  Either we are called from sys_getrusage on ourselves
 * below (we know we aren't going to exit/disappear and only we change our
 * rusage counters), or we are called from wait4() on a process which is
 * either stopped or zombied.  In the zombied case the task won't get
 * reaped till shortly after the call to getrusage(), in both cases the
 * task being examined is in a frozen state so the counters won't change.
 *
 * FIXME! Get the fault counts properly!
 */
int getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *ru)
{
        struct rusage r;

        memset((char *) &r, 0, sizeof(r));
        switch (who) {
                case RUSAGE_SELF:
                        r.ru_utime.tv_sec = CT_TO_SECS(p->times.tms_utime);
                        r.ru_utime.tv_usec = CT_TO_USECS(p->times.tms_utime);
                        r.ru_stime.tv_sec = CT_TO_SECS(p->times.tms_stime);
                        r.ru_stime.tv_usec = CT_TO_USECS(p->times.tms_stime);
                        r.ru_minflt = p->min_flt;
                        r.ru_majflt = p->maj_flt;
                        r.ru_nswap = p->nswap;
                        break;
                case RUSAGE_CHILDREN:
                        r.ru_utime.tv_sec = CT_TO_SECS(p->times.tms_cutime);
                        r.ru_utime.tv_usec = CT_TO_USECS(p->times.tms_cutime);
                        r.ru_stime.tv_sec = CT_TO_SECS(p->times.tms_cstime);
                        r.ru_stime.tv_usec = CT_TO_USECS(p->times.tms_cstime);
                        r.ru_minflt = p->cmin_flt;
                        r.ru_majflt = p->cmaj_flt;
                        r.ru_nswap = p->cnswap;
                        break;
                default:
                        r.ru_utime.tv_sec = CT_TO_SECS(p->times.tms_utime + p->times.tms_cutime);
                        r.ru_utime.tv_usec = CT_TO_USECS(p->times.tms_utime + p->times.tms_cutime);
                        r.ru_stime.tv_sec = CT_TO_SECS(p->times.tms_stime + p->times.tms_cstime);
                        r.ru_stime.tv_usec = CT_TO_USECS(p->times.tms_stime + p->times.tms_cstime);
                        r.ru_minflt = p->min_flt + p->cmin_flt;
                        r.ru_majflt = p->maj_flt + p->cmaj_flt;
                        r.ru_nswap = p->nswap + p->cnswap;
                        break;
        }
        return copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}

asmlinkage long sys_getrusage(int who, struct rusage *ru)
{
        if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN)
                return -EINVAL;
        return getrusage(current, who, ru);
}

asmlinkage long sys_umask(int mask)
{
        mask = xchg(&current->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO);
        return mask;
}
    
asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
                          unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
        int error = 0;
        int sig;

        switch (option) {
                case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG:
                        sig = arg2;
                        if (sig > _NSIG) {
                                error = -EINVAL;
                                break;
                        }
                        current->pdeath_signal = sig;
                        break;
                case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG:
                        error = put_user(current->pdeath_signal, (int *)arg2);
                        break;
                case PR_GET_DUMPABLE:
                        if (current->dumpable)
                                error = 1;
                        break;
                case PR_SET_DUMPABLE:
                        if (arg2 != 0 && arg2 != 1) {
                                error = -EINVAL;
                                break;
                        }
                        current->dumpable = arg2;
                        break;
                case PR_SET_UNALIGN:
#ifdef SET_UNALIGN_CTL
                        error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(current, arg2);
#else
                        error = -EINVAL;
#endif
                        break;

                case PR_GET_UNALIGN:
#ifdef GET_UNALIGN_CTL
                        error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(current, arg2);
#else
                        error = -EINVAL;
#endif
                        break;

                case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
                        if (current->keep_capabilities)
                                error = 1;
                        break;
                case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
                        if (arg2 != 0 && arg2 != 1) {
                                error = -EINVAL;
                                break;
                        }
                        current->keep_capabilities = arg2;
                        break;
                default:
                        error = -EINVAL;
                        break;
        }
        return error;
}

EXPORT_SYMBOL(notifier_chain_register);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(notifier_chain_unregister);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(notifier_call_chain);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_reboot_notifier);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_reboot_notifier);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(in_group_p);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(in_egroup_p);