gma500: Move our other GEM helper into the bits want to push into GEM
[linux-2.6/linux-acpi-2.6/ibm-acpi-2.6.git] / net / mac80211 / wpa.c
blob9dc3b5f26e80c800a306aca5287b0e22fcda5378
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
3 * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 * published by the Free Software Foundation.
8 */
10 #include <linux/netdevice.h>
11 #include <linux/types.h>
12 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
13 #include <linux/compiler.h>
14 #include <linux/ieee80211.h>
15 #include <linux/gfp.h>
16 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
17 #include <net/mac80211.h>
19 #include "ieee80211_i.h"
20 #include "michael.h"
21 #include "tkip.h"
22 #include "aes_ccm.h"
23 #include "aes_cmac.h"
24 #include "wpa.h"
26 ieee80211_tx_result
27 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
29 u8 *data, *key, *mic;
30 size_t data_len;
31 unsigned int hdrlen;
32 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
33 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
34 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
35 int tail;
37 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
38 if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
39 skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
40 return TX_CONTINUE;
42 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
43 if (skb->len < hdrlen)
44 return TX_DROP;
46 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
47 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
49 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
50 /* Need to use software crypto for the test */
51 info->control.hw_key = NULL;
54 if (info->control.hw_key &&
55 !(tx->flags & IEEE80211_TX_FRAGMENTED) &&
56 !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)) {
57 /* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC */
58 return TX_CONTINUE;
61 tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
62 if (!info->control.hw_key)
63 tail += TKIP_ICV_LEN;
65 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
66 skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN))
67 return TX_DROP;
69 key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
70 mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
71 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
72 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
73 mic[0]++;
75 return TX_CONTINUE;
79 ieee80211_rx_result
80 ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
82 u8 *data, *key = NULL;
83 size_t data_len;
84 unsigned int hdrlen;
85 u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
86 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
87 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
88 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
91 * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
92 * than data frames.
94 if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
95 return RX_CONTINUE;
98 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
99 * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
100 * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
101 * MIC failure report.
103 if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
104 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
105 goto mic_fail;
107 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
108 goto update_iv;
110 return RX_CONTINUE;
114 * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
115 * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
116 * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
118 if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
119 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
120 return RX_CONTINUE;
122 if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
124 * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
125 * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
126 * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
127 * frames in the BSS. (
129 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
132 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
133 goto mic_fail;
135 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
136 if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
137 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
139 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
140 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
141 key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
142 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
143 if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
144 goto mic_fail;
146 /* remove Michael MIC from payload */
147 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
149 update_iv:
150 /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
151 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->queue].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
152 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->queue].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
154 return RX_CONTINUE;
156 mic_fail:
157 mac80211_ev_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata, rx->key->conf.keyidx,
158 (void *) skb->data, NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
159 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
163 static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
165 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
166 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
167 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
168 unsigned int hdrlen;
169 int len, tail;
170 u8 *pos;
172 if (info->control.hw_key &&
173 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) {
174 /* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
175 return 0;
178 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
179 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
181 if (info->control.hw_key)
182 tail = 0;
183 else
184 tail = TKIP_ICV_LEN;
186 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
187 skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN))
188 return -1;
190 pos = skb_push(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN);
191 memmove(pos, pos + TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
192 pos += hdrlen;
194 /* Increase IV for the frame */
195 key->u.tkip.tx.iv16++;
196 if (key->u.tkip.tx.iv16 == 0)
197 key->u.tkip.tx.iv32++;
199 pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, key, key->u.tkip.tx.iv16);
201 /* hwaccel - with software IV */
202 if (info->control.hw_key)
203 return 0;
205 /* Add room for ICV */
206 skb_put(skb, TKIP_ICV_LEN);
208 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
209 return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(tx->local->wep_tx_tfm,
210 key, pos, len, hdr->addr2);
214 ieee80211_tx_result
215 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
217 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
219 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
221 do {
222 if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
223 return TX_DROP;
224 } while ((skb = skb->next));
226 return TX_CONTINUE;
230 ieee80211_rx_result
231 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
233 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
234 int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
235 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
236 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
237 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
239 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
241 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
242 return RX_CONTINUE;
244 if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
245 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
248 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
249 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
250 * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
252 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
253 hwaccel = 1;
255 res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
256 key, skb->data + hdrlen,
257 skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
258 hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->queue,
259 &rx->tkip_iv32,
260 &rx->tkip_iv16);
261 if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
262 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
264 /* Trim ICV */
265 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - TKIP_ICV_LEN);
267 /* Remove IV */
268 memmove(skb->data + TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
269 skb_pull(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN);
271 return RX_CONTINUE;
275 static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch,
276 int encrypted)
278 __le16 mask_fc;
279 int a4_included, mgmt;
280 u8 qos_tid;
281 u8 *b_0, *aad;
282 u16 data_len, len_a;
283 unsigned int hdrlen;
284 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
286 b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_LEN;
287 aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_LEN;
290 * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
291 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
293 mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
294 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
295 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
296 IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
297 if (!mgmt)
298 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
299 mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
301 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
302 len_a = hdrlen - 2;
303 a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
305 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
306 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
307 else
308 qos_tid = 0;
310 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN;
311 if (encrypted)
312 data_len -= CCMP_MIC_LEN;
314 /* First block, b_0 */
315 b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */
316 /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
317 * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
319 b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
320 memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
321 memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
322 /* l(m) */
323 put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]);
325 /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
326 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
327 put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
328 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
329 memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
331 /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
332 aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
333 aad[23] = 0;
335 if (a4_included) {
336 memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
337 aad[30] = qos_tid;
338 aad[31] = 0;
339 } else {
340 memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
341 aad[24] = qos_tid;
346 static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
348 hdr[0] = pn[5];
349 hdr[1] = pn[4];
350 hdr[2] = 0;
351 hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
352 hdr[4] = pn[3];
353 hdr[5] = pn[2];
354 hdr[6] = pn[1];
355 hdr[7] = pn[0];
359 static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
361 pn[0] = hdr[7];
362 pn[1] = hdr[6];
363 pn[2] = hdr[5];
364 pn[3] = hdr[4];
365 pn[4] = hdr[1];
366 pn[5] = hdr[0];
370 static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
372 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
373 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
374 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
375 int hdrlen, len, tail;
376 u8 *pos, *pn;
377 int i;
379 if (info->control.hw_key &&
380 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) {
382 * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
383 * header or MIC fields
385 return 0;
388 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
389 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
391 if (info->control.hw_key)
392 tail = 0;
393 else
394 tail = CCMP_MIC_LEN;
396 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
397 skb_headroom(skb) < CCMP_HDR_LEN))
398 return -1;
400 pos = skb_push(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
401 memmove(pos, pos + CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
402 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
403 pos += hdrlen;
405 /* PN = PN + 1 */
406 pn = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn;
408 for (i = CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
409 pn[i]++;
410 if (pn[i])
411 break;
414 ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
416 /* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
417 if (info->control.hw_key)
418 return 0;
420 pos += CCMP_HDR_LEN;
421 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, key->u.ccmp.tx_crypto_buf, 0);
422 ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, key->u.ccmp.tx_crypto_buf, pos, len,
423 pos, skb_put(skb, CCMP_MIC_LEN));
425 return 0;
429 ieee80211_tx_result
430 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
432 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
434 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
436 do {
437 if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
438 return TX_DROP;
439 } while ((skb = skb->next));
441 return TX_CONTINUE;
445 ieee80211_rx_result
446 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
448 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
449 int hdrlen;
450 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
451 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
452 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
453 u8 pn[CCMP_PN_LEN];
454 int data_len;
455 int queue;
457 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
459 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
460 !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(hdr))
461 return RX_CONTINUE;
463 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN - CCMP_MIC_LEN;
464 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
465 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
467 ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
469 queue = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control) ?
470 NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES : rx->queue;
472 if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
473 key->u.ccmp.replays++;
474 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
477 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
478 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
479 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf, 1);
481 if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
482 key->u.ccmp.tfm, key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf,
483 skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len,
484 skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN,
485 skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
486 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
489 memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
491 /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
492 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN);
493 memmove(skb->data + CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
494 skb_pull(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
496 return RX_CONTINUE;
500 static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
502 /* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
504 /* FC type/subtype */
505 aad[0] = skb->data[0];
506 /* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
507 aad[1] = skb->data[1] & ~(BIT(4) | BIT(5) | BIT(6));
508 /* A1 || A2 || A3 */
509 memcpy(aad + 2, skb->data + 4, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
513 static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
515 *d++ = s[5];
516 *d++ = s[4];
517 *d++ = s[3];
518 *d++ = s[2];
519 *d++ = s[1];
520 *d = s[0];
524 ieee80211_tx_result
525 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
527 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
528 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
529 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
530 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
531 u8 *pn, aad[20];
532 int i;
534 if (info->control.hw_key)
535 return 0;
537 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
538 return TX_DROP;
540 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
541 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
542 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
543 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
545 /* PN = PN + 1 */
546 pn = key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn;
548 for (i = sizeof(key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
549 pn[i]++;
550 if (pn[i])
551 break;
553 bip_ipn_swap(mmie->sequence_number, pn);
555 bip_aad(skb, aad);
558 * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
560 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, key->u.aes_cmac.tx_crypto_buf,
561 aad, skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
563 return TX_CONTINUE;
567 ieee80211_rx_result
568 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
570 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
571 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
572 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
573 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
574 u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6];
575 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
577 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
578 return RX_CONTINUE;
580 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
581 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
583 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *)
584 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
585 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
586 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
587 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
589 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
591 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
592 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
593 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
596 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
597 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
598 bip_aad(skb, aad);
599 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm,
600 key->u.aes_cmac.rx_crypto_buf, aad,
601 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
602 if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
603 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
604 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
608 memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
610 /* Remove MMIE */
611 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
613 return RX_CONTINUE;