mm/vmalloc.c: report more vmalloc failures
[linux-2.6/linux-acpi-2.6/ibm-acpi-2.6.git] / net / mac80211 / wpa.c
blobf614ce7bb6e3b4aea4f9c445e2594b2c6366e6d0
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
3 * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 * published by the Free Software Foundation.
8 */
10 #include <linux/netdevice.h>
11 #include <linux/types.h>
12 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
13 #include <linux/compiler.h>
14 #include <linux/ieee80211.h>
15 #include <linux/gfp.h>
16 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
17 #include <net/mac80211.h>
18 #include <crypto/aes.h>
20 #include "ieee80211_i.h"
21 #include "michael.h"
22 #include "tkip.h"
23 #include "aes_ccm.h"
24 #include "aes_cmac.h"
25 #include "wpa.h"
27 ieee80211_tx_result
28 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
30 u8 *data, *key, *mic;
31 size_t data_len;
32 unsigned int hdrlen;
33 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
34 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
35 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
36 int tail;
38 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
39 if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
40 skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
41 return TX_CONTINUE;
43 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
44 if (skb->len < hdrlen)
45 return TX_DROP;
47 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
48 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
50 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
51 /* Need to use software crypto for the test */
52 info->control.hw_key = NULL;
55 if (info->control.hw_key &&
56 (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG ||
57 tx->local->ops->set_frag_threshold) &&
58 !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)) {
59 /* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC */
60 return TX_CONTINUE;
63 tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
64 if (!info->control.hw_key)
65 tail += TKIP_ICV_LEN;
67 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
68 skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN))
69 return TX_DROP;
71 key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
72 mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
73 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
74 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
75 mic[0]++;
77 return TX_CONTINUE;
81 ieee80211_rx_result
82 ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
84 u8 *data, *key = NULL;
85 size_t data_len;
86 unsigned int hdrlen;
87 u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
88 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
89 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
90 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
93 * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
94 * than data frames.
96 if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
97 return RX_CONTINUE;
100 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
101 * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
102 * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
103 * MIC failure report.
105 if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
106 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
107 goto mic_fail;
109 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
110 goto update_iv;
112 return RX_CONTINUE;
116 * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
117 * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
118 * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
120 if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
121 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
122 return RX_CONTINUE;
124 if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
126 * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
127 * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
128 * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
129 * frames in the BSS. (
131 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
134 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
135 goto mic_fail;
137 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
138 if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
139 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
141 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
142 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
143 key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
144 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
145 if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
146 goto mic_fail;
148 /* remove Michael MIC from payload */
149 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
151 update_iv:
152 /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
153 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
154 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
156 return RX_CONTINUE;
158 mic_fail:
160 * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in
161 * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if
162 * the key is set.
164 mac80211_ev_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata,
165 rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1,
166 (void *) skb->data, NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
167 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
171 static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
173 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
174 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
175 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
176 unsigned long flags;
177 unsigned int hdrlen;
178 int len, tail;
179 u8 *pos;
181 if (info->control.hw_key &&
182 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) {
183 /* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
184 return 0;
187 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
188 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
190 if (info->control.hw_key)
191 tail = 0;
192 else
193 tail = TKIP_ICV_LEN;
195 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
196 skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN))
197 return -1;
199 pos = skb_push(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN);
200 memmove(pos, pos + TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
201 pos += hdrlen;
203 /* Increase IV for the frame */
204 spin_lock_irqsave(&key->u.tkip.txlock, flags);
205 key->u.tkip.tx.iv16++;
206 if (key->u.tkip.tx.iv16 == 0)
207 key->u.tkip.tx.iv32++;
208 pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, key);
209 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&key->u.tkip.txlock, flags);
211 /* hwaccel - with software IV */
212 if (info->control.hw_key)
213 return 0;
215 /* Add room for ICV */
216 skb_put(skb, TKIP_ICV_LEN);
218 return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(tx->local->wep_tx_tfm,
219 key, skb, pos, len);
223 ieee80211_tx_result
224 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
226 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
228 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
230 do {
231 if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
232 return TX_DROP;
233 } while ((skb = skb->next));
235 return TX_CONTINUE;
239 ieee80211_rx_result
240 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
242 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
243 int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
244 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
245 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
246 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
248 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
250 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
251 return RX_CONTINUE;
253 if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
254 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
257 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
258 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
259 * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
261 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
262 hwaccel = 1;
264 res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
265 key, skb->data + hdrlen,
266 skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
267 hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
268 &rx->tkip_iv32,
269 &rx->tkip_iv16);
270 if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
271 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
273 /* Trim ICV */
274 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - TKIP_ICV_LEN);
276 /* Remove IV */
277 memmove(skb->data + TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
278 skb_pull(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN);
280 return RX_CONTINUE;
284 static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch,
285 int encrypted)
287 __le16 mask_fc;
288 int a4_included, mgmt;
289 u8 qos_tid;
290 u8 *b_0, *aad;
291 u16 data_len, len_a;
292 unsigned int hdrlen;
293 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
295 memset(scratch, 0, 6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
297 b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
298 aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
301 * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
302 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
304 mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
305 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
306 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
307 IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
308 if (!mgmt)
309 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
310 mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
312 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
313 len_a = hdrlen - 2;
314 a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
316 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
317 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
318 else
319 qos_tid = 0;
321 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN;
322 if (encrypted)
323 data_len -= CCMP_MIC_LEN;
325 /* First block, b_0 */
326 b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */
327 /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
328 * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
330 b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
331 memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
332 memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
333 /* l(m) */
334 put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]);
336 /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
337 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
338 put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
339 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
340 memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
342 /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
343 aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
344 aad[23] = 0;
346 if (a4_included) {
347 memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
348 aad[30] = qos_tid;
349 aad[31] = 0;
350 } else {
351 memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
352 aad[24] = qos_tid;
357 static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
359 hdr[0] = pn[5];
360 hdr[1] = pn[4];
361 hdr[2] = 0;
362 hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
363 hdr[4] = pn[3];
364 hdr[5] = pn[2];
365 hdr[6] = pn[1];
366 hdr[7] = pn[0];
370 static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
372 pn[0] = hdr[7];
373 pn[1] = hdr[6];
374 pn[2] = hdr[5];
375 pn[3] = hdr[4];
376 pn[4] = hdr[1];
377 pn[5] = hdr[0];
381 static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
383 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
384 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
385 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
386 int hdrlen, len, tail;
387 u8 *pos;
388 u8 pn[6];
389 u64 pn64;
390 u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
392 if (info->control.hw_key &&
393 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) {
395 * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
396 * header or MIC fields
398 return 0;
401 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
402 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
404 if (info->control.hw_key)
405 tail = 0;
406 else
407 tail = CCMP_MIC_LEN;
409 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
410 skb_headroom(skb) < CCMP_HDR_LEN))
411 return -1;
413 pos = skb_push(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
414 memmove(pos, pos + CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
415 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
416 pos += hdrlen;
418 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn);
420 pn[5] = pn64;
421 pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
422 pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
423 pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
424 pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
425 pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
427 ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
429 /* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
430 if (info->control.hw_key)
431 return 0;
433 pos += CCMP_HDR_LEN;
434 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 0);
435 ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch, pos, len,
436 pos, skb_put(skb, CCMP_MIC_LEN));
438 return 0;
442 ieee80211_tx_result
443 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
445 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
447 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
449 do {
450 if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
451 return TX_DROP;
452 } while ((skb = skb->next));
454 return TX_CONTINUE;
458 ieee80211_rx_result
459 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
461 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
462 int hdrlen;
463 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
464 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
465 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
466 u8 pn[CCMP_PN_LEN];
467 int data_len;
468 int queue;
470 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
472 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
473 !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(hdr))
474 return RX_CONTINUE;
476 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN - CCMP_MIC_LEN;
477 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
478 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
480 ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
482 queue = rx->security_idx;
484 if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
485 key->u.ccmp.replays++;
486 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
489 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
490 u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
491 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
492 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 1);
494 if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
495 key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch,
496 skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len,
497 skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN,
498 skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
499 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
502 memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
504 /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
505 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN);
506 memmove(skb->data + CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
507 skb_pull(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
509 return RX_CONTINUE;
513 static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
515 /* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
517 /* FC type/subtype */
518 aad[0] = skb->data[0];
519 /* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
520 aad[1] = skb->data[1] & ~(BIT(4) | BIT(5) | BIT(6));
521 /* A1 || A2 || A3 */
522 memcpy(aad + 2, skb->data + 4, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
526 static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn)
528 *d++ = pn;
529 *d++ = pn >> 8;
530 *d++ = pn >> 16;
531 *d++ = pn >> 24;
532 *d++ = pn >> 32;
533 *d = pn >> 40;
536 static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
538 *d++ = s[5];
539 *d++ = s[4];
540 *d++ = s[3];
541 *d++ = s[2];
542 *d++ = s[1];
543 *d = s[0];
547 ieee80211_tx_result
548 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
550 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
551 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
552 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
553 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
554 u8 aad[20];
555 u64 pn64;
557 if (info->control.hw_key)
558 return 0;
560 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
561 return TX_DROP;
563 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
564 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
565 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
566 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
568 /* PN = PN + 1 */
569 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn);
571 bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
573 bip_aad(skb, aad);
576 * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
578 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
579 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
581 return TX_CONTINUE;
585 ieee80211_rx_result
586 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
588 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
589 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
590 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
591 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
592 u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6];
593 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
595 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
596 return RX_CONTINUE;
598 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
599 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
601 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *)
602 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
603 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
604 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
605 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
607 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
609 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
610 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
611 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
614 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
615 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
616 bip_aad(skb, aad);
617 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
618 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
619 if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
620 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
621 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
625 memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
627 /* Remove MMIE */
628 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
630 return RX_CONTINUE;