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[PATCH] Documentation/IPMI typos
[linux-2.6/linux-acpi-2.6/ibm-acpi-2.6.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c
blob51bec4c88f19fd020b9fd7f3f1a0556069c907d3
1 /*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
15 *
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
19 */
20
21 #include <linux/config.h>
22 #include <linux/module.h>
23 #include <linux/init.h>
24 #include <linux/kernel.h>
25 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
26 #include <linux/errno.h>
27 #include <linux/sched.h>
28 #include <linux/security.h>
29 #include <linux/xattr.h>
30 #include <linux/capability.h>
31 #include <linux/unistd.h>
32 #include <linux/mm.h>
33 #include <linux/mman.h>
34 #include <linux/slab.h>
35 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
36 #include <linux/swap.h>
37 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
38 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
39 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
40 #include <linux/file.h>
41 #include <linux/namei.h>
42 #include <linux/mount.h>
43 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
44 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
45 #include <linux/kd.h>
46 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
48 #include <linux/tty.h>
49 #include <net/icmp.h>
50 #include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
51 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
52 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
53 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
54 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
55 #include <linux/bitops.h>
56 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
57 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/tcp.h>
60 #include <linux/udp.h>
61 #include <linux/quota.h>
62 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
63 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
64 #include <linux/parser.h>
65 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
66 #include <net/ipv6.h>
67 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
68 #include <linux/personality.h>
69 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
70 #include <linux/audit.h>
71 #include <linux/string.h>
72 #include <linux/selinux.h>
73
74 #include "avc.h"
75 #include "objsec.h"
76 #include "netif.h"
77 #include "xfrm.h"
78
79 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
80 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
81
82 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
83 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
84 extern int selinux_compat_net;
85
86 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
87 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
88
89 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
90 {
91 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
92 return 1;
93 }
94 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
95 #endif
96
97 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
98 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
99
100 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
101 {
102 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
103 return 1;
104 }
105 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
106 #else
107 int selinux_enabled = 1;
108 #endif
109
110 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
111 static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
112
113 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
114 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
115 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
116 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
117 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
118
119 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
120 before the policy was loaded. */
121 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
122 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
123
124 static kmem_cache_t *sel_inode_cache;
125
126 /* Return security context for a given sid or just the context
127 length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
128 static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
129 {
130 char *context;
131 unsigned len;
132 int rc;
133
134 rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
135 if (rc)
136 return rc;
137
138 if (!buffer || !size)
139 goto getsecurity_exit;
140
141 if (size < len) {
142 len = -ERANGE;
143 goto getsecurity_exit;
144 }
145 memcpy(buffer, context, len);
146
147 getsecurity_exit:
148 kfree(context);
149 return len;
150 }
151
152 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
153
154 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
155 {
156 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
157
158 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
159 if (!tsec)
160 return -ENOMEM;
161
162 tsec->task = task;
163 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
164 task->security = tsec;
165
166 return 0;
167 }
168
169 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
170 {
171 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
172 task->security = NULL;
173 kfree(tsec);
174 }
175
176 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
177 {
178 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
179 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
180
181 isec = kmem_cache_alloc(sel_inode_cache, SLAB_KERNEL);
182 if (!isec)
183 return -ENOMEM;
184
185 memset(isec, 0, sizeof(*isec));
186 init_MUTEX(&isec->sem);
187 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
188 isec->inode = inode;
189 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
190 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
191 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
192 inode->i_security = isec;
193
194 return 0;
195 }
196
197 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
198 {
199 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
200 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
201
202 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
203 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
204 list_del_init(&isec->list);
205 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
206
207 inode->i_security = NULL;
208 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
209 }
210
211 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
212 {
213 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
214 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
215
216 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
217 if (!fsec)
218 return -ENOMEM;
219
220 fsec->file = file;
221 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
222 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
223 file->f_security = fsec;
224
225 return 0;
226 }
227
228 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
229 {
230 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
231 file->f_security = NULL;
232 kfree(fsec);
233 }
234
235 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
236 {
237 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
238
239 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
240 if (!sbsec)
241 return -ENOMEM;
242
243 init_MUTEX(&sbsec->sem);
244 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
245 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
246 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
247 sbsec->sb = sb;
248 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
249 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
250 sb->s_security = sbsec;
251
252 return 0;
253 }
254
255 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
256 {
257 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
258
259 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
260 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
261 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
262 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
263
264 sb->s_security = NULL;
265 kfree(sbsec);
266 }
267
268 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
269 {
270 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
271
272 if (family != PF_UNIX)
273 return 0;
274
275 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
276 if (!ssec)
277 return -ENOMEM;
278
279 ssec->sk = sk;
280 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
281 sk->sk_security = ssec;
282
283 return 0;
284 }
285
286 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
287 {
288 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
289
290 if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX)
291 return;
292
293 sk->sk_security = NULL;
294 kfree(ssec);
295 }
296
297 /* The security server must be initialized before
298 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
299 extern int ss_initialized;
300
301 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
302
303 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
304 "uses xattr",
305 "uses transition SIDs",
306 "uses task SIDs",
307 "uses genfs_contexts",
308 "not configured for labeling",
309 "uses mountpoint labeling",
310 };
311
312 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
313
314 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
315 {
316 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
317 }
318
319 enum {
320 Opt_context = 1,
321 Opt_fscontext = 2,
322 Opt_defcontext = 4,
323 };
324
325 static match_table_t tokens = {
326 {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
327 {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
328 {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
329 };
330
331 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
332
333 static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
334 {
335 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
336 const char *name;
337 u32 sid;
338 int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
339 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
340 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
341
342 if (!data)
343 goto out;
344
345 name = sb->s_type->name;
346
347 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
348
349 /* NFS we understand. */
350 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
351 struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
352
353 if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
354 goto out;
355
356 if (d->context[0]) {
357 context = d->context;
358 seen |= Opt_context;
359 }
360 } else
361 goto out;
362
363 } else {
364 /* Standard string-based options. */
365 char *p, *options = data;
366
367 while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
368 int token;
369 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
370
371 if (!*p)
372 continue;
373
374 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
375
376 switch (token) {
377 case Opt_context:
378 if (seen) {
379 rc = -EINVAL;
380 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
381 goto out_free;
382 }
383 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
384 if (!context) {
385 rc = -ENOMEM;
386 goto out_free;
387 }
388 if (!alloc)
389 alloc = 1;
390 seen |= Opt_context;
391 break;
392
393 case Opt_fscontext:
394 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_fscontext)) {
395 rc = -EINVAL;
396 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
397 goto out_free;
398 }
399 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
400 if (!context) {
401 rc = -ENOMEM;
402 goto out_free;
403 }
404 if (!alloc)
405 alloc = 1;
406 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
407 break;
408
409 case Opt_defcontext:
410 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
411 rc = -EINVAL;
412 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: "
413 "defcontext option is invalid "
414 "for this filesystem type\n");
415 goto out_free;
416 }
417 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
418 rc = -EINVAL;
419 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
420 goto out_free;
421 }
422 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
423 if (!defcontext) {
424 rc = -ENOMEM;
425 goto out_free;
426 }
427 if (!alloc)
428 alloc = 1;
429 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
430 break;
431
432 default:
433 rc = -EINVAL;
434 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount "
435 "option\n");
436 goto out_free;
437
438 }
439 }
440 }
441
442 if (!seen)
443 goto out;
444
445 if (context) {
446 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
447 if (rc) {
448 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
449 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
450 context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
451 goto out_free;
452 }
453
454 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
455 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
456 if (rc)
457 goto out_free;
458
459 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
460 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
461 if (rc)
462 goto out_free;
463
464 sbsec->sid = sid;
465
466 if (seen & Opt_context)
467 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
468 }
469
470 if (defcontext) {
471 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
472 if (rc) {
473 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
474 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
475 defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
476 goto out_free;
477 }
478
479 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
480 goto out_free;
481
482 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
483 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
484 if (rc)
485 goto out_free;
486
487 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
488 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
489 if (rc)
490 goto out_free;
491
492 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
493 }
494
495 out_free:
496 if (alloc) {
497 kfree(context);
498 kfree(defcontext);
499 }
500 out:
501 return rc;
502 }
503
504 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
505 {
506 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
507 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
508 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
509 int rc = 0;
510
511 down(&sbsec->sem);
512 if (sbsec->initialized)
513 goto out;
514
515 if (!ss_initialized) {
516 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
517 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
518 server is ready to handle calls. */
519 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
520 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
521 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
522 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
523 goto out;
524 }
525
526 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
527 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
528 if (rc) {
529 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
530 __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
531 goto out;
532 }
533
534 rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
535 if (rc)
536 goto out;
537
538 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
539 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
540 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
541 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
542 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
543 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
544 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
545 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
546 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
547 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
548 goto out;
549 }
550 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
551 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
552 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
553 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
554 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
555 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
556 else
557 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
558 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
559 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
560 goto out;
561 }
562 }
563
564 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
565 sbsec->proc = 1;
566
567 sbsec->initialized = 1;
568
569 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
570 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
571 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
572 }
573 else {
574 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
575 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
576 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
577 }
578
579 /* Initialize the root inode. */
580 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
581
582 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
583 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
584 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
585 populates itself. */
586 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
587 next_inode:
588 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
589 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
590 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
591 struct inode_security_struct, list);
592 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
593 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
594 inode = igrab(inode);
595 if (inode) {
596 if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
597 inode_doinit(inode);
598 iput(inode);
599 }
600 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
601 list_del_init(&isec->list);
602 goto next_inode;
603 }
604 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
605 out:
606 up(&sbsec->sem);
607 return rc;
608 }
609
610 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
611 {
612 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
613 case S_IFSOCK:
614 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
615 case S_IFLNK:
616 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
617 case S_IFREG:
618 return SECCLASS_FILE;
619 case S_IFBLK:
620 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
621 case S_IFDIR:
622 return SECCLASS_DIR;
623 case S_IFCHR:
624 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
625 case S_IFIFO:
626 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
627
628 }
629
630 return SECCLASS_FILE;
631 }
632
633 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
634 {
635 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
636 }
637
638 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
639 {
640 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
641 }
642
643 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
644 {
645 switch (family) {
646 case PF_UNIX:
647 switch (type) {
648 case SOCK_STREAM:
649 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
650 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
651 case SOCK_DGRAM:
652 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
653 }
654 break;
655 case PF_INET:
656 case PF_INET6:
657 switch (type) {
658 case SOCK_STREAM:
659 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
660 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
661 else
662 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
663 case SOCK_DGRAM:
664 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
665 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
666 else
667 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
668 default:
669 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
670 }
671 break;
672 case PF_NETLINK:
673 switch (protocol) {
674 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
675 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
676 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
677 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
678 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
679 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
680 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
681 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
682 case NETLINK_XFRM:
683 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
684 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
685 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
686 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
687 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
688 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
689 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
690 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
691 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
692 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
693 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
694 default:
695 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
696 }
697 case PF_PACKET:
698 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
699 case PF_KEY:
700 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
701 case PF_APPLETALK:
702 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
703 }
704
705 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
706 }
707
708 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
709 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
710 u16 tclass,
711 u32 *sid)
712 {
713 int buflen, rc;
714 char *buffer, *path, *end;
715
716 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
717 if (!buffer)
718 return -ENOMEM;
719
720 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
721 end = buffer+buflen;
722 *--end = '\0';
723 buflen--;
724 path = end-1;
725 *path = '/';
726 while (de && de != de->parent) {
727 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
728 if (buflen < 0)
729 break;
730 end -= de->namelen;
731 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
732 *--end = '/';
733 path = end;
734 de = de->parent;
735 }
736 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
737 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
738 return rc;
739 }
740 #else
741 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
742 u16 tclass,
743 u32 *sid)
744 {
745 return -EINVAL;
746 }
747 #endif
748
749 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
750 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
751 {
752 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
753 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
754 u32 sid;
755 struct dentry *dentry;
756 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
757 char *context = NULL;
758 unsigned len = 0;
759 int rc = 0;
760 int hold_sem = 0;
761
762 if (isec->initialized)
763 goto out;
764
765 down(&isec->sem);
766 hold_sem = 1;
767 if (isec->initialized)
768 goto out;
769
770 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
771 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
772 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
773 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
774 server is ready to handle calls. */
775 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
776 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
777 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
778 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
779 goto out;
780 }
781
782 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
783 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
784 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
785 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
786 break;
787 }
788
789 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
790 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
791 if (opt_dentry) {
792 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
793 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
794 } else {
795 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
796 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
797 }
798 if (!dentry) {
799 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s "
800 "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
801 inode->i_ino);
802 goto out;
803 }
804
805 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
806 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
807 if (!context) {
808 rc = -ENOMEM;
809 dput(dentry);
810 goto out;
811 }
812 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
813 context, len);
814 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
815 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
816 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
817 NULL, 0);
818 if (rc < 0) {
819 dput(dentry);
820 goto out;
821 }
822 kfree(context);
823 len = rc;
824 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
825 if (!context) {
826 rc = -ENOMEM;
827 dput(dentry);
828 goto out;
829 }
830 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
831 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
832 context, len);
833 }
834 dput(dentry);
835 if (rc < 0) {
836 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
837 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned "
838 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
839 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
840 kfree(context);
841 goto out;
842 }
843 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
844 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
845 rc = 0;
846 } else {
847 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
848 sbsec->def_sid);
849 if (rc) {
850 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) "
851 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
852 __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
853 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
854 kfree(context);
855 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
856 rc = 0;
857 break;
858 }
859 }
860 kfree(context);
861 isec->sid = sid;
862 break;
863 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
864 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
865 break;
866 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
867 /* Default to the fs SID. */
868 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
869
870 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
871 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
872 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
873 sbsec->sid,
874 isec->sclass,
875 &sid);
876 if (rc)
877 goto out;
878 isec->sid = sid;
879 break;
880 default:
881 /* Default to the fs SID. */
882 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
883
884 if (sbsec->proc) {
885 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
886 if (proci->pde) {
887 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
888 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
889 isec->sclass,
890 &sid);
891 if (rc)
892 goto out;
893 isec->sid = sid;
894 }
895 }
896 break;
897 }
898
899 isec->initialized = 1;
900
901 out:
902 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
903 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
904
905 if (hold_sem)
906 up(&isec->sem);
907 return rc;
908 }
909
910 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
911 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
912 {
913 u32 perm = 0;
914
915 switch (sig) {
916 case SIGCHLD:
917 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
918 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
919 break;
920 case SIGKILL:
921 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
922 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
923 break;
924 case SIGSTOP:
925 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
926 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
927 break;
928 default:
929 /* All other signals. */
930 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
931 break;
932 }
933
934 return perm;
935 }
936
937 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
938 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
939 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
940 struct task_struct *tsk2,
941 u32 perms)
942 {
943 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
944
945 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
946 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
947 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
948 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
949 }
950
951 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
952 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
953 int cap)
954 {
955 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
956 struct avc_audit_data ad;
957
958 tsec = tsk->security;
959
960 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
961 ad.tsk = tsk;
962 ad.u.cap = cap;
963
964 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
965 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
966 }
967
968 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
969 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
970 u32 perms)
971 {
972 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
973
974 tsec = tsk->security;
975
976 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
977 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
978 }
979
980 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
981 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
982 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
983 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
984 struct inode *inode,
985 u32 perms,
986 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
987 {
988 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
989 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
990 struct avc_audit_data ad;
991
992 tsec = tsk->security;
993 isec = inode->i_security;
994
995 if (!adp) {
996 adp = &ad;
997 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
998 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
999 }
1000
1001 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1002 }
1003
1004 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1005 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1006 pathname if needed. */
1007 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1008 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1009 struct dentry *dentry,
1010 u32 av)
1011 {
1012 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1013 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1014 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1015 ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1016 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1017 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1018 }
1019
1020 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1021 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1022 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1023 check a particular permission to the file.
1024 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1025 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1026 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1027 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1028 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1029 struct file *file,
1030 u32 av)
1031 {
1032 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1033 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1034 struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
1035 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
1036 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1037 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1038 int rc;
1039
1040 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1041 ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1042 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1043
1044 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1045 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1046 SECCLASS_FD,
1047 FD__USE,
1048 &ad);
1049 if (rc)
1050 return rc;
1051 }
1052
1053 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1054 if (av)
1055 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1056
1057 return 0;
1058 }
1059
1060 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1061 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1062 struct dentry *dentry,
1063 u16 tclass)
1064 {
1065 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1066 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1067 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1068 u32 newsid;
1069 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1070 int rc;
1071
1072 tsec = current->security;
1073 dsec = dir->i_security;
1074 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1075
1076 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1077 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1078
1079 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1080 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1081 &ad);
1082 if (rc)
1083 return rc;
1084
1085 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1086 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1087 } else {
1088 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1089 &newsid);
1090 if (rc)
1091 return rc;
1092 }
1093
1094 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1095 if (rc)
1096 return rc;
1097
1098 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1099 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1100 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1101 }
1102
1103 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1104 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1105 struct task_struct *ctx)
1106 {
1107 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1108
1109 tsec = ctx->security;
1110
1111 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1112 }
1113
1114 #define MAY_LINK 0
1115 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1116 #define MAY_RMDIR 2
1117
1118 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1119 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1120 struct dentry *dentry,
1121 int kind)
1122
1123 {
1124 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1125 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1126 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1127 u32 av;
1128 int rc;
1129
1130 tsec = current->security;
1131 dsec = dir->i_security;
1132 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1133
1134 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1135 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1136
1137 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1138 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1139 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1140 if (rc)
1141 return rc;
1142
1143 switch (kind) {
1144 case MAY_LINK:
1145 av = FILE__LINK;
1146 break;
1147 case MAY_UNLINK:
1148 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1149 break;
1150 case MAY_RMDIR:
1151 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1152 break;
1153 default:
1154 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1155 return 0;
1156 }
1157
1158 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1159 return rc;
1160 }
1161
1162 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1163 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1164 struct inode *new_dir,
1165 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1166 {
1167 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1168 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1169 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1170 u32 av;
1171 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1172 int rc;
1173
1174 tsec = current->security;
1175 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1176 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1177 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1178 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1179
1180 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1181
1182 ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1183 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1184 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1185 if (rc)
1186 return rc;
1187 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1188 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1189 if (rc)
1190 return rc;
1191 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1192 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1193 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1194 if (rc)
1195 return rc;
1196 }
1197
1198 ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1199 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1200 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1201 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1202 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1203 if (rc)
1204 return rc;
1205 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1206 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1207 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1208 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1209 new_isec->sclass,
1210 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1211 if (rc)
1212 return rc;
1213 }
1214
1215 return 0;
1216 }
1217
1218 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1219 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1220 struct super_block *sb,
1221 u32 perms,
1222 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1223 {
1224 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1225 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1226
1227 tsec = tsk->security;
1228 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1229 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1230 perms, ad);
1231 }
1232
1233 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1234 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1235 {
1236 u32 av = 0;
1237
1238 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1239 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1240 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1241 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1242 av |= FILE__READ;
1243
1244 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1245 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1246 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1247 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1248
1249 } else {
1250 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1251 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1252 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1253 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1254 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1255 av |= DIR__READ;
1256 }
1257
1258 return av;
1259 }
1260
1261 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1262 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1263 {
1264 u32 av = 0;
1265
1266 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1267 av |= FILE__READ;
1268 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1269 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1270 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1271 else
1272 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1273 }
1274
1275 return av;
1276 }
1277
1278 /* Set an inode's SID to a specified value. */
1279 static int inode_security_set_sid(struct inode *inode, u32 sid)
1280 {
1281 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1282 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1283
1284 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1285 /* Defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
1286 return 0;
1287 }
1288
1289 down(&isec->sem);
1290 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1291 isec->sid = sid;
1292 isec->initialized = 1;
1293 up(&isec->sem);
1294 return 0;
1295 }
1296
1297 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1298
1299 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1300 {
1301 struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1302 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1303 int rc;
1304
1305 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1306 if (rc)
1307 return rc;
1308
1309 rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1310 /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1311 if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !rc)
1312 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1313 return rc;
1314 }
1315
1316 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1317 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1318 {
1319 int error;
1320
1321 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1322 if (error)
1323 return error;
1324
1325 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1326 }
1327
1328 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1329 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1330 {
1331 int error;
1332
1333 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1334 if (error)
1335 return error;
1336
1337 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1338 }
1339
1340 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1341 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1342 {
1343 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1344 }
1345
1346 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1347 {
1348 int rc;
1349
1350 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1351 if (rc)
1352 return rc;
1353
1354 return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1355 }
1356
1357 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1358 {
1359 int error = 0;
1360 u32 av;
1361 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1362 u32 tsid;
1363 int rc;
1364
1365 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1366 if (rc)
1367 return rc;
1368
1369 tsec = current->security;
1370
1371 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
1372 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1373 if (rc) {
1374 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1375 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1376 }
1377
1378 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1379 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1380 if(op == 001) {
1381 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1382 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1383 } else {
1384 av = 0;
1385 if (op & 004)
1386 av |= FILE__READ;
1387 if (op & 002)
1388 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1389 if (av)
1390 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1391 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1392 }
1393
1394 return error;
1395 }
1396
1397 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1398 {
1399 int rc = 0;
1400
1401 if (!sb)
1402 return 0;
1403
1404 switch (cmds) {
1405 case Q_SYNC:
1406 case Q_QUOTAON:
1407 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1408 case Q_SETINFO:
1409 case Q_SETQUOTA:
1410 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1411 sb,
1412 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1413 break;
1414 case Q_GETFMT:
1415 case Q_GETINFO:
1416 case Q_GETQUOTA:
1417 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1418 sb,
1419 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1420 break;
1421 default:
1422 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1423 break;
1424 }
1425 return rc;
1426 }
1427
1428 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1429 {
1430 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1431 }
1432
1433 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1434 {
1435 int rc;
1436
1437 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1438 if (rc)
1439 return rc;
1440
1441 switch (type) {
1442 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1443 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1444 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1445 break;
1446 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1447 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1448 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1449 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1450 break;
1451 case 0: /* Close log */
1452 case 1: /* Open log */
1453 case 2: /* Read from log */
1454 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1455 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1456 default:
1457 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1458 break;
1459 }
1460 return rc;
1461 }
1462
1463 /*
1464 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1465 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1466 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1467 *
1468 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1469 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1470 * the capability is granted.
1471 *
1472 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1473 * processes that allocate mappings.
1474 */
1475 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
1476 {
1477 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1478 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1479
1480 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1481 if (rc == 0)
1482 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1483 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1484 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1485 NULL);
1486
1487 if (rc == 0)
1488 cap_sys_admin = 1;
1489
1490 return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
1491 }
1492
1493 /* binprm security operations */
1494
1495 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1496 {
1497 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1498
1499 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1500 if (!bsec)
1501 return -ENOMEM;
1502
1503 bsec->bprm = bprm;
1504 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1505 bsec->set = 0;
1506
1507 bprm->security = bsec;
1508 return 0;
1509 }
1510
1511 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1512 {
1513 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1514 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1515 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1516 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1517 u32 newsid;
1518 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1519 int rc;
1520
1521 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1522 if (rc)
1523 return rc;
1524
1525 bsec = bprm->security;
1526
1527 if (bsec->set)
1528 return 0;
1529
1530 tsec = current->security;
1531 isec = inode->i_security;
1532
1533 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1534 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1535
1536 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1537 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1538 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1539 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1540
1541 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1542 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1543 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1544 tsec->exec_sid = 0;
1545 } else {
1546 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1547 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1548 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1549 if (rc)
1550 return rc;
1551 }
1552
1553 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1554 ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt;
1555 ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
1556
1557 if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1558 newsid = tsec->sid;
1559
1560 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1561 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1562 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1563 if (rc)
1564 return rc;
1565 } else {
1566 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1567 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1568 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1569 if (rc)
1570 return rc;
1571
1572 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1573 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1574 if (rc)
1575 return rc;
1576
1577 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1578 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1579
1580 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1581 bsec->sid = newsid;
1582 }
1583
1584 bsec->set = 1;
1585 return 0;
1586 }
1587
1588 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1589 {
1590 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1591 }
1592
1593
1594 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1595 {
1596 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1597 int atsecure = 0;
1598
1599 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1600 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1601 the noatsecure permission is granted between
1602 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1603 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1604 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1605 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1606 }
1607
1608 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1609 }
1610
1611 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1612 {
1613 kfree(bprm->security);
1614 bprm->security = NULL;
1615 }
1616
1617 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1618 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1619
1620 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1621 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1622 {
1623 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1624 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1625 struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty;
1626 struct fdtable *fdt;
1627 long j = -1;
1628
1629 if (tty) {
1630 file_list_lock();
1631 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
1632 if (file) {
1633 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1634 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1635 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1636 file may belong to another process and we are only
1637 interested in the inode-based check here. */
1638 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1639 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1640 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1641 /* Reset controlling tty. */
1642 current->signal->tty = NULL;
1643 current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
1644 }
1645 }
1646 file_list_unlock();
1647 }
1648
1649 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1650
1651 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1652
1653 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1654 for (;;) {
1655 unsigned long set, i;
1656 int fd;
1657
1658 j++;
1659 i = j * __NFDBITS;
1660 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
1661 if (i >= fdt->max_fds || i >= fdt->max_fdset)
1662 break;
1663 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1664 if (!set)
1665 continue;
1666 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1667 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1668 if (set & 1) {
1669 file = fget(i);
1670 if (!file)
1671 continue;
1672 if (file_has_perm(current,
1673 file,
1674 file_to_av(file))) {
1675 sys_close(i);
1676 fd = get_unused_fd();
1677 if (fd != i) {
1678 if (fd >= 0)
1679 put_unused_fd(fd);
1680 fput(file);
1681 continue;
1682 }
1683 if (devnull) {
1684 get_file(devnull);
1685 } else {
1686 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
1687 if (!devnull) {
1688 put_unused_fd(fd);
1689 fput(file);
1690 continue;
1691 }
1692 }
1693 fd_install(fd, devnull);
1694 }
1695 fput(file);
1696 }
1697 }
1698 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1699
1700 }
1701 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1702 }
1703
1704 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1705 {
1706 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1707 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1708 u32 sid;
1709 int rc;
1710
1711 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1712
1713 tsec = current->security;
1714
1715 bsec = bprm->security;
1716 sid = bsec->sid;
1717
1718 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1719 bsec->unsafe = 0;
1720 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1721 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
1722 unchanged and kill. */
1723 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1724 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1725 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1726 if (rc) {
1727 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1728 return;
1729 }
1730 }
1731
1732 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1733 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1734 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1735 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1736 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1737 NULL);
1738 if (rc) {
1739 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1740 return;
1741 }
1742 }
1743 tsec->sid = sid;
1744 }
1745 }
1746
1747 /*
1748 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1749 */
1750 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1751 {
1752 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1753 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1754 struct itimerval itimer;
1755 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1756 int rc, i;
1757
1758 tsec = current->security;
1759 bsec = bprm->security;
1760
1761 if (bsec->unsafe) {
1762 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1763 return;
1764 }
1765 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1766 return;
1767
1768 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1769 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1770
1771 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1772 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
1773 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1774 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1775 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1776 will be checked against the new SID. */
1777 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1778 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1779 if (rc) {
1780 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1781 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1782 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1783 flush_signals(current);
1784 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1785 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1786 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
1787 recalc_sigpending();
1788 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1789 }
1790
1791 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1792 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
1793 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1794 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
1795 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1796 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1797 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1798 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1799 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1800 RLIMIT_STACK.*/
1801 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1802 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1803 if (rc) {
1804 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1805 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1806 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1807 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1808 }
1809 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1810 /*
1811 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1812 * to be refigured.
1813 */
1814 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1815 }
1816 }
1817
1818 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1819 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1820 wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1821 }
1822
1823 /* superblock security operations */
1824
1825 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1826 {
1827 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1828 }
1829
1830 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1831 {
1832 superblock_free_security(sb);
1833 }
1834
1835 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1836 {
1837 if (plen > olen)
1838 return 0;
1839
1840 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1841 }
1842
1843 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1844 {
1845 return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1846 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1847 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len));
1848 }
1849
1850 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1851 {
1852 if (!*first) {
1853 **to = ',';
1854 *to += 1;
1855 }
1856 else
1857 *first = 0;
1858 memcpy(*to, from, len);
1859 *to += len;
1860 }
1861
1862 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
1863 {
1864 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
1865 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
1866 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
1867
1868 in_curr = orig;
1869 sec_curr = copy;
1870
1871 /* Binary mount data: just copy */
1872 if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
1873 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
1874 goto out;
1875 }
1876
1877 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1878 if (!nosec) {
1879 rc = -ENOMEM;
1880 goto out;
1881 }
1882
1883 nosec_save = nosec;
1884 fnosec = fsec = 1;
1885 in_save = in_end = orig;
1886
1887 do {
1888 if (*in_end == ',' || *in_end == '\0') {
1889 int len = in_end - in_curr;
1890
1891 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
1892 take_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
1893 else
1894 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
1895
1896 in_curr = in_end + 1;
1897 }
1898 } while (*in_end++);
1899
1900 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
1901 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
1902 out:
1903 return rc;
1904 }
1905
1906 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1907 {
1908 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1909 int rc;
1910
1911 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
1912 if (rc)
1913 return rc;
1914
1915 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1916 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
1917 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
1918 }
1919
1920 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
1921 {
1922 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1923
1924 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1925 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
1926 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
1927 }
1928
1929 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
1930 struct nameidata *nd,
1931 char * type,
1932 unsigned long flags,
1933 void * data)
1934 {
1935 int rc;
1936
1937 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
1938 if (rc)
1939 return rc;
1940
1941 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
1942 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
1943 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
1944 else
1945 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
1946 FILE__MOUNTON);
1947 }
1948
1949 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
1950 {
1951 int rc;
1952
1953 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
1954 if (rc)
1955 return rc;
1956
1957 return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
1958 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
1959 }
1960
1961 /* inode security operations */
1962
1963 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
1964 {
1965 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
1966 }
1967
1968 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
1969 {
1970 inode_free_security(inode);
1971 }
1972
1973 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
1974 char **name, void **value,
1975 size_t *len)
1976 {
1977 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1978 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1979 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1980 u32 newsid, clen;
1981 int rc;
1982 char *namep = NULL, *context;
1983
1984 tsec = current->security;
1985 dsec = dir->i_security;
1986 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1987
1988 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1989 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1990 } else {
1991 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
1992 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
1993 &newsid);
1994 if (rc) {
1995 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
1996 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
1997 "ino=%ld)\n",
1998 __FUNCTION__,
1999 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2000 return rc;
2001 }
2002 }
2003
2004 inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid);
2005
2006 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2007 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2008
2009 if (name) {
2010 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
2011 if (!namep)
2012 return -ENOMEM;
2013 *name = namep;
2014 }
2015
2016 if (value && len) {
2017 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
2018 if (rc) {
2019 kfree(namep);
2020 return rc;
2021 }
2022 *value = context;
2023 *len = clen;
2024 }
2025
2026 return 0;
2027 }
2028
2029 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2030 {
2031 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2032 }
2033
2034 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2035 {
2036 int rc;
2037
2038 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2039 if (rc)
2040 return rc;
2041 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2042 }
2043
2044 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2045 {
2046 int rc;
2047
2048 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2049 if (rc)
2050 return rc;
2051 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2052 }
2053
2054 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2055 {
2056 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2057 }
2058
2059 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2060 {
2061 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2062 }
2063
2064 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2065 {
2066 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2067 }
2068
2069 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2070 {
2071 int rc;
2072
2073 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2074 if (rc)
2075 return rc;
2076
2077 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2078 }
2079
2080 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2081 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2082 {
2083 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2084 }
2085
2086 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2087 {
2088 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2089 }
2090
2091 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2092 {
2093 int rc;
2094
2095 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2096 if (rc)
2097 return rc;
2098 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2099 }
2100
2101 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2102 struct nameidata *nd)
2103 {
2104 int rc;
2105
2106 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2107 if (rc)
2108 return rc;
2109
2110 if (!mask) {
2111 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2112 return 0;
2113 }
2114
2115 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2116 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2117 }
2118
2119 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2120 {
2121 int rc;
2122
2123 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2124 if (rc)
2125 return rc;
2126
2127 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2128 return 0;
2129
2130 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2131 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2132 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2133
2134 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2135 }
2136
2137 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2138 {
2139 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2140 }
2141
2142 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2143 {
2144 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2145 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2146 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2147 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2148 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2149 u32 newsid;
2150 int rc = 0;
2151
2152 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2153 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2154 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2155 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2156 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2157 Restrict to administrator. */
2158 return -EPERM;
2159 }
2160
2161 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2162 ordinary setattr permission. */
2163 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2164 }
2165
2166 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2167 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2168 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2169
2170 if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
2171 return -EPERM;
2172
2173 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2174 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2175
2176 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2177 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2178 if (rc)
2179 return rc;
2180
2181 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2182 if (rc)
2183 return rc;
2184
2185 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2186 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2187 if (rc)
2188 return rc;
2189
2190 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2191 isec->sclass);
2192 if (rc)
2193 return rc;
2194
2195 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2196 sbsec->sid,
2197 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2198 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2199 &ad);
2200 }
2201
2202 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2203 void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2204 {
2205 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2206 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2207 u32 newsid;
2208 int rc;
2209
2210 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2211 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2212 return;
2213 }
2214
2215 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2216 if (rc) {
2217 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
2218 "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2219 return;
2220 }
2221
2222 isec->sid = newsid;
2223 return;
2224 }
2225
2226 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2227 {
2228 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2229 }
2230
2231 static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2232 {
2233 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2234 }
2235
2236 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2237 {
2238 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2239 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2240 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2241 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2242 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2243 Restrict to administrator. */
2244 return -EPERM;
2245 }
2246
2247 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2248 ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
2249 permission for removexattr. */
2250 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2251 }
2252
2253 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2254 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2255 return -EACCES;
2256 }
2257
2258 static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
2259 {
2260 return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2261 }
2262
2263 /*
2264 * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
2265 * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2266 * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2267 *
2268 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2269 */
2270 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
2271 {
2272 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2273
2274 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2275 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2276
2277 return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
2278 }
2279
2280 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2281 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2282 {
2283 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2284 u32 newsid;
2285 int rc;
2286
2287 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2288 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2289
2290 if (!value || !size)
2291 return -EACCES;
2292
2293 rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2294 if (rc)
2295 return rc;
2296
2297 isec->sid = newsid;
2298 return 0;
2299 }
2300
2301 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2302 {
2303 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2304 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2305 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2306 return len;
2307 }
2308
2309 /* file security operations */
2310
2311 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2312 {
2313 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
2314
2315 if (!mask) {
2316 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2317 return 0;
2318 }
2319
2320 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2321 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2322 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2323
2324 return file_has_perm(current, file,
2325 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2326 }
2327
2328 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2329 {
2330 return file_alloc_security(file);
2331 }
2332
2333 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2334 {
2335 file_free_security(file);
2336 }
2337
2338 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2339 unsigned long arg)
2340 {
2341 int error = 0;
2342
2343 switch (cmd) {
2344 case FIONREAD:
2345 /* fall through */
2346 case FIBMAP:
2347 /* fall through */
2348 case FIGETBSZ:
2349 /* fall through */
2350 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2351 /* fall through */
2352 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2353 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2354 break;
2355
2356 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2357 /* fall through */
2358 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2359 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2360 break;
2361
2362 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2363 case FIONBIO:
2364 /* fall through */
2365 case FIOASYNC:
2366 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2367 break;
2368
2369 case KDSKBENT:
2370 case KDSKBSENT:
2371 error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2372 break;
2373
2374 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2375 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2376 */
2377 default:
2378 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2379
2380 }
2381 return error;
2382 }
2383
2384 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2385 {
2386 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2387 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2388 /*
2389 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2390 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2391 * This has an additional check.
2392 */
2393 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2394 if (rc)
2395 return rc;
2396 }
2397 #endif
2398
2399 if (file) {
2400 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2401 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2402
2403 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2404 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2405 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2406
2407 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2408 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2409
2410 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2411 }
2412 return 0;
2413 }
2414
2415 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2416 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
2417 {
2418 int rc;
2419
2420 rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
2421 if (rc)
2422 return rc;
2423
2424 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2425 prot = reqprot;
2426
2427 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2428 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2429 }
2430
2431 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2432 unsigned long reqprot,
2433 unsigned long prot)
2434 {
2435 int rc;
2436
2437 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2438 if (rc)
2439 return rc;
2440
2441 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2442 prot = reqprot;
2443
2444 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2445 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2446 rc = 0;
2447 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2448 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2449 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2450 PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
2451 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2452 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2453 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2454 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2455 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2456 /*
2457 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2458 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2459 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2460 * modified content. This typically should only
2461 * occur for text relocations.
2462 */
2463 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
2464 FILE__EXECMOD);
2465 }
2466 if (rc)
2467 return rc;
2468 }
2469 #endif
2470
2471 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2472 }
2473
2474 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
2475 {
2476 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2477 }
2478
2479 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2480 unsigned long arg)
2481 {
2482 int err = 0;
2483
2484 switch (cmd) {
2485 case F_SETFL:
2486 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2487 err = -EINVAL;
2488 break;
2489 }
2490
2491 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
2492 err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
2493 break;
2494 }
2495 /* fall through */
2496 case F_SETOWN:
2497 case F_SETSIG:
2498 case F_GETFL:
2499 case F_GETOWN:
2500 case F_GETSIG:
2501 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
2502 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2503 break;
2504 case F_GETLK:
2505 case F_SETLK:
2506 case F_SETLKW:
2507 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
2508 case F_GETLK64:
2509 case F_SETLK64:
2510 case F_SETLKW64:
2511 #endif
2512 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2513 err = -EINVAL;
2514 break;
2515 }
2516 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2517 break;
2518 }
2519
2520 return err;
2521 }
2522
2523 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
2524 {
2525 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2526 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2527
2528 tsec = current->security;
2529 fsec = file->f_security;
2530 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
2531
2532 return 0;
2533 }
2534
2535 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
2536 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
2537 {
2538 struct file *file;
2539 u32 perm;
2540 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2541 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2542
2543 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
2544 file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner));
2545
2546 tsec = tsk->security;
2547 fsec = file->f_security;
2548
2549 if (!signum)
2550 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
2551 else
2552 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
2553
2554 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
2555 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2556 }
2557
2558 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
2559 {
2560 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
2561 }
2562
2563 /* task security operations */
2564
2565 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
2566 {
2567 int rc;
2568
2569 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
2570 if (rc)
2571 return rc;
2572
2573 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
2574 }
2575
2576 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2577 {
2578 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
2579 int rc;
2580
2581 tsec1 = current->security;
2582
2583 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
2584 if (rc)
2585 return rc;
2586 tsec2 = tsk->security;
2587
2588 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
2589 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
2590
2591 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
2592 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
2593 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
2594 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
2595 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
2596
2597 /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
2598 This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
2599 subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
2600 tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
2601
2602 return 0;
2603 }
2604
2605 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2606 {
2607 task_free_security(tsk);
2608 }
2609
2610 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2611 {
2612 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
2613 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
2614 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
2615 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
2616 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
2617 capable hook. */
2618 return 0;
2619 }
2620
2621 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2622 {
2623 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
2624 }
2625
2626 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
2627 {
2628 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2629 return 0;
2630 }
2631
2632 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2633 {
2634 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
2635 }
2636
2637 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2638 {
2639 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
2640 }
2641
2642 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2643 {
2644 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
2645 }
2646
2647 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2648 {
2649 selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid);
2650 }
2651
2652 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
2653 {
2654 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2655 return 0;
2656 }
2657
2658 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2659 {
2660 int rc;
2661
2662 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
2663 if (rc)
2664 return rc;
2665
2666 return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2667 }
2668
2669 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2670 {
2671 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2672 }
2673
2674 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2675 {
2676 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2677 }
2678
2679 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
2680 {
2681 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
2682 int rc;
2683
2684 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
2685 if (rc)
2686 return rc;
2687
2688 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
2689 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
2690 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
2691 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
2692 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
2693 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
2694
2695 return 0;
2696 }
2697
2698 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
2699 {
2700 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2701 }
2702
2703 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2704 {
2705 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2706 }
2707
2708 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2709 {
2710 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2711 }
2712
2713 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
2714 int sig, u32 secid)
2715 {
2716 u32 perm;
2717 int rc;
2718 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2719
2720 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
2721 if (rc)
2722 return rc;
2723
2724 if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
2725 return 0;
2726
2727 if (!sig)
2728 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
2729 else
2730 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
2731 tsec = p->security;
2732 if (secid)
2733 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2734 else
2735 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
2736 return rc;
2737 }
2738
2739 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
2740 unsigned long arg2,
2741 unsigned long arg3,
2742 unsigned long arg4,
2743 unsigned long arg5)
2744 {
2745 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
2746 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
2747 the state of the current process. */
2748 return 0;
2749 }
2750
2751 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2752 {
2753 u32 perm;
2754
2755 perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
2756
2757 return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
2758 }
2759
2760 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
2761 {
2762 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2763
2764 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
2765
2766 tsec = p->security;
2767 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2768 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
2769 return;
2770 }
2771
2772 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
2773 struct inode *inode)
2774 {
2775 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
2776 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2777
2778 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
2779 isec->initialized = 1;
2780 return;
2781 }
2782
2783 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2784 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2785 {
2786 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
2787 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
2788
2789 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2790 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
2791 if (ih == NULL)
2792 goto out;
2793
2794 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
2795 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
2796 goto out;
2797
2798 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
2799 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
2800 ret = 0;
2801
2802 switch (ih->protocol) {
2803 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
2804 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2805
2806 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2807 break;
2808
2809 offset += ihlen;
2810 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2811 if (th == NULL)
2812 break;
2813
2814 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2815 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2816 break;
2817 }
2818
2819 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
2820 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2821
2822 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2823 break;
2824
2825 offset += ihlen;
2826 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2827 if (uh == NULL)
2828 break;
2829
2830 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2831 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2832 break;
2833 }
2834
2835 default:
2836 break;
2837 }
2838 out:
2839 return ret;
2840 }
2841
2842 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2843
2844 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2845 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2846 {
2847 u8 nexthdr;
2848 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
2849 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
2850
2851 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2852 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
2853 if (ip6 == NULL)
2854 goto out;
2855
2856 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
2857 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
2858 ret = 0;
2859
2860 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
2861 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
2862 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
2863 if (offset < 0)
2864 goto out;
2865
2866 switch (nexthdr) {
2867 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
2868 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2869
2870 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2871 if (th == NULL)
2872 break;
2873
2874 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2875 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2876 break;
2877 }
2878
2879 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
2880 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2881
2882 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2883 if (uh == NULL)
2884 break;
2885
2886 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2887 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2888 break;
2889 }
2890
2891 /* includes fragments */
2892 default:
2893 break;
2894 }
2895 out:
2896 return ret;
2897 }
2898
2899 #endif /* IPV6 */
2900
2901 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
2902 char **addrp, int *len, int src)
2903 {
2904 int ret = 0;
2905
2906 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
2907 case PF_INET:
2908 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad);
2909 if (ret || !addrp)
2910 break;
2911 *len = 4;
2912 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
2913 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
2914 break;
2915
2916 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2917 case PF_INET6:
2918 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad);
2919 if (ret || !addrp)
2920 break;
2921 *len = 16;
2922 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
2923 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
2924 break;
2925 #endif /* IPV6 */
2926 default:
2927 break;
2928 }
2929
2930 return ret;
2931 }
2932
2933 /* socket security operations */
2934 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
2935 u32 perms)
2936 {
2937 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2938 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2939 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2940 int err = 0;
2941
2942 tsec = task->security;
2943 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2944
2945 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
2946 goto out;
2947
2948 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
2949 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
2950 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
2951
2952 out:
2953 return err;
2954 }
2955
2956 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
2957 int protocol, int kern)
2958 {
2959 int err = 0;
2960 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2961 u32 newsid;
2962
2963 if (kern)
2964 goto out;
2965
2966 tsec = current->security;
2967 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
2968 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2969 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
2970 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
2971
2972 out:
2973 return err;
2974 }
2975
2976 static void selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2977 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2978 {
2979 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2980 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2981 u32 newsid;
2982
2983 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2984
2985 tsec = current->security;
2986 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
2987 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
2988 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
2989 isec->initialized = 1;
2990
2991 return;
2992 }
2993
2994 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
2995 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
2996 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
2997 #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0]
2998 #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1]
2999
3000 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3001 {
3002 u16 family;
3003 int err;
3004
3005 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3006 if (err)
3007 goto out;
3008
3009 /*
3010 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3011 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3012 * check the first address now.
3013 */
3014 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3015 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3016 char *addrp;
3017 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3018 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3019 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3020 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3021 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3022 unsigned short snum;
3023 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3024 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3025
3026 tsec = current->security;
3027 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3028
3029 if (family == PF_INET) {
3030 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3031 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3032 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3033 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3034 } else {
3035 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3036 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3037 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3038 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3039 }
3040
3041 if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) ||
3042 snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) {
3043 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3044 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3045 if (err)
3046 goto out;
3047 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3048 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3049 ad.u.net.family = family;
3050 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3051 isec->sclass,
3052 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3053 if (err)
3054 goto out;
3055 }
3056
3057 switch(isec->sclass) {
3058 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3059 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3060 break;
3061
3062 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3063 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3064 break;
3065
3066 default:
3067 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3068 break;
3069 }
3070
3071 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
3072 if (err)
3073 goto out;
3074
3075 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3076 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3077 ad.u.net.family = family;
3078
3079 if (family == PF_INET)
3080 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3081 else
3082 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3083
3084 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3085 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3086 if (err)
3087 goto out;
3088 }
3089 out:
3090 return err;
3091 }
3092
3093 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3094 {
3095 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3096 int err;
3097
3098 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3099 if (err)
3100 return err;
3101
3102 /*
3103 * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3104 */
3105 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3106 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3107 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3108 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3109 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3110 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3111 unsigned short snum;
3112 u32 sid;
3113
3114 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3115 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3116 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3117 return -EINVAL;
3118 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3119 } else {
3120 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3121 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3122 return -EINVAL;
3123 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3124 }
3125
3126 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3127 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3128 if (err)
3129 goto out;
3130
3131 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3132 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3133 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3134 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass,
3135 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad);
3136 if (err)
3137 goto out;
3138 }
3139
3140 out:
3141 return err;
3142 }
3143
3144 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3145 {
3146 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3147 }
3148
3149 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3150 {
3151 int err;
3152 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3153 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3154
3155 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3156 if (err)
3157 return err;
3158
3159 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3160
3161 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3162 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3163 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3164 newisec->initialized = 1;
3165
3166 return 0;
3167 }
3168
3169 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3170 int size)
3171 {
3172 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3173 }
3174
3175 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3176 int size, int flags)
3177 {
3178 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3179 }
3180
3181 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3182 {
3183 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3184 }
3185
3186 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3187 {
3188 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3189 }
3190
3191 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
3192 {
3193 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3194 }
3195
3196 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3197 int optname)
3198 {
3199 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3200 }
3201
3202 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3203 {
3204 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3205 }
3206
3207 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3208 struct socket *other,
3209 struct sock *newsk)
3210 {
3211 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3212 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3213 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3214 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3215 int err;
3216
3217 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3218 if (err)
3219 return err;
3220
3221 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3222 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3223
3224 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3225 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3226
3227 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3228 isec->sclass,
3229 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3230 if (err)
3231 return err;
3232
3233 /* connecting socket */
3234 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3235 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3236
3237 /* server child socket */
3238 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3239 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3240
3241 return 0;
3242 }
3243
3244 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3245 struct socket *other)
3246 {
3247 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3248 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3249 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3250 int err;
3251
3252 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3253 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3254
3255 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3256 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3257
3258 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3259 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3260 if (err)
3261 return err;
3262
3263 return 0;
3264 }
3265
3266 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3267 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u32 sock_sid, u16 sock_class,
3268 u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3269 {
3270 int err = 0;
3271 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
3272
3273 if (!skb->dev)
3274 goto out;
3275
3276 err = sel_netif_sids(skb->dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3277 if (err)
3278 goto out;
3279
3280 switch (sock_class) {
3281 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3282 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3283 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3284 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3285 break;
3286
3287 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3288 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3289 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3290 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3291 break;
3292
3293 default:
3294 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3295 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3296 break;
3297 }
3298
3299 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3300 if (err)
3301 goto out;
3302
3303 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3304 if (err)
3305 goto out;
3306
3307 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3308 if (err)
3309 goto out;
3310
3311 if (recv_perm) {
3312 u32 port_sid;
3313
3314 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3315 sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
3316 &port_sid);
3317 if (err)
3318 goto out;
3319
3320 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
3321 sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
3322 }
3323
3324 out:
3325 return err;
3326 }
3327
3328 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3329 {
3330 u16 family;
3331 u16 sock_class = 0;
3332 char *addrp;
3333 int len, err = 0;
3334 u32 sock_sid = 0;
3335 struct socket *sock;
3336 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3337
3338 family = sk->sk_family;
3339 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
3340 goto out;
3341
3342 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3343 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
3344 family = PF_INET;
3345
3346 read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3347 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3348 if (sock) {
3349 struct inode *inode;
3350 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3351 if (inode) {
3352 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3353 isec = inode->i_security;
3354 sock_sid = isec->sid;
3355 sock_class = isec->sclass;
3356 }
3357 }
3358 read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3359 if (!sock_sid)
3360 goto out;
3361
3362 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3363 ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]";
3364 ad.u.net.family = family;
3365
3366 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
3367 if (err)
3368 goto out;
3369
3370 if (selinux_compat_net)
3371 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, sock_sid,
3372 sock_class, family,
3373 addrp, len);
3374 else
3375 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3376 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
3377 if (err)
3378 goto out;
3379
3380 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb);
3381 out:
3382 return err;
3383 }
3384
3385 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
3386 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3387 {
3388 int err = 0;
3389 char *scontext;
3390 u32 scontext_len;
3391 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3392 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3393 u32 peer_sid = 0;
3394
3395 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3396
3397 /* if UNIX_STREAM check peer_sid, if TCP check dst for labelled sa */
3398 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
3399 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3400 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3401 }
3402 else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3403 peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(sock->sk);
3404
3405 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
3406 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
3407 goto out;
3408 }
3409 }
3410 else {
3411 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
3412 goto out;
3413 }
3414
3415 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
3416
3417 if (err)
3418 goto out;
3419
3420 if (scontext_len > len) {
3421 err = -ERANGE;
3422 goto out_len;
3423 }
3424
3425 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
3426 err = -EFAULT;
3427
3428 out_len:
3429 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
3430 err = -EFAULT;
3431
3432 kfree(scontext);
3433 out:
3434 return err;
3435 }
3436
3437 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
3438 {
3439 int err = 0;
3440 u32 peer_sid;
3441
3442 if (skb->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
3443 selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(skb->sk->sk_socket),
3444 &peer_sid);
3445 else
3446 peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
3447
3448 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
3449 return -EINVAL;
3450
3451 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, secdata, seclen);
3452 if (err)
3453 return err;
3454
3455 return 0;
3456 }
3457
3458 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
3459 {
3460 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
3461 }
3462
3463 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
3464 {
3465 sk_free_security(sk);
3466 }
3467
3468 static unsigned int selinux_sk_getsid_security(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl, u8 dir)
3469 {
3470 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3471 u32 sock_sid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
3472
3473 if (!sk)
3474 return selinux_no_sk_sid(fl);
3475
3476 read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3477 isec = get_sock_isec(sk);
3478
3479 if (isec)
3480 sock_sid = isec->sid;
3481
3482 read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3483 return sock_sid;
3484 }
3485
3486 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3487 {
3488 int err = 0;
3489 u32 perm;
3490 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
3491 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
3492 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3493
3494 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
3495 err = -EINVAL;
3496 goto out;
3497 }
3498 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
3499
3500 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
3501 if (err) {
3502 if (err == -EINVAL) {
3503 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3504 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
3505 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
3506 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
3507 if (!selinux_enforcing)
3508 err = 0;
3509 }
3510
3511 /* Ignore */
3512 if (err == -ENOENT)
3513 err = 0;
3514 goto out;
3515 }
3516
3517 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
3518 out:
3519 return err;
3520 }
3521
3522 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
3523
3524 static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
3525 struct inode_security_struct *isec,
3526 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3527 u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3528 {
3529 int err;
3530 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
3531
3532 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3533 if (err)
3534 goto out;
3535
3536 switch (isec->sclass) {
3537 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3538 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
3539 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
3540 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3541 break;
3542
3543 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3544 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
3545 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
3546 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3547 break;
3548
3549 default:
3550 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
3551 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
3552 break;
3553 }
3554
3555 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3556 if (err)
3557 goto out;
3558
3559 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3560 if (err)
3561 goto out;
3562
3563 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3564 if (err)
3565 goto out;
3566
3567 if (send_perm) {
3568 u32 port_sid;
3569
3570 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3571 sk->sk_type,
3572 sk->sk_protocol,
3573 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport),
3574 &port_sid);
3575 if (err)
3576 goto out;
3577
3578 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
3579 send_perm, ad);
3580 }
3581 out:
3582 return err;
3583 }
3584
3585 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3586 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3587 const struct net_device *in,
3588 const struct net_device *out,
3589 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
3590 u16 family)
3591 {
3592 char *addrp;
3593 int len, err = 0;
3594 struct sock *sk;
3595 struct socket *sock;
3596 struct inode *inode;
3597 struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
3598 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3599 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3600 struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
3601
3602 sk = skb->sk;
3603 if (!sk)
3604 goto out;
3605
3606 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3607 if (!sock)
3608 goto out;
3609
3610 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3611 if (!inode)
3612 goto out;
3613
3614 isec = inode->i_security;
3615
3616 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3617 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3618 ad.u.net.family = family;
3619
3620 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0);
3621 if (err)
3622 goto out;
3623
3624 if (selinux_compat_net)
3625 err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, isec, &ad,
3626 family, addrp, len);
3627 else
3628 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3629 PACKET__SEND, &ad);
3630
3631 if (err)
3632 goto out;
3633
3634 err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb);
3635 out:
3636 return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3637 }
3638
3639 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3640 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3641 const struct net_device *in,
3642 const struct net_device *out,
3643 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3644 {
3645 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
3646 }
3647
3648 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3649
3650 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3651 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3652 const struct net_device *in,
3653 const struct net_device *out,
3654 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3655 {
3656 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
3657 }
3658
3659 #endif /* IPV6 */
3660
3661 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
3662
3663 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3664 {
3665 int err;
3666
3667 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
3668 if (err)
3669 return err;
3670
3671 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
3672 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
3673
3674 return err;
3675 }
3676
3677 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
3678 {
3679 int err;
3680 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3681
3682 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
3683 if (err)
3684 return err;
3685
3686 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
3687 ad.u.cap = capability;
3688
3689 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
3690 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
3691 }
3692
3693 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
3694 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
3695 u16 sclass)
3696 {
3697 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
3698 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3699
3700 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3701 if (!isec)
3702 return -ENOMEM;
3703
3704 isec->sclass = sclass;
3705 isec->ipc_perm = perm;
3706 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3707 perm->security = isec;
3708
3709 return 0;
3710 }
3711
3712 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
3713 {
3714 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
3715 perm->security = NULL;
3716 kfree(isec);
3717 }
3718
3719 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3720 {
3721 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3722
3723 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3724 if (!msec)
3725 return -ENOMEM;
3726
3727 msec->msg = msg;
3728 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3729 msg->security = msec;
3730
3731 return 0;
3732 }
3733
3734 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3735 {
3736 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
3737
3738 msg->security = NULL;
3739 kfree(msec);
3740 }
3741
3742 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
3743 u32 perms)
3744 {
3745 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3746 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3747 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3748
3749 tsec = current->security;
3750 isec = ipc_perms->security;
3751
3752 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3753 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
3754
3755 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3756 }
3757
3758 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3759 {
3760 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
3761 }
3762
3763 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3764 {
3765 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
3766 }
3767
3768 /* message queue security operations */
3769 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3770 {
3771 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3772 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3773 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3774 int rc;
3775
3776 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
3777 if (rc)
3778 return rc;
3779
3780 tsec = current->security;
3781 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3782
3783 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3784 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3785
3786 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3787 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
3788 if (rc) {
3789 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3790 return rc;
3791 }
3792 return 0;
3793 }
3794
3795 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3796 {
3797 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3798 }
3799
3800 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
3801 {
3802 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3803 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3804 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3805
3806 tsec = current->security;
3807 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3808
3809 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3810 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3811
3812 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3813 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3814 }
3815
3816 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
3817 {
3818 int err;
3819 int perms;
3820
3821 switch(cmd) {
3822 case IPC_INFO:
3823 case MSG_INFO:
3824 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3825 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3826 case IPC_STAT:
3827 case MSG_STAT:
3828 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
3829 break;
3830 case IPC_SET:
3831 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
3832 break;
3833 case IPC_RMID:
3834 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
3835 break;
3836 default:
3837 return 0;
3838 }
3839
3840 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
3841 return err;
3842 }
3843
3844 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
3845 {
3846 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3847 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3848 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3849 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3850 int rc;
3851
3852 tsec = current->security;
3853 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3854 msec = msg->security;
3855
3856 /*
3857 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
3858 */
3859 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
3860 /*
3861 * Compute new sid based on current process and
3862 * message queue this message will be stored in
3863 */
3864 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
3865 isec->sid,
3866 SECCLASS_MSG,
3867 &msec->sid);
3868 if (rc)
3869 return rc;
3870 }
3871
3872 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3873 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3874
3875 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
3876 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3877 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
3878 if (!rc)
3879 /* Can this process send the message */
3880 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
3881 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
3882 if (!rc)
3883 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
3884 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
3885 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
3886
3887 return rc;
3888 }
3889
3890 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3891 struct task_struct *target,
3892 long type, int mode)
3893 {
3894 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3895 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3896 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3897 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3898 int rc;
3899
3900 tsec = target->security;
3901 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3902 msec = msg->security;
3903
3904 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3905 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3906
3907 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
3908 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
3909 if (!rc)
3910 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
3911 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
3912 return rc;
3913 }
3914
3915 /* Shared Memory security operations */
3916 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
3917 {
3918 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3919 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3920 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3921 int rc;
3922
3923 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
3924 if (rc)
3925 return rc;
3926
3927 tsec = current->security;
3928 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
3929
3930 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3931 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
3932
3933 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
3934 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
3935 if (rc) {
3936 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
3937 return rc;
3938 }
3939 return 0;
3940 }
3941
3942 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
3943 {
3944 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
3945 }
3946
3947 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
3948 {
3949 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3950 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3951 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3952
3953 tsec = current->security;
3954 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
3955
3956 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3957 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
3958
3959 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
3960 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3961 }
3962
3963 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
3964 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
3965 {
3966 int perms;
3967 int err;
3968
3969 switch(cmd) {
3970 case IPC_INFO:
3971 case SHM_INFO:
3972 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3973 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3974 case IPC_STAT:
3975 case SHM_STAT:
3976 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
3977 break;
3978 case IPC_SET:
3979 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
3980 break;
3981 case SHM_LOCK:
3982 case SHM_UNLOCK:
3983 perms = SHM__LOCK;
3984 break;
3985 case IPC_RMID:
3986 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
3987 break;
3988 default:
3989 return 0;
3990 }
3991
3992 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
3993 return err;
3994 }
3995
3996 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
3997 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
3998 {
3999 u32 perms;
4000 int rc;
4001
4002 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4003 if (rc)
4004 return rc;
4005
4006 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4007 perms = SHM__READ;
4008 else
4009 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4010
4011 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4012 }
4013
4014 /* Semaphore security operations */
4015 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4016 {
4017 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4018 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4019 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4020 int rc;
4021
4022 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4023 if (rc)
4024 return rc;
4025
4026 tsec = current->security;
4027 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4028
4029 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4030 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4031
4032 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4033 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
4034 if (rc) {
4035 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4036 return rc;
4037 }
4038 return 0;
4039 }
4040
4041 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4042 {
4043 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4044 }
4045
4046 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4047 {
4048 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4049 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4050 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4051
4052 tsec = current->security;
4053 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4054
4055 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4056 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4057
4058 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4059 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4060 }
4061
4062 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4063 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4064 {
4065 int err;
4066 u32 perms;
4067
4068 switch(cmd) {
4069 case IPC_INFO:
4070 case SEM_INFO:
4071 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4072 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4073 case GETPID:
4074 case GETNCNT:
4075 case GETZCNT:
4076 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4077 break;
4078 case GETVAL:
4079 case GETALL:
4080 perms = SEM__READ;
4081 break;
4082 case SETVAL:
4083 case SETALL:
4084 perms = SEM__WRITE;
4085 break;
4086 case IPC_RMID:
4087 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
4088 break;
4089 case IPC_SET:
4090 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
4091 break;
4092 case IPC_STAT:
4093 case SEM_STAT:
4094 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
4095 break;
4096 default:
4097 return 0;
4098 }
4099
4100 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4101 return err;
4102 }
4103
4104 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
4105 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
4106 {
4107 u32 perms;
4108
4109 if (alter)
4110 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
4111 else
4112 perms = SEM__READ;
4113
4114 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4115 }
4116
4117 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
4118 {
4119 u32 av = 0;
4120
4121 av = 0;
4122 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
4123 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
4124 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
4125 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
4126
4127 if (av == 0)
4128 return 0;
4129
4130 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
4131 }
4132
4133 /* module stacking operations */
4134 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4135 {
4136 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
4137 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: There is already a secondary security "
4138 "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4139 return -EINVAL;
4140 }
4141
4142 secondary_ops = ops;
4143
4144 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
4145 __FUNCTION__,
4146 name);
4147
4148 return 0;
4149 }
4150
4151 static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4152 {
4153 if (ops != secondary_ops) {
4154 printk (KERN_INFO "%s: trying to unregister a security module "
4155 "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4156 return -EINVAL;
4157 }
4158
4159 secondary_ops = original_ops;
4160
4161 return 0;
4162 }
4163
4164 static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
4165 {
4166 if (inode)
4167 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
4168 }
4169
4170 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4171 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4172 {
4173 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4174 u32 sid;
4175 int error;
4176
4177 if (current != p) {
4178 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
4179 if (error)
4180 return error;
4181 }
4182
4183 tsec = p->security;
4184
4185 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4186 sid = tsec->sid;
4187 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
4188 sid = tsec->osid;
4189 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4190 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
4191 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4192 sid = tsec->create_sid;
4193 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4194 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4195 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4196 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4197 else
4198 return -EINVAL;
4199
4200 if (!sid)
4201 return 0;
4202
4203 return selinux_getsecurity(sid, value, size);
4204 }
4205
4206 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4207 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4208 {
4209 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4210 u32 sid = 0;
4211 int error;
4212 char *str = value;
4213
4214 if (current != p) {
4215 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
4216 security attributes. */
4217 return -EACCES;
4218 }
4219
4220 /*
4221 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
4222 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
4223 * above restriction is ever removed.
4224 */
4225 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4226 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
4227 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4228 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
4229 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4230 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
4231 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4232 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
4233 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4234 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
4235 else
4236 error = -EINVAL;
4237 if (error)
4238 return error;
4239
4240 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
4241 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
4242 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
4243 str[size-1] = 0;
4244 size--;
4245 }
4246 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
4247 if (error)
4248 return error;
4249 }
4250
4251 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
4252 performed during the actual operation (execve,
4253 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
4254 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
4255 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
4256 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
4257 tsec = p->security;
4258 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4259 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
4260 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4261 tsec->create_sid = sid;
4262 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
4263 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
4264 if (error)
4265 return error;
4266 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
4267 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4268 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
4269 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
4270 struct av_decision avd;
4271
4272 if (sid == 0)
4273 return -EINVAL;
4274
4275 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
4276 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
4277 struct task_struct *g, *t;
4278 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
4279 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4280 do_each_thread(g, t)
4281 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
4282 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4283 return -EPERM;
4284 }
4285 while_each_thread(g, t);
4286 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4287 }
4288
4289 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
4290 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4291 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
4292 if (error)
4293 return error;
4294
4295 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
4296 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
4297 task_lock(p);
4298 if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
4299 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
4300 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4301 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
4302 if (!error)
4303 tsec->sid = sid;
4304 task_unlock(p);
4305 avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4306 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
4307 if (error)
4308 return error;
4309 } else {
4310 tsec->sid = sid;
4311 task_unlock(p);
4312 }
4313 }
4314 else
4315 return -EINVAL;
4316
4317 return size;
4318 }
4319
4320 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4321
4322 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
4323 unsigned long flags)
4324 {
4325 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
4326 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4327
4328 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4329 if (!ksec)
4330 return -ENOMEM;
4331
4332 ksec->obj = k;
4333 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
4334 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4335 else
4336 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
4337 k->security = ksec;
4338
4339 return 0;
4340 }
4341
4342 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
4343 {
4344 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
4345
4346 k->security = NULL;
4347 kfree(ksec);
4348 }
4349
4350 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4351 struct task_struct *ctx,
4352 key_perm_t perm)
4353 {
4354 struct key *key;
4355 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4356 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4357
4358 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4359
4360 tsec = ctx->security;
4361 ksec = key->security;
4362
4363 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
4364 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
4365 appear to be created. */
4366 if (perm == 0)
4367 return 0;
4368
4369 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
4370 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
4371 }
4372
4373 #endif
4374
4375 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
4376 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
4377 .capget = selinux_capget,
4378 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
4379 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
4380 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
4381 .capable = selinux_capable,
4382 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
4383 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
4384 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
4385 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
4386
4387 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
4388 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
4389
4390 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
4391 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
4392 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
4393 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
4394 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
4395 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
4396 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
4397
4398 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
4399 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
4400 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
4401 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
4402 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
4403 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
4404 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
4405
4406 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
4407 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
4408 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
4409 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
4410 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
4411 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
4412 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
4413 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
4414 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
4415 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
4416 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
4417 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
4418 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
4419 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
4420 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
4421 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
4422 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
4423 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
4424 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
4425 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
4426 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
4427 .inode_xattr_getsuffix = selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix,
4428 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
4429 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
4430 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
4431
4432 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
4433 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
4434 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
4435 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
4436 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
4437 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
4438 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
4439 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
4440 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
4441 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
4442 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
4443
4444 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
4445 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
4446 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
4447 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
4448 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
4449 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
4450 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
4451 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
4452 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
4453 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
4454 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
4455 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
4456 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
4457 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
4458 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
4459 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
4460 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
4461 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
4462 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
4463 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
4464 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
4465 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
4466 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
4467
4468 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
4469
4470 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
4471 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
4472
4473 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
4474 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
4475 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
4476 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
4477 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
4478 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
4479
4480 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
4481 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
4482 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
4483 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
4484 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
4485
4486 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
4487 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
4488 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
4489 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
4490 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
4491
4492 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
4493 .unregister_security = selinux_unregister_security,
4494
4495 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
4496
4497 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
4498 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
4499
4500 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
4501 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
4502
4503 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
4504 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
4505 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
4506 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
4507 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
4508 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
4509 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
4510 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
4511 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
4512 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
4513 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
4514 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
4515 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
4516 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
4517 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
4518 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
4519 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
4520 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
4521 .sk_getsid = selinux_sk_getsid_security,
4522
4523 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
4524 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
4525 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
4526 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
4527 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
4528 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
4529 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
4530 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
4531 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
4532 #endif
4533
4534 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4535 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
4536 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
4537 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
4538 #endif
4539 };
4540
4541 static __init int selinux_init(void)
4542 {
4543 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4544
4545 if (!selinux_enabled) {
4546 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
4547 return 0;
4548 }
4549
4550 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
4551
4552 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
4553 if (task_alloc_security(current))
4554 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
4555 tsec = current->security;
4556 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4557
4558 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
4559 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
4560 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
4561 avc_init();
4562
4563 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
4564 if (!secondary_ops)
4565 panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
4566 if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
4567 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
4568
4569 if (selinux_enforcing) {
4570 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
4571 } else {
4572 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
4573 }
4574
4575 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4576 /* Add security information to initial keyrings */
4577 selinux_key_alloc(&root_user_keyring, current,
4578 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4579 selinux_key_alloc(&root_session_keyring, current,
4580 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4581 #endif
4582
4583 return 0;
4584 }
4585
4586 void selinux_complete_init(void)
4587 {
4588 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
4589
4590 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
4591 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
4592 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4593 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4594 next_sb:
4595 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
4596 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
4597 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
4598 struct superblock_security_struct,
4599 list);
4600 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
4601 sb->s_count++;
4602 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4603 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4604 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
4605 if (sb->s_root)
4606 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
4607 drop_super(sb);
4608 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4609 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4610 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
4611 goto next_sb;
4612 }
4613 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4614 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4615 }
4616
4617 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
4618 all processes and objects when they are created. */
4619 security_initcall(selinux_init);
4620
4621 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
4622
4623 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
4624 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
4625 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4626 .pf = PF_INET,
4627 .hooknum = NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
4628 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4629 };
4630
4631 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4632
4633 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
4634 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
4635 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4636 .pf = PF_INET6,
4637 .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
4638 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4639 };
4640
4641 #endif /* IPV6 */
4642
4643 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
4644 {
4645 int err = 0;
4646
4647 if (!selinux_enabled)
4648 goto out;
4649
4650 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
4651
4652 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4653 if (err)
4654 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
4655
4656 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4657
4658 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4659 if (err)
4660 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
4661
4662 #endif /* IPV6 */
4663
4664 out:
4665 return err;
4666 }
4667
4668 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
4669
4670 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4671 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
4672 {
4673 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
4674
4675 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4676 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4677 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4678 #endif /* IPV6 */
4679 }
4680 #endif
4681
4682 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4683
4684 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4685 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
4686 #endif
4687
4688 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4689
4690 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4691 int selinux_disable(void)
4692 {
4693 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
4694 static int selinux_disabled = 0;
4695
4696 if (ss_initialized) {
4697 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
4698 return -EINVAL;
4699 }
4700
4701 if (selinux_disabled) {
4702 /* Only do this once. */
4703 return -EINVAL;
4704 }
4705
4706 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
4707
4708 selinux_disabled = 1;
4709 selinux_enabled = 0;
4710
4711 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
4712 security_ops = secondary_ops;
4713
4714 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
4715 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
4716
4717 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
4718 exit_sel_fs();
4719
4720 return 0;
4721 }
4722 #endif
4723
4724
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