2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
88 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
89 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
91 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
93 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version
;
94 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass
, u16 nlmsg_type
, u32
*perm
);
95 extern int selinux_compat_net
;
96 extern struct security_operations
*security_ops
;
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing
;
104 static int __init
enforcing_setup(char *str
)
106 unsigned long enforcing
;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str
, 0, &enforcing
))
108 selinux_enforcing
= enforcing
? 1 : 0;
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup
);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled
= CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
;
117 static int __init
selinux_enabled_setup(char *str
)
119 unsigned long enabled
;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str
, 0, &enabled
))
121 selinux_enabled
= enabled
? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup
);
126 int selinux_enabled
= 1;
131 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
134 static struct security_operations
*secondary_ops
;
136 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
137 before the policy was loaded. */
138 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head
);
139 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock
);
141 static struct kmem_cache
*sel_inode_cache
;
144 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
147 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
148 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
149 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
150 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
153 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
155 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount
) > 0);
158 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
160 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct
*task
)
162 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
164 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
168 tsec
->osid
= tsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
169 task
->security
= tsec
;
174 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct
*task
)
176 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= task
->security
;
177 task
->security
= NULL
;
181 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
183 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current
->security
;
184 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
186 isec
= kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache
, GFP_NOFS
);
190 mutex_init(&isec
->lock
);
191 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec
->list
);
193 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
194 isec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_FILE
;
195 isec
->task_sid
= tsec
->sid
;
196 inode
->i_security
= isec
;
201 static void inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
203 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
204 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
206 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
207 if (!list_empty(&isec
->list
))
208 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
209 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
211 inode
->i_security
= NULL
;
212 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache
, isec
);
215 static int file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
217 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current
->security
;
218 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
220 fsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
224 fsec
->sid
= tsec
->sid
;
225 fsec
->fown_sid
= tsec
->sid
;
226 file
->f_security
= fsec
;
231 static void file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
233 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
234 file
->f_security
= NULL
;
238 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
240 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
242 sbsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
246 mutex_init(&sbsec
->lock
);
247 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec
->list
);
248 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec
->isec_head
);
249 spin_lock_init(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
251 sbsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
252 sbsec
->def_sid
= SECINITSID_FILE
;
253 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
254 sb
->s_security
= sbsec
;
259 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
261 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
263 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock
);
264 if (!list_empty(&sbsec
->list
))
265 list_del_init(&sbsec
->list
);
266 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock
);
268 sb
->s_security
= NULL
;
272 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock
*sk
, int family
, gfp_t priority
)
274 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
;
276 ssec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec
), priority
);
280 ssec
->peer_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
281 ssec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
282 sk
->sk_security
= ssec
;
284 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec
, family
);
289 static void sk_free_security(struct sock
*sk
)
291 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
= sk
->sk_security
;
293 sk
->sk_security
= NULL
;
297 /* The security server must be initialized before
298 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
299 extern int ss_initialized
;
301 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
303 static char *labeling_behaviors
[6] = {
305 "uses transition SIDs",
307 "uses genfs_contexts",
308 "not configured for labeling",
309 "uses mountpoint labeling",
312 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
);
314 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode
*inode
)
316 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, NULL
);
327 static match_table_t tokens
= {
328 {Opt_context
, CONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
329 {Opt_fscontext
, FSCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
330 {Opt_defcontext
, DEFCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
331 {Opt_rootcontext
, ROOTCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
335 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
337 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid
,
338 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
339 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
)
343 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
344 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
348 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
349 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
353 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid
,
354 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
355 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
)
358 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
359 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
363 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
364 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, NULL
);
368 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block
*sb
)
370 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
371 struct dentry
*root
= sb
->s_root
;
372 struct inode
*root_inode
= root
->d_inode
;
375 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
376 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
377 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
378 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
379 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
380 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
381 if (!root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
382 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
383 "xattr support\n", sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
387 rc
= root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr(root
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, NULL
, 0);
388 if (rc
< 0 && rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
389 if (rc
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
390 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
391 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
392 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
394 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
395 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb
->s_id
,
396 sb
->s_type
->name
, -rc
);
401 sbsec
->initialized
= 1;
403 if (sbsec
->behavior
> ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors
))
404 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
405 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
407 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
408 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
,
409 labeling_behaviors
[sbsec
->behavior
-1]);
411 /* Initialize the root inode. */
412 rc
= inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode
, root
);
414 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
415 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
416 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
418 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
420 if (!list_empty(&sbsec
->isec_head
)) {
421 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
=
422 list_entry(sbsec
->isec_head
.next
,
423 struct inode_security_struct
, list
);
424 struct inode
*inode
= isec
->inode
;
425 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
426 inode
= igrab(inode
);
428 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode
))
432 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
433 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
436 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
442 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
443 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
444 * mount options, or whatever.
446 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*sb
,
447 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
450 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
451 char *context
= NULL
;
455 security_init_mnt_opts(opts
);
457 if (!sbsec
->initialized
)
464 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
465 * settings this is going to need a mask
468 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
469 for (i
= 0; i
< 8; i
++) {
471 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
475 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
476 if (!opts
->mnt_opts
) {
481 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
482 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
488 if (sbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) {
489 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
492 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
493 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
495 if (sbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) {
496 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, &context
, &len
);
499 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
500 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
502 if (sbsec
->flags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) {
503 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->def_sid
, &context
, &len
);
506 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
507 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
509 if (sbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
510 struct inode
*root
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
511 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= root
->i_security
;
513 rc
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
516 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
517 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
520 BUG_ON(i
!= opts
->num_mnt_opts
);
525 security_free_mnt_opts(opts
);
529 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
, char flag
,
530 u32 old_sid
, u32 new_sid
)
532 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
533 if (sbsec
->initialized
)
534 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& flag
) ||
535 (old_sid
!= new_sid
))
538 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
539 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
541 if (!sbsec
->initialized
)
542 if (sbsec
->flags
& flag
)
548 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
549 * labeling information.
551 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block
*sb
,
552 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
555 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current
->security
;
556 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
557 const char *name
= sb
->s_type
->name
;
558 struct inode
*inode
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
559 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
= inode
->i_security
;
560 u32 fscontext_sid
= 0, context_sid
= 0, rootcontext_sid
= 0;
561 u32 defcontext_sid
= 0;
562 char **mount_options
= opts
->mnt_opts
;
563 int *flags
= opts
->mnt_opts_flags
;
564 int num_opts
= opts
->num_mnt_opts
;
566 mutex_lock(&sbsec
->lock
);
568 if (!ss_initialized
) {
570 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
571 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
572 server is ready to handle calls. */
573 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock
);
574 if (list_empty(&sbsec
->list
))
575 list_add(&sbsec
->list
, &superblock_security_head
);
576 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock
);
580 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
581 "before the security server is initialized\n");
586 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
587 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
588 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
589 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
591 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
592 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
593 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
594 * will be used for both mounts)
596 if (sbsec
->initialized
&& (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
601 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
602 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
603 * than once with different security options.
605 for (i
= 0; i
< num_opts
; i
++) {
607 rc
= security_context_to_sid(mount_options
[i
],
608 strlen(mount_options
[i
]), &sid
);
610 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
611 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
612 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, name
, rc
);
619 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
,
621 goto out_double_mount
;
623 sbsec
->flags
|= FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
628 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
,
630 goto out_double_mount
;
632 sbsec
->flags
|= CONTEXT_MNT
;
634 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
635 rootcontext_sid
= sid
;
637 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
,
639 goto out_double_mount
;
641 sbsec
->flags
|= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
645 defcontext_sid
= sid
;
647 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
,
649 goto out_double_mount
;
651 sbsec
->flags
|= DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
660 if (sbsec
->initialized
) {
661 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
662 if (sbsec
->flags
&& !num_opts
)
663 goto out_double_mount
;
668 if (strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "proc") == 0)
671 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
672 rc
= security_fs_use(sb
->s_type
->name
, &sbsec
->behavior
, &sbsec
->sid
);
674 printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
675 __func__
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
679 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
682 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid
, sbsec
, tsec
);
686 sbsec
->sid
= fscontext_sid
;
690 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
691 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
692 * the superblock context if not already set.
695 if (!fscontext_sid
) {
696 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
, tsec
);
699 sbsec
->sid
= context_sid
;
701 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
, tsec
);
705 if (!rootcontext_sid
)
706 rootcontext_sid
= context_sid
;
708 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= context_sid
;
709 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
;
712 if (rootcontext_sid
) {
713 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid
, sbsec
, tsec
);
717 root_isec
->sid
= rootcontext_sid
;
718 root_isec
->initialized
= 1;
721 if (defcontext_sid
) {
722 if (sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
724 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: defcontext option is "
725 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
729 if (defcontext_sid
!= sbsec
->def_sid
) {
730 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid
,
736 sbsec
->def_sid
= defcontext_sid
;
739 rc
= sb_finish_set_opts(sb
);
741 mutex_unlock(&sbsec
->lock
);
745 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
746 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb
->s_id
, name
);
750 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
751 struct super_block
*newsb
)
753 const struct superblock_security_struct
*oldsbsec
= oldsb
->s_security
;
754 struct superblock_security_struct
*newsbsec
= newsb
->s_security
;
756 int set_fscontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
);
757 int set_context
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
);
758 int set_rootcontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
);
761 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
762 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
765 if (!ss_initialized
) {
766 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock
);
767 if (list_empty(&newsbsec
->list
))
768 list_add(&newsbsec
->list
, &superblock_security_head
);
769 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock
);
773 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
774 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec
->initialized
);
776 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
777 if (newsbsec
->initialized
)
780 mutex_lock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
782 newsbsec
->flags
= oldsbsec
->flags
;
784 newsbsec
->sid
= oldsbsec
->sid
;
785 newsbsec
->def_sid
= oldsbsec
->def_sid
;
786 newsbsec
->behavior
= oldsbsec
->behavior
;
789 u32 sid
= oldsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
793 if (!set_rootcontext
) {
794 struct inode
*newinode
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
795 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
798 newsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= sid
;
800 if (set_rootcontext
) {
801 const struct inode
*oldinode
= oldsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
802 const struct inode_security_struct
*oldisec
= oldinode
->i_security
;
803 struct inode
*newinode
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
804 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
806 newisec
->sid
= oldisec
->sid
;
809 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb
);
810 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
813 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options
,
814 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
817 char *context
= NULL
, *defcontext
= NULL
;
818 char *fscontext
= NULL
, *rootcontext
= NULL
;
819 int rc
, num_mnt_opts
= 0;
821 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= 0;
823 /* Standard string-based options. */
824 while ((p
= strsep(&options
, "|")) != NULL
) {
826 substring_t args
[MAX_OPT_ARGS
];
831 token
= match_token(p
, tokens
, args
);
835 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
837 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
840 context
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
850 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
853 fscontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
860 case Opt_rootcontext
:
863 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
866 rootcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
874 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
876 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
879 defcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
888 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
895 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
899 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
900 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
901 kfree(opts
->mnt_opts
);
906 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = fscontext
;
907 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
910 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = context
;
911 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
914 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = rootcontext
;
915 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
918 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = defcontext
;
919 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
922 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= num_mnt_opts
;
933 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
935 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
938 char *options
= data
;
939 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
941 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
946 BUG_ON(sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
);
948 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(options
, &opts
);
953 rc
= selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
956 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
960 void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file
*m
, struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
965 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
->num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
966 char *has_comma
= strchr(opts
->mnt_opts
[i
], ',');
968 switch (opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
]) {
970 prefix
= CONTEXT_STR
;
973 prefix
= FSCONTEXT_STR
;
975 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
976 prefix
= ROOTCONTEXT_STR
;
979 prefix
= DEFCONTEXT_STR
;
984 /* we need a comma before each option */
989 seq_puts(m
, opts
->mnt_opts
[i
]);
995 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file
*m
, struct super_block
*sb
)
997 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1000 rc
= selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
1002 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1008 selinux_write_opts(m
, &opts
);
1010 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1015 static inline u16
inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode
)
1017 switch (mode
& S_IFMT
) {
1019 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE
;
1021 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
;
1023 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1025 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE
;
1027 return SECCLASS_DIR
;
1029 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE
;
1031 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE
;
1035 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1038 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol
)
1040 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_TCP
);
1043 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol
)
1045 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_UDP
);
1048 static inline u16
socket_type_to_security_class(int family
, int type
, int protocol
)
1054 case SOCK_SEQPACKET
:
1055 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
;
1057 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET
;
1064 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol
))
1065 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
;
1067 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1069 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol
))
1070 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
;
1072 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1074 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
;
1076 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1082 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET
;
1083 case NETLINK_FIREWALL
:
1084 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET
;
1085 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG
:
1086 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET
;
1088 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET
;
1090 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET
;
1091 case NETLINK_SELINUX
:
1092 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET
;
1094 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET
;
1095 case NETLINK_IP6_FW
:
1096 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET
;
1097 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG
:
1098 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET
;
1099 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT
:
1100 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET
;
1102 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET
;
1105 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET
;
1107 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET
;
1109 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET
;
1112 return SECCLASS_SOCKET
;
1115 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1116 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry
*de
,
1121 char *buffer
, *path
, *end
;
1123 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1128 end
= buffer
+buflen
;
1133 while (de
&& de
!= de
->parent
) {
1134 buflen
-= de
->namelen
+ 1;
1138 memcpy(end
, de
->name
, de
->namelen
);
1143 rc
= security_genfs_sid("proc", path
, tclass
, sid
);
1144 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1148 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry
*de
,
1156 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1157 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
)
1159 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= NULL
;
1160 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1162 struct dentry
*dentry
;
1163 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1164 char *context
= NULL
;
1168 if (isec
->initialized
)
1171 mutex_lock(&isec
->lock
);
1172 if (isec
->initialized
)
1175 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1176 if (!sbsec
->initialized
) {
1177 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1178 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1179 server is ready to handle calls. */
1180 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1181 if (list_empty(&isec
->list
))
1182 list_add(&isec
->list
, &sbsec
->isec_head
);
1183 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1187 switch (sbsec
->behavior
) {
1188 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
:
1189 if (!inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
1190 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1194 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1195 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1197 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1198 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1200 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1201 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1204 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1205 "ino=%ld\n", __func__
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
,
1210 len
= INITCONTEXTLEN
;
1211 context
= kmalloc(len
, GFP_NOFS
);
1217 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1219 if (rc
== -ERANGE
) {
1220 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1221 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1229 context
= kmalloc(len
, GFP_NOFS
);
1235 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
,
1241 if (rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
1242 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1243 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__
,
1244 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
1248 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1249 sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1252 rc
= security_context_to_sid_default(context
, rc
, &sid
,
1256 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1257 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1258 __func__
, context
, -rc
,
1259 inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
1261 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1269 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
:
1270 isec
->sid
= isec
->task_sid
;
1272 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
:
1273 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1274 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1276 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1277 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1278 rc
= security_transition_sid(isec
->task_sid
,
1286 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
:
1287 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1290 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1291 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1294 struct proc_inode
*proci
= PROC_I(inode
);
1296 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1297 rc
= selinux_proc_get_sid(proci
->pde
,
1308 isec
->initialized
= 1;
1311 mutex_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
1313 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_FILE
)
1314 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1318 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1319 static inline u32
signal_to_av(int sig
)
1325 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1326 perm
= PROCESS__SIGCHLD
;
1329 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1330 perm
= PROCESS__SIGKILL
;
1333 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1334 perm
= PROCESS__SIGSTOP
;
1337 /* All other signals. */
1338 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNAL
;
1345 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1346 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1347 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct
*tsk1
,
1348 struct task_struct
*tsk2
,
1351 struct task_security_struct
*tsec1
, *tsec2
;
1353 tsec1
= tsk1
->security
;
1354 tsec2
= tsk2
->security
;
1355 return avc_has_perm(tsec1
->sid
, tsec2
->sid
,
1356 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1359 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1360 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1363 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1364 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1367 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
1368 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
1370 u32 av
= CAP_TO_MASK(cap
);
1372 tsec
= tsk
->security
;
1374 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, CAP
);
1378 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap
)) {
1380 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
;
1383 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2
;
1387 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap
);
1390 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, tsec
->sid
, sclass
, av
, &ad
);
1393 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1394 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1397 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
1399 tsec
= tsk
->security
;
1401 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
1402 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, perms
, NULL
);
1405 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1406 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1407 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1408 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1409 struct inode
*inode
,
1411 struct avc_audit_data
*adp
)
1413 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
1414 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
1415 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
1417 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
1420 tsec
= tsk
->security
;
1421 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1425 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1426 ad
.u
.fs
.inode
= inode
;
1429 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, adp
);
1432 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1433 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1434 pathname if needed. */
1435 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1436 struct vfsmount
*mnt
,
1437 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1440 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
1441 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
1442 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1443 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.mnt
= mnt
;
1444 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
1445 return inode_has_perm(tsk
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1448 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1449 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1450 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1451 check a particular permission to the file.
1452 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1453 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1454 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1455 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1456 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1460 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= tsk
->security
;
1461 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
1462 struct inode
*inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
1463 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
1466 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1467 ad
.u
.fs
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1469 if (tsec
->sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
1470 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, fsec
->sid
,
1478 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1480 return inode_has_perm(tsk
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1485 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1486 static int may_create(struct inode
*dir
,
1487 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1490 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
1491 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
1492 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1494 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
1497 tsec
= current
->security
;
1498 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1499 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1501 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1502 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
1504 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1505 DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
,
1510 if (tsec
->create_sid
&& sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
) {
1511 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
1513 rc
= security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, dsec
->sid
, tclass
,
1519 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, newsid
, tclass
, FILE__CREATE
, &ad
);
1523 return avc_has_perm(newsid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1524 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
1525 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
1528 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1529 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid
,
1530 struct task_struct
*ctx
)
1532 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
1534 tsec
= ctx
->security
;
1536 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, ksid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, KEY__CREATE
, NULL
);
1540 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1543 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1544 static int may_link(struct inode
*dir
,
1545 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1549 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
1550 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
, *isec
;
1551 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
1555 tsec
= current
->security
;
1556 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1557 isec
= dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1559 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1560 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
1563 av
|= (kind
? DIR__REMOVE_NAME
: DIR__ADD_NAME
);
1564 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1579 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1584 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, av
, &ad
);
1588 static inline int may_rename(struct inode
*old_dir
,
1589 struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
1590 struct inode
*new_dir
,
1591 struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
1593 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
1594 struct inode_security_struct
*old_dsec
, *new_dsec
, *old_isec
, *new_isec
;
1595 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
1597 int old_is_dir
, new_is_dir
;
1600 tsec
= current
->security
;
1601 old_dsec
= old_dir
->i_security
;
1602 old_isec
= old_dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1603 old_is_dir
= S_ISDIR(old_dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
);
1604 new_dsec
= new_dir
->i_security
;
1606 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1608 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= old_dentry
;
1609 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, old_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1610 DIR__REMOVE_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
, &ad
);
1613 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1614 old_isec
->sclass
, FILE__RENAME
, &ad
);
1617 if (old_is_dir
&& new_dir
!= old_dir
) {
1618 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1619 old_isec
->sclass
, DIR__REPARENT
, &ad
);
1624 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= new_dentry
;
1625 av
= DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
;
1626 if (new_dentry
->d_inode
)
1627 av
|= DIR__REMOVE_NAME
;
1628 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, new_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1631 if (new_dentry
->d_inode
) {
1632 new_isec
= new_dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1633 new_is_dir
= S_ISDIR(new_dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
);
1634 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, new_isec
->sid
,
1636 (new_is_dir
? DIR__RMDIR
: FILE__UNLINK
), &ad
);
1644 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1645 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1646 struct super_block
*sb
,
1648 struct avc_audit_data
*ad
)
1650 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
1651 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1653 tsec
= tsk
->security
;
1654 sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
1655 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
1659 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1660 static inline u32
file_mask_to_av(int mode
, int mask
)
1664 if ((mode
& S_IFMT
) != S_IFDIR
) {
1665 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1666 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
1667 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1670 if (mask
& MAY_APPEND
)
1672 else if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1676 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1678 if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1680 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1688 * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
1691 static inline u32
open_file_mask_to_av(int mode
, int mask
)
1693 u32 av
= file_mask_to_av(mode
, mask
);
1695 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
) {
1697 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1701 else if (S_ISCHR(mode
))
1702 av
|= CHR_FILE__OPEN
;
1703 else if (S_ISBLK(mode
))
1704 av
|= BLK_FILE__OPEN
;
1705 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode
))
1706 av
|= FIFO_FILE__OPEN
;
1707 else if (S_ISDIR(mode
))
1710 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1711 "unknown mode:%x\n", __func__
, mode
);
1716 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1717 static inline u32
file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1721 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_READ
)
1723 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_WRITE
) {
1724 if (file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
)
1731 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1739 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1741 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct
*child
,
1746 rc
= secondary_ops
->ptrace_may_access(child
, mode
);
1750 if (mode
== PTRACE_MODE_READ
) {
1751 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current
->security
;
1752 struct task_security_struct
*csec
= child
->security
;
1753 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, csec
->sid
,
1754 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__READ
, NULL
);
1757 return task_has_perm(current
, child
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
1760 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct
*parent
)
1764 rc
= secondary_ops
->ptrace_traceme(parent
);
1768 return task_has_perm(parent
, current
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
1771 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct
*target
, kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
1772 kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
, kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
1776 error
= task_has_perm(current
, target
, PROCESS__GETCAP
);
1780 return secondary_ops
->capget(target
, effective
, inheritable
, permitted
);
1783 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct
*target
, kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
1784 kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
, kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
1788 error
= secondary_ops
->capset_check(target
, effective
, inheritable
, permitted
);
1792 return task_has_perm(current
, target
, PROCESS__SETCAP
);
1795 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct
*target
, kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
1796 kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
, kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
1798 secondary_ops
->capset_set(target
, effective
, inheritable
, permitted
);
1801 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct
*tsk
, int cap
)
1805 rc
= secondary_ops
->capable(tsk
, cap
);
1809 return task_has_capability(tsk
, cap
);
1812 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table
*table
, u16 tclass
, u32
*sid
)
1815 char *buffer
, *path
, *end
;
1818 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1823 end
= buffer
+buflen
;
1829 const char *name
= table
->procname
;
1830 size_t namelen
= strlen(name
);
1831 buflen
-= namelen
+ 1;
1835 memcpy(end
, name
, namelen
);
1838 table
= table
->parent
;
1844 memcpy(end
, "/sys", 4);
1846 rc
= security_genfs_sid("proc", path
, tclass
, sid
);
1848 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1853 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table
*table
, int op
)
1857 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
1861 rc
= secondary_ops
->sysctl(table
, op
);
1865 tsec
= current
->security
;
1867 rc
= selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table
, (op
== 0001) ?
1868 SECCLASS_DIR
: SECCLASS_FILE
, &tsid
);
1870 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1871 tsid
= SECINITSID_SYSCTL
;
1874 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1875 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1877 error
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, tsid
,
1878 SECCLASS_DIR
, DIR__SEARCH
, NULL
);
1886 error
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, tsid
,
1887 SECCLASS_FILE
, av
, NULL
);
1893 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds
, int type
, int id
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1906 rc
= superblock_has_perm(current
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD
,
1912 rc
= superblock_has_perm(current
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET
,
1916 rc
= 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1922 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry
*dentry
)
1924 return dentry_has_perm(current
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__QUOTAON
);
1927 static int selinux_syslog(int type
)
1931 rc
= secondary_ops
->syslog(type
);
1936 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1937 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1938 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ
);
1940 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1941 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1942 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1943 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE
);
1945 case 0: /* Close log */
1946 case 1: /* Open log */
1947 case 2: /* Read from log */
1948 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1949 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1951 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD
);
1958 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1959 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1960 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1962 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1963 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1964 * the capability is granted.
1966 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1967 * processes that allocate mappings.
1969 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct
*mm
, long pages
)
1971 int rc
, cap_sys_admin
= 0;
1972 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current
->security
;
1974 rc
= secondary_ops
->capable(current
, CAP_SYS_ADMIN
);
1976 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec
->sid
, tsec
->sid
,
1977 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
,
1978 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
),
1985 return __vm_enough_memory(mm
, pages
, cap_sys_admin
);
1988 /* binprm security operations */
1990 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
1992 struct bprm_security_struct
*bsec
;
1994 bsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
1998 bsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
2001 bprm
->security
= bsec
;
2005 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2007 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
2008 struct inode
*inode
= bprm
->file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2009 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2010 struct bprm_security_struct
*bsec
;
2012 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
2015 rc
= secondary_ops
->bprm_set_security(bprm
);
2019 bsec
= bprm
->security
;
2024 tsec
= current
->security
;
2025 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2027 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2028 bsec
->sid
= tsec
->sid
;
2030 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2031 tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
2032 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
2033 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
2035 if (tsec
->exec_sid
) {
2036 newsid
= tsec
->exec_sid
;
2037 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2040 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2041 rc
= security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2042 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, &newsid
);
2047 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2048 ad
.u
.fs
.path
= bprm
->file
->f_path
;
2050 if (bprm
->file
->f_path
.mnt
->mnt_flags
& MNT_NOSUID
)
2053 if (tsec
->sid
== newsid
) {
2054 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2055 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS
, &ad
);
2059 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2060 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, newsid
,
2061 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__TRANSITION
, &ad
);
2065 rc
= avc_has_perm(newsid
, isec
->sid
,
2066 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__ENTRYPOINT
, &ad
);
2070 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2071 current
->personality
&= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID
;
2073 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2081 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2083 return secondary_ops
->bprm_check_security(bprm
);
2087 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2089 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current
->security
;
2092 if (tsec
->osid
!= tsec
->sid
) {
2093 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2094 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2095 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2096 atsecure
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->osid
, tsec
->sid
,
2098 PROCESS__NOATSECURE
, NULL
);
2101 return (atsecure
|| secondary_ops
->bprm_secureexec(bprm
));
2104 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2106 kfree(bprm
->security
);
2107 bprm
->security
= NULL
;
2110 extern struct vfsmount
*selinuxfs_mount
;
2111 extern struct dentry
*selinux_null
;
2113 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2114 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct
*files
)
2116 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
2117 struct file
*file
, *devnull
= NULL
;
2118 struct tty_struct
*tty
;
2119 struct fdtable
*fdt
;
2123 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex
);
2124 tty
= get_current_tty();
2127 file
= list_entry(tty
->tty_files
.next
, typeof(*file
), f_u
.fu_list
);
2129 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2130 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2131 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2132 file may belong to another process and we are only
2133 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2134 struct inode
*inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2135 if (inode_has_perm(current
, inode
,
2136 FILE__READ
| FILE__WRITE
, NULL
)) {
2142 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex
);
2143 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2147 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2149 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2151 spin_lock(&files
->file_lock
);
2153 unsigned long set
, i
;
2158 fdt
= files_fdtable(files
);
2159 if (i
>= fdt
->max_fds
)
2161 set
= fdt
->open_fds
->fds_bits
[j
];
2164 spin_unlock(&files
->file_lock
);
2165 for ( ; set
; i
++, set
>>= 1) {
2170 if (file_has_perm(current
,
2172 file_to_av(file
))) {
2174 fd
= get_unused_fd();
2184 devnull
= dentry_open(dget(selinux_null
), mntget(selinuxfs_mount
), O_RDWR
);
2185 if (IS_ERR(devnull
)) {
2192 fd_install(fd
, devnull
);
2197 spin_lock(&files
->file_lock
);
2200 spin_unlock(&files
->file_lock
);
2203 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
, int unsafe
)
2205 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
2206 struct bprm_security_struct
*bsec
;
2210 secondary_ops
->bprm_apply_creds(bprm
, unsafe
);
2212 tsec
= current
->security
;
2214 bsec
= bprm
->security
;
2217 tsec
->osid
= tsec
->sid
;
2219 if (tsec
->sid
!= sid
) {
2220 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2221 unchanged and kill. */
2222 if (unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE
) {
2223 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2224 PROCESS__SHARE
, NULL
);
2231 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2232 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2233 if (unsafe
& (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE
| LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
)) {
2234 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
2235 struct task_security_struct
*sec
;
2239 tracer
= tracehook_tracer_task(current
);
2240 if (likely(tracer
!= NULL
)) {
2241 sec
= tracer
->security
;
2247 rc
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2248 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
2260 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2262 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2264 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
2265 struct rlimit
*rlim
, *initrlim
;
2266 struct itimerval itimer
;
2267 struct bprm_security_struct
*bsec
;
2270 tsec
= current
->security
;
2271 bsec
= bprm
->security
;
2274 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL
, current
);
2277 if (tsec
->osid
== tsec
->sid
)
2280 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2281 flush_unauthorized_files(current
->files
);
2283 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2284 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2285 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2286 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2287 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2288 will be checked against the new SID. */
2289 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->osid
, tsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2290 PROCESS__SIGINH
, NULL
);
2292 memset(&itimer
, 0, sizeof itimer
);
2293 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
2294 do_setitimer(i
, &itimer
, NULL
);
2295 flush_signals(current
);
2296 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2297 flush_signal_handlers(current
, 1);
2298 sigemptyset(¤t
->blocked
);
2299 recalc_sigpending();
2300 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2303 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2304 current
->pdeath_signal
= 0;
2306 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2307 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2308 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2309 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2310 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2311 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2312 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2313 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2314 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2316 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->osid
, tsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2317 PROCESS__RLIMITINH
, NULL
);
2319 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++) {
2320 rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2321 initrlim
= init_task
.signal
->rlim
+i
;
2322 rlim
->rlim_cur
= min(rlim
->rlim_max
, initrlim
->rlim_cur
);
2324 if (current
->signal
->rlim
[RLIMIT_CPU
].rlim_cur
!= RLIM_INFINITY
) {
2326 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
2329 current
->it_prof_expires
= jiffies_to_cputime(1);
2333 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2334 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2335 wake_up_interruptible(¤t
->parent
->signal
->wait_chldexit
);
2338 /* superblock security operations */
2340 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2342 return superblock_alloc_security(sb
);
2345 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2347 superblock_free_security(sb
);
2350 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix
, int plen
, char *option
, int olen
)
2355 return !memcmp(prefix
, option
, plen
);
2358 static inline int selinux_option(char *option
, int len
)
2360 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2361 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2362 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2363 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
));
2366 static inline void take_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
, int len
)
2373 memcpy(*to
, from
, len
);
2377 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
,
2380 int current_size
= 0;
2388 while (current_size
< len
) {
2398 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig
, char *copy
)
2400 int fnosec
, fsec
, rc
= 0;
2401 char *in_save
, *in_curr
, *in_end
;
2402 char *sec_curr
, *nosec_save
, *nosec
;
2408 nosec
= (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
2416 in_save
= in_end
= orig
;
2420 open_quote
= !open_quote
;
2421 if ((*in_end
== ',' && open_quote
== 0) ||
2423 int len
= in_end
- in_curr
;
2425 if (selinux_option(in_curr
, len
))
2426 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr
, in_curr
, &fsec
, len
);
2428 take_option(&nosec
, in_curr
, &fnosec
, len
);
2430 in_curr
= in_end
+ 1;
2432 } while (*in_end
++);
2434 strcpy(in_save
, nosec_save
);
2435 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save
);
2440 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
2442 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
2445 rc
= superblock_doinit(sb
, data
);
2449 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2450 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= sb
->s_root
;
2451 return superblock_has_perm(current
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT
, &ad
);
2454 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2456 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
2458 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2459 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
->d_sb
->s_root
;
2460 return superblock_has_perm(current
, dentry
->d_sb
, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR
, &ad
);
2463 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name
,
2466 unsigned long flags
,
2471 rc
= secondary_ops
->sb_mount(dev_name
, path
, type
, flags
, data
);
2475 if (flags
& MS_REMOUNT
)
2476 return superblock_has_perm(current
, path
->mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2477 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT
, NULL
);
2479 return dentry_has_perm(current
, path
->mnt
, path
->dentry
,
2483 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, int flags
)
2487 rc
= secondary_ops
->sb_umount(mnt
, flags
);
2491 return superblock_has_perm(current
, mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2492 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT
, NULL
);
2495 /* inode security operations */
2497 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2499 return inode_alloc_security(inode
);
2502 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2504 inode_free_security(inode
);
2507 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode
*inode
, struct inode
*dir
,
2508 char **name
, void **value
,
2511 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
2512 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
2513 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2516 char *namep
= NULL
, *context
;
2518 tsec
= current
->security
;
2519 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
2520 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2522 if (tsec
->create_sid
&& sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
) {
2523 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2525 rc
= security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, dsec
->sid
,
2526 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
),
2529 printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: "
2530 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2533 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
2538 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2539 if (sbsec
->initialized
) {
2540 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2541 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
2543 isec
->initialized
= 1;
2546 if (!ss_initialized
|| sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
)
2550 namep
= kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, GFP_NOFS
);
2557 rc
= security_sid_to_context_force(newsid
, &context
, &clen
);
2569 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, int mask
)
2571 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_FILE
);
2574 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry
*old_dentry
, struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2578 rc
= secondary_ops
->inode_link(old_dentry
, dir
, new_dentry
);
2581 return may_link(dir
, old_dentry
, MAY_LINK
);
2584 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2588 rc
= secondary_ops
->inode_unlink(dir
, dentry
);
2591 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_UNLINK
);
2594 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2596 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
);
2599 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, int mask
)
2601 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_DIR
);
2604 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2606 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_RMDIR
);
2609 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, int mode
, dev_t dev
)
2613 rc
= secondary_ops
->inode_mknod(dir
, dentry
, mode
, dev
);
2617 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
));
2620 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode
*old_inode
, struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
2621 struct inode
*new_inode
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2623 return may_rename(old_inode
, old_dentry
, new_inode
, new_dentry
);
2626 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2628 return dentry_has_perm(current
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2631 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct nameidata
*nameidata
)
2635 rc
= secondary_ops
->inode_follow_link(dentry
, nameidata
);
2638 return dentry_has_perm(current
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2641 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
, int mask
)
2645 rc
= secondary_ops
->inode_permission(inode
, mask
);
2650 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2654 return inode_has_perm(current
, inode
,
2655 open_file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
), NULL
);
2658 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct iattr
*iattr
)
2662 rc
= secondary_ops
->inode_setattr(dentry
, iattr
);
2666 if (iattr
->ia_valid
& ATTR_FORCE
)
2669 if (iattr
->ia_valid
& (ATTR_MODE
| ATTR_UID
| ATTR_GID
|
2670 ATTR_ATIME_SET
| ATTR_MTIME_SET
))
2671 return dentry_has_perm(current
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2673 return dentry_has_perm(current
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__WRITE
);
2676 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2678 return dentry_has_perm(current
, mnt
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2681 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2683 if (!strncmp(name
, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
,
2684 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
- 1)) {
2685 if (!strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_CAPS
)) {
2686 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP
))
2688 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
2689 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2690 Restrict to administrator. */
2695 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2696 ordinary setattr permission. */
2697 return dentry_has_perm(current
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2700 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2701 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
2703 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current
->security
;
2704 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2705 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2706 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2707 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
2711 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
2712 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
2714 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2715 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
)
2718 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode
))
2721 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2722 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
2724 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
,
2725 FILE__RELABELFROM
, &ad
);
2729 rc
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2730 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
2731 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
))
2733 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2738 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, newsid
, isec
->sclass
,
2739 FILE__RELABELTO
, &ad
);
2743 rc
= security_validate_transition(isec
->sid
, newsid
, tsec
->sid
,
2748 return avc_has_perm(newsid
,
2750 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
2751 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
,
2755 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2756 const void *value
, size_t size
,
2759 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2760 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2764 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
)) {
2765 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2769 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2771 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2772 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2773 inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
, -rc
);
2781 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2783 return dentry_has_perm(current
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2786 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2788 return dentry_has_perm(current
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2791 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2793 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
2794 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
2796 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2797 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2802 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2804 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2806 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
, void **buffer
, bool alloc
)
2810 char *context
= NULL
;
2811 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current
->security
;
2812 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2814 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
2818 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2819 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2820 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2821 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2822 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2823 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2824 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2826 error
= secondary_ops
->capable(current
, CAP_MAC_ADMIN
);
2828 error
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec
->sid
, tsec
->sid
,
2829 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2
,
2830 CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN
,
2834 error
= security_sid_to_context_force(isec
->sid
, &context
,
2837 error
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &size
);
2850 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
,
2851 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
2853 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2857 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
2860 if (!value
|| !size
)
2863 rc
= security_context_to_sid((void *)value
, size
, &newsid
);
2871 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, char *buffer
, size_t buffer_size
)
2873 const int len
= sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
);
2874 if (buffer
&& len
<= buffer_size
)
2875 memcpy(buffer
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, len
);
2879 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2881 return secondary_ops
->inode_need_killpriv(dentry
);
2884 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2886 return secondary_ops
->inode_killpriv(dentry
);
2889 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode
*inode
, u32
*secid
)
2891 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2895 /* file security operations */
2897 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
2900 struct inode
*inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2903 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2907 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2908 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && (mask
& MAY_WRITE
))
2911 rc
= file_has_perm(current
, file
,
2912 file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
));
2916 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode
, mask
);
2919 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
2921 struct inode
*inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2922 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current
->security
;
2923 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
2924 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2927 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2931 if (tsec
->sid
== fsec
->sid
&& fsec
->isid
== isec
->sid
2932 && fsec
->pseqno
== avc_policy_seqno())
2933 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode
, mask
);
2935 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file
, mask
);
2938 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
2940 return file_alloc_security(file
);
2943 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
2945 file_free_security(file
);
2948 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
2953 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd
) & _IOC_WRITE
)
2955 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd
) & _IOC_READ
)
2960 return file_has_perm(current
, file
, av
);
2963 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file
*file
, unsigned long prot
, int shared
)
2965 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2966 if ((prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && (!file
|| (!shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
)))) {
2968 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2969 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2970 * This has an additional check.
2972 int rc
= task_has_perm(current
, current
, PROCESS__EXECMEM
);
2979 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2980 u32 av
= FILE__READ
;
2982 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2983 if (shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
))
2986 if (prot
& PROT_EXEC
)
2987 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
2989 return file_has_perm(current
, file
, av
);
2994 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file
*file
, unsigned long reqprot
,
2995 unsigned long prot
, unsigned long flags
,
2996 unsigned long addr
, unsigned long addr_only
)
2999 u32 sid
= ((struct task_security_struct
*)(current
->security
))->sid
;
3001 if (addr
< mmap_min_addr
)
3002 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT
,
3003 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO
, NULL
);
3004 if (rc
|| addr_only
)
3007 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3010 return file_map_prot_check(file
, prot
,
3011 (flags
& MAP_TYPE
) == MAP_SHARED
);
3014 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct
*vma
,
3015 unsigned long reqprot
,
3020 rc
= secondary_ops
->file_mprotect(vma
, reqprot
, prot
);
3024 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3027 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3028 if ((prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && !(vma
->vm_flags
& VM_EXEC
)) {
3030 if (vma
->vm_start
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_brk
&&
3031 vma
->vm_end
<= vma
->vm_mm
->brk
) {
3032 rc
= task_has_perm(current
, current
,
3034 } else if (!vma
->vm_file
&&
3035 vma
->vm_start
<= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
&&
3036 vma
->vm_end
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
) {
3037 rc
= task_has_perm(current
, current
, PROCESS__EXECSTACK
);
3038 } else if (vma
->vm_file
&& vma
->anon_vma
) {
3040 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3041 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3042 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3043 * modified content. This typically should only
3044 * occur for text relocations.
3046 rc
= file_has_perm(current
, vma
->vm_file
,
3054 return file_map_prot_check(vma
->vm_file
, prot
, vma
->vm_flags
&VM_SHARED
);
3057 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
)
3059 return file_has_perm(current
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3062 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3069 if (!file
->f_path
.dentry
|| !file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
) {
3074 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && !(arg
& O_APPEND
)) {
3075 err
= file_has_perm(current
, file
, FILE__WRITE
);
3084 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3085 err
= file_has_perm(current
, file
, 0);
3090 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3095 if (!file
->f_path
.dentry
|| !file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
) {
3099 err
= file_has_perm(current
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3106 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file
*file
)
3108 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3109 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3111 tsec
= current
->security
;
3112 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3113 fsec
->fown_sid
= tsec
->sid
;
3118 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
3119 struct fown_struct
*fown
, int signum
)
3123 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3124 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3126 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3127 file
= container_of(fown
, struct file
, f_owner
);
3129 tsec
= tsk
->security
;
3130 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3133 perm
= signal_to_av(SIGIO
); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3135 perm
= signal_to_av(signum
);
3137 return avc_has_perm(fsec
->fown_sid
, tsec
->sid
,
3138 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3141 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file
*file
)
3143 return file_has_perm(current
, file
, file_to_av(file
));
3146 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file
*file
)
3148 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3149 struct inode
*inode
;
3150 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3151 inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
3152 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3153 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3155 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3156 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3157 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3158 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3159 * struct as its SID.
3161 fsec
->isid
= isec
->sid
;
3162 fsec
->pseqno
= avc_policy_seqno();
3164 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3165 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3166 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3167 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3168 * new inode label or new policy.
3169 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3171 return inode_has_perm(current
, inode
, file_to_av(file
), NULL
);
3174 /* task security operations */
3176 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags
)
3180 rc
= secondary_ops
->task_create(clone_flags
);
3184 return task_has_perm(current
, current
, PROCESS__FORK
);
3187 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
3189 struct task_security_struct
*tsec1
, *tsec2
;
3192 tsec1
= current
->security
;
3194 rc
= task_alloc_security(tsk
);
3197 tsec2
= tsk
->security
;
3199 tsec2
->osid
= tsec1
->osid
;
3200 tsec2
->sid
= tsec1
->sid
;
3202 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3203 tsec2
->exec_sid
= tsec1
->exec_sid
;
3204 tsec2
->create_sid
= tsec1
->create_sid
;
3205 tsec2
->keycreate_sid
= tsec1
->keycreate_sid
;
3206 tsec2
->sockcreate_sid
= tsec1
->sockcreate_sid
;
3211 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
3213 task_free_security(tsk
);
3216 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0
, uid_t id1
, uid_t id2
, int flags
)
3218 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3219 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3220 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3221 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3222 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3227 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0
, uid_t id1
, uid_t id2
, int flags
)
3229 return secondary_ops
->task_post_setuid(id0
, id1
, id2
, flags
);
3232 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0
, gid_t id1
, gid_t id2
, int flags
)
3234 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3238 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct
*p
, pid_t pgid
)
3240 return task_has_perm(current
, p
, PROCESS__SETPGID
);
3243 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3245 return task_has_perm(current
, p
, PROCESS__GETPGID
);
3248 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3250 return task_has_perm(current
, p
, PROCESS__GETSESSION
);
3253 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct
*p
, u32
*secid
)
3255 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= p
->security
;
3259 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info
*group_info
)
3261 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3265 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct
*p
, int nice
)
3269 rc
= secondary_ops
->task_setnice(p
, nice
);
3273 return task_has_perm(current
, p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3276 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct
*p
, int ioprio
)
3280 rc
= secondary_ops
->task_setioprio(p
, ioprio
);
3284 return task_has_perm(current
, p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3287 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct
*p
)
3289 return task_has_perm(current
, p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3292 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource
, struct rlimit
*new_rlim
)
3294 struct rlimit
*old_rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ resource
;
3297 rc
= secondary_ops
->task_setrlimit(resource
, new_rlim
);
3301 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3302 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3303 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3304 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3305 if (old_rlim
->rlim_max
!= new_rlim
->rlim_max
)
3306 return task_has_perm(current
, current
, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT
);
3311 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
, int policy
, struct sched_param
*lp
)
3315 rc
= secondary_ops
->task_setscheduler(p
, policy
, lp
);
3319 return task_has_perm(current
, p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3322 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3324 return task_has_perm(current
, p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3327 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct
*p
)
3329 return task_has_perm(current
, p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3332 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct
*p
, struct siginfo
*info
,
3337 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3339 rc
= secondary_ops
->task_kill(p
, info
, sig
, secid
);
3344 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNULL
; /* null signal; existence test */
3346 perm
= signal_to_av(sig
);
3349 rc
= avc_has_perm(secid
, tsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3351 rc
= task_has_perm(current
, p
, perm
);
3355 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option
,
3362 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3363 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3364 the state of the current process. */
3365 return secondary_ops
->task_prctl(option
, arg2
, arg3
, arg4
, arg5
, rc_p
);
3368 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct
*p
)
3370 return task_has_perm(p
, current
, PROCESS__SIGCHLD
);
3373 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct
*p
)
3375 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3377 secondary_ops
->task_reparent_to_init(p
);
3380 tsec
->osid
= tsec
->sid
;
3381 tsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
3385 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct
*p
,
3386 struct inode
*inode
)
3388 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= p
->security
;
3389 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3391 isec
->sid
= tsec
->sid
;
3392 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3396 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3397 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3398 struct avc_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3400 int offset
, ihlen
, ret
= -EINVAL
;
3401 struct iphdr _iph
, *ih
;
3403 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3404 ih
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_iph
), &_iph
);
3408 ihlen
= ih
->ihl
* 4;
3409 if (ihlen
< sizeof(_iph
))
3412 ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.saddr
= ih
->saddr
;
3413 ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.daddr
= ih
->daddr
;
3417 *proto
= ih
->protocol
;
3419 switch (ih
->protocol
) {
3421 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3423 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3427 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3431 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= th
->source
;
3432 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= th
->dest
;
3437 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3439 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3443 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3447 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= uh
->source
;
3448 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= uh
->dest
;
3452 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3453 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3455 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3459 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3463 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3464 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3475 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3477 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3478 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3479 struct avc_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3482 int ret
= -EINVAL
, offset
;
3483 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h
, *ip6
;
3485 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3486 ip6
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_ipv6h
), &_ipv6h
);
3490 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.saddr
, &ip6
->saddr
);
3491 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.daddr
, &ip6
->daddr
);
3494 nexthdr
= ip6
->nexthdr
;
3495 offset
+= sizeof(_ipv6h
);
3496 offset
= ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb
, offset
, &nexthdr
);
3505 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3507 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3511 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= th
->source
;
3512 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= th
->dest
;
3517 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3519 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3523 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= uh
->source
;
3524 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= uh
->dest
;
3528 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3529 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3531 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3535 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3536 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3540 /* includes fragments */
3550 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff
*skb
, struct avc_audit_data
*ad
,
3551 char **addrp
, int src
, u8
*proto
)
3555 switch (ad
->u
.net
.family
) {
3557 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3560 *addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.saddr
:
3561 &ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.daddr
);
3564 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3566 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3569 *addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.saddr
:
3570 &ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.daddr
);
3579 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3580 " unable to parse packet\n");
3586 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3588 * @family: protocol family
3589 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3592 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3593 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3594 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3595 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3596 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3600 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff
*skb
, u16 family
, u32
*sid
)
3607 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb
, &xfrm_sid
);
3608 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb
, family
, &nlbl_type
, &nlbl_sid
);
3610 err
= security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid
, nlbl_type
, xfrm_sid
, sid
);
3611 if (unlikely(err
)) {
3613 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3614 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3621 /* socket security operations */
3622 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct
*task
, struct socket
*sock
,
3625 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3626 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3627 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
3630 tsec
= task
->security
;
3631 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3633 if (isec
->sid
== SECINITSID_KERNEL
)
3636 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3637 ad
.u
.net
.sk
= sock
->sk
;
3638 err
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
3644 static int selinux_socket_create(int family
, int type
,
3645 int protocol
, int kern
)
3648 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3654 tsec
= current
->security
;
3655 newsid
= tsec
->sockcreate_sid
? : tsec
->sid
;
3656 err
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, newsid
,
3657 socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
,
3658 protocol
), SOCKET__CREATE
, NULL
);
3664 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket
*sock
, int family
,
3665 int type
, int protocol
, int kern
)
3668 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3669 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3670 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
3673 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3675 tsec
= current
->security
;
3676 newsid
= tsec
->sockcreate_sid
? : tsec
->sid
;
3677 isec
->sclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
3678 isec
->sid
= kern
? SECINITSID_KERNEL
: newsid
;
3679 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3682 sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
3683 sksec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
3684 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
3685 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock
);
3691 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3692 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3693 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3695 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
3700 err
= socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__BIND
);
3705 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3706 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3707 * check the first address now.
3709 family
= sock
->sk
->sk_family
;
3710 if (family
== PF_INET
|| family
== PF_INET6
) {
3712 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3713 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3714 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
3715 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
3716 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
3717 unsigned short snum
;
3718 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
3721 tsec
= current
->security
;
3722 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3724 if (family
== PF_INET
) {
3725 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
3726 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
3727 addrp
= (char *)&addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
3729 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
3730 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
3731 addrp
= (char *)&addr6
->sin6_addr
.s6_addr
;
3737 inet_get_local_port_range(&low
, &high
);
3739 if (snum
< max(PROT_SOCK
, low
) || snum
> high
) {
3740 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
,
3744 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3745 ad
.u
.net
.sport
= htons(snum
);
3746 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
3747 err
= avc_has_perm(isec
->sid
, sid
,
3749 SOCKET__NAME_BIND
, &ad
);
3755 switch (isec
->sclass
) {
3756 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
:
3757 node_perm
= TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3760 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
:
3761 node_perm
= UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3764 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
:
3765 node_perm
= DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3769 node_perm
= RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3773 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &sid
);
3777 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3778 ad
.u
.net
.sport
= htons(snum
);
3779 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
3781 if (family
== PF_INET
)
3782 ad
.u
.net
.v4info
.saddr
= addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
3784 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad
.u
.net
.v6info
.saddr
, &addr6
->sin6_addr
);
3786 err
= avc_has_perm(isec
->sid
, sid
,
3787 isec
->sclass
, node_perm
, &ad
);
3795 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
3797 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3800 err
= socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__CONNECT
);
3805 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3807 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3808 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
||
3809 isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
) {
3810 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
3811 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
3812 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
3813 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
3814 unsigned short snum
;
3817 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
) {
3818 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
3819 if (addrlen
< sizeof(struct sockaddr_in
))
3821 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
3823 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
3824 if (addrlen
< SIN6_LEN_RFC2133
)
3826 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
3829 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
, snum
, &sid
);
3833 perm
= (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
) ?
3834 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
: DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
;
3836 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3837 ad
.u
.net
.dport
= htons(snum
);
3838 ad
.u
.net
.family
= sk
->sk_family
;
3839 err
= avc_has_perm(isec
->sid
, sid
, isec
->sclass
, perm
, &ad
);
3848 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket
*sock
, int backlog
)
3850 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__LISTEN
);
3853 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket
*sock
, struct socket
*newsock
)
3856 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3857 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
;
3859 err
= socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__ACCEPT
);
3863 newisec
= SOCK_INODE(newsock
)->i_security
;
3865 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3866 newisec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
3867 newisec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
3868 newisec
->initialized
= 1;
3873 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
3878 rc
= socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__WRITE
);
3882 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock
), MAY_WRITE
);
3885 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
3886 int size
, int flags
)
3888 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__READ
);
3891 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket
*sock
)
3893 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
3896 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket
*sock
)
3898 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
3901 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
, int optname
)
3905 err
= socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__SETOPT
);
3909 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock
, level
, optname
);
3912 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
,
3915 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__GETOPT
);
3918 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket
*sock
, int how
)
3920 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN
);
3923 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket
*sock
,
3924 struct socket
*other
,
3927 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
;
3928 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3929 struct inode_security_struct
*other_isec
;
3930 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
3933 err
= secondary_ops
->unix_stream_connect(sock
, other
, newsk
);
3937 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3938 other_isec
= SOCK_INODE(other
)->i_security
;
3940 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3941 ad
.u
.net
.sk
= other
->sk
;
3943 err
= avc_has_perm(isec
->sid
, other_isec
->sid
,
3945 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO
, &ad
);
3949 /* connecting socket */
3950 ssec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
3951 ssec
->peer_sid
= other_isec
->sid
;
3953 /* server child socket */
3954 ssec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
3955 ssec
->peer_sid
= isec
->sid
;
3956 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec
->sid
, ssec
->peer_sid
, &ssec
->sid
);
3961 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket
*sock
,
3962 struct socket
*other
)
3964 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3965 struct inode_security_struct
*other_isec
;
3966 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
3969 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3970 other_isec
= SOCK_INODE(other
)->i_security
;
3972 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3973 ad
.u
.net
.sk
= other
->sk
;
3975 err
= avc_has_perm(isec
->sid
, other_isec
->sid
,
3976 isec
->sclass
, SOCKET__SENDTO
, &ad
);
3983 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex
, char *addrp
, u16 family
,
3985 struct avc_audit_data
*ad
)
3991 err
= sel_netif_sid(ifindex
, &if_sid
);
3994 err
= avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
3995 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__INGRESS
, ad
);
3999 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
);
4002 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4003 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__RECVFROM
, ad
);
4006 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock
*sk
,
4007 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4008 struct avc_audit_data
*ad
,
4013 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4015 u32 netif_perm
, node_perm
, recv_perm
;
4016 u32 port_sid
, node_sid
, if_sid
, sk_sid
;
4018 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4019 sk_class
= sksec
->sclass
;
4022 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
:
4023 netif_perm
= NETIF__UDP_RECV
;
4024 node_perm
= NODE__UDP_RECV
;
4025 recv_perm
= UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG
;
4027 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
:
4028 netif_perm
= NETIF__TCP_RECV
;
4029 node_perm
= NODE__TCP_RECV
;
4030 recv_perm
= TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG
;
4032 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
:
4033 netif_perm
= NETIF__DCCP_RECV
;
4034 node_perm
= NODE__DCCP_RECV
;
4035 recv_perm
= DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG
;
4038 netif_perm
= NETIF__RAWIP_RECV
;
4039 node_perm
= NODE__RAWIP_RECV
;
4044 err
= sel_netif_sid(skb
->iif
, &if_sid
);
4047 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, if_sid
, SECCLASS_NETIF
, netif_perm
, ad
);
4051 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
);
4054 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, node_sid
, SECCLASS_NODE
, node_perm
, ad
);
4060 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
,
4061 ntohs(ad
->u
.net
.sport
), &port_sid
);
4062 if (unlikely(err
)) {
4064 "SELinux: failure in"
4065 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4066 " network port label not found\n");
4069 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, port_sid
, sk_class
, recv_perm
, ad
);
4072 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4076 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4078 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4079 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
4082 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4083 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= skb
->iif
;
4084 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4085 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4089 if (selinux_compat_net
)
4090 err
= selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk
, skb
, &ad
,
4093 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4098 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer
) {
4099 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
4102 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, peer_sid
,
4103 SECCLASS_PEER
, PEER__RECV
, &ad
);
4105 err
= selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
, skb
, family
, &ad
);
4108 err
= selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
);
4114 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4117 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4118 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4119 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4120 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
4125 if (family
!= PF_INET
&& family
!= PF_INET6
)
4128 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4129 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4132 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4133 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4134 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4135 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4136 if (selinux_compat_net
|| !selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4137 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk
, skb
, family
);
4139 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4140 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4141 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4144 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4145 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= skb
->iif
;
4146 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4147 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4151 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4154 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
4157 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb
->iif
, addrp
, family
,
4161 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, peer_sid
, SECCLASS_PEER
,
4165 if (secmark_active
) {
4166 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4175 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket
*sock
, char __user
*optval
,
4176 int __user
*optlen
, unsigned len
)
4181 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
;
4182 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
4183 u32 peer_sid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4185 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
4187 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
||
4188 isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
) {
4189 ssec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4190 peer_sid
= ssec
->peer_sid
;
4192 if (peer_sid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
4197 err
= security_sid_to_context(peer_sid
, &scontext
, &scontext_len
);
4202 if (scontext_len
> len
) {
4207 if (copy_to_user(optval
, scontext
, scontext_len
))
4211 if (put_user(scontext_len
, optlen
))
4219 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket
*sock
, struct sk_buff
*skb
, u32
*secid
)
4221 u32 peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4224 if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4226 else if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IPV6
))
4229 family
= sock
->sk
->sk_family
;
4233 if (sock
&& family
== PF_UNIX
)
4234 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock
), &peer_secid
);
4236 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_secid
);
4239 *secid
= peer_secid
;
4240 if (peer_secid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4245 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock
*sk
, int family
, gfp_t priority
)
4247 return sk_alloc_security(sk
, family
, priority
);
4250 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock
*sk
)
4252 sk_free_security(sk
);
4255 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock
*sk
, struct sock
*newsk
)
4257 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4258 struct sk_security_struct
*newssec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4260 newssec
->sid
= ssec
->sid
;
4261 newssec
->peer_sid
= ssec
->peer_sid
;
4262 newssec
->sclass
= ssec
->sclass
;
4264 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec
, newsk
->sk_family
);
4267 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock
*sk
, u32
*secid
)
4270 *secid
= SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET
;
4272 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4274 *secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4278 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock
*sk
, struct socket
*parent
)
4280 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(parent
)->i_security
;
4281 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4283 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
|| sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET6
||
4284 sk
->sk_family
== PF_UNIX
)
4285 isec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4286 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4288 selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk
, parent
);
4291 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4292 struct request_sock
*req
)
4294 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4296 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4300 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4301 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4304 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peersid
);
4307 if (peersid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
4308 req
->secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4309 req
->peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4313 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sksec
->sid
, peersid
, &newsid
);
4317 req
->secid
= newsid
;
4318 req
->peer_secid
= peersid
;
4322 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock
*newsk
,
4323 const struct request_sock
*req
)
4325 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4327 newsksec
->sid
= req
->secid
;
4328 newsksec
->peer_sid
= req
->peer_secid
;
4329 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4330 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4331 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4332 time it will have been created and available. */
4334 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4335 * thread with access to newsksec */
4336 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec
, req
->rsk_ops
->family
);
4339 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock
*sk
,
4340 struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4342 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4343 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4345 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4346 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4349 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &sksec
->peer_sid
);
4352 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock
*req
,
4355 fl
->secid
= req
->secid
;
4358 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4362 struct nlmsghdr
*nlh
;
4363 struct socket
*sock
= sk
->sk_socket
;
4364 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
4366 if (skb
->len
< NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4370 nlh
= nlmsg_hdr(skb
);
4372 err
= selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec
->sclass
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
, &perm
);
4374 if (err
== -EINVAL
) {
4375 audit_log(current
->audit_context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
4376 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4377 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4378 nlh
->nlmsg_type
, isec
->sclass
);
4379 if (!selinux_enforcing
)
4389 err
= socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, perm
);
4394 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4396 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int ifindex
,
4401 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
4405 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4408 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4409 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4410 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4413 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
) != 0)
4416 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4417 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= ifindex
;
4418 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4419 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
) != 0)
4423 if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex
, addrp
, family
,
4424 peer_sid
, &ad
) != 0)
4428 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4429 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__FORWARD_IN
, &ad
))
4435 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum
,
4436 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4437 const struct net_device
*in
,
4438 const struct net_device
*out
,
4439 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4441 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, in
->ifindex
, PF_INET
);
4444 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4445 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum
,
4446 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4447 const struct net_device
*in
,
4448 const struct net_device
*out
,
4449 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4451 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, in
->ifindex
, PF_INET6
);
4455 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock
*sk
,
4457 struct avc_audit_data
*ad
,
4458 u16 family
, char *addrp
)
4461 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4463 u32 netif_perm
, node_perm
, send_perm
;
4464 u32 port_sid
, node_sid
, if_sid
, sk_sid
;
4466 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4467 sk_class
= sksec
->sclass
;
4470 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
:
4471 netif_perm
= NETIF__UDP_SEND
;
4472 node_perm
= NODE__UDP_SEND
;
4473 send_perm
= UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG
;
4475 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
:
4476 netif_perm
= NETIF__TCP_SEND
;
4477 node_perm
= NODE__TCP_SEND
;
4478 send_perm
= TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG
;
4480 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
:
4481 netif_perm
= NETIF__DCCP_SEND
;
4482 node_perm
= NODE__DCCP_SEND
;
4483 send_perm
= DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG
;
4486 netif_perm
= NETIF__RAWIP_SEND
;
4487 node_perm
= NODE__RAWIP_SEND
;
4492 err
= sel_netif_sid(ifindex
, &if_sid
);
4495 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, if_sid
, SECCLASS_NETIF
, netif_perm
, ad
);
4498 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
);
4501 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, node_sid
, SECCLASS_NODE
, node_perm
, ad
);
4508 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
,
4509 ntohs(ad
->u
.net
.dport
), &port_sid
);
4510 if (unlikely(err
)) {
4512 "SELinux: failure in"
4513 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4514 " network port label not found\n");
4517 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, port_sid
, sk_class
, send_perm
, ad
);
4520 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4524 struct sock
*sk
= skb
->sk
;
4525 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4526 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
4532 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4534 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4535 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= ifindex
;
4536 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4537 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, &proto
))
4540 if (selinux_compat_net
) {
4541 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb
->sk
, ifindex
,
4542 &ad
, family
, addrp
))
4545 if (avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4546 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__SEND
, &ad
))
4550 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4551 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
, proto
))
4557 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int ifindex
,
4563 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
4568 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4569 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4570 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4571 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4572 if (selinux_compat_net
|| !selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4573 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb
, ifindex
, family
);
4575 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4576 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4577 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4578 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4579 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4580 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4581 if (skb
->dst
!= NULL
&& skb
->dst
->xfrm
!= NULL
)
4584 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4585 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4586 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4589 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4590 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4591 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4592 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4597 if (IPCB(skb
)->flags
& IPSKB_FORWARDED
)
4598 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
4600 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4603 if (IP6CB(skb
)->flags
& IP6SKB_FORWARDED
)
4604 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
4606 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4611 if (secmark_perm
== PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
) {
4612 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
))
4615 peer_sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4617 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4618 peer_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4619 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4622 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4623 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= ifindex
;
4624 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4625 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, NULL
))
4629 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4630 SECCLASS_PACKET
, secmark_perm
, &ad
))
4633 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4637 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex
, &if_sid
))
4639 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4640 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__EGRESS
, &ad
))
4643 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
))
4645 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4646 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__SENDTO
, &ad
))
4653 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum
,
4654 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4655 const struct net_device
*in
,
4656 const struct net_device
*out
,
4657 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4659 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, out
->ifindex
, PF_INET
);
4662 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4663 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum
,
4664 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4665 const struct net_device
*in
,
4666 const struct net_device
*out
,
4667 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4669 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, out
->ifindex
, PF_INET6
);
4673 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4675 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4679 err
= secondary_ops
->netlink_send(sk
, skb
);
4683 if (policydb_loaded_version
>= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS
)
4684 err
= selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk
, skb
);
4689 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int capability
)
4692 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
4694 err
= secondary_ops
->netlink_recv(skb
, capability
);
4698 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, CAP
);
4699 ad
.u
.cap
= capability
;
4701 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb
).sid
, NETLINK_CB(skb
).sid
,
4702 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
, CAP_TO_MASK(capability
), &ad
);
4705 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct
*task
,
4706 struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
,
4709 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= task
->security
;
4710 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4712 isec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4716 isec
->sclass
= sclass
;
4717 isec
->sid
= tsec
->sid
;
4718 perm
->security
= isec
;
4723 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
)
4725 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= perm
->security
;
4726 perm
->security
= NULL
;
4730 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4732 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4734 msec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4738 msec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4739 msg
->security
= msec
;
4744 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4746 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
= msg
->security
;
4748 msg
->security
= NULL
;
4752 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipc_perms
,
4755 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
4756 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4757 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
4759 tsec
= current
->security
;
4760 isec
= ipc_perms
->security
;
4762 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4763 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= ipc_perms
->key
;
4765 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
4768 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4770 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg
);
4773 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4775 msg_msg_free_security(msg
);
4778 /* message queue security operations */
4779 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
4781 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
4782 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4783 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
4786 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &msq
->q_perm
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
);
4790 tsec
= current
->security
;
4791 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4793 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4794 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4796 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4799 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
4805 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
4807 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
4810 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int msqflg
)
4812 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
4813 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4814 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
4816 tsec
= current
->security
;
4817 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4819 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4820 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4822 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4823 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
4826 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int cmd
)
4834 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4835 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
4838 perms
= MSGQ__GETATTR
| MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
;
4841 perms
= MSGQ__SETATTR
;
4844 perms
= MSGQ__DESTROY
;
4850 err
= ipc_has_perm(&msq
->q_perm
, perms
);
4854 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
, int msqflg
)
4856 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
4857 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4858 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4859 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
4862 tsec
= current
->security
;
4863 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4864 msec
= msg
->security
;
4867 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4869 if (msec
->sid
== SECINITSID_UNLABELED
) {
4871 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4872 * message queue this message will be stored in
4874 rc
= security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
,
4882 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4883 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4885 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4886 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4889 /* Can this process send the message */
4890 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, msec
->sid
,
4891 SECCLASS_MSG
, MSG__SEND
, &ad
);
4893 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4894 rc
= avc_has_perm(msec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
4895 SECCLASS_MSGQ
, MSGQ__ENQUEUE
, &ad
);
4900 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
,
4901 struct task_struct
*target
,
4902 long type
, int mode
)
4904 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
4905 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4906 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4907 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
4910 tsec
= target
->security
;
4911 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4912 msec
= msg
->security
;
4914 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4915 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4917 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
4918 SECCLASS_MSGQ
, MSGQ__READ
, &ad
);
4920 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, msec
->sid
,
4921 SECCLASS_MSG
, MSG__RECEIVE
, &ad
);
4925 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4926 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
4928 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
4929 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4930 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
4933 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &shp
->shm_perm
, SECCLASS_SHM
);
4937 tsec
= current
->security
;
4938 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
4940 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4941 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
4943 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
4946 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
4952 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
4954 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
4957 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int shmflg
)
4959 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
4960 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4961 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
4963 tsec
= current
->security
;
4964 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
4966 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4967 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
4969 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
4970 SHM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
4973 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4974 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int cmd
)
4982 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4983 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
4986 perms
= SHM__GETATTR
| SHM__ASSOCIATE
;
4989 perms
= SHM__SETATTR
;
4996 perms
= SHM__DESTROY
;
5002 err
= ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5006 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
,
5007 char __user
*shmaddr
, int shmflg
)
5012 rc
= secondary_ops
->shm_shmat(shp
, shmaddr
, shmflg
);
5016 if (shmflg
& SHM_RDONLY
)
5019 perms
= SHM__READ
| SHM__WRITE
;
5021 return ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5024 /* Semaphore security operations */
5025 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5027 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5028 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5029 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
5032 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &sma
->sem_perm
, SECCLASS_SEM
);
5036 tsec
= current
->security
;
5037 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5039 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
5040 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5042 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5045 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5051 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5053 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5056 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array
*sma
, int semflg
)
5058 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5059 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5060 struct avc_audit_data ad
;
5062 tsec
= current
->security
;
5063 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5065 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
5066 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5068 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5069 SEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5072 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5073 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array
*sma
, int cmd
)
5081 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5082 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5086 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
;
5097 perms
= SEM__DESTROY
;
5100 perms
= SEM__SETATTR
;
5104 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
| SEM__ASSOCIATE
;
5110 err
= ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5114 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array
*sma
,
5115 struct sembuf
*sops
, unsigned nsops
, int alter
)
5120 perms
= SEM__READ
| SEM__WRITE
;
5124 return ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5127 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, short flag
)
5133 av
|= IPC__UNIX_READ
;
5135 av
|= IPC__UNIX_WRITE
;
5140 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp
, av
);
5143 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, u32
*secid
)
5145 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= ipcp
->security
;
5149 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
)
5152 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, dentry
);
5155 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5156 char *name
, char **value
)
5158 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5164 error
= task_has_perm(current
, p
, PROCESS__GETATTR
);
5171 if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5173 else if (!strcmp(name
, "prev"))
5175 else if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5176 sid
= tsec
->exec_sid
;
5177 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5178 sid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
5179 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5180 sid
= tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5181 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5182 sid
= tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
5189 error
= security_sid_to_context(sid
, value
, &len
);
5195 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5196 char *name
, void *value
, size_t size
)
5198 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5199 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
5205 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5206 security attributes. */
5211 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5212 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5213 * above restriction is ever removed.
5215 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5216 error
= task_has_perm(current
, p
, PROCESS__SETEXEC
);
5217 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5218 error
= task_has_perm(current
, p
, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE
);
5219 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5220 error
= task_has_perm(current
, p
, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE
);
5221 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5222 error
= task_has_perm(current
, p
, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE
);
5223 else if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5224 error
= task_has_perm(current
, p
, PROCESS__SETCURRENT
);
5230 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5231 if (size
&& str
[1] && str
[1] != '\n') {
5232 if (str
[size
-1] == '\n') {
5236 error
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &sid
);
5237 if (error
== -EINVAL
&& !strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5238 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
))
5240 error
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
,
5247 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5248 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5249 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5250 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5251 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5252 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5254 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5255 tsec
->exec_sid
= sid
;
5256 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5257 tsec
->create_sid
= sid
;
5258 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate")) {
5259 error
= may_create_key(sid
, p
);
5262 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= sid
;
5263 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5264 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= sid
;
5265 else if (!strcmp(name
, "current")) {
5266 struct av_decision avd
;
5271 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5272 if (atomic_read(&p
->mm
->mm_users
) != 1) {
5273 struct task_struct
*g
, *t
;
5274 struct mm_struct
*mm
= p
->mm
;
5275 read_lock(&tasklist_lock
);
5276 do_each_thread(g
, t
) {
5277 if (t
->mm
== mm
&& t
!= p
) {
5278 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock
);
5281 } while_each_thread(g
, t
);
5282 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock
);
5285 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5286 error
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5287 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION
, NULL
);
5291 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5292 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5295 tracer
= tracehook_tracer_task(p
);
5296 if (tracer
!= NULL
) {
5297 struct task_security_struct
*ptsec
= tracer
->security
;
5298 u32 ptsid
= ptsec
->sid
;
5300 error
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid
, sid
,
5302 PROCESS__PTRACE
, 0, &avd
);
5306 avc_audit(ptsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5307 PROCESS__PTRACE
, &avd
, error
, NULL
);
5321 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid
, char **secdata
, u32
*seclen
)
5323 return security_sid_to_context(secid
, secdata
, seclen
);
5326 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata
, u32 seclen
, u32
*secid
)
5328 return security_context_to_sid(secdata
, seclen
, secid
);
5331 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata
, u32 seclen
)
5338 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key
*k
, struct task_struct
*tsk
,
5339 unsigned long flags
)
5341 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= tsk
->security
;
5342 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5344 ksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5348 if (tsec
->keycreate_sid
)
5349 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5351 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->sid
;
5357 static void selinux_key_free(struct key
*k
)
5359 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= k
->security
;
5365 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref
,
5366 struct task_struct
*ctx
,
5370 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5371 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5373 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
5375 tsec
= ctx
->security
;
5376 ksec
= key
->security
;
5378 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5379 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5380 appear to be created. */
5384 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, ksec
->sid
,
5385 SECCLASS_KEY
, perm
, NULL
);
5388 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key
*key
, char **_buffer
)
5390 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= key
->security
;
5391 char *context
= NULL
;
5395 rc
= security_sid_to_context(ksec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
5404 static struct security_operations selinux_ops
= {
5407 .ptrace_may_access
= selinux_ptrace_may_access
,
5408 .ptrace_traceme
= selinux_ptrace_traceme
,
5409 .capget
= selinux_capget
,
5410 .capset_check
= selinux_capset_check
,
5411 .capset_set
= selinux_capset_set
,
5412 .sysctl
= selinux_sysctl
,
5413 .capable
= selinux_capable
,
5414 .quotactl
= selinux_quotactl
,
5415 .quota_on
= selinux_quota_on
,
5416 .syslog
= selinux_syslog
,
5417 .vm_enough_memory
= selinux_vm_enough_memory
,
5419 .netlink_send
= selinux_netlink_send
,
5420 .netlink_recv
= selinux_netlink_recv
,
5422 .bprm_alloc_security
= selinux_bprm_alloc_security
,
5423 .bprm_free_security
= selinux_bprm_free_security
,
5424 .bprm_apply_creds
= selinux_bprm_apply_creds
,
5425 .bprm_post_apply_creds
= selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds
,
5426 .bprm_set_security
= selinux_bprm_set_security
,
5427 .bprm_check_security
= selinux_bprm_check_security
,
5428 .bprm_secureexec
= selinux_bprm_secureexec
,
5430 .sb_alloc_security
= selinux_sb_alloc_security
,
5431 .sb_free_security
= selinux_sb_free_security
,
5432 .sb_copy_data
= selinux_sb_copy_data
,
5433 .sb_kern_mount
= selinux_sb_kern_mount
,
5434 .sb_show_options
= selinux_sb_show_options
,
5435 .sb_statfs
= selinux_sb_statfs
,
5436 .sb_mount
= selinux_mount
,
5437 .sb_umount
= selinux_umount
,
5438 .sb_set_mnt_opts
= selinux_set_mnt_opts
,
5439 .sb_clone_mnt_opts
= selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts
,
5440 .sb_parse_opts_str
= selinux_parse_opts_str
,
5443 .inode_alloc_security
= selinux_inode_alloc_security
,
5444 .inode_free_security
= selinux_inode_free_security
,
5445 .inode_init_security
= selinux_inode_init_security
,
5446 .inode_create
= selinux_inode_create
,
5447 .inode_link
= selinux_inode_link
,
5448 .inode_unlink
= selinux_inode_unlink
,
5449 .inode_symlink
= selinux_inode_symlink
,
5450 .inode_mkdir
= selinux_inode_mkdir
,
5451 .inode_rmdir
= selinux_inode_rmdir
,
5452 .inode_mknod
= selinux_inode_mknod
,
5453 .inode_rename
= selinux_inode_rename
,
5454 .inode_readlink
= selinux_inode_readlink
,
5455 .inode_follow_link
= selinux_inode_follow_link
,
5456 .inode_permission
= selinux_inode_permission
,
5457 .inode_setattr
= selinux_inode_setattr
,
5458 .inode_getattr
= selinux_inode_getattr
,
5459 .inode_setxattr
= selinux_inode_setxattr
,
5460 .inode_post_setxattr
= selinux_inode_post_setxattr
,
5461 .inode_getxattr
= selinux_inode_getxattr
,
5462 .inode_listxattr
= selinux_inode_listxattr
,
5463 .inode_removexattr
= selinux_inode_removexattr
,
5464 .inode_getsecurity
= selinux_inode_getsecurity
,
5465 .inode_setsecurity
= selinux_inode_setsecurity
,
5466 .inode_listsecurity
= selinux_inode_listsecurity
,
5467 .inode_need_killpriv
= selinux_inode_need_killpriv
,
5468 .inode_killpriv
= selinux_inode_killpriv
,
5469 .inode_getsecid
= selinux_inode_getsecid
,
5471 .file_permission
= selinux_file_permission
,
5472 .file_alloc_security
= selinux_file_alloc_security
,
5473 .file_free_security
= selinux_file_free_security
,
5474 .file_ioctl
= selinux_file_ioctl
,
5475 .file_mmap
= selinux_file_mmap
,
5476 .file_mprotect
= selinux_file_mprotect
,
5477 .file_lock
= selinux_file_lock
,
5478 .file_fcntl
= selinux_file_fcntl
,
5479 .file_set_fowner
= selinux_file_set_fowner
,
5480 .file_send_sigiotask
= selinux_file_send_sigiotask
,
5481 .file_receive
= selinux_file_receive
,
5483 .dentry_open
= selinux_dentry_open
,
5485 .task_create
= selinux_task_create
,
5486 .task_alloc_security
= selinux_task_alloc_security
,
5487 .task_free_security
= selinux_task_free_security
,
5488 .task_setuid
= selinux_task_setuid
,
5489 .task_post_setuid
= selinux_task_post_setuid
,
5490 .task_setgid
= selinux_task_setgid
,
5491 .task_setpgid
= selinux_task_setpgid
,
5492 .task_getpgid
= selinux_task_getpgid
,
5493 .task_getsid
= selinux_task_getsid
,
5494 .task_getsecid
= selinux_task_getsecid
,
5495 .task_setgroups
= selinux_task_setgroups
,
5496 .task_setnice
= selinux_task_setnice
,
5497 .task_setioprio
= selinux_task_setioprio
,
5498 .task_getioprio
= selinux_task_getioprio
,
5499 .task_setrlimit
= selinux_task_setrlimit
,
5500 .task_setscheduler
= selinux_task_setscheduler
,
5501 .task_getscheduler
= selinux_task_getscheduler
,
5502 .task_movememory
= selinux_task_movememory
,
5503 .task_kill
= selinux_task_kill
,
5504 .task_wait
= selinux_task_wait
,
5505 .task_prctl
= selinux_task_prctl
,
5506 .task_reparent_to_init
= selinux_task_reparent_to_init
,
5507 .task_to_inode
= selinux_task_to_inode
,
5509 .ipc_permission
= selinux_ipc_permission
,
5510 .ipc_getsecid
= selinux_ipc_getsecid
,
5512 .msg_msg_alloc_security
= selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security
,
5513 .msg_msg_free_security
= selinux_msg_msg_free_security
,
5515 .msg_queue_alloc_security
= selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security
,
5516 .msg_queue_free_security
= selinux_msg_queue_free_security
,
5517 .msg_queue_associate
= selinux_msg_queue_associate
,
5518 .msg_queue_msgctl
= selinux_msg_queue_msgctl
,
5519 .msg_queue_msgsnd
= selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd
,
5520 .msg_queue_msgrcv
= selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv
,
5522 .shm_alloc_security
= selinux_shm_alloc_security
,
5523 .shm_free_security
= selinux_shm_free_security
,
5524 .shm_associate
= selinux_shm_associate
,
5525 .shm_shmctl
= selinux_shm_shmctl
,
5526 .shm_shmat
= selinux_shm_shmat
,
5528 .sem_alloc_security
= selinux_sem_alloc_security
,
5529 .sem_free_security
= selinux_sem_free_security
,
5530 .sem_associate
= selinux_sem_associate
,
5531 .sem_semctl
= selinux_sem_semctl
,
5532 .sem_semop
= selinux_sem_semop
,
5534 .d_instantiate
= selinux_d_instantiate
,
5536 .getprocattr
= selinux_getprocattr
,
5537 .setprocattr
= selinux_setprocattr
,
5539 .secid_to_secctx
= selinux_secid_to_secctx
,
5540 .secctx_to_secid
= selinux_secctx_to_secid
,
5541 .release_secctx
= selinux_release_secctx
,
5543 .unix_stream_connect
= selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect
,
5544 .unix_may_send
= selinux_socket_unix_may_send
,
5546 .socket_create
= selinux_socket_create
,
5547 .socket_post_create
= selinux_socket_post_create
,
5548 .socket_bind
= selinux_socket_bind
,
5549 .socket_connect
= selinux_socket_connect
,
5550 .socket_listen
= selinux_socket_listen
,
5551 .socket_accept
= selinux_socket_accept
,
5552 .socket_sendmsg
= selinux_socket_sendmsg
,
5553 .socket_recvmsg
= selinux_socket_recvmsg
,
5554 .socket_getsockname
= selinux_socket_getsockname
,
5555 .socket_getpeername
= selinux_socket_getpeername
,
5556 .socket_getsockopt
= selinux_socket_getsockopt
,
5557 .socket_setsockopt
= selinux_socket_setsockopt
,
5558 .socket_shutdown
= selinux_socket_shutdown
,
5559 .socket_sock_rcv_skb
= selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb
,
5560 .socket_getpeersec_stream
= selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream
,
5561 .socket_getpeersec_dgram
= selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram
,
5562 .sk_alloc_security
= selinux_sk_alloc_security
,
5563 .sk_free_security
= selinux_sk_free_security
,
5564 .sk_clone_security
= selinux_sk_clone_security
,
5565 .sk_getsecid
= selinux_sk_getsecid
,
5566 .sock_graft
= selinux_sock_graft
,
5567 .inet_conn_request
= selinux_inet_conn_request
,
5568 .inet_csk_clone
= selinux_inet_csk_clone
,
5569 .inet_conn_established
= selinux_inet_conn_established
,
5570 .req_classify_flow
= selinux_req_classify_flow
,
5572 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5573 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc
,
5574 .xfrm_policy_clone_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_clone
,
5575 .xfrm_policy_free_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_free
,
5576 .xfrm_policy_delete_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_delete
,
5577 .xfrm_state_alloc_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_alloc
,
5578 .xfrm_state_free_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_free
,
5579 .xfrm_state_delete_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_delete
,
5580 .xfrm_policy_lookup
= selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup
,
5581 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
= selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
,
5582 .xfrm_decode_session
= selinux_xfrm_decode_session
,
5586 .key_alloc
= selinux_key_alloc
,
5587 .key_free
= selinux_key_free
,
5588 .key_permission
= selinux_key_permission
,
5589 .key_getsecurity
= selinux_key_getsecurity
,
5593 .audit_rule_init
= selinux_audit_rule_init
,
5594 .audit_rule_known
= selinux_audit_rule_known
,
5595 .audit_rule_match
= selinux_audit_rule_match
,
5596 .audit_rule_free
= selinux_audit_rule_free
,
5600 static __init
int selinux_init(void)
5602 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5604 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops
)) {
5605 selinux_enabled
= 0;
5609 if (!selinux_enabled
) {
5610 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5614 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5616 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5617 if (task_alloc_security(current
))
5618 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5619 tsec
= current
->security
;
5620 tsec
->osid
= tsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
5622 sel_inode_cache
= kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5623 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct
),
5624 0, SLAB_PANIC
, NULL
);
5627 secondary_ops
= security_ops
;
5629 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5630 if (register_security(&selinux_ops
))
5631 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5633 if (selinux_enforcing
)
5634 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5636 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5641 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5643 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5645 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5646 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5647 spin_lock(&sb_lock
);
5648 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock
);
5650 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head
)) {
5651 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
=
5652 list_entry(superblock_security_head
.next
,
5653 struct superblock_security_struct
,
5655 struct super_block
*sb
= sbsec
->sb
;
5657 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock
);
5658 spin_unlock(&sb_lock
);
5659 down_read(&sb
->s_umount
);
5661 superblock_doinit(sb
, NULL
);
5663 spin_lock(&sb_lock
);
5664 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock
);
5665 list_del_init(&sbsec
->list
);
5668 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock
);
5669 spin_unlock(&sb_lock
);
5672 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5673 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5674 security_initcall(selinux_init
);
5676 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5678 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops
[] = {
5680 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_postroute
,
5681 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5683 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
5684 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
5687 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_forward
,
5688 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5690 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
5691 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5695 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5697 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops
[] = {
5699 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_postroute
,
5700 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5702 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
5703 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
5706 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_forward
,
5707 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5709 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
5710 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5716 static int __init
selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5720 if (!selinux_enabled
)
5723 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5725 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops
));
5727 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err
);
5729 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5730 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops
));
5732 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err
);
5739 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init
);
5741 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5742 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5744 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5746 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops
));
5747 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5748 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops
));
5753 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5755 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5756 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5759 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5761 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5762 static int selinux_disabled
;
5764 int selinux_disable(void)
5766 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5768 if (ss_initialized
) {
5769 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5773 if (selinux_disabled
) {
5774 /* Only do this once. */
5778 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5780 selinux_disabled
= 1;
5781 selinux_enabled
= 0;
5783 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5784 security_ops
= secondary_ops
;
5786 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5787 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5789 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */