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NetLabel: SELinux cleanups
[linux-2.6/linux-acpi-2.6/ibm-acpi-2.6.git] / security / selinux / ss / services.c
blobb66b454fe72b41ca5559aa636e9252cd6619ba93
1 /*
2 * Implementation of the security services.
3 *
4 * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
5 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
6 *
7 * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
8 *
9 * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
10 * Support for context based audit filters.
11 *
12 * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
13 *
14 * Added conditional policy language extensions
15 *
16 * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com>
17 *
18 * Added support for NetLabel
19 *
20 * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
21 *
22 * Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
23 *
24 * Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
25 * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
26 * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
27 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
28 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
29 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
30 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
31 */
32 #include <linux/kernel.h>
33 #include <linux/slab.h>
34 #include <linux/string.h>
35 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
36 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
37 #include <linux/errno.h>
38 #include <linux/in.h>
39 #include <linux/sched.h>
40 #include <linux/audit.h>
41 #include <linux/mutex.h>
42 #include <net/sock.h>
43 #include <net/netlabel.h>
44
45 #include "flask.h"
46 #include "avc.h"
47 #include "avc_ss.h"
48 #include "security.h"
49 #include "context.h"
50 #include "policydb.h"
51 #include "sidtab.h"
52 #include "services.h"
53 #include "conditional.h"
54 #include "mls.h"
55 #include "objsec.h"
56 #include "selinux_netlabel.h"
57
58 extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
59 unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
60
61 /*
62 * This is declared in avc.c
63 */
64 extern const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm;
65
66 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
67 #define POLICY_RDLOCK read_lock(&policy_rwlock)
68 #define POLICY_WRLOCK write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
69 #define POLICY_RDUNLOCK read_unlock(&policy_rwlock)
70 #define POLICY_WRUNLOCK write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
71
72 static DEFINE_MUTEX(load_mutex);
73 #define LOAD_LOCK mutex_lock(&load_mutex)
74 #define LOAD_UNLOCK mutex_unlock(&load_mutex)
75
76 static struct sidtab sidtab;
77 struct policydb policydb;
78 int ss_initialized = 0;
79
80 /*
81 * The largest sequence number that has been used when
82 * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
83 * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
84 * occurs.
85 */
86 static u32 latest_granting = 0;
87
88 /* Forward declaration. */
89 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
90 u32 *scontext_len);
91
92 /*
93 * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
94 * when it is applied to the specified source and target
95 * security contexts.
96 *
97 * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules
98 * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
99 * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
100 * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of
101 * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
102 */
103 static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
104 struct context *tcontext,
105 struct context *xcontext,
106 struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
107 {
108 u32 val1, val2;
109 struct context *c;
110 struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
111 struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
112 struct constraint_expr *e;
113 int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
114 int sp = -1;
115
116 for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
117 switch (e->expr_type) {
118 case CEXPR_NOT:
119 BUG_ON(sp < 0);
120 s[sp] = !s[sp];
121 break;
122 case CEXPR_AND:
123 BUG_ON(sp < 1);
124 sp--;
125 s[sp] &= s[sp+1];
126 break;
127 case CEXPR_OR:
128 BUG_ON(sp < 1);
129 sp--;
130 s[sp] |= s[sp+1];
131 break;
132 case CEXPR_ATTR:
133 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
134 return 0;
135 switch (e->attr) {
136 case CEXPR_USER:
137 val1 = scontext->user;
138 val2 = tcontext->user;
139 break;
140 case CEXPR_TYPE:
141 val1 = scontext->type;
142 val2 = tcontext->type;
143 break;
144 case CEXPR_ROLE:
145 val1 = scontext->role;
146 val2 = tcontext->role;
147 r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
148 r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
149 switch (e->op) {
150 case CEXPR_DOM:
151 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
152 val2 - 1);
153 continue;
154 case CEXPR_DOMBY:
155 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
156 val1 - 1);
157 continue;
158 case CEXPR_INCOMP:
159 s[++sp] = ( !ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
160 val2 - 1) &&
161 !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
162 val1 - 1) );
163 continue;
164 default:
165 break;
166 }
167 break;
168 case CEXPR_L1L2:
169 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
170 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
171 goto mls_ops;
172 case CEXPR_L1H2:
173 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
174 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
175 goto mls_ops;
176 case CEXPR_H1L2:
177 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
178 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
179 goto mls_ops;
180 case CEXPR_H1H2:
181 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
182 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
183 goto mls_ops;
184 case CEXPR_L1H1:
185 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
186 l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
187 goto mls_ops;
188 case CEXPR_L2H2:
189 l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
190 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
191 goto mls_ops;
192 mls_ops:
193 switch (e->op) {
194 case CEXPR_EQ:
195 s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
196 continue;
197 case CEXPR_NEQ:
198 s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
199 continue;
200 case CEXPR_DOM:
201 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
202 continue;
203 case CEXPR_DOMBY:
204 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
205 continue;
206 case CEXPR_INCOMP:
207 s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
208 continue;
209 default:
210 BUG();
211 return 0;
212 }
213 break;
214 default:
215 BUG();
216 return 0;
217 }
218
219 switch (e->op) {
220 case CEXPR_EQ:
221 s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
222 break;
223 case CEXPR_NEQ:
224 s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
225 break;
226 default:
227 BUG();
228 return 0;
229 }
230 break;
231 case CEXPR_NAMES:
232 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
233 return 0;
234 c = scontext;
235 if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
236 c = tcontext;
237 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
238 c = xcontext;
239 if (!c) {
240 BUG();
241 return 0;
242 }
243 }
244 if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
245 val1 = c->user;
246 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
247 val1 = c->role;
248 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
249 val1 = c->type;
250 else {
251 BUG();
252 return 0;
253 }
254
255 switch (e->op) {
256 case CEXPR_EQ:
257 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
258 break;
259 case CEXPR_NEQ:
260 s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
261 break;
262 default:
263 BUG();
264 return 0;
265 }
266 break;
267 default:
268 BUG();
269 return 0;
270 }
271 }
272
273 BUG_ON(sp != 0);
274 return s[0];
275 }
276
277 /*
278 * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
279 * the permissions in a particular class.
280 */
281 static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
282 struct context *tcontext,
283 u16 tclass,
284 u32 requested,
285 struct av_decision *avd)
286 {
287 struct constraint_node *constraint;
288 struct role_allow *ra;
289 struct avtab_key avkey;
290 struct avtab_node *node;
291 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
292 struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
293 struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
294 unsigned int i, j;
295
296 /*
297 * Remap extended Netlink classes for old policy versions.
298 * Do this here rather than socket_type_to_security_class()
299 * in case a newer policy version is loaded, allowing sockets
300 * to remain in the correct class.
301 */
302 if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
303 if (tclass >= SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET &&
304 tclass <= SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET)
305 tclass = SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
306
307 if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
308 printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av: unrecognized class %d\n",
309 tclass);
310 return -EINVAL;
311 }
312 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
313
314 /*
315 * Initialize the access vectors to the default values.
316 */
317 avd->allowed = 0;
318 avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
319 avd->auditallow = 0;
320 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
321 avd->seqno = latest_granting;
322
323 /*
324 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
325 * this permission check, then use it.
326 */
327 avkey.target_class = tclass;
328 avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
329 sattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[scontext->type - 1];
330 tattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[tcontext->type - 1];
331 ebitmap_for_each_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
332 if (!ebitmap_node_get_bit(snode, i))
333 continue;
334 ebitmap_for_each_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
335 if (!ebitmap_node_get_bit(tnode, j))
336 continue;
337 avkey.source_type = i + 1;
338 avkey.target_type = j + 1;
339 for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
340 node != NULL;
341 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
342 if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
343 avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
344 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
345 avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
346 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
347 avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
348 }
349
350 /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
351 cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
352
353 }
354 }
355
356 /*
357 * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
358 * the MLS policy).
359 */
360 constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
361 while (constraint) {
362 if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
363 !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
364 constraint->expr)) {
365 avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(constraint->permissions);
366 }
367 constraint = constraint->next;
368 }
369
370 /*
371 * If checking process transition permission and the
372 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
373 * pair.
374 */
375 if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS &&
376 (avd->allowed & (PROCESS__TRANSITION | PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION)) &&
377 scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
378 for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
379 if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
380 tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
381 break;
382 }
383 if (!ra)
384 avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION |
385 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
386 }
387
388 return 0;
389 }
390
391 static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
392 struct context *ncontext,
393 struct context *tcontext,
394 u16 tclass)
395 {
396 char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
397 u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
398
399 if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen) < 0)
400 goto out;
401 if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
402 goto out;
403 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
404 goto out;
405 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
406 "security_validate_transition: denied for"
407 " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
408 o, n, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
409 out:
410 kfree(o);
411 kfree(n);
412 kfree(t);
413
414 if (!selinux_enforcing)
415 return 0;
416 return -EPERM;
417 }
418
419 int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
420 u16 tclass)
421 {
422 struct context *ocontext;
423 struct context *ncontext;
424 struct context *tcontext;
425 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
426 struct constraint_node *constraint;
427 int rc = 0;
428
429 if (!ss_initialized)
430 return 0;
431
432 POLICY_RDLOCK;
433
434 /*
435 * Remap extended Netlink classes for old policy versions.
436 * Do this here rather than socket_type_to_security_class()
437 * in case a newer policy version is loaded, allowing sockets
438 * to remain in the correct class.
439 */
440 if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
441 if (tclass >= SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET &&
442 tclass <= SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET)
443 tclass = SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
444
445 if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
446 printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
447 "unrecognized class %d\n", tclass);
448 rc = -EINVAL;
449 goto out;
450 }
451 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
452
453 ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
454 if (!ocontext) {
455 printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
456 " unrecognized SID %d\n", oldsid);
457 rc = -EINVAL;
458 goto out;
459 }
460
461 ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
462 if (!ncontext) {
463 printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
464 " unrecognized SID %d\n", newsid);
465 rc = -EINVAL;
466 goto out;
467 }
468
469 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
470 if (!tcontext) {
471 printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
472 " unrecognized SID %d\n", tasksid);
473 rc = -EINVAL;
474 goto out;
475 }
476
477 constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
478 while (constraint) {
479 if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
480 constraint->expr)) {
481 rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, ncontext,
482 tcontext, tclass);
483 goto out;
484 }
485 constraint = constraint->next;
486 }
487
488 out:
489 POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
490 return rc;
491 }
492
493 /**
494 * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
495 * @ssid: source security identifier
496 * @tsid: target security identifier
497 * @tclass: target security class
498 * @requested: requested permissions
499 * @avd: access vector decisions
500 *
501 * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
502 * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
503 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid or %0
504 * if the access vector decisions were computed successfully.
505 */
506 int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
507 u32 tsid,
508 u16 tclass,
509 u32 requested,
510 struct av_decision *avd)
511 {
512 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
513 int rc = 0;
514
515 if (!ss_initialized) {
516 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
517 avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
518 avd->auditallow = 0;
519 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
520 avd->seqno = latest_granting;
521 return 0;
522 }
523
524 POLICY_RDLOCK;
525
526 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
527 if (!scontext) {
528 printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av: unrecognized SID %d\n",
529 ssid);
530 rc = -EINVAL;
531 goto out;
532 }
533 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
534 if (!tcontext) {
535 printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av: unrecognized SID %d\n",
536 tsid);
537 rc = -EINVAL;
538 goto out;
539 }
540
541 rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass,
542 requested, avd);
543 out:
544 POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
545 return rc;
546 }
547
548 /*
549 * Write the security context string representation of
550 * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
551 * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext'
552 * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
553 * the length of the string.
554 */
555 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
556 {
557 char *scontextp;
558
559 *scontext = NULL;
560 *scontext_len = 0;
561
562 /* Compute the size of the context. */
563 *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) + 1;
564 *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) + 1;
565 *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]) + 1;
566 *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
567
568 /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
569 scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
570 if (!scontextp) {
571 return -ENOMEM;
572 }
573 *scontext = scontextp;
574
575 /*
576 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
577 */
578 sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
579 policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1],
580 policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1],
581 policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
582 scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) +
583 1 + strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) +
584 1 + strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
585
586 mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
587
588 *scontextp = 0;
589
590 return 0;
591 }
592
593 #include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
594
595 /**
596 * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
597 * @sid: security identifier, SID
598 * @scontext: security context
599 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
600 *
601 * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
602 * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
603 * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
604 */
605 int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
606 {
607 struct context *context;
608 int rc = 0;
609
610 if (!ss_initialized) {
611 if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
612 char *scontextp;
613
614 *scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
615 scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len,GFP_ATOMIC);
616 if (!scontextp) {
617 rc = -ENOMEM;
618 goto out;
619 }
620 strcpy(scontextp, initial_sid_to_string[sid]);
621 *scontext = scontextp;
622 goto out;
623 }
624 printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_to_context: called before initial "
625 "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", sid);
626 rc = -EINVAL;
627 goto out;
628 }
629 POLICY_RDLOCK;
630 context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
631 if (!context) {
632 printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_to_context: unrecognized SID "
633 "%d\n", sid);
634 rc = -EINVAL;
635 goto out_unlock;
636 }
637 rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
638 out_unlock:
639 POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
640 out:
641 return rc;
642
643 }
644
645 static int security_context_to_sid_core(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, u32 def_sid)
646 {
647 char *scontext2;
648 struct context context;
649 struct role_datum *role;
650 struct type_datum *typdatum;
651 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
652 char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
653 int rc = 0;
654
655 if (!ss_initialized) {
656 int i;
657
658 for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
659 if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
660 *sid = i;
661 goto out;
662 }
663 }
664 *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
665 goto out;
666 }
667 *sid = SECSID_NULL;
668
669 /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it.
670 The string should already by null terminated, but we append a
671 null suffix to the copy to avoid problems with the existing
672 attr package, which doesn't view the null terminator as part
673 of the attribute value. */
674 scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len+1,GFP_KERNEL);
675 if (!scontext2) {
676 rc = -ENOMEM;
677 goto out;
678 }
679 memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
680 scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
681
682 context_init(&context);
683 *sid = SECSID_NULL;
684
685 POLICY_RDLOCK;
686
687 /* Parse the security context. */
688
689 rc = -EINVAL;
690 scontextp = (char *) scontext2;
691
692 /* Extract the user. */
693 p = scontextp;
694 while (*p && *p != ':')
695 p++;
696
697 if (*p == 0)
698 goto out_unlock;
699
700 *p++ = 0;
701
702 usrdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, scontextp);
703 if (!usrdatum)
704 goto out_unlock;
705
706 context.user = usrdatum->value;
707
708 /* Extract role. */
709 scontextp = p;
710 while (*p && *p != ':')
711 p++;
712
713 if (*p == 0)
714 goto out_unlock;
715
716 *p++ = 0;
717
718 role = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, scontextp);
719 if (!role)
720 goto out_unlock;
721 context.role = role->value;
722
723 /* Extract type. */
724 scontextp = p;
725 while (*p && *p != ':')
726 p++;
727 oldc = *p;
728 *p++ = 0;
729
730 typdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, scontextp);
731 if (!typdatum)
732 goto out_unlock;
733
734 context.type = typdatum->value;
735
736 rc = mls_context_to_sid(oldc, &p, &context, &sidtab, def_sid);
737 if (rc)
738 goto out_unlock;
739
740 if ((p - scontext2) < scontext_len) {
741 rc = -EINVAL;
742 goto out_unlock;
743 }
744
745 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
746 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &context)) {
747 rc = -EINVAL;
748 goto out_unlock;
749 }
750 /* Obtain the new sid. */
751 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
752 out_unlock:
753 POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
754 context_destroy(&context);
755 kfree(scontext2);
756 out:
757 return rc;
758 }
759
760 /**
761 * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
762 * @scontext: security context
763 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
764 * @sid: security identifier, SID
765 *
766 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
767 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
768 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
769 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
770 */
771 int security_context_to_sid(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid)
772 {
773 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
774 sid, SECSID_NULL);
775 }
776
777 /**
778 * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
779 * falling back to specified default if needed.
780 *
781 * @scontext: security context
782 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
783 * @sid: security identifier, SID
784 * @def_sid: default SID to assign on errror
785 *
786 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
787 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
788 * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
789 * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
790 * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
791 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
792 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
793 */
794 int security_context_to_sid_default(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, u32 def_sid)
795 {
796 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
797 sid, def_sid);
798 }
799
800 static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
801 struct context *scontext,
802 struct context *tcontext,
803 u16 tclass,
804 struct context *newcontext)
805 {
806 char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
807 u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
808
809 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen) < 0)
810 goto out;
811 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
812 goto out;
813 if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
814 goto out;
815 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
816 "security_compute_sid: invalid context %s"
817 " for scontext=%s"
818 " tcontext=%s"
819 " tclass=%s",
820 n, s, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
821 out:
822 kfree(s);
823 kfree(t);
824 kfree(n);
825 if (!selinux_enforcing)
826 return 0;
827 return -EACCES;
828 }
829
830 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
831 u32 tsid,
832 u16 tclass,
833 u32 specified,
834 u32 *out_sid)
835 {
836 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
837 struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
838 struct avtab_key avkey;
839 struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
840 struct avtab_node *node;
841 int rc = 0;
842
843 if (!ss_initialized) {
844 switch (tclass) {
845 case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
846 *out_sid = ssid;
847 break;
848 default:
849 *out_sid = tsid;
850 break;
851 }
852 goto out;
853 }
854
855 context_init(&newcontext);
856
857 POLICY_RDLOCK;
858
859 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
860 if (!scontext) {
861 printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_sid: unrecognized SID %d\n",
862 ssid);
863 rc = -EINVAL;
864 goto out_unlock;
865 }
866 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
867 if (!tcontext) {
868 printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_sid: unrecognized SID %d\n",
869 tsid);
870 rc = -EINVAL;
871 goto out_unlock;
872 }
873
874 /* Set the user identity. */
875 switch (specified) {
876 case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
877 case AVTAB_CHANGE:
878 /* Use the process user identity. */
879 newcontext.user = scontext->user;
880 break;
881 case AVTAB_MEMBER:
882 /* Use the related object owner. */
883 newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
884 break;
885 }
886
887 /* Set the role and type to default values. */
888 switch (tclass) {
889 case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
890 /* Use the current role and type of process. */
891 newcontext.role = scontext->role;
892 newcontext.type = scontext->type;
893 break;
894 default:
895 /* Use the well-defined object role. */
896 newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
897 /* Use the type of the related object. */
898 newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
899 }
900
901 /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
902 avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
903 avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
904 avkey.target_class = tclass;
905 avkey.specified = specified;
906 avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
907
908 /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
909 if(!avdatum) {
910 node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
911 for (; node != NULL; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
912 if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
913 avdatum = &node->datum;
914 break;
915 }
916 }
917 }
918
919 if (avdatum) {
920 /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
921 newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
922 }
923
924 /* Check for class-specific changes. */
925 switch (tclass) {
926 case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
927 if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
928 /* Look for a role transition rule. */
929 for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr;
930 roletr = roletr->next) {
931 if (roletr->role == scontext->role &&
932 roletr->type == tcontext->type) {
933 /* Use the role transition rule. */
934 newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
935 break;
936 }
937 }
938 }
939 break;
940 default:
941 break;
942 }
943
944 /* Set the MLS attributes.
945 This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
946 rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified, &newcontext);
947 if (rc)
948 goto out_unlock;
949
950 /* Check the validity of the context. */
951 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
952 rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
953 tcontext,
954 tclass,
955 &newcontext);
956 if (rc)
957 goto out_unlock;
958 }
959 /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
960 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
961 out_unlock:
962 POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
963 context_destroy(&newcontext);
964 out:
965 return rc;
966 }
967
968 /**
969 * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
970 * @ssid: source security identifier
971 * @tsid: target security identifier
972 * @tclass: target security class
973 * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
974 *
975 * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
976 * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
977 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
978 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
979 * computed successfully.
980 */
981 int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid,
982 u32 tsid,
983 u16 tclass,
984 u32 *out_sid)
985 {
986 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION, out_sid);
987 }
988
989 /**
990 * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
991 * @ssid: source security identifier
992 * @tsid: target security identifier
993 * @tclass: target security class
994 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
995 *
996 * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
997 * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
998 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
999 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1000 * computed successfully.
1001 */
1002 int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
1003 u32 tsid,
1004 u16 tclass,
1005 u32 *out_sid)
1006 {
1007 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid);
1008 }
1009
1010 /**
1011 * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
1012 * @ssid: source security identifier
1013 * @tsid: target security identifier
1014 * @tclass: target security class
1015 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1016 *
1017 * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
1018 * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1019 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1020 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1021 * computed successfully.
1022 */
1023 int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
1024 u32 tsid,
1025 u16 tclass,
1026 u32 *out_sid)
1027 {
1028 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid);
1029 }
1030
1031 /*
1032 * Verify that each kernel class that is defined in the
1033 * policy is correct
1034 */
1035 static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
1036 {
1037 int i, j;
1038 struct class_datum *cladatum;
1039 struct perm_datum *perdatum;
1040 u32 nprim, tmp, common_pts_len, perm_val, pol_val;
1041 u16 class_val;
1042 const struct selinux_class_perm *kdefs = &selinux_class_perm;
1043 const char *def_class, *def_perm, *pol_class;
1044 struct symtab *perms;
1045
1046 for (i = 1; i < kdefs->cts_len; i++) {
1047 def_class = kdefs->class_to_string[i];
1048 if (i > p->p_classes.nprim) {
1049 printk(KERN_INFO
1050 "security: class %s not defined in policy\n",
1051 def_class);
1052 continue;
1053 }
1054 pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[i-1];
1055 if (strcmp(pol_class, def_class)) {
1056 printk(KERN_ERR
1057 "security: class %d is incorrect, found %s but should be %s\n",
1058 i, pol_class, def_class);
1059 return -EINVAL;
1060 }
1061 }
1062 for (i = 0; i < kdefs->av_pts_len; i++) {
1063 class_val = kdefs->av_perm_to_string[i].tclass;
1064 perm_val = kdefs->av_perm_to_string[i].value;
1065 def_perm = kdefs->av_perm_to_string[i].name;
1066 if (class_val > p->p_classes.nprim)
1067 continue;
1068 pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[class_val-1];
1069 cladatum = hashtab_search(p->p_classes.table, pol_class);
1070 BUG_ON(!cladatum);
1071 perms = &cladatum->permissions;
1072 nprim = 1 << (perms->nprim - 1);
1073 if (perm_val > nprim) {
1074 printk(KERN_INFO
1075 "security: permission %s in class %s not defined in policy\n",
1076 def_perm, pol_class);
1077 continue;
1078 }
1079 perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm);
1080 if (perdatum == NULL) {
1081 printk(KERN_ERR
1082 "security: permission %s in class %s not found in policy\n",
1083 def_perm, pol_class);
1084 return -EINVAL;
1085 }
1086 pol_val = 1 << (perdatum->value - 1);
1087 if (pol_val != perm_val) {
1088 printk(KERN_ERR
1089 "security: permission %s in class %s has incorrect value\n",
1090 def_perm, pol_class);
1091 return -EINVAL;
1092 }
1093 }
1094 for (i = 0; i < kdefs->av_inherit_len; i++) {
1095 class_val = kdefs->av_inherit[i].tclass;
1096 if (class_val > p->p_classes.nprim)
1097 continue;
1098 pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[class_val-1];
1099 cladatum = hashtab_search(p->p_classes.table, pol_class);
1100 BUG_ON(!cladatum);
1101 if (!cladatum->comdatum) {
1102 printk(KERN_ERR
1103 "security: class %s should have an inherits clause but does not\n",
1104 pol_class);
1105 return -EINVAL;
1106 }
1107 tmp = kdefs->av_inherit[i].common_base;
1108 common_pts_len = 0;
1109 while (!(tmp & 0x01)) {
1110 common_pts_len++;
1111 tmp >>= 1;
1112 }
1113 perms = &cladatum->comdatum->permissions;
1114 for (j = 0; j < common_pts_len; j++) {
1115 def_perm = kdefs->av_inherit[i].common_pts[j];
1116 if (j >= perms->nprim) {
1117 printk(KERN_INFO
1118 "security: permission %s in class %s not defined in policy\n",
1119 def_perm, pol_class);
1120 continue;
1121 }
1122 perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm);
1123 if (perdatum == NULL) {
1124 printk(KERN_ERR
1125 "security: permission %s in class %s not found in policy\n",
1126 def_perm, pol_class);
1127 return -EINVAL;
1128 }
1129 if (perdatum->value != j + 1) {
1130 printk(KERN_ERR
1131 "security: permission %s in class %s has incorrect value\n",
1132 def_perm, pol_class);
1133 return -EINVAL;
1134 }
1135 }
1136 }
1137 return 0;
1138 }
1139
1140 /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
1141 static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
1142 struct context *context,
1143 void *arg)
1144 {
1145 struct sidtab *s = arg;
1146
1147 return sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
1148 }
1149
1150 static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
1151 {
1152 int rc = 0;
1153
1154 if (selinux_enforcing) {
1155 rc = -EINVAL;
1156 } else {
1157 char *s;
1158 u32 len;
1159
1160 context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len);
1161 printk(KERN_ERR "security: context %s is invalid\n", s);
1162 kfree(s);
1163 }
1164 return rc;
1165 }
1166
1167 struct convert_context_args {
1168 struct policydb *oldp;
1169 struct policydb *newp;
1170 };
1171
1172 /*
1173 * Convert the values in the security context
1174 * structure `c' from the values specified
1175 * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
1176 * in the policy `p->newp'. Verify that the
1177 * context is valid under the new policy.
1178 */
1179 static int convert_context(u32 key,
1180 struct context *c,
1181 void *p)
1182 {
1183 struct convert_context_args *args;
1184 struct context oldc;
1185 struct role_datum *role;
1186 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1187 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1188 char *s;
1189 u32 len;
1190 int rc;
1191
1192 args = p;
1193
1194 rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
1195 if (rc)
1196 goto out;
1197
1198 rc = -EINVAL;
1199
1200 /* Convert the user. */
1201 usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
1202 args->oldp->p_user_val_to_name[c->user - 1]);
1203 if (!usrdatum) {
1204 goto bad;
1205 }
1206 c->user = usrdatum->value;
1207
1208 /* Convert the role. */
1209 role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
1210 args->oldp->p_role_val_to_name[c->role - 1]);
1211 if (!role) {
1212 goto bad;
1213 }
1214 c->role = role->value;
1215
1216 /* Convert the type. */
1217 typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
1218 args->oldp->p_type_val_to_name[c->type - 1]);
1219 if (!typdatum) {
1220 goto bad;
1221 }
1222 c->type = typdatum->value;
1223
1224 rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
1225 if (rc)
1226 goto bad;
1227
1228 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1229 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
1230 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
1231 if (rc)
1232 goto bad;
1233 }
1234
1235 context_destroy(&oldc);
1236 out:
1237 return rc;
1238 bad:
1239 context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
1240 context_destroy(&oldc);
1241 printk(KERN_ERR "security: invalidating context %s\n", s);
1242 kfree(s);
1243 goto out;
1244 }
1245
1246 extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
1247
1248 /**
1249 * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
1250 * @data: binary policy data
1251 * @len: length of data in bytes
1252 *
1253 * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
1254 * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
1255 * This function will flush the access vector cache after
1256 * loading the new policy.
1257 */
1258 int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
1259 {
1260 struct policydb oldpolicydb, newpolicydb;
1261 struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
1262 struct convert_context_args args;
1263 u32 seqno;
1264 int rc = 0;
1265 struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
1266
1267 LOAD_LOCK;
1268
1269 if (!ss_initialized) {
1270 avtab_cache_init();
1271 if (policydb_read(&policydb, fp)) {
1272 LOAD_UNLOCK;
1273 avtab_cache_destroy();
1274 return -EINVAL;
1275 }
1276 if (policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab)) {
1277 LOAD_UNLOCK;
1278 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
1279 avtab_cache_destroy();
1280 return -EINVAL;
1281 }
1282 /* Verify that the kernel defined classes are correct. */
1283 if (validate_classes(&policydb)) {
1284 printk(KERN_ERR
1285 "security: the definition of a class is incorrect\n");
1286 LOAD_UNLOCK;
1287 sidtab_destroy(&sidtab);
1288 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
1289 avtab_cache_destroy();
1290 return -EINVAL;
1291 }
1292 policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
1293 ss_initialized = 1;
1294 seqno = ++latest_granting;
1295 LOAD_UNLOCK;
1296 selinux_complete_init();
1297 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
1298 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
1299 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
1300 return 0;
1301 }
1302
1303 #if 0
1304 sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
1305 #endif
1306
1307 if (policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp)) {
1308 LOAD_UNLOCK;
1309 return -EINVAL;
1310 }
1311
1312 sidtab_init(&newsidtab);
1313
1314 /* Verify that the kernel defined classes are correct. */
1315 if (validate_classes(&newpolicydb)) {
1316 printk(KERN_ERR
1317 "security: the definition of a class is incorrect\n");
1318 rc = -EINVAL;
1319 goto err;
1320 }
1321
1322 /* Clone the SID table. */
1323 sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
1324 if (sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab)) {
1325 rc = -ENOMEM;
1326 goto err;
1327 }
1328
1329 /* Convert the internal representations of contexts
1330 in the new SID table and remove invalid SIDs. */
1331 args.oldp = &policydb;
1332 args.newp = &newpolicydb;
1333 sidtab_map_remove_on_error(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
1334
1335 /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
1336 memcpy(&oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof policydb);
1337 sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
1338
1339 /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
1340 POLICY_WRLOCK;
1341 memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb);
1342 sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
1343 seqno = ++latest_granting;
1344 policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
1345 POLICY_WRUNLOCK;
1346 LOAD_UNLOCK;
1347
1348 /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
1349 policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb);
1350 sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
1351
1352 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
1353 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
1354 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
1355
1356 return 0;
1357
1358 err:
1359 LOAD_UNLOCK;
1360 sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
1361 policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
1362 return rc;
1363
1364 }
1365
1366 /**
1367 * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
1368 * @domain: communication domain aka address family
1369 * @type: socket type
1370 * @protocol: protocol number
1371 * @port: port number
1372 * @out_sid: security identifier
1373 */
1374 int security_port_sid(u16 domain,
1375 u16 type,
1376 u8 protocol,
1377 u16 port,
1378 u32 *out_sid)
1379 {
1380 struct ocontext *c;
1381 int rc = 0;
1382
1383 POLICY_RDLOCK;
1384
1385 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
1386 while (c) {
1387 if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
1388 c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
1389 c->u.port.high_port >= port)
1390 break;
1391 c = c->next;
1392 }
1393
1394 if (c) {
1395 if (!c->sid[0]) {
1396 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1397 &c->context[0],
1398 &c->sid[0]);
1399 if (rc)
1400 goto out;
1401 }
1402 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
1403 } else {
1404 *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
1405 }
1406
1407 out:
1408 POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
1409 return rc;
1410 }
1411
1412 /**
1413 * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
1414 * @name: interface name
1415 * @if_sid: interface SID
1416 * @msg_sid: default SID for received packets
1417 */
1418 int security_netif_sid(char *name,
1419 u32 *if_sid,
1420 u32 *msg_sid)
1421 {
1422 int rc = 0;
1423 struct ocontext *c;
1424
1425 POLICY_RDLOCK;
1426
1427 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
1428 while (c) {
1429 if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
1430 break;
1431 c = c->next;
1432 }
1433
1434 if (c) {
1435 if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
1436 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1437 &c->context[0],
1438 &c->sid[0]);
1439 if (rc)
1440 goto out;
1441 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1442 &c->context[1],
1443 &c->sid[1]);
1444 if (rc)
1445 goto out;
1446 }
1447 *if_sid = c->sid[0];
1448 *msg_sid = c->sid[1];
1449 } else {
1450 *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
1451 *msg_sid = SECINITSID_NETMSG;
1452 }
1453
1454 out:
1455 POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
1456 return rc;
1457 }
1458
1459 static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
1460 {
1461 int i, fail = 0;
1462
1463 for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)
1464 if(addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
1465 fail = 1;
1466 break;
1467 }
1468
1469 return !fail;
1470 }
1471
1472 /**
1473 * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
1474 * @domain: communication domain aka address family
1475 * @addrp: address
1476 * @addrlen: address length in bytes
1477 * @out_sid: security identifier
1478 */
1479 int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
1480 void *addrp,
1481 u32 addrlen,
1482 u32 *out_sid)
1483 {
1484 int rc = 0;
1485 struct ocontext *c;
1486
1487 POLICY_RDLOCK;
1488
1489 switch (domain) {
1490 case AF_INET: {
1491 u32 addr;
1492
1493 if (addrlen != sizeof(u32)) {
1494 rc = -EINVAL;
1495 goto out;
1496 }
1497
1498 addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
1499
1500 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
1501 while (c) {
1502 if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
1503 break;
1504 c = c->next;
1505 }
1506 break;
1507 }
1508
1509 case AF_INET6:
1510 if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2) {
1511 rc = -EINVAL;
1512 goto out;
1513 }
1514 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
1515 while (c) {
1516 if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
1517 c->u.node6.mask))
1518 break;
1519 c = c->next;
1520 }
1521 break;
1522
1523 default:
1524 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
1525 goto out;
1526 }
1527
1528 if (c) {
1529 if (!c->sid[0]) {
1530 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1531 &c->context[0],
1532 &c->sid[0]);
1533 if (rc)
1534 goto out;
1535 }
1536 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
1537 } else {
1538 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
1539 }
1540
1541 out:
1542 POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
1543 return rc;
1544 }
1545
1546 #define SIDS_NEL 25
1547
1548 /**
1549 * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
1550 * @fromsid: starting SID
1551 * @username: username
1552 * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
1553 * @nel: number of elements in @sids
1554 *
1555 * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
1556 * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
1557 * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
1558 * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the
1559 * number of elements in the array.
1560 */
1561
1562 int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
1563 char *username,
1564 u32 **sids,
1565 u32 *nel)
1566 {
1567 struct context *fromcon, usercon;
1568 u32 *mysids, *mysids2, sid;
1569 u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
1570 struct user_datum *user;
1571 struct role_datum *role;
1572 struct av_decision avd;
1573 struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
1574 int rc = 0, i, j;
1575
1576 if (!ss_initialized) {
1577 *sids = NULL;
1578 *nel = 0;
1579 goto out;
1580 }
1581
1582 POLICY_RDLOCK;
1583
1584 fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
1585 if (!fromcon) {
1586 rc = -EINVAL;
1587 goto out_unlock;
1588 }
1589
1590 user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
1591 if (!user) {
1592 rc = -EINVAL;
1593 goto out_unlock;
1594 }
1595 usercon.user = user->value;
1596
1597 mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
1598 if (!mysids) {
1599 rc = -ENOMEM;
1600 goto out_unlock;
1601 }
1602
1603 ebitmap_for_each_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
1604 if (!ebitmap_node_get_bit(rnode, i))
1605 continue;
1606 role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
1607 usercon.role = i+1;
1608 ebitmap_for_each_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
1609 if (!ebitmap_node_get_bit(tnode, j))
1610 continue;
1611 usercon.type = j+1;
1612
1613 if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
1614 continue;
1615
1616 rc = context_struct_compute_av(fromcon, &usercon,
1617 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1618 PROCESS__TRANSITION,
1619 &avd);
1620 if (rc || !(avd.allowed & PROCESS__TRANSITION))
1621 continue;
1622 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
1623 if (rc) {
1624 kfree(mysids);
1625 goto out_unlock;
1626 }
1627 if (mynel < maxnel) {
1628 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
1629 } else {
1630 maxnel += SIDS_NEL;
1631 mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
1632 if (!mysids2) {
1633 rc = -ENOMEM;
1634 kfree(mysids);
1635 goto out_unlock;
1636 }
1637 memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
1638 kfree(mysids);
1639 mysids = mysids2;
1640 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
1641 }
1642 }
1643 }
1644
1645 *sids = mysids;
1646 *nel = mynel;
1647
1648 out_unlock:
1649 POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
1650 out:
1651 return rc;
1652 }
1653
1654 /**
1655 * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
1656 * @fstype: filesystem type
1657 * @path: path from root of mount
1658 * @sclass: file security class
1659 * @sid: SID for path
1660 *
1661 * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
1662 * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
1663 * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
1664 */
1665 int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
1666 char *path,
1667 u16 sclass,
1668 u32 *sid)
1669 {
1670 int len;
1671 struct genfs *genfs;
1672 struct ocontext *c;
1673 int rc = 0, cmp = 0;
1674
1675 POLICY_RDLOCK;
1676
1677 for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
1678 cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
1679 if (cmp <= 0)
1680 break;
1681 }
1682
1683 if (!genfs || cmp) {
1684 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1685 rc = -ENOENT;
1686 goto out;
1687 }
1688
1689 for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
1690 len = strlen(c->u.name);
1691 if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
1692 (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
1693 break;
1694 }
1695
1696 if (!c) {
1697 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1698 rc = -ENOENT;
1699 goto out;
1700 }
1701
1702 if (!c->sid[0]) {
1703 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1704 &c->context[0],
1705 &c->sid[0]);
1706 if (rc)
1707 goto out;
1708 }
1709
1710 *sid = c->sid[0];
1711 out:
1712 POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
1713 return rc;
1714 }
1715
1716 /**
1717 * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
1718 * @fstype: filesystem type
1719 * @behavior: labeling behavior
1720 * @sid: SID for filesystem (superblock)
1721 */
1722 int security_fs_use(
1723 const char *fstype,
1724 unsigned int *behavior,
1725 u32 *sid)
1726 {
1727 int rc = 0;
1728 struct ocontext *c;
1729
1730 POLICY_RDLOCK;
1731
1732 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
1733 while (c) {
1734 if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
1735 break;
1736 c = c->next;
1737 }
1738
1739 if (c) {
1740 *behavior = c->v.behavior;
1741 if (!c->sid[0]) {
1742 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1743 &c->context[0],
1744 &c->sid[0]);
1745 if (rc)
1746 goto out;
1747 }
1748 *sid = c->sid[0];
1749 } else {
1750 rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, sid);
1751 if (rc) {
1752 *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
1753 rc = 0;
1754 } else {
1755 *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
1756 }
1757 }
1758
1759 out:
1760 POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
1761 return rc;
1762 }
1763
1764 int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
1765 {
1766 int i, rc = -ENOMEM;
1767
1768 POLICY_RDLOCK;
1769 *names = NULL;
1770 *values = NULL;
1771
1772 *len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
1773 if (!*len) {
1774 rc = 0;
1775 goto out;
1776 }
1777
1778 *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char*), GFP_ATOMIC);
1779 if (!*names)
1780 goto err;
1781
1782 *values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
1783 if (!*values)
1784 goto err;
1785
1786 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
1787 size_t name_len;
1788 (*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
1789 name_len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i]) + 1;
1790 (*names)[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1791 if (!(*names)[i])
1792 goto err;
1793 strncpy((*names)[i], policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], name_len);
1794 (*names)[i][name_len - 1] = 0;
1795 }
1796 rc = 0;
1797 out:
1798 POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
1799 return rc;
1800 err:
1801 if (*names) {
1802 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
1803 kfree((*names)[i]);
1804 }
1805 kfree(*values);
1806 goto out;
1807 }
1808
1809
1810 int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
1811 {
1812 int i, rc = 0;
1813 int lenp, seqno = 0;
1814 struct cond_node *cur;
1815
1816 POLICY_WRLOCK;
1817
1818 lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
1819 if (len != lenp) {
1820 rc = -EFAULT;
1821 goto out;
1822 }
1823
1824 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
1825 if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
1826 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
1827 AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
1828 "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u",
1829 policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
1830 !!values[i],
1831 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
1832 audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
1833 }
1834 if (values[i]) {
1835 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
1836 } else {
1837 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
1838 }
1839 }
1840
1841 for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
1842 rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
1843 if (rc)
1844 goto out;
1845 }
1846
1847 seqno = ++latest_granting;
1848
1849 out:
1850 POLICY_WRUNLOCK;
1851 if (!rc) {
1852 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
1853 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
1854 }
1855 return rc;
1856 }
1857
1858 int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
1859 {
1860 int rc = 0;
1861 int len;
1862
1863 POLICY_RDLOCK;
1864
1865 len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
1866 if (bool >= len) {
1867 rc = -EFAULT;
1868 goto out;
1869 }
1870
1871 rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
1872 out:
1873 POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
1874 return rc;
1875 }
1876
1877 /*
1878 * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
1879 * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
1880 */
1881 int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
1882 {
1883 struct context *context1;
1884 struct context *context2;
1885 struct context newcon;
1886 char *s;
1887 u32 len;
1888 int rc = 0;
1889
1890 if (!ss_initialized || !selinux_mls_enabled) {
1891 *new_sid = sid;
1892 goto out;
1893 }
1894
1895 context_init(&newcon);
1896
1897 POLICY_RDLOCK;
1898 context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
1899 if (!context1) {
1900 printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_mls_copy: unrecognized SID "
1901 "%d\n", sid);
1902 rc = -EINVAL;
1903 goto out_unlock;
1904 }
1905
1906 context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
1907 if (!context2) {
1908 printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_mls_copy: unrecognized SID "
1909 "%d\n", mls_sid);
1910 rc = -EINVAL;
1911 goto out_unlock;
1912 }
1913
1914 newcon.user = context1->user;
1915 newcon.role = context1->role;
1916 newcon.type = context1->type;
1917 rc = mls_copy_context(&newcon, context2);
1918 if (rc)
1919 goto out_unlock;
1920
1921
1922 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1923 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) {
1924 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon);
1925 if (rc)
1926 goto bad;
1927 }
1928
1929 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
1930 goto out_unlock;
1931
1932 bad:
1933 if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
1934 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
1935 "security_sid_mls_copy: invalid context %s", s);
1936 kfree(s);
1937 }
1938
1939 out_unlock:
1940 POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
1941 context_destroy(&newcon);
1942 out:
1943 return rc;
1944 }
1945
1946 struct selinux_audit_rule {
1947 u32 au_seqno;
1948 struct context au_ctxt;
1949 };
1950
1951 void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule)
1952 {
1953 if (rule) {
1954 context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
1955 kfree(rule);
1956 }
1957 }
1958
1959 int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
1960 struct selinux_audit_rule **rule)
1961 {
1962 struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
1963 struct role_datum *roledatum;
1964 struct type_datum *typedatum;
1965 struct user_datum *userdatum;
1966 int rc = 0;
1967
1968 *rule = NULL;
1969
1970 if (!ss_initialized)
1971 return -ENOTSUPP;
1972
1973 switch (field) {
1974 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
1975 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
1976 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
1977 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
1978 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
1979 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
1980 /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
1981 if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
1982 return -EINVAL;
1983 break;
1984 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
1985 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
1986 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
1987 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
1988 /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
1989 if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
1990 return -EINVAL;
1991 break;
1992 default:
1993 /* only the above fields are valid */
1994 return -EINVAL;
1995 }
1996
1997 tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
1998 if (!tmprule)
1999 return -ENOMEM;
2000
2001 context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
2002
2003 POLICY_RDLOCK;
2004
2005 tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
2006
2007 switch (field) {
2008 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2009 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2010 userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
2011 if (!userdatum)
2012 rc = -EINVAL;
2013 else
2014 tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
2015 break;
2016 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2017 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2018 roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
2019 if (!roledatum)
2020 rc = -EINVAL;
2021 else
2022 tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
2023 break;
2024 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2025 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2026 typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
2027 if (!typedatum)
2028 rc = -EINVAL;
2029 else
2030 tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
2031 break;
2032 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2033 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2034 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2035 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2036 rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
2037 break;
2038 }
2039
2040 POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
2041
2042 if (rc) {
2043 selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
2044 tmprule = NULL;
2045 }
2046
2047 *rule = tmprule;
2048
2049 return rc;
2050 }
2051
2052 int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
2053 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
2054 struct audit_context *actx)
2055 {
2056 struct context *ctxt;
2057 struct mls_level *level;
2058 int match = 0;
2059
2060 if (!rule) {
2061 audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2062 "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
2063 return -ENOENT;
2064 }
2065
2066 POLICY_RDLOCK;
2067
2068 if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
2069 audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2070 "selinux_audit_rule_match: stale rule\n");
2071 match = -ESTALE;
2072 goto out;
2073 }
2074
2075 ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
2076 if (!ctxt) {
2077 audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2078 "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2079 sid);
2080 match = -ENOENT;
2081 goto out;
2082 }
2083
2084 /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
2085 without a match */
2086 switch (field) {
2087 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2088 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2089 switch (op) {
2090 case AUDIT_EQUAL:
2091 match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
2092 break;
2093 case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
2094 match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
2095 break;
2096 }
2097 break;
2098 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2099 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2100 switch (op) {
2101 case AUDIT_EQUAL:
2102 match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
2103 break;
2104 case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
2105 match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
2106 break;
2107 }
2108 break;
2109 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2110 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2111 switch (op) {
2112 case AUDIT_EQUAL:
2113 match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
2114 break;
2115 case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
2116 match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
2117 break;
2118 }
2119 break;
2120 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2121 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2122 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2123 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2124 level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
2125 field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
2126 &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
2127 switch (op) {
2128 case AUDIT_EQUAL:
2129 match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2130 level);
2131 break;
2132 case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
2133 match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2134 level);
2135 break;
2136 case AUDIT_LESS_THAN:
2137 match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2138 level) &&
2139 !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2140 level));
2141 break;
2142 case AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
2143 match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2144 level);
2145 break;
2146 case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN:
2147 match = (mls_level_dom(level,
2148 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
2149 !mls_level_eq(level,
2150 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
2151 break;
2152 case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
2153 match = mls_level_dom(level,
2154 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
2155 break;
2156 }
2157 }
2158
2159 out:
2160 POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
2161 return match;
2162 }
2163
2164 static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = NULL;
2165
2166 static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
2167 u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
2168 {
2169 int err = 0;
2170
2171 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET && aurule_callback)
2172 err = aurule_callback();
2173 return err;
2174 }
2175
2176 static int __init aurule_init(void)
2177 {
2178 int err;
2179
2180 err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
2181 SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
2182 if (err)
2183 panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
2184
2185 return err;
2186 }
2187 __initcall(aurule_init);
2188
2189 void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
2190 {
2191 aurule_callback = callback;
2192 }
2193
2194 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
2195 /*
2196 * This is the structure we store inside the NetLabel cache block.
2197 */
2198 #define NETLBL_CACHE(x) ((struct netlbl_cache *)(x))
2199 #define NETLBL_CACHE_T_NONE 0
2200 #define NETLBL_CACHE_T_SID 1
2201 #define NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS 2
2202 struct netlbl_cache {
2203 u32 type;
2204 union {
2205 u32 sid;
2206 struct mls_range mls_label;
2207 } data;
2208 };
2209
2210 /**
2211 * selinux_netlbl_cache_free - Free the NetLabel cached data
2212 * @data: the data to free
2213 *
2214 * Description:
2215 * This function is intended to be used as the free() callback inside the
2216 * netlbl_lsm_cache structure.
2217 *
2218 */
2219 static void selinux_netlbl_cache_free(const void *data)
2220 {
2221 struct netlbl_cache *cache;
2222
2223 if (data == NULL)
2224 return;
2225
2226 cache = NETLBL_CACHE(data);
2227 switch (cache->type) {
2228 case NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS:
2229 ebitmap_destroy(&cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat);
2230 break;
2231 }
2232 kfree(data);
2233 }
2234
2235 /**
2236 * selinux_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
2237 * @skb: the packet
2238 * @ctx: the SELinux context
2239 *
2240 * Description:
2241 * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
2242 * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache.
2243 *
2244 */
2245 static void selinux_netlbl_cache_add(struct sk_buff *skb, struct context *ctx)
2246 {
2247 struct netlbl_cache *cache = NULL;
2248 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
2249
2250 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
2251 secattr.cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
2252 if (secattr.cache == NULL)
2253 goto netlbl_cache_add_return;
2254
2255 cache = kzalloc(sizeof(*cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
2256 if (cache == NULL)
2257 goto netlbl_cache_add_return;
2258
2259 cache->type = NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS;
2260 if (ebitmap_cpy(&cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat,
2261 &ctx->range.level[0].cat) != 0)
2262 goto netlbl_cache_add_return;
2263 cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.highbit =
2264 cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.highbit;
2265 cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.node =
2266 cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.node;
2267 cache->data.mls_label.level[0].sens = ctx->range.level[0].sens;
2268 cache->data.mls_label.level[1].sens = ctx->range.level[0].sens;
2269
2270 secattr.cache->free = selinux_netlbl_cache_free;
2271 secattr.cache->data = (void *)cache;
2272 secattr.flags = NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
2273
2274 netlbl_cache_add(skb, &secattr);
2275
2276 netlbl_cache_add_return:
2277 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
2278 }
2279
2280 /**
2281 * selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate - Invalidate the NetLabel cache
2282 *
2283 * Description:
2284 * Invalidate the NetLabel security attribute mapping cache.
2285 *
2286 */
2287 void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
2288 {
2289 netlbl_cache_invalidate();
2290 }
2291
2292 /**
2293 * selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
2294 * @skb: the network packet
2295 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
2296 * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only attributes
2297 * @sid: the SELinux SID
2298 *
2299 * Description:
2300 * Convert the given NetLabel packet security attributes in @secattr into a
2301 * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
2302 * SID/context then use the context in @base_sid as the foundation. If @skb
2303 * is not NULL attempt to cache as much data as possibile. Returns zero on
2304 * success, negative values on failure.
2305 *
2306 */
2307 static int selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
2308 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
2309 u32 base_sid,
2310 u32 *sid)
2311 {
2312 int rc = -EIDRM;
2313 struct context *ctx;
2314 struct context ctx_new;
2315 struct netlbl_cache *cache;
2316
2317 POLICY_RDLOCK;
2318
2319 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) {
2320 cache = NETLBL_CACHE(secattr->cache->data);
2321 switch (cache->type) {
2322 case NETLBL_CACHE_T_SID:
2323 *sid = cache->data.sid;
2324 rc = 0;
2325 break;
2326 case NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS:
2327 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, base_sid);
2328 if (ctx == NULL)
2329 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
2330
2331 ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
2332 ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
2333 ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
2334 ctx_new.range.level[0].sens =
2335 cache->data.mls_label.level[0].sens;
2336 ctx_new.range.level[0].cat.highbit =
2337 cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.highbit;
2338 ctx_new.range.level[0].cat.node =
2339 cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.node;
2340 ctx_new.range.level[1].sens =
2341 cache->data.mls_label.level[1].sens;
2342 ctx_new.range.level[1].cat.highbit =
2343 cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.highbit;
2344 ctx_new.range.level[1].cat.node =
2345 cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.node;
2346
2347 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
2348 break;
2349 default:
2350 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
2351 }
2352 } else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
2353 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, base_sid);
2354 if (ctx == NULL)
2355 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
2356
2357 ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
2358 ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
2359 ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
2360 mls_import_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr->mls_lvl, secattr->mls_lvl);
2361 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
2362 if (mls_import_cat(&ctx_new,
2363 secattr->mls_cat,
2364 secattr->mls_cat_len,
2365 NULL,
2366 0) != 0)
2367 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
2368 ctx_new.range.level[1].cat.highbit =
2369 ctx_new.range.level[0].cat.highbit;
2370 ctx_new.range.level[1].cat.node =
2371 ctx_new.range.level[0].cat.node;
2372 } else {
2373 ebitmap_init(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
2374 ebitmap_init(&ctx_new.range.level[1].cat);
2375 }
2376 if (mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new) != 1)
2377 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup;
2378
2379 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
2380 if (rc != 0)
2381 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup;
2382
2383 if (skb != NULL)
2384 selinux_netlbl_cache_add(skb, &ctx_new);
2385 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
2386 } else {
2387 *sid = SECSID_NULL;
2388 rc = 0;
2389 }
2390
2391 netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return:
2392 POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
2393 return rc;
2394 netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup:
2395 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
2396 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
2397 }
2398
2399 /**
2400 * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid - Get the sid of a packet using NetLabel
2401 * @skb: the packet
2402 * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only attributes
2403 * @sid: the SID
2404 *
2405 * Description:
2406 * Call the NetLabel mechanism to get the security attributes of the given
2407 * packet and use those attributes to determine the correct context/SID to
2408 * assign to the packet. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
2409 *
2410 */
2411 static int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
2412 u32 base_sid,
2413 u32 *sid)
2414 {
2415 int rc;
2416 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
2417
2418 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
2419 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, &secattr);
2420 if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
2421 rc = selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(skb,
2422 &secattr,
2423 base_sid,
2424 sid);
2425 else
2426 *sid = SECSID_NULL;
2427 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
2428
2429 return rc;
2430 }
2431
2432 /**
2433 * selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid - Label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism
2434 * @sock: the socket to label
2435 * @sid: the SID to use
2436 *
2437 * Description:
2438 * Attempt to label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism using the given
2439 * SID. Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure. The
2440 * caller is responsibile for calling rcu_read_lock() before calling this
2441 * this function and rcu_read_unlock() after this function returns.
2442 *
2443 */
2444 static int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(struct socket *sock, u32 sid)
2445 {
2446 int rc = -ENOENT;
2447 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
2448 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
2449 struct context *ctx;
2450
2451 if (!ss_initialized)
2452 return 0;
2453
2454 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
2455
2456 POLICY_RDLOCK;
2457
2458 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
2459 if (ctx == NULL)
2460 goto netlbl_socket_setsid_return;
2461
2462 secattr.domain = kstrdup(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[ctx->type - 1],
2463 GFP_ATOMIC);
2464 mls_export_lvl(ctx, &secattr.mls_lvl, NULL);
2465 rc = mls_export_cat(ctx,
2466 &secattr.mls_cat,
2467 &secattr.mls_cat_len,
2468 NULL,
2469 NULL);
2470 if (rc != 0)
2471 goto netlbl_socket_setsid_return;
2472
2473 secattr.flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
2474 if (secattr.mls_cat)
2475 secattr.flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
2476
2477 rc = netlbl_socket_setattr(sock, &secattr);
2478 if (rc == 0) {
2479 spin_lock(&sksec->nlbl_lock);
2480 sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
2481 spin_unlock(&sksec->nlbl_lock);
2482 }
2483
2484 netlbl_socket_setsid_return:
2485 POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
2486 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
2487 return rc;
2488 }
2489
2490 /**
2491 * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset - Reset the NetLabel fields
2492 * @ssec: the sk_security_struct
2493 * @family: the socket family
2494 *
2495 * Description:
2496 * Called when the NetLabel state of a sk_security_struct needs to be reset.
2497 * The caller is responsibile for all the NetLabel sk_security_struct locking.
2498 *
2499 */
2500 void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
2501 int family)
2502 {
2503 if (family == PF_INET)
2504 ssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQUIRE;
2505 else
2506 ssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
2507 }
2508
2509 /**
2510 * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init - Setup the NetLabel fields
2511 * @ssec: the sk_security_struct
2512 * @family: the socket family
2513 *
2514 * Description:
2515 * Called when a new sk_security_struct is allocated to initialize the NetLabel
2516 * fields.
2517 *
2518 */
2519 void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
2520 int family)
2521 {
2522 /* No locking needed, we are the only one who has access to ssec */
2523 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
2524 spin_lock_init(&ssec->nlbl_lock);
2525 }
2526
2527 /**
2528 * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone - Copy the NetLabel fields
2529 * @ssec: the original sk_security_struct
2530 * @newssec: the cloned sk_security_struct
2531 *
2532 * Description:
2533 * Clone the NetLabel specific sk_security_struct fields from @ssec to
2534 * @newssec.
2535 *
2536 */
2537 void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
2538 struct sk_security_struct *newssec)
2539 {
2540 /* We don't need to take newssec->nlbl_lock because we are the only
2541 * thread with access to newssec, but we do need to take the RCU read
2542 * lock as other threads could have access to ssec */
2543 rcu_read_lock();
2544 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, ssec->sk->sk_family);
2545 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
2546 rcu_read_unlock();
2547 }
2548
2549 /**
2550 * selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create - Label a socket using NetLabel
2551 * @sock: the socket to label
2552 *
2553 * Description:
2554 * Attempt to label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism using the given
2555 * SID. Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
2556 *
2557 */
2558 int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock)
2559 {
2560 int rc = 0;
2561 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2562 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
2563
2564 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
2565
2566 rcu_read_lock();
2567 if (sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_REQUIRE)
2568 rc = selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(sock, sksec->sid);
2569 rcu_read_unlock();
2570
2571 return rc;
2572 }
2573
2574 /**
2575 * selinux_netlbl_sock_graft - Netlabel the new socket
2576 * @sk: the new connection
2577 * @sock: the new socket
2578 *
2579 * Description:
2580 * The connection represented by @sk is being grafted onto @sock so set the
2581 * socket's NetLabel to match the SID of @sk.
2582 *
2583 */
2584 void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
2585 {
2586 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2587 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
2588 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
2589 u32 nlbl_peer_sid;
2590
2591 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
2592
2593 rcu_read_lock();
2594
2595 if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE) {
2596 rcu_read_unlock();
2597 return;
2598 }
2599
2600 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
2601 if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 &&
2602 secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE &&
2603 selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(NULL,
2604 &secattr,
2605 SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
2606 &nlbl_peer_sid) == 0)
2607 sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid;
2608 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
2609
2610 /* Try to set the NetLabel on the socket to save time later, if we fail
2611 * here we will pick up the pieces in later calls to
2612 * selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(). */
2613 selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(sock, sksec->sid);
2614
2615 rcu_read_unlock();
2616 }
2617
2618 /**
2619 * selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Handle a new connection request
2620 * @skb: the packet
2621 * @sock_sid: the SID of the parent socket
2622 *
2623 * Description:
2624 * If present, use the security attributes of the packet in @skb and the
2625 * parent sock's SID to arrive at a SID for the new child sock. Returns the
2626 * SID of the connection or SECSID_NULL on failure.
2627 *
2628 */
2629 u32 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 sock_sid)
2630 {
2631 int rc;
2632 u32 peer_sid;
2633
2634 rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, sock_sid, &peer_sid);
2635 if (rc != 0)
2636 return SECSID_NULL;
2637
2638 return peer_sid;
2639 }
2640
2641 /**
2642 * selinux_netlbl_inode_permission - Verify the socket is NetLabel labeled
2643 * @inode: the file descriptor's inode
2644 * @mask: the permission mask
2645 *
2646 * Description:
2647 * Looks at a file's inode and if it is marked as a socket protected by
2648 * NetLabel then verify that the socket has been labeled, if not try to label
2649 * the socket now with the inode's SID. Returns zero on success, negative
2650 * values on failure.
2651 *
2652 */
2653 int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2654 {
2655 int rc;
2656 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
2657 struct socket *sock;
2658
2659 if (!S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode) ||
2660 ((mask & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)) == 0))
2661 return 0;
2662 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
2663 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
2664
2665 rcu_read_lock();
2666 if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE) {
2667 rcu_read_unlock();
2668 return 0;
2669 }
2670 lock_sock(sock->sk);
2671 rc = selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(sock, sksec->sid);
2672 release_sock(sock->sk);
2673 rcu_read_unlock();
2674
2675 return rc;
2676 }
2677
2678 /**
2679 * selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb - Do an inbound access check using NetLabel
2680 * @sksec: the sock's sk_security_struct
2681 * @skb: the packet
2682 * @ad: the audit data
2683 *
2684 * Description:
2685 * Fetch the NetLabel security attributes from @skb and perform an access check
2686 * against the receiving socket. Returns zero on success, negative values on
2687 * error.
2688 *
2689 */
2690 int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
2691 struct sk_buff *skb,
2692 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2693 {
2694 int rc;
2695 u32 netlbl_sid;
2696 u32 recv_perm;
2697
2698 rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
2699 SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
2700 &netlbl_sid);
2701 if (rc != 0)
2702 return rc;
2703
2704 if (netlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL)
2705 return 0;
2706
2707 switch (sksec->sclass) {
2708 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
2709 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
2710 break;
2711 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
2712 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
2713 break;
2714 default:
2715 recv_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
2716 }
2717
2718 rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid,
2719 netlbl_sid,
2720 sksec->sclass,
2721 recv_perm,
2722 ad);
2723 if (rc == 0)
2724 return 0;
2725
2726 netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc);
2727 return rc;
2728 }
2729
2730 /**
2731 * selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream - Return the connected peer's SID
2732 * @sock: the socket
2733 *
2734 * Description:
2735 * Examine @sock to find the connected peer's SID. Returns the SID on success
2736 * or SECSID_NULL on error.
2737 *
2738 */
2739 u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock)
2740 {
2741 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
2742 return sksec->peer_sid;
2743 }
2744
2745 /**
2746 * selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram - Return the SID of a NetLabel packet
2747 * @skb: the packet
2748 *
2749 * Description:
2750 * Examine @skb to find the SID assigned to it by NetLabel. Returns the SID on
2751 * success, SECSID_NULL on error.
2752 *
2753 */
2754 u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
2755 {
2756 int peer_sid;
2757
2758 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
2759 SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
2760 &peer_sid) != 0)
2761 return SECSID_NULL;
2762
2763 return peer_sid;
2764 }
2765
2766 /**
2767 * selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt - Do not allow users to remove a NetLabel
2768 * @sock: the socket
2769 * @level: the socket level or protocol
2770 * @optname: the socket option name
2771 *
2772 * Description:
2773 * Check the setsockopt() call and if the user is trying to replace the IP
2774 * options on a socket and a NetLabel is in place for the socket deny the
2775 * access; otherwise allow the access. Returns zero when the access is
2776 * allowed, -EACCES when denied, and other negative values on error.
2777 *
2778 */
2779 int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
2780 int level,
2781 int optname)
2782 {
2783 int rc = 0;
2784 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
2785 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
2786
2787 rcu_read_lock();
2788 if (level == IPPROTO_IP && optname == IP_OPTIONS &&
2789 sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_LABELED) {
2790 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
2791 rc = netlbl_socket_getattr(sock, &secattr);
2792 if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
2793 rc = -EACCES;
2794 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
2795 }
2796 rcu_read_unlock();
2797
2798 return rc;
2799 }
2800 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
Linux 2.6 ibm-acpi/thinkpad-acpi driver git tree