evm: key must be set once during initialization
[linux-2.6/linux-acpi-2.6/ibm-acpi-2.6.git] / security / integrity / evm / evm_crypto.c
blob3b9f5a080e4f69b937b2c782f67142541811fba9
1 /*
2 * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
4 * Authors:
5 * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
6 * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
8 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
9 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
10 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
12 * File: evm_crypto.c
13 * Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC
16 #include <linux/module.h>
17 #include <linux/crypto.h>
18 #include <linux/xattr.h>
19 #include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
20 #include <crypto/hash.h>
21 #include "evm.h"
23 #define EVMKEY "evm-key"
24 #define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
25 static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
26 static int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;
28 struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
29 struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
31 static struct shash_desc *init_desc(const char type)
33 int rc;
34 char *algo;
35 struct crypto_shash **tfm;
36 struct shash_desc *desc;
38 if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
39 tfm = &hmac_tfm;
40 algo = evm_hmac;
41 } else {
42 tfm = &hash_tfm;
43 algo = evm_hash;
46 if (*tfm == NULL) {
47 *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
48 if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) {
49 pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n",
50 algo, PTR_ERR(*tfm));
51 rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm);
52 *tfm = NULL;
53 return ERR_PTR(rc);
55 if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
56 rc = crypto_shash_setkey(*tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
57 if (rc) {
58 crypto_free_shash(*tfm);
59 *tfm = NULL;
60 return ERR_PTR(rc);
65 desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),
66 GFP_KERNEL);
67 if (!desc)
68 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
70 desc->tfm = *tfm;
71 desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
73 rc = crypto_shash_init(desc);
74 if (rc) {
75 kfree(desc);
76 return ERR_PTR(rc);
78 return desc;
81 /* Protect against 'cutting & pasting' security.evm xattr, include inode
82 * specific info.
84 * (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete
85 * protection.)
87 static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
88 char *digest)
90 struct h_misc {
91 unsigned long ino;
92 __u32 generation;
93 uid_t uid;
94 gid_t gid;
95 umode_t mode;
96 } hmac_misc;
98 memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc);
99 hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
100 hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
101 hmac_misc.uid = inode->i_uid;
102 hmac_misc.gid = inode->i_gid;
103 hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
104 crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc);
105 crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
109 * Calculate the HMAC value across the set of protected security xattrs.
111 * Instead of retrieving the requested xattr, for performance, calculate
112 * the hmac using the requested xattr value. Don't alloc/free memory for
113 * each xattr, but attempt to re-use the previously allocated memory.
115 static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
116 const char *req_xattr_name,
117 const char *req_xattr_value,
118 size_t req_xattr_value_len,
119 char type, char *digest)
121 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
122 struct shash_desc *desc;
123 char **xattrname;
124 size_t xattr_size = 0;
125 char *xattr_value = NULL;
126 int error;
127 int size;
129 if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
130 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
131 desc = init_desc(type);
132 if (IS_ERR(desc))
133 return PTR_ERR(desc);
135 error = -ENODATA;
136 for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) {
137 if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value)
138 && !strcmp(*xattrname, req_xattr_name)) {
139 error = 0;
140 crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value,
141 req_xattr_value_len);
142 continue;
144 size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, *xattrname,
145 &xattr_value, xattr_size, GFP_NOFS);
146 if (size == -ENOMEM) {
147 error = -ENOMEM;
148 goto out;
150 if (size < 0)
151 continue;
153 error = 0;
154 xattr_size = size;
155 crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size);
157 hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, digest);
159 out:
160 kfree(xattr_value);
161 kfree(desc);
162 return error;
165 int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
166 const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
167 char *digest)
169 return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
170 req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, digest);
173 int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
174 const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
175 char *digest)
177 return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
178 req_xattr_value_len, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST, digest);
182 * Calculate the hmac and update security.evm xattr
184 * Expects to be called with i_mutex locked.
186 int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
187 const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
189 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
190 struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data;
191 int rc = 0;
193 rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
194 xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest);
195 if (rc == 0) {
196 xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
197 rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
198 &xattr_data,
199 sizeof(xattr_data), 0);
201 else if (rc == -ENODATA)
202 rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
203 return rc;
206 int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
207 char *hmac_val)
209 struct shash_desc *desc;
211 desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC);
212 if (IS_ERR(desc)) {
213 printk(KERN_INFO "init_desc failed\n");
214 return PTR_ERR(desc);
217 crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len);
218 hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, hmac_val);
219 kfree(desc);
220 return 0;
224 * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC
226 int evm_init_key(void)
228 struct key *evm_key;
229 struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
230 int rc = 0;
232 evm_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, EVMKEY, NULL);
233 if (IS_ERR(evm_key))
234 return -ENOENT;
236 down_read(&evm_key->sem);
237 ekp = evm_key->payload.data;
238 if (ekp->decrypted_datalen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
239 rc = -EINVAL;
240 goto out;
242 memcpy(evmkey, ekp->decrypted_data, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
243 out:
244 /* burn the original key contents */
245 memset(ekp->decrypted_data, 0, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
246 up_read(&evm_key->sem);
247 key_put(evm_key);
248 return rc;