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SELinux: drop secondary_ops->sysctl
[linux-2.6/linux-acpi-2.6/ibm-acpi-2.6.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c
blobdd19ba81201f9c1031440790203540077e8dae50
1 /*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 *
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
24 */
25
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
35 #include <linux/mm.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
50 #include <net/icmp.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
70 #include <net/ipv6.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
79
80 #include "avc.h"
81 #include "objsec.h"
82 #include "netif.h"
83 #include "netnode.h"
84 #include "netport.h"
85 #include "xfrm.h"
86 #include "netlabel.h"
87 #include "audit.h"
88
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
91
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
93
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
97
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
103
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
105 {
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
109 return 1;
110 }
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
112 #endif
113
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
116
117 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
118 {
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
122 return 1;
123 }
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
125 #else
126 int selinux_enabled = 1;
127 #endif
128
129
130 /*
131 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
133 */
134 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
135
136 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
137 before the policy was loaded. */
138 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
139 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
140
141 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
142
143 /**
144 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
145 *
146 * Description:
147 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
148 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
149 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
150 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
151 *
152 */
153 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
154 {
155 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
156 }
157
158 /*
159 * initialise the security for the init task
160 */
161 static void cred_init_security(void)
162 {
163 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
164 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
165
166 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
167 if (!tsec)
168 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
169
170 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
171 cred->security = tsec;
172 }
173
174 /*
175 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
176 */
177 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
178 {
179 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
180
181 tsec = cred->security;
182 return tsec->sid;
183 }
184
185 /*
186 * get the objective security ID of a task
187 */
188 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
189 {
190 u32 sid;
191
192 rcu_read_lock();
193 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
194 rcu_read_unlock();
195 return sid;
196 }
197
198 /*
199 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
200 */
201 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
202 {
203 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
204
205 return tsec->sid;
206 }
207
208 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
209
210 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
211 {
212 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
213 u32 sid = current_sid();
214
215 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
216 if (!isec)
217 return -ENOMEM;
218
219 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
220 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
221 isec->inode = inode;
222 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
223 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
224 isec->task_sid = sid;
225 inode->i_security = isec;
226
227 return 0;
228 }
229
230 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
231 {
232 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
233 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
234
235 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
236 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
237 list_del_init(&isec->list);
238 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
239
240 inode->i_security = NULL;
241 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
242 }
243
244 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
245 {
246 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
247 u32 sid = current_sid();
248
249 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
250 if (!fsec)
251 return -ENOMEM;
252
253 fsec->sid = sid;
254 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
255 file->f_security = fsec;
256
257 return 0;
258 }
259
260 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
261 {
262 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
263 file->f_security = NULL;
264 kfree(fsec);
265 }
266
267 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
268 {
269 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
270
271 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
272 if (!sbsec)
273 return -ENOMEM;
274
275 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
276 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
278 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
279 sbsec->sb = sb;
280 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
281 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
282 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
283 sb->s_security = sbsec;
284
285 return 0;
286 }
287
288 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
289 {
290 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
291
292 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
293 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
294 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
295 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
296
297 sb->s_security = NULL;
298 kfree(sbsec);
299 }
300
301 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
302 {
303 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
304
305 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
306 if (!ssec)
307 return -ENOMEM;
308
309 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
310 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 sk->sk_security = ssec;
312
313 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec);
314
315 return 0;
316 }
317
318 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
319 {
320 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
321
322 sk->sk_security = NULL;
323 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
324 kfree(ssec);
325 }
326
327 /* The security server must be initialized before
328 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
329 extern int ss_initialized;
330
331 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
332
333 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
334 "uses xattr",
335 "uses transition SIDs",
336 "uses task SIDs",
337 "uses genfs_contexts",
338 "not configured for labeling",
339 "uses mountpoint labeling",
340 };
341
342 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
343
344 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
345 {
346 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
347 }
348
349 enum {
350 Opt_error = -1,
351 Opt_context = 1,
352 Opt_fscontext = 2,
353 Opt_defcontext = 3,
354 Opt_rootcontext = 4,
355 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
356 };
357
358 static const match_table_t tokens = {
359 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
360 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
363 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
364 {Opt_error, NULL},
365 };
366
367 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
368
369 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
370 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
371 const struct cred *cred)
372 {
373 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
374 int rc;
375
376 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
377 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
378 if (rc)
379 return rc;
380
381 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
382 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
383 return rc;
384 }
385
386 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
387 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
388 const struct cred *cred)
389 {
390 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
391 int rc;
392 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
393 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
394 if (rc)
395 return rc;
396
397 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
398 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
399 return rc;
400 }
401
402 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
403 {
404 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
405 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
406 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
407 int rc = 0;
408
409 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
410 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
411 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
412 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
413 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
414 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
415 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
416 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
417 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
418 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
419 goto out;
420 }
421 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
422 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
423 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
424 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
425 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
426 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
427 else
428 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
429 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
430 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
431 goto out;
432 }
433 }
434
435 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
436
437 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
438 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
439 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
440 else
441 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
442 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
443 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
444
445 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
446 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
447 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
448 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
449 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
450
451 /* Initialize the root inode. */
452 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
453
454 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
455 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
456 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
457 populates itself. */
458 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
459 next_inode:
460 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
461 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
462 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
463 struct inode_security_struct, list);
464 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
465 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
466 inode = igrab(inode);
467 if (inode) {
468 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
469 inode_doinit(inode);
470 iput(inode);
471 }
472 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
473 list_del_init(&isec->list);
474 goto next_inode;
475 }
476 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
477 out:
478 return rc;
479 }
480
481 /*
482 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
483 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
484 * mount options, or whatever.
485 */
486 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
487 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
488 {
489 int rc = 0, i;
490 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
491 char *context = NULL;
492 u32 len;
493 char tmp;
494
495 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
496
497 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
498 return -EINVAL;
499
500 if (!ss_initialized)
501 return -EINVAL;
502
503 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
504 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
505 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
506 if (tmp & 0x01)
507 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
508 tmp >>= 1;
509 }
510 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
511 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
512 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
513
514 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
515 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
516 rc = -ENOMEM;
517 goto out_free;
518 }
519
520 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
521 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
522 rc = -ENOMEM;
523 goto out_free;
524 }
525
526 i = 0;
527 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
528 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
529 if (rc)
530 goto out_free;
531 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
532 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
533 }
534 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
535 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
536 if (rc)
537 goto out_free;
538 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
539 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
540 }
541 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
542 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
543 if (rc)
544 goto out_free;
545 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
546 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
547 }
548 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
549 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
550 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
551
552 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
553 if (rc)
554 goto out_free;
555 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
556 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
557 }
558 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
559 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
560 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
561 }
562
563 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
564
565 return 0;
566
567 out_free:
568 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
569 return rc;
570 }
571
572 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
573 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
574 {
575 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
576
577 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
578 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
579 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
580 (old_sid != new_sid))
581 return 1;
582
583 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
584 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
585 */
586 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
587 if (mnt_flags & flag)
588 return 1;
589 return 0;
590 }
591
592 /*
593 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
594 * labeling information.
595 */
596 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
597 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
598 {
599 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
600 int rc = 0, i;
601 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
602 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
603 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
604 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
605 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
606 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
607 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
608 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
609 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
610
611 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
612
613 if (!ss_initialized) {
614 if (!num_opts) {
615 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
616 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
617 server is ready to handle calls. */
618 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
619 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
620 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
621 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
622 goto out;
623 }
624 rc = -EINVAL;
625 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
626 "before the security server is initialized\n");
627 goto out;
628 }
629
630 /*
631 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
632 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
633 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
634 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
635 *
636 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
637 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
638 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
639 * will be used for both mounts)
640 */
641 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
642 && (num_opts == 0))
643 goto out;
644
645 /*
646 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
647 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
648 * than once with different security options.
649 */
650 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
651 u32 sid;
652
653 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
654 continue;
655 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
656 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
657 if (rc) {
658 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
659 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
660 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
661 goto out;
662 }
663 switch (flags[i]) {
664 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
665 fscontext_sid = sid;
666
667 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
668 fscontext_sid))
669 goto out_double_mount;
670
671 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
672 break;
673 case CONTEXT_MNT:
674 context_sid = sid;
675
676 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
677 context_sid))
678 goto out_double_mount;
679
680 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
681 break;
682 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
683 rootcontext_sid = sid;
684
685 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
686 rootcontext_sid))
687 goto out_double_mount;
688
689 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
690
691 break;
692 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
693 defcontext_sid = sid;
694
695 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
696 defcontext_sid))
697 goto out_double_mount;
698
699 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
700
701 break;
702 default:
703 rc = -EINVAL;
704 goto out;
705 }
706 }
707
708 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
709 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
710 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
711 goto out_double_mount;
712 rc = 0;
713 goto out;
714 }
715
716 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
717 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
718
719 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
720 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
721 if (rc) {
722 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
723 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
724 goto out;
725 }
726
727 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
728 if (fscontext_sid) {
729 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
730 if (rc)
731 goto out;
732
733 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
734 }
735
736 /*
737 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
738 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
739 * the superblock context if not already set.
740 */
741 if (context_sid) {
742 if (!fscontext_sid) {
743 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
744 cred);
745 if (rc)
746 goto out;
747 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
748 } else {
749 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
750 cred);
751 if (rc)
752 goto out;
753 }
754 if (!rootcontext_sid)
755 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
756
757 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
758 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
759 }
760
761 if (rootcontext_sid) {
762 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
763 cred);
764 if (rc)
765 goto out;
766
767 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
768 root_isec->initialized = 1;
769 }
770
771 if (defcontext_sid) {
772 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
773 rc = -EINVAL;
774 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
775 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
776 goto out;
777 }
778
779 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
780 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
781 sbsec, cred);
782 if (rc)
783 goto out;
784 }
785
786 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
787 }
788
789 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
790 out:
791 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
792 return rc;
793 out_double_mount:
794 rc = -EINVAL;
795 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
796 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
797 goto out;
798 }
799
800 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
801 struct super_block *newsb)
802 {
803 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
804 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
805
806 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
807 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
808 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
809
810 /*
811 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
812 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
813 * with it later
814 */
815 if (!ss_initialized) {
816 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
817 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
818 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
819 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
820 return;
821 }
822
823 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
824 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
825
826 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
827 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
828 return;
829
830 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
831
832 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
833
834 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
835 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
836 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
837
838 if (set_context) {
839 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
840
841 if (!set_fscontext)
842 newsbsec->sid = sid;
843 if (!set_rootcontext) {
844 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
845 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
846 newisec->sid = sid;
847 }
848 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
849 }
850 if (set_rootcontext) {
851 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
852 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
853 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
854 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
855
856 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
857 }
858
859 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
860 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
861 }
862
863 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
864 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
865 {
866 char *p;
867 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
868 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
869 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
870
871 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
872
873 /* Standard string-based options. */
874 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
875 int token;
876 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
877
878 if (!*p)
879 continue;
880
881 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
882
883 switch (token) {
884 case Opt_context:
885 if (context || defcontext) {
886 rc = -EINVAL;
887 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
888 goto out_err;
889 }
890 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
891 if (!context) {
892 rc = -ENOMEM;
893 goto out_err;
894 }
895 break;
896
897 case Opt_fscontext:
898 if (fscontext) {
899 rc = -EINVAL;
900 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
901 goto out_err;
902 }
903 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
904 if (!fscontext) {
905 rc = -ENOMEM;
906 goto out_err;
907 }
908 break;
909
910 case Opt_rootcontext:
911 if (rootcontext) {
912 rc = -EINVAL;
913 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
914 goto out_err;
915 }
916 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
917 if (!rootcontext) {
918 rc = -ENOMEM;
919 goto out_err;
920 }
921 break;
922
923 case Opt_defcontext:
924 if (context || defcontext) {
925 rc = -EINVAL;
926 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
927 goto out_err;
928 }
929 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
930 if (!defcontext) {
931 rc = -ENOMEM;
932 goto out_err;
933 }
934 break;
935 case Opt_labelsupport:
936 break;
937 default:
938 rc = -EINVAL;
939 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
940 goto out_err;
941
942 }
943 }
944
945 rc = -ENOMEM;
946 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
947 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
948 goto out_err;
949
950 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
951 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
952 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
953 goto out_err;
954 }
955
956 if (fscontext) {
957 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
958 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
959 }
960 if (context) {
961 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
962 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
963 }
964 if (rootcontext) {
965 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
966 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
967 }
968 if (defcontext) {
969 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
970 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
971 }
972
973 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
974 return 0;
975
976 out_err:
977 kfree(context);
978 kfree(defcontext);
979 kfree(fscontext);
980 kfree(rootcontext);
981 return rc;
982 }
983 /*
984 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
985 */
986 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
987 {
988 int rc = 0;
989 char *options = data;
990 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
991
992 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
993
994 if (!data)
995 goto out;
996
997 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
998
999 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1000 if (rc)
1001 goto out_err;
1002
1003 out:
1004 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1005
1006 out_err:
1007 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1008 return rc;
1009 }
1010
1011 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1012 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1013 {
1014 int i;
1015 char *prefix;
1016
1017 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1018 char *has_comma;
1019
1020 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1021 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1022 else
1023 has_comma = NULL;
1024
1025 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1026 case CONTEXT_MNT:
1027 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1028 break;
1029 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
1030 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1031 break;
1032 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1033 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1034 break;
1035 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1036 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1037 break;
1038 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1039 seq_putc(m, ',');
1040 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1041 continue;
1042 default:
1043 BUG();
1044 };
1045 /* we need a comma before each option */
1046 seq_putc(m, ',');
1047 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1048 if (has_comma)
1049 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1050 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1051 if (has_comma)
1052 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1053 }
1054 }
1055
1056 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1057 {
1058 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1059 int rc;
1060
1061 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1062 if (rc) {
1063 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1064 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1065 rc = 0;
1066 return rc;
1067 }
1068
1069 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1070
1071 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1072
1073 return rc;
1074 }
1075
1076 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1077 {
1078 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1079 case S_IFSOCK:
1080 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1081 case S_IFLNK:
1082 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1083 case S_IFREG:
1084 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1085 case S_IFBLK:
1086 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1087 case S_IFDIR:
1088 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1089 case S_IFCHR:
1090 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1091 case S_IFIFO:
1092 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1093
1094 }
1095
1096 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1097 }
1098
1099 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1100 {
1101 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1102 }
1103
1104 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1105 {
1106 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1107 }
1108
1109 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1110 {
1111 switch (family) {
1112 case PF_UNIX:
1113 switch (type) {
1114 case SOCK_STREAM:
1115 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1116 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1117 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1118 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1119 }
1120 break;
1121 case PF_INET:
1122 case PF_INET6:
1123 switch (type) {
1124 case SOCK_STREAM:
1125 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1126 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1127 else
1128 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1129 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1130 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1131 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1132 else
1133 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1134 case SOCK_DCCP:
1135 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1136 default:
1137 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1138 }
1139 break;
1140 case PF_NETLINK:
1141 switch (protocol) {
1142 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1143 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1144 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1145 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1146 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1147 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1148 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1149 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1150 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1151 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1152 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1153 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1154 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1155 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1156 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1157 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1158 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1159 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1160 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1161 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1162 default:
1163 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1164 }
1165 case PF_PACKET:
1166 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1167 case PF_KEY:
1168 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1169 case PF_APPLETALK:
1170 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1171 }
1172
1173 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1174 }
1175
1176 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1177 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1178 u16 tclass,
1179 u32 *sid)
1180 {
1181 int buflen, rc;
1182 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1183
1184 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1185 if (!buffer)
1186 return -ENOMEM;
1187
1188 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1189 end = buffer+buflen;
1190 *--end = '\0';
1191 buflen--;
1192 path = end-1;
1193 *path = '/';
1194 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1195 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1196 if (buflen < 0)
1197 break;
1198 end -= de->namelen;
1199 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1200 *--end = '/';
1201 path = end;
1202 de = de->parent;
1203 }
1204 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1205 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1206 return rc;
1207 }
1208 #else
1209 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1210 u16 tclass,
1211 u32 *sid)
1212 {
1213 return -EINVAL;
1214 }
1215 #endif
1216
1217 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1218 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1219 {
1220 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1221 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1222 u32 sid;
1223 struct dentry *dentry;
1224 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1225 char *context = NULL;
1226 unsigned len = 0;
1227 int rc = 0;
1228
1229 if (isec->initialized)
1230 goto out;
1231
1232 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1233 if (isec->initialized)
1234 goto out_unlock;
1235
1236 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1237 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1238 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1239 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1240 server is ready to handle calls. */
1241 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1242 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1243 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1244 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1245 goto out_unlock;
1246 }
1247
1248 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1249 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1250 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1251 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1252 break;
1253 }
1254
1255 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1256 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1257 if (opt_dentry) {
1258 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1259 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1260 } else {
1261 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1262 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1263 }
1264 if (!dentry) {
1265 /*
1266 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1267 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1268 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1269 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1270 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1271 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1272 * be used again by userspace.
1273 */
1274 goto out_unlock;
1275 }
1276
1277 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1278 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1279 if (!context) {
1280 rc = -ENOMEM;
1281 dput(dentry);
1282 goto out_unlock;
1283 }
1284 context[len] = '\0';
1285 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1286 context, len);
1287 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1288 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1289 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1290 NULL, 0);
1291 if (rc < 0) {
1292 dput(dentry);
1293 goto out_unlock;
1294 }
1295 kfree(context);
1296 len = rc;
1297 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1298 if (!context) {
1299 rc = -ENOMEM;
1300 dput(dentry);
1301 goto out_unlock;
1302 }
1303 context[len] = '\0';
1304 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1305 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1306 context, len);
1307 }
1308 dput(dentry);
1309 if (rc < 0) {
1310 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1311 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1312 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1313 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1314 kfree(context);
1315 goto out_unlock;
1316 }
1317 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1318 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1319 rc = 0;
1320 } else {
1321 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1322 sbsec->def_sid,
1323 GFP_NOFS);
1324 if (rc) {
1325 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1326 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1327
1328 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1329 if (printk_ratelimit())
1330 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1331 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1332 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1333 } else {
1334 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1335 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1336 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1337 }
1338 kfree(context);
1339 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1340 rc = 0;
1341 break;
1342 }
1343 }
1344 kfree(context);
1345 isec->sid = sid;
1346 break;
1347 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1348 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1349 break;
1350 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1351 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1352 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1353
1354 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1355 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1356 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1357 sbsec->sid,
1358 isec->sclass,
1359 &sid);
1360 if (rc)
1361 goto out_unlock;
1362 isec->sid = sid;
1363 break;
1364 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1365 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1366 break;
1367 default:
1368 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1369 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1370
1371 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1372 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1373 if (proci->pde) {
1374 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1375 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1376 isec->sclass,
1377 &sid);
1378 if (rc)
1379 goto out_unlock;
1380 isec->sid = sid;
1381 }
1382 }
1383 break;
1384 }
1385
1386 isec->initialized = 1;
1387
1388 out_unlock:
1389 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1390 out:
1391 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1392 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1393 return rc;
1394 }
1395
1396 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1397 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1398 {
1399 u32 perm = 0;
1400
1401 switch (sig) {
1402 case SIGCHLD:
1403 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1404 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1405 break;
1406 case SIGKILL:
1407 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1408 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1409 break;
1410 case SIGSTOP:
1411 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1412 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1413 break;
1414 default:
1415 /* All other signals. */
1416 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1417 break;
1418 }
1419
1420 return perm;
1421 }
1422
1423 /*
1424 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1425 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1426 */
1427 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1428 const struct cred *target,
1429 u32 perms)
1430 {
1431 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1432
1433 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1434 }
1435
1436 /*
1437 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1438 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1439 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1440 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1441 */
1442 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1443 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1444 u32 perms)
1445 {
1446 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1447 u32 sid1, sid2;
1448
1449 rcu_read_lock();
1450 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1451 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1452 rcu_read_unlock();
1453 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1454 }
1455
1456 /*
1457 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1458 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1459 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1460 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1461 */
1462 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1463 u32 perms)
1464 {
1465 u32 sid, tsid;
1466
1467 sid = current_sid();
1468 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1469 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1470 }
1471
1472 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1473 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1474 #endif
1475
1476 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1477 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1478 const struct cred *cred,
1479 int cap, int audit)
1480 {
1481 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1482 struct av_decision avd;
1483 u16 sclass;
1484 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1485 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1486 int rc;
1487
1488 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1489 ad.tsk = tsk;
1490 ad.u.cap = cap;
1491
1492 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1493 case 0:
1494 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1495 break;
1496 case 1:
1497 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1498 break;
1499 default:
1500 printk(KERN_ERR
1501 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1502 BUG();
1503 }
1504
1505 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1506 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1507 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1508 return rc;
1509 }
1510
1511 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1512 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1513 u32 perms)
1514 {
1515 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1516
1517 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1518 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1519 }
1520
1521 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1522 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1523 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1524 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1525 struct inode *inode,
1526 u32 perms,
1527 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1528 {
1529 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1530 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1531 u32 sid;
1532
1533 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1534 return 0;
1535
1536 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1537 isec = inode->i_security;
1538
1539 if (!adp) {
1540 adp = &ad;
1541 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1542 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1543 }
1544
1545 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1546 }
1547
1548 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1549 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1550 pathname if needed. */
1551 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1552 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1553 struct dentry *dentry,
1554 u32 av)
1555 {
1556 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1557 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1558
1559 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1560 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1561 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1562 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1563 }
1564
1565 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1566 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1567 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1568 check a particular permission to the file.
1569 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1570 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1571 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1572 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1573 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1574 struct file *file,
1575 u32 av)
1576 {
1577 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1578 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1579 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1580 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1581 int rc;
1582
1583 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1584 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1585
1586 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1587 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1588 SECCLASS_FD,
1589 FD__USE,
1590 &ad);
1591 if (rc)
1592 goto out;
1593 }
1594
1595 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1596 rc = 0;
1597 if (av)
1598 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1599
1600 out:
1601 return rc;
1602 }
1603
1604 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1605 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1606 struct dentry *dentry,
1607 u16 tclass)
1608 {
1609 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1610 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1611 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1612 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1613 u32 sid, newsid;
1614 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1615 int rc;
1616
1617 dsec = dir->i_security;
1618 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1619
1620 sid = tsec->sid;
1621 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1622
1623 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1624 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1625
1626 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1627 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1628 &ad);
1629 if (rc)
1630 return rc;
1631
1632 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1633 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1634 if (rc)
1635 return rc;
1636 }
1637
1638 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1639 if (rc)
1640 return rc;
1641
1642 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1643 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1644 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1645 }
1646
1647 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1648 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1649 struct task_struct *ctx)
1650 {
1651 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1652
1653 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1654 }
1655
1656 #define MAY_LINK 0
1657 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1658 #define MAY_RMDIR 2
1659
1660 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1661 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1662 struct dentry *dentry,
1663 int kind)
1664
1665 {
1666 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1667 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1668 u32 sid = current_sid();
1669 u32 av;
1670 int rc;
1671
1672 dsec = dir->i_security;
1673 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1674
1675 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1676 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1677
1678 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1679 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1680 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1681 if (rc)
1682 return rc;
1683
1684 switch (kind) {
1685 case MAY_LINK:
1686 av = FILE__LINK;
1687 break;
1688 case MAY_UNLINK:
1689 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1690 break;
1691 case MAY_RMDIR:
1692 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1693 break;
1694 default:
1695 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1696 __func__, kind);
1697 return 0;
1698 }
1699
1700 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1701 return rc;
1702 }
1703
1704 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1705 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1706 struct inode *new_dir,
1707 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1708 {
1709 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1710 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1711 u32 sid = current_sid();
1712 u32 av;
1713 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1714 int rc;
1715
1716 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1717 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1718 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1719 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1720
1721 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1722
1723 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1724 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1725 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1726 if (rc)
1727 return rc;
1728 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1729 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1730 if (rc)
1731 return rc;
1732 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1733 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1734 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1735 if (rc)
1736 return rc;
1737 }
1738
1739 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1740 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1741 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1742 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1743 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1744 if (rc)
1745 return rc;
1746 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1747 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1748 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1749 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1750 new_isec->sclass,
1751 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1752 if (rc)
1753 return rc;
1754 }
1755
1756 return 0;
1757 }
1758
1759 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1760 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1761 struct super_block *sb,
1762 u32 perms,
1763 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1764 {
1765 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1766 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1767
1768 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1769 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1770 }
1771
1772 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1773 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1774 {
1775 u32 av = 0;
1776
1777 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1778 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1779 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1780 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1781 av |= FILE__READ;
1782
1783 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1784 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1785 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1786 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1787
1788 } else {
1789 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1790 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1791 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1792 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1793 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1794 av |= DIR__READ;
1795 }
1796
1797 return av;
1798 }
1799
1800 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1801 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1802 {
1803 u32 av = 0;
1804
1805 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1806 av |= FILE__READ;
1807 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1808 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1809 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1810 else
1811 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1812 }
1813 if (!av) {
1814 /*
1815 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1816 */
1817 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1818 }
1819
1820 return av;
1821 }
1822
1823 /*
1824 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1825 * open permission.
1826 */
1827 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1828 {
1829 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1830
1831 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1832 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1833 /*
1834 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1835 */
1836 if (S_ISREG(mode))
1837 av |= FILE__OPEN;
1838 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1839 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1840 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1841 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1842 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1843 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1844 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1845 av |= DIR__OPEN;
1846 else if (S_ISSOCK(mode))
1847 av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN;
1848 else
1849 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1850 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1851 }
1852 return av;
1853 }
1854
1855 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1856
1857 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1858 unsigned int mode)
1859 {
1860 int rc;
1861
1862 rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1863 if (rc)
1864 return rc;
1865
1866 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1867 u32 sid = current_sid();
1868 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1869 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1870 }
1871
1872 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1873 }
1874
1875 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1876 {
1877 int rc;
1878
1879 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1880 if (rc)
1881 return rc;
1882
1883 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1884 }
1885
1886 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1887 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1888 {
1889 int error;
1890
1891 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1892 if (error)
1893 return error;
1894
1895 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1896 }
1897
1898 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1899 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1900 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1901 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1902 {
1903 int error;
1904
1905 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1906 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1907 if (error)
1908 return error;
1909
1910 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1911 }
1912
1913 /*
1914 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1915 * which was removed).
1916 *
1917 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1918 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1919 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1920 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1921 */
1922
1923 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1924 int cap, int audit)
1925 {
1926 int rc;
1927
1928 rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1929 if (rc)
1930 return rc;
1931
1932 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1933 }
1934
1935 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1936 {
1937 int buflen, rc;
1938 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1939
1940 rc = -ENOMEM;
1941 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1942 if (!buffer)
1943 goto out;
1944
1945 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1946 end = buffer+buflen;
1947 *--end = '\0';
1948 buflen--;
1949 path = end-1;
1950 *path = '/';
1951 while (table) {
1952 const char *name = table->procname;
1953 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1954 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1955 if (buflen < 0)
1956 goto out_free;
1957 end -= namelen;
1958 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1959 *--end = '/';
1960 path = end;
1961 table = table->parent;
1962 }
1963 buflen -= 4;
1964 if (buflen < 0)
1965 goto out_free;
1966 end -= 4;
1967 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1968 path = end;
1969 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1970 out_free:
1971 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1972 out:
1973 return rc;
1974 }
1975
1976 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1977 {
1978 int error = 0;
1979 u32 av;
1980 u32 tsid, sid;
1981 int rc;
1982
1983 sid = current_sid();
1984
1985 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1986 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1987 if (rc) {
1988 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1989 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1990 }
1991
1992 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1993 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1994 if (op == 001) {
1995 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1996 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1997 } else {
1998 av = 0;
1999 if (op & 004)
2000 av |= FILE__READ;
2001 if (op & 002)
2002 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2003 if (av)
2004 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
2005 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
2006 }
2007
2008 return error;
2009 }
2010
2011 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2012 {
2013 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2014 int rc = 0;
2015
2016 if (!sb)
2017 return 0;
2018
2019 switch (cmds) {
2020 case Q_SYNC:
2021 case Q_QUOTAON:
2022 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2023 case Q_SETINFO:
2024 case Q_SETQUOTA:
2025 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2026 break;
2027 case Q_GETFMT:
2028 case Q_GETINFO:
2029 case Q_GETQUOTA:
2030 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2031 break;
2032 default:
2033 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2034 break;
2035 }
2036 return rc;
2037 }
2038
2039 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2040 {
2041 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2042
2043 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2044 }
2045
2046 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2047 {
2048 int rc;
2049
2050 rc = cap_syslog(type);
2051 if (rc)
2052 return rc;
2053
2054 switch (type) {
2055 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
2056 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2057 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2058 break;
2059 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
2060 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
2061 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2062 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2063 break;
2064 case 0: /* Close log */
2065 case 1: /* Open log */
2066 case 2: /* Read from log */
2067 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2068 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2069 default:
2070 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2071 break;
2072 }
2073 return rc;
2074 }
2075
2076 /*
2077 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2078 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2079 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2080 *
2081 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2082 * processes that allocate mappings.
2083 */
2084 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2085 {
2086 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2087
2088 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2089 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2090 if (rc == 0)
2091 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2092
2093 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2094 }
2095
2096 /* binprm security operations */
2097
2098 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2099 {
2100 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2101 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2102 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2103 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2104 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2105 int rc;
2106
2107 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2108 if (rc)
2109 return rc;
2110
2111 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2112 * the script interpreter */
2113 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2114 return 0;
2115
2116 old_tsec = current_security();
2117 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2118 isec = inode->i_security;
2119
2120 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2121 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2122 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2123
2124 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2125 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2126 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2127 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2128
2129 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2130 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2131 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2132 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2133 } else {
2134 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2135 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2136 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2137 if (rc)
2138 return rc;
2139 }
2140
2141 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2142 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2143
2144 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2145 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2146
2147 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2148 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2149 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2150 if (rc)
2151 return rc;
2152 } else {
2153 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2154 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2155 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2156 if (rc)
2157 return rc;
2158
2159 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2160 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2161 if (rc)
2162 return rc;
2163
2164 /* Check for shared state */
2165 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2166 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2167 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2168 NULL);
2169 if (rc)
2170 return -EPERM;
2171 }
2172
2173 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2174 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2175 if (bprm->unsafe &
2176 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2177 struct task_struct *tracer;
2178 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2179 u32 ptsid = 0;
2180
2181 rcu_read_lock();
2182 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2183 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2184 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2185 ptsid = sec->sid;
2186 }
2187 rcu_read_unlock();
2188
2189 if (ptsid != 0) {
2190 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2191 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2192 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2193 if (rc)
2194 return -EPERM;
2195 }
2196 }
2197
2198 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2199 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2200 }
2201
2202 return 0;
2203 }
2204
2205 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2206 {
2207 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2208 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2209 u32 sid, osid;
2210 int atsecure = 0;
2211
2212 sid = tsec->sid;
2213 osid = tsec->osid;
2214
2215 if (osid != sid) {
2216 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2217 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2218 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2219 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2220 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2221 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2222 }
2223
2224 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2225 }
2226
2227 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2228 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2229
2230 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2231 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2232 struct files_struct *files)
2233 {
2234 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2235 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2236 struct tty_struct *tty;
2237 struct fdtable *fdt;
2238 long j = -1;
2239 int drop_tty = 0;
2240
2241 tty = get_current_tty();
2242 if (tty) {
2243 file_list_lock();
2244 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2245 struct inode *inode;
2246
2247 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2248 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2249 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2250 file may belong to another process and we are only
2251 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2252 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2253 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2254 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2255 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2256 drop_tty = 1;
2257 }
2258 }
2259 file_list_unlock();
2260 tty_kref_put(tty);
2261 }
2262 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2263 if (drop_tty)
2264 no_tty();
2265
2266 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2267
2268 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2269
2270 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2271 for (;;) {
2272 unsigned long set, i;
2273 int fd;
2274
2275 j++;
2276 i = j * __NFDBITS;
2277 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2278 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2279 break;
2280 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2281 if (!set)
2282 continue;
2283 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2284 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2285 if (set & 1) {
2286 file = fget(i);
2287 if (!file)
2288 continue;
2289 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2290 file,
2291 file_to_av(file))) {
2292 sys_close(i);
2293 fd = get_unused_fd();
2294 if (fd != i) {
2295 if (fd >= 0)
2296 put_unused_fd(fd);
2297 fput(file);
2298 continue;
2299 }
2300 if (devnull) {
2301 get_file(devnull);
2302 } else {
2303 devnull = dentry_open(
2304 dget(selinux_null),
2305 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2306 O_RDWR, cred);
2307 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2308 devnull = NULL;
2309 put_unused_fd(fd);
2310 fput(file);
2311 continue;
2312 }
2313 }
2314 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2315 }
2316 fput(file);
2317 }
2318 }
2319 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2320
2321 }
2322 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2323 }
2324
2325 /*
2326 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2327 */
2328 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2329 {
2330 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2331 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2332 int rc, i;
2333
2334 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2335 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2336 return;
2337
2338 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2339 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2340
2341 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2342 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2343
2344 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2345 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2346 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2347 *
2348 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2349 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2350 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2351 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2352 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2353 */
2354 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2355 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2356 if (rc) {
2357 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2358 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2359 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2360 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2361 }
2362 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2363 }
2364 }
2365
2366 /*
2367 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2368 * due to exec
2369 */
2370 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2371 {
2372 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2373 struct itimerval itimer;
2374 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2375 u32 osid, sid;
2376 int rc, i;
2377 unsigned long flags;
2378
2379 osid = tsec->osid;
2380 sid = tsec->sid;
2381
2382 if (sid == osid)
2383 return;
2384
2385 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2386 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2387 * flush and unblock signals.
2388 *
2389 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2390 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2391 */
2392 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2393 if (rc) {
2394 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2395 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2396 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2397 flush_signals(current);
2398 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2399 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2400 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2401 recalc_sigpending();
2402 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2403 }
2404
2405 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2406 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2407 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2408 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2409 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2410 wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2411 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2412 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2413 }
2414
2415 /* superblock security operations */
2416
2417 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2418 {
2419 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2420 }
2421
2422 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2423 {
2424 superblock_free_security(sb);
2425 }
2426
2427 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2428 {
2429 if (plen > olen)
2430 return 0;
2431
2432 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2433 }
2434
2435 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2436 {
2437 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2438 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2439 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2440 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2441 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2442 }
2443
2444 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2445 {
2446 if (!*first) {
2447 **to = ',';
2448 *to += 1;
2449 } else
2450 *first = 0;
2451 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2452 *to += len;
2453 }
2454
2455 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2456 int len)
2457 {
2458 int current_size = 0;
2459
2460 if (!*first) {
2461 **to = '|';
2462 *to += 1;
2463 } else
2464 *first = 0;
2465
2466 while (current_size < len) {
2467 if (*from != '"') {
2468 **to = *from;
2469 *to += 1;
2470 }
2471 from += 1;
2472 current_size += 1;
2473 }
2474 }
2475
2476 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2477 {
2478 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2479 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2480 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2481 int open_quote = 0;
2482
2483 in_curr = orig;
2484 sec_curr = copy;
2485
2486 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2487 if (!nosec) {
2488 rc = -ENOMEM;
2489 goto out;
2490 }
2491
2492 nosec_save = nosec;
2493 fnosec = fsec = 1;
2494 in_save = in_end = orig;
2495
2496 do {
2497 if (*in_end == '"')
2498 open_quote = !open_quote;
2499 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2500 *in_end == '\0') {
2501 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2502
2503 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2504 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2505 else
2506 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2507
2508 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2509 }
2510 } while (*in_end++);
2511
2512 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2513 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2514 out:
2515 return rc;
2516 }
2517
2518 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2519 {
2520 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2521 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2522 int rc;
2523
2524 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2525 if (rc)
2526 return rc;
2527
2528 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2529 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2530 return 0;
2531
2532 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2533 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2534 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2535 }
2536
2537 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2538 {
2539 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2540 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2541
2542 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2543 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2544 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2545 }
2546
2547 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2548 struct path *path,
2549 char *type,
2550 unsigned long flags,
2551 void *data)
2552 {
2553 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2554
2555 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2556 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2557 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2558 else
2559 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2560 FILE__MOUNTON);
2561 }
2562
2563 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2564 {
2565 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2566
2567 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2568 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2569 }
2570
2571 /* inode security operations */
2572
2573 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2574 {
2575 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2576 }
2577
2578 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2579 {
2580 inode_free_security(inode);
2581 }
2582
2583 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2584 char **name, void **value,
2585 size_t *len)
2586 {
2587 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2588 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2589 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2590 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2591 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2592 int rc;
2593 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2594
2595 dsec = dir->i_security;
2596 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2597
2598 sid = tsec->sid;
2599 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2600
2601 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2602 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2603 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2604 &newsid);
2605 if (rc) {
2606 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2607 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2608 "ino=%ld)\n",
2609 __func__,
2610 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2611 return rc;
2612 }
2613 }
2614
2615 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2616 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2617 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2618 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2619 isec->sid = newsid;
2620 isec->initialized = 1;
2621 }
2622
2623 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2624 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2625
2626 if (name) {
2627 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2628 if (!namep)
2629 return -ENOMEM;
2630 *name = namep;
2631 }
2632
2633 if (value && len) {
2634 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2635 if (rc) {
2636 kfree(namep);
2637 return rc;
2638 }
2639 *value = context;
2640 *len = clen;
2641 }
2642
2643 return 0;
2644 }
2645
2646 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2647 {
2648 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2649 }
2650
2651 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2652 {
2653 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2654 }
2655
2656 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2657 {
2658 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2659 }
2660
2661 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2662 {
2663 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2664 }
2665
2666 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2667 {
2668 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2669 }
2670
2671 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2672 {
2673 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2674 }
2675
2676 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2677 {
2678 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2679 }
2680
2681 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2682 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2683 {
2684 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2685 }
2686
2687 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2688 {
2689 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2690
2691 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2692 }
2693
2694 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2695 {
2696 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2697
2698 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2699 }
2700
2701 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2702 {
2703 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2704
2705 if (!mask) {
2706 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2707 return 0;
2708 }
2709
2710 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2711 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2712 }
2713
2714 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2715 {
2716 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2717
2718 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2719 return 0;
2720
2721 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2722 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2723 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2724
2725 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2726 }
2727
2728 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2729 {
2730 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2731
2732 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2733 }
2734
2735 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2736 {
2737 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2738
2739 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2740 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2741 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2742 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2743 return -EPERM;
2744 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2745 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2746 Restrict to administrator. */
2747 return -EPERM;
2748 }
2749 }
2750
2751 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2752 ordinary setattr permission. */
2753 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2754 }
2755
2756 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2757 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2758 {
2759 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2760 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2761 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2762 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2763 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2764 int rc = 0;
2765
2766 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2767 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2768
2769 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2770 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2771 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2772
2773 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2774 return -EPERM;
2775
2776 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2777 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2778
2779 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2780 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2781 if (rc)
2782 return rc;
2783
2784 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2785 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2786 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2787 return rc;
2788 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2789 }
2790 if (rc)
2791 return rc;
2792
2793 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2794 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2795 if (rc)
2796 return rc;
2797
2798 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2799 isec->sclass);
2800 if (rc)
2801 return rc;
2802
2803 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2804 sbsec->sid,
2805 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2806 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2807 &ad);
2808 }
2809
2810 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2811 const void *value, size_t size,
2812 int flags)
2813 {
2814 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2815 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2816 u32 newsid;
2817 int rc;
2818
2819 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2820 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2821 return;
2822 }
2823
2824 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2825 if (rc) {
2826 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2827 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2828 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2829 return;
2830 }
2831
2832 isec->sid = newsid;
2833 return;
2834 }
2835
2836 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2837 {
2838 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2839
2840 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2841 }
2842
2843 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2844 {
2845 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2846
2847 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2848 }
2849
2850 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2851 {
2852 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2853 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2854
2855 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2856 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2857 return -EACCES;
2858 }
2859
2860 /*
2861 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2862 *
2863 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2864 */
2865 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2866 {
2867 u32 size;
2868 int error;
2869 char *context = NULL;
2870 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2871
2872 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2873 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2874
2875 /*
2876 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2877 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2878 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2879 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2880 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2881 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2882 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2883 */
2884 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2885 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2886 if (!error)
2887 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2888 &size);
2889 else
2890 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2891 if (error)
2892 return error;
2893 error = size;
2894 if (alloc) {
2895 *buffer = context;
2896 goto out_nofree;
2897 }
2898 kfree(context);
2899 out_nofree:
2900 return error;
2901 }
2902
2903 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2904 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2905 {
2906 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2907 u32 newsid;
2908 int rc;
2909
2910 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2911 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2912
2913 if (!value || !size)
2914 return -EACCES;
2915
2916 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2917 if (rc)
2918 return rc;
2919
2920 isec->sid = newsid;
2921 return 0;
2922 }
2923
2924 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2925 {
2926 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2927 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2928 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2929 return len;
2930 }
2931
2932 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2933 {
2934 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2935 *secid = isec->sid;
2936 }
2937
2938 /* file security operations */
2939
2940 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2941 {
2942 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2943 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2944
2945 if (!mask) {
2946 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2947 return 0;
2948 }
2949
2950 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2951 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2952 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2953
2954 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2955 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2956 }
2957
2958 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2959 {
2960 if (!mask)
2961 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2962 return 0;
2963
2964 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2965 }
2966
2967 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2968 {
2969 return file_alloc_security(file);
2970 }
2971
2972 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2973 {
2974 file_free_security(file);
2975 }
2976
2977 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2978 unsigned long arg)
2979 {
2980 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2981 u32 av = 0;
2982
2983 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2984 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2985 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2986 av |= FILE__READ;
2987 if (!av)
2988 av = FILE__IOCTL;
2989
2990 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
2991 }
2992
2993 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2994 {
2995 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2996 int rc = 0;
2997
2998 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2999 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3000 /*
3001 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3002 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3003 * This has an additional check.
3004 */
3005 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3006 if (rc)
3007 goto error;
3008 }
3009 #endif
3010
3011 if (file) {
3012 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3013 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3014
3015 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3016 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3017 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3018
3019 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3020 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3021
3022 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3023 }
3024
3025 error:
3026 return rc;
3027 }
3028
3029 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3030 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3031 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3032 {
3033 int rc = 0;
3034 u32 sid = current_sid();
3035
3036 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3037 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3038 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3039 if (rc || addr_only)
3040 return rc;
3041
3042 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3043 prot = reqprot;
3044
3045 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3046 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3047 }
3048
3049 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3050 unsigned long reqprot,
3051 unsigned long prot)
3052 {
3053 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3054
3055 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3056 prot = reqprot;
3057
3058 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3059 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3060 int rc = 0;
3061 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3062 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3063 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3064 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3065 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3066 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3067 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3068 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3069 /*
3070 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3071 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3072 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3073 * modified content. This typically should only
3074 * occur for text relocations.
3075 */
3076 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3077 }
3078 if (rc)
3079 return rc;
3080 }
3081 #endif
3082
3083 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3084 }
3085
3086 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3087 {
3088 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3089
3090 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3091 }
3092
3093 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3094 unsigned long arg)
3095 {
3096 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3097 int err = 0;
3098
3099 switch (cmd) {
3100 case F_SETFL:
3101 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3102 err = -EINVAL;
3103 break;
3104 }
3105
3106 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3107 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3108 break;
3109 }
3110 /* fall through */
3111 case F_SETOWN:
3112 case F_SETSIG:
3113 case F_GETFL:
3114 case F_GETOWN:
3115 case F_GETSIG:
3116 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3117 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3118 break;
3119 case F_GETLK:
3120 case F_SETLK:
3121 case F_SETLKW:
3122 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3123 case F_GETLK64:
3124 case F_SETLK64:
3125 case F_SETLKW64:
3126 #endif
3127 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3128 err = -EINVAL;
3129 break;
3130 }
3131 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3132 break;
3133 }
3134
3135 return err;
3136 }
3137
3138 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3139 {
3140 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3141
3142 fsec = file->f_security;
3143 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3144
3145 return 0;
3146 }
3147
3148 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3149 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3150 {
3151 struct file *file;
3152 u32 sid = current_sid();
3153 u32 perm;
3154 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3155
3156 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3157 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3158
3159 fsec = file->f_security;
3160
3161 if (!signum)
3162 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3163 else
3164 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3165
3166 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3167 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3168 }
3169
3170 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3171 {
3172 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3173
3174 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3175 }
3176
3177 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3178 {
3179 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3180 struct inode *inode;
3181 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3182
3183 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3184 fsec = file->f_security;
3185 isec = inode->i_security;
3186 /*
3187 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3188 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3189 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3190 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3191 * struct as its SID.
3192 */
3193 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3194 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3195 /*
3196 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3197 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3198 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3199 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3200 * new inode label or new policy.
3201 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3202 */
3203 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3204 }
3205
3206 /* task security operations */
3207
3208 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3209 {
3210 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3211 }
3212
3213 /*
3214 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3215 */
3216 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3217 {
3218 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3219 cred->security = NULL;
3220 kfree(tsec);
3221 }
3222
3223 /*
3224 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3225 */
3226 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3227 gfp_t gfp)
3228 {
3229 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3230 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3231
3232 old_tsec = old->security;
3233
3234 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3235 if (!tsec)
3236 return -ENOMEM;
3237
3238 new->security = tsec;
3239 return 0;
3240 }
3241
3242 /*
3243 * set the security data for a kernel service
3244 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3245 */
3246 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3247 {
3248 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3249 u32 sid = current_sid();
3250 int ret;
3251
3252 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3253 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3254 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3255 NULL);
3256 if (ret == 0) {
3257 tsec->sid = secid;
3258 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3259 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3260 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3261 }
3262 return ret;
3263 }
3264
3265 /*
3266 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3267 * objective context of the specified inode
3268 */
3269 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3270 {
3271 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3272 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3273 u32 sid = current_sid();
3274 int ret;
3275
3276 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3277 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3278 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3279 NULL);
3280
3281 if (ret == 0)
3282 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3283 return 0;
3284 }
3285
3286 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3287 {
3288 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3289 }
3290
3291 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3292 {
3293 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3294 }
3295
3296 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3297 {
3298 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3299 }
3300
3301 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3302 {
3303 *secid = task_sid(p);
3304 }
3305
3306 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3307 {
3308 int rc;
3309
3310 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3311 if (rc)
3312 return rc;
3313
3314 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3315 }
3316
3317 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3318 {
3319 int rc;
3320
3321 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3322 if (rc)
3323 return rc;
3324
3325 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3326 }
3327
3328 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3329 {
3330 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3331 }
3332
3333 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3334 {
3335 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3336
3337 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3338 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3339 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3340 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3341 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3342 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3343
3344 return 0;
3345 }
3346
3347 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3348 {
3349 int rc;
3350
3351 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3352 if (rc)
3353 return rc;
3354
3355 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3356 }
3357
3358 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3359 {
3360 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3361 }
3362
3363 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3364 {
3365 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3366 }
3367
3368 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3369 int sig, u32 secid)
3370 {
3371 u32 perm;
3372 int rc;
3373
3374 if (!sig)
3375 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3376 else
3377 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3378 if (secid)
3379 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3380 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3381 else
3382 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3383 return rc;
3384 }
3385
3386 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3387 {
3388 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3389 }
3390
3391 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3392 struct inode *inode)
3393 {
3394 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3395 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3396
3397 isec->sid = sid;
3398 isec->initialized = 1;
3399 }
3400
3401 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3402 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3403 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3404 {
3405 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3406 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3407
3408 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3409 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3410 if (ih == NULL)
3411 goto out;
3412
3413 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3414 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3415 goto out;
3416
3417 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3418 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3419 ret = 0;
3420
3421 if (proto)
3422 *proto = ih->protocol;
3423
3424 switch (ih->protocol) {
3425 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3426 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3427
3428 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3429 break;
3430
3431 offset += ihlen;
3432 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3433 if (th == NULL)
3434 break;
3435
3436 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3437 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3438 break;
3439 }
3440
3441 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3442 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3443
3444 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3445 break;
3446
3447 offset += ihlen;
3448 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3449 if (uh == NULL)
3450 break;
3451
3452 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3453 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3454 break;
3455 }
3456
3457 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3458 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3459
3460 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3461 break;
3462
3463 offset += ihlen;
3464 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3465 if (dh == NULL)
3466 break;
3467
3468 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3469 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3470 break;
3471 }
3472
3473 default:
3474 break;
3475 }
3476 out:
3477 return ret;
3478 }
3479
3480 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3481
3482 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3483 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3484 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3485 {
3486 u8 nexthdr;
3487 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3488 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3489
3490 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3491 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3492 if (ip6 == NULL)
3493 goto out;
3494
3495 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3496 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3497 ret = 0;
3498
3499 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3500 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3501 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3502 if (offset < 0)
3503 goto out;
3504
3505 if (proto)
3506 *proto = nexthdr;
3507
3508 switch (nexthdr) {
3509 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3510 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3511
3512 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3513 if (th == NULL)
3514 break;
3515
3516 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3517 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3518 break;
3519 }
3520
3521 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3522 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3523
3524 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3525 if (uh == NULL)
3526 break;
3527
3528 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3529 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3530 break;
3531 }
3532
3533 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3534 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3535
3536 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3537 if (dh == NULL)
3538 break;
3539
3540 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3541 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3542 break;
3543 }
3544
3545 /* includes fragments */
3546 default:
3547 break;
3548 }
3549 out:
3550 return ret;
3551 }
3552
3553 #endif /* IPV6 */
3554
3555 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3556 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3557 {
3558 char *addrp;
3559 int ret;
3560
3561 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3562 case PF_INET:
3563 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3564 if (ret)
3565 goto parse_error;
3566 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3567 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3568 goto okay;
3569
3570 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3571 case PF_INET6:
3572 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3573 if (ret)
3574 goto parse_error;
3575 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3576 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3577 goto okay;
3578 #endif /* IPV6 */
3579 default:
3580 addrp = NULL;
3581 goto okay;
3582 }
3583
3584 parse_error:
3585 printk(KERN_WARNING
3586 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3587 " unable to parse packet\n");
3588 return ret;
3589
3590 okay:
3591 if (_addrp)
3592 *_addrp = addrp;
3593 return 0;
3594 }
3595
3596 /**
3597 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3598 * @skb: the packet
3599 * @family: protocol family
3600 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3601 *
3602 * Description:
3603 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3604 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3605 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3606 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3607 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3608 * peer labels.
3609 *
3610 */
3611 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3612 {
3613 int err;
3614 u32 xfrm_sid;
3615 u32 nlbl_sid;
3616 u32 nlbl_type;
3617
3618 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3619 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3620
3621 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3622 if (unlikely(err)) {
3623 printk(KERN_WARNING
3624 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3625 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3626 return -EACCES;
3627 }
3628
3629 return 0;
3630 }
3631
3632 /* socket security operations */
3633 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3634 u32 perms)
3635 {
3636 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3637 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3638 u32 sid;
3639 int err = 0;
3640
3641 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3642
3643 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3644 goto out;
3645 sid = task_sid(task);
3646
3647 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3648 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3649 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3650
3651 out:
3652 return err;
3653 }
3654
3655 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3656 int protocol, int kern)
3657 {
3658 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3659 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3660 u32 sid, newsid;
3661 u16 secclass;
3662 int err = 0;
3663
3664 if (kern)
3665 goto out;
3666
3667 sid = tsec->sid;
3668 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3669
3670 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3671 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3672
3673 out:
3674 return err;
3675 }
3676
3677 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3678 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3679 {
3680 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3681 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3682 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3683 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3684 u32 sid, newsid;
3685 int err = 0;
3686
3687 sid = tsec->sid;
3688 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3689
3690 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3691
3692 if (kern)
3693 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3694 else if (newsid)
3695 isec->sid = newsid;
3696 else
3697 isec->sid = sid;
3698
3699 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3700 isec->initialized = 1;
3701
3702 if (sock->sk) {
3703 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3704 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3705 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3706 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3707 }
3708
3709 return err;
3710 }
3711
3712 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3713 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3714 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3715
3716 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3717 {
3718 u16 family;
3719 int err;
3720
3721 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3722 if (err)
3723 goto out;
3724
3725 /*
3726 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3727 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3728 * check the first address now.
3729 */
3730 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3731 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3732 char *addrp;
3733 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3734 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3735 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3736 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3737 unsigned short snum;
3738 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3739 u32 sid, node_perm;
3740
3741 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3742
3743 if (family == PF_INET) {
3744 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3745 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3746 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3747 } else {
3748 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3749 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3750 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3751 }
3752
3753 if (snum) {
3754 int low, high;
3755
3756 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3757
3758 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3759 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3760 snum, &sid);
3761 if (err)
3762 goto out;
3763 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3764 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3765 ad.u.net.family = family;
3766 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3767 isec->sclass,
3768 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3769 if (err)
3770 goto out;
3771 }
3772 }
3773
3774 switch (isec->sclass) {
3775 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3776 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3777 break;
3778
3779 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3780 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3781 break;
3782
3783 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3784 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3785 break;
3786
3787 default:
3788 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3789 break;
3790 }
3791
3792 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3793 if (err)
3794 goto out;
3795
3796 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3797 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3798 ad.u.net.family = family;
3799
3800 if (family == PF_INET)
3801 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3802 else
3803 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3804
3805 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3806 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3807 if (err)
3808 goto out;
3809 }
3810 out:
3811 return err;
3812 }
3813
3814 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3815 {
3816 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3817 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3818 int err;
3819
3820 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3821 if (err)
3822 return err;
3823
3824 /*
3825 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3826 */
3827 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3828 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3829 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3830 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3831 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3832 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3833 unsigned short snum;
3834 u32 sid, perm;
3835
3836 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3837 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3838 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3839 return -EINVAL;
3840 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3841 } else {
3842 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3843 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3844 return -EINVAL;
3845 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3846 }
3847
3848 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3849 if (err)
3850 goto out;
3851
3852 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3853 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3854
3855 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3856 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3857 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3858 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3859 if (err)
3860 goto out;
3861 }
3862
3863 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3864
3865 out:
3866 return err;
3867 }
3868
3869 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3870 {
3871 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3872 }
3873
3874 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3875 {
3876 int err;
3877 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3878 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3879
3880 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3881 if (err)
3882 return err;
3883
3884 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3885
3886 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3887 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3888 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3889 newisec->initialized = 1;
3890
3891 return 0;
3892 }
3893
3894 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3895 int size)
3896 {
3897 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3898 }
3899
3900 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3901 int size, int flags)
3902 {
3903 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3904 }
3905
3906 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3907 {
3908 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3909 }
3910
3911 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3912 {
3913 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3914 }
3915
3916 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3917 {
3918 int err;
3919
3920 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3921 if (err)
3922 return err;
3923
3924 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3925 }
3926
3927 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3928 int optname)
3929 {
3930 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3931 }
3932
3933 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3934 {
3935 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3936 }
3937
3938 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3939 struct socket *other,
3940 struct sock *newsk)
3941 {
3942 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3943 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3944 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3945 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3946 int err;
3947
3948 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3949 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3950
3951 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3952 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3953
3954 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3955 isec->sclass,
3956 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3957 if (err)
3958 return err;
3959
3960 /* connecting socket */
3961 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3962 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3963
3964 /* server child socket */
3965 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3966 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3967 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3968
3969 return err;
3970 }
3971
3972 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3973 struct socket *other)
3974 {
3975 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3976 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3977 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3978 int err;
3979
3980 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3981 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3982
3983 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3984 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3985
3986 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3987 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3988 if (err)
3989 return err;
3990
3991 return 0;
3992 }
3993
3994 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3995 u32 peer_sid,
3996 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
3997 {
3998 int err;
3999 u32 if_sid;
4000 u32 node_sid;
4001
4002 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4003 if (err)
4004 return err;
4005 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4006 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4007 if (err)
4008 return err;
4009
4010 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4011 if (err)
4012 return err;
4013 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4014 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4015 }
4016
4017 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4018 u16 family)
4019 {
4020 int err = 0;
4021 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4022 u32 peer_sid;
4023 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4024 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4025 char *addrp;
4026
4027 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4028 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4029 ad.u.net.family = family;
4030 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4031 if (err)
4032 return err;
4033
4034 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4035 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4036 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4037 if (err)
4038 return err;
4039 }
4040
4041 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4042 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4043 if (err)
4044 return err;
4045 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4046 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4047 if (err)
4048 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4049 } else {
4050 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4051 if (err)
4052 return err;
4053 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4054 }
4055
4056 return err;
4057 }
4058
4059 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4060 {
4061 int err;
4062 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4063 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4064 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4065 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4066 char *addrp;
4067 u8 secmark_active;
4068 u8 peerlbl_active;
4069
4070 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4071 return 0;
4072
4073 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4074 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4075 family = PF_INET;
4076
4077 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4078 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4079 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4080 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4081 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4082 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4083
4084 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4085 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4086 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4087 return 0;
4088
4089 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4090 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4091 ad.u.net.family = family;
4092 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4093 if (err)
4094 return err;
4095
4096 if (peerlbl_active) {
4097 u32 peer_sid;
4098
4099 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4100 if (err)
4101 return err;
4102 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4103 peer_sid, &ad);
4104 if (err) {
4105 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4106 return err;
4107 }
4108 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4109 PEER__RECV, &ad);
4110 if (err)
4111 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4112 }
4113
4114 if (secmark_active) {
4115 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4116 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4117 if (err)
4118 return err;
4119 }
4120
4121 return err;
4122 }
4123
4124 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4125 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4126 {
4127 int err = 0;
4128 char *scontext;
4129 u32 scontext_len;
4130 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4131 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4132 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4133
4134 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4135
4136 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4137 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4138 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4139 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4140 }
4141 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4142 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
4143 goto out;
4144 }
4145
4146 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4147
4148 if (err)
4149 goto out;
4150
4151 if (scontext_len > len) {
4152 err = -ERANGE;
4153 goto out_len;
4154 }
4155
4156 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4157 err = -EFAULT;
4158
4159 out_len:
4160 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4161 err = -EFAULT;
4162
4163 kfree(scontext);
4164 out:
4165 return err;
4166 }
4167
4168 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4169 {
4170 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4171 u16 family;
4172
4173 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4174 family = PF_INET;
4175 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4176 family = PF_INET6;
4177 else if (sock)
4178 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4179 else
4180 goto out;
4181
4182 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4183 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4184 else if (skb)
4185 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4186
4187 out:
4188 *secid = peer_secid;
4189 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4190 return -EINVAL;
4191 return 0;
4192 }
4193
4194 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4195 {
4196 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4197 }
4198
4199 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4200 {
4201 sk_free_security(sk);
4202 }
4203
4204 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4205 {
4206 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4207 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4208
4209 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4210 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4211 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4212
4213 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec);
4214 }
4215
4216 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4217 {
4218 if (!sk)
4219 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4220 else {
4221 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4222
4223 *secid = sksec->sid;
4224 }
4225 }
4226
4227 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4228 {
4229 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4230 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4231
4232 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4233 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4234 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4235 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4236 }
4237
4238 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4239 struct request_sock *req)
4240 {
4241 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4242 int err;
4243 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4244 u32 newsid;
4245 u32 peersid;
4246
4247 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4248 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4249 family = PF_INET;
4250
4251 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4252 if (err)
4253 return err;
4254 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4255 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4256 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4257 } else {
4258 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4259 if (err)
4260 return err;
4261 req->secid = newsid;
4262 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4263 }
4264
4265 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4266 }
4267
4268 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4269 const struct request_sock *req)
4270 {
4271 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4272
4273 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4274 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4275 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4276 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4277 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4278 time it will have been created and available. */
4279
4280 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4281 * thread with access to newsksec */
4282 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4283 }
4284
4285 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4286 {
4287 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4288 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4289
4290 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4291 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4292 family = PF_INET;
4293
4294 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4295 }
4296
4297 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4298 struct flowi *fl)
4299 {
4300 fl->secid = req->secid;
4301 }
4302
4303 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4304 {
4305 int err = 0;
4306 u32 perm;
4307 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4308 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4309 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4310
4311 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4312 err = -EINVAL;
4313 goto out;
4314 }
4315 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4316
4317 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4318 if (err) {
4319 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4320 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4321 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4322 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4323 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4324 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4325 err = 0;
4326 }
4327
4328 /* Ignore */
4329 if (err == -ENOENT)
4330 err = 0;
4331 goto out;
4332 }
4333
4334 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4335 out:
4336 return err;
4337 }
4338
4339 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4340
4341 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4342 u16 family)
4343 {
4344 int err;
4345 char *addrp;
4346 u32 peer_sid;
4347 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4348 u8 secmark_active;
4349 u8 netlbl_active;
4350 u8 peerlbl_active;
4351
4352 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4353 return NF_ACCEPT;
4354
4355 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4356 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4357 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4358 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4359 return NF_ACCEPT;
4360
4361 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4362 return NF_DROP;
4363
4364 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4365 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4366 ad.u.net.family = family;
4367 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4368 return NF_DROP;
4369
4370 if (peerlbl_active) {
4371 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4372 peer_sid, &ad);
4373 if (err) {
4374 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4375 return NF_DROP;
4376 }
4377 }
4378
4379 if (secmark_active)
4380 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4381 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4382 return NF_DROP;
4383
4384 if (netlbl_active)
4385 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4386 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4387 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4388 * protection */
4389 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4390 return NF_DROP;
4391
4392 return NF_ACCEPT;
4393 }
4394
4395 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4396 struct sk_buff *skb,
4397 const struct net_device *in,
4398 const struct net_device *out,
4399 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4400 {
4401 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4402 }
4403
4404 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4405 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4406 struct sk_buff *skb,
4407 const struct net_device *in,
4408 const struct net_device *out,
4409 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4410 {
4411 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4412 }
4413 #endif /* IPV6 */
4414
4415 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4416 u16 family)
4417 {
4418 u32 sid;
4419
4420 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4421 return NF_ACCEPT;
4422
4423 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4424 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4425 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4426 if (skb->sk) {
4427 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4428 sid = sksec->sid;
4429 } else
4430 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4431 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4432 return NF_DROP;
4433
4434 return NF_ACCEPT;
4435 }
4436
4437 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4438 struct sk_buff *skb,
4439 const struct net_device *in,
4440 const struct net_device *out,
4441 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4442 {
4443 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4444 }
4445
4446 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4447 int ifindex,
4448 u16 family)
4449 {
4450 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4451 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4452 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4453 char *addrp;
4454 u8 proto;
4455
4456 if (sk == NULL)
4457 return NF_ACCEPT;
4458 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4459
4460 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4461 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4462 ad.u.net.family = family;
4463 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4464 return NF_DROP;
4465
4466 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4467 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4468 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4469 return NF_DROP;
4470
4471 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4472 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4473 return NF_DROP;
4474
4475 return NF_ACCEPT;
4476 }
4477
4478 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4479 u16 family)
4480 {
4481 u32 secmark_perm;
4482 u32 peer_sid;
4483 struct sock *sk;
4484 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4485 char *addrp;
4486 u8 secmark_active;
4487 u8 peerlbl_active;
4488
4489 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4490 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4491 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4492 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4493 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4494 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4495 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
4496 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4497 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4498 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4499 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4500 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4501 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4502 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4503 return NF_ACCEPT;
4504 #endif
4505 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4506 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4507 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4508 return NF_ACCEPT;
4509
4510 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4511 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4512 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4513 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4514 sk = skb->sk;
4515 if (sk == NULL) {
4516 switch (family) {
4517 case PF_INET:
4518 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4519 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4520 else
4521 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4522 break;
4523 case PF_INET6:
4524 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4525 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4526 else
4527 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4528 break;
4529 default:
4530 return NF_DROP;
4531 }
4532 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4533 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4534 return NF_DROP;
4535 } else
4536 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4537 } else {
4538 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4539 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4540 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4541 }
4542
4543 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4544 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4545 ad.u.net.family = family;
4546 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4547 return NF_DROP;
4548
4549 if (secmark_active)
4550 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4551 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4552 return NF_DROP;
4553
4554 if (peerlbl_active) {
4555 u32 if_sid;
4556 u32 node_sid;
4557
4558 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4559 return NF_DROP;
4560 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4561 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4562 return NF_DROP;
4563
4564 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4565 return NF_DROP;
4566 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4567 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4568 return NF_DROP;
4569 }
4570
4571 return NF_ACCEPT;
4572 }
4573
4574 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4575 struct sk_buff *skb,
4576 const struct net_device *in,
4577 const struct net_device *out,
4578 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4579 {
4580 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4581 }
4582
4583 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4584 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4585 struct sk_buff *skb,
4586 const struct net_device *in,
4587 const struct net_device *out,
4588 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4589 {
4590 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4591 }
4592 #endif /* IPV6 */
4593
4594 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4595
4596 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4597 {
4598 int err;
4599
4600 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4601 if (err)
4602 return err;
4603
4604 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4605 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4606
4607 return err;
4608 }
4609
4610 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4611 {
4612 int err;
4613 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4614
4615 err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4616 if (err)
4617 return err;
4618
4619 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4620 ad.u.cap = capability;
4621
4622 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4623 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4624 }
4625
4626 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4627 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4628 u16 sclass)
4629 {
4630 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4631 u32 sid;
4632
4633 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4634 if (!isec)
4635 return -ENOMEM;
4636
4637 sid = task_sid(task);
4638 isec->sclass = sclass;
4639 isec->sid = sid;
4640 perm->security = isec;
4641
4642 return 0;
4643 }
4644
4645 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4646 {
4647 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4648 perm->security = NULL;
4649 kfree(isec);
4650 }
4651
4652 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4653 {
4654 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4655
4656 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4657 if (!msec)
4658 return -ENOMEM;
4659
4660 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4661 msg->security = msec;
4662
4663 return 0;
4664 }
4665
4666 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4667 {
4668 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4669
4670 msg->security = NULL;
4671 kfree(msec);
4672 }
4673
4674 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4675 u32 perms)
4676 {
4677 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4678 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4679 u32 sid = current_sid();
4680
4681 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4682
4683 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4684 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4685
4686 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4687 }
4688
4689 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4690 {
4691 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4692 }
4693
4694 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4695 {
4696 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4697 }
4698
4699 /* message queue security operations */
4700 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4701 {
4702 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4703 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4704 u32 sid = current_sid();
4705 int rc;
4706
4707 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4708 if (rc)
4709 return rc;
4710
4711 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4712
4713 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4714 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4715
4716 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4717 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
4718 if (rc) {
4719 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4720 return rc;
4721 }
4722 return 0;
4723 }
4724
4725 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4726 {
4727 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4728 }
4729
4730 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4731 {
4732 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4733 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4734 u32 sid = current_sid();
4735
4736 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4737
4738 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4739 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4740
4741 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4742 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4743 }
4744
4745 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4746 {
4747 int err;
4748 int perms;
4749
4750 switch (cmd) {
4751 case IPC_INFO:
4752 case MSG_INFO:
4753 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4754 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4755 case IPC_STAT:
4756 case MSG_STAT:
4757 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4758 break;
4759 case IPC_SET:
4760 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4761 break;
4762 case IPC_RMID:
4763 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4764 break;
4765 default:
4766 return 0;
4767 }
4768
4769 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4770 return err;
4771 }
4772
4773 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4774 {
4775 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4776 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4777 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4778 u32 sid = current_sid();
4779 int rc;
4780
4781 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4782 msec = msg->security;
4783
4784 /*
4785 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4786 */
4787 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4788 /*
4789 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4790 * message queue this message will be stored in
4791 */
4792 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4793 &msec->sid);
4794 if (rc)
4795 return rc;
4796 }
4797
4798 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4799 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4800
4801 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4802 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4803 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
4804 if (!rc)
4805 /* Can this process send the message */
4806 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4807 MSG__SEND, &ad);
4808 if (!rc)
4809 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4810 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4811 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4812
4813 return rc;
4814 }
4815
4816 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4817 struct task_struct *target,
4818 long type, int mode)
4819 {
4820 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4821 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4822 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4823 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4824 int rc;
4825
4826 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4827 msec = msg->security;
4828
4829 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4830 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4831
4832 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4833 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4834 if (!rc)
4835 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4836 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4837 return rc;
4838 }
4839
4840 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4841 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4842 {
4843 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4844 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4845 u32 sid = current_sid();
4846 int rc;
4847
4848 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4849 if (rc)
4850 return rc;
4851
4852 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4853
4854 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4855 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4856
4857 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4858 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
4859 if (rc) {
4860 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4861 return rc;
4862 }
4863 return 0;
4864 }
4865
4866 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4867 {
4868 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4869 }
4870
4871 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4872 {
4873 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4874 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4875 u32 sid = current_sid();
4876
4877 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4878
4879 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4880 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4881
4882 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4883 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4884 }
4885
4886 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4887 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4888 {
4889 int perms;
4890 int err;
4891
4892 switch (cmd) {
4893 case IPC_INFO:
4894 case SHM_INFO:
4895 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4896 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4897 case IPC_STAT:
4898 case SHM_STAT:
4899 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4900 break;
4901 case IPC_SET:
4902 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4903 break;
4904 case SHM_LOCK:
4905 case SHM_UNLOCK:
4906 perms = SHM__LOCK;
4907 break;
4908 case IPC_RMID:
4909 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4910 break;
4911 default:
4912 return 0;
4913 }
4914
4915 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4916 return err;
4917 }
4918
4919 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4920 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4921 {
4922 u32 perms;
4923
4924 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4925 perms = SHM__READ;
4926 else
4927 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4928
4929 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4930 }
4931
4932 /* Semaphore security operations */
4933 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4934 {
4935 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4936 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4937 u32 sid = current_sid();
4938 int rc;
4939
4940 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4941 if (rc)
4942 return rc;
4943
4944 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4945
4946 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4947 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4948
4949 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4950 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
4951 if (rc) {
4952 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4953 return rc;
4954 }
4955 return 0;
4956 }
4957
4958 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4959 {
4960 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4961 }
4962
4963 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4964 {
4965 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4966 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4967 u32 sid = current_sid();
4968
4969 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4970
4971 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4972 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4973
4974 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4975 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4976 }
4977
4978 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4979 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4980 {
4981 int err;
4982 u32 perms;
4983
4984 switch (cmd) {
4985 case IPC_INFO:
4986 case SEM_INFO:
4987 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4988 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4989 case GETPID:
4990 case GETNCNT:
4991 case GETZCNT:
4992 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4993 break;
4994 case GETVAL:
4995 case GETALL:
4996 perms = SEM__READ;
4997 break;
4998 case SETVAL:
4999 case SETALL:
5000 perms = SEM__WRITE;
5001 break;
5002 case IPC_RMID:
5003 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5004 break;
5005 case IPC_SET:
5006 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5007 break;
5008 case IPC_STAT:
5009 case SEM_STAT:
5010 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5011 break;
5012 default:
5013 return 0;
5014 }
5015
5016 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5017 return err;
5018 }
5019
5020 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5021 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5022 {
5023 u32 perms;
5024
5025 if (alter)
5026 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5027 else
5028 perms = SEM__READ;
5029
5030 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5031 }
5032
5033 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5034 {
5035 u32 av = 0;
5036
5037 av = 0;
5038 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5039 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5040 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5041 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5042
5043 if (av == 0)
5044 return 0;
5045
5046 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5047 }
5048
5049 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5050 {
5051 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5052 *secid = isec->sid;
5053 }
5054
5055 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5056 {
5057 if (inode)
5058 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5059 }
5060
5061 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5062 char *name, char **value)
5063 {
5064 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5065 u32 sid;
5066 int error;
5067 unsigned len;
5068
5069 if (current != p) {
5070 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5071 if (error)
5072 return error;
5073 }
5074
5075 rcu_read_lock();
5076 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5077
5078 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5079 sid = __tsec->sid;
5080 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5081 sid = __tsec->osid;
5082 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5083 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5084 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5085 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5086 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5087 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5088 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5089 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5090 else
5091 goto invalid;
5092 rcu_read_unlock();
5093
5094 if (!sid)
5095 return 0;
5096
5097 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5098 if (error)
5099 return error;
5100 return len;
5101
5102 invalid:
5103 rcu_read_unlock();
5104 return -EINVAL;
5105 }
5106
5107 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5108 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5109 {
5110 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5111 struct task_struct *tracer;
5112 struct cred *new;
5113 u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
5114 int error;
5115 char *str = value;
5116
5117 if (current != p) {
5118 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5119 security attributes. */
5120 return -EACCES;
5121 }
5122
5123 /*
5124 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5125 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5126 * above restriction is ever removed.
5127 */
5128 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5129 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5130 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5131 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5132 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5133 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5134 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5135 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5136 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5137 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5138 else
5139 error = -EINVAL;
5140 if (error)
5141 return error;
5142
5143 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5144 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5145 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5146 str[size-1] = 0;
5147 size--;
5148 }
5149 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5150 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5151 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5152 return error;
5153 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5154 &sid);
5155 }
5156 if (error)
5157 return error;
5158 }
5159
5160 new = prepare_creds();
5161 if (!new)
5162 return -ENOMEM;
5163
5164 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5165 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5166 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5167 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5168 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5169 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5170 tsec = new->security;
5171 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5172 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5173 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5174 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5175 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5176 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5177 if (error)
5178 goto abort_change;
5179 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5180 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5181 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5182 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5183 error = -EINVAL;
5184 if (sid == 0)
5185 goto abort_change;
5186
5187 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5188 error = -EPERM;
5189 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5190 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5191 if (error)
5192 goto abort_change;
5193 }
5194
5195 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5196 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5197 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5198 if (error)
5199 goto abort_change;
5200
5201 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5202 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5203 ptsid = 0;
5204 task_lock(p);
5205 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5206 if (tracer)
5207 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5208 task_unlock(p);
5209
5210 if (tracer) {
5211 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5212 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5213 if (error)
5214 goto abort_change;
5215 }
5216
5217 tsec->sid = sid;
5218 } else {
5219 error = -EINVAL;
5220 goto abort_change;
5221 }
5222
5223 commit_creds(new);
5224 return size;
5225
5226 abort_change:
5227 abort_creds(new);
5228 return error;
5229 }
5230
5231 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5232 {
5233 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5234 }
5235
5236 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5237 {
5238 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5239 }
5240
5241 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5242 {
5243 kfree(secdata);
5244 }
5245
5246 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5247
5248 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5249 unsigned long flags)
5250 {
5251 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5252 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5253
5254 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5255 if (!ksec)
5256 return -ENOMEM;
5257
5258 tsec = cred->security;
5259 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5260 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5261 else
5262 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5263
5264 k->security = ksec;
5265 return 0;
5266 }
5267
5268 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5269 {
5270 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5271
5272 k->security = NULL;
5273 kfree(ksec);
5274 }
5275
5276 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5277 const struct cred *cred,
5278 key_perm_t perm)
5279 {
5280 struct key *key;
5281 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5282 u32 sid;
5283
5284 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5285 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5286 appear to be created. */
5287 if (perm == 0)
5288 return 0;
5289
5290 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5291
5292 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5293 ksec = key->security;
5294
5295 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5296 }
5297
5298 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5299 {
5300 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5301 char *context = NULL;
5302 unsigned len;
5303 int rc;
5304
5305 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5306 if (!rc)
5307 rc = len;
5308 *_buffer = context;
5309 return rc;
5310 }
5311
5312 #endif
5313
5314 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5315 .name = "selinux",
5316
5317 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5318 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5319 .capget = selinux_capget,
5320 .capset = selinux_capset,
5321 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5322 .capable = selinux_capable,
5323 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5324 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5325 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5326 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5327
5328 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5329 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5330
5331 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5332 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5333 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5334 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5335
5336 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5337 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5338 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5339 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5340 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5341 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5342 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5343 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5344 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5345 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5346 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5347
5348
5349 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5350 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5351 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5352 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5353 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5354 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5355 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5356 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5357 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5358 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5359 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5360 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5361 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5362 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5363 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5364 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5365 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5366 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5367 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5368 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5369 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5370 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5371 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5372 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5373 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5374
5375 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5376 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5377 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5378 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5379 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5380 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5381 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5382 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5383 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5384 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5385 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5386
5387 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5388
5389 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5390 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5391 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5392 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5393 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5394 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5395 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5396 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5397 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5398 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5399 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5400 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5401 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5402 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5403 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5404 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5405 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5406 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5407 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5408
5409 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5410 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5411
5412 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5413 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5414
5415 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5416 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5417 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5418 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5419 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5420 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5421
5422 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5423 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5424 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5425 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5426 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5427
5428 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5429 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5430 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5431 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5432 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5433
5434 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5435
5436 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5437 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5438
5439 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5440 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5441 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5442
5443 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5444 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5445
5446 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5447 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5448 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5449 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5450 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5451 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5452 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5453 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5454 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5455 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5456 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5457 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5458 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5459 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5460 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5461 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5462 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5463 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5464 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5465 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5466 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5467 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5468 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5469 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5470 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5471
5472 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5473 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5474 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5475 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5476 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5477 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5478 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5479 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5480 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5481 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5482 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5483 #endif
5484
5485 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5486 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5487 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5488 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5489 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5490 #endif
5491
5492 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
5493 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5494 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5495 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5496 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5497 #endif
5498 };
5499
5500 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5501 {
5502 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5503 selinux_enabled = 0;
5504 return 0;
5505 }
5506
5507 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5508 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5509 return 0;
5510 }
5511
5512 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5513
5514 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5515 cred_init_security();
5516
5517 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5518 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5519 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5520 avc_init();
5521
5522 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5523 if (!secondary_ops)
5524 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5525 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5526 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5527
5528 if (selinux_enforcing)
5529 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5530 else
5531 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5532
5533 return 0;
5534 }
5535
5536 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5537 {
5538 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5539
5540 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5541 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5542 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5543 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5544 next_sb:
5545 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5546 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5547 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5548 struct superblock_security_struct,
5549 list);
5550 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5551 sb->s_count++;
5552 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5553 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5554 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5555 if (sb->s_root)
5556 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5557 drop_super(sb);
5558 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5559 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5560 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5561 goto next_sb;
5562 }
5563 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5564 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5565 }
5566
5567 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5568 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5569 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5570
5571 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5572
5573 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5574 {
5575 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5576 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5577 .pf = PF_INET,
5578 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5579 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5580 },
5581 {
5582 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5583 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5584 .pf = PF_INET,
5585 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5586 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5587 },
5588 {
5589 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5590 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5591 .pf = PF_INET,
5592 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5593 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5594 }
5595 };
5596
5597 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5598
5599 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5600 {
5601 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5602 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5603 .pf = PF_INET6,
5604 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5605 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5606 },
5607 {
5608 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5609 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5610 .pf = PF_INET6,
5611 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5612 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5613 }
5614 };
5615
5616 #endif /* IPV6 */
5617
5618 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5619 {
5620 int err = 0;
5621
5622 if (!selinux_enabled)
5623 goto out;
5624
5625 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5626
5627 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5628 if (err)
5629 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5630
5631 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5632 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5633 if (err)
5634 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5635 #endif /* IPV6 */
5636
5637 out:
5638 return err;
5639 }
5640
5641 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5642
5643 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5644 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5645 {
5646 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5647
5648 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5649 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5650 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5651 #endif /* IPV6 */
5652 }
5653 #endif
5654
5655 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5656
5657 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5658 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5659 #endif
5660
5661 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5662
5663 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5664 static int selinux_disabled;
5665
5666 int selinux_disable(void)
5667 {
5668 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5669
5670 if (ss_initialized) {
5671 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5672 return -EINVAL;
5673 }
5674
5675 if (selinux_disabled) {
5676 /* Only do this once. */
5677 return -EINVAL;
5678 }
5679
5680 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5681
5682 selinux_disabled = 1;
5683 selinux_enabled = 0;
5684
5685 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5686 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5687
5688 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5689 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5690
5691 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
5692 exit_sel_fs();
5693
5694 return 0;
5695 }
5696 #endif
Linux 2.6 ibm-acpi/thinkpad-acpi driver git tree