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DVB: fix nxt200x rf input switching
[linux-2.6/linux-acpi-2.6/ibm-acpi-2.6.git] / kernel / auditsc.c
blob470f845e62f369ddd22c655dfce29cbdaac9d65d
1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
7 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
40 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
43 */
44
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <asm/atomic.h>
48 #include <asm/types.h>
49 #include <linux/fs.h>
50 #include <linux/namei.h>
51 #include <linux/mm.h>
52 #include <linux/module.h>
53 #include <linux/mount.h>
54 #include <linux/socket.h>
55 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
56 #include <linux/audit.h>
57 #include <linux/personality.h>
58 #include <linux/time.h>
59 #include <linux/netlink.h>
60 #include <linux/compiler.h>
61 #include <asm/unistd.h>
62 #include <linux/security.h>
63 #include <linux/list.h>
64 #include <linux/tty.h>
65 #include <linux/selinux.h>
66 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
67 #include <linux/highmem.h>
68 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
69
70 #include "audit.h"
71
72 extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
73
74 /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
75 extern int audit_enabled;
76
77 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
78 * for saving names from getname(). */
79 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
80
81 /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
82 * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
83 * path_lookup. */
84 #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
85
86 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
87 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
88
89 /* number of audit rules */
90 int audit_n_rules;
91
92 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
93 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
94 * pointers at syscall exit time).
95 *
96 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
97 struct audit_names {
98 const char *name;
99 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
100 unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
101 unsigned long ino;
102 dev_t dev;
103 umode_t mode;
104 uid_t uid;
105 gid_t gid;
106 dev_t rdev;
107 u32 osid;
108 };
109
110 struct audit_aux_data {
111 struct audit_aux_data *next;
112 int type;
113 };
114
115 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
116
117 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open {
118 struct audit_aux_data d;
119 int oflag;
120 mode_t mode;
121 struct mq_attr attr;
122 };
123
124 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv {
125 struct audit_aux_data d;
126 mqd_t mqdes;
127 size_t msg_len;
128 unsigned int msg_prio;
129 struct timespec abs_timeout;
130 };
131
132 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify {
133 struct audit_aux_data d;
134 mqd_t mqdes;
135 struct sigevent notification;
136 };
137
138 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr {
139 struct audit_aux_data d;
140 mqd_t mqdes;
141 struct mq_attr mqstat;
142 };
143
144 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
145 struct audit_aux_data d;
146 struct ipc_perm p;
147 unsigned long qbytes;
148 uid_t uid;
149 gid_t gid;
150 mode_t mode;
151 u32 osid;
152 };
153
154 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
155 struct audit_aux_data d;
156 int argc;
157 int envc;
158 char mem[0];
159 };
160
161 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
162 struct audit_aux_data d;
163 int nargs;
164 unsigned long args[0];
165 };
166
167 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
168 struct audit_aux_data d;
169 int len;
170 char a[0];
171 };
172
173 struct audit_aux_data_path {
174 struct audit_aux_data d;
175 struct dentry *dentry;
176 struct vfsmount *mnt;
177 };
178
179 /* The per-task audit context. */
180 struct audit_context {
181 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
182 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
183 enum audit_state state;
184 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
185 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
186 uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */
187 int major; /* syscall number */
188 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
189 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
190 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
191 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
192 int name_count;
193 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
194 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
195 struct dentry * pwd;
196 struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
197 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
198 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
199
200 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
201 pid_t pid, ppid;
202 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
203 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
204 unsigned long personality;
205 int arch;
206
207 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
208 int put_count;
209 int ino_count;
210 #endif
211 };
212
213 #define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
214 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
215 {
216 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
217 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
218 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
219 return n & mask;
220 }
221
222 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
223 {
224 unsigned n = ctx->major;
225 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
226 case 0: /* native */
227 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
228 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
229 return 1;
230 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
231 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
232 return 1;
233 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
234 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
235 return 1;
236 return 0;
237 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
238 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
239 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
240 return 1;
241 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
242 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
243 return 1;
244 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
245 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
246 return 1;
247 return 0;
248 case 2: /* open */
249 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
250 case 3: /* openat */
251 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
252 case 4: /* socketcall */
253 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
254 case 5: /* execve */
255 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
256 default:
257 return 0;
258 }
259 }
260
261 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
262 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
263 * otherwise. */
264 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
265 struct audit_krule *rule,
266 struct audit_context *ctx,
267 struct audit_names *name,
268 enum audit_state *state)
269 {
270 int i, j, need_sid = 1;
271 u32 sid;
272
273 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
274 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
275 int result = 0;
276
277 switch (f->type) {
278 case AUDIT_PID:
279 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
280 break;
281 case AUDIT_PPID:
282 if (ctx) {
283 if (!ctx->ppid)
284 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
285 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
286 }
287 break;
288 case AUDIT_UID:
289 result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
290 break;
291 case AUDIT_EUID:
292 result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
293 break;
294 case AUDIT_SUID:
295 result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
296 break;
297 case AUDIT_FSUID:
298 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
299 break;
300 case AUDIT_GID:
301 result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
302 break;
303 case AUDIT_EGID:
304 result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
305 break;
306 case AUDIT_SGID:
307 result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
308 break;
309 case AUDIT_FSGID:
310 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
311 break;
312 case AUDIT_PERS:
313 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
314 break;
315 case AUDIT_ARCH:
316 if (ctx)
317 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
318 break;
319
320 case AUDIT_EXIT:
321 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
322 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
323 break;
324 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
325 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
326 if (f->val)
327 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
328 else
329 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
330 }
331 break;
332 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
333 if (name)
334 result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
335 f->op, f->val);
336 else if (ctx) {
337 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
338 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
339 ++result;
340 break;
341 }
342 }
343 }
344 break;
345 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
346 if (name)
347 result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
348 f->op, f->val);
349 else if (ctx) {
350 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
351 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
352 ++result;
353 break;
354 }
355 }
356 }
357 break;
358 case AUDIT_INODE:
359 if (name)
360 result = (name->ino == f->val);
361 else if (ctx) {
362 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
363 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
364 ++result;
365 break;
366 }
367 }
368 }
369 break;
370 case AUDIT_WATCH:
371 if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1)
372 result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
373 name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
374 break;
375 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
376 result = 0;
377 if (ctx)
378 result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
379 break;
380 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
381 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
382 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
383 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
384 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
385 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
386 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
387 match for now to avoid losing information that
388 may be wanted. An error message will also be
389 logged upon error */
390 if (f->se_rule) {
391 if (need_sid) {
392 selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &sid);
393 need_sid = 0;
394 }
395 result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
396 f->op,
397 f->se_rule,
398 ctx);
399 }
400 break;
401 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
402 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
403 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
404 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
405 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
406 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
407 also applies here */
408 if (f->se_rule) {
409 /* Find files that match */
410 if (name) {
411 result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
412 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
413 f->se_rule, ctx);
414 } else if (ctx) {
415 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
416 if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
417 ctx->names[j].osid,
418 f->type, f->op,
419 f->se_rule, ctx)) {
420 ++result;
421 break;
422 }
423 }
424 }
425 /* Find ipc objects that match */
426 if (ctx) {
427 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
428 for (aux = ctx->aux; aux;
429 aux = aux->next) {
430 if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
431 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
432 if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
433 ++result;
434 break;
435 }
436 }
437 }
438 }
439 }
440 break;
441 case AUDIT_ARG0:
442 case AUDIT_ARG1:
443 case AUDIT_ARG2:
444 case AUDIT_ARG3:
445 if (ctx)
446 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
447 break;
448 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
449 /* ignore this field for filtering */
450 result = 1;
451 break;
452 case AUDIT_PERM:
453 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
454 break;
455 }
456
457 if (!result)
458 return 0;
459 }
460 if (rule->filterkey)
461 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
462 switch (rule->action) {
463 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
464 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
465 }
466 return 1;
467 }
468
469 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
470 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
471 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
472 */
473 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
474 {
475 struct audit_entry *e;
476 enum audit_state state;
477
478 rcu_read_lock();
479 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
480 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
481 rcu_read_unlock();
482 return state;
483 }
484 }
485 rcu_read_unlock();
486 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
487 }
488
489 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
490 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
491 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
492 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
493 */
494 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
495 struct audit_context *ctx,
496 struct list_head *list)
497 {
498 struct audit_entry *e;
499 enum audit_state state;
500
501 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
502 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
503
504 rcu_read_lock();
505 if (!list_empty(list)) {
506 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
507 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
508
509 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
510 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
511 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
512 &state)) {
513 rcu_read_unlock();
514 return state;
515 }
516 }
517 }
518 rcu_read_unlock();
519 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
520 }
521
522 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
523 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
524 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
525 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
526 */
527 enum audit_state audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
528 struct audit_context *ctx)
529 {
530 int i;
531 struct audit_entry *e;
532 enum audit_state state;
533
534 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
535 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
536
537 rcu_read_lock();
538 for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
539 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
540 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
541 struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
542 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
543 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
544
545 if (list_empty(list))
546 continue;
547
548 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
549 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
550 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
551 rcu_read_unlock();
552 return state;
553 }
554 }
555 }
556 rcu_read_unlock();
557 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
558 }
559
560 void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
561 {
562 ctx->auditable = 1;
563 }
564
565 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
566 int return_valid,
567 int return_code)
568 {
569 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
570
571 if (likely(!context))
572 return NULL;
573 context->return_valid = return_valid;
574 context->return_code = return_code;
575
576 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy && !context->auditable) {
577 enum audit_state state;
578
579 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
580 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
581 context->auditable = 1;
582 goto get_context;
583 }
584
585 state = audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
586 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
587 context->auditable = 1;
588
589 }
590
591 get_context:
592
593 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
594 return context;
595 }
596
597 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
598 {
599 int i;
600
601 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
602 if (context->auditable
603 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
604 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
605 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
606 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
607 __FILE__, __LINE__,
608 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
609 context->name_count, context->put_count,
610 context->ino_count);
611 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
612 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
613 context->names[i].name,
614 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
615 }
616 dump_stack();
617 return;
618 }
619 #endif
620 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
621 context->put_count = 0;
622 context->ino_count = 0;
623 #endif
624
625 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
626 if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
627 __putname(context->names[i].name);
628 }
629 context->name_count = 0;
630 if (context->pwd)
631 dput(context->pwd);
632 if (context->pwdmnt)
633 mntput(context->pwdmnt);
634 context->pwd = NULL;
635 context->pwdmnt = NULL;
636 }
637
638 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
639 {
640 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
641
642 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
643 if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
644 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
645 dput(axi->dentry);
646 mntput(axi->mnt);
647 }
648
649 context->aux = aux->next;
650 kfree(aux);
651 }
652 }
653
654 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
655 enum audit_state state)
656 {
657 uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
658
659 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
660 context->state = state;
661 context->loginuid = loginuid;
662 }
663
664 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
665 {
666 struct audit_context *context;
667
668 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
669 return NULL;
670 audit_zero_context(context, state);
671 return context;
672 }
673
674 /**
675 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
676 * @tsk: task
677 *
678 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
679 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
680 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
681 * needed.
682 */
683 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
684 {
685 struct audit_context *context;
686 enum audit_state state;
687
688 if (likely(!audit_enabled))
689 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
690
691 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
692 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
693 return 0;
694
695 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
696 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
697 return -ENOMEM;
698 }
699
700 /* Preserve login uid */
701 context->loginuid = -1;
702 if (current->audit_context)
703 context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
704
705 tsk->audit_context = context;
706 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
707 return 0;
708 }
709
710 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
711 {
712 struct audit_context *previous;
713 int count = 0;
714
715 do {
716 previous = context->previous;
717 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
718 ++count;
719 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
720 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
721 context->serial, context->major,
722 context->name_count, count);
723 }
724 audit_free_names(context);
725 audit_free_aux(context);
726 kfree(context->filterkey);
727 kfree(context);
728 context = previous;
729 } while (context);
730 if (count >= 10)
731 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
732 }
733
734 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
735 {
736 char *ctx = NULL;
737 unsigned len;
738 int error;
739 u32 sid;
740
741 selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
742 if (!sid)
743 return;
744
745 error = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
746 if (error) {
747 if (error != -EINVAL)
748 goto error_path;
749 return;
750 }
751
752 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
753 kfree(ctx);
754 return;
755
756 error_path:
757 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
758 return;
759 }
760
761 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
762
763 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
764 {
765 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
766 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
767 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
768
769 /* tsk == current */
770
771 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
772 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
773 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
774
775 if (mm) {
776 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
777 vma = mm->mmap;
778 while (vma) {
779 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
780 vma->vm_file) {
781 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
782 vma->vm_file->f_path.dentry,
783 vma->vm_file->f_path.mnt);
784 break;
785 }
786 vma = vma->vm_next;
787 }
788 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
789 }
790 audit_log_task_context(ab);
791 }
792
793 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
794 {
795 int i, call_panic = 0;
796 struct audit_buffer *ab;
797 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
798 const char *tty;
799
800 /* tsk == current */
801 context->pid = tsk->pid;
802 if (!context->ppid)
803 context->ppid = sys_getppid();
804 context->uid = tsk->uid;
805 context->gid = tsk->gid;
806 context->euid = tsk->euid;
807 context->suid = tsk->suid;
808 context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
809 context->egid = tsk->egid;
810 context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
811 context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
812 context->personality = tsk->personality;
813
814 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
815 if (!ab)
816 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
817 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
818 context->arch, context->major);
819 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
820 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
821 if (context->return_valid)
822 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
823 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
824 context->return_code);
825
826 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
827 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
828 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
829 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
830 else
831 tty = "(none)";
832 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
833 audit_log_format(ab,
834 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
835 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
836 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
837 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
838 context->argv[0],
839 context->argv[1],
840 context->argv[2],
841 context->argv[3],
842 context->name_count,
843 context->ppid,
844 context->pid,
845 context->loginuid,
846 context->uid,
847 context->gid,
848 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
849 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
850
851 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
852
853 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
854 if (context->filterkey) {
855 audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
856 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
857 } else
858 audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
859 audit_log_end(ab);
860
861 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
862
863 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
864 if (!ab)
865 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
866
867 switch (aux->type) {
868 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
869 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *axi = (void *)aux;
870 audit_log_format(ab,
871 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
872 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
873 axi->oflag, axi->mode, axi->attr.mq_flags,
874 axi->attr.mq_maxmsg, axi->attr.mq_msgsize,
875 axi->attr.mq_curmsgs);
876 break; }
877
878 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
879 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *axi = (void *)aux;
880 audit_log_format(ab,
881 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
882 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
883 axi->mqdes, axi->msg_len, axi->msg_prio,
884 axi->abs_timeout.tv_sec, axi->abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
885 break; }
886
887 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
888 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *axi = (void *)aux;
889 audit_log_format(ab,
890 "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
891 axi->mqdes,
892 axi->notification.sigev_signo);
893 break; }
894
895 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
896 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *axi = (void *)aux;
897 audit_log_format(ab,
898 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
899 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
900 axi->mqdes,
901 axi->mqstat.mq_flags, axi->mqstat.mq_maxmsg,
902 axi->mqstat.mq_msgsize, axi->mqstat.mq_curmsgs);
903 break; }
904
905 case AUDIT_IPC: {
906 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
907 audit_log_format(ab,
908 "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
909 axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
910 if (axi->osid != 0) {
911 char *ctx = NULL;
912 u32 len;
913 if (selinux_sid_to_string(
914 axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
915 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
916 axi->osid);
917 call_panic = 1;
918 } else
919 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
920 kfree(ctx);
921 }
922 break; }
923
924 case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
925 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
926 audit_log_format(ab,
927 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
928 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
929 break; }
930
931 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
932 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
933 int i;
934 const char *p;
935 for (i = 0, p = axi->mem; i < axi->argc; i++) {
936 audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i);
937 p = audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
938 audit_log_format(ab, "\n");
939 }
940 break; }
941
942 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
943 int i;
944 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
945 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
946 for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
947 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
948 break; }
949
950 case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
951 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
952
953 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
954 audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
955 break; }
956
957 case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
958 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
959 audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
960 break; }
961
962 }
963 audit_log_end(ab);
964 }
965
966 if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
967 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
968 if (ab) {
969 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
970 audit_log_end(ab);
971 }
972 }
973 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
974 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
975
976 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
977 if (!ab)
978 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
979
980 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
981
982 if (n->name) {
983 switch(n->name_len) {
984 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
985 /* log the full path */
986 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
987 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
988 break;
989 case 0:
990 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
991 * directory component is the cwd */
992 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", context->pwd,
993 context->pwdmnt);
994 break;
995 default:
996 /* log the name's directory component */
997 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
998 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name_len,
999 n->name);
1000 }
1001 } else
1002 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1003
1004 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1005 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1006 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1007 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1008 n->ino,
1009 MAJOR(n->dev),
1010 MINOR(n->dev),
1011 n->mode,
1012 n->uid,
1013 n->gid,
1014 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1015 MINOR(n->rdev));
1016 }
1017 if (n->osid != 0) {
1018 char *ctx = NULL;
1019 u32 len;
1020 if (selinux_sid_to_string(
1021 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1022 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1023 call_panic = 2;
1024 } else
1025 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1026 kfree(ctx);
1027 }
1028
1029 audit_log_end(ab);
1030 }
1031 if (call_panic)
1032 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1033 }
1034
1035 /**
1036 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1037 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1038 *
1039 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1040 */
1041 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1042 {
1043 struct audit_context *context;
1044
1045 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1046 if (likely(!context))
1047 return;
1048
1049 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1050 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1051 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1052 * in the context of the idle thread */
1053 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1054 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1055 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1056
1057 audit_free_context(context);
1058 }
1059
1060 /**
1061 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1062 * @tsk: task being audited
1063 * @arch: architecture type
1064 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1065 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1066 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1067 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1068 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1069 *
1070 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1071 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1072 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1073 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1074 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1075 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1076 * be written).
1077 */
1078 void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1079 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1080 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1081 {
1082 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1083 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1084 enum audit_state state;
1085
1086 BUG_ON(!context);
1087
1088 /*
1089 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1090 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1091 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1092 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1093 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1094 *
1095 * i386 no
1096 * x86_64 no
1097 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1098 *
1099 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1100 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1101 */
1102 if (context->in_syscall) {
1103 struct audit_context *newctx;
1104
1105 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1106 printk(KERN_ERR
1107 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1108 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1109 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1110 #endif
1111 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1112 if (newctx) {
1113 newctx->previous = context;
1114 context = newctx;
1115 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1116 } else {
1117 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1118 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1119 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1120 * to abandon auditing. */
1121 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1122 }
1123 }
1124 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1125
1126 if (!audit_enabled)
1127 return;
1128
1129 context->arch = arch;
1130 context->major = major;
1131 context->argv[0] = a1;
1132 context->argv[1] = a2;
1133 context->argv[2] = a3;
1134 context->argv[3] = a4;
1135
1136 state = context->state;
1137 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1138 if (!context->dummy && (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT))
1139 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1140 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
1141 return;
1142
1143 context->serial = 0;
1144 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1145 context->in_syscall = 1;
1146 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
1147 context->ppid = 0;
1148 }
1149
1150 /**
1151 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1152 * @tsk: task being audited
1153 * @valid: success/failure flag
1154 * @return_code: syscall return value
1155 *
1156 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1157 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1158 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1159 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1160 * free the names stored from getname().
1161 */
1162 void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
1163 {
1164 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1165 struct audit_context *context;
1166
1167 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
1168
1169 if (likely(!context))
1170 return;
1171
1172 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1173 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1174
1175 context->in_syscall = 0;
1176 context->auditable = 0;
1177
1178 if (context->previous) {
1179 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1180 context->previous = NULL;
1181 audit_free_context(context);
1182 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1183 } else {
1184 audit_free_names(context);
1185 audit_free_aux(context);
1186 kfree(context->filterkey);
1187 context->filterkey = NULL;
1188 tsk->audit_context = context;
1189 }
1190 }
1191
1192 /**
1193 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1194 * @name: name to add
1195 *
1196 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1197 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1198 */
1199 void __audit_getname(const char *name)
1200 {
1201 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1202
1203 if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
1204 return;
1205
1206 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1207 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1208 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1209 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1210 dump_stack();
1211 #endif
1212 return;
1213 }
1214 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1215 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
1216 context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1217 context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
1218 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1219 ++context->name_count;
1220 if (!context->pwd) {
1221 read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
1222 context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd);
1223 context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt);
1224 read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
1225 }
1226
1227 }
1228
1229 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1230 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1231 *
1232 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1233 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1234 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1235 */
1236 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1237 {
1238 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1239
1240 BUG_ON(!context);
1241 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1242 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1243 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1244 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1245 if (context->name_count) {
1246 int i;
1247 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1248 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1249 context->names[i].name,
1250 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
1251 }
1252 #endif
1253 __putname(name);
1254 }
1255 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1256 else {
1257 ++context->put_count;
1258 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1259 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1260 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1261 " put_count=%d\n",
1262 __FILE__, __LINE__,
1263 context->serial, context->major,
1264 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1265 context->put_count);
1266 dump_stack();
1267 }
1268 }
1269 #endif
1270 }
1271
1272 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1273 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode)
1274 {
1275 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1276 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1277 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1278 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1279 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1280 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1281 selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &name->osid);
1282 }
1283
1284 /**
1285 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1286 * @name: name being audited
1287 * @inode: inode being audited
1288 *
1289 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1290 */
1291 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
1292 {
1293 int idx;
1294 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1295
1296 if (!context->in_syscall)
1297 return;
1298 if (context->name_count
1299 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1300 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1301 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1302 else if (context->name_count > 1
1303 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1304 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1305 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1306 else {
1307 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1308 * associated name? */
1309 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
1310 return;
1311 idx = context->name_count++;
1312 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1313 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1314 ++context->ino_count;
1315 #endif
1316 }
1317 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1318 }
1319
1320 /**
1321 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1322 * @dname: inode's dentry name
1323 * @inode: inode being audited
1324 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1325 *
1326 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1327 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1328 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1329 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1330 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1331 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1332 * unsuccessful attempts.
1333 */
1334 void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
1335 const struct inode *parent)
1336 {
1337 int idx;
1338 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1339 const char *found_name = NULL;
1340 int dirlen = 0;
1341
1342 if (!context->in_syscall)
1343 return;
1344
1345 /* determine matching parent */
1346 if (!dname)
1347 goto update_context;
1348 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
1349 if (context->names[idx].ino == parent->i_ino) {
1350 const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
1351
1352 if (!name)
1353 continue;
1354
1355 if (audit_compare_dname_path(dname, name, &dirlen) == 0) {
1356 context->names[idx].name_len = dirlen;
1357 found_name = name;
1358 break;
1359 }
1360 }
1361
1362 update_context:
1363 idx = context->name_count;
1364 if (context->name_count == AUDIT_NAMES) {
1365 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed and losing %s\n",
1366 found_name ?: "(null)");
1367 return;
1368 }
1369 context->name_count++;
1370 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1371 context->ino_count++;
1372 #endif
1373 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent directory.
1374 * All names for this context are relinquished in audit_free_names() */
1375 context->names[idx].name = found_name;
1376 context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1377 context->names[idx].name_put = 0; /* don't call __putname() */
1378
1379 if (!inode)
1380 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1381 else
1382 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1383
1384 /* A parent was not found in audit_names, so copy the inode data for the
1385 * provided parent. */
1386 if (!found_name) {
1387 idx = context->name_count;
1388 if (context->name_count == AUDIT_NAMES) {
1389 printk(KERN_DEBUG
1390 "name_count maxed and losing parent inode data: dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu",
1391 MAJOR(parent->i_sb->s_dev),
1392 MINOR(parent->i_sb->s_dev),
1393 parent->i_ino);
1394 return;
1395 }
1396 context->name_count++;
1397 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1398 context->ino_count++;
1399 #endif
1400 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], parent);
1401 }
1402 }
1403
1404 /**
1405 * audit_inode_update - update inode info for last collected name
1406 * @inode: inode being audited
1407 *
1408 * When open() is called on an existing object with the O_CREAT flag, the inode
1409 * data audit initially collects is incorrect. This additional hook ensures
1410 * audit has the inode data for the actual object to be opened.
1411 */
1412 void __audit_inode_update(const struct inode *inode)
1413 {
1414 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1415 int idx;
1416
1417 if (!context->in_syscall || !inode)
1418 return;
1419
1420 if (context->name_count == 0) {
1421 context->name_count++;
1422 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1423 context->ino_count++;
1424 #endif
1425 }
1426 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1427
1428 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1429 }
1430
1431 /**
1432 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1433 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1434 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1435 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1436 *
1437 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1438 */
1439 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1440 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1441 {
1442 if (!ctx->serial)
1443 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
1444 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1445 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1446 *serial = ctx->serial;
1447 ctx->auditable = 1;
1448 }
1449
1450 /**
1451 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
1452 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
1453 * @loginuid: loginuid value
1454 *
1455 * Returns 0.
1456 *
1457 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
1458 */
1459 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
1460 {
1461 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
1462
1463 if (context) {
1464 /* Only log if audit is enabled */
1465 if (context->in_syscall) {
1466 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1467
1468 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1469 if (ab) {
1470 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1471 "old auid=%u new auid=%u",
1472 task->pid, task->uid,
1473 context->loginuid, loginuid);
1474 audit_log_end(ab);
1475 }
1476 }
1477 context->loginuid = loginuid;
1478 }
1479 return 0;
1480 }
1481
1482 /**
1483 * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
1484 * @ctx: the audit_context
1485 *
1486 * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
1487 */
1488 uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
1489 {
1490 return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
1491 }
1492
1493 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_get_loginuid);
1494
1495 /**
1496 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
1497 * @oflag: open flag
1498 * @mode: mode bits
1499 * @u_attr: queue attributes
1500 *
1501 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1502 */
1503 int __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr __user *u_attr)
1504 {
1505 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *ax;
1506 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1507
1508 if (!audit_enabled)
1509 return 0;
1510
1511 if (likely(!context))
1512 return 0;
1513
1514 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1515 if (!ax)
1516 return -ENOMEM;
1517
1518 if (u_attr != NULL) {
1519 if (copy_from_user(&ax->attr, u_attr, sizeof(ax->attr))) {
1520 kfree(ax);
1521 return -EFAULT;
1522 }
1523 } else
1524 memset(&ax->attr, 0, sizeof(ax->attr));
1525
1526 ax->oflag = oflag;
1527 ax->mode = mode;
1528
1529 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
1530 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1531 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1532 return 0;
1533 }
1534
1535 /**
1536 * __audit_mq_timedsend - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send
1537 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1538 * @msg_len: Message length
1539 * @msg_prio: Message priority
1540 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
1541 *
1542 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1543 */
1544 int __audit_mq_timedsend(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
1545 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
1546 {
1547 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
1548 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1549
1550 if (!audit_enabled)
1551 return 0;
1552
1553 if (likely(!context))
1554 return 0;
1555
1556 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1557 if (!ax)
1558 return -ENOMEM;
1559
1560 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
1561 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
1562 kfree(ax);
1563 return -EFAULT;
1564 }
1565 } else
1566 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
1567
1568 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
1569 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
1570 ax->msg_prio = msg_prio;
1571
1572 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
1573 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1574 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1575 return 0;
1576 }
1577
1578 /**
1579 * __audit_mq_timedreceive - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed receive
1580 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1581 * @msg_len: Message length
1582 * @u_msg_prio: Message priority
1583 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
1584 *
1585 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1586 */
1587 int __audit_mq_timedreceive(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len,
1588 unsigned int __user *u_msg_prio,
1589 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
1590 {
1591 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
1592 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1593
1594 if (!audit_enabled)
1595 return 0;
1596
1597 if (likely(!context))
1598 return 0;
1599
1600 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1601 if (!ax)
1602 return -ENOMEM;
1603
1604 if (u_msg_prio != NULL) {
1605 if (get_user(ax->msg_prio, u_msg_prio)) {
1606 kfree(ax);
1607 return -EFAULT;
1608 }
1609 } else
1610 ax->msg_prio = 0;
1611
1612 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
1613 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
1614 kfree(ax);
1615 return -EFAULT;
1616 }
1617 } else
1618 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
1619
1620 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
1621 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
1622
1623 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
1624 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1625 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1626 return 0;
1627 }
1628
1629 /**
1630 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
1631 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1632 * @u_notification: Notification event
1633 *
1634 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1635 */
1636
1637 int __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent __user *u_notification)
1638 {
1639 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *ax;
1640 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1641
1642 if (!audit_enabled)
1643 return 0;
1644
1645 if (likely(!context))
1646 return 0;
1647
1648 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1649 if (!ax)
1650 return -ENOMEM;
1651
1652 if (u_notification != NULL) {
1653 if (copy_from_user(&ax->notification, u_notification, sizeof(ax->notification))) {
1654 kfree(ax);
1655 return -EFAULT;
1656 }
1657 } else
1658 memset(&ax->notification, 0, sizeof(ax->notification));
1659
1660 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
1661
1662 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
1663 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1664 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1665 return 0;
1666 }
1667
1668 /**
1669 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
1670 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1671 * @mqstat: MQ flags
1672 *
1673 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1674 */
1675 int __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
1676 {
1677 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *ax;
1678 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1679
1680 if (!audit_enabled)
1681 return 0;
1682
1683 if (likely(!context))
1684 return 0;
1685
1686 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1687 if (!ax)
1688 return -ENOMEM;
1689
1690 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
1691 ax->mqstat = *mqstat;
1692
1693 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
1694 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1695 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1696 return 0;
1697 }
1698
1699 /**
1700 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
1701 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
1702 *
1703 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1704 */
1705 int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
1706 {
1707 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1708 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1709
1710 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1711 if (!ax)
1712 return -ENOMEM;
1713
1714 ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
1715 ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
1716 ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
1717 selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
1718
1719 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
1720 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1721 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1722 return 0;
1723 }
1724
1725 /**
1726 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
1727 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
1728 * @uid: msgq user id
1729 * @gid: msgq group id
1730 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
1731 *
1732 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1733 */
1734 int __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
1735 {
1736 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1737 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1738
1739 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1740 if (!ax)
1741 return -ENOMEM;
1742
1743 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
1744 ax->uid = uid;
1745 ax->gid = gid;
1746 ax->mode = mode;
1747
1748 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM;
1749 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1750 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1751 return 0;
1752 }
1753
1754 int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1755 {
1756 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
1757 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1758 unsigned long p, next;
1759 void *to;
1760
1761 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
1762 return 0;
1763
1764 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - bprm->p,
1765 GFP_KERNEL);
1766 if (!ax)
1767 return -ENOMEM;
1768
1769 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
1770 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
1771 for (p = bprm->p, to = ax->mem; p < MAX_ARG_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE; p = next) {
1772 struct page *page = bprm->page[p / PAGE_SIZE];
1773 void *kaddr = kmap(page);
1774 next = (p + PAGE_SIZE) & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);
1775 memcpy(to, kaddr + (p & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)), next - p);
1776 to += next - p;
1777 kunmap(page);
1778 }
1779
1780 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
1781 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1782 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1783 return 0;
1784 }
1785
1786
1787 /**
1788 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
1789 * @nargs: number of args
1790 * @args: args array
1791 *
1792 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1793 */
1794 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
1795 {
1796 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
1797 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1798
1799 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
1800 return 0;
1801
1802 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
1803 if (!ax)
1804 return -ENOMEM;
1805
1806 ax->nargs = nargs;
1807 memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
1808
1809 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
1810 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1811 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1812 return 0;
1813 }
1814
1815 /**
1816 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
1817 * @len: data length in user space
1818 * @a: data address in kernel space
1819 *
1820 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1821 */
1822 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
1823 {
1824 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
1825 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1826
1827 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
1828 return 0;
1829
1830 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
1831 if (!ax)
1832 return -ENOMEM;
1833
1834 ax->len = len;
1835 memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
1836
1837 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
1838 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1839 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1840 return 0;
1841 }
1842
1843 /**
1844 * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
1845 * @dentry: dentry to record
1846 * @mnt: mnt to record
1847 *
1848 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1849 *
1850 * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
1851 */
1852 int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
1853 {
1854 struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
1855 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1856
1857 if (likely(!context))
1858 return 0;
1859
1860 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1861 if (!ax)
1862 return -ENOMEM;
1863
1864 ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
1865 ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
1866
1867 ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
1868 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1869 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1870 return 0;
1871 }
1872
1873 /**
1874 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
1875 * @sig: signal value
1876 * @t: task being signaled
1877 *
1878 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
1879 * and uid that is doing that.
1880 */
1881 void __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
1882 {
1883 extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
1884 extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
1885 extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
1886
1887 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1) {
1888 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1889 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
1890 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
1891 if (ctx)
1892 audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
1893 else
1894 audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
1895 selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
1896 }
1897 }
Linux 2.6 ibm-acpi/thinkpad-acpi driver git tree