?  search:
summary | log | graphiclog1 | graphiclog2 | commit | commitdiff | tree | refs | edit | fork
blame | history | raw | HEAD
x86: fix is_io_mapping_possible() build warning on i386 allnoconfig
[linux-2.6/linux-acpi-2.6/ibm-acpi-2.6.git] / kernel / auditsc.c
blob2bfc647867654874df4c36d8009e87c5f6764728
1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
7 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
40 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
43 */
44
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <asm/atomic.h>
48 #include <linux/fs.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
50 #include <linux/mm.h>
51 #include <linux/module.h>
52 #include <linux/mount.h>
53 #include <linux/socket.h>
54 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
55 #include <linux/audit.h>
56 #include <linux/personality.h>
57 #include <linux/time.h>
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/compiler.h>
60 #include <asm/unistd.h>
61 #include <linux/security.h>
62 #include <linux/list.h>
63 #include <linux/tty.h>
64 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
65 #include <linux/highmem.h>
66 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
67 #include <linux/inotify.h>
68 #include <linux/capability.h>
69 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
70
71 #include "audit.h"
72
73 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
74 * for saving names from getname(). */
75 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
76
77 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
78 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
79
80 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
81 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
82
83 /* number of audit rules */
84 int audit_n_rules;
85
86 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
87 int audit_signals;
88
89 struct audit_cap_data {
90 kernel_cap_t permitted;
91 kernel_cap_t inheritable;
92 union {
93 unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */
94 kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */
95 };
96 };
97
98 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
99 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
100 * pointers at syscall exit time).
101 *
102 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
103 struct audit_names {
104 const char *name;
105 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
106 unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
107 unsigned long ino;
108 dev_t dev;
109 umode_t mode;
110 uid_t uid;
111 gid_t gid;
112 dev_t rdev;
113 u32 osid;
114 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
115 unsigned int fcap_ver;
116 };
117
118 struct audit_aux_data {
119 struct audit_aux_data *next;
120 int type;
121 };
122
123 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
124
125 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
126 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
127
128 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
129 struct audit_aux_data d;
130 int argc;
131 int envc;
132 struct mm_struct *mm;
133 };
134
135 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
136 struct audit_aux_data d;
137 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
138 uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
139 uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
140 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
141 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
142 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
143 int pid_count;
144 };
145
146 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
147 struct audit_aux_data d;
148 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
149 unsigned int fcap_ver;
150 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
151 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
152 };
153
154 struct audit_aux_data_capset {
155 struct audit_aux_data d;
156 pid_t pid;
157 struct audit_cap_data cap;
158 };
159
160 struct audit_tree_refs {
161 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
162 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
163 };
164
165 /* The per-task audit context. */
166 struct audit_context {
167 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
168 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
169 enum audit_state state, current_state;
170 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
171 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
172 int major; /* syscall number */
173 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
174 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
175 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
176 u64 prio;
177 int name_count;
178 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
179 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
180 struct path pwd;
181 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
182 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
183 struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
184 struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr;
185 size_t sockaddr_len;
186 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
187 pid_t pid, ppid;
188 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
189 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
190 unsigned long personality;
191 int arch;
192
193 pid_t target_pid;
194 uid_t target_auid;
195 uid_t target_uid;
196 unsigned int target_sessionid;
197 u32 target_sid;
198 char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
199
200 struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
201 int tree_count;
202
203 int type;
204 union {
205 struct {
206 int nargs;
207 long args[6];
208 } socketcall;
209 struct {
210 uid_t uid;
211 gid_t gid;
212 mode_t mode;
213 u32 osid;
214 int has_perm;
215 uid_t perm_uid;
216 gid_t perm_gid;
217 mode_t perm_mode;
218 unsigned long qbytes;
219 } ipc;
220 struct {
221 mqd_t mqdes;
222 struct mq_attr mqstat;
223 } mq_getsetattr;
224 struct {
225 mqd_t mqdes;
226 int sigev_signo;
227 } mq_notify;
228 struct {
229 mqd_t mqdes;
230 size_t msg_len;
231 unsigned int msg_prio;
232 struct timespec abs_timeout;
233 } mq_sendrecv;
234 struct {
235 int oflag;
236 mode_t mode;
237 struct mq_attr attr;
238 } mq_open;
239 struct {
240 pid_t pid;
241 struct audit_cap_data cap;
242 } capset;
243 };
244 int fds[2];
245
246 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
247 int put_count;
248 int ino_count;
249 #endif
250 };
251
252 #define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
253 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
254 {
255 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
256 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
257 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
258 return n & mask;
259 }
260
261 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
262 {
263 unsigned n;
264 if (unlikely(!ctx))
265 return 0;
266 n = ctx->major;
267
268 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
269 case 0: /* native */
270 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
271 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
272 return 1;
273 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
274 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
275 return 1;
276 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
277 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
278 return 1;
279 return 0;
280 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
281 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
282 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
283 return 1;
284 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
285 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
286 return 1;
287 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
288 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
289 return 1;
290 return 0;
291 case 2: /* open */
292 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
293 case 3: /* openat */
294 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
295 case 4: /* socketcall */
296 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
297 case 5: /* execve */
298 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
299 default:
300 return 0;
301 }
302 }
303
304 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which)
305 {
306 unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT;
307 mode_t mode = which & S_IFMT;
308
309 if (unlikely(!ctx))
310 return 0;
311
312 if (index >= ctx->name_count)
313 return 0;
314 if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1)
315 return 0;
316 if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT)
317 return 0;
318 return 1;
319 }
320
321 /*
322 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
323 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
324 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
325 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
326 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
327 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
328 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
329 */
330
331 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
332 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
333 {
334 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
335 int left = ctx->tree_count;
336 if (likely(left)) {
337 p->c[--left] = chunk;
338 ctx->tree_count = left;
339 return 1;
340 }
341 if (!p)
342 return 0;
343 p = p->next;
344 if (p) {
345 p->c[30] = chunk;
346 ctx->trees = p;
347 ctx->tree_count = 30;
348 return 1;
349 }
350 return 0;
351 }
352
353 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
354 {
355 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
356 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
357 if (!ctx->trees) {
358 ctx->trees = p;
359 return 0;
360 }
361 if (p)
362 p->next = ctx->trees;
363 else
364 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
365 ctx->tree_count = 31;
366 return 1;
367 }
368 #endif
369
370 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
371 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
372 {
373 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
374 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
375 int n;
376 if (!p) {
377 /* we started with empty chain */
378 p = ctx->first_trees;
379 count = 31;
380 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
381 if (!p)
382 return;
383 }
384 n = count;
385 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
386 while (n--) {
387 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
388 q->c[n] = NULL;
389 }
390 }
391 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
392 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
393 q->c[n] = NULL;
394 }
395 ctx->trees = p;
396 ctx->tree_count = count;
397 #endif
398 }
399
400 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
401 {
402 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
403 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
404 q = p->next;
405 kfree(p);
406 }
407 }
408
409 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
410 {
411 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
412 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
413 int n;
414 if (!tree)
415 return 0;
416 /* full ones */
417 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
418 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
419 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
420 return 1;
421 }
422 /* partial */
423 if (p) {
424 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
425 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
426 return 1;
427 }
428 #endif
429 return 0;
430 }
431
432 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
433 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
434 * otherwise. */
435 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
436 struct audit_krule *rule,
437 struct audit_context *ctx,
438 struct audit_names *name,
439 enum audit_state *state)
440 {
441 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
442 int i, j, need_sid = 1;
443 u32 sid;
444
445 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
446 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
447 int result = 0;
448
449 switch (f->type) {
450 case AUDIT_PID:
451 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
452 break;
453 case AUDIT_PPID:
454 if (ctx) {
455 if (!ctx->ppid)
456 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
457 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
458 }
459 break;
460 case AUDIT_UID:
461 result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val);
462 break;
463 case AUDIT_EUID:
464 result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val);
465 break;
466 case AUDIT_SUID:
467 result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val);
468 break;
469 case AUDIT_FSUID:
470 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
471 break;
472 case AUDIT_GID:
473 result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val);
474 break;
475 case AUDIT_EGID:
476 result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val);
477 break;
478 case AUDIT_SGID:
479 result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val);
480 break;
481 case AUDIT_FSGID:
482 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
483 break;
484 case AUDIT_PERS:
485 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
486 break;
487 case AUDIT_ARCH:
488 if (ctx)
489 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
490 break;
491
492 case AUDIT_EXIT:
493 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
494 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
495 break;
496 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
497 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
498 if (f->val)
499 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
500 else
501 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
502 }
503 break;
504 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
505 if (name)
506 result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
507 f->op, f->val);
508 else if (ctx) {
509 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
510 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
511 ++result;
512 break;
513 }
514 }
515 }
516 break;
517 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
518 if (name)
519 result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
520 f->op, f->val);
521 else if (ctx) {
522 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
523 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
524 ++result;
525 break;
526 }
527 }
528 }
529 break;
530 case AUDIT_INODE:
531 if (name)
532 result = (name->ino == f->val);
533 else if (ctx) {
534 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
535 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
536 ++result;
537 break;
538 }
539 }
540 }
541 break;
542 case AUDIT_WATCH:
543 if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1)
544 result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
545 name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
546 break;
547 case AUDIT_DIR:
548 if (ctx)
549 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
550 break;
551 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
552 result = 0;
553 if (ctx)
554 result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
555 break;
556 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
557 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
558 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
559 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
560 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
561 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
562 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
563 match for now to avoid losing information that
564 may be wanted. An error message will also be
565 logged upon error */
566 if (f->lsm_rule) {
567 if (need_sid) {
568 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
569 need_sid = 0;
570 }
571 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
572 f->op,
573 f->lsm_rule,
574 ctx);
575 }
576 break;
577 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
578 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
579 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
580 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
581 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
582 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
583 also applies here */
584 if (f->lsm_rule) {
585 /* Find files that match */
586 if (name) {
587 result = security_audit_rule_match(
588 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
589 f->lsm_rule, ctx);
590 } else if (ctx) {
591 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
592 if (security_audit_rule_match(
593 ctx->names[j].osid,
594 f->type, f->op,
595 f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
596 ++result;
597 break;
598 }
599 }
600 }
601 /* Find ipc objects that match */
602 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
603 break;
604 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
605 f->type, f->op,
606 f->lsm_rule, ctx))
607 ++result;
608 }
609 break;
610 case AUDIT_ARG0:
611 case AUDIT_ARG1:
612 case AUDIT_ARG2:
613 case AUDIT_ARG3:
614 if (ctx)
615 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
616 break;
617 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
618 /* ignore this field for filtering */
619 result = 1;
620 break;
621 case AUDIT_PERM:
622 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
623 break;
624 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
625 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
626 break;
627 }
628
629 if (!result) {
630 put_cred(cred);
631 return 0;
632 }
633 }
634
635 if (ctx) {
636 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
637 return 0;
638 if (rule->filterkey) {
639 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
640 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
641 }
642 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
643 }
644 switch (rule->action) {
645 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
646 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
647 }
648 put_cred(cred);
649 return 1;
650 }
651
652 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
653 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
654 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
655 */
656 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
657 {
658 struct audit_entry *e;
659 enum audit_state state;
660
661 rcu_read_lock();
662 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
663 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
664 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
665 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
666 rcu_read_unlock();
667 return state;
668 }
669 }
670 rcu_read_unlock();
671 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
672 }
673
674 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
675 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
676 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
677 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
678 */
679 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
680 struct audit_context *ctx,
681 struct list_head *list)
682 {
683 struct audit_entry *e;
684 enum audit_state state;
685
686 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
687 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
688
689 rcu_read_lock();
690 if (!list_empty(list)) {
691 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
692 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
693
694 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
695 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
696 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
697 &state)) {
698 rcu_read_unlock();
699 ctx->current_state = state;
700 return state;
701 }
702 }
703 }
704 rcu_read_unlock();
705 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
706 }
707
708 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
709 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
710 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
711 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
712 */
713 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
714 {
715 int i;
716 struct audit_entry *e;
717 enum audit_state state;
718
719 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
720 return;
721
722 rcu_read_lock();
723 for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
724 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
725 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
726 struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
727 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
728 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
729
730 if (list_empty(list))
731 continue;
732
733 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
734 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
735 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
736 rcu_read_unlock();
737 ctx->current_state = state;
738 return;
739 }
740 }
741 }
742 rcu_read_unlock();
743 }
744
745 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
746 {
747 if (!ctx->prio) {
748 ctx->prio = 1;
749 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
750 }
751 }
752
753 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
754 int return_valid,
755 int return_code)
756 {
757 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
758
759 if (likely(!context))
760 return NULL;
761 context->return_valid = return_valid;
762
763 /*
764 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
765 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
766 * signal handlers
767 *
768 * This is actually a test for:
769 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
770 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
771 *
772 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
773 */
774 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
775 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
776 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
777 context->return_code = -EINTR;
778 else
779 context->return_code = return_code;
780
781 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
782 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
783 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
784 }
785
786 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
787 return context;
788 }
789
790 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
791 {
792 int i;
793
794 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
795 if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
796 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
797 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
798 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
799 __FILE__, __LINE__,
800 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
801 context->name_count, context->put_count,
802 context->ino_count);
803 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
804 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
805 context->names[i].name,
806 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
807 }
808 dump_stack();
809 return;
810 }
811 #endif
812 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
813 context->put_count = 0;
814 context->ino_count = 0;
815 #endif
816
817 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
818 if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
819 __putname(context->names[i].name);
820 }
821 context->name_count = 0;
822 path_put(&context->pwd);
823 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
824 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
825 }
826
827 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
828 {
829 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
830
831 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
832 context->aux = aux->next;
833 kfree(aux);
834 }
835 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
836 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
837 kfree(aux);
838 }
839 }
840
841 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
842 enum audit_state state)
843 {
844 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
845 context->state = state;
846 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
847 }
848
849 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
850 {
851 struct audit_context *context;
852
853 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
854 return NULL;
855 audit_zero_context(context, state);
856 return context;
857 }
858
859 /**
860 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
861 * @tsk: task
862 *
863 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
864 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
865 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
866 * needed.
867 */
868 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
869 {
870 struct audit_context *context;
871 enum audit_state state;
872 char *key = NULL;
873
874 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
875 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
876
877 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
878 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
879 return 0;
880
881 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
882 kfree(key);
883 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
884 return -ENOMEM;
885 }
886 context->filterkey = key;
887
888 tsk->audit_context = context;
889 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
890 return 0;
891 }
892
893 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
894 {
895 struct audit_context *previous;
896 int count = 0;
897
898 do {
899 previous = context->previous;
900 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
901 ++count;
902 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
903 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
904 context->serial, context->major,
905 context->name_count, count);
906 }
907 audit_free_names(context);
908 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
909 free_tree_refs(context);
910 audit_free_aux(context);
911 kfree(context->filterkey);
912 kfree(context->sockaddr);
913 kfree(context);
914 context = previous;
915 } while (context);
916 if (count >= 10)
917 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
918 }
919
920 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
921 {
922 char *ctx = NULL;
923 unsigned len;
924 int error;
925 u32 sid;
926
927 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
928 if (!sid)
929 return;
930
931 error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
932 if (error) {
933 if (error != -EINVAL)
934 goto error_path;
935 return;
936 }
937
938 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
939 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
940 return;
941
942 error_path:
943 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
944 return;
945 }
946
947 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
948
949 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
950 {
951 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
952 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
953 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
954
955 /* tsk == current */
956
957 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
958 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
959 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
960
961 if (mm) {
962 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
963 vma = mm->mmap;
964 while (vma) {
965 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
966 vma->vm_file) {
967 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
968 &vma->vm_file->f_path);
969 break;
970 }
971 vma = vma->vm_next;
972 }
973 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
974 }
975 audit_log_task_context(ab);
976 }
977
978 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
979 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
980 u32 sid, char *comm)
981 {
982 struct audit_buffer *ab;
983 char *ctx = NULL;
984 u32 len;
985 int rc = 0;
986
987 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
988 if (!ab)
989 return rc;
990
991 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
992 uid, sessionid);
993 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
994 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
995 rc = 1;
996 } else {
997 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
998 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
999 }
1000 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1001 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1002 audit_log_end(ab);
1003
1004 return rc;
1005 }
1006
1007 /*
1008 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1009 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1010 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry)
1011 *
1012 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1013 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1014 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1015 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1016 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1017 */
1018 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1019 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1020 int arg_num,
1021 size_t *len_sent,
1022 const char __user *p,
1023 char *buf)
1024 {
1025 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1026 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1027 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 3 is the length of a=\n */
1028 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 3;
1029 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1030 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1031 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1032 int ret;
1033
1034 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1035 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1036
1037 /*
1038 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1039 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1040 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1041 * any.
1042 */
1043 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1044 WARN_ON(1);
1045 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1046 return -1;
1047 }
1048
1049 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1050 do {
1051 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1052 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1053 else
1054 to_send = len_left;
1055 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1056 /*
1057 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1058 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1059 * space yet.
1060 */
1061 if (ret) {
1062 WARN_ON(1);
1063 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1064 return -1;
1065 }
1066 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1067 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1068 if (has_cntl) {
1069 /*
1070 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1071 * send half as much in each message
1072 */
1073 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1074 break;
1075 }
1076 len_left -= to_send;
1077 tmp_p += to_send;
1078 } while (len_left > 0);
1079
1080 len_left = len;
1081
1082 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1083 too_long = 1;
1084
1085 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1086 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1087 int room_left;
1088
1089 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1090 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1091 else
1092 to_send = len_left;
1093
1094 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1095 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1096 if (has_cntl)
1097 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1098 else
1099 room_left -= to_send;
1100 if (room_left < 0) {
1101 *len_sent = 0;
1102 audit_log_end(*ab);
1103 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1104 if (!*ab)
1105 return 0;
1106 }
1107
1108 /*
1109 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1110 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1111 */
1112 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1113 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d_len=%zu ", arg_num,
1114 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1115
1116 /*
1117 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1118 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1119 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1120 */
1121 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1122 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1123 else
1124 ret = 0;
1125 if (ret) {
1126 WARN_ON(1);
1127 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1128 return -1;
1129 }
1130 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1131
1132 /* actually log it */
1133 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d", arg_num);
1134 if (too_long)
1135 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1136 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1137 if (has_cntl)
1138 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1139 else
1140 audit_log_format(*ab, "\"%s\"", buf);
1141 audit_log_format(*ab, "\n");
1142
1143 p += to_send;
1144 len_left -= to_send;
1145 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1146 if (has_cntl)
1147 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1148 else
1149 *len_sent += to_send;
1150 }
1151 /* include the null we didn't log */
1152 return len + 1;
1153 }
1154
1155 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1156 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1157 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
1158 {
1159 int i;
1160 size_t len, len_sent = 0;
1161 const char __user *p;
1162 char *buf;
1163
1164 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
1165 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1166
1167 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
1168
1169 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d ", axi->argc);
1170
1171 /*
1172 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1173 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1174 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1175 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1176 */
1177 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1178 if (!buf) {
1179 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1180 return;
1181 }
1182
1183 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
1184 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1185 &len_sent, p, buf);
1186 if (len <= 0)
1187 break;
1188 p += len;
1189 }
1190 kfree(buf);
1191 }
1192
1193 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
1194 {
1195 int i;
1196
1197 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1198 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
1199 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
1200 }
1201 }
1202
1203 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1204 {
1205 kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
1206 kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
1207 int log = 0;
1208
1209 if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
1210 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
1211 log = 1;
1212 }
1213 if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
1214 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
1215 log = 1;
1216 }
1217
1218 if (log)
1219 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
1220 }
1221
1222 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1223 {
1224 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1225 int i;
1226
1227 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1228 if (!ab)
1229 return;
1230
1231 switch (context->type) {
1232 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1233 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1234 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1235 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1236 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1237 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1238 break; }
1239 case AUDIT_IPC: {
1240 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1241
1242 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1243 context->ipc.uid, context->ipc.gid, context->ipc.mode);
1244 if (osid) {
1245 char *ctx = NULL;
1246 u32 len;
1247 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1248 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1249 *call_panic = 1;
1250 } else {
1251 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1252 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1253 }
1254 }
1255 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1256 audit_log_end(ab);
1257 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1258 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1259 audit_log_format(ab,
1260 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1261 context->ipc.qbytes,
1262 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1263 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1264 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1265 if (!ab)
1266 return;
1267 }
1268 break; }
1269 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1270 audit_log_format(ab,
1271 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1272 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1273 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1274 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1275 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1276 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1277 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1278 break; }
1279 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1280 audit_log_format(ab,
1281 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1282 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1283 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1284 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1285 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1286 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1287 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1288 break; }
1289 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1290 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1291 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1292 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1293 break; }
1294 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1295 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1296 audit_log_format(ab,
1297 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1298 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
1299 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1300 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1301 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1302 break; }
1303 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1304 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1305 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1306 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1307 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1308 break; }
1309 }
1310 audit_log_end(ab);
1311 }
1312
1313 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1314 {
1315 const struct cred *cred;
1316 int i, call_panic = 0;
1317 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1318 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1319 const char *tty;
1320
1321 /* tsk == current */
1322 context->pid = tsk->pid;
1323 if (!context->ppid)
1324 context->ppid = sys_getppid();
1325 cred = current_cred();
1326 context->uid = cred->uid;
1327 context->gid = cred->gid;
1328 context->euid = cred->euid;
1329 context->suid = cred->suid;
1330 context->fsuid = cred->fsuid;
1331 context->egid = cred->egid;
1332 context->sgid = cred->sgid;
1333 context->fsgid = cred->fsgid;
1334 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1335
1336 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1337 if (!ab)
1338 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1339 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1340 context->arch, context->major);
1341 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1342 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1343 if (context->return_valid)
1344 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1345 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1346 context->return_code);
1347
1348 spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1349 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
1350 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
1351 else
1352 tty = "(none)";
1353 spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1354
1355 audit_log_format(ab,
1356 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
1357 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
1358 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
1359 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
1360 context->argv[0],
1361 context->argv[1],
1362 context->argv[2],
1363 context->argv[3],
1364 context->name_count,
1365 context->ppid,
1366 context->pid,
1367 tsk->loginuid,
1368 context->uid,
1369 context->gid,
1370 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
1371 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
1372 tsk->sessionid);
1373
1374
1375 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1376 if (context->filterkey) {
1377 audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
1378 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
1379 } else
1380 audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
1381 audit_log_end(ab);
1382
1383 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1384
1385 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1386 if (!ab)
1387 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1388
1389 switch (aux->type) {
1390
1391 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1392 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
1393 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
1394 break; }
1395
1396 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1397 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1398 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1399 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1400 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1401 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1402 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1403 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1404 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1405 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1406 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1407 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1408 break; }
1409
1410 }
1411 audit_log_end(ab);
1412 }
1413
1414 if (context->type)
1415 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1416
1417 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1418 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1419 if (ab) {
1420 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1421 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1422 audit_log_end(ab);
1423 }
1424 }
1425
1426 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1427 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1428 if (ab) {
1429 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1430 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1431 context->sockaddr_len);
1432 audit_log_end(ab);
1433 }
1434 }
1435
1436 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1437 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1438
1439 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1440 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1441 axs->target_auid[i],
1442 axs->target_uid[i],
1443 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1444 axs->target_sid[i],
1445 axs->target_comm[i]))
1446 call_panic = 1;
1447 }
1448
1449 if (context->target_pid &&
1450 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1451 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1452 context->target_sessionid,
1453 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1454 call_panic = 1;
1455
1456 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1457 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1458 if (ab) {
1459 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1460 audit_log_end(ab);
1461 }
1462 }
1463 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
1464 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
1465
1466 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1467 if (!ab)
1468 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1469
1470 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
1471
1472 if (n->name) {
1473 switch(n->name_len) {
1474 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1475 /* log the full path */
1476 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1477 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
1478 break;
1479 case 0:
1480 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1481 * directory component is the cwd */
1482 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1483 break;
1484 default:
1485 /* log the name's directory component */
1486 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1487 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name,
1488 n->name_len);
1489 }
1490 } else
1491 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1492
1493 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1494 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1495 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1496 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1497 n->ino,
1498 MAJOR(n->dev),
1499 MINOR(n->dev),
1500 n->mode,
1501 n->uid,
1502 n->gid,
1503 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1504 MINOR(n->rdev));
1505 }
1506 if (n->osid != 0) {
1507 char *ctx = NULL;
1508 u32 len;
1509 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1510 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1511 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1512 call_panic = 2;
1513 } else {
1514 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1515 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1516 }
1517 }
1518
1519 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1520
1521 audit_log_end(ab);
1522 }
1523
1524 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1525 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1526 if (ab)
1527 audit_log_end(ab);
1528 if (call_panic)
1529 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1530 }
1531
1532 /**
1533 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1534 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1535 *
1536 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1537 */
1538 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1539 {
1540 struct audit_context *context;
1541
1542 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1543 if (likely(!context))
1544 return;
1545
1546 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1547 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1548 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1549 * in the context of the idle thread */
1550 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1551 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1552 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1553
1554 audit_free_context(context);
1555 }
1556
1557 /**
1558 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1559 * @arch: architecture type
1560 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1561 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1562 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1563 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1564 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1565 *
1566 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1567 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1568 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1569 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1570 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1571 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1572 * be written).
1573 */
1574 void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1575 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1576 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1577 {
1578 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1579 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1580 enum audit_state state;
1581
1582 if (unlikely(!context))
1583 return;
1584
1585 /*
1586 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1587 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1588 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1589 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1590 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1591 *
1592 * i386 no
1593 * x86_64 no
1594 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1595 *
1596 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1597 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1598 */
1599 if (context->in_syscall) {
1600 struct audit_context *newctx;
1601
1602 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1603 printk(KERN_ERR
1604 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1605 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1606 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1607 #endif
1608 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1609 if (newctx) {
1610 newctx->previous = context;
1611 context = newctx;
1612 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1613 } else {
1614 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1615 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1616 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1617 * to abandon auditing. */
1618 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1619 }
1620 }
1621 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1622
1623 if (!audit_enabled)
1624 return;
1625
1626 context->arch = arch;
1627 context->major = major;
1628 context->argv[0] = a1;
1629 context->argv[1] = a2;
1630 context->argv[2] = a3;
1631 context->argv[3] = a4;
1632
1633 state = context->state;
1634 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1635 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1636 context->prio = 0;
1637 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1638 }
1639 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
1640 return;
1641
1642 context->serial = 0;
1643 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1644 context->in_syscall = 1;
1645 context->current_state = state;
1646 context->ppid = 0;
1647 }
1648
1649 void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct *child)
1650 {
1651 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
1652 struct audit_context *p = child->audit_context;
1653 if (!p || !ctx)
1654 return;
1655 if (!ctx->in_syscall || ctx->current_state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1656 return;
1657 p->arch = ctx->arch;
1658 p->major = ctx->major;
1659 memcpy(p->argv, ctx->argv, sizeof(ctx->argv));
1660 p->ctime = ctx->ctime;
1661 p->dummy = ctx->dummy;
1662 p->in_syscall = ctx->in_syscall;
1663 p->filterkey = kstrdup(ctx->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL);
1664 p->ppid = current->pid;
1665 p->prio = ctx->prio;
1666 p->current_state = ctx->current_state;
1667 }
1668
1669 /**
1670 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1671 * @valid: success/failure flag
1672 * @return_code: syscall return value
1673 *
1674 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1675 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1676 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1677 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1678 * free the names stored from getname().
1679 */
1680 void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
1681 {
1682 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1683 struct audit_context *context;
1684
1685 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
1686
1687 if (likely(!context))
1688 return;
1689
1690 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1691 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1692
1693 context->in_syscall = 0;
1694 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1695
1696 if (context->previous) {
1697 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1698 context->previous = NULL;
1699 audit_free_context(context);
1700 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1701 } else {
1702 audit_free_names(context);
1703 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1704 audit_free_aux(context);
1705 context->aux = NULL;
1706 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1707 context->target_pid = 0;
1708 context->target_sid = 0;
1709 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1710 context->type = 0;
1711 context->fds[0] = -1;
1712 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1713 kfree(context->filterkey);
1714 context->filterkey = NULL;
1715 }
1716 tsk->audit_context = context;
1717 }
1718 }
1719
1720 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1721 {
1722 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1723 struct audit_context *context;
1724 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1725 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1726 int count;
1727 if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches)))
1728 return;
1729 context = current->audit_context;
1730 p = context->trees;
1731 count = context->tree_count;
1732 rcu_read_lock();
1733 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1734 rcu_read_unlock();
1735 if (!chunk)
1736 return;
1737 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1738 return;
1739 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1740 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1741 audit_set_auditable(context);
1742 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1743 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1744 return;
1745 }
1746 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1747 #endif
1748 }
1749
1750 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1751 {
1752 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1753 struct audit_context *context;
1754 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1755 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1756 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1757 unsigned long seq;
1758 int count;
1759
1760 context = current->audit_context;
1761 p = context->trees;
1762 count = context->tree_count;
1763 retry:
1764 drop = NULL;
1765 d = dentry;
1766 rcu_read_lock();
1767 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1768 for(;;) {
1769 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1770 if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) {
1771 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1772 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1773 if (chunk) {
1774 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1775 drop = chunk;
1776 break;
1777 }
1778 }
1779 }
1780 parent = d->d_parent;
1781 if (parent == d)
1782 break;
1783 d = parent;
1784 }
1785 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1786 rcu_read_unlock();
1787 if (!drop) {
1788 /* just a race with rename */
1789 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1790 goto retry;
1791 }
1792 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1793 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1794 /* OK, got more space */
1795 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1796 goto retry;
1797 }
1798 /* too bad */
1799 printk(KERN_WARNING
1800 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1801 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1802 audit_set_auditable(context);
1803 return;
1804 }
1805 rcu_read_unlock();
1806 #endif
1807 }
1808
1809 /**
1810 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1811 * @name: name to add
1812 *
1813 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1814 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1815 */
1816 void __audit_getname(const char *name)
1817 {
1818 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1819
1820 if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
1821 return;
1822
1823 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1824 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1825 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1826 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1827 dump_stack();
1828 #endif
1829 return;
1830 }
1831 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1832 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
1833 context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1834 context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
1835 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1836 context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0;
1837 ++context->name_count;
1838 if (!context->pwd.dentry) {
1839 read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
1840 context->pwd = current->fs->pwd;
1841 path_get(&current->fs->pwd);
1842 read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
1843 }
1844
1845 }
1846
1847 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1848 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1849 *
1850 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1851 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1852 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1853 */
1854 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1855 {
1856 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1857
1858 BUG_ON(!context);
1859 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1860 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1861 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1862 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1863 if (context->name_count) {
1864 int i;
1865 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1866 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1867 context->names[i].name,
1868 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
1869 }
1870 #endif
1871 __putname(name);
1872 }
1873 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1874 else {
1875 ++context->put_count;
1876 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1877 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1878 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1879 " put_count=%d\n",
1880 __FILE__, __LINE__,
1881 context->serial, context->major,
1882 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1883 context->put_count);
1884 dump_stack();
1885 }
1886 }
1887 #endif
1888 }
1889
1890 static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context,
1891 const struct inode *inode)
1892 {
1893 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) {
1894 if (inode)
1895 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data: "
1896 "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n",
1897 MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1898 MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1899 inode->i_ino);
1900
1901 else
1902 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n");
1903 return 1;
1904 }
1905 context->name_count++;
1906 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1907 context->ino_count++;
1908 #endif
1909 return 0;
1910 }
1911
1912
1913 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1914 {
1915 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
1916 int rc;
1917
1918 memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1919 memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1920 name->fcap.fE = 0;
1921 name->fcap_ver = 0;
1922
1923 if (!dentry)
1924 return 0;
1925
1926 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
1927 if (rc)
1928 return rc;
1929
1930 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
1931 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
1932 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
1933 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
1934
1935 return 0;
1936 }
1937
1938
1939 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1940 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1941 const struct inode *inode)
1942 {
1943 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1944 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1945 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1946 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1947 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1948 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1949 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
1950 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
1951 }
1952
1953 /**
1954 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1955 * @name: name being audited
1956 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1957 *
1958 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1959 */
1960 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1961 {
1962 int idx;
1963 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1964 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1965
1966 if (!context->in_syscall)
1967 return;
1968 if (context->name_count
1969 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1970 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1971 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1972 else if (context->name_count > 1
1973 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1974 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1975 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1976 else {
1977 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1978 * associated name? */
1979 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
1980 return;
1981 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1982 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1983 }
1984 handle_path(dentry);
1985 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode);
1986 }
1987
1988 /**
1989 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1990 * @dname: inode's dentry name
1991 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1992 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1993 *
1994 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1995 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1996 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1997 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1998 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1999 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2000 * unsuccessful attempts.
2001 */
2002 void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry,
2003 const struct inode *parent)
2004 {
2005 int idx;
2006 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2007 const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
2008 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2009 int dirlen = 0;
2010
2011 if (!context->in_syscall)
2012 return;
2013
2014 if (inode)
2015 handle_one(inode);
2016 /* determine matching parent */
2017 if (!dname)
2018 goto add_names;
2019
2020 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
2021 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
2022 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
2023
2024 if (!n->name)
2025 continue;
2026
2027 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
2028 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2029 n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
2030 found_parent = n->name;
2031 goto add_names;
2032 }
2033 }
2034
2035 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
2036 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
2037 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
2038
2039 if (!n->name)
2040 continue;
2041
2042 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
2043 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
2044 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2045 if (inode)
2046 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode);
2047 else
2048 n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2049 found_child = n->name;
2050 goto add_names;
2051 }
2052 }
2053
2054 add_names:
2055 if (!found_parent) {
2056 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent))
2057 return;
2058 idx = context->name_count - 1;
2059 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
2060 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent);
2061 }
2062
2063 if (!found_child) {
2064 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
2065 return;
2066 idx = context->name_count - 1;
2067
2068 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2069 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2070 * audit_free_names() */
2071 if (found_parent) {
2072 context->names[idx].name = found_parent;
2073 context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2074 /* don't call __putname() */
2075 context->names[idx].name_put = 0;
2076 } else {
2077 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
2078 }
2079
2080 if (inode)
2081 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode);
2082 else
2083 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2084 }
2085 }
2086 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2087
2088 /**
2089 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2090 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2091 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
2092 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2093 *
2094 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2095 */
2096 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2097 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
2098 {
2099 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2100 return 0;
2101 if (!ctx->serial)
2102 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2103 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2104 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2105 *serial = ctx->serial;
2106 if (!ctx->prio) {
2107 ctx->prio = 1;
2108 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
2109 }
2110 return 1;
2111 }
2112
2113 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
2114 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
2115
2116 /**
2117 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
2118 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
2119 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2120 *
2121 * Returns 0.
2122 *
2123 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2124 */
2125 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
2126 {
2127 unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
2128 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
2129
2130 if (context && context->in_syscall) {
2131 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2132
2133 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
2134 if (ab) {
2135 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
2136 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
2137 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
2138 task->pid, task_uid(task),
2139 task->loginuid, loginuid,
2140 task->sessionid, sessionid);
2141 audit_log_end(ab);
2142 }
2143 }
2144 task->sessionid = sessionid;
2145 task->loginuid = loginuid;
2146 return 0;
2147 }
2148
2149 /**
2150 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2151 * @oflag: open flag
2152 * @mode: mode bits
2153 * @u_attr: queue attributes
2154 *
2155 */
2156 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2157 {
2158 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2159
2160 if (attr)
2161 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2162 else
2163 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2164
2165 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2166 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2167
2168 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2169 }
2170
2171 /**
2172 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2173 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2174 * @msg_len: Message length
2175 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2176 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2177 *
2178 */
2179 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2180 const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
2181 {
2182 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2183 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2184
2185 if (abs_timeout)
2186 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
2187 else
2188 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
2189
2190 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2191 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2192 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2193
2194 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2195 }
2196
2197 /**
2198 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2199 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2200 * @u_notification: Notification event
2201 *
2202 */
2203
2204 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2205 {
2206 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2207
2208 if (notification)
2209 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2210 else
2211 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2212
2213 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2214 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2215 }
2216
2217 /**
2218 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2219 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2220 * @mqstat: MQ flags
2221 *
2222 */
2223 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2224 {
2225 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2226 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2227 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2228 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2229 }
2230
2231 /**
2232 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2233 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2234 *
2235 */
2236 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2237 {
2238 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2239 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2240 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2241 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2242 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2243 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2244 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2245 }
2246
2247 /**
2248 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2249 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2250 * @uid: msgq user id
2251 * @gid: msgq group id
2252 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2253 *
2254 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2255 */
2256 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
2257 {
2258 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2259
2260 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2261 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2262 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2263 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2264 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2265 }
2266
2267 int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2268 {
2269 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
2270 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2271
2272 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
2273 return 0;
2274
2275 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2276 if (!ax)
2277 return -ENOMEM;
2278
2279 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
2280 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
2281 ax->mm = bprm->mm;
2282 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2283 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2284 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2285 return 0;
2286 }
2287
2288
2289 /**
2290 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2291 * @nargs: number of args
2292 * @args: args array
2293 *
2294 */
2295 void audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2296 {
2297 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2298
2299 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2300 return;
2301
2302 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2303 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2304 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2305 }
2306
2307 /**
2308 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2309 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2310 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2311 *
2312 */
2313 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2314 {
2315 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2316 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2317 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2318 }
2319
2320 /**
2321 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2322 * @len: data length in user space
2323 * @a: data address in kernel space
2324 *
2325 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2326 */
2327 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2328 {
2329 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2330
2331 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2332 return 0;
2333
2334 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2335 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2336 if (!p)
2337 return -ENOMEM;
2338 context->sockaddr = p;
2339 }
2340
2341 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2342 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2343 return 0;
2344 }
2345
2346 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2347 {
2348 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2349
2350 context->target_pid = t->pid;
2351 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2352 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2353 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2354 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2355 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2356 }
2357
2358 /**
2359 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2360 * @sig: signal value
2361 * @t: task being signaled
2362 *
2363 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2364 * and uid that is doing that.
2365 */
2366 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2367 {
2368 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2369 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2370 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2371 uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
2372
2373 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2374 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2375 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
2376 if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
2377 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2378 else
2379 audit_sig_uid = uid;
2380 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2381 }
2382 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2383 return 0;
2384 }
2385
2386 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2387 * in audit_context */
2388 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2389 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
2390 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2391 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2392 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2393 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2394 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2395 return 0;
2396 }
2397
2398 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2399 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2400 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2401 if (!axp)
2402 return -ENOMEM;
2403
2404 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2405 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2406 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2407 }
2408 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2409
2410 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
2411 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2412 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2413 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2414 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2415 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2416 axp->pid_count++;
2417
2418 return 0;
2419 }
2420
2421 /**
2422 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2423 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2424 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2425 * @old: the old credentials
2426 *
2427 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2428 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2429 *
2430 * -Eric
2431 */
2432 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2433 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2434 {
2435 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2436 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2437 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2438 struct dentry *dentry;
2439
2440 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2441 if (!ax)
2442 return -ENOMEM;
2443
2444 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2445 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2446 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2447
2448 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
2449 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
2450 dput(dentry);
2451
2452 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2453 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2454 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2455 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2456
2457 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2458 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2459 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2460
2461 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2462 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2463 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2464 return 0;
2465 }
2466
2467 /**
2468 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2469 * @pid: target pid of the capset call
2470 * @new: the new credentials
2471 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2472 *
2473 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2474 * audit system if applicable
2475 */
2476 void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid,
2477 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2478 {
2479 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2480 context->capset.pid = pid;
2481 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2482 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2483 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2484 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2485 }
2486
2487 /**
2488 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2489 * @signr: signal value
2490 *
2491 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2492 * should record the event for investigation.
2493 */
2494 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2495 {
2496 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2497 u32 sid;
2498 uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid;
2499 gid_t gid;
2500 unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2501
2502 if (!audit_enabled)
2503 return;
2504
2505 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2506 return;
2507
2508 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2509 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2510 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2511 auid, uid, gid, sessionid);
2512 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
2513 if (sid) {
2514 char *ctx = NULL;
2515 u32 len;
2516
2517 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
2518 audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
2519 else {
2520 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
2521 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
2522 }
2523 }
2524 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2525 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2526 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2527 audit_log_end(ab);
2528 }
Linux 2.6 ibm-acpi/thinkpad-acpi driver git tree