Linux 3.0-rc7
[linux-2.6/linux-acpi-2.6/ibm-acpi-2.6.git] / net / mac80211 / wpa.c
blobd91c1a26630dc07a00ec22547e13ca7a02620f33
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
3 * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 * published by the Free Software Foundation.
8 */
10 #include <linux/netdevice.h>
11 #include <linux/types.h>
12 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
13 #include <linux/compiler.h>
14 #include <linux/ieee80211.h>
15 #include <linux/gfp.h>
16 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
17 #include <net/mac80211.h>
19 #include "ieee80211_i.h"
20 #include "michael.h"
21 #include "tkip.h"
22 #include "aes_ccm.h"
23 #include "aes_cmac.h"
24 #include "wpa.h"
26 ieee80211_tx_result
27 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
29 u8 *data, *key, *mic;
30 size_t data_len;
31 unsigned int hdrlen;
32 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
33 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
34 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
35 int tail;
37 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
38 if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
39 skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
40 return TX_CONTINUE;
42 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
43 if (skb->len < hdrlen)
44 return TX_DROP;
46 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
47 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
49 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
50 /* Need to use software crypto for the test */
51 info->control.hw_key = NULL;
54 if (info->control.hw_key &&
55 !(tx->flags & IEEE80211_TX_FRAGMENTED) &&
56 !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)) {
57 /* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC */
58 return TX_CONTINUE;
61 tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
62 if (!info->control.hw_key)
63 tail += TKIP_ICV_LEN;
65 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
66 skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN))
67 return TX_DROP;
69 key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
70 mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
71 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
72 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
73 mic[0]++;
75 return TX_CONTINUE;
79 ieee80211_rx_result
80 ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
82 u8 *data, *key = NULL;
83 size_t data_len;
84 unsigned int hdrlen;
85 u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
86 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
87 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
88 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
91 * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
92 * than data frames.
94 if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
95 return RX_CONTINUE;
98 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
99 * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
100 * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
101 * MIC failure report.
103 if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
104 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
105 goto mic_fail;
107 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
108 goto update_iv;
110 return RX_CONTINUE;
114 * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
115 * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
116 * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
118 if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
119 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
120 return RX_CONTINUE;
122 if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
124 * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
125 * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
126 * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
127 * frames in the BSS. (
129 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
132 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
133 goto mic_fail;
135 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
136 if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
137 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
139 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
140 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
141 key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
142 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
143 if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
144 goto mic_fail;
146 /* remove Michael MIC from payload */
147 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
149 update_iv:
150 /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
151 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->queue].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
152 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->queue].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
154 return RX_CONTINUE;
156 mic_fail:
158 * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in
159 * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if
160 * the key is set.
162 mac80211_ev_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata,
163 rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1,
164 (void *) skb->data, NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
165 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
169 static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
171 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
172 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
173 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
174 unsigned int hdrlen;
175 int len, tail;
176 u8 *pos;
178 if (info->control.hw_key &&
179 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) {
180 /* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
181 return 0;
184 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
185 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
187 if (info->control.hw_key)
188 tail = 0;
189 else
190 tail = TKIP_ICV_LEN;
192 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
193 skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN))
194 return -1;
196 pos = skb_push(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN);
197 memmove(pos, pos + TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
198 pos += hdrlen;
200 /* Increase IV for the frame */
201 key->u.tkip.tx.iv16++;
202 if (key->u.tkip.tx.iv16 == 0)
203 key->u.tkip.tx.iv32++;
205 pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, key, key->u.tkip.tx.iv16);
207 /* hwaccel - with software IV */
208 if (info->control.hw_key)
209 return 0;
211 /* Add room for ICV */
212 skb_put(skb, TKIP_ICV_LEN);
214 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
215 return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(tx->local->wep_tx_tfm,
216 key, pos, len, hdr->addr2);
220 ieee80211_tx_result
221 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
223 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
225 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
227 do {
228 if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
229 return TX_DROP;
230 } while ((skb = skb->next));
232 return TX_CONTINUE;
236 ieee80211_rx_result
237 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
239 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
240 int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
241 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
242 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
243 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
245 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
247 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
248 return RX_CONTINUE;
250 if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
251 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
254 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
255 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
256 * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
258 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
259 hwaccel = 1;
261 res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
262 key, skb->data + hdrlen,
263 skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
264 hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->queue,
265 &rx->tkip_iv32,
266 &rx->tkip_iv16);
267 if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
268 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
270 /* Trim ICV */
271 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - TKIP_ICV_LEN);
273 /* Remove IV */
274 memmove(skb->data + TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
275 skb_pull(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN);
277 return RX_CONTINUE;
281 static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch,
282 int encrypted)
284 __le16 mask_fc;
285 int a4_included, mgmt;
286 u8 qos_tid;
287 u8 *b_0, *aad;
288 u16 data_len, len_a;
289 unsigned int hdrlen;
290 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
292 b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_LEN;
293 aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_LEN;
296 * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
297 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
299 mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
300 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
301 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
302 IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
303 if (!mgmt)
304 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
305 mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
307 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
308 len_a = hdrlen - 2;
309 a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
311 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
312 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
313 else
314 qos_tid = 0;
316 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN;
317 if (encrypted)
318 data_len -= CCMP_MIC_LEN;
320 /* First block, b_0 */
321 b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */
322 /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
323 * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
325 b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
326 memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
327 memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
328 /* l(m) */
329 put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]);
331 /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
332 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
333 put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
334 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
335 memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
337 /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
338 aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
339 aad[23] = 0;
341 if (a4_included) {
342 memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
343 aad[30] = qos_tid;
344 aad[31] = 0;
345 } else {
346 memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
347 aad[24] = qos_tid;
352 static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
354 hdr[0] = pn[5];
355 hdr[1] = pn[4];
356 hdr[2] = 0;
357 hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
358 hdr[4] = pn[3];
359 hdr[5] = pn[2];
360 hdr[6] = pn[1];
361 hdr[7] = pn[0];
365 static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
367 pn[0] = hdr[7];
368 pn[1] = hdr[6];
369 pn[2] = hdr[5];
370 pn[3] = hdr[4];
371 pn[4] = hdr[1];
372 pn[5] = hdr[0];
376 static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
378 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
379 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
380 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
381 int hdrlen, len, tail;
382 u8 *pos, *pn;
383 int i;
385 if (info->control.hw_key &&
386 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) {
388 * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
389 * header or MIC fields
391 return 0;
394 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
395 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
397 if (info->control.hw_key)
398 tail = 0;
399 else
400 tail = CCMP_MIC_LEN;
402 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
403 skb_headroom(skb) < CCMP_HDR_LEN))
404 return -1;
406 pos = skb_push(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
407 memmove(pos, pos + CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
408 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
409 pos += hdrlen;
411 /* PN = PN + 1 */
412 pn = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn;
414 for (i = CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
415 pn[i]++;
416 if (pn[i])
417 break;
420 ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
422 /* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
423 if (info->control.hw_key)
424 return 0;
426 pos += CCMP_HDR_LEN;
427 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, key->u.ccmp.tx_crypto_buf, 0);
428 ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, key->u.ccmp.tx_crypto_buf, pos, len,
429 pos, skb_put(skb, CCMP_MIC_LEN));
431 return 0;
435 ieee80211_tx_result
436 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
438 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
440 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
442 do {
443 if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
444 return TX_DROP;
445 } while ((skb = skb->next));
447 return TX_CONTINUE;
451 ieee80211_rx_result
452 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
454 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
455 int hdrlen;
456 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
457 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
458 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
459 u8 pn[CCMP_PN_LEN];
460 int data_len;
461 int queue;
463 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
465 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
466 !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(hdr))
467 return RX_CONTINUE;
469 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN - CCMP_MIC_LEN;
470 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
471 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
473 ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
475 queue = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control) ?
476 NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES : rx->queue;
478 if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
479 key->u.ccmp.replays++;
480 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
483 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
484 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
485 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf, 1);
487 if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
488 key->u.ccmp.tfm, key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf,
489 skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len,
490 skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN,
491 skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
492 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
495 memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
497 /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
498 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN);
499 memmove(skb->data + CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
500 skb_pull(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
502 return RX_CONTINUE;
506 static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
508 /* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
510 /* FC type/subtype */
511 aad[0] = skb->data[0];
512 /* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
513 aad[1] = skb->data[1] & ~(BIT(4) | BIT(5) | BIT(6));
514 /* A1 || A2 || A3 */
515 memcpy(aad + 2, skb->data + 4, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
519 static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
521 *d++ = s[5];
522 *d++ = s[4];
523 *d++ = s[3];
524 *d++ = s[2];
525 *d++ = s[1];
526 *d = s[0];
530 ieee80211_tx_result
531 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
533 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
534 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
535 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
536 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
537 u8 *pn, aad[20];
538 int i;
540 if (info->control.hw_key)
541 return 0;
543 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
544 return TX_DROP;
546 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
547 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
548 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
549 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
551 /* PN = PN + 1 */
552 pn = key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn;
554 for (i = sizeof(key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
555 pn[i]++;
556 if (pn[i])
557 break;
559 bip_ipn_swap(mmie->sequence_number, pn);
561 bip_aad(skb, aad);
564 * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
566 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, key->u.aes_cmac.tx_crypto_buf,
567 aad, skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
569 return TX_CONTINUE;
573 ieee80211_rx_result
574 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
576 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
577 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
578 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
579 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
580 u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6];
581 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
583 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
584 return RX_CONTINUE;
586 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
587 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
589 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *)
590 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
591 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
592 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
593 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
595 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
597 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
598 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
599 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
602 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
603 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
604 bip_aad(skb, aad);
605 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm,
606 key->u.aes_cmac.rx_crypto_buf, aad,
607 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
608 if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
609 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
610 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
614 memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
616 /* Remove MMIE */
617 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
619 return RX_CONTINUE;