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Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mason/btrfs-unstable
[linux-2.6/linux-acpi-2.6/ibm-acpi-2.6.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c
blob2fcad7c33eafd43a5e67beef49aea5f7cd020a89
1 /*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 *
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
24 */
25
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
35 #include <linux/mm.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
50 #include <net/icmp.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
70 #include <net/ipv6.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
79
80 #include "avc.h"
81 #include "objsec.h"
82 #include "netif.h"
83 #include "netnode.h"
84 #include "netport.h"
85 #include "xfrm.h"
86 #include "netlabel.h"
87 #include "audit.h"
88
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
91
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
93
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
97
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
103
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
105 {
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
109 return 1;
110 }
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
112 #endif
113
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
116
117 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
118 {
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
122 return 1;
123 }
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
125 #else
126 int selinux_enabled = 1;
127 #endif
128
129
130 /*
131 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
133 */
134 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
135
136 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
137 before the policy was loaded. */
138 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
139 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
140
141 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
142
143 /**
144 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
145 *
146 * Description:
147 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
148 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
149 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
150 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
151 *
152 */
153 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
154 {
155 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
156 }
157
158 /*
159 * initialise the security for the init task
160 */
161 static void cred_init_security(void)
162 {
163 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
164 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
165
166 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
167 if (!tsec)
168 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
169
170 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
171 cred->security = tsec;
172 }
173
174 /*
175 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
176 */
177 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
178 {
179 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
180
181 tsec = cred->security;
182 return tsec->sid;
183 }
184
185 /*
186 * get the objective security ID of a task
187 */
188 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
189 {
190 u32 sid;
191
192 rcu_read_lock();
193 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
194 rcu_read_unlock();
195 return sid;
196 }
197
198 /*
199 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
200 */
201 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
202 {
203 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
204
205 return tsec->sid;
206 }
207
208 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
209
210 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
211 {
212 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
213 u32 sid = current_sid();
214
215 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
216 if (!isec)
217 return -ENOMEM;
218
219 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
220 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
221 isec->inode = inode;
222 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
223 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
224 isec->task_sid = sid;
225 inode->i_security = isec;
226
227 return 0;
228 }
229
230 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
231 {
232 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
233 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
234
235 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
236 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
237 list_del_init(&isec->list);
238 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
239
240 inode->i_security = NULL;
241 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
242 }
243
244 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
245 {
246 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
247 u32 sid = current_sid();
248
249 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
250 if (!fsec)
251 return -ENOMEM;
252
253 fsec->sid = sid;
254 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
255 file->f_security = fsec;
256
257 return 0;
258 }
259
260 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
261 {
262 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
263 file->f_security = NULL;
264 kfree(fsec);
265 }
266
267 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
268 {
269 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
270
271 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
272 if (!sbsec)
273 return -ENOMEM;
274
275 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
276 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
278 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
279 sbsec->sb = sb;
280 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
281 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
282 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
283 sb->s_security = sbsec;
284
285 return 0;
286 }
287
288 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
289 {
290 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
291
292 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
293 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
294 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
295 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
296
297 sb->s_security = NULL;
298 kfree(sbsec);
299 }
300
301 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
302 {
303 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
304
305 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
306 if (!ssec)
307 return -ENOMEM;
308
309 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
310 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 sk->sk_security = ssec;
312
313 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec);
314
315 return 0;
316 }
317
318 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
319 {
320 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
321
322 sk->sk_security = NULL;
323 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
324 kfree(ssec);
325 }
326
327 /* The security server must be initialized before
328 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
329 extern int ss_initialized;
330
331 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
332
333 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
334 "uses xattr",
335 "uses transition SIDs",
336 "uses task SIDs",
337 "uses genfs_contexts",
338 "not configured for labeling",
339 "uses mountpoint labeling",
340 };
341
342 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
343
344 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
345 {
346 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
347 }
348
349 enum {
350 Opt_error = -1,
351 Opt_context = 1,
352 Opt_fscontext = 2,
353 Opt_defcontext = 3,
354 Opt_rootcontext = 4,
355 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
356 };
357
358 static const match_table_t tokens = {
359 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
360 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
363 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
364 {Opt_error, NULL},
365 };
366
367 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
368
369 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
370 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
371 const struct cred *cred)
372 {
373 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
374 int rc;
375
376 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
377 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
378 if (rc)
379 return rc;
380
381 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
382 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
383 return rc;
384 }
385
386 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
387 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
388 const struct cred *cred)
389 {
390 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
391 int rc;
392 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
393 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
394 if (rc)
395 return rc;
396
397 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
398 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
399 return rc;
400 }
401
402 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
403 {
404 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
405 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
406 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
407 int rc = 0;
408
409 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
410 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
411 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
412 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
413 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
414 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
415 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
416 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
417 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
418 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
419 goto out;
420 }
421 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
422 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
423 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
424 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
425 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
426 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
427 else
428 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
429 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
430 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
431 goto out;
432 }
433 }
434
435 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
436
437 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
438 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
439 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
440 else
441 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
442 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
443 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
444
445 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
446 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
447 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
448 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
449 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
450
451 /* Initialize the root inode. */
452 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
453
454 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
455 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
456 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
457 populates itself. */
458 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
459 next_inode:
460 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
461 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
462 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
463 struct inode_security_struct, list);
464 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
465 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
466 inode = igrab(inode);
467 if (inode) {
468 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
469 inode_doinit(inode);
470 iput(inode);
471 }
472 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
473 list_del_init(&isec->list);
474 goto next_inode;
475 }
476 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
477 out:
478 return rc;
479 }
480
481 /*
482 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
483 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
484 * mount options, or whatever.
485 */
486 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
487 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
488 {
489 int rc = 0, i;
490 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
491 char *context = NULL;
492 u32 len;
493 char tmp;
494
495 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
496
497 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
498 return -EINVAL;
499
500 if (!ss_initialized)
501 return -EINVAL;
502
503 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
504 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
505 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
506 if (tmp & 0x01)
507 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
508 tmp >>= 1;
509 }
510 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
511 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
512 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
513
514 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
515 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
516 rc = -ENOMEM;
517 goto out_free;
518 }
519
520 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
521 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
522 rc = -ENOMEM;
523 goto out_free;
524 }
525
526 i = 0;
527 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
528 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
529 if (rc)
530 goto out_free;
531 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
532 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
533 }
534 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
535 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
536 if (rc)
537 goto out_free;
538 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
539 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
540 }
541 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
542 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
543 if (rc)
544 goto out_free;
545 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
546 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
547 }
548 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
549 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
550 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
551
552 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
553 if (rc)
554 goto out_free;
555 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
556 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
557 }
558 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
559 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
560 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
561 }
562
563 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
564
565 return 0;
566
567 out_free:
568 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
569 return rc;
570 }
571
572 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
573 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
574 {
575 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
576
577 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
578 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
579 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
580 (old_sid != new_sid))
581 return 1;
582
583 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
584 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
585 */
586 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
587 if (mnt_flags & flag)
588 return 1;
589 return 0;
590 }
591
592 /*
593 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
594 * labeling information.
595 */
596 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
597 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
598 {
599 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
600 int rc = 0, i;
601 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
602 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
603 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
604 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
605 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
606 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
607 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
608 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
609 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
610
611 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
612
613 if (!ss_initialized) {
614 if (!num_opts) {
615 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
616 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
617 server is ready to handle calls. */
618 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
619 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
620 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
621 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
622 goto out;
623 }
624 rc = -EINVAL;
625 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
626 "before the security server is initialized\n");
627 goto out;
628 }
629
630 /*
631 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
632 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
633 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
634 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
635 *
636 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
637 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
638 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
639 * will be used for both mounts)
640 */
641 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
642 && (num_opts == 0))
643 goto out;
644
645 /*
646 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
647 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
648 * than once with different security options.
649 */
650 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
651 u32 sid;
652
653 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
654 continue;
655 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
656 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
657 if (rc) {
658 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
659 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
660 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
661 goto out;
662 }
663 switch (flags[i]) {
664 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
665 fscontext_sid = sid;
666
667 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
668 fscontext_sid))
669 goto out_double_mount;
670
671 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
672 break;
673 case CONTEXT_MNT:
674 context_sid = sid;
675
676 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
677 context_sid))
678 goto out_double_mount;
679
680 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
681 break;
682 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
683 rootcontext_sid = sid;
684
685 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
686 rootcontext_sid))
687 goto out_double_mount;
688
689 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
690
691 break;
692 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
693 defcontext_sid = sid;
694
695 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
696 defcontext_sid))
697 goto out_double_mount;
698
699 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
700
701 break;
702 default:
703 rc = -EINVAL;
704 goto out;
705 }
706 }
707
708 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
709 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
710 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
711 goto out_double_mount;
712 rc = 0;
713 goto out;
714 }
715
716 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
717 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
718
719 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
720 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
721 if (rc) {
722 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
723 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
724 goto out;
725 }
726
727 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
728 if (fscontext_sid) {
729 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
730 if (rc)
731 goto out;
732
733 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
734 }
735
736 /*
737 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
738 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
739 * the superblock context if not already set.
740 */
741 if (context_sid) {
742 if (!fscontext_sid) {
743 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
744 cred);
745 if (rc)
746 goto out;
747 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
748 } else {
749 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
750 cred);
751 if (rc)
752 goto out;
753 }
754 if (!rootcontext_sid)
755 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
756
757 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
758 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
759 }
760
761 if (rootcontext_sid) {
762 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
763 cred);
764 if (rc)
765 goto out;
766
767 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
768 root_isec->initialized = 1;
769 }
770
771 if (defcontext_sid) {
772 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
773 rc = -EINVAL;
774 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
775 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
776 goto out;
777 }
778
779 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
780 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
781 sbsec, cred);
782 if (rc)
783 goto out;
784 }
785
786 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
787 }
788
789 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
790 out:
791 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
792 return rc;
793 out_double_mount:
794 rc = -EINVAL;
795 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
796 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
797 goto out;
798 }
799
800 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
801 struct super_block *newsb)
802 {
803 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
804 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
805
806 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
807 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
808 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
809
810 /*
811 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
812 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
813 * with it later
814 */
815 if (!ss_initialized) {
816 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
817 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
818 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
819 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
820 return;
821 }
822
823 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
824 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
825
826 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
827 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
828 return;
829
830 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
831
832 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
833
834 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
835 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
836 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
837
838 if (set_context) {
839 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
840
841 if (!set_fscontext)
842 newsbsec->sid = sid;
843 if (!set_rootcontext) {
844 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
845 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
846 newisec->sid = sid;
847 }
848 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
849 }
850 if (set_rootcontext) {
851 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
852 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
853 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
854 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
855
856 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
857 }
858
859 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
860 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
861 }
862
863 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
864 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
865 {
866 char *p;
867 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
868 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
869 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
870
871 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
872
873 /* Standard string-based options. */
874 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
875 int token;
876 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
877
878 if (!*p)
879 continue;
880
881 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
882
883 switch (token) {
884 case Opt_context:
885 if (context || defcontext) {
886 rc = -EINVAL;
887 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
888 goto out_err;
889 }
890 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
891 if (!context) {
892 rc = -ENOMEM;
893 goto out_err;
894 }
895 break;
896
897 case Opt_fscontext:
898 if (fscontext) {
899 rc = -EINVAL;
900 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
901 goto out_err;
902 }
903 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
904 if (!fscontext) {
905 rc = -ENOMEM;
906 goto out_err;
907 }
908 break;
909
910 case Opt_rootcontext:
911 if (rootcontext) {
912 rc = -EINVAL;
913 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
914 goto out_err;
915 }
916 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
917 if (!rootcontext) {
918 rc = -ENOMEM;
919 goto out_err;
920 }
921 break;
922
923 case Opt_defcontext:
924 if (context || defcontext) {
925 rc = -EINVAL;
926 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
927 goto out_err;
928 }
929 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
930 if (!defcontext) {
931 rc = -ENOMEM;
932 goto out_err;
933 }
934 break;
935 case Opt_labelsupport:
936 break;
937 default:
938 rc = -EINVAL;
939 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
940 goto out_err;
941
942 }
943 }
944
945 rc = -ENOMEM;
946 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
947 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
948 goto out_err;
949
950 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
951 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
952 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
953 goto out_err;
954 }
955
956 if (fscontext) {
957 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
958 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
959 }
960 if (context) {
961 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
962 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
963 }
964 if (rootcontext) {
965 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
966 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
967 }
968 if (defcontext) {
969 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
970 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
971 }
972
973 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
974 return 0;
975
976 out_err:
977 kfree(context);
978 kfree(defcontext);
979 kfree(fscontext);
980 kfree(rootcontext);
981 return rc;
982 }
983 /*
984 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
985 */
986 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
987 {
988 int rc = 0;
989 char *options = data;
990 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
991
992 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
993
994 if (!data)
995 goto out;
996
997 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
998
999 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1000 if (rc)
1001 goto out_err;
1002
1003 out:
1004 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1005
1006 out_err:
1007 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1008 return rc;
1009 }
1010
1011 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1012 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1013 {
1014 int i;
1015 char *prefix;
1016
1017 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1018 char *has_comma;
1019
1020 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1021 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1022 else
1023 has_comma = NULL;
1024
1025 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1026 case CONTEXT_MNT:
1027 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1028 break;
1029 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
1030 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1031 break;
1032 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1033 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1034 break;
1035 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1036 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1037 break;
1038 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1039 seq_putc(m, ',');
1040 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1041 continue;
1042 default:
1043 BUG();
1044 };
1045 /* we need a comma before each option */
1046 seq_putc(m, ',');
1047 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1048 if (has_comma)
1049 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1050 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1051 if (has_comma)
1052 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1053 }
1054 }
1055
1056 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1057 {
1058 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1059 int rc;
1060
1061 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1062 if (rc) {
1063 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1064 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1065 rc = 0;
1066 return rc;
1067 }
1068
1069 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1070
1071 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1072
1073 return rc;
1074 }
1075
1076 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1077 {
1078 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1079 case S_IFSOCK:
1080 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1081 case S_IFLNK:
1082 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1083 case S_IFREG:
1084 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1085 case S_IFBLK:
1086 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1087 case S_IFDIR:
1088 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1089 case S_IFCHR:
1090 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1091 case S_IFIFO:
1092 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1093
1094 }
1095
1096 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1097 }
1098
1099 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1100 {
1101 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1102 }
1103
1104 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1105 {
1106 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1107 }
1108
1109 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1110 {
1111 switch (family) {
1112 case PF_UNIX:
1113 switch (type) {
1114 case SOCK_STREAM:
1115 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1116 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1117 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1118 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1119 }
1120 break;
1121 case PF_INET:
1122 case PF_INET6:
1123 switch (type) {
1124 case SOCK_STREAM:
1125 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1126 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1127 else
1128 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1129 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1130 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1131 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1132 else
1133 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1134 case SOCK_DCCP:
1135 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1136 default:
1137 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1138 }
1139 break;
1140 case PF_NETLINK:
1141 switch (protocol) {
1142 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1143 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1144 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1145 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1146 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1147 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1148 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1149 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1150 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1151 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1152 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1153 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1154 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1155 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1156 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1157 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1158 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1159 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1160 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1161 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1162 default:
1163 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1164 }
1165 case PF_PACKET:
1166 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1167 case PF_KEY:
1168 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1169 case PF_APPLETALK:
1170 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1171 }
1172
1173 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1174 }
1175
1176 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1177 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1178 u16 tclass,
1179 u32 *sid)
1180 {
1181 int buflen, rc;
1182 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1183
1184 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1185 if (!buffer)
1186 return -ENOMEM;
1187
1188 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1189 end = buffer+buflen;
1190 *--end = '\0';
1191 buflen--;
1192 path = end-1;
1193 *path = '/';
1194 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1195 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1196 if (buflen < 0)
1197 break;
1198 end -= de->namelen;
1199 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1200 *--end = '/';
1201 path = end;
1202 de = de->parent;
1203 }
1204 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1205 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1206 return rc;
1207 }
1208 #else
1209 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1210 u16 tclass,
1211 u32 *sid)
1212 {
1213 return -EINVAL;
1214 }
1215 #endif
1216
1217 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1218 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1219 {
1220 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1221 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1222 u32 sid;
1223 struct dentry *dentry;
1224 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1225 char *context = NULL;
1226 unsigned len = 0;
1227 int rc = 0;
1228
1229 if (isec->initialized)
1230 goto out;
1231
1232 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1233 if (isec->initialized)
1234 goto out_unlock;
1235
1236 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1237 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1238 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1239 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1240 server is ready to handle calls. */
1241 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1242 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1243 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1244 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1245 goto out_unlock;
1246 }
1247
1248 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1249 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1250 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1251 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1252 break;
1253 }
1254
1255 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1256 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1257 if (opt_dentry) {
1258 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1259 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1260 } else {
1261 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1262 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1263 }
1264 if (!dentry) {
1265 /*
1266 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1267 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1268 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1269 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1270 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1271 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1272 * be used again by userspace.
1273 */
1274 goto out_unlock;
1275 }
1276
1277 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1278 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1279 if (!context) {
1280 rc = -ENOMEM;
1281 dput(dentry);
1282 goto out_unlock;
1283 }
1284 context[len] = '\0';
1285 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1286 context, len);
1287 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1288 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1289 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1290 NULL, 0);
1291 if (rc < 0) {
1292 dput(dentry);
1293 goto out_unlock;
1294 }
1295 kfree(context);
1296 len = rc;
1297 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1298 if (!context) {
1299 rc = -ENOMEM;
1300 dput(dentry);
1301 goto out_unlock;
1302 }
1303 context[len] = '\0';
1304 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1305 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1306 context, len);
1307 }
1308 dput(dentry);
1309 if (rc < 0) {
1310 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1311 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1312 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1313 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1314 kfree(context);
1315 goto out_unlock;
1316 }
1317 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1318 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1319 rc = 0;
1320 } else {
1321 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1322 sbsec->def_sid,
1323 GFP_NOFS);
1324 if (rc) {
1325 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1326 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1327
1328 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1329 if (printk_ratelimit())
1330 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1331 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1332 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1333 } else {
1334 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1335 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1336 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1337 }
1338 kfree(context);
1339 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1340 rc = 0;
1341 break;
1342 }
1343 }
1344 kfree(context);
1345 isec->sid = sid;
1346 break;
1347 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1348 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1349 break;
1350 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1351 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1352 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1353
1354 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1355 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1356 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1357 sbsec->sid,
1358 isec->sclass,
1359 &sid);
1360 if (rc)
1361 goto out_unlock;
1362 isec->sid = sid;
1363 break;
1364 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1365 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1366 break;
1367 default:
1368 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1369 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1370
1371 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1372 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1373 if (proci->pde) {
1374 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1375 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1376 isec->sclass,
1377 &sid);
1378 if (rc)
1379 goto out_unlock;
1380 isec->sid = sid;
1381 }
1382 }
1383 break;
1384 }
1385
1386 isec->initialized = 1;
1387
1388 out_unlock:
1389 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1390 out:
1391 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1392 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1393 return rc;
1394 }
1395
1396 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1397 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1398 {
1399 u32 perm = 0;
1400
1401 switch (sig) {
1402 case SIGCHLD:
1403 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1404 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1405 break;
1406 case SIGKILL:
1407 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1408 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1409 break;
1410 case SIGSTOP:
1411 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1412 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1413 break;
1414 default:
1415 /* All other signals. */
1416 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1417 break;
1418 }
1419
1420 return perm;
1421 }
1422
1423 /*
1424 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1425 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1426 */
1427 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1428 const struct cred *target,
1429 u32 perms)
1430 {
1431 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1432
1433 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1434 }
1435
1436 /*
1437 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1438 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1439 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1440 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1441 */
1442 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1443 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1444 u32 perms)
1445 {
1446 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1447 u32 sid1, sid2;
1448
1449 rcu_read_lock();
1450 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1451 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1452 rcu_read_unlock();
1453 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1454 }
1455
1456 /*
1457 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1458 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1459 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1460 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1461 */
1462 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1463 u32 perms)
1464 {
1465 u32 sid, tsid;
1466
1467 sid = current_sid();
1468 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1469 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1470 }
1471
1472 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1473 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1474 #endif
1475
1476 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1477 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1478 const struct cred *cred,
1479 int cap, int audit)
1480 {
1481 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1482 struct av_decision avd;
1483 u16 sclass;
1484 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1485 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1486 int rc;
1487
1488 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1489 ad.tsk = tsk;
1490 ad.u.cap = cap;
1491
1492 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1493 case 0:
1494 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1495 break;
1496 case 1:
1497 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1498 break;
1499 default:
1500 printk(KERN_ERR
1501 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1502 BUG();
1503 }
1504
1505 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1506 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1507 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1508 return rc;
1509 }
1510
1511 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1512 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1513 u32 perms)
1514 {
1515 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1516
1517 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1518 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1519 }
1520
1521 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1522 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1523 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1524 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1525 struct inode *inode,
1526 u32 perms,
1527 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1528 {
1529 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1530 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1531 u32 sid;
1532
1533 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1534 return 0;
1535
1536 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1537 isec = inode->i_security;
1538
1539 if (!adp) {
1540 adp = &ad;
1541 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1542 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1543 }
1544
1545 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1546 }
1547
1548 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1549 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1550 pathname if needed. */
1551 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1552 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1553 struct dentry *dentry,
1554 u32 av)
1555 {
1556 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1557 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1558
1559 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1560 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1561 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1562 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1563 }
1564
1565 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1566 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1567 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1568 check a particular permission to the file.
1569 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1570 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1571 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1572 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1573 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1574 struct file *file,
1575 u32 av)
1576 {
1577 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1578 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1579 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1580 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1581 int rc;
1582
1583 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1584 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1585
1586 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1587 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1588 SECCLASS_FD,
1589 FD__USE,
1590 &ad);
1591 if (rc)
1592 goto out;
1593 }
1594
1595 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1596 rc = 0;
1597 if (av)
1598 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1599
1600 out:
1601 return rc;
1602 }
1603
1604 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1605 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1606 struct dentry *dentry,
1607 u16 tclass)
1608 {
1609 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1610 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1611 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1612 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1613 u32 sid, newsid;
1614 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1615 int rc;
1616
1617 dsec = dir->i_security;
1618 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1619
1620 sid = tsec->sid;
1621 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1622
1623 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1624 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1625
1626 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1627 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1628 &ad);
1629 if (rc)
1630 return rc;
1631
1632 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1633 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1634 if (rc)
1635 return rc;
1636 }
1637
1638 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1639 if (rc)
1640 return rc;
1641
1642 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1643 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1644 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1645 }
1646
1647 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1648 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1649 struct task_struct *ctx)
1650 {
1651 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1652
1653 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1654 }
1655
1656 #define MAY_LINK 0
1657 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1658 #define MAY_RMDIR 2
1659
1660 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1661 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1662 struct dentry *dentry,
1663 int kind)
1664
1665 {
1666 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1667 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1668 u32 sid = current_sid();
1669 u32 av;
1670 int rc;
1671
1672 dsec = dir->i_security;
1673 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1674
1675 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1676 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1677
1678 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1679 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1680 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1681 if (rc)
1682 return rc;
1683
1684 switch (kind) {
1685 case MAY_LINK:
1686 av = FILE__LINK;
1687 break;
1688 case MAY_UNLINK:
1689 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1690 break;
1691 case MAY_RMDIR:
1692 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1693 break;
1694 default:
1695 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1696 __func__, kind);
1697 return 0;
1698 }
1699
1700 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1701 return rc;
1702 }
1703
1704 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1705 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1706 struct inode *new_dir,
1707 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1708 {
1709 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1710 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1711 u32 sid = current_sid();
1712 u32 av;
1713 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1714 int rc;
1715
1716 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1717 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1718 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1719 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1720
1721 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1722
1723 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1724 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1725 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1726 if (rc)
1727 return rc;
1728 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1729 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1730 if (rc)
1731 return rc;
1732 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1733 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1734 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1735 if (rc)
1736 return rc;
1737 }
1738
1739 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1740 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1741 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1742 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1743 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1744 if (rc)
1745 return rc;
1746 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1747 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1748 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1749 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1750 new_isec->sclass,
1751 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1752 if (rc)
1753 return rc;
1754 }
1755
1756 return 0;
1757 }
1758
1759 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1760 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1761 struct super_block *sb,
1762 u32 perms,
1763 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1764 {
1765 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1766 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1767
1768 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1769 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1770 }
1771
1772 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1773 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1774 {
1775 u32 av = 0;
1776
1777 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1778 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1779 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1780 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1781 av |= FILE__READ;
1782
1783 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1784 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1785 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1786 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1787
1788 } else {
1789 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1790 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1791 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1792 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1793 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1794 av |= DIR__READ;
1795 }
1796
1797 return av;
1798 }
1799
1800 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1801 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1802 {
1803 u32 av = 0;
1804
1805 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1806 av |= FILE__READ;
1807 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1808 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1809 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1810 else
1811 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1812 }
1813 if (!av) {
1814 /*
1815 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1816 */
1817 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1818 }
1819
1820 return av;
1821 }
1822
1823 /*
1824 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1825 * open permission.
1826 */
1827 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1828 {
1829 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1830
1831 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1832 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1833 /*
1834 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1835 */
1836 if (S_ISREG(mode))
1837 av |= FILE__OPEN;
1838 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1839 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1840 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1841 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1842 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1843 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1844 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1845 av |= DIR__OPEN;
1846 else if (S_ISSOCK(mode))
1847 av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN;
1848 else
1849 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1850 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1851 }
1852 return av;
1853 }
1854
1855 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1856
1857 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1858 unsigned int mode)
1859 {
1860 int rc;
1861
1862 rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1863 if (rc)
1864 return rc;
1865
1866 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1867 u32 sid = current_sid();
1868 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1869 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1870 }
1871
1872 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1873 }
1874
1875 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1876 {
1877 int rc;
1878
1879 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1880 if (rc)
1881 return rc;
1882
1883 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1884 }
1885
1886 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1887 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1888 {
1889 int error;
1890
1891 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1892 if (error)
1893 return error;
1894
1895 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1896 }
1897
1898 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1899 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1900 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1901 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1902 {
1903 int error;
1904
1905 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1906 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1907 if (error)
1908 return error;
1909
1910 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1911 }
1912
1913 /*
1914 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1915 * which was removed).
1916 *
1917 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1918 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1919 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1920 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1921 */
1922
1923 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1924 int cap, int audit)
1925 {
1926 int rc;
1927
1928 rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1929 if (rc)
1930 return rc;
1931
1932 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1933 }
1934
1935 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1936 {
1937 int buflen, rc;
1938 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1939
1940 rc = -ENOMEM;
1941 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1942 if (!buffer)
1943 goto out;
1944
1945 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1946 end = buffer+buflen;
1947 *--end = '\0';
1948 buflen--;
1949 path = end-1;
1950 *path = '/';
1951 while (table) {
1952 const char *name = table->procname;
1953 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1954 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1955 if (buflen < 0)
1956 goto out_free;
1957 end -= namelen;
1958 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1959 *--end = '/';
1960 path = end;
1961 table = table->parent;
1962 }
1963 buflen -= 4;
1964 if (buflen < 0)
1965 goto out_free;
1966 end -= 4;
1967 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1968 path = end;
1969 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1970 out_free:
1971 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1972 out:
1973 return rc;
1974 }
1975
1976 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1977 {
1978 int error = 0;
1979 u32 av;
1980 u32 tsid, sid;
1981 int rc;
1982
1983 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1984 if (rc)
1985 return rc;
1986
1987 sid = current_sid();
1988
1989 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1990 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1991 if (rc) {
1992 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1993 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1994 }
1995
1996 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1997 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1998 if (op == 001) {
1999 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
2000 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
2001 } else {
2002 av = 0;
2003 if (op & 004)
2004 av |= FILE__READ;
2005 if (op & 002)
2006 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2007 if (av)
2008 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
2009 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
2010 }
2011
2012 return error;
2013 }
2014
2015 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2016 {
2017 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2018 int rc = 0;
2019
2020 if (!sb)
2021 return 0;
2022
2023 switch (cmds) {
2024 case Q_SYNC:
2025 case Q_QUOTAON:
2026 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2027 case Q_SETINFO:
2028 case Q_SETQUOTA:
2029 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2030 break;
2031 case Q_GETFMT:
2032 case Q_GETINFO:
2033 case Q_GETQUOTA:
2034 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2035 break;
2036 default:
2037 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2038 break;
2039 }
2040 return rc;
2041 }
2042
2043 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2044 {
2045 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2046
2047 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2048 }
2049
2050 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2051 {
2052 int rc;
2053
2054 rc = cap_syslog(type);
2055 if (rc)
2056 return rc;
2057
2058 switch (type) {
2059 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
2060 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2061 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2062 break;
2063 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
2064 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
2065 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2066 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2067 break;
2068 case 0: /* Close log */
2069 case 1: /* Open log */
2070 case 2: /* Read from log */
2071 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2072 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2073 default:
2074 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2075 break;
2076 }
2077 return rc;
2078 }
2079
2080 /*
2081 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2082 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2083 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2084 *
2085 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2086 * processes that allocate mappings.
2087 */
2088 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2089 {
2090 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2091
2092 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2093 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2094 if (rc == 0)
2095 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2096
2097 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2098 }
2099
2100 /* binprm security operations */
2101
2102 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2103 {
2104 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2105 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2106 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2107 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2108 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2109 int rc;
2110
2111 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2112 if (rc)
2113 return rc;
2114
2115 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2116 * the script interpreter */
2117 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2118 return 0;
2119
2120 old_tsec = current_security();
2121 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2122 isec = inode->i_security;
2123
2124 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2125 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2126 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2127
2128 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2129 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2130 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2131 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2132
2133 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2134 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2135 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2136 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2137 } else {
2138 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2139 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2140 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2141 if (rc)
2142 return rc;
2143 }
2144
2145 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2146 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2147
2148 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2149 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2150
2151 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2152 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2153 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2154 if (rc)
2155 return rc;
2156 } else {
2157 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2158 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2159 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2160 if (rc)
2161 return rc;
2162
2163 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2164 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2165 if (rc)
2166 return rc;
2167
2168 /* Check for shared state */
2169 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2170 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2171 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2172 NULL);
2173 if (rc)
2174 return -EPERM;
2175 }
2176
2177 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2178 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2179 if (bprm->unsafe &
2180 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2181 struct task_struct *tracer;
2182 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2183 u32 ptsid = 0;
2184
2185 rcu_read_lock();
2186 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2187 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2188 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2189 ptsid = sec->sid;
2190 }
2191 rcu_read_unlock();
2192
2193 if (ptsid != 0) {
2194 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2195 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2196 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2197 if (rc)
2198 return -EPERM;
2199 }
2200 }
2201
2202 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2203 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2204 }
2205
2206 return 0;
2207 }
2208
2209 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2210 {
2211 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2212 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2213 u32 sid, osid;
2214 int atsecure = 0;
2215
2216 sid = tsec->sid;
2217 osid = tsec->osid;
2218
2219 if (osid != sid) {
2220 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2221 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2222 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2223 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2224 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2225 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2226 }
2227
2228 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2229 }
2230
2231 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2232 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2233
2234 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2235 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2236 struct files_struct *files)
2237 {
2238 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2239 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2240 struct tty_struct *tty;
2241 struct fdtable *fdt;
2242 long j = -1;
2243 int drop_tty = 0;
2244
2245 tty = get_current_tty();
2246 if (tty) {
2247 file_list_lock();
2248 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2249 struct inode *inode;
2250
2251 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2252 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2253 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2254 file may belong to another process and we are only
2255 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2256 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2257 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2258 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2259 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2260 drop_tty = 1;
2261 }
2262 }
2263 file_list_unlock();
2264 tty_kref_put(tty);
2265 }
2266 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2267 if (drop_tty)
2268 no_tty();
2269
2270 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2271
2272 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2273
2274 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2275 for (;;) {
2276 unsigned long set, i;
2277 int fd;
2278
2279 j++;
2280 i = j * __NFDBITS;
2281 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2282 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2283 break;
2284 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2285 if (!set)
2286 continue;
2287 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2288 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2289 if (set & 1) {
2290 file = fget(i);
2291 if (!file)
2292 continue;
2293 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2294 file,
2295 file_to_av(file))) {
2296 sys_close(i);
2297 fd = get_unused_fd();
2298 if (fd != i) {
2299 if (fd >= 0)
2300 put_unused_fd(fd);
2301 fput(file);
2302 continue;
2303 }
2304 if (devnull) {
2305 get_file(devnull);
2306 } else {
2307 devnull = dentry_open(
2308 dget(selinux_null),
2309 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2310 O_RDWR, cred);
2311 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2312 devnull = NULL;
2313 put_unused_fd(fd);
2314 fput(file);
2315 continue;
2316 }
2317 }
2318 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2319 }
2320 fput(file);
2321 }
2322 }
2323 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2324
2325 }
2326 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2327 }
2328
2329 /*
2330 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2331 */
2332 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2333 {
2334 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2335 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2336 int rc, i;
2337
2338 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2339 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2340 return;
2341
2342 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2343 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2344
2345 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2346 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2347
2348 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2349 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2350 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2351 *
2352 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2353 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2354 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2355 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2356 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2357 */
2358 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2359 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2360 if (rc) {
2361 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2362 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2363 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2364 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2365 }
2366 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2367 }
2368 }
2369
2370 /*
2371 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2372 * due to exec
2373 */
2374 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2375 {
2376 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2377 struct itimerval itimer;
2378 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2379 u32 osid, sid;
2380 int rc, i;
2381 unsigned long flags;
2382
2383 osid = tsec->osid;
2384 sid = tsec->sid;
2385
2386 if (sid == osid)
2387 return;
2388
2389 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2390 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2391 * flush and unblock signals.
2392 *
2393 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2394 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2395 */
2396 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2397 if (rc) {
2398 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2399 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2400 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2401 flush_signals(current);
2402 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2403 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2404 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2405 recalc_sigpending();
2406 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2407 }
2408
2409 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2410 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2411 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2412 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2413 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2414 wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2415 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2416 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2417 }
2418
2419 /* superblock security operations */
2420
2421 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2422 {
2423 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2424 }
2425
2426 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2427 {
2428 superblock_free_security(sb);
2429 }
2430
2431 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2432 {
2433 if (plen > olen)
2434 return 0;
2435
2436 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2437 }
2438
2439 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2440 {
2441 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2442 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2443 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2444 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2445 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2446 }
2447
2448 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2449 {
2450 if (!*first) {
2451 **to = ',';
2452 *to += 1;
2453 } else
2454 *first = 0;
2455 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2456 *to += len;
2457 }
2458
2459 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2460 int len)
2461 {
2462 int current_size = 0;
2463
2464 if (!*first) {
2465 **to = '|';
2466 *to += 1;
2467 } else
2468 *first = 0;
2469
2470 while (current_size < len) {
2471 if (*from != '"') {
2472 **to = *from;
2473 *to += 1;
2474 }
2475 from += 1;
2476 current_size += 1;
2477 }
2478 }
2479
2480 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2481 {
2482 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2483 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2484 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2485 int open_quote = 0;
2486
2487 in_curr = orig;
2488 sec_curr = copy;
2489
2490 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2491 if (!nosec) {
2492 rc = -ENOMEM;
2493 goto out;
2494 }
2495
2496 nosec_save = nosec;
2497 fnosec = fsec = 1;
2498 in_save = in_end = orig;
2499
2500 do {
2501 if (*in_end == '"')
2502 open_quote = !open_quote;
2503 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2504 *in_end == '\0') {
2505 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2506
2507 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2508 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2509 else
2510 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2511
2512 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2513 }
2514 } while (*in_end++);
2515
2516 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2517 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2518 out:
2519 return rc;
2520 }
2521
2522 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2523 {
2524 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2525 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2526 int rc;
2527
2528 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2529 if (rc)
2530 return rc;
2531
2532 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2533 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2534 return 0;
2535
2536 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2537 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2538 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2539 }
2540
2541 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2542 {
2543 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2544 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2545
2546 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2547 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2548 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2549 }
2550
2551 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2552 struct path *path,
2553 char *type,
2554 unsigned long flags,
2555 void *data)
2556 {
2557 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2558
2559 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2560 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2561 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2562 else
2563 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2564 FILE__MOUNTON);
2565 }
2566
2567 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2568 {
2569 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2570
2571 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2572 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2573 }
2574
2575 /* inode security operations */
2576
2577 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2578 {
2579 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2580 }
2581
2582 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2583 {
2584 inode_free_security(inode);
2585 }
2586
2587 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2588 char **name, void **value,
2589 size_t *len)
2590 {
2591 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2592 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2593 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2594 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2595 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2596 int rc;
2597 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2598
2599 dsec = dir->i_security;
2600 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2601
2602 sid = tsec->sid;
2603 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2604
2605 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2606 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2607 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2608 &newsid);
2609 if (rc) {
2610 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2611 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2612 "ino=%ld)\n",
2613 __func__,
2614 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2615 return rc;
2616 }
2617 }
2618
2619 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2620 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2621 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2622 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2623 isec->sid = newsid;
2624 isec->initialized = 1;
2625 }
2626
2627 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2628 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2629
2630 if (name) {
2631 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2632 if (!namep)
2633 return -ENOMEM;
2634 *name = namep;
2635 }
2636
2637 if (value && len) {
2638 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2639 if (rc) {
2640 kfree(namep);
2641 return rc;
2642 }
2643 *value = context;
2644 *len = clen;
2645 }
2646
2647 return 0;
2648 }
2649
2650 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2651 {
2652 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2653 }
2654
2655 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2656 {
2657 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2658 }
2659
2660 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2661 {
2662 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2663 }
2664
2665 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2666 {
2667 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2668 }
2669
2670 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2671 {
2672 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2673 }
2674
2675 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2676 {
2677 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2678 }
2679
2680 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2681 {
2682 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2683 }
2684
2685 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2686 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2687 {
2688 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2689 }
2690
2691 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2692 {
2693 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2694
2695 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2696 }
2697
2698 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2699 {
2700 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2701
2702 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2703 }
2704
2705 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2706 {
2707 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2708
2709 if (!mask) {
2710 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2711 return 0;
2712 }
2713
2714 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2715 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2716 }
2717
2718 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2719 {
2720 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2721
2722 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2723 return 0;
2724
2725 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2726 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2727 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2728
2729 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2730 }
2731
2732 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2733 {
2734 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2735
2736 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2737 }
2738
2739 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2740 {
2741 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2742
2743 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2744 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2745 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2746 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2747 return -EPERM;
2748 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2749 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2750 Restrict to administrator. */
2751 return -EPERM;
2752 }
2753 }
2754
2755 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2756 ordinary setattr permission. */
2757 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2758 }
2759
2760 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2761 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2762 {
2763 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2764 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2765 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2766 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2767 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2768 int rc = 0;
2769
2770 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2771 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2772
2773 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2774 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2775 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2776
2777 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2778 return -EPERM;
2779
2780 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2781 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2782
2783 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2784 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2785 if (rc)
2786 return rc;
2787
2788 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2789 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2790 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2791 return rc;
2792 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2793 }
2794 if (rc)
2795 return rc;
2796
2797 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2798 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2799 if (rc)
2800 return rc;
2801
2802 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2803 isec->sclass);
2804 if (rc)
2805 return rc;
2806
2807 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2808 sbsec->sid,
2809 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2810 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2811 &ad);
2812 }
2813
2814 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2815 const void *value, size_t size,
2816 int flags)
2817 {
2818 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2819 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2820 u32 newsid;
2821 int rc;
2822
2823 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2824 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2825 return;
2826 }
2827
2828 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2829 if (rc) {
2830 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2831 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2832 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2833 return;
2834 }
2835
2836 isec->sid = newsid;
2837 return;
2838 }
2839
2840 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2841 {
2842 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2843
2844 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2845 }
2846
2847 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2848 {
2849 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2850
2851 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2852 }
2853
2854 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2855 {
2856 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2857 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2858
2859 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2860 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2861 return -EACCES;
2862 }
2863
2864 /*
2865 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2866 *
2867 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2868 */
2869 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2870 {
2871 u32 size;
2872 int error;
2873 char *context = NULL;
2874 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2875
2876 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2877 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2878
2879 /*
2880 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2881 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2882 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2883 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2884 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2885 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2886 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2887 */
2888 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2889 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2890 if (!error)
2891 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2892 &size);
2893 else
2894 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2895 if (error)
2896 return error;
2897 error = size;
2898 if (alloc) {
2899 *buffer = context;
2900 goto out_nofree;
2901 }
2902 kfree(context);
2903 out_nofree:
2904 return error;
2905 }
2906
2907 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2908 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2909 {
2910 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2911 u32 newsid;
2912 int rc;
2913
2914 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2915 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2916
2917 if (!value || !size)
2918 return -EACCES;
2919
2920 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2921 if (rc)
2922 return rc;
2923
2924 isec->sid = newsid;
2925 return 0;
2926 }
2927
2928 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2929 {
2930 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2931 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2932 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2933 return len;
2934 }
2935
2936 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2937 {
2938 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2939 *secid = isec->sid;
2940 }
2941
2942 /* file security operations */
2943
2944 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2945 {
2946 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2947 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2948
2949 if (!mask) {
2950 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2951 return 0;
2952 }
2953
2954 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2955 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2956 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2957
2958 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2959 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2960 }
2961
2962 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2963 {
2964 if (!mask)
2965 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2966 return 0;
2967
2968 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2969 }
2970
2971 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2972 {
2973 return file_alloc_security(file);
2974 }
2975
2976 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2977 {
2978 file_free_security(file);
2979 }
2980
2981 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2982 unsigned long arg)
2983 {
2984 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2985 u32 av = 0;
2986
2987 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2988 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2989 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2990 av |= FILE__READ;
2991 if (!av)
2992 av = FILE__IOCTL;
2993
2994 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
2995 }
2996
2997 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2998 {
2999 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3000 int rc = 0;
3001
3002 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3003 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3004 /*
3005 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3006 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3007 * This has an additional check.
3008 */
3009 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3010 if (rc)
3011 goto error;
3012 }
3013 #endif
3014
3015 if (file) {
3016 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3017 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3018
3019 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3020 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3021 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3022
3023 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3024 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3025
3026 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3027 }
3028
3029 error:
3030 return rc;
3031 }
3032
3033 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3034 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3035 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3036 {
3037 int rc = 0;
3038 u32 sid = current_sid();
3039
3040 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3041 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3042 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3043 if (rc || addr_only)
3044 return rc;
3045
3046 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3047 prot = reqprot;
3048
3049 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3050 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3051 }
3052
3053 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3054 unsigned long reqprot,
3055 unsigned long prot)
3056 {
3057 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3058
3059 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3060 prot = reqprot;
3061
3062 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3063 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3064 int rc = 0;
3065 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3066 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3067 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3068 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3069 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3070 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3071 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3072 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3073 /*
3074 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3075 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3076 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3077 * modified content. This typically should only
3078 * occur for text relocations.
3079 */
3080 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3081 }
3082 if (rc)
3083 return rc;
3084 }
3085 #endif
3086
3087 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3088 }
3089
3090 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3091 {
3092 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3093
3094 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3095 }
3096
3097 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3098 unsigned long arg)
3099 {
3100 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3101 int err = 0;
3102
3103 switch (cmd) {
3104 case F_SETFL:
3105 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3106 err = -EINVAL;
3107 break;
3108 }
3109
3110 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3111 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3112 break;
3113 }
3114 /* fall through */
3115 case F_SETOWN:
3116 case F_SETSIG:
3117 case F_GETFL:
3118 case F_GETOWN:
3119 case F_GETSIG:
3120 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3121 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3122 break;
3123 case F_GETLK:
3124 case F_SETLK:
3125 case F_SETLKW:
3126 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3127 case F_GETLK64:
3128 case F_SETLK64:
3129 case F_SETLKW64:
3130 #endif
3131 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3132 err = -EINVAL;
3133 break;
3134 }
3135 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3136 break;
3137 }
3138
3139 return err;
3140 }
3141
3142 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3143 {
3144 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3145
3146 fsec = file->f_security;
3147 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3148
3149 return 0;
3150 }
3151
3152 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3153 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3154 {
3155 struct file *file;
3156 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3157 u32 perm;
3158 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3159
3160 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3161 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3162
3163 fsec = file->f_security;
3164
3165 if (!signum)
3166 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3167 else
3168 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3169
3170 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3171 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3172 }
3173
3174 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3175 {
3176 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3177
3178 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3179 }
3180
3181 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3182 {
3183 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3184 struct inode *inode;
3185 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3186
3187 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3188 fsec = file->f_security;
3189 isec = inode->i_security;
3190 /*
3191 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3192 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3193 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3194 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3195 * struct as its SID.
3196 */
3197 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3198 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3199 /*
3200 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3201 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3202 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3203 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3204 * new inode label or new policy.
3205 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3206 */
3207 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3208 }
3209
3210 /* task security operations */
3211
3212 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3213 {
3214 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3215 }
3216
3217 /*
3218 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3219 */
3220 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3221 {
3222 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3223 cred->security = NULL;
3224 kfree(tsec);
3225 }
3226
3227 /*
3228 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3229 */
3230 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3231 gfp_t gfp)
3232 {
3233 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3234 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3235
3236 old_tsec = old->security;
3237
3238 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3239 if (!tsec)
3240 return -ENOMEM;
3241
3242 new->security = tsec;
3243 return 0;
3244 }
3245
3246 /*
3247 * set the security data for a kernel service
3248 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3249 */
3250 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3251 {
3252 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3253 u32 sid = current_sid();
3254 int ret;
3255
3256 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3257 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3258 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3259 NULL);
3260 if (ret == 0) {
3261 tsec->sid = secid;
3262 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3263 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3264 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3265 }
3266 return ret;
3267 }
3268
3269 /*
3270 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3271 * objective context of the specified inode
3272 */
3273 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3274 {
3275 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3276 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3277 u32 sid = current_sid();
3278 int ret;
3279
3280 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3281 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3282 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3283 NULL);
3284
3285 if (ret == 0)
3286 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3287 return 0;
3288 }
3289
3290 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3291 {
3292 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3293 }
3294
3295 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3296 {
3297 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3298 }
3299
3300 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3301 {
3302 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3303 }
3304
3305 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3306 {
3307 *secid = task_sid(p);
3308 }
3309
3310 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3311 {
3312 int rc;
3313
3314 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3315 if (rc)
3316 return rc;
3317
3318 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3319 }
3320
3321 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3322 {
3323 int rc;
3324
3325 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3326 if (rc)
3327 return rc;
3328
3329 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3330 }
3331
3332 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3333 {
3334 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3335 }
3336
3337 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3338 {
3339 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3340
3341 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3342 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3343 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3344 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3345 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3346 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3347
3348 return 0;
3349 }
3350
3351 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3352 {
3353 int rc;
3354
3355 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3356 if (rc)
3357 return rc;
3358
3359 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3360 }
3361
3362 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3363 {
3364 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3365 }
3366
3367 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3368 {
3369 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3370 }
3371
3372 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3373 int sig, u32 secid)
3374 {
3375 u32 perm;
3376 int rc;
3377
3378 if (!sig)
3379 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3380 else
3381 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3382 if (secid)
3383 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3384 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3385 else
3386 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3387 return rc;
3388 }
3389
3390 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3391 {
3392 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3393 }
3394
3395 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3396 struct inode *inode)
3397 {
3398 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3399 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3400
3401 isec->sid = sid;
3402 isec->initialized = 1;
3403 }
3404
3405 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3406 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3407 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3408 {
3409 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3410 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3411
3412 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3413 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3414 if (ih == NULL)
3415 goto out;
3416
3417 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3418 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3419 goto out;
3420
3421 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3422 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3423 ret = 0;
3424
3425 if (proto)
3426 *proto = ih->protocol;
3427
3428 switch (ih->protocol) {
3429 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3430 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3431
3432 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3433 break;
3434
3435 offset += ihlen;
3436 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3437 if (th == NULL)
3438 break;
3439
3440 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3441 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3442 break;
3443 }
3444
3445 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3446 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3447
3448 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3449 break;
3450
3451 offset += ihlen;
3452 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3453 if (uh == NULL)
3454 break;
3455
3456 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3457 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3458 break;
3459 }
3460
3461 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3462 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3463
3464 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3465 break;
3466
3467 offset += ihlen;
3468 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3469 if (dh == NULL)
3470 break;
3471
3472 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3473 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3474 break;
3475 }
3476
3477 default:
3478 break;
3479 }
3480 out:
3481 return ret;
3482 }
3483
3484 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3485
3486 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3487 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3488 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3489 {
3490 u8 nexthdr;
3491 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3492 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3493
3494 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3495 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3496 if (ip6 == NULL)
3497 goto out;
3498
3499 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3500 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3501 ret = 0;
3502
3503 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3504 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3505 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3506 if (offset < 0)
3507 goto out;
3508
3509 if (proto)
3510 *proto = nexthdr;
3511
3512 switch (nexthdr) {
3513 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3514 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3515
3516 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3517 if (th == NULL)
3518 break;
3519
3520 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3521 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3522 break;
3523 }
3524
3525 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3526 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3527
3528 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3529 if (uh == NULL)
3530 break;
3531
3532 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3533 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3534 break;
3535 }
3536
3537 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3538 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3539
3540 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3541 if (dh == NULL)
3542 break;
3543
3544 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3545 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3546 break;
3547 }
3548
3549 /* includes fragments */
3550 default:
3551 break;
3552 }
3553 out:
3554 return ret;
3555 }
3556
3557 #endif /* IPV6 */
3558
3559 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3560 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3561 {
3562 char *addrp;
3563 int ret;
3564
3565 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3566 case PF_INET:
3567 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3568 if (ret)
3569 goto parse_error;
3570 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3571 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3572 goto okay;
3573
3574 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3575 case PF_INET6:
3576 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3577 if (ret)
3578 goto parse_error;
3579 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3580 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3581 goto okay;
3582 #endif /* IPV6 */
3583 default:
3584 addrp = NULL;
3585 goto okay;
3586 }
3587
3588 parse_error:
3589 printk(KERN_WARNING
3590 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3591 " unable to parse packet\n");
3592 return ret;
3593
3594 okay:
3595 if (_addrp)
3596 *_addrp = addrp;
3597 return 0;
3598 }
3599
3600 /**
3601 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3602 * @skb: the packet
3603 * @family: protocol family
3604 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3605 *
3606 * Description:
3607 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3608 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3609 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3610 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3611 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3612 * peer labels.
3613 *
3614 */
3615 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3616 {
3617 int err;
3618 u32 xfrm_sid;
3619 u32 nlbl_sid;
3620 u32 nlbl_type;
3621
3622 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3623 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3624
3625 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3626 if (unlikely(err)) {
3627 printk(KERN_WARNING
3628 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3629 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3630 return -EACCES;
3631 }
3632
3633 return 0;
3634 }
3635
3636 /* socket security operations */
3637 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3638 u32 perms)
3639 {
3640 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3641 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3642 u32 sid;
3643 int err = 0;
3644
3645 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3646
3647 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3648 goto out;
3649 sid = task_sid(task);
3650
3651 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3652 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3653 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3654
3655 out:
3656 return err;
3657 }
3658
3659 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3660 int protocol, int kern)
3661 {
3662 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3663 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3664 u32 sid, newsid;
3665 u16 secclass;
3666 int err = 0;
3667
3668 if (kern)
3669 goto out;
3670
3671 sid = tsec->sid;
3672 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3673
3674 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3675 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3676
3677 out:
3678 return err;
3679 }
3680
3681 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3682 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3683 {
3684 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3685 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3686 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3687 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3688 u32 sid, newsid;
3689 int err = 0;
3690
3691 sid = tsec->sid;
3692 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3693
3694 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3695
3696 if (kern)
3697 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3698 else if (newsid)
3699 isec->sid = newsid;
3700 else
3701 isec->sid = sid;
3702
3703 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3704 isec->initialized = 1;
3705
3706 if (sock->sk) {
3707 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3708 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3709 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3710 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3711 }
3712
3713 return err;
3714 }
3715
3716 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3717 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3718 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3719
3720 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3721 {
3722 u16 family;
3723 int err;
3724
3725 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3726 if (err)
3727 goto out;
3728
3729 /*
3730 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3731 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3732 * check the first address now.
3733 */
3734 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3735 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3736 char *addrp;
3737 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3738 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3739 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3740 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3741 unsigned short snum;
3742 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3743 u32 sid, node_perm;
3744
3745 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3746
3747 if (family == PF_INET) {
3748 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3749 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3750 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3751 } else {
3752 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3753 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3754 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3755 }
3756
3757 if (snum) {
3758 int low, high;
3759
3760 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3761
3762 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3763 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3764 snum, &sid);
3765 if (err)
3766 goto out;
3767 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3768 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3769 ad.u.net.family = family;
3770 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3771 isec->sclass,
3772 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3773 if (err)
3774 goto out;
3775 }
3776 }
3777
3778 switch (isec->sclass) {
3779 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3780 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3781 break;
3782
3783 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3784 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3785 break;
3786
3787 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3788 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3789 break;
3790
3791 default:
3792 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3793 break;
3794 }
3795
3796 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3797 if (err)
3798 goto out;
3799
3800 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3801 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3802 ad.u.net.family = family;
3803
3804 if (family == PF_INET)
3805 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3806 else
3807 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3808
3809 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3810 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3811 if (err)
3812 goto out;
3813 }
3814 out:
3815 return err;
3816 }
3817
3818 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3819 {
3820 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3821 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3822 int err;
3823
3824 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3825 if (err)
3826 return err;
3827
3828 /*
3829 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3830 */
3831 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3832 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3833 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3834 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3835 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3836 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3837 unsigned short snum;
3838 u32 sid, perm;
3839
3840 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3841 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3842 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3843 return -EINVAL;
3844 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3845 } else {
3846 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3847 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3848 return -EINVAL;
3849 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3850 }
3851
3852 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3853 if (err)
3854 goto out;
3855
3856 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3857 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3858
3859 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3860 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3861 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3862 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3863 if (err)
3864 goto out;
3865 }
3866
3867 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3868
3869 out:
3870 return err;
3871 }
3872
3873 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3874 {
3875 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3876 }
3877
3878 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3879 {
3880 int err;
3881 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3882 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3883
3884 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3885 if (err)
3886 return err;
3887
3888 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3889
3890 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3891 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3892 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3893 newisec->initialized = 1;
3894
3895 return 0;
3896 }
3897
3898 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3899 int size)
3900 {
3901 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3902 }
3903
3904 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3905 int size, int flags)
3906 {
3907 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3908 }
3909
3910 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3911 {
3912 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3913 }
3914
3915 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3916 {
3917 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3918 }
3919
3920 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3921 {
3922 int err;
3923
3924 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3925 if (err)
3926 return err;
3927
3928 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3929 }
3930
3931 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3932 int optname)
3933 {
3934 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3935 }
3936
3937 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3938 {
3939 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3940 }
3941
3942 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3943 struct socket *other,
3944 struct sock *newsk)
3945 {
3946 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3947 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3948 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3949 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3950 int err;
3951
3952 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3953 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3954
3955 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3956 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3957
3958 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3959 isec->sclass,
3960 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3961 if (err)
3962 return err;
3963
3964 /* connecting socket */
3965 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3966 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3967
3968 /* server child socket */
3969 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3970 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3971 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3972
3973 return err;
3974 }
3975
3976 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3977 struct socket *other)
3978 {
3979 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3980 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3981 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3982 int err;
3983
3984 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3985 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3986
3987 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3988 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3989
3990 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3991 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3992 if (err)
3993 return err;
3994
3995 return 0;
3996 }
3997
3998 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3999 u32 peer_sid,
4000 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4001 {
4002 int err;
4003 u32 if_sid;
4004 u32 node_sid;
4005
4006 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4007 if (err)
4008 return err;
4009 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4010 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4011 if (err)
4012 return err;
4013
4014 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4015 if (err)
4016 return err;
4017 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4018 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4019 }
4020
4021 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4022 u16 family)
4023 {
4024 int err = 0;
4025 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4026 u32 peer_sid;
4027 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4028 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4029 char *addrp;
4030
4031 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4032 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4033 ad.u.net.family = family;
4034 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4035 if (err)
4036 return err;
4037
4038 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4039 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4040 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4041 if (err)
4042 return err;
4043 }
4044
4045 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4046 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4047 if (err)
4048 return err;
4049 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4050 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4051 if (err)
4052 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4053 } else {
4054 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4055 if (err)
4056 return err;
4057 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4058 }
4059
4060 return err;
4061 }
4062
4063 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4064 {
4065 int err;
4066 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4067 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4068 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4069 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4070 char *addrp;
4071 u8 secmark_active;
4072 u8 peerlbl_active;
4073
4074 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4075 return 0;
4076
4077 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4078 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4079 family = PF_INET;
4080
4081 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4082 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4083 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4084 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4085 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4086 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4087
4088 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4089 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4090 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4091 return 0;
4092
4093 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4094 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4095 ad.u.net.family = family;
4096 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4097 if (err)
4098 return err;
4099
4100 if (peerlbl_active) {
4101 u32 peer_sid;
4102
4103 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4104 if (err)
4105 return err;
4106 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4107 peer_sid, &ad);
4108 if (err) {
4109 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4110 return err;
4111 }
4112 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4113 PEER__RECV, &ad);
4114 if (err)
4115 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4116 }
4117
4118 if (secmark_active) {
4119 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4120 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4121 if (err)
4122 return err;
4123 }
4124
4125 return err;
4126 }
4127
4128 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4129 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4130 {
4131 int err = 0;
4132 char *scontext;
4133 u32 scontext_len;
4134 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4135 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4136 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4137
4138 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4139
4140 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4141 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4142 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4143 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4144 }
4145 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4146 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
4147 goto out;
4148 }
4149
4150 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4151
4152 if (err)
4153 goto out;
4154
4155 if (scontext_len > len) {
4156 err = -ERANGE;
4157 goto out_len;
4158 }
4159
4160 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4161 err = -EFAULT;
4162
4163 out_len:
4164 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4165 err = -EFAULT;
4166
4167 kfree(scontext);
4168 out:
4169 return err;
4170 }
4171
4172 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4173 {
4174 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4175 u16 family;
4176
4177 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4178 family = PF_INET;
4179 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4180 family = PF_INET6;
4181 else if (sock)
4182 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4183 else
4184 goto out;
4185
4186 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4187 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4188 else if (skb)
4189 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4190
4191 out:
4192 *secid = peer_secid;
4193 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4194 return -EINVAL;
4195 return 0;
4196 }
4197
4198 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4199 {
4200 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4201 }
4202
4203 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4204 {
4205 sk_free_security(sk);
4206 }
4207
4208 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4209 {
4210 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4211 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4212
4213 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4214 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4215 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4216
4217 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec);
4218 }
4219
4220 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4221 {
4222 if (!sk)
4223 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4224 else {
4225 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4226
4227 *secid = sksec->sid;
4228 }
4229 }
4230
4231 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4232 {
4233 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4234 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4235
4236 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4237 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4238 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4239 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4240 }
4241
4242 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4243 struct request_sock *req)
4244 {
4245 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4246 int err;
4247 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4248 u32 newsid;
4249 u32 peersid;
4250
4251 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4252 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4253 family = PF_INET;
4254
4255 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4256 if (err)
4257 return err;
4258 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4259 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4260 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4261 } else {
4262 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4263 if (err)
4264 return err;
4265 req->secid = newsid;
4266 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4267 }
4268
4269 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4270 }
4271
4272 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4273 const struct request_sock *req)
4274 {
4275 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4276
4277 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4278 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4279 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4280 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4281 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4282 time it will have been created and available. */
4283
4284 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4285 * thread with access to newsksec */
4286 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4287 }
4288
4289 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4290 {
4291 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4292 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4293
4294 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4295 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4296 family = PF_INET;
4297
4298 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4299 }
4300
4301 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4302 struct flowi *fl)
4303 {
4304 fl->secid = req->secid;
4305 }
4306
4307 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4308 {
4309 int err = 0;
4310 u32 perm;
4311 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4312 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4313 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4314
4315 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4316 err = -EINVAL;
4317 goto out;
4318 }
4319 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4320
4321 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4322 if (err) {
4323 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4324 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4325 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4326 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4327 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4328 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4329 err = 0;
4330 }
4331
4332 /* Ignore */
4333 if (err == -ENOENT)
4334 err = 0;
4335 goto out;
4336 }
4337
4338 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4339 out:
4340 return err;
4341 }
4342
4343 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4344
4345 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4346 u16 family)
4347 {
4348 int err;
4349 char *addrp;
4350 u32 peer_sid;
4351 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4352 u8 secmark_active;
4353 u8 netlbl_active;
4354 u8 peerlbl_active;
4355
4356 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4357 return NF_ACCEPT;
4358
4359 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4360 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4361 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4362 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4363 return NF_ACCEPT;
4364
4365 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4366 return NF_DROP;
4367
4368 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4369 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4370 ad.u.net.family = family;
4371 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4372 return NF_DROP;
4373
4374 if (peerlbl_active) {
4375 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4376 peer_sid, &ad);
4377 if (err) {
4378 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4379 return NF_DROP;
4380 }
4381 }
4382
4383 if (secmark_active)
4384 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4385 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4386 return NF_DROP;
4387
4388 if (netlbl_active)
4389 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4390 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4391 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4392 * protection */
4393 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4394 return NF_DROP;
4395
4396 return NF_ACCEPT;
4397 }
4398
4399 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4400 struct sk_buff *skb,
4401 const struct net_device *in,
4402 const struct net_device *out,
4403 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4404 {
4405 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4406 }
4407
4408 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4409 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4410 struct sk_buff *skb,
4411 const struct net_device *in,
4412 const struct net_device *out,
4413 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4414 {
4415 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4416 }
4417 #endif /* IPV6 */
4418
4419 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4420 u16 family)
4421 {
4422 u32 sid;
4423
4424 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4425 return NF_ACCEPT;
4426
4427 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4428 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4429 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4430 if (skb->sk) {
4431 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4432 sid = sksec->sid;
4433 } else
4434 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4435 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4436 return NF_DROP;
4437
4438 return NF_ACCEPT;
4439 }
4440
4441 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4442 struct sk_buff *skb,
4443 const struct net_device *in,
4444 const struct net_device *out,
4445 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4446 {
4447 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4448 }
4449
4450 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4451 int ifindex,
4452 u16 family)
4453 {
4454 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4455 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4456 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4457 char *addrp;
4458 u8 proto;
4459
4460 if (sk == NULL)
4461 return NF_ACCEPT;
4462 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4463
4464 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4465 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4466 ad.u.net.family = family;
4467 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4468 return NF_DROP;
4469
4470 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4471 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4472 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4473 return NF_DROP;
4474
4475 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4476 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4477 return NF_DROP;
4478
4479 return NF_ACCEPT;
4480 }
4481
4482 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4483 u16 family)
4484 {
4485 u32 secmark_perm;
4486 u32 peer_sid;
4487 struct sock *sk;
4488 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4489 char *addrp;
4490 u8 secmark_active;
4491 u8 peerlbl_active;
4492
4493 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4494 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4495 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4496 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4497 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4498 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4499 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
4500 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4501 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4502 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4503 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4504 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4505 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4506 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4507 return NF_ACCEPT;
4508 #endif
4509 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4510 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4511 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4512 return NF_ACCEPT;
4513
4514 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4515 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4516 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4517 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4518 sk = skb->sk;
4519 if (sk == NULL) {
4520 switch (family) {
4521 case PF_INET:
4522 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4523 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4524 else
4525 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4526 break;
4527 case PF_INET6:
4528 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4529 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4530 else
4531 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4532 break;
4533 default:
4534 return NF_DROP;
4535 }
4536 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4537 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4538 return NF_DROP;
4539 } else
4540 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4541 } else {
4542 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4543 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4544 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4545 }
4546
4547 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4548 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4549 ad.u.net.family = family;
4550 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4551 return NF_DROP;
4552
4553 if (secmark_active)
4554 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4555 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4556 return NF_DROP;
4557
4558 if (peerlbl_active) {
4559 u32 if_sid;
4560 u32 node_sid;
4561
4562 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4563 return NF_DROP;
4564 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4565 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4566 return NF_DROP;
4567
4568 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4569 return NF_DROP;
4570 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4571 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4572 return NF_DROP;
4573 }
4574
4575 return NF_ACCEPT;
4576 }
4577
4578 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4579 struct sk_buff *skb,
4580 const struct net_device *in,
4581 const struct net_device *out,
4582 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4583 {
4584 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4585 }
4586
4587 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4588 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4589 struct sk_buff *skb,
4590 const struct net_device *in,
4591 const struct net_device *out,
4592 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4593 {
4594 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4595 }
4596 #endif /* IPV6 */
4597
4598 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4599
4600 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4601 {
4602 int err;
4603
4604 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4605 if (err)
4606 return err;
4607
4608 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4609 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4610
4611 return err;
4612 }
4613
4614 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4615 {
4616 int err;
4617 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4618
4619 err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4620 if (err)
4621 return err;
4622
4623 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4624 ad.u.cap = capability;
4625
4626 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4627 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4628 }
4629
4630 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4631 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4632 u16 sclass)
4633 {
4634 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4635 u32 sid;
4636
4637 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4638 if (!isec)
4639 return -ENOMEM;
4640
4641 sid = task_sid(task);
4642 isec->sclass = sclass;
4643 isec->sid = sid;
4644 perm->security = isec;
4645
4646 return 0;
4647 }
4648
4649 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4650 {
4651 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4652 perm->security = NULL;
4653 kfree(isec);
4654 }
4655
4656 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4657 {
4658 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4659
4660 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4661 if (!msec)
4662 return -ENOMEM;
4663
4664 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4665 msg->security = msec;
4666
4667 return 0;
4668 }
4669
4670 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4671 {
4672 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4673
4674 msg->security = NULL;
4675 kfree(msec);
4676 }
4677
4678 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4679 u32 perms)
4680 {
4681 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4682 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4683 u32 sid = current_sid();
4684
4685 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4686
4687 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4688 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4689
4690 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4691 }
4692
4693 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4694 {
4695 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4696 }
4697
4698 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4699 {
4700 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4701 }
4702
4703 /* message queue security operations */
4704 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4705 {
4706 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4707 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4708 u32 sid = current_sid();
4709 int rc;
4710
4711 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4712 if (rc)
4713 return rc;
4714
4715 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4716
4717 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4718 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4719
4720 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4721 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
4722 if (rc) {
4723 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4724 return rc;
4725 }
4726 return 0;
4727 }
4728
4729 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4730 {
4731 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4732 }
4733
4734 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4735 {
4736 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4737 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4738 u32 sid = current_sid();
4739
4740 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4741
4742 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4743 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4744
4745 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4746 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4747 }
4748
4749 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4750 {
4751 int err;
4752 int perms;
4753
4754 switch (cmd) {
4755 case IPC_INFO:
4756 case MSG_INFO:
4757 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4758 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4759 case IPC_STAT:
4760 case MSG_STAT:
4761 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4762 break;
4763 case IPC_SET:
4764 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4765 break;
4766 case IPC_RMID:
4767 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4768 break;
4769 default:
4770 return 0;
4771 }
4772
4773 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4774 return err;
4775 }
4776
4777 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4778 {
4779 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4780 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4781 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4782 u32 sid = current_sid();
4783 int rc;
4784
4785 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4786 msec = msg->security;
4787
4788 /*
4789 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4790 */
4791 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4792 /*
4793 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4794 * message queue this message will be stored in
4795 */
4796 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4797 &msec->sid);
4798 if (rc)
4799 return rc;
4800 }
4801
4802 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4803 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4804
4805 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4806 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4807 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
4808 if (!rc)
4809 /* Can this process send the message */
4810 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4811 MSG__SEND, &ad);
4812 if (!rc)
4813 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4814 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4815 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4816
4817 return rc;
4818 }
4819
4820 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4821 struct task_struct *target,
4822 long type, int mode)
4823 {
4824 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4825 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4826 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4827 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4828 int rc;
4829
4830 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4831 msec = msg->security;
4832
4833 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4834 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4835
4836 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4837 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4838 if (!rc)
4839 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4840 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4841 return rc;
4842 }
4843
4844 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4845 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4846 {
4847 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4848 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4849 u32 sid = current_sid();
4850 int rc;
4851
4852 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4853 if (rc)
4854 return rc;
4855
4856 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4857
4858 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4859 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4860
4861 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4862 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
4863 if (rc) {
4864 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4865 return rc;
4866 }
4867 return 0;
4868 }
4869
4870 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4871 {
4872 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4873 }
4874
4875 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4876 {
4877 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4878 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4879 u32 sid = current_sid();
4880
4881 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4882
4883 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4884 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4885
4886 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4887 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4888 }
4889
4890 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4891 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4892 {
4893 int perms;
4894 int err;
4895
4896 switch (cmd) {
4897 case IPC_INFO:
4898 case SHM_INFO:
4899 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4900 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4901 case IPC_STAT:
4902 case SHM_STAT:
4903 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4904 break;
4905 case IPC_SET:
4906 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4907 break;
4908 case SHM_LOCK:
4909 case SHM_UNLOCK:
4910 perms = SHM__LOCK;
4911 break;
4912 case IPC_RMID:
4913 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4914 break;
4915 default:
4916 return 0;
4917 }
4918
4919 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4920 return err;
4921 }
4922
4923 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4924 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4925 {
4926 u32 perms;
4927
4928 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4929 perms = SHM__READ;
4930 else
4931 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4932
4933 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4934 }
4935
4936 /* Semaphore security operations */
4937 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4938 {
4939 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4940 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4941 u32 sid = current_sid();
4942 int rc;
4943
4944 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4945 if (rc)
4946 return rc;
4947
4948 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4949
4950 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4951 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4952
4953 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4954 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
4955 if (rc) {
4956 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4957 return rc;
4958 }
4959 return 0;
4960 }
4961
4962 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4963 {
4964 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4965 }
4966
4967 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4968 {
4969 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4970 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4971 u32 sid = current_sid();
4972
4973 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4974
4975 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4976 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4977
4978 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4979 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4980 }
4981
4982 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4983 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4984 {
4985 int err;
4986 u32 perms;
4987
4988 switch (cmd) {
4989 case IPC_INFO:
4990 case SEM_INFO:
4991 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4992 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4993 case GETPID:
4994 case GETNCNT:
4995 case GETZCNT:
4996 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4997 break;
4998 case GETVAL:
4999 case GETALL:
5000 perms = SEM__READ;
5001 break;
5002 case SETVAL:
5003 case SETALL:
5004 perms = SEM__WRITE;
5005 break;
5006 case IPC_RMID:
5007 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5008 break;
5009 case IPC_SET:
5010 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5011 break;
5012 case IPC_STAT:
5013 case SEM_STAT:
5014 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5015 break;
5016 default:
5017 return 0;
5018 }
5019
5020 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5021 return err;
5022 }
5023
5024 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5025 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5026 {
5027 u32 perms;
5028
5029 if (alter)
5030 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5031 else
5032 perms = SEM__READ;
5033
5034 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5035 }
5036
5037 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5038 {
5039 u32 av = 0;
5040
5041 av = 0;
5042 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5043 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5044 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5045 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5046
5047 if (av == 0)
5048 return 0;
5049
5050 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5051 }
5052
5053 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5054 {
5055 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5056 *secid = isec->sid;
5057 }
5058
5059 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5060 {
5061 if (inode)
5062 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5063 }
5064
5065 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5066 char *name, char **value)
5067 {
5068 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5069 u32 sid;
5070 int error;
5071 unsigned len;
5072
5073 if (current != p) {
5074 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5075 if (error)
5076 return error;
5077 }
5078
5079 rcu_read_lock();
5080 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5081
5082 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5083 sid = __tsec->sid;
5084 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5085 sid = __tsec->osid;
5086 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5087 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5088 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5089 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5090 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5091 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5092 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5093 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5094 else
5095 goto invalid;
5096 rcu_read_unlock();
5097
5098 if (!sid)
5099 return 0;
5100
5101 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5102 if (error)
5103 return error;
5104 return len;
5105
5106 invalid:
5107 rcu_read_unlock();
5108 return -EINVAL;
5109 }
5110
5111 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5112 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5113 {
5114 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5115 struct task_struct *tracer;
5116 struct cred *new;
5117 u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
5118 int error;
5119 char *str = value;
5120
5121 if (current != p) {
5122 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5123 security attributes. */
5124 return -EACCES;
5125 }
5126
5127 /*
5128 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5129 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5130 * above restriction is ever removed.
5131 */
5132 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5133 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5134 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5135 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5136 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5137 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5138 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5139 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5140 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5141 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5142 else
5143 error = -EINVAL;
5144 if (error)
5145 return error;
5146
5147 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5148 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5149 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5150 str[size-1] = 0;
5151 size--;
5152 }
5153 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5154 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5155 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5156 return error;
5157 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5158 &sid);
5159 }
5160 if (error)
5161 return error;
5162 }
5163
5164 new = prepare_creds();
5165 if (!new)
5166 return -ENOMEM;
5167
5168 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5169 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5170 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5171 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5172 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5173 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5174 tsec = new->security;
5175 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5176 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5177 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5178 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5179 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5180 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5181 if (error)
5182 goto abort_change;
5183 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5184 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5185 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5186 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5187 error = -EINVAL;
5188 if (sid == 0)
5189 goto abort_change;
5190
5191 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5192 error = -EPERM;
5193 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5194 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5195 if (error)
5196 goto abort_change;
5197 }
5198
5199 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5200 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5201 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5202 if (error)
5203 goto abort_change;
5204
5205 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5206 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5207 ptsid = 0;
5208 task_lock(p);
5209 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5210 if (tracer)
5211 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5212 task_unlock(p);
5213
5214 if (tracer) {
5215 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5216 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5217 if (error)
5218 goto abort_change;
5219 }
5220
5221 tsec->sid = sid;
5222 } else {
5223 error = -EINVAL;
5224 goto abort_change;
5225 }
5226
5227 commit_creds(new);
5228 return size;
5229
5230 abort_change:
5231 abort_creds(new);
5232 return error;
5233 }
5234
5235 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5236 {
5237 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5238 }
5239
5240 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5241 {
5242 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5243 }
5244
5245 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5246 {
5247 kfree(secdata);
5248 }
5249
5250 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5251
5252 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5253 unsigned long flags)
5254 {
5255 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5256 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5257
5258 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5259 if (!ksec)
5260 return -ENOMEM;
5261
5262 tsec = cred->security;
5263 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5264 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5265 else
5266 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5267
5268 k->security = ksec;
5269 return 0;
5270 }
5271
5272 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5273 {
5274 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5275
5276 k->security = NULL;
5277 kfree(ksec);
5278 }
5279
5280 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5281 const struct cred *cred,
5282 key_perm_t perm)
5283 {
5284 struct key *key;
5285 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5286 u32 sid;
5287
5288 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5289 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5290 appear to be created. */
5291 if (perm == 0)
5292 return 0;
5293
5294 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5295
5296 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5297 ksec = key->security;
5298
5299 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5300 }
5301
5302 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5303 {
5304 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5305 char *context = NULL;
5306 unsigned len;
5307 int rc;
5308
5309 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5310 if (!rc)
5311 rc = len;
5312 *_buffer = context;
5313 return rc;
5314 }
5315
5316 #endif
5317
5318 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5319 .name = "selinux",
5320
5321 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5322 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5323 .capget = selinux_capget,
5324 .capset = selinux_capset,
5325 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5326 .capable = selinux_capable,
5327 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5328 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5329 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5330 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5331
5332 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5333 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5334
5335 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5336 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5337 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5338 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5339
5340 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5341 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5342 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5343 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5344 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5345 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5346 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5347 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5348 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5349 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5350 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5351
5352
5353 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5354 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5355 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5356 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5357 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5358 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5359 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5360 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5361 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5362 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5363 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5364 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5365 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5366 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5367 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5368 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5369 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5370 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5371 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5372 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5373 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5374 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5375 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5376 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5377 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5378
5379 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5380 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5381 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5382 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5383 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5384 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5385 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5386 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5387 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5388 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5389 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5390
5391 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5392
5393 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5394 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5395 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5396 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5397 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5398 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5399 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5400 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5401 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5402 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5403 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5404 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5405 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5406 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5407 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5408 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5409 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5410 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5411 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5412
5413 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5414 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5415
5416 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5417 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5418
5419 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5420 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5421 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5422 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5423 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5424 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5425
5426 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5427 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5428 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5429 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5430 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5431
5432 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5433 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5434 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5435 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5436 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5437
5438 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5439
5440 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5441 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5442
5443 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5444 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5445 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5446
5447 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5448 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5449
5450 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5451 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5452 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5453 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5454 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5455 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5456 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5457 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5458 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5459 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5460 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5461 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5462 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5463 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5464 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5465 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5466 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5467 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5468 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5469 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5470 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5471 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5472 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5473 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5474 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5475
5476 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5477 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5478 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5479 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5480 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5481 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5482 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5483 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5484 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5485 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5486 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5487 #endif
5488
5489 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5490 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5491 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5492 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5493 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5494 #endif
5495
5496 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
5497 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5498 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5499 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5500 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5501 #endif
5502 };
5503
5504 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5505 {
5506 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5507 selinux_enabled = 0;
5508 return 0;
5509 }
5510
5511 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5512 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5513 return 0;
5514 }
5515
5516 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5517
5518 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5519 cred_init_security();
5520
5521 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5522 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5523 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5524 avc_init();
5525
5526 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5527 if (!secondary_ops)
5528 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5529 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5530 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5531
5532 if (selinux_enforcing)
5533 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5534 else
5535 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5536
5537 return 0;
5538 }
5539
5540 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5541 {
5542 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5543
5544 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5545 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5546 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5547 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5548 next_sb:
5549 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5550 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5551 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5552 struct superblock_security_struct,
5553 list);
5554 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5555 sb->s_count++;
5556 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5557 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5558 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5559 if (sb->s_root)
5560 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5561 drop_super(sb);
5562 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5563 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5564 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5565 goto next_sb;
5566 }
5567 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5568 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5569 }
5570
5571 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5572 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5573 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5574
5575 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5576
5577 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5578 {
5579 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5580 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5581 .pf = PF_INET,
5582 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5583 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5584 },
5585 {
5586 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5587 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5588 .pf = PF_INET,
5589 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5590 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5591 },
5592 {
5593 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5594 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5595 .pf = PF_INET,
5596 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5597 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5598 }
5599 };
5600
5601 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5602
5603 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5604 {
5605 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5606 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5607 .pf = PF_INET6,
5608 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5609 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5610 },
5611 {
5612 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5613 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5614 .pf = PF_INET6,
5615 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5616 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5617 }
5618 };
5619
5620 #endif /* IPV6 */
5621
5622 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5623 {
5624 int err = 0;
5625
5626 if (!selinux_enabled)
5627 goto out;
5628
5629 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5630
5631 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5632 if (err)
5633 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5634
5635 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5636 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5637 if (err)
5638 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5639 #endif /* IPV6 */
5640
5641 out:
5642 return err;
5643 }
5644
5645 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5646
5647 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5648 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5649 {
5650 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5651
5652 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5653 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5654 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5655 #endif /* IPV6 */
5656 }
5657 #endif
5658
5659 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5660
5661 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5662 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5663 #endif
5664
5665 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5666
5667 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5668 static int selinux_disabled;
5669
5670 int selinux_disable(void)
5671 {
5672 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5673
5674 if (ss_initialized) {
5675 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5676 return -EINVAL;
5677 }
5678
5679 if (selinux_disabled) {
5680 /* Only do this once. */
5681 return -EINVAL;
5682 }
5683
5684 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5685
5686 selinux_disabled = 1;
5687 selinux_enabled = 0;
5688
5689 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5690 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5691
5692 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5693 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5694
5695 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
5696 exit_sel_fs();
5697
5698 return 0;
5699 }
5700 #endif
Linux 2.6 ibm-acpi/thinkpad-acpi driver git tree