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ACPI: thinkpad-acpi: add brightness_force parameter
[linux-2.6/linux-acpi-2.6/ibm-acpi-2.6.git] / kernel / auditsc.c
blob04f3ffb8d9d4adfd03b314db621f43c8c3ab11fe
1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
7 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
40 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
43 */
44
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <asm/atomic.h>
48 #include <asm/types.h>
49 #include <linux/fs.h>
50 #include <linux/namei.h>
51 #include <linux/mm.h>
52 #include <linux/module.h>
53 #include <linux/mount.h>
54 #include <linux/socket.h>
55 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
56 #include <linux/audit.h>
57 #include <linux/personality.h>
58 #include <linux/time.h>
59 #include <linux/netlink.h>
60 #include <linux/compiler.h>
61 #include <asm/unistd.h>
62 #include <linux/security.h>
63 #include <linux/list.h>
64 #include <linux/tty.h>
65 #include <linux/selinux.h>
66 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
67 #include <linux/highmem.h>
68 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
69
70 #include "audit.h"
71
72 extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
73
74 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
75 * for saving names from getname(). */
76 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
77
78 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
79 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
80
81 /* number of audit rules */
82 int audit_n_rules;
83
84 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
85 int audit_signals;
86
87 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
88 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
89 * pointers at syscall exit time).
90 *
91 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
92 struct audit_names {
93 const char *name;
94 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
95 unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
96 unsigned long ino;
97 dev_t dev;
98 umode_t mode;
99 uid_t uid;
100 gid_t gid;
101 dev_t rdev;
102 u32 osid;
103 };
104
105 struct audit_aux_data {
106 struct audit_aux_data *next;
107 int type;
108 };
109
110 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
111
112 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
113 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
114
115 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open {
116 struct audit_aux_data d;
117 int oflag;
118 mode_t mode;
119 struct mq_attr attr;
120 };
121
122 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv {
123 struct audit_aux_data d;
124 mqd_t mqdes;
125 size_t msg_len;
126 unsigned int msg_prio;
127 struct timespec abs_timeout;
128 };
129
130 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify {
131 struct audit_aux_data d;
132 mqd_t mqdes;
133 struct sigevent notification;
134 };
135
136 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr {
137 struct audit_aux_data d;
138 mqd_t mqdes;
139 struct mq_attr mqstat;
140 };
141
142 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
143 struct audit_aux_data d;
144 struct ipc_perm p;
145 unsigned long qbytes;
146 uid_t uid;
147 gid_t gid;
148 mode_t mode;
149 u32 osid;
150 };
151
152 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
153 struct audit_aux_data d;
154 int argc;
155 int envc;
156 struct mm_struct *mm;
157 };
158
159 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
160 struct audit_aux_data d;
161 int nargs;
162 unsigned long args[0];
163 };
164
165 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
166 struct audit_aux_data d;
167 int len;
168 char a[0];
169 };
170
171 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair {
172 struct audit_aux_data d;
173 int fd[2];
174 };
175
176 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
177 struct audit_aux_data d;
178 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
179 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
180 int pid_count;
181 };
182
183 /* The per-task audit context. */
184 struct audit_context {
185 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
186 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
187 enum audit_state state;
188 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
189 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
190 uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */
191 int major; /* syscall number */
192 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
193 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
194 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
195 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
196 int name_count;
197 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
198 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
199 struct dentry * pwd;
200 struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
201 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
202 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
203 struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
204
205 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
206 pid_t pid, ppid;
207 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
208 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
209 unsigned long personality;
210 int arch;
211
212 pid_t target_pid;
213 u32 target_sid;
214
215 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
216 int put_count;
217 int ino_count;
218 #endif
219 };
220
221 #define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
222 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
223 {
224 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
225 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
226 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
227 return n & mask;
228 }
229
230 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
231 {
232 unsigned n = ctx->major;
233 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
234 case 0: /* native */
235 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
236 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
237 return 1;
238 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
239 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
240 return 1;
241 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
242 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
243 return 1;
244 return 0;
245 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
246 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
247 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
248 return 1;
249 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
250 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
251 return 1;
252 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
253 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
254 return 1;
255 return 0;
256 case 2: /* open */
257 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
258 case 3: /* openat */
259 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
260 case 4: /* socketcall */
261 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
262 case 5: /* execve */
263 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
264 default:
265 return 0;
266 }
267 }
268
269 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
270 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
271 * otherwise. */
272 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
273 struct audit_krule *rule,
274 struct audit_context *ctx,
275 struct audit_names *name,
276 enum audit_state *state)
277 {
278 int i, j, need_sid = 1;
279 u32 sid;
280
281 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
282 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
283 int result = 0;
284
285 switch (f->type) {
286 case AUDIT_PID:
287 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
288 break;
289 case AUDIT_PPID:
290 if (ctx) {
291 if (!ctx->ppid)
292 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
293 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
294 }
295 break;
296 case AUDIT_UID:
297 result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
298 break;
299 case AUDIT_EUID:
300 result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
301 break;
302 case AUDIT_SUID:
303 result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
304 break;
305 case AUDIT_FSUID:
306 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
307 break;
308 case AUDIT_GID:
309 result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
310 break;
311 case AUDIT_EGID:
312 result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
313 break;
314 case AUDIT_SGID:
315 result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
316 break;
317 case AUDIT_FSGID:
318 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
319 break;
320 case AUDIT_PERS:
321 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
322 break;
323 case AUDIT_ARCH:
324 if (ctx)
325 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
326 break;
327
328 case AUDIT_EXIT:
329 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
330 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
331 break;
332 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
333 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
334 if (f->val)
335 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
336 else
337 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
338 }
339 break;
340 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
341 if (name)
342 result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
343 f->op, f->val);
344 else if (ctx) {
345 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
346 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
347 ++result;
348 break;
349 }
350 }
351 }
352 break;
353 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
354 if (name)
355 result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
356 f->op, f->val);
357 else if (ctx) {
358 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
359 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
360 ++result;
361 break;
362 }
363 }
364 }
365 break;
366 case AUDIT_INODE:
367 if (name)
368 result = (name->ino == f->val);
369 else if (ctx) {
370 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
371 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
372 ++result;
373 break;
374 }
375 }
376 }
377 break;
378 case AUDIT_WATCH:
379 if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1)
380 result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
381 name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
382 break;
383 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
384 result = 0;
385 if (ctx)
386 result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
387 break;
388 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
389 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
390 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
391 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
392 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
393 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
394 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
395 match for now to avoid losing information that
396 may be wanted. An error message will also be
397 logged upon error */
398 if (f->se_rule) {
399 if (need_sid) {
400 selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &sid);
401 need_sid = 0;
402 }
403 result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
404 f->op,
405 f->se_rule,
406 ctx);
407 }
408 break;
409 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
410 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
411 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
412 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
413 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
414 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
415 also applies here */
416 if (f->se_rule) {
417 /* Find files that match */
418 if (name) {
419 result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
420 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
421 f->se_rule, ctx);
422 } else if (ctx) {
423 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
424 if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
425 ctx->names[j].osid,
426 f->type, f->op,
427 f->se_rule, ctx)) {
428 ++result;
429 break;
430 }
431 }
432 }
433 /* Find ipc objects that match */
434 if (ctx) {
435 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
436 for (aux = ctx->aux; aux;
437 aux = aux->next) {
438 if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
439 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
440 if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
441 ++result;
442 break;
443 }
444 }
445 }
446 }
447 }
448 break;
449 case AUDIT_ARG0:
450 case AUDIT_ARG1:
451 case AUDIT_ARG2:
452 case AUDIT_ARG3:
453 if (ctx)
454 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
455 break;
456 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
457 /* ignore this field for filtering */
458 result = 1;
459 break;
460 case AUDIT_PERM:
461 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
462 break;
463 }
464
465 if (!result)
466 return 0;
467 }
468 if (rule->filterkey)
469 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
470 switch (rule->action) {
471 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
472 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
473 }
474 return 1;
475 }
476
477 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
478 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
479 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
480 */
481 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
482 {
483 struct audit_entry *e;
484 enum audit_state state;
485
486 rcu_read_lock();
487 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
488 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
489 rcu_read_unlock();
490 return state;
491 }
492 }
493 rcu_read_unlock();
494 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
495 }
496
497 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
498 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
499 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
500 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
501 */
502 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
503 struct audit_context *ctx,
504 struct list_head *list)
505 {
506 struct audit_entry *e;
507 enum audit_state state;
508
509 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
510 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
511
512 rcu_read_lock();
513 if (!list_empty(list)) {
514 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
515 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
516
517 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
518 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
519 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
520 &state)) {
521 rcu_read_unlock();
522 return state;
523 }
524 }
525 }
526 rcu_read_unlock();
527 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
528 }
529
530 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
531 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
532 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
533 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
534 */
535 enum audit_state audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
536 struct audit_context *ctx)
537 {
538 int i;
539 struct audit_entry *e;
540 enum audit_state state;
541
542 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
543 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
544
545 rcu_read_lock();
546 for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
547 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
548 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
549 struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
550 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
551 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
552
553 if (list_empty(list))
554 continue;
555
556 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
557 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
558 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
559 rcu_read_unlock();
560 return state;
561 }
562 }
563 }
564 rcu_read_unlock();
565 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
566 }
567
568 void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
569 {
570 ctx->auditable = 1;
571 }
572
573 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
574 int return_valid,
575 int return_code)
576 {
577 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
578
579 if (likely(!context))
580 return NULL;
581 context->return_valid = return_valid;
582 context->return_code = return_code;
583
584 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy && !context->auditable) {
585 enum audit_state state;
586
587 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
588 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
589 context->auditable = 1;
590 goto get_context;
591 }
592
593 state = audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
594 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
595 context->auditable = 1;
596
597 }
598
599 get_context:
600
601 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
602 return context;
603 }
604
605 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
606 {
607 int i;
608
609 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
610 if (context->auditable
611 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
612 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
613 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
614 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
615 __FILE__, __LINE__,
616 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
617 context->name_count, context->put_count,
618 context->ino_count);
619 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
620 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
621 context->names[i].name,
622 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
623 }
624 dump_stack();
625 return;
626 }
627 #endif
628 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
629 context->put_count = 0;
630 context->ino_count = 0;
631 #endif
632
633 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
634 if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
635 __putname(context->names[i].name);
636 }
637 context->name_count = 0;
638 if (context->pwd)
639 dput(context->pwd);
640 if (context->pwdmnt)
641 mntput(context->pwdmnt);
642 context->pwd = NULL;
643 context->pwdmnt = NULL;
644 }
645
646 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
647 {
648 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
649
650 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
651 context->aux = aux->next;
652 kfree(aux);
653 }
654 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
655 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
656 kfree(aux);
657 }
658 }
659
660 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
661 enum audit_state state)
662 {
663 uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
664
665 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
666 context->state = state;
667 context->loginuid = loginuid;
668 }
669
670 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
671 {
672 struct audit_context *context;
673
674 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
675 return NULL;
676 audit_zero_context(context, state);
677 return context;
678 }
679
680 /**
681 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
682 * @tsk: task
683 *
684 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
685 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
686 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
687 * needed.
688 */
689 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
690 {
691 struct audit_context *context;
692 enum audit_state state;
693
694 if (likely(!audit_enabled))
695 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
696
697 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
698 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
699 return 0;
700
701 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
702 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
703 return -ENOMEM;
704 }
705
706 /* Preserve login uid */
707 context->loginuid = -1;
708 if (current->audit_context)
709 context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
710
711 tsk->audit_context = context;
712 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
713 return 0;
714 }
715
716 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
717 {
718 struct audit_context *previous;
719 int count = 0;
720
721 do {
722 previous = context->previous;
723 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
724 ++count;
725 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
726 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
727 context->serial, context->major,
728 context->name_count, count);
729 }
730 audit_free_names(context);
731 audit_free_aux(context);
732 kfree(context->filterkey);
733 kfree(context);
734 context = previous;
735 } while (context);
736 if (count >= 10)
737 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
738 }
739
740 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
741 {
742 char *ctx = NULL;
743 unsigned len;
744 int error;
745 u32 sid;
746
747 selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
748 if (!sid)
749 return;
750
751 error = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
752 if (error) {
753 if (error != -EINVAL)
754 goto error_path;
755 return;
756 }
757
758 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
759 kfree(ctx);
760 return;
761
762 error_path:
763 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
764 return;
765 }
766
767 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
768
769 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
770 {
771 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
772 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
773 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
774
775 /* tsk == current */
776
777 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
778 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
779 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
780
781 if (mm) {
782 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
783 vma = mm->mmap;
784 while (vma) {
785 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
786 vma->vm_file) {
787 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
788 vma->vm_file->f_path.dentry,
789 vma->vm_file->f_path.mnt);
790 break;
791 }
792 vma = vma->vm_next;
793 }
794 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
795 }
796 audit_log_task_context(ab);
797 }
798
799 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
800 u32 sid)
801 {
802 struct audit_buffer *ab;
803 char *s = NULL;
804 u32 len;
805 int rc = 0;
806
807 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
808 if (!ab)
809 return 1;
810
811 if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &s, &len)) {
812 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d obj=(none)", pid);
813 rc = 1;
814 } else
815 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d obj=%s", pid, s);
816 audit_log_end(ab);
817 kfree(s);
818
819 return rc;
820 }
821
822 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_buffer *ab,
823 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
824 {
825 int i;
826 long len, ret;
827 const char __user *p;
828 char *buf;
829
830 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
831 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
832
833 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
834
835 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++, p += len) {
836 len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN);
837 /*
838 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
839 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
840 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
841 * any.
842 */
843 if (!len || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN) {
844 WARN_ON(1);
845 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
846 }
847
848 buf = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
849 if (!buf) {
850 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
851 break;
852 }
853
854 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, len);
855 /*
856 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
857 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
858 * space yet.
859 */
860 if (ret) {
861 WARN_ON(1);
862 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
863 }
864
865 audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i);
866 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, buf);
867 audit_log_format(ab, "\n");
868
869 kfree(buf);
870 }
871 }
872
873 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
874 {
875 int i, call_panic = 0;
876 struct audit_buffer *ab;
877 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
878 const char *tty;
879
880 /* tsk == current */
881 context->pid = tsk->pid;
882 if (!context->ppid)
883 context->ppid = sys_getppid();
884 context->uid = tsk->uid;
885 context->gid = tsk->gid;
886 context->euid = tsk->euid;
887 context->suid = tsk->suid;
888 context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
889 context->egid = tsk->egid;
890 context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
891 context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
892 context->personality = tsk->personality;
893
894 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
895 if (!ab)
896 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
897 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
898 context->arch, context->major);
899 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
900 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
901 if (context->return_valid)
902 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
903 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
904 context->return_code);
905
906 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
907 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
908 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
909 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
910 else
911 tty = "(none)";
912 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
913 audit_log_format(ab,
914 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
915 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
916 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
917 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
918 context->argv[0],
919 context->argv[1],
920 context->argv[2],
921 context->argv[3],
922 context->name_count,
923 context->ppid,
924 context->pid,
925 context->loginuid,
926 context->uid,
927 context->gid,
928 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
929 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
930
931 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
932
933 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
934 if (context->filterkey) {
935 audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
936 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
937 } else
938 audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
939 audit_log_end(ab);
940
941 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
942
943 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
944 if (!ab)
945 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
946
947 switch (aux->type) {
948 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
949 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *axi = (void *)aux;
950 audit_log_format(ab,
951 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
952 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
953 axi->oflag, axi->mode, axi->attr.mq_flags,
954 axi->attr.mq_maxmsg, axi->attr.mq_msgsize,
955 axi->attr.mq_curmsgs);
956 break; }
957
958 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
959 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *axi = (void *)aux;
960 audit_log_format(ab,
961 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
962 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
963 axi->mqdes, axi->msg_len, axi->msg_prio,
964 axi->abs_timeout.tv_sec, axi->abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
965 break; }
966
967 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
968 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *axi = (void *)aux;
969 audit_log_format(ab,
970 "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
971 axi->mqdes,
972 axi->notification.sigev_signo);
973 break; }
974
975 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
976 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *axi = (void *)aux;
977 audit_log_format(ab,
978 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
979 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
980 axi->mqdes,
981 axi->mqstat.mq_flags, axi->mqstat.mq_maxmsg,
982 axi->mqstat.mq_msgsize, axi->mqstat.mq_curmsgs);
983 break; }
984
985 case AUDIT_IPC: {
986 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
987 audit_log_format(ab,
988 "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
989 axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
990 if (axi->osid != 0) {
991 char *ctx = NULL;
992 u32 len;
993 if (selinux_sid_to_string(
994 axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
995 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
996 axi->osid);
997 call_panic = 1;
998 } else
999 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1000 kfree(ctx);
1001 }
1002 break; }
1003
1004 case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
1005 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
1006 audit_log_format(ab,
1007 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1008 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
1009 break; }
1010
1011 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1012 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
1013 audit_log_execve_info(ab, axi);
1014 break; }
1015
1016 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1017 int i;
1018 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
1019 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
1020 for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
1021 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
1022 break; }
1023
1024 case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
1025 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
1026
1027 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1028 audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
1029 break; }
1030
1031 case AUDIT_FD_PAIR: {
1032 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *axs = (void *)aux;
1033 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", axs->fd[0], axs->fd[1]);
1034 break; }
1035
1036 }
1037 audit_log_end(ab);
1038 }
1039
1040 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1041 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1042 int i;
1043
1044 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1045 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1046 axs->target_sid[i]))
1047 call_panic = 1;
1048 }
1049
1050 if (context->target_pid &&
1051 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1052 context->target_sid))
1053 call_panic = 1;
1054
1055 if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
1056 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1057 if (ab) {
1058 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
1059 audit_log_end(ab);
1060 }
1061 }
1062 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
1063 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
1064
1065 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1066 if (!ab)
1067 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1068
1069 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
1070
1071 if (n->name) {
1072 switch(n->name_len) {
1073 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1074 /* log the full path */
1075 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1076 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
1077 break;
1078 case 0:
1079 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1080 * directory component is the cwd */
1081 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", context->pwd,
1082 context->pwdmnt);
1083 break;
1084 default:
1085 /* log the name's directory component */
1086 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1087 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name_len,
1088 n->name);
1089 }
1090 } else
1091 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1092
1093 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1094 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1095 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1096 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1097 n->ino,
1098 MAJOR(n->dev),
1099 MINOR(n->dev),
1100 n->mode,
1101 n->uid,
1102 n->gid,
1103 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1104 MINOR(n->rdev));
1105 }
1106 if (n->osid != 0) {
1107 char *ctx = NULL;
1108 u32 len;
1109 if (selinux_sid_to_string(
1110 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1111 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1112 call_panic = 2;
1113 } else
1114 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1115 kfree(ctx);
1116 }
1117
1118 audit_log_end(ab);
1119 }
1120 if (call_panic)
1121 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1122 }
1123
1124 /**
1125 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1126 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1127 *
1128 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1129 */
1130 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1131 {
1132 struct audit_context *context;
1133
1134 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1135 if (likely(!context))
1136 return;
1137
1138 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1139 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1140 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1141 * in the context of the idle thread */
1142 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1143 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1144 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1145
1146 audit_free_context(context);
1147 }
1148
1149 /**
1150 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1151 * @tsk: task being audited
1152 * @arch: architecture type
1153 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1154 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1155 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1156 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1157 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1158 *
1159 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1160 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1161 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1162 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1163 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1164 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1165 * be written).
1166 */
1167 void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1168 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1169 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1170 {
1171 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1172 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1173 enum audit_state state;
1174
1175 BUG_ON(!context);
1176
1177 /*
1178 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1179 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1180 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1181 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1182 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1183 *
1184 * i386 no
1185 * x86_64 no
1186 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1187 *
1188 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1189 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1190 */
1191 if (context->in_syscall) {
1192 struct audit_context *newctx;
1193
1194 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1195 printk(KERN_ERR
1196 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1197 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1198 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1199 #endif
1200 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1201 if (newctx) {
1202 newctx->previous = context;
1203 context = newctx;
1204 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1205 } else {
1206 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1207 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1208 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1209 * to abandon auditing. */
1210 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1211 }
1212 }
1213 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1214
1215 if (!audit_enabled)
1216 return;
1217
1218 context->arch = arch;
1219 context->major = major;
1220 context->argv[0] = a1;
1221 context->argv[1] = a2;
1222 context->argv[2] = a3;
1223 context->argv[3] = a4;
1224
1225 state = context->state;
1226 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1227 if (!context->dummy && (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT))
1228 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1229 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
1230 return;
1231
1232 context->serial = 0;
1233 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1234 context->in_syscall = 1;
1235 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
1236 context->ppid = 0;
1237 }
1238
1239 /**
1240 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1241 * @tsk: task being audited
1242 * @valid: success/failure flag
1243 * @return_code: syscall return value
1244 *
1245 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1246 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1247 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1248 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1249 * free the names stored from getname().
1250 */
1251 void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
1252 {
1253 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1254 struct audit_context *context;
1255
1256 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
1257
1258 if (likely(!context))
1259 return;
1260
1261 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1262 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1263
1264 context->in_syscall = 0;
1265 context->auditable = 0;
1266
1267 if (context->previous) {
1268 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1269 context->previous = NULL;
1270 audit_free_context(context);
1271 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1272 } else {
1273 audit_free_names(context);
1274 audit_free_aux(context);
1275 context->aux = NULL;
1276 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1277 context->target_pid = 0;
1278 context->target_sid = 0;
1279 kfree(context->filterkey);
1280 context->filterkey = NULL;
1281 tsk->audit_context = context;
1282 }
1283 }
1284
1285 /**
1286 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1287 * @name: name to add
1288 *
1289 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1290 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1291 */
1292 void __audit_getname(const char *name)
1293 {
1294 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1295
1296 if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
1297 return;
1298
1299 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1300 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1301 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1302 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1303 dump_stack();
1304 #endif
1305 return;
1306 }
1307 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1308 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
1309 context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1310 context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
1311 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1312 context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0;
1313 ++context->name_count;
1314 if (!context->pwd) {
1315 read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
1316 context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd);
1317 context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt);
1318 read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
1319 }
1320
1321 }
1322
1323 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1324 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1325 *
1326 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1327 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1328 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1329 */
1330 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1331 {
1332 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1333
1334 BUG_ON(!context);
1335 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1336 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1337 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1338 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1339 if (context->name_count) {
1340 int i;
1341 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1342 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1343 context->names[i].name,
1344 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
1345 }
1346 #endif
1347 __putname(name);
1348 }
1349 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1350 else {
1351 ++context->put_count;
1352 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1353 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1354 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1355 " put_count=%d\n",
1356 __FILE__, __LINE__,
1357 context->serial, context->major,
1358 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1359 context->put_count);
1360 dump_stack();
1361 }
1362 }
1363 #endif
1364 }
1365
1366 static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context,
1367 const struct inode *inode)
1368 {
1369 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) {
1370 if (inode)
1371 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data: "
1372 "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu",
1373 MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1374 MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1375 inode->i_ino);
1376
1377 else
1378 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data");
1379 return 1;
1380 }
1381 context->name_count++;
1382 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1383 context->ino_count++;
1384 #endif
1385 return 0;
1386 }
1387
1388 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1389 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode)
1390 {
1391 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1392 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1393 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1394 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1395 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1396 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1397 selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &name->osid);
1398 }
1399
1400 /**
1401 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1402 * @name: name being audited
1403 * @inode: inode being audited
1404 *
1405 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1406 */
1407 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
1408 {
1409 int idx;
1410 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1411
1412 if (!context->in_syscall)
1413 return;
1414 if (context->name_count
1415 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1416 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1417 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1418 else if (context->name_count > 1
1419 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1420 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1421 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1422 else {
1423 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1424 * associated name? */
1425 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
1426 return;
1427 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1428 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1429 }
1430 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1431 }
1432
1433 /**
1434 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1435 * @dname: inode's dentry name
1436 * @inode: inode being audited
1437 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1438 *
1439 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1440 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1441 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1442 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1443 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1444 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1445 * unsuccessful attempts.
1446 */
1447 void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
1448 const struct inode *parent)
1449 {
1450 int idx;
1451 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1452 const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
1453 int dirlen = 0;
1454
1455 if (!context->in_syscall)
1456 return;
1457
1458 /* determine matching parent */
1459 if (!dname)
1460 goto add_names;
1461
1462 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
1463 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
1464 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
1465
1466 if (!n->name)
1467 continue;
1468
1469 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
1470 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
1471 n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
1472 found_parent = n->name;
1473 goto add_names;
1474 }
1475 }
1476
1477 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
1478 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
1479 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
1480
1481 if (!n->name)
1482 continue;
1483
1484 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
1485 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
1486 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
1487 if (inode)
1488 audit_copy_inode(n, inode);
1489 else
1490 n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1491 found_child = n->name;
1492 goto add_names;
1493 }
1494 }
1495
1496 add_names:
1497 if (!found_parent) {
1498 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent))
1499 return;
1500 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1501 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1502 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], parent);
1503 }
1504
1505 if (!found_child) {
1506 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
1507 return;
1508 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1509
1510 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
1511 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
1512 * audit_free_names() */
1513 if (found_parent) {
1514 context->names[idx].name = found_parent;
1515 context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1516 /* don't call __putname() */
1517 context->names[idx].name_put = 0;
1518 } else {
1519 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1520 }
1521
1522 if (inode)
1523 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1524 else
1525 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1526 }
1527 }
1528
1529 /**
1530 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1531 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1532 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1533 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1534 *
1535 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1536 */
1537 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1538 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1539 {
1540 if (!ctx->serial)
1541 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
1542 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1543 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1544 *serial = ctx->serial;
1545 ctx->auditable = 1;
1546 }
1547
1548 /**
1549 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
1550 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
1551 * @loginuid: loginuid value
1552 *
1553 * Returns 0.
1554 *
1555 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
1556 */
1557 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
1558 {
1559 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
1560
1561 if (context) {
1562 /* Only log if audit is enabled */
1563 if (context->in_syscall) {
1564 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1565
1566 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1567 if (ab) {
1568 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1569 "old auid=%u new auid=%u",
1570 task->pid, task->uid,
1571 context->loginuid, loginuid);
1572 audit_log_end(ab);
1573 }
1574 }
1575 context->loginuid = loginuid;
1576 }
1577 return 0;
1578 }
1579
1580 /**
1581 * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
1582 * @ctx: the audit_context
1583 *
1584 * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
1585 */
1586 uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
1587 {
1588 return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
1589 }
1590
1591 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_get_loginuid);
1592
1593 /**
1594 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
1595 * @oflag: open flag
1596 * @mode: mode bits
1597 * @u_attr: queue attributes
1598 *
1599 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1600 */
1601 int __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr __user *u_attr)
1602 {
1603 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *ax;
1604 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1605
1606 if (!audit_enabled)
1607 return 0;
1608
1609 if (likely(!context))
1610 return 0;
1611
1612 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1613 if (!ax)
1614 return -ENOMEM;
1615
1616 if (u_attr != NULL) {
1617 if (copy_from_user(&ax->attr, u_attr, sizeof(ax->attr))) {
1618 kfree(ax);
1619 return -EFAULT;
1620 }
1621 } else
1622 memset(&ax->attr, 0, sizeof(ax->attr));
1623
1624 ax->oflag = oflag;
1625 ax->mode = mode;
1626
1627 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
1628 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1629 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1630 return 0;
1631 }
1632
1633 /**
1634 * __audit_mq_timedsend - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send
1635 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1636 * @msg_len: Message length
1637 * @msg_prio: Message priority
1638 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
1639 *
1640 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1641 */
1642 int __audit_mq_timedsend(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
1643 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
1644 {
1645 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
1646 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1647
1648 if (!audit_enabled)
1649 return 0;
1650
1651 if (likely(!context))
1652 return 0;
1653
1654 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1655 if (!ax)
1656 return -ENOMEM;
1657
1658 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
1659 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
1660 kfree(ax);
1661 return -EFAULT;
1662 }
1663 } else
1664 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
1665
1666 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
1667 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
1668 ax->msg_prio = msg_prio;
1669
1670 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
1671 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1672 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1673 return 0;
1674 }
1675
1676 /**
1677 * __audit_mq_timedreceive - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed receive
1678 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1679 * @msg_len: Message length
1680 * @u_msg_prio: Message priority
1681 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
1682 *
1683 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1684 */
1685 int __audit_mq_timedreceive(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len,
1686 unsigned int __user *u_msg_prio,
1687 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
1688 {
1689 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
1690 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1691
1692 if (!audit_enabled)
1693 return 0;
1694
1695 if (likely(!context))
1696 return 0;
1697
1698 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1699 if (!ax)
1700 return -ENOMEM;
1701
1702 if (u_msg_prio != NULL) {
1703 if (get_user(ax->msg_prio, u_msg_prio)) {
1704 kfree(ax);
1705 return -EFAULT;
1706 }
1707 } else
1708 ax->msg_prio = 0;
1709
1710 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
1711 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
1712 kfree(ax);
1713 return -EFAULT;
1714 }
1715 } else
1716 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
1717
1718 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
1719 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
1720
1721 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
1722 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1723 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1724 return 0;
1725 }
1726
1727 /**
1728 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
1729 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1730 * @u_notification: Notification event
1731 *
1732 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1733 */
1734
1735 int __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent __user *u_notification)
1736 {
1737 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *ax;
1738 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1739
1740 if (!audit_enabled)
1741 return 0;
1742
1743 if (likely(!context))
1744 return 0;
1745
1746 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1747 if (!ax)
1748 return -ENOMEM;
1749
1750 if (u_notification != NULL) {
1751 if (copy_from_user(&ax->notification, u_notification, sizeof(ax->notification))) {
1752 kfree(ax);
1753 return -EFAULT;
1754 }
1755 } else
1756 memset(&ax->notification, 0, sizeof(ax->notification));
1757
1758 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
1759
1760 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
1761 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1762 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1763 return 0;
1764 }
1765
1766 /**
1767 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
1768 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1769 * @mqstat: MQ flags
1770 *
1771 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1772 */
1773 int __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
1774 {
1775 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *ax;
1776 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1777
1778 if (!audit_enabled)
1779 return 0;
1780
1781 if (likely(!context))
1782 return 0;
1783
1784 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1785 if (!ax)
1786 return -ENOMEM;
1787
1788 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
1789 ax->mqstat = *mqstat;
1790
1791 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
1792 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1793 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1794 return 0;
1795 }
1796
1797 /**
1798 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
1799 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
1800 *
1801 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1802 */
1803 int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
1804 {
1805 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1806 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1807
1808 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1809 if (!ax)
1810 return -ENOMEM;
1811
1812 ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
1813 ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
1814 ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
1815 selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
1816
1817 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
1818 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1819 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1820 return 0;
1821 }
1822
1823 /**
1824 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
1825 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
1826 * @uid: msgq user id
1827 * @gid: msgq group id
1828 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
1829 *
1830 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1831 */
1832 int __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
1833 {
1834 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1835 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1836
1837 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1838 if (!ax)
1839 return -ENOMEM;
1840
1841 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
1842 ax->uid = uid;
1843 ax->gid = gid;
1844 ax->mode = mode;
1845
1846 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM;
1847 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1848 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1849 return 0;
1850 }
1851
1852 int audit_argv_kb = 32;
1853
1854 int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1855 {
1856 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
1857 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1858
1859 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
1860 return 0;
1861
1862 /*
1863 * Even though the stack code doesn't limit the arg+env size any more,
1864 * the audit code requires that _all_ arguments be logged in a single
1865 * netlink skb. Hence cap it :-(
1866 */
1867 if (bprm->argv_len > (audit_argv_kb << 10))
1868 return -E2BIG;
1869
1870 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
1871 if (!ax)
1872 return -ENOMEM;
1873
1874 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
1875 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
1876 ax->mm = bprm->mm;
1877 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
1878 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1879 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1880 return 0;
1881 }
1882
1883
1884 /**
1885 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
1886 * @nargs: number of args
1887 * @args: args array
1888 *
1889 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1890 */
1891 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
1892 {
1893 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
1894 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1895
1896 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
1897 return 0;
1898
1899 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
1900 if (!ax)
1901 return -ENOMEM;
1902
1903 ax->nargs = nargs;
1904 memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
1905
1906 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
1907 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1908 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1909 return 0;
1910 }
1911
1912 /**
1913 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
1914 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
1915 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
1916 *
1917 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1918 */
1919 int __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
1920 {
1921 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1922 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *ax;
1923
1924 if (likely(!context)) {
1925 return 0;
1926 }
1927
1928 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
1929 if (!ax) {
1930 return -ENOMEM;
1931 }
1932
1933 ax->fd[0] = fd1;
1934 ax->fd[1] = fd2;
1935
1936 ax->d.type = AUDIT_FD_PAIR;
1937 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1938 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1939 return 0;
1940 }
1941
1942 /**
1943 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
1944 * @len: data length in user space
1945 * @a: data address in kernel space
1946 *
1947 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1948 */
1949 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
1950 {
1951 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
1952 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1953
1954 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
1955 return 0;
1956
1957 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
1958 if (!ax)
1959 return -ENOMEM;
1960
1961 ax->len = len;
1962 memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
1963
1964 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
1965 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1966 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1967 return 0;
1968 }
1969
1970 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
1971 {
1972 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1973
1974 context->target_pid = t->pid;
1975 selinux_get_task_sid(t, &context->target_sid);
1976 }
1977
1978 /**
1979 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
1980 * @sig: signal value
1981 * @t: task being signaled
1982 *
1983 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
1984 * and uid that is doing that.
1985 */
1986 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
1987 {
1988 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
1989 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1990 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
1991 extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
1992 extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
1993 extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
1994
1995 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
1996 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1) {
1997 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
1998 if (ctx)
1999 audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
2000 else
2001 audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
2002 selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2003 }
2004 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2005 return 0;
2006 }
2007
2008 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2009 * in audit_context */
2010 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2011 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
2012 selinux_get_task_sid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2013 return 0;
2014 }
2015
2016 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2017 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2018 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2019 if (!axp)
2020 return -ENOMEM;
2021
2022 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2023 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2024 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2025 }
2026 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2027
2028 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
2029 selinux_get_task_sid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2030 axp->pid_count++;
2031
2032 return 0;
2033 }
2034
2035 /**
2036 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2037 * @signr: signal value
2038 *
2039 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2040 * should record the event for investigation.
2041 */
2042 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2043 {
2044 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2045 u32 sid;
2046
2047 if (!audit_enabled)
2048 return;
2049
2050 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2051 return;
2052
2053 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2054 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u",
2055 audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context),
2056 current->uid, current->gid);
2057 selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
2058 if (sid) {
2059 char *ctx = NULL;
2060 u32 len;
2061
2062 if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
2063 audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
2064 else
2065 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
2066 kfree(ctx);
2067 }
2068 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2069 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2070 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2071 audit_log_end(ab);
2072 }
Linux 2.6 ibm-acpi/thinkpad-acpi driver git tree