security/commoncap.c

   1 /* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o and root_plug.o
   2  *
   3  *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   4  *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
   5  *      the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
   6  *      (at your option) any later version.
   7  *
   8  */
   9
  10 #include <linux/capability.h>
  11 #include <linux/module.h>
  12 #include <linux/init.h>
  13 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  14 #include <linux/security.h>
  15 #include <linux/file.h>
  16 #include <linux/mm.h>
  17 #include <linux/mman.h>
  18 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
  19 #include <linux/swap.h>
  20 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
  21 #include <linux/netlink.h>
  22 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
  23 #include <linux/xattr.h>
  24 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
  25 #include <linux/mount.h>
  26 #include <linux/sched.h>
  27 #include <linux/prctl.h>
  28 #include <linux/securebits.h>
  29
  30 int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
  31 {
  32         NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective;
  33         return 0;
  34 }
  35
  36 int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
  37 {
  38         if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, cap))
  39                 return -EPERM;
  40         return 0;
  41 }
  42
  43 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
  44
  45 /*
  46  * NOTE WELL: cap_capable() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
  47  * function.  That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable()
  48  * returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable()
  49  * returns 1 for this case.
  50  */
  51 int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
  52 {
  53         /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
  54         if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap))
  55                 return 0;
  56         return -EPERM;
  57 }
  58
  59 int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
  60 {
  61         if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME))
  62                 return -EPERM;
  63         return 0;
  64 }
  65
  66 int cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
  67 {
  68         /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
  69         if (!cap_issubset(child->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted) &&
  70             !__capable(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
  71                 return -EPERM;
  72         return 0;
  73 }
  74
  75 int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
  76                 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
  77 {
  78         /* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */
  79         *effective = target->cap_effective;
  80         *inheritable = target->cap_inheritable;
  81         *permitted = target->cap_permitted;
  82         return 0;
  83 }
  84
  85 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
  86
  87 static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *target)
  88 {
  89         /*
  90          * No support for remote process capability manipulation with
  91          * filesystem capability support.
  92          */
  93         return (target != current);
  94 }
  95
  96 static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
  97 {
  98         /*
  99          * Return 1 if changes to the inheritable set are limited
 100          * to the old permitted set. That is, if the current task
 101          * does *not* possess the CAP_SETPCAP capability.
 102          */
 103         return (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0);
 104 }
 105
 106 static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void) { return 1; }
 107
 108 #else /* ie., ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
 109
 110 static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *t) { return 0; }
 111 static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) { return 1; }
 112 static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void)
 113 {
 114         return !capable(CAP_SETPCAP);
 115 }
 116
 117 #endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
 118
 119 int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 120                       kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 121 {
 122         if (cap_block_setpcap(target)) {
 123                 return -EPERM;
 124         }
 125         if (cap_inh_is_capped()
 126             && !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
 127                              cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
 128                                          current->cap_permitted))) {
 129                 /* incapable of using this inheritable set */
 130                 return -EPERM;
 131         }
 132         if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
 133                            cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
 134                                        current->cap_bset))) {
 135                 /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
 136                 return -EPERM;
 137         }
 138
 139         /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
 140         if (!cap_issubset (*permitted,
 141                            cap_combine (target->cap_permitted,
 142                                         current->cap_permitted))) {
 143                 return -EPERM;
 144         }
 145
 146         /* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */
 147         if (!cap_issubset (*effective, *permitted)) {
 148                 return -EPERM;
 149         }
 150
 151         return 0;
 152 }
 153
 154 void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 155                      kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 156 {
 157         target->cap_effective = *effective;
 158         target->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
 159         target->cap_permitted = *permitted;
 160 }
 161
 162 static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 163 {
 164         cap_clear(bprm->cap_inheritable);
 165         cap_clear(bprm->cap_permitted);
 166         bprm->cap_effective = false;
 167 }
 168
 169 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 170
 171 int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 172 {
 173         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 174         int error;
 175
 176         if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
 177                return 0;
 178
 179         error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0);
 180         if (error <= 0)
 181                 return 0;
 182         return 1;
 183 }
 184
 185 int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 186 {
 187         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 188
 189         if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->removexattr)
 190                return 0;
 191
 192         return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
 193 }
 194
 195 static inline int cap_from_disk(struct vfs_cap_data *caps,
 196                                 struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned size)
 197 {
 198         __u32 magic_etc;
 199         unsigned tocopy, i;
 200
 201         if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
 202                 return -EINVAL;
 203
 204         magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc);
 205
 206         switch ((magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)) {
 207         case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
 208                 if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1)
 209                         return -EINVAL;
 210                 tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_1;
 211                 break;
 212         case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2:
 213                 if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
 214                         return -EINVAL;
 215                 tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2;
 216                 break;
 217         default:
 218                 return -EINVAL;
 219         }
 220
 221         if (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) {
 222                 bprm->cap_effective = true;
 223         } else {
 224                 bprm->cap_effective = false;
 225         }
 226
 227         for (i = 0; i < tocopy; ++i) {
 228                 bprm->cap_permitted.cap[i] =
 229                         le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].permitted);
 230                 bprm->cap_inheritable.cap[i] =
 231                         le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].inheritable);
 232         }
 233         while (i < VFS_CAP_U32) {
 234                 bprm->cap_permitted.cap[i] = 0;
 235                 bprm->cap_inheritable.cap[i] = 0;
 236                 i++;
 237         }
 238
 239         return 0;
 240 }
 241
 242 /* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
 243 static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 244 {
 245         struct dentry *dentry;
 246         int rc = 0;
 247         struct vfs_cap_data vcaps;
 248         struct inode *inode;
 249
 250         if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) {
 251                 bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
 252                 return 0;
 253         }
 254
 255         dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
 256         inode = dentry->d_inode;
 257         if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
 258                 goto out;
 259
 260         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &vcaps,
 261                                    XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
 262         if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
 263                 /* no data, that's ok */
 264                 rc = 0;
 265                 goto out;
 266         }
 267         if (rc < 0)
 268                 goto out;
 269
 270         rc = cap_from_disk(&vcaps, bprm, rc);
 271         if (rc)
 272                 printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
 273                         __func__, rc, bprm->filename);
 274
 275 out:
 276         dput(dentry);
 277         if (rc)
 278                 bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
 279
 280         return rc;
 281 }
 282
 283 #else
 284 int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 285 {
 286         return 0;
 287 }
 288
 289 int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 290 {
 291         return 0;
 292 }
 293
 294 static inline int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 295 {
 296         bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
 297         return 0;
 298 }
 299 #endif
 300
 301 int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 302 {
 303         int ret;
 304
 305         ret = get_file_caps(bprm);
 306         if (ret)
 307                 printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_file_caps returned %d for %s\n",
 308                         __func__, ret, bprm->filename);
 309
 310         /*  To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
 311          *  executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
 312          *  capability sets for the file.
 313          *
 314          *  If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable
 315          *  and permitted sets of the executable file.
 316          */
 317
 318         if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) {
 319                 if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
 320                         cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
 321                         cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
 322                 }
 323                 if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
 324                         bprm->cap_effective = true;
 325         }
 326
 327         return ret;
 328 }
 329
 330 void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
 331 {
 332         /* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */
 333         kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working;
 334
 335         new_permitted = cap_intersect(bprm->cap_permitted,
 336                                  current->cap_bset);
 337         working = cap_intersect(bprm->cap_inheritable,
 338                                  current->cap_inheritable);
 339         new_permitted = cap_combine(new_permitted, working);
 340
 341         if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid ||
 342             !cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) {
 343                 set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
 344                 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
 345
 346                 if (unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
 347                         if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
 348                                 bprm->e_uid = current->uid;
 349                                 bprm->e_gid = current->gid;
 350                         }
 351                         if (cap_limit_ptraced_target()) {
 352                                 new_permitted =
 353                                         cap_intersect(new_permitted,
 354                                                       current->cap_permitted);
 355                         }
 356                 }
 357         }
 358
 359         current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
 360         current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
 361
 362         /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set
 363          * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual
 364          * capability rules */
 365         if (!is_global_init(current)) {
 366                 current->cap_permitted = new_permitted;
 367                 if (bprm->cap_effective)
 368                         current->cap_effective = new_permitted;
 369                 else
 370                         cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
 371         }
 372
 373         /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
 374
 375         current->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
 376 }
 377
 378 int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 379 {
 380         if (current->uid != 0) {
 381                 if (bprm->cap_effective)
 382                         return 1;
 383                 if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_permitted))
 384                         return 1;
 385                 if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_inheritable))
 386                         return 1;
 387         }
 388
 389         return (current->euid != current->uid ||
 390                 current->egid != current->gid);
 391 }
 392
 393 int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 394                        const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 395 {
 396         if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
 397                 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
 398                         return -EPERM;
 399                 return 0;
 400         } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
 401                      sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)  &&
 402             !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 403                 return -EPERM;
 404         return 0;
 405 }
 406
 407 int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 408 {
 409         if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
 410                 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
 411                         return -EPERM;
 412                 return 0;
 413         } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
 414                      sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)  &&
 415             !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 416                 return -EPERM;
 417         return 0;
 418 }
 419
 420 /* moved from kernel/sys.c. */
 421 /*
 422  * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of
 423  * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid.
 424  *
 425  *  1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of
 426  *  {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are
 427  *  cleared.
 428  *
 429  *  2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective
 430  *  capabilities of the process are cleared.
 431  *
 432  *  3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective
 433  *  capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities.
 434  *
 435  *  fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should
 436  *  never happen.
 437  *
 438  *  -astor
 439  *
 440  * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99
 441  * A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it
 442  * calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and
 443  * effective sets will be retained.
 444  * Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some
 445  * of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges!
 446  * Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital
 447  * files..
 448  * Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this.
 449  */
 450 static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid (int old_ruid, int old_euid,
 451                                         int old_suid)
 452 {
 453         if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) &&
 454             (current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0 && current->suid != 0) &&
 455             !issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) {
 456                 cap_clear (current->cap_permitted);
 457                 cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
 458         }
 459         if (old_euid == 0 && current->euid != 0) {
 460                 cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
 461         }
 462         if (old_euid != 0 && current->euid == 0) {
 463                 current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted;
 464         }
 465 }
 466
 467 int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
 468                           int flags)
 469 {
 470         switch (flags) {
 471         case LSM_SETID_RE:
 472         case LSM_SETID_ID:
 473         case LSM_SETID_RES:
 474                 /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setreuid/setuid/setresuid. */
 475                 if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
 476                         cap_emulate_setxuid (old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid);
 477                 }
 478                 break;
 479         case LSM_SETID_FS:
 480                 {
 481                         uid_t old_fsuid = old_ruid;
 482
 483                         /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setfsuid. */
 484
 485                         /*
 486                          * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
 487                          *          if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
 488                          */
 489
 490                         if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
 491                                 if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) {
 492                                         current->cap_effective =
 493                                                 cap_drop_fs_set(
 494                                                     current->cap_effective);
 495                                 }
 496                                 if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) {
 497                                         current->cap_effective =
 498                                                 cap_raise_fs_set(
 499                                                     current->cap_effective,
 500                                                     current->cap_permitted);
 501                                 }
 502                         }
 503                         break;
 504                 }
 505         default:
 506                 return -EINVAL;
 507         }
 508
 509         return 0;
 510 }
 511
 512 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 513 /*
 514  * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and
 515  * task_setnice, assumes that
 516  *   . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed
 517  *   . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes,
 518  *      then those actions should be allowed
 519  * This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but
 520  * yet with increased caps.
 521  * So we check for increased caps on the target process.
 522  */
 523 static inline int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
 524 {
 525         if (!cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
 526             !__capable(current, CAP_SYS_NICE))
 527                 return -EPERM;
 528         return 0;
 529 }
 530
 531 int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
 532                            struct sched_param *lp)
 533 {
 534         return cap_safe_nice(p);
 535 }
 536
 537 int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 538 {
 539         return cap_safe_nice(p);
 540 }
 541
 542 int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 543 {
 544         return cap_safe_nice(p);
 545 }
 546
 547 /*
 548  * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
 549  * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
 550  * no new races - i.e. only another task doing capget() on
 551  * this task could get inconsistent info.  There can be no
 552  * racing writer bc a task can only change its own caps.
 553  */
 554 static long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
 555 {
 556         if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
 557                 return -EPERM;
 558         if (!cap_valid(cap))
 559                 return -EINVAL;
 560         cap_lower(current->cap_bset, cap);
 561         return 0;
 562 }
 563
 564 #else
 565 int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
 566                            struct sched_param *lp)
 567 {
 568         return 0;
 569 }
 570 int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 571 {
 572         return 0;
 573 }
 574 int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 575 {
 576         return 0;
 577 }
 578 #endif
 579
 580 int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 581                    unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
 582 {
 583         long error = 0;
 584
 585         switch (option) {
 586         case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
 587                 if (!cap_valid(arg2))
 588                         error = -EINVAL;
 589                 else
 590                         error = !!cap_raised(current->cap_bset, arg2);
 591                 break;
 592 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 593         case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
 594                 error = cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
 595                 break;
 596
 597         /*
 598          * The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a
 599          * system from legacy UID=0 based privilege (when filesystem
 600          * capabilities are not in use) to a system using filesystem
 601          * capabilities only - as the POSIX.1e draft intended.
 602          *
 603          * Note:
 604          *
 605          *  PR_SET_SECUREBITS =
 606          *      issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)
 607          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)
 608          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)
 609          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)
 610          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)
 611          *
 612          * will ensure that the current process and all of its
 613          * children will be locked into a pure
 614          * capability-based-privilege environment.
 615          */
 616         case PR_SET_SECUREBITS:
 617                 if ((((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
 618                      & (current->securebits ^ arg2))                  /*[1]*/
 619                     || ((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS
 620                          & ~arg2))                                    /*[2]*/
 621                     || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
 622                     || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0)) {    /*[4]*/
 623                         /*
 624                          * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
 625                          * [2] no unlocking of locks
 626                          * [3] no setting of unsupported bits
 627                          * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about
 628                          *     the "sendmail capabilities bug")
 629                          */
 630                         error = -EPERM;  /* cannot change a locked bit */
 631                 } else {
 632                         current->securebits = arg2;
 633                 }
 634                 break;
 635         case PR_GET_SECUREBITS:
 636                 error = current->securebits;
 637                 break;
 638
 639 #endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
 640
 641         case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
 642                 if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
 643                         error = 1;
 644                 break;
 645         case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
 646                 if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */
 647                         error = -EINVAL;
 648                 else if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
 649                         error = -EPERM;
 650                 else if (arg2)
 651                         current->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
 652                 else
 653                         current->securebits &=
 654                                 ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
 655                 break;
 656
 657         default:
 658                 /* No functionality available - continue with default */
 659                 return 0;
 660         }
 661
 662         /* Functionality provided */
 663         *rc_p = error;
 664         return 1;
 665 }
 666
 667 void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
 668 {
 669         cap_set_init_eff(p->cap_effective);
 670         cap_clear(p->cap_inheritable);
 671         cap_set_full(p->cap_permitted);
 672         p->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT;
 673         return;
 674 }
 675
 676 int cap_syslog (int type)
 677 {
 678         if ((type != 3 && type != 10) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 679                 return -EPERM;
 680         return 0;
 681 }
 682
 683 int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 684 {
 685         int cap_sys_admin = 0;
 686
 687         if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0)
 688                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
 689         return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
 690 }
 691