Merge master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/sparc-2.6
[linux-2.6/linux-acpi-2.6/ibm-acpi-2.6.git] / kernel / auditsc.c
blob7f160df21a23e22a3d8e0e36b29712bcc9758692
1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation
7 * All Rights Reserved.
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
33 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
35 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
36 * filesystem information.
38 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
39 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
42 #include <linux/init.h>
43 #include <asm/types.h>
44 #include <asm/atomic.h>
45 #include <asm/types.h>
46 #include <linux/fs.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mm.h>
49 #include <linux/module.h>
50 #include <linux/mount.h>
51 #include <linux/socket.h>
52 #include <linux/audit.h>
53 #include <linux/personality.h>
54 #include <linux/time.h>
55 #include <linux/netlink.h>
56 #include <linux/compiler.h>
57 #include <asm/unistd.h>
58 #include <linux/security.h>
59 #include <linux/list.h>
60 #include <linux/tty.h>
62 #include "audit.h"
64 extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
66 /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
67 extern int audit_enabled;
69 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
70 * for saving names from getname(). */
71 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
73 /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
74 * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
75 * path_lookup. */
76 #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
78 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
79 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
80 * pointers at syscall exit time).
82 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
83 struct audit_names {
84 const char *name;
85 unsigned long ino;
86 unsigned long pino;
87 dev_t dev;
88 umode_t mode;
89 uid_t uid;
90 gid_t gid;
91 dev_t rdev;
92 char *ctx;
95 struct audit_aux_data {
96 struct audit_aux_data *next;
97 int type;
100 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
102 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
103 struct audit_aux_data d;
104 struct ipc_perm p;
105 unsigned long qbytes;
106 uid_t uid;
107 gid_t gid;
108 mode_t mode;
109 char *ctx;
112 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
113 struct audit_aux_data d;
114 int nargs;
115 unsigned long args[0];
118 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
119 struct audit_aux_data d;
120 int len;
121 char a[0];
124 struct audit_aux_data_path {
125 struct audit_aux_data d;
126 struct dentry *dentry;
127 struct vfsmount *mnt;
130 /* The per-task audit context. */
131 struct audit_context {
132 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
133 enum audit_state state;
134 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
135 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
136 uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */
137 int major; /* syscall number */
138 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
139 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
140 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
141 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
142 int name_count;
143 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
144 struct dentry * pwd;
145 struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
146 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
147 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
149 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
150 pid_t pid;
151 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
152 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
153 unsigned long personality;
154 int arch;
156 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
157 int put_count;
158 int ino_count;
159 #endif
163 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
164 * otherwise. */
165 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
166 struct audit_krule *rule,
167 struct audit_context *ctx,
168 enum audit_state *state)
170 int i, j;
172 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
173 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
174 int result = 0;
176 switch (f->type) {
177 case AUDIT_PID:
178 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
179 break;
180 case AUDIT_UID:
181 result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
182 break;
183 case AUDIT_EUID:
184 result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
185 break;
186 case AUDIT_SUID:
187 result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
188 break;
189 case AUDIT_FSUID:
190 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
191 break;
192 case AUDIT_GID:
193 result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
194 break;
195 case AUDIT_EGID:
196 result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
197 break;
198 case AUDIT_SGID:
199 result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
200 break;
201 case AUDIT_FSGID:
202 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
203 break;
204 case AUDIT_PERS:
205 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
206 break;
207 case AUDIT_ARCH:
208 if (ctx)
209 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
210 break;
212 case AUDIT_EXIT:
213 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
214 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
215 break;
216 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
217 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
218 if (f->val)
219 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
220 else
221 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
223 break;
224 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
225 if (ctx) {
226 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
227 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
228 ++result;
229 break;
233 break;
234 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
235 if (ctx) {
236 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
237 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
238 ++result;
239 break;
243 break;
244 case AUDIT_INODE:
245 if (ctx) {
246 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
247 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val) ||
248 audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, f->op, f->val)) {
249 ++result;
250 break;
254 break;
255 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
256 result = 0;
257 if (ctx)
258 result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
259 break;
260 case AUDIT_ARG0:
261 case AUDIT_ARG1:
262 case AUDIT_ARG2:
263 case AUDIT_ARG3:
264 if (ctx)
265 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
266 break;
269 if (!result)
270 return 0;
272 switch (rule->action) {
273 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
274 case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
275 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
277 return 1;
280 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
281 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
282 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
284 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
286 struct audit_entry *e;
287 enum audit_state state;
289 rcu_read_lock();
290 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
291 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
292 rcu_read_unlock();
293 return state;
296 rcu_read_unlock();
297 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
300 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
301 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
302 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
303 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
305 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
306 struct audit_context *ctx,
307 struct list_head *list)
309 struct audit_entry *e;
310 enum audit_state state;
312 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
313 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
315 rcu_read_lock();
316 if (!list_empty(list)) {
317 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
318 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
320 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
321 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
322 && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
323 rcu_read_unlock();
324 return state;
328 rcu_read_unlock();
329 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
332 /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
333 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
334 int return_valid,
335 int return_code)
337 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
339 if (likely(!context))
340 return NULL;
341 context->return_valid = return_valid;
342 context->return_code = return_code;
344 if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
345 enum audit_state state;
346 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
347 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
348 context->auditable = 1;
351 context->pid = tsk->pid;
352 context->uid = tsk->uid;
353 context->gid = tsk->gid;
354 context->euid = tsk->euid;
355 context->suid = tsk->suid;
356 context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
357 context->egid = tsk->egid;
358 context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
359 context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
360 context->personality = tsk->personality;
361 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
362 return context;
365 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
367 int i;
369 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
370 if (context->auditable
371 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
372 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
373 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
374 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
375 __FILE__, __LINE__,
376 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
377 context->name_count, context->put_count,
378 context->ino_count);
379 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
380 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
381 context->names[i].name,
382 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
384 dump_stack();
385 return;
387 #endif
388 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
389 context->put_count = 0;
390 context->ino_count = 0;
391 #endif
393 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
394 char *p = context->names[i].ctx;
395 context->names[i].ctx = NULL;
396 kfree(p);
397 if (context->names[i].name)
398 __putname(context->names[i].name);
400 context->name_count = 0;
401 if (context->pwd)
402 dput(context->pwd);
403 if (context->pwdmnt)
404 mntput(context->pwdmnt);
405 context->pwd = NULL;
406 context->pwdmnt = NULL;
409 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
411 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
413 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
414 if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
415 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
416 dput(axi->dentry);
417 mntput(axi->mnt);
419 if ( aux->type == AUDIT_IPC ) {
420 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
421 if (axi->ctx)
422 kfree(axi->ctx);
425 context->aux = aux->next;
426 kfree(aux);
430 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
431 enum audit_state state)
433 uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
435 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
436 context->state = state;
437 context->loginuid = loginuid;
440 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
442 struct audit_context *context;
444 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
445 return NULL;
446 audit_zero_context(context, state);
447 return context;
451 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
452 * @tsk: task
454 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
455 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
456 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
457 * needed.
459 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
461 struct audit_context *context;
462 enum audit_state state;
464 if (likely(!audit_enabled))
465 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
467 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
468 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
469 return 0;
471 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
472 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
473 return -ENOMEM;
476 /* Preserve login uid */
477 context->loginuid = -1;
478 if (current->audit_context)
479 context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
481 tsk->audit_context = context;
482 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
483 return 0;
486 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
488 struct audit_context *previous;
489 int count = 0;
491 do {
492 previous = context->previous;
493 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
494 ++count;
495 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
496 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
497 context->serial, context->major,
498 context->name_count, count);
500 audit_free_names(context);
501 audit_free_aux(context);
502 kfree(context);
503 context = previous;
504 } while (context);
505 if (count >= 10)
506 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
509 static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
511 char *ctx = NULL;
512 ssize_t len = 0;
514 len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0);
515 if (len < 0) {
516 if (len != -EINVAL)
517 goto error_path;
518 return;
521 ctx = kmalloc(len, gfp_mask);
522 if (!ctx)
523 goto error_path;
525 len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len);
526 if (len < 0 )
527 goto error_path;
529 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
530 return;
532 error_path:
533 if (ctx)
534 kfree(ctx);
535 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
536 return;
539 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
541 char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
542 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
543 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
545 get_task_comm(name, current);
546 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
547 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
549 if (!mm)
550 return;
553 * this is brittle; all callers that pass GFP_ATOMIC will have
554 * NULL current->mm and we won't get here.
556 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
557 vma = mm->mmap;
558 while (vma) {
559 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
560 vma->vm_file) {
561 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
562 vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
563 vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
564 break;
566 vma = vma->vm_next;
568 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
569 audit_log_task_context(ab, gfp_mask);
572 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
574 int i;
575 struct audit_buffer *ab;
576 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
577 const char *tty;
579 ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
580 if (!ab)
581 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
582 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
583 context->arch, context->major);
584 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
585 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
586 if (context->return_valid)
587 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
588 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
589 context->return_code);
590 if (current->signal->tty && current->signal->tty->name)
591 tty = current->signal->tty->name;
592 else
593 tty = "(none)";
594 audit_log_format(ab,
595 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
596 " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
597 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
598 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
599 context->argv[0],
600 context->argv[1],
601 context->argv[2],
602 context->argv[3],
603 context->name_count,
604 context->pid,
605 context->loginuid,
606 context->uid,
607 context->gid,
608 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
609 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
610 audit_log_task_info(ab, gfp_mask);
611 audit_log_end(ab);
613 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
615 ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, aux->type);
616 if (!ab)
617 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
619 switch (aux->type) {
620 case AUDIT_IPC: {
621 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
622 audit_log_format(ab,
623 " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x obj=%s",
624 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode, axi->ctx);
625 break; }
627 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
628 int i;
629 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
630 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
631 for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
632 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
633 break; }
635 case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
636 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
638 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
639 audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
640 break; }
642 case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
643 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
644 audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
645 break; }
648 audit_log_end(ab);
651 if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
652 ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_CWD);
653 if (ab) {
654 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
655 audit_log_end(ab);
658 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
659 unsigned long ino = context->names[i].ino;
660 unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino;
662 ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH);
663 if (!ab)
664 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
666 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
668 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
669 if (context->names[i].name)
670 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
671 else
672 audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
674 if (pino != (unsigned long)-1)
675 audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%lu", pino);
676 if (ino != (unsigned long)-1)
677 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu", ino);
678 if ((pino != (unsigned long)-1) || (ino != (unsigned long)-1))
679 audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
680 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
681 MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
682 MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
683 context->names[i].mode,
684 context->names[i].uid,
685 context->names[i].gid,
686 MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
687 MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
688 if (context->names[i].ctx) {
689 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s",
690 context->names[i].ctx);
693 audit_log_end(ab);
698 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
699 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
701 * Called from copy_process and __put_task_struct.
703 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
705 struct audit_context *context;
708 * No need to lock the task - when we execute audit_free()
709 * then the task has no external references anymore, and
710 * we are tearing it down. (The locking also confuses
711 * DEBUG_LOCKDEP - this freeing may occur in softirq
712 * contexts as well, via RCU.)
714 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
715 if (likely(!context))
716 return;
718 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
719 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
720 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
721 * in the context of the idle thread */
722 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
723 audit_log_exit(context, GFP_ATOMIC);
725 audit_free_context(context);
729 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
730 * @tsk: task being audited
731 * @arch: architecture type
732 * @major: major syscall type (function)
733 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
734 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
735 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
736 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
738 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
739 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
740 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
741 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
742 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
743 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
744 * be written).
746 void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
747 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
748 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
750 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
751 enum audit_state state;
753 BUG_ON(!context);
756 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
757 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
758 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
759 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
760 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
762 * i386 no
763 * x86_64 no
764 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
766 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
767 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
769 if (context->in_syscall) {
770 struct audit_context *newctx;
772 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
773 printk(KERN_ERR
774 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
775 " entering syscall=%d\n",
776 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
777 #endif
778 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
779 if (newctx) {
780 newctx->previous = context;
781 context = newctx;
782 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
783 } else {
784 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
785 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
786 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
787 * to abandon auditing. */
788 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
791 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
793 if (!audit_enabled)
794 return;
796 context->arch = arch;
797 context->major = major;
798 context->argv[0] = a1;
799 context->argv[1] = a2;
800 context->argv[2] = a3;
801 context->argv[3] = a4;
803 state = context->state;
804 if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)
805 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
806 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
807 return;
809 context->serial = 0;
810 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
811 context->in_syscall = 1;
812 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
816 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
817 * @tsk: task being audited
818 * @valid: success/failure flag
819 * @return_code: syscall return value
821 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
822 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
823 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
824 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
825 * free the names stored from getname().
827 void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
829 struct audit_context *context;
831 get_task_struct(tsk);
832 task_lock(tsk);
833 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
834 task_unlock(tsk);
836 /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
837 * called __put_task_struct. */
838 if (likely(!context))
839 goto out;
841 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
842 audit_log_exit(context, GFP_KERNEL);
844 context->in_syscall = 0;
845 context->auditable = 0;
847 if (context->previous) {
848 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
849 context->previous = NULL;
850 audit_free_context(context);
851 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
852 } else {
853 audit_free_names(context);
854 audit_free_aux(context);
855 tsk->audit_context = context;
857 out:
858 put_task_struct(tsk);
862 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
863 * @name: name to add
865 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
866 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
868 void audit_getname(const char *name)
870 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
872 if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name)
873 return;
875 if (!context->in_syscall) {
876 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
877 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
878 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
879 dump_stack();
880 #endif
881 return;
883 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
884 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
885 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
886 ++context->name_count;
887 if (!context->pwd) {
888 read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
889 context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd);
890 context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt);
891 read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
896 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
897 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
899 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
900 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
901 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
903 void audit_putname(const char *name)
905 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
907 BUG_ON(!context);
908 if (!context->in_syscall) {
909 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
910 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
911 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
912 if (context->name_count) {
913 int i;
914 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
915 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
916 context->names[i].name,
917 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
919 #endif
920 __putname(name);
922 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
923 else {
924 ++context->put_count;
925 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
926 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
927 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
928 " put_count=%d\n",
929 __FILE__, __LINE__,
930 context->serial, context->major,
931 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
932 context->put_count);
933 dump_stack();
936 #endif
939 void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode)
941 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
942 const char *suffix = security_inode_xattr_getsuffix();
943 char *ctx = NULL;
944 int len = 0;
946 if (!suffix)
947 goto ret;
949 len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, NULL, 0, 0);
950 if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
951 goto ret;
952 if (len < 0)
953 goto error_path;
955 ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
956 if (!ctx)
957 goto error_path;
959 len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, ctx, len, 0);
960 if (len < 0)
961 goto error_path;
963 kfree(context->names[idx].ctx);
964 context->names[idx].ctx = ctx;
965 goto ret;
967 error_path:
968 if (ctx)
969 kfree(ctx);
970 audit_panic("error in audit_inode_context");
971 ret:
972 return;
977 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
978 * @name: name being audited
979 * @inode: inode being audited
980 * @flags: lookup flags (as used in path_lookup())
982 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
984 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
986 int idx;
987 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
989 if (!context->in_syscall)
990 return;
991 if (context->name_count
992 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
993 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
994 idx = context->name_count - 1;
995 else if (context->name_count > 1
996 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
997 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
998 idx = context->name_count - 2;
999 else {
1000 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1001 * associated name? */
1002 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
1003 return;
1004 idx = context->name_count++;
1005 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1006 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1007 ++context->ino_count;
1008 #endif
1010 context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1011 context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
1012 context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
1013 context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
1014 context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1015 audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
1016 if ((flags & LOOKUP_PARENT) && (strcmp(name, "/") != 0) &&
1017 (strcmp(name, ".") != 0)) {
1018 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1019 context->names[idx].pino = inode->i_ino;
1020 } else {
1021 context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
1022 context->names[idx].pino = (unsigned long)-1;
1027 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1028 * @dname: inode's dentry name
1029 * @inode: inode being audited
1030 * @pino: inode number of dentry parent
1032 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1033 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1034 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1035 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1036 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1037 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1038 * unsuccessful attempts.
1040 void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
1041 unsigned long pino)
1043 int idx;
1044 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1046 if (!context->in_syscall)
1047 return;
1049 /* determine matching parent */
1050 if (dname)
1051 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
1052 if (context->names[idx].pino == pino) {
1053 const char *n;
1054 const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
1055 int dlen = strlen(dname);
1056 int nlen = name ? strlen(name) : 0;
1058 if (nlen < dlen)
1059 continue;
1061 /* disregard trailing slashes */
1062 n = name + nlen - 1;
1063 while ((*n == '/') && (n > name))
1064 n--;
1066 /* find last path component */
1067 n = n - dlen + 1;
1068 if (n < name)
1069 continue;
1070 else if (n > name) {
1071 if (*--n != '/')
1072 continue;
1073 else
1074 n++;
1077 if (strncmp(n, dname, dlen) == 0)
1078 goto update_context;
1081 /* catch-all in case match not found */
1082 idx = context->name_count++;
1083 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1084 context->names[idx].pino = pino;
1085 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1086 context->ino_count++;
1087 #endif
1089 update_context:
1090 if (inode) {
1091 context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
1092 context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1093 context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
1094 context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
1095 context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
1096 context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1097 audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
1102 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1103 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1104 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1105 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1107 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1109 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1110 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1112 if (!ctx->serial)
1113 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
1114 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1115 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1116 *serial = ctx->serial;
1117 ctx->auditable = 1;
1121 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
1122 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
1123 * @loginuid: loginuid value
1125 * Returns 0.
1127 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
1129 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
1131 if (task->audit_context) {
1132 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1134 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1135 if (ab) {
1136 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1137 "old auid=%u new auid=%u",
1138 task->pid, task->uid,
1139 task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid);
1140 audit_log_end(ab);
1142 task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid;
1144 return 0;
1148 * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
1149 * @ctx: the audit_context
1151 * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
1153 uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
1155 return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
1158 static char *audit_ipc_context(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
1160 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1161 char *ctx = NULL;
1162 int len = 0;
1164 if (likely(!context))
1165 return NULL;
1167 len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, NULL, 0);
1168 if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
1169 goto ret;
1170 if (len < 0)
1171 goto error_path;
1173 ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1174 if (!ctx)
1175 goto error_path;
1177 len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, ctx, len);
1178 if (len < 0)
1179 goto error_path;
1181 return ctx;
1183 error_path:
1184 kfree(ctx);
1185 audit_panic("error in audit_ipc_context");
1186 ret:
1187 return NULL;
1191 * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc
1192 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
1193 * @uid: msgq user id
1194 * @gid: msgq group id
1195 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
1197 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1199 int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
1201 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1202 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1204 if (likely(!context))
1205 return 0;
1207 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1208 if (!ax)
1209 return -ENOMEM;
1211 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
1212 ax->uid = uid;
1213 ax->gid = gid;
1214 ax->mode = mode;
1215 ax->ctx = audit_ipc_context(ipcp);
1217 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
1218 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1219 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1220 return 0;
1224 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
1225 * @nargs: number of args
1226 * @args: args array
1228 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1230 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
1232 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
1233 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1235 if (likely(!context))
1236 return 0;
1238 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
1239 if (!ax)
1240 return -ENOMEM;
1242 ax->nargs = nargs;
1243 memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
1245 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
1246 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1247 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1248 return 0;
1252 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
1253 * @len: data length in user space
1254 * @a: data address in kernel space
1256 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1258 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
1260 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
1261 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1263 if (likely(!context))
1264 return 0;
1266 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
1267 if (!ax)
1268 return -ENOMEM;
1270 ax->len = len;
1271 memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
1273 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
1274 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1275 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1276 return 0;
1280 * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
1281 * @dentry: dentry to record
1282 * @mnt: mnt to record
1284 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1286 * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
1288 int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
1290 struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
1291 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1293 if (likely(!context))
1294 return 0;
1296 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1297 if (!ax)
1298 return -ENOMEM;
1300 ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
1301 ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
1303 ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
1304 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1305 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1306 return 0;
1310 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
1311 * @sig: signal value
1312 * @t: task being signaled
1314 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
1315 * and uid that is doing that.
1317 void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
1319 extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
1320 extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
1322 if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid)) {
1323 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) {
1324 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
1325 audit_sig_pid = current->pid;
1326 if (ctx)
1327 audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
1328 else
1329 audit_sig_uid = current->uid;