5 The key request service is part of the key retention service (refer to
6 Documentation/keys.txt). This document explains more fully how the requesting
9 The process starts by either the kernel requesting a service by calling
12 struct key *request_key(const struct key_type *type,
13 const char *description,
14 const char *callout_string);
18 struct key *request_key_with_auxdata(const struct key_type *type,
19 const char *description,
20 const char *callout_string,
25 struct key *request_key_async(const struct key_type *type,
26 const char *description,
27 const char *callout_string);
31 struct key *request_key_async_with_auxdata(const struct key_type *type,
32 const char *description,
33 const char *callout_string,
36 Or by userspace invoking the request_key system call:
38 key_serial_t request_key(const char *type,
39 const char *description,
40 const char *callout_info,
41 key_serial_t dest_keyring);
43 The main difference between the access points is that the in-kernel interface
44 does not need to link the key to a keyring to prevent it from being immediately
45 destroyed. The kernel interface returns a pointer directly to the key, and
46 it's up to the caller to destroy the key.
48 The request_key*_with_auxdata() calls are like the in-kernel request_key*()
49 calls, except that they permit auxiliary data to be passed to the upcaller (the
50 default is NULL). This is only useful for those key types that define their
51 own upcall mechanism rather than using /sbin/request-key.
53 The two async in-kernel calls may return keys that are still in the process of
54 being constructed. The two non-async ones will wait for construction to
57 The userspace interface links the key to a keyring associated with the process
58 to prevent the key from going away, and returns the serial number of the key to
62 The following example assumes that the key types involved don't define their
63 own upcall mechanisms. If they do, then those should be substituted for the
64 forking and execution of /sbin/request-key.
71 A request proceeds in the following manner:
73 (1) Process A calls request_key() [the userspace syscall calls the kernel
76 (2) request_key() searches the process's subscribed keyrings to see if there's
77 a suitable key there. If there is, it returns the key. If there isn't,
78 and callout_info is not set, an error is returned. Otherwise the process
79 proceeds to the next step.
81 (3) request_key() sees that A doesn't have the desired key yet, so it creates
84 (a) An uninstantiated key U of requested type and description.
86 (b) An authorisation key V that refers to key U and notes that process A
87 is the context in which key U should be instantiated and secured, and
88 from which associated key requests may be satisfied.
90 (4) request_key() then forks and executes /sbin/request-key with a new session
91 keyring that contains a link to auth key V.
93 (5) /sbin/request-key assumes the authority associated with key U.
95 (6) /sbin/request-key execs an appropriate program to perform the actual
98 (7) The program may want to access another key from A's context (say a
99 Kerberos TGT key). It just requests the appropriate key, and the keyring
100 search notes that the session keyring has auth key V in its bottom level.
102 This will permit it to then search the keyrings of process A with the
103 UID, GID, groups and security info of process A as if it was process A,
104 and come up with key W.
106 (8) The program then does what it must to get the data with which to
107 instantiate key U, using key W as a reference (perhaps it contacts a
108 Kerberos server using the TGT) and then instantiates key U.
110 (9) Upon instantiating key U, auth key V is automatically revoked so that it
111 may not be used again.
113 (10) The program then exits 0 and request_key() deletes key V and returns key
116 This also extends further. If key W (step 7 above) didn't exist, key W would
117 be created uninstantiated, another auth key (X) would be created (as per step
118 3) and another copy of /sbin/request-key spawned (as per step 4); but the
119 context specified by auth key X will still be process A, as it was in auth key
122 This is because process A's keyrings can't simply be attached to
123 /sbin/request-key at the appropriate places because (a) execve will discard two
124 of them, and (b) it requires the same UID/GID/Groups all the way through.
127 ======================
128 NEGATIVE INSTANTIATION
129 ======================
131 Rather than instantiating a key, it is possible for the possessor of an
132 authorisation key to negatively instantiate a key that's under construction.
133 This is a short duration placeholder that causes any attempt at re-requesting
134 the key whilst it exists to fail with error ENOKEY.
136 This is provided to prevent excessive repeated spawning of /sbin/request-key
137 processes for a key that will never be obtainable.
139 Should the /sbin/request-key process exit anything other than 0 or die on a
140 signal, the key under construction will be automatically negatively
141 instantiated for a short amount of time.
148 A search of any particular keyring proceeds in the following fashion:
150 (1) When the key management code searches for a key (keyring_search_aux) it
151 firstly calls key_permission(SEARCH) on the keyring it's starting with,
152 if this denies permission, it doesn't search further.
154 (2) It considers all the non-keyring keys within that keyring and, if any key
155 matches the criteria specified, calls key_permission(SEARCH) on it to see
156 if the key is allowed to be found. If it is, that key is returned; if
157 not, the search continues, and the error code is retained if of higher
158 priority than the one currently set.
160 (3) It then considers all the keyring-type keys in the keyring it's currently
161 searching. It calls key_permission(SEARCH) on each keyring, and if this
162 grants permission, it recurses, executing steps (2) and (3) on that
165 The process stops immediately a valid key is found with permission granted to
166 use it. Any error from a previous match attempt is discarded and the key is
169 When search_process_keyrings() is invoked, it performs the following searches
172 (1) If extant, the process's thread keyring is searched.
174 (2) If extant, the process's process keyring is searched.
176 (3) The process's session keyring is searched.
178 (4) If the process has assumed the authority associated with a request_key()
179 authorisation key then:
181 (a) If extant, the calling process's thread keyring is searched.
183 (b) If extant, the calling process's process keyring is searched.
185 (c) The calling process's session keyring is searched.
187 The moment one succeeds, all pending errors are discarded and the found key is
190 Only if all these fail does the whole thing fail with the highest priority
191 error. Note that several errors may have come from LSM.
193 The error priority is:
195 EKEYREVOKED > EKEYEXPIRED > ENOKEY
197 EACCES/EPERM are only returned on a direct search of a specific keyring where
198 the basal keyring does not grant Search permission.